

BUILDING INCLUSIVE RESILIENCE:  
EXPLORING JUSTICE AND SOCIAL EQUITY IN URBAN RESILIENCE PLANNING

by

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### **Author's declaration**

This thesis consists of material all of which I authored or co-authored: see Statement of Contributions included in the thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.

## **Statement of Contributions**

This thesis follows the manuscript option for Master's students in the School of Planning at the University of Waterloo. This thesis consists of two manuscripts, one of which has been published in a peer-reviewed journal and appears verbatim in this thesis with only minor editorial changes. The other is intended for journal submission and will be adapted in response to peer review.

For all chapters of this thesis, I (Joanne Fitzgibbons) am the principal author. I designed analytical criteria and research methods for both manuscripts based on literature review and supervisory guidance from Dr. Carrie Mitchell, conducted all data collection and analysis, and wrote 90% of content for both manuscripts. The remaining 10% reflects the written edits and additions contributed by Dr. Carrie Mitchell and Dr. Sarah Burch.

As primary supervisor, Dr. Carrie Mitchell contributed supervision and conceptual guidance, and supported the development of the research question, approach, and analytical framework for both manuscripts. Dr. Mitchell also provided written feedback and edits most substantively to the first manuscript (Just urban futures? Exploring equity in "100 Resilient Cities"), which has been published in the journal *World Development* (<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.06.021>). Co-supervisor Dr. Sarah Burch also provided feedback and edits to thesis, most substantively to the second manuscript (Inclusive Resilience: A case study of equity-centred strategic planning in Toronto, Canada) and final draft thesis.

This thesis is situated within broader research in Carrie Mitchell's RiPPLE (Resilience in Planning Practice Living Experiments) Lab at the University of Waterloo and associated SSHRC Insight Development Grant #430-2017-00135, which explores the process and politics of planning for urban resilience.

## **Abstract**

This thesis explores the process and politics of planning for urban resilience with an eye to issues of social equity and justice. Resilience approaches to urban planning have experienced a rise in popularity in recent years, thanks in part to high-profile global campaigns like “100 Resilient Cities – Pioneered by The Rockefeller Foundation” (100RC). Several critics, however, have cautioned that the concept of resilience is inherently conservative and negligent to social justice.

The goal of this mixed-methods thesis is to empirically test the common theoretical hypothesis that resilience approaches neglect justice by exploring how issues of resilience and justice coalesce or conflict in in-situ instances of resilience planning. Two manuscripts comprise this thesis. The first is a global analysis of City Resilience Strategies produced under the 100RC program, intended to draw broader conclusions about how social equity and justice are prioritized (or not) in written resilience plans. The second is a case study which examines how one participating 100RC city (Toronto, Canada) has attempted to be procedurally just and inclusive in its resilience planning process. In sum, this thesis evaluates both the written products and deliberative processes of planning for resilience.

Overall, this research concludes that resilience planning is not inherently at odds with goals of social equity and justice, but that city planners must pay keen attention to issues of redistribution, recognition, and participation during both strategy development and implementation if they hope to advance resilience and justice simultaneously. The thesis highlights a number of tools and recommendations that can be used by local governments and globally networked urban experiments alike to advance equity in their resilience building efforts. The findings of this research can help to inform more inclusive and equitable planning practices for more resilient and sustainable cities.

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Navigating the intersection of social and environmental problems can be exhausting. It is not uncommon for people working, advocating, and researching in this space to become fatigued and disenchanted: we are trying to advance action on seemingly insurmountable and complex problems, like growing inequality, path dependency, and climate change. But I am finishing this thesis feeling energized and encouraged instead of defeated, and I have my research participants to thank for this. They have reminded me of the everyday heroes in the world. Some of these heroes are public servants, and others have been homeless. Many will never be formally recognized for the tireless work that they do out of love for their communities. Thank you to the Local Champions for being devoted advocates for people who are too often left feeling voiceless. Thank you to the Centre for Connected Communities for advancing grassroots leadership in Toronto, and for working to honour and legitimize community voice. Thank you to the ResilientTO staff who had the humility to accept that Toronto did not need another plan, but instead, for someone to hold the microphone and support the existing resilience work taking place in invisible neighbourhood networks and City divisions alike. Thank you to all of my interviewees who refused to take “no” or “not enough budget” or “not enough time” or “that’s not how we do things” for an answer, and instead, leapt on an opportunity to try something new: in so doing, you have set an example about how this work *can* be done.

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## Chapter 1. Introduction to the thesis

Urban systems are complex systems, comprised of nearly-infinite interrelationships across organizations, physical infrastructures, ecosystems, individuals and problems. Changing technologies, norms, security threats, weather patterns, political contexts and aging infrastructures stress all of these systems, but the density and complexity of networks in cities means that these impacts are cascading and affect a plethora of individuals and institutions in ways that are often unforeseen. The combined global trends of climate change and rapid urbanization make these challenges more complex and unpredictable in today's times than they have ever been (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014). Simply put, urban planners are tasked with managing increasingly uncertain futures and “wicked problems” (Rittel & Webber, 1973) in cities.

Accordingly, the idea of planning for “resilience” has become popular in both global and local policy narratives. The term's use has skyrocketed in recent years and it has become the “buzzword” of choice among major global organizations. The resilience approach is attractive in part because it purports to build a more general type of strength, overcoming some of the aforementioned complexity by mitigating the need to fully understand or forecast threats. Instead, a resilience approach argues that if cities possess certain attributes, they can weather these uncertain challenges: the 100 Resilient Cities program, pioneered by the Rockefeller Foundation, argues that resilient cities must be “flexible, redundant, robust, resourceful, reflective, inclusive, and integrated” (p. 15, The Rockefeller Foundation & Arup, 2015).

Resilience of what, however, to what threats, and how best to advance it, are the subject of ongoing debate (Cretney, 2014; Herrera, 2017; Meerow & Newell, 2016; Vale, 2014), and some scholars have raised pragmatic and ethical considerations of the approach. Notable research has

offered the critique that a resilience approach treats normative problems as externalities (Cote & Nightingale, 2012), that it is negligent to issues of power (Bahadur & Tanner, 2014; Cote & Nightingale, 2012; Harris, Chu, & Ziervogel, 2017; Meerow & Newell, 2016), and that focusing on general robustness obfuscates specific entrenched issues, such as justice (Archer & Dodman, 2015; Fainstein, 2015, 2018; Shi et al., 2016; Ziervogel et al., 2017), poverty (Friend & Moench, 2013, 2015), and vulnerability (F. Miller et al., 2010). Others argue that advancing the goal of “bouncing back” after a shock or stress is inherently conservative, and hampers progress on the kinds of transformative changes needed to simultaneously adapt to climate change and achieve social equity (Davoudi & Porter, 2012; Fainstein, 2015, 2018; Gillard, 2016; Gillard et al., 2016; Ziervogel et al., 2016). However, across all of these diverse explorations, there is consensus that issues of justice and equity are both morally and functionally important to building resilience (see also Bahadur, Ibrahim, & Tanner, 2013).

Some scholars have contributed empirical findings exploring how these challenges unfold in practice, particularly in fields of disaster risk reduction (Aldunce, Beilin, Handmer, & Howden, 2016) and international urban development (Archer & Dodman, 2015; Friend & Moench, 2013; Harris et al., 2017). More empirical research is needed which explores urban resilience strategic planning processes (but see Archer et al., 2017; Aurrekoetxea Casaus, 2018; Fainstein, 2018; Woodruff et al., 2018) and specific pathways for change (Bahadur & Tanner, 2014; Harris et al., 2017; Vogel et al., 2007).

This thesis has taken advantage of a window of opportunity to examine how resilience planning grapples with issues of social equity in practice. In 2013, the Rockefeller Foundation launched “100 Resilient Cities” (100RC), a global campaign with the purpose of mainstreaming resilience thinking into urban planning in diverse international cities. The goal of this research is to

contribute to resilience and urban planning scholarship, first by providing empirical findings testing the popular hypothesis that resilience approaches are negligent to justice, and second, by shedding light on possible approaches that can be taken by city governments to advance social equity in their resilience planning (and other strategic planning) endeavors.

In July of 2019, 100RC formally concluded its operations, and the funding stream previously dedicated to this program has been redirected into at least three other resilience endeavors led by The Rockefeller Foundation (Berkowitz, 2019). As such, this research provides an important opportunity to learn from 100RC's successes and failures, and inform more equitable resilience work in the future.

### 1.1 Defining justice, equity, and inclusion

A brief overview of the philosophical underpinnings framing terms such as “justice”, “equity”, “fairness” and “inclusion” in the context of urban planning warranted to contextualize the critiques of resilience described herein. Firstly, it is worth noting that these and related terms are often deployed interchangeably or with only minor distinctions in scholarship. Additionally, they are inherently normative and politically charged concepts with divergent definitions.

This thesis, for its part, uses an egalitarian definition of equity stemming originally from John Rawls' 1971 “A Theory of Justice” (Rawls, 1971) and subsequent critiques, expansions and adaptations of this theory discussed throughout this thesis. Rawls' conceptualization of justice is framed around concepts of egalitarianism and equity of both freedoms and materials: namely, that the most disadvantaged people in a society ought to receive the most benefits in order to figuratively “raise the floor” and eliminate their comparative disadvantage (Ibid). Subsequent

theorists of justice argued that Rawls' theory of justice neglected to acknowledge, for example, that different people are equipped with different capabilities to use the same resources and freedoms even when they are distributed equally (Sen, 1985, 2003), dimensions of oppression revolving around misrepresentation and cultural domination (Fraser, 1995, 1997; Honneth, 2004; Young, 1990), or lack of inclusion in decision-making processes (Schlosberg, 1995, 2007).

This latter point surrounding inclusion has been well-discussed in communicative planning theory, which emerged as a criticism to the rational comprehensive planning model. In communicative planning, rather than the planner being seen as a technical expert, their role is instead to "listen to people's stories and assist in forging a consensus among differing viewpoints" (p. 454, Fainstein, 2000). Arguably, however, communicative planning theorists have paid less attention to normative issues of justice, and more attention to the utility of inclusive planning processes for superior planning outcomes. For example, Judith Innes (Innes, 1996) and David Booher (Innes & Booher, 1999b, 1999a) are well known for documenting the benefits and strategies that surround "consensus-building" approaches to public consultation. They identify that consensus-building approaches are useful for comprehensive planning because they can help to manage conflicts, power discrepancies, and political differences amongst stakeholders, resulting in better outcomes (Ibid). Implicit in the consensus-building approach is a utilitarian view of equity which considers a planning process to be "fair" if it produces the greatest good for the largest number of people (Sen, 1979). Consensus-building theories of planning are entrenched more broadly in communicative planning theory; other distillations of this thinking, such as Patsy Healy's, have ostensibly placed more emphasis on the inherent value of argument and collaboration for enhancing social relations and building institutional capacity (Healey, 1996, 1998). Many of these communicative planning theories can be viewed as

pragmatic but less radical applications of the works of earlier social theorists, such as Henri Lefebvre's "Right to the City / Droit à la Ville" (Lefebvre, 1968; Purcell, 2014) or Jurgen Habermas' "Theory of Communicative Action" (Fainstein, 2000; Habermas, 1983; Healey, 1996).

While lauding the ideals of communicative planning theory, Susan Fainstein (2000) points out that it falls too far to the opposite end of the planning spectrum. Communicative planning, she argues, fails inasmuch as it (wrongly) assumes impartiality of planners, and values voice over analysis. In so doing, it claims a sort of moral superiority whilst still neglecting to address real distributive and power inequities and the forces that cause them. "Communicative theorists," Fainstein argues, "avoid dealing with the classic topic of what to do when open processes produce unjust results" (p. 457) ... "Changing speech alone does not transform structures" (p. 458, Fainstein, 2000). In response, she coined a new planning ideal: "The Just City" (Fainstein, 2000, 2011) arguing in favor of the use of normative theories of justice by planners in order to address structural inequalities. Fainstein introduces city planners to the theories of egalitarian justice pioneered by John Rawls (1971), recognitional justice by Iris Marion Young (Young, 1990) and capabilities approaches by Amartya Sen (Sen, 1985, 2003) and Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum, 2011).

Since Fainstein synthesizes these ideas and applies them to a city planning context, this thesis interprets issues of justice in resilience planning in relation to Fainstein's characterization of a "just city" (Fainstein, 2011) as well as its influencing and source theories (eg. theories by Rawls, Marion Young, Sen, Innes, Healey and others aforementioned). Debate abounds within justice theory about the extent to which communicative, procedural, recognitional and distributive issues had ought to be prioritized. This thesis, for its part, assumes a three-pronged

conceptualization of justice, arguing that recognitional, distributive and communicative or participatory justice must all be present in processes as well as outcomes in order for planning to be considered wholly just.

## 1.2 Emergence and debate of resilience in social and policy research

While each of the embedded manuscripts of this thesis is equipped with a more specific literature review relevant to the topic of the respective paper, a brief overview of existing literature on urban resilience is warranted to contextualize the overall thesis. Resilience scholarship is rich and diverse, spanning several academic and professional fields including (but not limited to) urban studies (eg. Bulkeley et al., 2013; Leichenko, 2011), ecology (eg. Holling, 1973), engineering (eg. Hollnagel, 2014; Rahimi & Madni, 2014), psychology (eg. Bonanno, 2004; Masten, 2001), and socio-ecological systems research (eg. Folke, 2006; Olsson, Folke, & Berkes, 2004; Walker et al., 2004). This section will briefly map the emergence of resilience thinking in social sciences and planning, and review some of the main areas of debate in resilience literature as they pertain to social construction, equity, and power, which are central analytical themes for this thesis.

As previously mentioned, the question of “resilience for whom, and against what?” has been repeatedly raised by scholars (Cretney, 2014; Herrera, 2017; Meerow & Newell, 2016; Vale, 2014; Walker et al., 2004). By many accounts, the term “resilience” is inherently subjective, sometimes even personal, which raises obvious challenges for operationalizing the concept in planning and development practice. In general, while resilience as a word has been around much longer, most scholars point to C.S. Holling as being the first author to challenge the use of engineering definitions of resilience – defined as the ability to bounce back to a stable state

following a disturbance - in living systems. Instead, Holling argued that this definition more accurately describes “stability”, whereas “resilience” should instead be understood as a system’s ability to absorb exogenous changes, retain functions and relationships, and persist, even if the system does not return to equilibria (Holling, 1973). Social-ecological systems and social science researchers later appropriated the term and began to apply it to human social systems (eg. Folke, 2006; Lebel et al., 2006; Leichenko, 2011; and see Meerow, Newell & Stults, 2016 which traces the lineage and use of resilience across disciplines). As the subject began to gain traction in social science circles, scholars began to question not only how resilience *is* defined, but also how it had *ought* to be defined.

Some scholars see the malleability of resilience as being positive because it allows the term to serve as a “boundary object” (Star & Griesemer, 1989): an orienting point to bring together diverse discourses, actors and interests to share dialogue and work toward superordinate goals (Brand & Jax, 2007; Gillard, 2016; Meerow, Newell, & Stults, 2016). On the other hand, several scholars have presented cautions akin to “if resilience is everything, then maybe it is nothing”: that the value of resilience in its original use as a descriptive term - where it has been especially important in fields such as ecology (Holling, 1973) and engineering (Hollnagel, 2014; Rahimi & Madni, 2014) - may be lost if it is used as a malleable boundary object (Brand & Jax, 2007; Gillard, 2016). Furthermore, some social and policy scholars have cautioned that the application of resilience to widely diverse and often unrelated applications renders the term to a buzzword, and in this case, it runs the risk of becoming meaningless terminology that simply supports the status quo (Béné et al., 2018; Porter & Davoudi, 2012).

Planners and policymakers, however, are largely disconnected from this semantic debate (Béné et al., 2018). This raises an important question with no single answer: since resilience is

nonetheless being implemented in global and local policy endeavors alike, how are planners and policymakers defining the term? To some extent, initiatives like The Rockefeller Foundation's 100 Resilient Cities have sought to manage this challenge by imposing a definition on member cities; 100RC defines resilience as "the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses and systems within a city to survive, adapt and grow no matter what kind of chronic stresses and acute shocks they experience" (The Rockefeller Foundation & Arup, 2015). This is reasonably well aligned - if less detailed and more growth-oriented - with other practice- and policy-oriented definitions, such as the one used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): "The capacity of social, economic, and environmental systems to cope with a hazardous event or trend or disturbance, responding or reorganizing in ways that maintain their essential function, identity, and structure, while also maintaining the capacity for adaptation, learning, and transformation" (p. 5, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014). Nonetheless, there is evidence to suggest that policy actors at a local scale do not accept the hegemony of these definitions: in some 100RC-produced City Resilience Strategies, member cities take time to re-position resilience as a boundary object with several diverging definitions among their constituents (eg. Greater Christchurch Partnership, 2016), or, bypass the official 100RC definition altogether in favour of one that emphasizes more locally salient challenges (eg. The City of Medellin, 2016).

In sum, despite the calls from some researchers to return to the descriptive roots of resilience (Brand & Jax, 2007), its proliferation in policy arenas has meant that many diverse and divergent definitions of the term are indeed being deployed in practitioner circles. This has sparked new and ongoing branches of debate surrounding the merits of resilience thinking in relation to existing approaches such as vulnerability (Bulkeley & Tuts, 2013; F. Miller et al., 2010),

sustainability (Redman, 2014; Romero-Lankao et al., 2016; Stumpp, 2013; Yanarella & Levine, 2014), disaster risk reduction (Aldunce et al., 2014; Alexander, 2013; Doberstein, Fitzgibbons, & Mitchell, 2018; Matyas & Pelling, 2015) adaptation (Aldunce et al., 2016; Woodruff et al., 2018) and problems such as globalization (Armitage & Johnson, 2006). Additionally, several scholars have demanded that attention be paid to the ethical dimensions of resilience. As identified in the introduction, these criticisms have revolved around the concern that resilience is silent on normative issues (Cote & Nightingale, 2012), and negligent to issues of power (Bahadur & Tanner, 2014; Cote & Nightingale, 2012; Harris et al., 2017; Meerow & Newell, 2016), justice (Archer & Dodman, 2015; Fainstein, 2015, 2018; Shi et al., 2016; Ziervogel et al., 2017), poverty (Friend & Moench, 2013, 2015), and vulnerability (Miller et al., 2010). The consequence is that resilience-oriented policy that claims that these issues are embedded may not be able to address them as effectively as if the issues received more explicit policy attention; or, more colloquially, that resilience is a “jack of all trades, but a master of none”. Many scholars further argue that resilience is inherently conservative and neoliberal, and that the approach, almost by definition, reinforces the (unjust, unsustainable) status quo (Fainstein, 2015; Gillard, 2016; Gillard et al., 2016; Joseph, 2013; Porter & Davoudi, 2012). Indeed, as Friend & Moench (2013) point out, “Many hierarchical and exploitative systems have endured and proved highly ‘resilient’ to disruption throughout history” (p. 104, Friend & Moench, 2013).

Evidently, there is little consensus surrounding the meaning or value of resilience. Nonetheless, resilience is only becoming more popular with time, as planners and policymakers continue to deploy the concept at multiple scales (Meerow et al., 2016). Accordingly, some scholars (eg. De Carli, 2016; Harris et al., 2017; Ireni-Saban, 2013; Meerow & Newell, 2016; Shi et al., 2016; Ziervogel et al., 2017) are focusing their efforts on illuminating pathways to advance resilience

work in more robust and equitable ways; this is the area of research in which this thesis is situated.

**Table 1: Trade-offs in resilience planning**

Questions to consider		
Who?	T R A D E O F F S	Who determines what is desirable, for urban resilience? Who sets the agenda? Who does not? Whose resilience is prioritized, and at whose expense? Who is “urban”?
What?		Against what disruptions should the system be resilient? What actors and networks are part of the system? Is the resilience being built specific (eg. resilient urban transportation systems) or broad (eg. urban resilience)?
When?		Are chronic stresses or acute shocks prioritized? Is short-term or long-term resilience being emphasized? Is resilience for present-day systems, or future ones? Do actions taken now affect future generations?
Where?		What is “urban”? Are some areas (eg. low vs. high-income neighbourhoods) prioritized over others? Does prioritizing one area come at the expense of another?
Why?		Is the outcome or the process most important? What is the objective? Is resilience the appropriate analytical framework? Does resilience serve an agenda?

*Source: adapted from Meerow, Newell & Stults (2016)*

Notably for this thesis are those scholars that have called attention to the inherent trade-offs and power relations embedded in planning for resilience. The “who, what, when, where, and why” (Table 1 above, from Meerow & Newell, 2016) of resilience affects the ways that planners construct and advance it in cities, and hence, the way that resilience building efforts affect the lives of urban residents. To this end, Harris et al. (2017) call for the re-imagining of resilience as a process of negotiation rather than an outcome or goal (Harris et al., 2017). Other researchers, such as Aldunce et al. (2016) call for increased attention to social learning and more inclusive planning processes (Aldunce, Beilin, et al., 2016).

Calling attention to issues of power and trade-offs can address some of the criticisms afforded by aforementioned scholars by centring normative and ethical considerations, and promote more just processes in resilience planning practice. Accordingly, a procedurally just resilience planning process will be both inclusive – particularly of disempowered and marginalized stakeholders - and deliberative. This is the central argument which inspired this research and prompted an exploration into issues of inclusion and equity in the planning processes that surround urban resilience.

### 1.3 Methodology

A combination of mixed-methods approaches has been used to conduct this research. The intent of using several methods is to cross-validate findings across methods, manuscripts, scales and regions. The first manuscript of this thesis is a global plan evaluation of 31 City Resilience Strategies produced by 100RC, using manifest content analysis methods to determine whether they have prioritized social equity and justice. It makes use of both inductive and deductive reasoning through a combination of directed and summative content analysis (Creswell, 2013b). Worded more simply, I developed a framework for this paper that simultaneously tests specific hypotheses (through a checklist of directed criteria) and allows the data to speak for itself (through open coding). Manuscript 1 concludes with recommendations for program design and implementation tools that can support the advancement of social equity in future large-scale urban experiments. The second manuscript then profiles one equity-focused participant city, the City of Toronto, to explore how it has operationalized social equity throughout the strategic planning process. It primarily made use of inductive grounded theory methods, especially key informant interviews. This research began with a broad goal of exploring whether (and how)

ResilientTO grappled with issues of social equity, and evolved into a case study of “Resilient Conversations” as an example of “negotiated resilience” (Harris et al., 2017) in practice. The program used Local Champions to access grass-roots networks and co-create resilience with residents from Toronto’s Neighbourhood Improvement Areas (NIAs). It concludes by relaying the challenges and opportunities that participants identified with this approach.

In sum, Manuscript 1 provides an overview of justice in resilience planning at the global scale and offers a snapshot of broadly generalizable findings about the 100RC program, whereas Manuscript 2 represents a “deeper dive” into a specific case study to explore best practices and triggers for success. Together, the manuscripts offer a glimpse of how the practice of planning for urban resilience grapples with issues of social equity and justice at present, and identifies a number of pathways toward advancing social equity in strategic planning for resilience.

This thesis assumes a transformative research philosophy because it focuses on issues of power, justice, and equity (Creswell, 2013b). Ultimately, the goal of this research is indeed to promote change: my hope is that the findings will be used by practitioners, policymakers, and governments to guide best practices in planning for more equitable and just climate change adaptation and resilience planning. Additionally, this research deploys a constructivist ontology inasmuch as it views resilience as a contested concept with diverse definitions and normative conceptions of its meaning (Brand & Jax, 2007; Meerow et al., 2016), as well as the fact that this research focuses explicitly on how resilience is constructed and produced by diverse actors at multiple scales (Harris et al., 2017).

## 1.4 Limitations

This thesis has focused on the 100RC program. As the world's largest urban resilience planning effort to date, 100RC has ostensibly set the agenda for resilience in planning practice internationally. However, in choosing to focus on 100RC, we have not captured alternative resilience planning initiatives led by other organizations, or independently by individual local governments. Additionally, because 100RC uses specific definitions, frameworks and program tools, and relies on social learning across the network of 100 cities, the findings of this thesis may not necessarily reflect the resilience concept as it is interpreted by all actors, but rather, how the concept has been operationalized by The Rockefeller Foundation and 100RC.

With any qualitative research there may be an increased risk of researcher bias. In some cases this can be mitigated: for example, through inter-rater reliability measures. In the first manuscript, we recruited a second rater to repeat the content analysis using the same analytical framework, the details of which are described in Manuscript 1. There are some biases, however, that cannot be mitigated, only communicated. One of these is my positionality as a researcher. This thesis takes a 'critical theory' perspective and is inherently concerned with issues of social equity, justice, and power relations (Creswell, 2013b), which is openly reflected in the research topic. Accordingly, during my analysis, I paid attention to issues such as race, gender, class and (dis)ability. Other evaluations of 100RC led by researchers with a different positionality and focus may yield different results and/or emphasize different dimensions of the issue.

Additionally, I, the author, am a white, Western researcher at a Canadian institution; so too are my supervisors and committee members. I have no lived experience of being subjected to racism, classism, poverty, or corruption, but these problems are central to my research. I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize that while I have presented the Resilient Conversations

approach as a positive example, this idea is not mine to claim ownership of: the approach was pioneered by people who have lived experience with structural violence, inequality and systemic racism, which I discuss in Manuscript 2. Additionally, the irony of conducting justice-oriented research on stolen land does not escape me: the University of Waterloo and the City of Toronto are covered by Treaty 13 and rest on the traditional territory of several Indigenous nations including the Mississaugas of the Credit River, the Anishanabeg, the Chippewa, the Haudenosaunee and the Wendat peoples. I live and work on this land as a direct result of exploitative and assimilative practices advanced during European settlement, and since.

In short, I am privileged, and this personally removes me from many of the challenges I discuss in this research. Where relevant, I have acknowledged the ways in which this tangibly influences the findings of my research (for example, by recognizing the limitations of deploying a Western theory of justice in international contexts in Manuscript 1) and I have also made efforts to cite and refer to researchers from different countries, social contexts, and backgrounds than my own. Nonetheless, it is important to note my privilege in this area of research and the fact that I benefit from many of the systems of oppression that I criticize herein.

In the following chapters, I will present the two manuscripts that comprise this thesis, a synthesis and summary of the findings overall, and conclude by highlighting several areas for future research.

## Chapter 2. Just urban futures? Exploring equity in “100 Resilient Cities”

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*Co-authored by Dr. Carrie Mitchell, who provided supervisory guidance (including contributions to concept and methods formulation), and edits to written content.*

### 2.1 Abstract

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and associated Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) view resilience, sustainability, and social equity as being inherently linked. However, several critical scholars have cautioned that theories of resilience fail to address issues of equity, justice, and power, which potentially puts these goals at odds with one another. To date, we have limited empirical evidence testing these theoretical claims. In 2013, the USA-based Rockefeller Foundation pioneered 100 Resilient Cities (100RC), a network of cities dedicated to building resilience in urban areas. Critical engagement with the outputs of this program, particularly around how participating cities operationalize concepts of equity and justice, is important and timely given the scale of this global urban experiment.

Using directed and summative content analysis of 31 100RC “City Resilience Strategies” from Global North and South countries, we examine the extent to which participating cities focus on social equity in their narratives, and whether justice is operationalized in the strategies’ embedded actions. Actions featuring a focus on inequality and justice are piece-meal across the Strategies, suggesting that the decision to prioritize or ignore equity may not be a direct result of the 100RC program offerings. Furthermore, we identify a number of threats to social equity and justice that appear in the program itself, and its resultant City Resilience Strategies. We conclude by making recommendations that could enable 100RC and other large-scale urban experiments to promote equity and justice more universally across member cities.

## 2.2 Introduction

In September of 2015, international heads of state met at the United Nations Headquarters in New York to announce the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and decide on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These 17 new goals and 169 embedded targets, which replace the prior Millennium Development Goals, describe the agenda for United Nations member states to advance human development both domestically and in international affairs to the year 2030. The 2030 Agenda ambitiously resolves to end poverty and hunger, combat global inequality, foster peace and justice, protect human rights, empower women and girls, and protect the planet's natural resources (United Nations General Assembly, 2015). The Goals are meant to guide the development of member states to enhance human and environmental wellbeing by promoting just, equitable, inclusive, and ecologically sustainable targets.

The concept of “resilience” is also firmly embedded in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and associated SDGs. Goals 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure) and 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities) promote “inclusive[ity]” and “resilience” in the same breath. Target 1.5 specifically emphasizes building the climate and disaster resilience of the world's poor; 9.1 emphasizes affordable and equitable access to resilient infrastructure, and 9.a and 11.c specifically recommend extending support to least developed states to build their resilience; and, 11.b links disaster resilience and climate adaptation with social inclusion (United Nations General Assembly, 2015). Clearly in the view of the SDGs and the 2030 Agenda, resilience, inclusiveness and equity are inextricably linked. Critical scholarship on resilience, however, has cautioned that in fact, the quest for resilience – if inattentively executed – can fortify structural inequalities and the institutional processes that create them (Brown, 2012;

Fainstein, 2015, 2018; Gillard, 2016; Gillard et al., 2016; Joseph, 2013; Meerow & Newell, 2016; Vale, 2014).

100 Resilient Cities (100RC), a global network of cities selected and funded by The Rockefeller Foundation, is (to date) the largest coordinated effort at implementing resilience thinking into city planning processes internationally. The Foundation announced its intention to end the program in 2019, providing an opportunity to examine lessons learned from its operations. In the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, resilience has been linked to issues of inclusiveness, equity, and justice. Furthermore, if some segments of the population are unable to rebound following an acute shock, or are persistently disproportionately burdened by a city's chronic stresses, then the "resilience" of that city's population has not been universally advanced; it has only been enhanced for privileged social groups. Accordingly, resilience building efforts should be designed to advance social equity. In light of these considerations, our research asks: *"has the 100RC program generated an emphasis on social equity and justice in the resulting City Resilience Strategies?"*

We find wide variation in the degree to which participating Cities prioritize social equity. While we ultimately conclude that the 100RC program does not inherently guide cities to promote justice, we posit that the endeavors of "advancing resilience" and "advancing justice" need not be at odds. There are lessons to be learned from 100RC in the form of program changes that could have been made – and that can be factored into new urban experiments - to support a more universal focus on social equity and justice across participating cities. Indeed, these solutions already exist: some have already been piloted in a limited selection of the 100RC member cities. Our hope is that the findings of this research will inform the design of future large scale urban

experiments to enable them to more effectively support local governments in their efforts to build just, resilient and sustainable cities.

### 2.3 Resilience and equity

Resilience thinking originated in the field of ecology and was defined in this context as the capacity of a system to return to a stable state following an acute shock (Holling, 1973). The term has also risen to popularity in several other disciplines, such as (but not limited to) engineering (eg. Hollnagel, 2014; Rahimi & Madni, 2014) and psychology (eg. Bonanno, 2004; Masten, 2001). The concept of urban resilience has gained momentum in the study of complex adaptive socio-ecological systems (Adger, 2000; Folke, 2006; Olsson et al., 2004; Walker et al., 2004) and particularly urban systems (Bulkeley et al., 2013; Collier et al., 2013; Leichenko, 2011; Meerow & Newell, 2016; Meerow et al., 2016; Vale, 2014). This widespread use of resilience across disciplines has led to divergent definitions and understandings of the term. Meerow, Newell & Stults (2016) conducted a bibliometric analysis of resilience literature and developed a definition of urban resilience which sought to summarize and reconcile the main conceptual tensions they found:

“Urban resilience refers to the ability of an urban system and all its constituent socio-ecological and socio-technical networks across temporal and spatial scales to maintain or rapidly return to desired functions in the face of a disturbance, to adapt to change, and to quickly transform systems that limit future adaptive capacity.” (p. 39).

One of the main areas of debate in the literature has surrounded whether resilience can effectively capture normative dimensions of social research and practice, such as justice. While

physical sciences and ecological studies have often used the term as a descriptive concept, social science researchers have increasingly begun to question what resilience had *ought* to mean, given that the term is growing more popular in global and local policy narratives (Brand & Jax, 2007). This rise to buzzword status – even in the absence of consensus surrounding the meaning of resilience – has caused many scholars to question whose resilience is being prioritized, against what threats, and at what (or whose) cost (Bahadur & Tanner, 2014; Béné et al., 2018; Bulkeley et al., 2013; Cote & Nightingale, 2012; Cretney, 2014; Fainstein, 2015, 2018; Harris et al., 2017; Joseph, 2013; Kaika, 2017; Meerow & Newell, 2016; Meerow et al., 2016; Porter & Davoudi, 2012; Vale, 2014; Ziervogel et al., 2017). Meerow & Newell distill this robust area of critical research into a framework, imploring researchers and practitioners to consider the complex trade-offs of urban resilience through the “5 W’s”: whose resilience is prioritized, against what shocks or stresses, when, where, and why (Meerow & Newell, 2016)?

The answers to these questions hold implications for the way that planners and practitioners implement resilience-focused policy and infrastructure in cities, and hence, can have profound implications for the wellbeing of residents. In fact, many of the aforementioned scholars have argued that the resilience paradigm is inherently conservative, and stalls progress on the types of social transformation needed to disrupt entrenched inequalities; or, worded differently, that promoting “resilience” might not be a good thing if the current urban system is dysfunctional and unjust (Ibid). While empirical research exploring the in-situ outcomes of resilience planning is still limited, preliminary findings have argued that it has been ineffective at targeting the root causes of poverty (Friend & Moench, 2013, 2015), it has promoted a largely neoliberal agenda (Fainstein, 2018), it has not been conducted in sufficiently inclusive or participatory ways (Aldunce, Beilin, et al., 2016), and it has not advanced transformative change toward more

socially equitable cities (Archer & Dodman, 2015). Simply put, the limited available evidence suggests that resilience thinking, in practice, supports the status quo. This would suggest that the SDG objectives of resilience, justice, and social equity are in conflict with one another – at least, as “resilience” is currently being planned for. The following section explores this theme further by conceptualizing what is meant by justice, and how we might expect to see the concept reflected in City Resilience Strategies.

#### 2.4 Justice, equity, and participation

In this paper, we deploy a conceptualization of justice that is three-pronged, arguing that recognition, redistribution, and participation must all be present in order to advance justice in planning processes and outcomes. This approach has been shaped most notably by theorists Young (Young, 1990, 2001), Fraser (Fraser, 1995, 1997), Honneth (Anderson & Honneth, 2005; Honneth, 2004) and Schlosberg (Schlosberg, 1995, 2001, 2004, 2007). These scholars assert that acknowledging differentiated and marginalized social groups is crucial to identify and address structural inequalities, and have pioneered ideas of recognitional and participatory justice.

Young (1990) argues that disenfranchised social groups are disenfranchised because they have been powerless to affect institutions, the built environment, and mainstream culture. This creates marginalization when institutions and processes are created in a way that does not reflect the interests of the disempowered social group (Young, 1990). In the context of city planning, for example, this disempowerment can manifest itself physically, as in the case of informal settlements not serviced with standard municipal infrastructure. Nancy Fraser (1995, 1997) would later refer to such material and distributive inequalities as “socioeconomic injustices”. Marginalization can also manifest socioeconomically and culturally, whereby (for example)

informal or homeless residents may be precluded from taking part in formal social processes, like voting, due to lack of official residence, or are excluded from participation in social life due to stigma. Fraser refers to these as “cultural injustices”, whereby a social group’s identity, culture or needs are communicated by groups that benefit from their oppression (Fraser, 1997). In reality, these terms overlap considerably and are challenging to disentangle. In general, however, when analyzing the City Resilience Strategies, we looked for distributive solutions to socioeconomic injustices – for example, through actions that reallocate material wealth, income, or the structures that surround these. For cultural injustices, we looked for recognitional efforts, understood as “upwardly revaluing disrespected identities and the cultural products of maligned groups” (Fraser, 1995, p. 73).

David Schlosberg later added a third dimension to the discussion stemming from procedural justice theory (eg. Miller, 1999), arguing that recognition, distribution, *and* participation are necessary (Schlosberg, 1995, 2001, 2004, 2007). Enabling marginalized groups to self-identify their own needs, priorities and portrayal can help to mitigate misrepresentation, and lived experience with structural inequalities can provide unique insights and perspectives that can inform solutions. Accordingly, we looked for evidence of inclusive and recognitional public engagement processes as one indicator of procedural justice.

As Cooke & Kothari (2001) point out, however, inclusion in planning processes does not inevitably resolve injustices. In fact, participatory processes can be a vehicle for misrepresentation and domination. In such instances, members of a marginalized social group may find that their dissatisfaction with an outcome or process is repudiated on the grounds of their participation being (wrongly) taken as consent (Brownhill & Carpenter, 2007; Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Moore, von der Porten, & Castleden, 2017). Meanwhile, powerful actors such as

fundors or managers who facilitated the project are absolved of scrutiny because they have “consulted” stakeholders or the public.<sup>1</sup>

## 2.5 Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities and the City Resilience Index

The “100 Resilient Cities – Pioneered by The Rockefeller Foundation” (100RC) initiative launched in 2013 with the purpose of mainstreaming resilience thinking into city planning processes globally. 100RC was established as an independent non-government organization founded and funded by The Rockefeller Foundation. The program was inspired by the recognition that many of the world’s most urgent problems are more pronounced in cities, due to the global trend of rapid urbanization. In early 2019, The Rockefeller Foundation announced its intention to discontinue the 100RC program and its funding, and “transition the work of 100 Resilient Cities into at least three separate pathways: a new Resilience Office within the Foundation, supporting place-based resilience work within the new economic mobility efforts at the Foundation in the United States, and funding a resilience effort at the Atlantic Council”

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<sup>1</sup> As an example, provinces in Canada have a legal duty to consult Indigenous people on projects that affect land and natural resources. Moore, von der Porten, & Castleden (2017), however, point out that “consultation” in this context is not legally synonymous with either shared decision-making power, nor free, prior, and informed consent (Moore et al., 2017, p. 2). In this legal context, consultation processes are often used simply to “check the box” rather than to build opportunities for co-management of natural resources. This has hindered progress on reconciliation and resulted in acts of injustice against Indigenous people (Moore et al., 2017).

(Berkowitz, 2019). The latter of these efforts and apparent successor to 100RC has since been named the Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center, the mission of which is to enhance the resilience of 1 billion people before 2030 (Atlantic Council, 2019). The 100RC program will close its operations in July of 2019, near the end of the dedicated funding period for the final cohort, although at the time of writing, several cities in the network are still in the strategy development process. The future of the Foundation's resilience efforts – particularly with respect to funding resilience planning in the Global South, a key focus of this paper – is unclear. As such, this research presents important lessons learned from the 100RC program that can help to inform more socially just practices in future resilience-building activities led by the Foundation, as well as other large-scale urban experiments and local resilience planning efforts alike.

The 100RC initiative aims to enhance urban resilience by building networks and partnerships across stakeholders to support coordinated action on local shocks and stresses. The 100RC website estimates that the total value of contributions (including partners, training, and other non-monetary resources) exceeds \$1 million for each participating city (*“100 Resilient Cities - Pioneered by Rockefeller Foundation,”* n.d.). Participating cities also gained membership to the 100RC network, which is meant to support peer learning across member cities. The resulting "City Resilience Strategies" are envisaged as "living documents" that align with and support existing city initiatives, bringing them under a common umbrella (resilience) in order to foster integration and reduce siloed governance (Ibid).

The program provided platform partnerships, technical guidance, and financial support to hire a Chief Resilience Officer (CRO) in 100 global cities that successfully passed a competitive application process. An evaluation panel was developed to select the 100 successful applicant

cities. According to 100RC, this panel selected cities based on the presence of “innovative mayors, a recent catalyst for change, a history of building partnerships and an ability to work with a wide range of stakeholders” (“*100 Resilient Cities – Pioneered by The Rockefeller Foundation*”, n.d.). In the Findings section, we identify equity-related challenges associated with this selection approach.

The CROs served as champions of the resilience approach. Their daily work over the 2-year funding period was focused on forging partnerships; bringing new and existing City initiatives under the umbrella of “resilience”; facilitating collaboration and coordination across city departments and external stakeholder to develop a resilience strategy; and, leading stakeholder and public engagement processes. Some participating cities have opted to support the efforts of the CRO through the provision of additional staff members, forming a “Chief Resilience Office” using existing municipal resources. In some cities, the Chief Resilience Office becomes a permanent department, while in other cities, the core resilience-focused staff return to different or previous municipal positions at the conclusion of the 100RC funding period.

The technical guidance offered to participating Cities includes a framework for project phasing and stakeholder engagement processes, as well as a City Resilience Index (Da Silva & Moench, 2014; The Rockefeller Foundation & Arup, 2015) which the cities use to assess the shocks and stresses they face, and their capacity to address them. Table 2 provides an overview of the City Resilience Index, which was developed by Arup, a private international consulting firm, based on a combination of scholarly research and lessons learned from previous resilience initiatives (eg. The Rockefeller Foundation’s Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network [ACCCRN]). The City Resilience Index was used by participating cities to analyze existing challenges and guide the development of their respective Strategies.

**Table 2: Four dimensions and 12 embedded goals of the City Resilience Index**

<b>Leadership &amp; Strategy</b>	<b>Health &amp; Wellbeing</b>	<b>Economy &amp; Society</b>	<b>Infrastructure &amp; Ecosystems</b>
Promotes Leadership & Effective Management	Meets Basic Needs	Fosters Economic Prosperity	Provides Reliable Communications and Mobility
Empowers a Broad Range of Stakeholders	Supports Livelihoods and Employment	Ensures Social Stability, Security and Justice <sup>2</sup>	Ensures Continuity of Critical Services
Fosters Long-Term and Integrated Planning	Ensures Public Health Services	Promotes Cohesive and Engaged Communities	Provides and Enhances Natural and Manmade Assets

*Source: Adapted from “100 Resilient Cities – Pioneered by The Rockefeller Foundation”, n.d.*

Participating cities took part in a six to nine month process of developing a City Resilience Strategy based on the 100RC semi-standardized process (Figure 1). All strategies commenced their engagement process with an Agenda Setting Workshop. For many (but not all) cities, this was a public event which sought to gain input from urban residents and stakeholders surrounding their perceptions of the city’s chronic stresses and acute shocks. The CRO and steering committee for resilience were often appointed following this workshop, and the first phase of their work on the project culminated in a Preliminary Resilience Assessment (PRA). The PRA

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<sup>2</sup> Note that “Justice” as it appears in this version of the City Resilience Index refers to legal and criminal justice, but not, apparently, to social justice or inequality as understood by the literature we reference.

was typically a key stakeholder engagement session that invites participation from a selection of urban stakeholders who are seen as relevant to the City's identified shocks and stresses.

**Figure 1: 100RC Strategy Development Process**



Our analysis found that stakeholders involved in the PRA were often a mix of internal (City departments) and external (nonprofits, businesses, etc.) stakeholders. Following the PRA, working groups of both internal and external stakeholders are developed, and these groups develop the action areas and partnerships that would ultimately be profiled in the strategies. Lastly, after strategy publication, partnerships and stakeholders can participate in the implementation of resilience-building actions and initiatives.

## 2.6 Methods

This paper reports on the findings of a plan evaluation of a purposive sample of 31 of the participating cities in the 100RC program. This plan evaluation deployed both directed and summative content analysis to answer the question: *has the 100RC program generated an emphasis on social equity and justice in the resulting City Resilience Strategies?* Directed content analysis uses pre-determined criteria to evaluate content, whereas summative analysis requires taking open-ended observations which are subsequently clustered and coded (Creswell, 2013b). A plan evaluation is a systematic evaluation of a project's processes, organization, or results. Because this evaluation took place as the program was unfolding, we have used formative plan evaluation methods, rather than summative evaluation. A summative evaluation

analyzes the performance and results of an implemented plan, while a formative evaluation is focused on analyzing the design, planning process, and delivery of the plan (Guyadeen & Seasons, 2016).

All City Resilience Strategies that had been published in English as of September, 2018 were included in the sample, with the exception of most published strategies from the United States of America (USA). As we describe in the Findings section, the USA is over-represented in the 100RC program. Accordingly, we deliberately excluded several cities from the USA in order to avoid biasing results with an over-representation of cities in wealthy countries, and to gain a more diverse sample of cities across the Global North and South with varying institutional capacities and development challenges. We selected only three strategies from the United States (Norfolk, San Francisco, and Dallas) from eastern, western and southern regions of the country respectively.

The timing of this study has meant that many participating cities are still developing their strategies at the time of writing. The 100RC program has been rolled out in three “rounds”, with selection of cities taking place between 2013 and 2016, which has meant that there is a larger proportion of cities in our sample from the first phase of the project. Because the 100RC process is meant to be adaptive, our findings may not represent lessons learned and changes made during later phases of the 100RC program. Additionally, this timing combined with the actual distribution of participating cities (discussed further in the Findings section) has meant that there are geographic gaps in representation in our sample. Notably, our sample contains no small island developing states from the Caribbean or Oceania, and only one city from the continent of Africa (Dakar, Senegal).

For our directed content analysis, we devised a framework for evaluating how City Resilience Strategies grapple with issues of justice and equity. The criteria for this framework were designed to address the three pillars of justice: recognitional, distributive, and procedural. Procedural justice and participation are exemplified in the “Open Process” category of criteria. Recognitional and distributive justice have been amalgamated into a single category of criteria for reasons that Fraser (1995, 1997) alluded to: in reality, oppression is “bivalent” and real instances of injustice among real social groups can rarely be categorized so neatly. In light of the arguments presented by Fraser, Young, Schlosberg and others, we argue that participating cities that hope to address inequality through their City Resilience Strategy must specifically identify disempowered social groups, and make effort to combat their powerlessness by including them in the creative processes that might ultimately affect their situation. This argument and other works (notably Anguelovski et al., 2016; Archer & Dodman, 2015; Arnstein, 1969; Cannon & Müller-Mahn, 2010; Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Meerow & Newell, 2016; F. Miller et al., 2010) have been instrumental in shaping the criteria for this content analysis. Acknowledging that participation does not invariably result in redress, we have included criteria in our framework that might shed light on the quality and power hierarchies embedded in engagement processes (eg. by prompting about ongoing partnerships, co-creation versus consultation, engagement of “key” and expert stakeholders versus the general public, etc.).

We identified two broad categories for criteria – Open Process, and Recognitional and Distributive justice. It should be noted, however, that many of the criteria touched on multiple dimensions of justice, and their categorization corresponds with the dimension that the indicator is *most* applicable to.

Within these two categories and five sub-themes (Table 3), 36 criteria were developed, of which 28 were used to assign points. In addition to this directed analysis, eight unscored criteria were used in conjunction with summative observations in order to capture unanticipated or locally-specific equity considerations. These observations were collected and coded using NVivo software, and the results of both analyses are discussed throughout the Findings section.

The 28 criteria that were used to score City Resilience Strategies reflected the degree to which the published plans explicitly sought to address inequalities. Each of the 28 scoreable criteria could receive 1, 0.5, or 0 points depending on how thoroughly they addressed the criteria (Table 4). To validate ratings, a second, external rater used the same criteria and methods to review the strategies in the sample independently. The initial overall average scores, before reconciling, were 97.35% similar between the two independent raters. To reconcile discrepancies in both summative and directed (scored) observations, the two raters met to compare results and validate observations. Major discrepancies in ratings (defined as having a discrepancy of more than 20%) occurred in four City Resilience Strategies, and minor (having a discrepancy of 10-20%) occurred in six strategies. The raters focused on identifying and reconciling discrepancies across these mismatched strategies by re-reviewing the strategies together and agreeing on a new score. After reconciling, the overall average scores between raters were 99.31% similar. There were no major or conflicting observations in terms of summative data.

**Table 3: Categories of criteria for directed content analysis**

Area of Concern	Number of scoreable criteria (weight)
<i>Open Process</i>	

Participation	12
Monitoring & Evaluation	4
<i>Recognitional and Distributive Justice</i>	
Acts of Omission*	5
Acts of Commission*	3
Vulnerability	4
Total	28

*\*The concepts of Acts of Omission and Commission are coined and described by Anguelovski et al., 2016*

**Table 4: Point system for directed content analysis**

1	The Strategy contains compelling evidence that this criteria was fulfilled.
0.5	There is superficial mention of this criteria; or, the criteria is only partially fulfilled.
0	There is no evidence to suggest that this criteria was considered or included in the Strategy. The possibility of this criteria is not acknowledged or discussed.

Anguelovski et al. (2016) coined the terms “acts of commission” and “acts of omission” to typify acts of injustice enacted in the name of climate change adaptation in cities. An act of commission refers to an action that directly negatively affects or displaces a disempowered community. An act of omission, on the other hand, is an action which protects or enhances life for elite members of society at the expense of disempowered people. While we have drawn on these concepts, it is important to note that this research is a formative plan evaluation and hence did not critically evaluate the actual *in-situ* outcomes or implementation of the City Resilience Strategies in our sample. In most cases, doing this would not have been possible, as many of the strategies were completed too recently to have reported on progress. Instead, we have used the concepts of “acts

of commission” and “omission” to signal potentially risky actions, and to evaluate the extent to which cities mitigated the known risks associated with these actions. This is discussed in greater detail with examples in the Findings section.

### *2.6.1 Scope and limitations*

The directed content analysis framework is a manifest framework which only evaluates the explicit content of the report. This approach is beneficial for: providing a high-level overview of the degree to which participating cities overtly prioritize social equity; for quantification; for identifying patterns across cities; and for evaluating transparency. It also has limitations. This analysis has not captured the actual *in-situ* participatory approaches taken during strategy development in each city if they were not described in the document, nor has it explored the implementation of strategy initiatives. A summative plan evaluation (Guyadeen & Seasons, 2016) of 100RC could be used to monitor the performance of 100RC after the City Resilience Strategies have been implemented. Additionally, our manifest framework has prioritized explicit expressions of justice and equity. Future researchers could build on the findings of this study by using latent content analysis to capture less explicit expressions of justice.

Cities in the sample did not universally provide the same degree of information about their engagement processes: some cities provided substantial detail about who, when, and how many people were consulted, while others used much broader terms and provided very little detail about participation. To this end, the “Open Process” indicators more accurately capture how transparent participating cities have been in communicating their engagement process in the City Resilience Strategy. We speculate that this is a reasonable proximation of the degree to which

cities actually deployed participatory approaches, although further case study research would be needed to empirically verify this.

Further, most of the City Resilience Strategies featured a combination of new and pre-existing initiatives. In some cases, this made it challenging to disentangle the resilience planning processes from regular municipal government and planning processes, or to draw conclusions about how 100RC has influenced or changed those existing processes. Future research could enhance our findings by analyzing specific case studies to determine the extent to which municipal governments already focused (or not) on equity before and after the 100RC intervention.

As previously mentioned, the first cohort of 100RC member cities is over-represented in our sample due to the timing of this analysis. It is possible that the first cohort of participating cities may be systematically different from those selected in subsequent rounds due to selection bias. For example, these first selected cities may have had an existing or prior relationship with The Rockefeller Foundation through other initiatives such as the Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN) or a similar initiative. Alternatively, they may have been selected partly on the premise that the first round of cities may be subject to more scrutiny from press and researchers than subsequent rounds. While we acknowledge the possibility of such a selection bias, we did not factor it into our sampling process nor our analytical criteria.

Lastly, the City Resilience Index provides flexibility for participating cities to self-identify their own needs and the degree of focus they wish to allocate on different shocks and stresses. This flexibility is appropriate given the heterogeneity of shocks/stresses, culture, development context, and geography of participating cities. While some cities performed poorly on the grounds of representation or open process, they may have devised excellent solutions for other

pressing sustainability and resilience issues. For example, two cities that received medium-low overall scores, San Francisco (with a score of 9) and Da Nang (10.5), featured very robust and integrated disaster risk reduction initiatives that fulfil many of the Resilient City Framework's seven qualities of resilient systems<sup>3</sup> (Da Silva & Moench, 2014; The Rockefeller Foundation & Arup, 2015), the Stockholm Resilience Centre's seven principles for building resilience in social-ecological systems<sup>4</sup> (Simonsen et al., 2013), and promote progress on the SDGs. Both strategies featured a wealth of approaches which would ensure diversity and redundancy, and prioritized integration and alignment with multiple strategies and frameworks. On these grounds, they were successful strategies which are likely to enhance some aspects of resilience and sustainability in their respective cities. Similarly, many of the cities that received high scores in our justice-focused analysis may have failed to fulfil other principles of resilience, such as (for example) promoting redundancy. Accordingly, the scores assigned to each city or region are **not** meant to offer a snapshot of overall report quality, but instead to communicate the degree to which each city prioritized equity and justice in their City Resilience Strategy.

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<sup>3</sup> 100 Resilient Cities understands a system to be resilient if it is: reflective, resourceful, robust, redundant, flexible, inclusive, and integrated.

<sup>4</sup> The Stockholm Resilience Centre's principles are: 1. Maintain diversity and redundancy, 2. Manage connectivity, 3. Manage slow variables and feedbacks, 4. Foster complex adaptive systems thinking, 5. Encourage learning, 6. Broaden participation, and 7. Promote polycentric governance systems.

## 2.7 Findings

Overall, the data collected suggests that the 100RC intervention has not inherently focused on issues of structural inequality. Actions featuring a focus on inequality and justice are piece-meal across participating cities and their strategies, suggesting that the decision to prioritize or ignore equity may not be a direct result of the 100RC program offerings.

Furthermore, we have identified a number of threats to social equity and justice that appear in the program itself, and its resultant City Resilience Strategies. There are three primary findings which form the basis of this assertion: 1. The 100 Resilient Cities are heavily concentrated in wealthier countries, 2. Few strategies (23%) offer marginalized residents an opportunity to self-identify their needs, priorities and portrayal, 3. Several strategies feature Acts of Commission and Omission that go unmitigated. These findings are discussed in greater detail in the following sub-sections. In our Discussion and Recommendations section, we go on to suggest solutions to these challenges, including changes to the member-city selection strategy, and mainstreaming an existing 100RC pilot project that was used in a small selection of participating cities.

### *2.7.1 Distribution of participating cities and resources*

Our sample (mapped in Figure 2) included 13 City Resilience Strategies from cities in countries with high, medium or low human development (less than 0.8 on the Human Development Index [HDI]), and 18 strategies from cities in countries with very high human development (more than 0.8 HDI) (UNDP, 2018). Accordingly, more “Global North” countries (countries with very high human development), were represented in our sample. While efforts were made to take a sample that was representative of countries with both high and low human development, this disparity is largely a reflection of the actual distribution of cities participating in the 100RC program.

**Figure 2: Sampled cities (squares) and all participating 100 Resilient Cities (dots)**





Figure 3 demonstrates that a disproportionate number (more than 75%) of participating cities in 100RC are from countries with high or very high human development. Of the 58 participating cities with very high human development, nearly half (25 – a quarter of all 100 Resilient Cities) are in the United States (US) or a US territory. By comparison, only five (5) cities are from countries with low human development, and 15 are from countries with medium human development<sup>5</sup>. Notably, there are no developing states from Oceania participating in the 100RC program.

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<sup>5</sup> The researchers plotted the City Resilience Strategy scores against the national Human Development Index (HDI) and Gini Coefficients and found that neither were reliably correlated to the degree to which a Strategy prioritized equity.

**Figure 3: Distribution of 100 Resilient Cities by country's human development (HDI)**



This uneven distribution of participating cities is a distributive justice issue (and, an act of omission). As previously mentioned, the evaluation panel in charge of selecting the successful 100 Resilient Cities “looked for innovative mayors, a recent catalyst for change, a history of building partnerships and an ability to work with a wide range of stakeholders” (*100 Resilient Cities – Pioneered by The Rockefeller Foundation*, n.d.). To some extent, then, cities were successful if they already demonstrated some capacity for resilience-building (partnerships and stakeholder engagement), and if they had a compelling story (a recent catalyst for change) (Ibid). These selection criteria were developed with the intention of achieving a reliable return on the Foundation’s philanthropic investment, or what 100RC calls a “Resilience Dividend” (Ibid) – cities with stronger institutional capacity are more likely to be able to complete the work successfully, resulting (in theory) with a greater quantity of resilient cities. However, the selection process also may have had the consequence of widening the resilience gap between Global North and South because city governments that are institutionally unstable, corrupt or abjectly impoverished also have the lowest capacity to respond to and recover from acute shocks and chronic stresses. Most simply put, the 100 Resilient Cities were not selected because they truly needed the support, but because they demonstrated the capacity to complete the work.


From a global perspective, 100RC largely precluded the most abjectly poor cities from participating in the program. As more privileged cities receive additional resources to enhance

their adaptive capacity, the most vulnerable cities globally are effectively “left behind”. While the program did not deliberately re-direct resources away from marginalized cities toward more privileged ones, one could speculate that the omission of the most abjectly poor cities with the lowest adaptive capacity will likely result in a widened resilience gap across Global North and South cities.


### *2.7.2 Engagement of marginalized residents*

Several of the cities collaborate mainly with key stakeholders (eg. organizations and experts) and only engage the general public in a limited way. In general, these are the cities who display lower than average scores in Figure 4. Many cities, however, propose extended engagement and more "bottom-up" participatory actions during the implementation of specific actions, scoring higher across Figure 4.

**Figure 4: Open Process scores**



**Figure 5: Open Process score distribution**



*Most (19) strategies received medium-high scores in terms of open process.*

However, the majority of strategies fell in the “medium-high” range (Figure 5), the average score being 8.2. The majority of strategies falling into a similar range is likely a result of the semi-

standardized process for stakeholder engagement established by The Rockefeller Foundation that participating cities are expected to undertake, discussed in the section “Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities and the City Resilience Index”.

Almost all (85%) strategies identify key external stakeholders, such as associations or non-government organizations, to collaborate on the implementation of specific actions. Actions themselves were sometimes participatory or consultative in nature. With respect to equity in engagement processes, most (87%) strategies identified specific marginalized groups in their cities, and many (82%) further identified specific actions to improve the circumstances of those identified groups. However, few strategies (23%) mentioned having directly consulted those disempowered groups in the City Resilience Strategy development process. As discussed in the section “Justice, Equity and Participation”, this presents a challenge for promoting procedural and recognition justice because the needs, priorities and portrayal of disempowered groups are being interpreted and communicated by actors that do not belong to those groups.

The degree of external involvement within the stakeholder engagement process varied dramatically across cities, and additional stakeholder or public engagement over and above the 100RC process (Figure 1) process was at the participant city’s discretion. Some cities engaged thousands of residents in addition to key stakeholders, while others opted to limit engagement to experts. As an example, Da Nang, Vietnam’s working groups and partnerships were expert-focused and comprised almost entirely of stakeholders from multiple levels of government. Comparatively few of the identified stakeholders were external (in this case, from universities and foundations) and there is no indication that the general public were consulted regarding the City Resilience Strategy content.

Glasgow, Scotland (UK), on the other hand, described engaging the general public in interactive consultations comprised of “face-to-face conversations”, “on-line surveys”, “street games, participative art and public installations” with more than 1500 lay-residents (p. 28, City of Glasgow & 100 Resilient Cities, 2016). In addition to public engagement, Glasgow described engaging more than 300 key external stakeholders (particularly from non-government organizations) in targeted workshops to explore resilience scenarios. These activities were apparently in addition to the working groups, and potentially a part of agenda setting and PRA processes.

While both of these cities fulfilled the criteria required of them by The Rockefeller Foundation, Da Nang received a lower score (6) in the Open Process section of the directed content analysis because they prioritized mostly government engagement and partnerships, did not describe their public communication processes, and did not appear to provide opportunities for residents (particularly at-risk residents) to self-identify their needs and priorities. Glasgow, conversely, fulfilled nearly all of the criteria and received an Open Process score of 15 out of a possible 16.

Note, however, that Vietnam is a communist state with different sociocultural and political protocol toward the subject of “participation” compared to Western countries. The popular theories on participation and justice that have shaped our analysis were socially constructed, debated, and published in the West. In this context, scholars have suggested that participation of disempowered social groups in governance processes can mitigate inequalities. In Vietnam, instead, the government has sought to mitigate inequality and risk with a top-down approach to managing distribution, procedure, and recognition. This is an important consideration, because while Western theories of justice have largely shaped our analytical criteria, we also implore the readers to recognize that these ideas are not necessarily universal.


Cities used a range of tools and media for gaining public contributions. Several cities described having used public opinion polls and/or surveys. While these are important tools with which cities can gain broad information about public perception of threats and solutions, they rarely provide meaningful opportunities for collaboration or co-creation (“deep engagement”), and restrict the agency of residents to actively take part in decision-making. To refer to Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation, surveys and polls might represent a level of engagement akin to "consultation": that is, they maintain the status quo in power relations but do not offer residents decision-making power or creative control (Arnstein, 1969).

Overall, these findings suggest that there is more that participating cities and the 100RC program overall could do to make their existing processes more inclusive, even without fundamentally rearranging municipal governance and authority structures. This finding also reflects familiar criticisms of “participation” by the likes of Cooke & Kothari (2001), Brownhill & Carpenter (2007) and others: while the 100RC program and most of the strategies describe their process as highly collaborative, evidence suggests that this collaboration focused on stakeholders who already had an authoritative voice (eg. experts, government staff, etc.). The self-portrayal of 100RC as participatory and collaborative is hence a partial truth, depending on the “scale” of collaboration being explored. There is indeed substantial evidence of polycentric governance among key internal and external stakeholders through strategic partnerships; 85% of strategies described partnering with external organizations and stakeholders to create and implement actions. Lay-residents, however, and particularly marginalized lay-residents, were (with some notable exceptions) largely precluded from taking part in the co-creative processes that would ultimately affect their city and their lives.


2.7.3 *Unmitigated acts of commission and omission*

Anguelovski et al.’s (2016) concepts of “acts of commission” and “acts of omission” were deployed as part of the analytical criteria for gauging recognitional and distributive (in)justice. For example, when assessing actions in the strategy, our analysis considered whether a proposed action intentionally directed benefits at certain marginalized groups (distributive justice) but also whether that action might disproportionately negatively affect a specific group (an act of commission). It also considered whether strategies identified a specific marginalized group and explored the historical context of their disempowerment (recognitional justice).

**Figure 6: Recognitional and Distributive Justice scores**



**Figure 7: Recognitional and Distributive score distribution**



*Most (18) strategies received medium-low scores in terms of recognitional and distributive justice.*

Figures 6 and 7 display the strategies' scores with respect to criteria surrounding recognitional and distributive justice, such as the presence of unmitigated acts of commission and omission. Two common acts of commission (Anguelovski et al., 2016) emerged from the sample. The first revolved around eliminating informality. Most frequently this took the form of forced resettlement or "upgrading" of informal communities in areas of unmitigatable risk (eg. areas prone to flooding or landslides). This type of action appears in almost all of the sampled South American strategies (except Santiago de Chile, Chile), and it also occurs in a handful of Asian strategies. Da Nang (Vietnam) and Bangkok (Thailand) both similarly referenced forced resettlement of at-risk communities. Other types of informality (apart from settlements) were also addressed; Semarang (Indonesia) referred to the reorganizing of physical space occupied by informal economy workers, eg. street vendors, and in Bangkok, undocumented migrants are identified as a chronic stress (and hence, considered a threat to "legitimate" citizens). The second, related act of commission was gentrification, as some (five<sup>6</sup>) Global North strategies

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<sup>6</sup> Five strategies explicitly used the language of revitalization, but additional strategies featured actions that could raise property values and result in gentrification (such as, for example, the

without “informal” neighborhoods nonetheless featured plans to revitalize derelict or declining neighborhoods, which could potentially displace low-income and racialized residents.

Note again that this analysis focuses on manifest plan content, but not implementation.

Accordingly, as mentioned in the Methods section, these points are not demonstrable in-situ findings so much as signals of potential risk. Strategies received higher scores on these criteria if they acknowledged and attempted to mitigate the well-known risks associated with disruptive actions such as forced resettlement or neighborhood renewal. Santa Fe, Argentina was the only city to receive full points in this category for explicitly acknowledging and mitigating the risk associated with their City Resilience Strategy’s disruptive actions (in their case, resettlement). Many other cities (eg. Quito, Ecuador; Medellin, Colombia; Dallas, USA) mentioned the importance of conducting the work in a sensitive way (but did elaborate on how they would do this, or why it was a sensitive issue) and others (eg. Da Nang, Vietnam) acknowledged the risk but did not describe efforts to mitigate it. Cali (Colombia) managed the risk associated with resettlement by promoting actions (eg. Action 4.1.3) that would strengthen the resilience of informal settlements in at-risk areas (such that resettlement would not be necessary) but also featured actions to stop and prevent illegal land uses, including illegal occupation (Action 4.1.4) and did not describe protocol to reconcile the disruption caused to those residents.

Based on strategy content alone, it was not possible to ascertain whether embedded actions would enhance the resilience of a privileged group at the expense of some other segment of society (an act of omission, as Anguelovski et al., 2016 define it). Further research (eg. analyzing

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provision of new parks and green space to a neighbourhood). As such, this (5) is a minimum value.

how the distribution of a City's annual municipal budget changes according to the actions included in City Resilience Strategies) could help to identify specific acts of omission. There were, however, several less malignant omissions in the sense of marginalized social groups simply not benefitting from actions to the same extent as privileged residents would. The most common of such omissive actions surrounded digital technologies and Smart City initiatives, with many (19) cities planning to launch open data platforms, web-based engagement programs, or implement wireless internet in downtown areas. While these actions do not directly harm marginalized residents, they are often inaccessible to residents without an internet connection (eg. homeless and low-income people) and people who may require technological support (eg. seniors and impaired people). In some cases, they may re-direct municipal funding away from other initiatives with more universally accessible benefits, but further investigation would be necessary to empirically verify this.

The strategy development process and the 100RC program itself are embedded with omissive actions at multiple scales. At the city level, as previously mentioned, very few strategies mentioned having engaged vulnerable residents in consultative or co-creative processes. Research suggests that explicit invitations and sometimes material accommodations are necessary in order to successfully engage marginalized residents due to systemic barriers such as transportation, poverty, language, and self-image (Lawless & Fox, 2001; Pugh, 2013; Ravensbergen & VanderPlaat, 2010; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Verba, Schlozman, Brady, & Nie, 1993). Accordingly, if marginalized residents were expected to engage in lay-public engagement processes without having been offered such accommodations, it is unlikely that they were sufficiently represented in the process. In these instances, privileged residents have taken part in consultation while disempowered residents have not, and hence, the needs and

priorities of privileged residents may be more thoroughly reflected in the City Resilience Strategies' actions.

Lastly, two criteria in this section of the analysis were rarely attained. The first was acknowledging that some of the City Resilience Strategies' purported benefits may not be accessible to all residents, or specific groups of residents, due to systemic barriers; only five strategies acknowledged this, and two alluded less clearly to the possibility. The second (achieved fully by four strategies, and partially by one strategy) asked whether the strategy made efforts to improve uneven access to benefits by managing such systemic barriers.

#### *2.7.4 Additional considerations*

As previously emphasized, the score allocated to each strategy is not an indicator of overall strategy quality, but rather, an indicator of the degree to which they prioritized equity as both a process and outcome of building resilience. Notably, some of those strategies that received relatively low scores placed heavy emphasis on building capacity in other areas. As examples, Ramallah, Palestine (scored 15.5) and Dakar, Senegal (scored 8.5) both grapple with lacking basic municipal services, such as sanitation, waste collection services, and public transportation. Given the acute governance challenges facing these cities – such as lack of sovereignty (Ramallah) and low overall human development (Dakar) – these cities have focused on building the capacity of their municipal governments to provide urban services. In another exception, Da Nang (10.5) did not prioritize equity to a serious extent, but the issue of equality (as distinct from equity) is ostensibly entrenched in Vietnam's single-party socialist governance structure, which may be part of the reason these themes received less emphasis in the Strategy.

In a word, context matters: “Inclusiveness” is only one of several principles of resilience (Simonsen et al., 2013; The Rockefeller Foundation & Arup, 2015). Some strategies leveraged 100RC resources to address issues of chronic violence (Medellin, Colombia; Santiago de Chile, Chile). Others – particularly at-risk coastal cities (Da Nang, Vietnam; San Francisco, USA; Rotterdam, The Netherlands and others) – emphasized climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction. All of these issues, too, are undeniably linked to both resilience and the SDGs, and indeed, are in many cases a matter of justice and necessity in their own right.

While these nuances were captured through unstructured qualitative observations, this research used manifest (rather than latent) content analysis as a primary research method. Future researchers who hope to build on the findings of this review have several methodological options. Latent content analysis and open coding could be used to capture less explicit expressions of justice in the City Resilience Strategies, and additional analysis of both manifest and latent content could determine the extent to which Strategies adhere to and align with the SDGs, the City Resilience Index, and scholarly literature on the principles of socio-ecological resilience.

## 2.8 Discussion and Recommendations

Several of the cities in our sample approached issues of social equity and justice with fervor, interspersing consideration of social and economic inequalities throughout all aspects of the report. However, the overall focus on inequality and injustice across participating cities was piecemeal. Accordingly, while 100RC has provided cities with the financial and human resources needed to explore social equity and justice in their Strategies – which many cities

chose to do – we do not find evidence that the 100RC program offerings are what encouraged those cities to emphasize justice, with a possible exception to note in Dallas, USA.

The Dallas, USA City Resilience Strategy (City of Dallas & 100 Resilient Cities, 2018) featured an overarching narrative of social equity, acknowledged the structural nature of inequality, engaged marginalized groups during all project phases, featured actions to unpack institutionalized racism, and discussed the intersectional nature of inequality. Dallas was also one of the five USA-based 100 Resilient Cities that took part in an Equality Indicators pilot project (or “Equity Indicators” in the case of Dallas) partially funded by The Rockefeller Foundation<sup>7</sup> (100 Resilient Cities, 2018; “*Equality Indicators*,” n.d.). The Equality Indicators project was a collaboration between five participating 100RC cities (Dallas, Oakland, St. Louis, Pittsburgh and Tulsa), the CUNY Institute for State and Local Governance, and local community partners to create a locally-specific monitoring and evaluation tool to examine the state of social equity in each city respectively. The intent was that the Equality Indicators tools would help to inform equity-focused actions and policies in these cities (100 Resilient Cities, 2018; “*Equality Indicators*”, n.d.). Overall, Dallas received one of the highest scores in our sample, 18.5 of a possible 28, and serves as one of the few instances where we found a clear connection between 100RC program offerings (the Equality Indicators tool), and the degree to which a City Resilience Strategy emphasized equity. If this Equality Indicators project were to be an entrenched aspect of the 100RC program, built-in as a universal component of the Preliminary Resilience Assessment or the City Resilience Index, we suspect that the City Resilience

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<sup>7</sup> The other Equality Indicators pilot cities – Oakland, Pittsburgh, St. Louis and Tulsa – were not featured in our sample.

Strategies might accordingly feature a greater focus on equity than we found in our analysis. In the case of Dallas, the Equity Indicators tool will be used as the primary method of monitoring and evaluation for strategy implementation, and is repeatedly referenced throughout the report (City of Dallas & 100 Resilient Cities, 2018). Accordingly, we suspect that the Equality Indicators pilot was influential in terms of promoting an emphasis on justice and equity in the Resilient Dallas Strategy.

That being said, it is also likely that the Chief Resilience Office and other municipal actors in Dallas were already amenable to the idea of an equity-focused strategy, and may have chosen to emphasize it without the support of this pilot. This speculation is supported by the fact that most of the other cities in our sample that received relatively high social equity scores (eg. Mexico City, Mexico; Athens, Greece; Greater Christchurch, New Zealand) did not take part in the Equality Indicators pilot. Furthermore, Table 2 demonstrates that social inequality is not a consideration that is embedded into the version of the City Resilience Index that was made available to most participating cities. Accordingly, the decision to focus (or not) on equity was at the discretion of participant cities, and several cities indeed chose to emphasize it. This suggests that there are other factors that influence the degree to which participant cities emphasize equity; future research could focus on unearthing these triggers for success. For example, researchers could explore the causal link between degree of social equity found in strategies and the work/educational background of actors directly involved in drafting the City Resilience strategies. We hypothesize that actors embedded in cities' resilience planning processes have the potential to guide strategies/plans in a more socially equitable direction; for example, the Chief Resilience Officer in a particular city could influence the overall discourse of the resilience planning process, and the resultant direction of City Resilience Strategies.

In the meantime, our recommendation for future resilience-building activities by The Rockefeller Foundation, and other large-scale, globally-networked urban experiments, is to embed equity-focused tools and analyses (such as the Equality Indicators) into universal program materials from the start, and to make them available to all participating cities. At the very least, this could trigger actors involved in the process of resilience planning to consider social equity, and how to potentially measure it. Such tools should also encourage participating cities to consider that their own proposed actions might have disproportionate impacts, and devise solutions to mitigate those impacts. Additionally, future urban experiments can learn from the uneven distribution of participating cities across Global North and South that we found in this program, and promote distributive equity at a global scale by using selection criteria that prioritizes “resilience need” rather than existing “resilience capacity”. The challenge with this approach, as 100RC has likely already identified, is that cities with lower capacity will require an increased investment of time and resources in order to reach the same goals, compared to cities with more institutional capacity and resources. To address this challenge, the organization might choose to allocate its resources based on an “equity” rather than “equality” model – that is, by providing a different level of service to lower versus higher capacity participants.

## 2.9 Conclusion

The SDGs and 2030 Agenda are clear: resilience, inclusiveness and equity are inextricably linked. But to what extent are resilience, inclusiveness and equity emphasized in actual instances of resilience planning in cities? This paper examines this question in the context of global experiment of 100 cities, aptly named 100 Resilient Cities (100RC). Specifically, we ask: *has the*

*100RC program generated an emphasis on social equity and justice in the resulting City Resilience Strategies?*

In this paper we present a framework by which to examine social equity and justice in City Resilience Strategies. Using directed and summative content analysis, we measure 31 City Resilience Strategies developed through the 100RC program against our social equity and justice framework. Our findings suggest that addressing inequality and justice across participating cities has been piece-meal. Furthermore, through our analysis we have identified program level threats to social equity and justice. For example, the 100RC Cities are heavily concentrated in the Global North; few strategies (23%) offer marginalized residents an opportunity to self-identify their needs, priorities and portrayal; and, several strategies feature Acts of Commission (i.e. an action that directly negatively affects or displaces a disempowered community; Anguelovski et al., 2016) and Omission (i.e. an action which protects or enhances life for elite members of society at the expense of disempowered people; Ibid) that go unmitigated.

Moving forward, we find large urban experiments oriented to urban resilience can learn several important lessons from 100RC about how to design their programs to advance equity at both the program and project levels. Specifically, they could promote distributive equity at a global scale by using selection criteria and a funding model designed around equity (rather than equality). At the project level, they could champion the use of tools such as the Equity Indicators as a necessary first step in the planning process.

Resilience, inclusiveness and equity need not be mutually exclusive endeavors. The pace and scale of global resilience efforts is significant, and all actors involved in this real-time experiment, with the right program and supports, can plan for more resilient and more equitable urban futures.

## Chapter 3. Inclusive Resilience: A case study of equity-centred strategic planning in Toronto, Canada

*Intended for submission to a peer-reviewed journal. Co-authored by Dr. Carrie Mitchell, who provided supervisory guidance (including contributions to concept and methods formulation) and networking support.*

### 3.1 Abstract

Existing but limited empirical research suggests that while inclusivity, equity and justice are centrally important to building and negotiating resilience, City governments using a resilience framework for planning projects are not consistently prioritizing social equity in resultant City plans (Fitzgibbons & Mitchell, 2019). Hence, more research is needed to unearth pathways toward just and equitable strategic planning processes that surround planning for urban resilience. The goal of this paper is hence to contribute to filling this empirical gap, asking whether and how principles of justice have been incorporated in in-situ resilience planning practices. We explore a case study of one equity-focused participant City in “100 Resilient Cities – Pioneered by The Rockefeller Foundation”: the City of Toronto. Using key informant interviews and document analysis, this qualitative research paper examines the approach taken by Toronto to weave social equity and inclusion throughout all phases of the ResilientTO project. We find that the Resilient Conversations approach corroborates existing arguments that emphasizing power and voice through a “negotiated resilience” approach (Harris et al., 2017) can help to advance procedural justice in urban planning for resilience. We argue that, with some important cautions and considerations, the Resilient Conversations approach and corresponding partnership between the City and a local non-profit may represent a model practice for operationalizing negotiated resilience, and we hope that the findings can inform more procedurally just strategic planning processes in a North American context.

## 3.2 Introduction

As resilience becomes an increasingly popular term in urban policy discourses, several scholars have questioned whether or not the concept can effectively address normative questions of social justice and equity. Despite these cautions and criticisms, resilience is becoming ever-more prevalent, thanks in part to the attention of major philanthropic interventions such as The Rockefeller Foundation's "100 Resilient Cities" (100RC) initiative. Spanning 6 years and 100 participating international cities, with \$164 million in direct contributions from Rockefeller and \$3.35 billion "leveraged" to implement resultant resilience projects (Berkowitz, 2019), 100RC has been instrumental in setting the agenda for urban resilience around the world and has popularized the language of resilience in urban planning practice. As of July 2019, 100RC has officially concluded and The Rockefeller Foundation has redirected its funding stream to other resilience-related endeavors (Ibid). Accordingly, this research capitalizes on an important opportunity to reflect on the lessons learned from the 100RC intervention and how these can inform more equitable and just urban resilience planning in the future.

This paper follows previous research conducted by the authors on the 100RC program. In a previous paper (Fitzgibbons & Mitchell, 2019), we conducted a plan evaluation of 31 City Resilience Strategies completed under the 100RC program. Using directed and summative content analysis methods, this research screened strategies to determine the extent to which participating cities emphasized issues of social equity and justice. This research found that social equity and justice received piece-meal emphasis across the City Resilience Strategies, and concluded that 100RC itself or its base program offerings were (with some exceptions) likely not what triggered some cities to emphasize these issues. This paper, accordingly, attempts to

unearth some of the triggers for success through a more in-depth case study exploring the planning process in one participating city, Toronto.

This paper describes the Resilient Conversations approach and corresponding Local Champions initiative, and highlights a number of strengths and weaknesses that can help to inform its use in planning practice. Overall, we find that the Resilient Conversations process is a strong example of a meaningfully co-creative process in which the City government shared the creative process with marginalized residents in hard-to-reach communities. We take this opportunity to provide new empirical insights examining the implementation barriers and catalysts for operationalizing “negotiated resilience” (Harris et al., 2017) in planning practice.

Toronto’s First Resilience Strategy launched on June 4<sup>th</sup>, 2019. A post-hoc analysis using the plan evaluation framework deployed in Fitzgibbons & Mitchell (2019) reveals that the City of Toronto is not only among the minority of participating cities that strongly emphasized equity, but in fact, it received a higher score than the 31 other sampled strategies overall. Accordingly, we find that Resilient Conversations can serve as a best practice for cities in other jurisdictions that hope to advance justice, equity, and resilience simultaneously.

### 3.3 Negotiated resilience and equitable engagement

As climate change becomes an ever more pressing dimension of global and local policy discourses, so too has the language of “resilience” (Leichenko, 2011; Meerow et al., 2016). In the context of many cities, climate change brings heightened risk of extreme weather and heat events which exceed the design specifications of existing urban infrastructure and stress local actors’ and governments’ capacity to respond (Leichenko, 2011). These challenges

disproportionately impact disadvantaged urban residents (Bulkeley et al., 2013; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014; Reckien et al., 2017; Schlosberg, 2012). However, a robust body of literature has demonstrated that the way many cities have attempted to mitigate and adapt to these challenges also disempower and exploit the most vulnerable and marginalized actors. Locally, lower income residents are displaced by urban greening and adaptation projects, or simply not prioritized in the planning process, such that more affluent parts of a city benefit from adaptation at the expense of marginalized residents (Anguelovski et al., 2016; Pearsall & Anguelovski, 2016). Globally, sustainability, climate change mitigation, and adaptation projects advanced at the local scale – particularly those surrounding green technology advancements – rely on socially and ecologically exploitative practices advanced in lower income countries (Agyeman, Bullard, & Evans, 2003; Bazilian, 2018; C. Miller, 2014). Accordingly, much recent scholarship at the intersection of people and the environment has sought to advance “climate justice”(Agyeman, Schlosberg, Craven, & Matthews, 2016; Bulkeley et al., 2013; Popke, Curtis, & Gamble, 2016; Schlosberg, 2012; Schlosberg & Collins, 2014) and “just sustainabilities” (Agyeman et al., 2003, 2016). These literatures draw attention to the importance of devising solutions that simultaneously advance justice alongside mitigation and adaptation efforts.

Resilience thinking has emerged as common nomenclature for addressing climate change in cities (Meerow & Newell, 2016), and while in an urban context the term is most often deployed in relation to climate change (Leichenko, 2011) it has also become a sort of catch-all approach for addressing a multiplicity of complex and cascading urban problems (Béné et al., 2018; Brand & Jax, 2007; Meerow et al., 2016; The Rockefeller Foundation & Arup, 2015). There has been considerable debate in both scholarly and practitioner circles surrounding the value of resilience

and concern of its potential to displace existing narratives of vulnerability (Bulkeley & Tuts, 2013; F. Miller et al., 2010), sustainability (Redman, 2014; Romero-Lankao et al., 2016; Stumpp, 2013; Yanarella & Levine, 2014), disaster risk reduction (Aldunce et al., 2014; Alexander, 2013; Doberstein, Fitzgibbons, & Mitchell, 2018; Matyas & Pelling, 2015) adaptation (Aldunce et al., 2016; Woodruff et al., 2018) and poverty reduction (Friend & Moench, 2013, 2015). In particular, critical scholars have posited that resilience approaches may afford less attention to normative issues (Cote & Nightingale, 2012) and accordingly will fail to advance solutions that are sensitive to power (Bahadur & Tanner, 2014; Cote & Nightingale, 2012; Harris et al., 2017; Meerow & Newell, 2016), justice (Archer & Dodman, 2015; Fainstein, 2015, 2018; Shi et al., 2016; Ziervogel et al., 2017), poverty (Friend & Moench, 2013, 2015), and vulnerability (F. Miller et al., 2010). Lastly, the common interpretation of resilience as “bouncing back” and an overall neoliberal discourse of self-reliance has led several scholars to caution that the approach is conservative and supportive of the status quo (Fainstein, 2015; Gillard, 2016; Gillard et al., 2016; Joseph, 2013; Porter & Davoudi, 2012). Evidently, then, there is uncertainty about whether increasingly popular resilience approaches can effectively advance climate justice and just sustainability.

Harris, Chu & Ziervogel (2017) offer a solution in the form of “negotiated resilience”. The authors argue that the main deficiency in resilience thinking is its lack of attention to issues of power, and that resilience cannot be removed from processes of contestation that surround everyday life, such as culture, politics, and discourse. They call for a recognition that resilience is both socially constructed and malleable. By viewing resilience as an ongoing process of negotiation rather than a goal or outcome, actors can foreground the “for whom, and against what” dimensions of resilience, and amplify the lived experiences of those who are

conventionally left out. “Since resilience thinking cannot avoid difficult choices,” they argue, “the focus on negotiation also serves to underscore that it must be pursued in a discursive, deliberative and negotiated manner that is tailored to on-the-ground realities” (p. 3). The authors offer case studies of shared learning dialogues from the Rockefeller-funded Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN) as examples of negotiated resilience in practice (Harris et al., 2017).

In sum, by embracing the contested and divergent meanings inherent in the resilience concept, rather than ignoring them, scholars and planners can more effectively grapple with issues of equity, power, and voice. Harris, Chu & Ziervogel (2017) offer a compelling argument that processes of negotiation are crucial to advancing justice in resilience planning. This is perhaps unsurprising given the many well-documented benefits of communicative participatory processes more broadly: they can support social learning across stakeholders (Innes & Booher, 1999a; Menzel & Buchecker, 2013); build institutional capacity (Healey, 1998a); and enhance trust and social capital (Höppner, Frick, & Buchecker, 2007; Wagner & Fernandez-Gimenez, 2009), to name just a few. However, an important conundrum for planners and policymakers who hope to operationalize negotiated resilience emerges: the most disempowered stakeholders are the least likely to participate in formal deliberative forums.

The experience of poverty - which intersects with gender, race, social class and (dis)ability - hinders disadvantaged residents’ capacity to participate in traditional public engagement forums. The financial and time commitment necessary to engage in political activities impede many low-income residents ability to engage both directly in political activities and indirectly through other activities that would build civic skills to support their political participation (Lawless & Fox, 2001; Verba et al., 1995). Education, age, and proficiency in the dominant official language are

correlated with higher levels of political engagement, so immigrant and communities of colour tend to be less politically engaged than national populations overall, due to these systemic barriers (Lawless & Fox, 2001; Verba et al., 1993). Additionally, because poverty often intersects with race, gender and social class, socioeconomically disempowered residents may also experience mistrust of government due to intergenerational oppression, trauma, racial discrimination, and overall negative experiences with authority (Ibid). Accordingly, disempowered and marginalized residents are less likely to participate in formal political activities, such as voting, public engagement events, or writing to local politicians (Lawless & Fox, 2001; Verba et al., 1995).

Resilience aside, this is an important problem for all planning and policymaking. This lack of representation constitutes an injustice because the needs, interests and portrayal of the group are interpreted and communicated by actors that not only do not belong to that group, but also, structurally speaking, have benefitted from their oppression (Fraser, 1997). Moreover, practically, it means that the interests and lived experiences of disempowered groups are not captured in planning or policymaking forums. The resultant plans and policies hence, for at least some groups, miss out on the many benefits of a robust public engagement process; notably, that the resulting decisions are consensual and approximate public interest (Innes, 1996); that plans are perceived as legitimate (Innes, 1996; Healey, 1998); and that diverse forms of local knowledge and meaning are recognized (Healey, 1998). Evidently, then, successfully engaging disadvantaged residents is challenging, but essential to deploying negotiated resilience in the planning process.

The following sections will delve into how these issues unfold at the local scale in the City of Toronto, characterize the city's marginalized communities, and begin to explain how the ResilientTO has attempted to overcome these challenges to advancing resilience equitably.


### 3.4 Situating Toronto

In the context of Toronto, Canada's most populous city, many of the aforementioned intersectional challenges are most prevalent across the city's Neighbourhood Improvement Areas (NIAs). For social planning purposes, the City of Toronto is divided into 140 distinct neighbourhoods; in 2005, the City launched the first iteration of the Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods program, a municipal social planning initiative which focuses on social inequality, access to opportunity, and other justice issues in Toronto's neighbourhoods. At that time, 13 priority neighbourhoods were identified. Future iterations saw the addition of new priority areas and nomenclature such that the Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy for 2020 (TSNS2020) identified 31 NIAs and 8 "Emerging Neighbourhoods" (former priority areas that have experienced considerable development or are otherwise not considered NIAs) (City of Toronto, 2015).

The NIAs were selected based on 5 domains of wellbeing stemming from the World Health Organization's Urban Health Equity Assessment and Response Tool: physical surroundings, economic opportunities, healthy lives, social development, and participation in civic decision-making. Embedded in these domains are more specific indicators such as "unemployment, high school graduation, walkability, access to community space and access to healthy food in the neighbourhood" (p. 9, City of Toronto, 2015). The 31 NIAs constitute neighbourhoods that scored low across these indices; in short, compared to more affluent parts of the city, they are


disadvantaged urban neighbourhoods that lack equitable access to the physical, social and economic opportunities required to live comfortably and in good health. The “Three Cities Within Toronto” report (and corresponding Neighbourhood Change Research Partnership at the University of Toronto) provides a thorough account of the geographic distribution of income inequality in the city, although the term NIA had not yet been coined at the time of publication (Hulchanski, 2010).

**Figure 8: Toronto's Neighbourhood Improvement Areas.**



Source: p. 24, "Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020", City of Toronto, 2015.

**Figure 9: Income polarization and neighbourhood change in Toronto.**



Source: p. 53, "Toronto's First Resilience Strategy", City of Toronto, 2019.

In the 1970's, low-income residents of Toronto tended to live within the inner city, but gentrification and urban intensification caused affordable housing (and, with it, poverty) to be gradually pushed to the outer suburbs. This has meant that Toronto's low income residents have been subjected to decreasing access to services and transit (Amar & Teelucksingh, 2015; Hulchanski, 2010). Additionally, over the same period, the proportion of middle income residents has shrunk as incomes become more polarized, so disadvantaged households are both more prevalent and more physically marginalized than in decades past (City of Toronto, 2019; Hulchanski, 2010). Accordingly, most of the NIA's identified in TSNS2020 are in the City's outer suburbs.

The NIA's are also largely immigrant communities and communities of colour; the Three Cities Within Toronto report found that in 2006, 61% of households in low-income neighbourhoods were immigrant communities, a drastic increase from 31% of low-income households in 1970 (p. 11, Hulchanski, 2010). Toronto's First Resilience Strategy, featuring an analysis contributed by the same Neighbourhood Change Research Partnership but using more recent data from 2016, identifies that 69% of residents in low-income neighbourhoods are people of colour<sup>8</sup>, compared to only 27%<sup>9</sup> in high-income neighbourhoods (Hulchanski & Maaranen in City of Toronto, 2019). Additionally, roughly 30% of low income families reside in apartment towers, which are more vulnerable to power shortages, acute shocks such as fires, and extreme heat and weather events (City of Toronto, 2019). With respect to transportation, immigrants and racial minorities are more likely to use transit and are disproportionately affected by disruptions and poor

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<sup>8</sup> 19% South Asian, 13% Chinese, 13% Black, and 23% "other". This analysis was based on 2016 census data and did not include Indigenous peoples, so the overlap of geographic and income marginality for Indigenous peoples in Toronto is less well-documented.

<sup>9</sup> 4% South Asian, 8% Chinese, 3% Black, and 11% "other".

connectivity; black Torontonians and immigrants face longer commute times and are more likely to commute via transit (Amar & Teelucksingh, 2015; City of Toronto, 2019). Lastly, Indigenous residents are disempowered and marginalized in Toronto but less clearly geographically segregated. More than 30% of Indigenous adults in the city were homeless or precariously housed in 2018 (p. 60, City of Toronto, 2019) and Indigenous people across North America / Turtle Island face numerous other inequalities as a result of intergenerational trauma due to historic and ongoing discrimination and assimilative practices (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015).

Toronto's First Resilience Strategy acknowledges and discusses the intersectionality of poverty, vulnerability, neighbourhood, gender, race, and class. It identifies equity as central to resilience efforts, explaining that it was, by far, the most frequent concern identified by residents and stakeholders during public consultation (City of Toronto, 2019). In later sections, we describe in greater detail how ResilientTO represented issues of social, economic and racial inequality in Toronto's First Resilience Strategy, and how the strategy compares to 31 other City Resilience Strategies produced under 100RC with respect to prioritizing equity.

In the next section we describe the methods used to explore how the City of Toronto grappled with these aforementioned issues in the planning process.

### 3.5 Methods and Limitations

This research used inductive grounded theory methods explore a case study of equity-focused resilience planning in the City of Toronto. Whereas a deductive approach aims to test a specific hypothesis or theory, an inductive approach allows the data to inform the resultant theory or

explanation (Creswell, 2013b). Charmaz (2006) explains that grounded theory methods “consist of systematic, yet flexible guidelines for collecting and analyzing qualitative data to construct theories ‘grounded’ in the data themselves” (p. 2). In grounded theory research, the data is often analyzed concurrently as it is collected, allowing the research direction to be progressively shaped by findings (Charmaz, 2006; Creswell, 2013a). Importantly, while grounded theory methods are often used to develop a novel theory – particularly in the case of topics that have not been well-explored – the data unearthed in this research has instead corroborated the importance of an existing theory, “negotiated resilience” (Harris et al., 2017), and provided new empirical insights to inform the use of negotiated resilience in planning practices.

More specifically, we entered into this research with with the broad goal of exploring the planning process of ResilientTO, questioning whether and how it might be different from other City planning processes. Social justice and equity were of key analytical interest. Early interview insights began to point in the direction of the Resilient Conversations approach as being one of the most prevalent and unique ways in which ResilientTO grappled with equity. This early finding shaped the research by influencing later sampling protocol, interview questions, and literature review. In particular, while a preliminary literature review on the relationship between resilience and social equity inspired this research topic, the literature review was also expanded in late phases of the research to check, explain, and cross-reference with analytical findings from this research (Charmaz, 2006), especially with respect to social justice and inclusion in public engagement processes. Open coding of qualitative interviews is a common approach to data processing in grounded theory research, whereby statements made by participants are clustered by similarity in order to illuminate key findings and themes (Creswell, 2013b); this is the approach that we have taken to interpret interviews for this research.

In later phases of the research, protocols were adapted to explore implementation gaps and triggers for success in “doing” social equity in resilience strategy development process. The initial sampling protocol for key informant interviews used in early phases of research (August 2018 – March 2019) targeted two main groups: City of Toronto staff who had been directly involved in the ResilientTO process (either as contributing staff, or through working groups), and staff from external partner organizations. Inductive analysis of the interview responses pointed to the use of Local Champions to advance equity in the planning process, so in later phases of data collection (March 2019 – June 2019), sampling protocol was adjusted to focus on interviewing stakeholders who had interacted directly with this program: the Local Champions themselves, as well as staff from the Centre for Connected Communities, and the City of Toronto’s Resilience and Social Development, Finance and Administration offices.

**Table 5: Characterizing the interview sample**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Role in ResilientTO</b>	<b>Interviewees</b>
City of Toronto: Resilience Office	Core staff involved in producing Toronto’s First Resilience Strategy	3
Local Champions	Community representatives; Resilient Conversation facilitators	2
Centre for Connected Communities (C3)	Key partner; Facilitated relationship to Local Champions	2
City of Toronto: Environment and Energy Division	Participants in ResilientTO Working Groups	3
City of Toronto: Social Development, Finance and Administration	Participants in ResilientTO Working Groups; Facilitated relationship to C3	2
		<b>TOTAL: 12</b>

In order to protect the anonymity of participants, throughout this paper, the highest level of abstraction practical will be used to refer to interviewees. For example, if a quote or paraphrased statement from an interviewee in the Environment and Energy Division is used, but their division

or employer is not relevant, we simply refer to them as “an interviewee”. Conversely, if it is relevant and important to the finding for the reader to know that the statement came from an internal stakeholder employed by the City, we refer to them as “a City of Toronto staff member”, “a member of one of the Working Groups”, or the most relevant equivalent. In many cases, it is essential to differentiate between the perspectives of interviewees who have had a direct hand in the production of the strategy, so frequently, we refer to “core staff from the Resilience Office”, “a Local Champion” or “a key collaborator on ResilientTO”. Interviewees gave their consent to use anonymous quotations in this research.

Observational methods were also used, largely to corroborate findings from the interviews and screen for possible discrepancies in the way the ResilientTO project was communicated to different stakeholders. Two stakeholder engagement events were attended in December 2018 and June 2019 respectively to collect observations about the nature of stakeholder engagement, the issues raised by stakeholders, and the way that the strategy was communicated by the Resilience Office. The first attended event in December 2018 was the Resilient Action Workshop, attended by over 100 stakeholders and members of the public. The intent of this event was to devise ideas for actions, and review the findings from an internal Visions and Principles workshop held in September, which engaged the Local Champions and City staff from various divisions. It was at this event that one author first met one of the Local Champions in-person and began to explore the program in greater detail. The second observed event, in June 2019, was the official launch of Toronto’s First Resilience Strategy. Engagement activities revolved around advancing the actions described in the strategy across its two core issue areas: climate change, and neighbourhood equity. The narrative surrounding ResilientTO and the Resilient Conversations approach remained largely consistent across interviews, public meetings, and the strategy itself.

This was the only major finding pertinent to this research that emerged from these events, so subsequent sections of this paper prioritize findings from the interviews.

Lastly, following the strategy's official launch, we conducted a plan evaluation of it using the content analysis framework deployed in Fitzgibbons & Mitchell (2019). This analysis revealed that in addition to having a strongly equity-focused engagement process "behind the scenes", the written content of the report was also highly focused on themes of equity and neighbourhood resilience. Notably, it received a higher score than any of the 31 strategies analyzed for our previous research, largely because it featured more robust discussion of recognitional and distributive dimensions of justice than the other sampled strategies. The main purpose of this content analysis was to determine whether the equity-focused engagement processes resulted in a greater focus on equity in the written content of the report. Indeed, it did, which suggests that our hypothesis from Fitzgibbons & Mitchell (2019) may be true in some cases: the degree to which equity is emphasized in written content of the strategy is likely a reasonable proxy for the degree to which equity was prioritized in the stakeholder engagement processes preceding the strategy. We further postulate that the degree to which equity is emphasized in a resilience strategy is significantly influenced by core staff in the City's resilience office, as we hypothesized in Fitzgibbons & Mitchell (2019).

By using a combination of approaches to triangulate findings, most of the drawbacks associated with relying on a singular method have been overcome. However, some important limitations are worth noting. Using grounded theory and inductive reasoning meant that the Resilient Conversations approach did not emerge as the natural case study until relatively late in the ResilientTO planning process. Because of this, the authors missed the opportunity to attend and observe important Local Champions events, such as the Visions and Principles workshop, or any

of the Resilient Conversations held in NIAs. Without having attended the Resilient Conversations, we were unable to access the attendees of these events – lay-residents from the respective NIAs – who may have had different perspectives on the program than the Local Champions, C3, and City of Toronto staff. Due to their employment arrangements and/or honorariums received, these actors may have felt obligated to portray the work in a favourable light, whereas lay-residents might have been more free to share critical reflections on the sessions. Additionally, because the Local Champions underwent a capacity building program to gain membership to the network, they likely have different perspectives than lay-residents from NIAs who have had less direct exposure to government decision-making, or who have had negative interactions with government. Additionally, two members of the Local Champions network were interviewed for this research, only one of whom had facilitated Resilient Conversations in their community; the other participated during public stakeholder engagement events. Accordingly, our findings are not fully representative of the full scope of experiences and perspectives of the 7 centrally involved Local Champions that facilitated Resilient Conversations for ResilientTO.

The following sections explain the ResilientTO strategy development process and provide a glimpse of how Toronto’s First Resilience Strategy compares to 31 other City Resilience Strategies produced under 100RC with respect to emphasizing equity in strategy content. The sections thereafter explain how the ResilientTO project team and their partners sought to overcome the aforementioned challenges of engaging disempowered residents through an initiative targeting NIAs called “Resilient Conversations”. In so doing, we provide new empirical evidence to corroborate Harris et al.’s (2017) argument that the shortcoming of resilience

approaches relating to equity and justice can be overcome by re-framing resilience as a deliberative process.

### 3.6 Comparing Toronto and other 100RC City Resilience Strategies

As previously mentioned, this paper follows from previous research examining a broad sample of City Resilience Strategies from member cities of 100RC (Fitzgibbons & Mitchell, 2019). This research revealed that overall emphasis on equity and justice was not consistent across City Resilience Strategies, and posited that there are yet-unearthed triggers for success within the strategy development process and City governments in participating cities that influence the degree to which a participating city prioritizes equity. This paper, accordingly, seeks to explore how and why one participating city chose to prioritize issues of social equity.

Because Toronto's First Resilience Strategy was published near the end of this research project's timeline, we had no preconceptions about how equity might have been emphasized or neglected in the case of Toronto. However, when the strategy was released in June 2019, we conducted a post-hoc analysis using the same analytical framework that was deployed for this previous research and compared Toronto's City Resilience Strategy to 31 others produced under 100RC. The analytical framework for this plan evaluation used a combination of directed and summative content analysis; that is, by way of a "checklist" where points were allocated if a criteria was sufficiently or partially fulfilled, as well as open coding of key statements and themes of interest in strategy content. For a full explanation of the methods and analytical criteria, see our previous paper (Fitzgibbons & Mitchell, 2019).


This post-hoc analysis reveals that Toronto emphasized social equity considerably more than most other City Resilience Strategies in our sample. Whereas, as Figure 3 demonstrates, several

other cities scored well with respect to Open Process, Toronto's higher score is largely attributable to the fact that it fulfilled more criteria under the Recognitional and Distributive dimensions of justice. Some of these criteria were rarely fulfilled by other strategies in the sample, such as such as: attempting to mitigate or reconcile previous acts of injustice; acknowledging that that some benefits are not accessible to all stakeholders; attempting to manage this by improving access and circumstances for specific disempowered stakeholders; and, acknowledging how municipal and other governments are partially responsible for distributive injustices due to historic under-investment and lack of representation in decision-making processes.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Appendices A and B can be used to compare how Toronto scored against other City Resilience Strategies in relation to specific directed criteria.

**Figure 10: Toronto's First Resilience Strategy compared to other 100RC strategies**



Qualitative observation revealed specific features within Toronto’s First Resilience Strategy which set it apart from others with respect to equity. For example, in several of the strategies, specific actions are linked to the anticipated shocks, stresses or co-benefits by way of icons or “Resilience Objective / Value / Benefit” statements (see, for examples, the City Resilience Strategies for Athens, Greece; Mexico City, Mexico; Melbourne, Australia). Toronto’s First Resilience Strategy additionally communicates an “Equity Impact” for most of its embedded actions, which was unique even among other strategies with a heavy focus on equity. While less rigorous or precise than, for example, Dallas’s Equity Indicators, including this as a gesture may

have helped to ensure that social equity was a consideration even among actions that were more traditionally oriented to physical infrastructure. Toronto's First Resilience Strategy also has several noteworthy addendums that are relevant to social equity, such as the Resilient Conversations Toolkit (discussed in subsequent sections) and the Indigenous Climate Action Summary Report, which is a preliminary effort to integrate Indigenous Traditional Knowledge and decision-making into the City's climate change action efforts. The Strategy also opened with an acknowledgement that the modern city of Toronto sits on the traditional territory of several First Nations, a point which was reiterated several times throughout the strategy, and which was the subject of some specific actions. By contrast, Montreal was the only other Canadian City Resilience Strategy analyzed for this research and the first Canadian strategy to be published; it contains neither a land acknowledgement nor any substantive mention of First Nations, Inuit or Metis people<sup>11</sup>.

Most notably for this paper, only 23% of the 31 previously sampled strategies appeared to offer residents an opportunity to identify their own needs, priorities and portrayal during the strategy development process. Only four other sampled cities provided clear evidence of having specifically consulted or engaged marginalized groups and six others provided latent or less clear evidence alluding to the possibility (see Appendix B, Criteria 32). However, even among the cities that fulfilled this criteria, only Glasgow and Greater Christchurch described this process in detail, and both of these cities appeared to have used non-profit and civil society organizations as

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<sup>11</sup> In the Montreal strategy, First Nations people are listed once alongside other vulnerable populations such as seniors, immigrants, and people with disabilities. Apart from this, the words "Indigenous", "First Nations", "Inuit", "Metis" or "Aboriginal" do not appear in the strategy. We regard this as a major transgression of recognitional justice. By contrast, both Calgary and Vancouver released resilience strategies in 2019, shortly after Toronto's launch, and these appear to feature more robust acknowledgement of First Nations, although neither were analyzed for this research.

representatives rather than engaging marginalized lay-residents directly.<sup>12</sup> Toronto's First Resilience Strategy is the only city analyzed which described having made concerted efforts to engage disempowered lay-residents themselves. This was achieved through a dialogue-centered initiative called Resilient Conversations, which is the focus of the rest of this paper.

### 3.7 Timeline and the ResilientTO engagement process


The City of Toronto was one of the third and final cohort of cities to join the 100RC network. Figure 11 below describes the timeline of developing Toronto's City Resilience Strategy from application to 100RC in 2015, formal acceptance to the network in 2016, to the strategy's public launch in June 2019. The Chief Resilience Officer was hired in 2017 following initial agenda setting activities. Like all cities in the 100RC network, Toronto underwent a semi-standardized process of developing the City Resilience Strategy. The first official phase of work (following the Agenda Setting Workshop and subsequent hiring of the CRO) was the Preliminary Resilience Assessment, which largely took place throughout 2017. This phase was comprised of wide-reaching public consultation focused on collecting information and opinions about the city's chronic shocks and acute stresses. The following phase, "Strategy Development," took place throughout 2018 and was when the majority of co-creation and "deep engagement" activities with key stakeholders and Local Champions took place; the Resilient Conversations, in particular, took place in July and August of 2018. This phase culminated in a public Resilient

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<sup>12</sup> In the case of Glasgow, the strategy describes having engaged stakeholder groups in roleplay and future scenario visioning; the nine stakeholder groups engaged included "Glasgow Disability Alliance; West of Scotland Racial Equality Council; Interfaith Glasgow; Glasgow Homelessness Network and the City Mission" (p. 9, City of Glasgow & 100 Resilient Cities, 2016). In Greater Christchurch, local Maori tribal leadership were extensively engaged in the strategy development process as members of the Greater Christchurch Partnership and are assumed to represent their constituents and Maori people living in the region (Greater Christchurch Partnership, 2016).

Action Workshop in 2018, where the Resilience Office compiled the findings of both public and stakeholder engagement thus far into a series of 6 core issue areas: Equity, Climate and Environment, Civic Engagement, Communities and Neighbourhoods, Housing, and Mobility. Finally, “Toronto’s First Resilience Strategy” – intentionally named to emphasize the City’s intention to iterate and adapt in subsequent years – launched on June 4<sup>th</sup>, 2019 to an audience of stakeholders and the media (City of Toronto, 2019; personal and public communications, 2018, 2019).

**Figure 11: ResilientTO strategy development and engagement timeline**



The wider stakeholder engagement strategy for ResilientTO was developed first by a Senior Strategic Policy Consultant with extensive public engagement experience in public and private sector planning. Another staff member at ResilientTO supported executing public engagement with a particular focus on NIA's, and a third ResilientTO staff member held the role of liaison and facilitated coordination and alignment especially amongst other City divisions. These three staff members and the Chief Resilience Officer comprised the ResilientTO core team tasked with developing Toronto's First Resilience Strategy, although several other City staff members from other divisions were also involved through the application process and working groups.

Several partnerships, key events, and public outreach efforts underpinned ResilientTO's public engagement process. Some of these included establishing Resilience Hubs in partnership with the Toronto Foundation, large public consultations in the Toronto Public Library, and a Telephone Town Hall event which over-sampled NIAs and marginal areas of the city; it yielded more than 6,000 participants, more than 1,400 of whom participated for more than 5 minutes (City of Toronto, 2019; personal communication, 2018). For the purposes of this paper, we will focus on a particularly intensive engagement endeavor known as Resilient Conversations, but in sum, consultation processes were both collaboratively designed and executed across several core staff and partners to ResilientTO.

As part of the "deep" engagement activities facilitated in NIAs, ResilientTO co-created a public engagement toolkit alongside grassroots leaders (Local Champions) and a local non-profit (Centre for Connected Communities).

**Figure 12: Resilient Conversations actors and process model for ResilientTO**




Figure 12 above conveys a visual model of how the Local Champions, the Centre for Connected Communities (C3) and ResilientTO collaborated for the Resilient Conversations work. The ResilientTO core staff member who led equity-focused engagement worked with the Centre for Connected Communities (C3) to identify and engage 7 (originally 8) Local Champions from NIAs around Toronto. The Local Champions program was not developed for the purposes of ResilientTO; rather, it is an existing and ongoing initiative originally spearheaded by the City of Toronto’s Social Development, Finance and Administration (SDFA) division in partnership with C3, who designed and continue to deliver the program. C3 describes Local Champions as “a one year capacity building program designed to provide seasoned grassroots leaders with the vocabulary, context and tools so that they can influence the systems that affect them” (Centre for Connected Communities, n.d.). When Local Champions complete the capacity building program,

they become permanent members of the network and hold status as grassroots community organizers.

According to interviewees from both C3 and the SDFa division, the Local Champions were always intended to serve as community informants to City of Toronto planning and policymaking processes. Four interviewees (two from C3, one from ResilientTO and one from SDFa) noted that ResilientTO appeared to be the first strategic planning process to engage the Champions in co-creation and co-facilitation, whereas other strategies consulted the Champions for their expertise and perspective – for example, through Neighbourhood Planning Tables - but did not co-create materials with them. Accordingly, the Resilient Conversations approach was inspired by a blend of ongoing NIA-focused engagement approaches taken by the city, best practices in public engagement more broadly, and one staff member’s previous career experiences with dialogue- and justice-focused engagements (described in subsequent sections).

As conveyed in Figure 12, for ResilientTO, each Local Champion collaborated mainly with one core staff member of ResilientTO and with staff at C3 to co-create a toolkit for equitable consultation. Once satisfied with the product, the Champions then took this toolkit (the Resilient Conversations Toolkit) and used it to facilitate “Resilient Conversations” with 20-30 residents in their neighbourhood without presence or facilitation from ResilientTO or C3. The Local Champions documented the feedback heard during these conversations, and returned it to the ResilientTO core staff member, who integrated it into the written content and initiatives in the final City Resilience Strategy. Overall, the perspectives of more than 200 hard-to-reach residents from 7 NIAs were captured through this process.

The Resilient Conversations Toolkit itself is now a publicly available facilitation guide that can be found online and in Toronto Public Libraries across the city (personal communication, 2019).

The target audience or facilitators for the toolkit may include “non-profit staff, frontline workers, City staff and stakeholders, community based organizations, faith-based groups, citizens/residents, tenant groups and representatives, and neighbourhood librarians” (p. 12, Ejaz et al., 2018). The toolkit itself is comprised of 6 key tools, each with embedded steps and exercises to facilitate Resilient Conversations. The tools are:

1. Raising awareness and sharing stories
2. Building relationships and trust
3. Resilience mapping
4. Knowing our past: A history of stresses and shocks
5. Revisiting our stories: New insights, thoughts and reflections
6. Creating a resilience vision: Proposals, ideas and actions (p. 13, Ejaz et al., 2018)

Each of the steps and activities embedded in the 6 tools are designed to be easily facilitated with basic materials available in most public libraries (such as, for example flipchart paper, markers, and a video screen). Each of the 6 tools is designed to take roughly 30 minutes to complete. The toolkit also provides several options for combining the tools and specific facilitation instructions through “carousel tools”, which are essentially pre-packaged combinations of three of the tools designed to facilitate 90 minute Resilient Conversations. The focus varies from tool to tool, but in general, they draw on the importance of storytelling, oral history of the neighbourhood, empathy, social learning and collective reflection; and, have participants work together toward the superordinate goal of developing a shared vision of what a resilient neighbourhood might look like (Ejaz et al., 2018).

For the purposes of developing Toronto’s First Resilience Strategy, ResilientTO co-created this toolkit with the Local Champions and C3. Then, the Local Champions piloted the toolkit,

facilitating Resilient Conversations with lay-residents in their respective neighbourhoods. The overall program served as a pilot project for ongoing equity-focused and dialogue-focused resilience work in NIAs. In the following sections, we will draw on data from key informant interviews to explain how the ResilientTO core staff, C3 and Local Champions co-designed the Resilient Conversations process to address two important dimensions of procedural justice: overcoming barriers to consulting disempowered residents, and the importance of dialogue and conversation. Through open coding of interviews, four key themes of interest emerged: A. The importance of conversation for both resilience and justice; B. (Mis)trust and oppression as barriers to equitable engagement; C. Implementation challenges; and D. Implementation enablers.

### 3.8 Interview findings

#### A. *“Negotiated Resilience” through Resilient Conversations, and the importance of dialogue*

One instrumental core staff member at ResilientTO gave a robust account of the lineage of the Resilient Conversations approach, noting that it was significantly influenced by the interviewee’s previous experience working in HIV/AIDS prevention in Africa using a “Community Capacity Enhancement – Community Conversations Approach” (herein referred to as ‘Community Conversations’). The Community Conversations approach, deployed by the Nelson Mandela Foundation and informed by the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Community Capacity Enhancement framework (Gueye, Diouf, Chaava, & Tiomkin, 2005; Nelson Mandela Foundation, 2009, 2010), was borne partly of an understanding that many of the most wide-reaching and well-funded HIV/AIDS prevention initiatives directed at the pandemic in Sub-Saharan Africa were advanced by western science and policy actors, leading to an

absence of solutions informed by lived experience with the virus. Rolston (2010, 2016) refers to this dynamic as “hegemonic benevolence”. Problematically, this structure means that the western scholars and policy actors who develop and prescribe solutions to HIV/AIDS in Africa continue to benefit from a legacy of colonialism and cultural domination, work within institutions that were built and financed by African slave labour (and other oppressive colonial practices), and develop “solutions” that are often informed by racist misperceptions about the behaviour and personal care practices of HIV/AIDS-infected African people (Rolston, 2010, 2016). In short, the people advancing solutions to African problems have benefitted from the oppression of African people.

African people with lived experience with the retrovirus have historically been precluded from taking part in conversations around HIV/AIDS prevention. (Rolston, 2010, 2016). In much the same way, low-income racialized residents in Toronto have largely been precluded from developing and advancing solutions to their own poverty and oppressive city building practices. Conversely, the Community Conversations approach (adapted and re-named “Resilient Conversations” for the ResilientTO project) foregrounds community networks, voice, agency, and lived experience, rather than treating these as externalities to the process of crafting solutions. To use a cliché, the concept is familiar: solutions “by the people, for the people”, but with the acknowledgement that some people are prevented from taking part in conventional solution-building processes due to systemic barriers and hegemonies.

Additionally, by centring issues of voice, power and negotiation, the Resilient Conversations approach operationalizes the concept of “negotiated resilience” (Harris et al., 2017), though without using this specific terminology. Indeed, “resilience is a process” emerged as a de-facto motto for ResilientTO and is both emphasized in the strategy (pg. 9) and was repeatedly re-

iterated during stakeholder engagement events (public communication, Dec. 2018; Jun. 2019). During interviews, the importance of contestation, power relations, and dissensus in Resilient Conversations were well-recognized by ResilientTO staff and partners. Room for argument and conversation were intentionally built into the consultation approach because of the importance that these processes serve for strengthening community cooperation and networks, which were seen as crucial dimensions of resilience. As one ResilientTO core staff member described:

“We see the input that we get from people as data, not a side project, so we want to ground all the work in what we hear from people. But there’s also this sort of meta-process [whereby] the engagement that we’re doing is also a testing ground, and part of building resilience in-and-of-itself.” ... “The [Resilient Conversations] ... are part of community building and part of building relationships with people in those communities. We often hear people say things like ‘I’ve never met with this kind of a group before’, or ‘this is a new thing for us’.”

Reflecting on the Resilient Conversations and the importance of contestation in particular, one instrumental ResilientTO staff member commented:

“Most [of the Resilient Conversations] went really well – I say that really carefully ... because I think it’s really problematic to put a quality measurement on a resident dialogue ... Conversations can fall apart. Sometimes they’re supposed to.”

Rather than trying to consolidate divergent definitions or force consensus about how resilience would look in different communities, ResilientTO embraced localized perspectives through the “Neighbourhood Resilience” branch of the strategy, allowing NIAs to define resilience in their

own terms. To this end, ResilientTO took the view of resilience as being a boundary object with several divergent but respected definitions rather than a descriptive term (Brand & Jax, 2007).

Several interviewees noted the profound impression made by the Vision and Principles workshop, in particular, which brought together the Local Champions to collaborate with public servants and department heads from several of the City's divisions "What happened in the room that day was really magical," one interviewee reflected:

"There were maybe 150 folks in suits [from] downtown proper, in a tall office building ... and then there were these 8 Local Champions who were strategically placed at each table, and at every one of those tables, the Local Champions led the conversations. ... Those two [groups] never get together in a room."

By treating resilience as a boundary object, ResilientTO was able to advance negotiated resilience by bringing together actors with varying levels of power and lived experience to the municipal decision-making process.

#### *B. Trust and oppression in public consultation*

All of the core staff involved with ResilientTO at both the City of Toronto and the Centre for Connected Communities commented on the difficulty that municipal governments have when attempting to engage disempowered communities, and how the Local Champions were instrumental facilitating consultation with marginalized residents who are conventionally left out. Simply put, the systemic barriers and oppressive forces previously discussed (eg. (Lawless & Fox, 2001; Verba et al., 1995, 1993) are well understood by practitioners.

One ResilientTO core staff member commented:

“Vulnerable communities are weirdly over-consulted away but then also not really listened to. ... One of the major outcomes of our work that we’ve done in NIAs is that there’s a deep lack of trust in government and in engagement processes. There’s a feeling that the City asks and then doesn’t really care about the answer, and then doesn’t really respond and doesn’t get back to us about our needs, and/or makes decisions that are not in our best interest.”

Indeed, most ResilientTO core staff commented during interviews that these barriers were exactly the reason they chose to engage Local Champions. By effectively outsourcing the public consultation in NIA’s to more trusted and familiar community leaders, one interviewee explained, ResilientTO was able to “reach those other populations that might not necessarily feel comfortable talking to us”.

The wide and robust recognition of this important problem amongst public servant interviewees raised an important follow-up question: why, then, does every strategic planning process not make use of this approach? Theme C below explores some of the reflections presented by interviewees in relation to this question.

### *C. Implementation challenges*

When asked about what, if anything, made ResilientTO unique from other strategic planning processes held by the City, most interviewees commented on the robustness of its public and stakeholder engagement approach. Importantly, some interviewees pointed out that ResilientTO is not the only strategic planning process to have been creative or inclusive with its public engagement; at least three interviewees pointed to the TSNS2020 and the Poverty Reduction

Strategy as also having taken steps to “[substantively] engage people who are not the usual suspects” (one interviewed Local Champion had participated in all three, but not always in their capacity as a Local Champion). Nonetheless, even those interviewees who acknowledged the other creative engagements taking place noted that these were not typical or familiar approaches for the City, although several noted the sentiment that “things are changing”.

Three interrelated sub-themes emerged within the overall theme of implementation challenges: budgeting and fair compensation (C.1.), gatekeeping (C.2.), and time constraints (C.3.). When asked about why dialogue- and equity-focused approaches to consultation were not taken more often, the most common hurdles were perhaps unsurprising: inflexibility in bureaucratic processes, time constraints, and budget constraints. The “time” and “budget” constraints, however, were not framed by any participants as a matter of the City simply not *having* enough, but rather, as the need to re-think municipal budgeting of finances and time in order to allow for more time and flexibility (hence, linked to the issue of inflexible bureaucratic processes).

To some extent, C3’s role as a gatekeeper of the Local Champions helped to manage some of these challenges by providing structure in the absence of a clear municipal standard for contracting resident experts. Interviewees at both C3 and ResilientTO commented that while the increased time requirements serve as a deterrent for City governments in committing to these types of approaches, the longer durations are actually one of the defining features that make such approaches more successful from an equity standpoint, because deliberation and working toward a superordinate goal helps to build trust between stakeholders.

### ***C.1. Budgeting and fair compensation***

All ResilientTO staff members except the Chief Resilience Officer had prior experience working internally in other City divisions, and could personally reflect on the differences between

ResilientTO and other strategic planning processes. While all agreed on the importance of additional accommodations to engage marginalized residents, their perspectives on what constituted appropriate amounts of time and compensation were heterogeneous. One ResilientTO staff member commented:

“The actual money spent was, like, less than \$5,000. It’s not that much money. It’s more about the staff time and building the relationships, that’s what’s resource-intensive. And then part of it is just, like, paying for food at meetings, paying for their transportation, paying for honorariums, and stuff that we think is really important and critical to get engagement from people who are not just the usual suspects. But it doesn’t actually cost that much money.”.

Conversely, another ResilientTO staff member commented, “Our budget was nowhere close to being fully respectful. ... We didn’t have the budget to pay people like we should have,” and commented that C3 also contributed facilitation materials and other supports to supplement ResilientTO’s budgetary limitations for the work. This interviewee also described needing to change the engagement approach part way through in order to avoid exploiting the labour of Local Champions:

“We planned on having a final meeting where we were supposed to turn that Resilient Conversations toolkit into a long-term toolkit. ... But then I realized, if we were going to use Local Champions’ time, they had already done so much work, so to ask everyone to come back and sit down for another four hours, and recreate this toolkit in a permanent way, that wasn’t well-planned on my part.” ... “When I think about complications ... [in the future] I would start much earlier than I need to ... and [figure out] how to budget and compensate people so that it’s worth their while to be there. And

not just sort of, like, honorariums, but if you have folks like Local Champions, they're basically local consultants. They're experts and community leaders, and we should pay them as such."

In sum, while all ResilientTO staff members commented on the importance of compensation and additional efforts to engage marginalized residents, there was some interpretive discrepancy about what constituted appropriate payment or inclusion measures. In the above examples, while one interviewee pointed to the use of honorariums as a positive example, another interviewee felt that they were an insufficient gesture. Because the City government lacks a standardized framework for contracting resident experts, a lack of consensus on this matter may signal a hindrance to future attempts to replicate the process in other City divisions or jurisdictions. City staff who do not deal explicitly with issues of justice or disempowerment in their work may not know how to effectively budget for all of the nuances of an inclusive and co-creative process, and indeed, even those who do work in this space may not agree on what constitutes appropriate compensation. In the case of ResilientTO, this points to the importance of C3 as a gatekeeper and administrator of the Local Champions.

### ***C.2. Gatekeeping***

Infusing equity and fair compensation for actors who are not City-employed, not registered professional consultants, and not registered charities, is an area of institutional capacity that needs improvement; three interviewees (two from C3, one from ResilientTO) asserted this point. One interviewee commented that:

"[Grassroots leaders] need to be brought to the table as partners – with power, and with money. That's a complex process for the City to wrap its head around and make happen, and I don't think it's been done in that way yet. But there's a lot of momentum around

it.” ... “The city government, major funders, whoever we’re talking about, can try to engage grassroots groups, but the City doesn’t actually know how to fund grassroots groups that [don’t] have charitable status.”

This ostensibly points to the importance of C3 and similar organizations as “gatekeepers” of the Local Champions. C3 is a registered charity and can serve as a vehicle for paying the Local Champions, and additionally, they advise both the City and Local Champions about fair labour and compensation. Two interviewees confirmed that C3 uses a pay rate of \$25 per hour to compensate the Local Champions; however, if the Champions were to be contracted directly by the City rather than sub-contracted by C3, it would be up to the City division and the Champion to negotiate fair pay.

An interviewee from C3 described their gatekeeper status as having both opportunities and drawbacks:

“I think one of the challenges that we face is the inability of The City to contract directly with Local Champions. They have to contract C3, who has to contract the Local Champions.” ... “Sometimes [it’s] really important [to do it that way]. If it’s a new piece of work then we are coaches and mentors and everything to the Local Champions. But as time goes on, if Local Champions are really going to be contracted experts in their own right, we need to figure out a better way for them to have a direct relationship with the City instead of going through us.”

On the other hand, the ResilientTO staff member who was most involved with C3 and the Local Champions commented:

“C3 has a really progressive approach to the way that it does stuff with respect to community, and I think that what made the City’s work around resilience strong was the partnership. Having folks at the table like [the staff at C3], they don’t mince words. They’re straight-up about how you should work with community and how you shouldn’t.” ... “And I don’t think that the lens would have been the same if we had tried to do it completely on our own or if we had found some way to just work [directly] with Local Champions.”

Accordingly, while some interviewees from C3 found the City’s inability to contract directly with Local Champions to be problematic, we posit that their involvement and role as a gatekeeper ultimately had a positive influence on the project and enabled a direct collaboration and partnership between City government and residents from marginalized neighbourhoods that otherwise would not have been possible within the City’s existing bureaucratic constraints. However, we note that there are potential drawbacks to using an intermediary organization which were not explored in this research. For example, a non-profit intermediary organization may only be able to administrate such a program for as long as it can secure a suitable grant or funding stream for the work. Additionally, the program is likely to be influenced by the positionality and mandate of gatekeeper organizations. Lastly, a gatekeeper organization necessarily moderates resident access to the City, and similarly, City’s access to residents or Local Champions. Interactions between the City and Local Champions are hence influenced by the presence of the intermediary organization, which likely presents both benefits and drawbacks. While a full exploration of the pros and cons of using intermediary organizations is out of scope for this paper, we implore City governments and other organizations that are considering deploying this

type of approach to explore these possibilities in their own local contexts before entering a partnership.

### *C.3. Time*

The final sub-theme that emerged within the broader theme of implementation challenges was the issue of time. Simply put, lengthy consultation processes were seen as both the “blessing and the burden” of inclusive and dialogue-focused engagement with marginalized residents. One interviewee explained: “If power is the issue, and if we need to get better at making policy together as a way of building urban resilience, then that means that these processes *need* to be longer” ... “[with] more time, more conflict, and more insecurity” ... “but I think [the products] would actually be far more impactful and far more durable”. In relation to previous points about trust and oppression in public engagement processes (Theme B), one City staff member acknowledged a tangible example:

“With Indigenous communities it’s a similar barrier – there’s decades, centuries of violence and genocidal relationships with government, so it’s a really untrustworthy space where government has to go above and beyond to build meaningful, trusting relationships, and that takes a lot of time and it’s hard to do that with a limited amount of time.”

Several interviewees noted the 2-year timeline of ResilientTO in contrast with other strategic planning processes. Interestingly, some interviewees felt that ResilientTO had more time than other strategic planning processes while other interviewees felt it had less. One interviewee lamented that time limitations for ResilientTO constrained their ability to continue equitable engagement during the data analysis and writing phases of work which, in their opinion, is the phase of work in which most power is embedded. Regardless, there was consensus among

interviewees that more equitable engagement processes which meaningfully distribute power across stakeholders will necessarily be time consuming because the very act of spending time together on a superordinate goal helps to rebuild broken trust. Trust, in turn, is necessary to continue collaborative efforts and overcome the mistrust of government that typically burdens efforts to consult and engage disempowered residents (Lawless & Fox, 2001; Verba et al., 1995). However, several interviewees commented that it is difficult to justify the need for longer public engagement timelines to higher levels of municipal authority.

#### *D. Implementation enablers*

When asked about what made ResilientTO unique compared to other City of Toronto strategic planning processes, several of the interviewees commented that they felt ResilientTO may have been more able to adopt a less familiar (but more equitable) consultation approach simply because it was new. One interviewee from C3 explained:

“ResilientTO is quite a new project and they’re going through right now their first strategic plan.” ... “It was an intentional decision for them and an opportunistic time to say that, you know, we want community development leadership supporting our strategy from the get-go.” ... “Typically it’s ‘Let’s have these very high level conversations with high level folks, with people in positions of power and decision making authority, and THEN go back to community and ‘check it’.” ... “The [ResilientTO] team [instead] saw this as an opportunity to say ‘We’re starting something from scratch. Let’s make sure we have the right folks at the table,’

In another interview, a City staff member corroborated this, describing their experience in other City divisions:

“The Neighbourhood Resilience Initiative was completely new, and it was connected to a bunch of global initiatives that were thinking about the same [ideas that] residents should be involved in policymaking. So, in a lot of ways, what I hoped to influence [in a previous role at a different City division], I was more able to concretely influence in the climate resilience work.”

These comments point to an important benefit of 100RC’s role in creating space for this type of work to be piloted. For one, 100RC provided financial resources to the project that did not come from City of Toronto taxpayers; this may have created a more “safe to fail” or at least “safe to experiment” context in which ResilientTO was encouraged to be creative rather than conservative. One ResilientTO staff member also explained that ResilientTO sits in a different position in the City’s organizational structure than a typical division, reporting directly to the City Manager rather than being positioned at a lower level of the bureaucratic hierarchy, although they expressed ambivalence about the importance of this distinction. Apparently more important was the fact that ResilientTO was effectively implanted into the City government by 100RC, and hence the division had to “build [their] own mandate and [their] own policy space at the City”. These factors, when taken in conjunction, may have contributed to ResilientTO’s ability to be more bureaucratically nimble than other strategic planning processes.

Two interviewees from ResilientTO noted the hope that the creative public engagement tools used for this project would catch on in other City divisions. Indeed, two different interviewees from Local Champions and C3 commented that other City divisions are beginning to express interest in working with the Local Champions for other planning processes. We suspect that the

use of Local Champions in both TSNS2020 and ResilientTO “broke the ice” for other City divisions to begin taking this approach.

### 3.9 Conclusions

The key findings that have emerged from this case study shed light on why ResilientTO was able to deploy more equitable public engagement practices even in light of the challenges to justice presented by both resilience approaches and conventional public engagements.

We find, firstly, that the ResilientTO team chose to view resilience as a boundary object rather than a descriptive term (Brand & Jax, 2007). The actual definition and precise indicators associated with resilience were of secondary importance during this project. Of primary importance was the value that the resilience concept brought to the table as an orienting point for the many diverse neighbourhoods, contexts, actors and existing strategic plans that already exist in the city. Importantly, resilience also served as a boundary object between NIAs and City government actors. Treating resilience as a contested boundary object rather than a descriptive term was instrumental for advancing negotiated resilience because it legitimized unofficial interpretations of the term and hence opened the dialogue to a greater diversity of actors, many of whom are normally precluded from taking part in formal city-building processes.

We also find that ResilientTO was able to bypass some of the conventional implementation challenges that typically burden efforts to deploy more creative and equitable engagement processes. More than half of our interviewees speculated that this was because ResilientTO was “a new outfit” with a different reporting structure, a source of external funding, and no existing path dependencies. These are characteristics of an urban experiment, which leads us to our

second conclusion, which is particularly important in light of the findings of the first manuscript: while 100RC did not explicitly advance an agenda of social equity, we posit that it provided an important opportunity and a “safe space” for the City of Toronto to bend the rules and pilot new approaches to infusing social equity in its public consultation processes. ResilientTO core staff confirmed that the frameworks and other tools provided by 100RC did not influence their decision to prioritize social equity; rather, the feedback received from residents during initial public engagements as well as the core team’s own experience with disruptive and dialogue-centric social justice work triggered ResilientTO’s decision to emphasize equity.

As previously mentioned, interviewees suggested that other City of Toronto divisions are following the example set by ResilientTO and reaching out to C3 and Local Champions to engage them in other planning processes. If this trend continues, it suggests that the ResilientTO urban experiment “broke the ice” and disrupted some of the bureaucratic structures that uphold oppressive practices such as lack of representation in public consultation processes. We present this as a key insight for the scholarship and practice of urban experimentation, and recommend future research to corroborate this finding in other case studies.

Nonetheless, some implementation challenges did emerge, largely on the subject of budgeting and time. There was consensus across all interviewees of the importance of paying Local Champions and otherwise providing supports for engagement of marginalized residents such as travel or childcare funding. However, some discrepancies emerged between City staff about how much pay and what types of supports were the most important. This finding points to the importance of C3 and similar organizations as “gatekeepers” of the Local Champions, which three interviewees commented on explicitly. In this case study, two interviewees commented on the challenge of “red tape” prohibiting the City of Toronto from contracting Local Champions

directly because they lack formal registration as either a charity or a business. Accordingly, the City contracts C3 who sub-contracts the Local Champions, and C3 is hence able to enforce a fair wage rate of \$25 per hour for the Local Champions' time. While some interviewees expressed frustration at the City's apparent inflexibility on this matter, we posit that this type of arrangement was important given the apparent lack of consensus and clear guidelines surrounding fair compensation for resident consultants within the City's own structure. C3 provides additional benefits as a gatekeeper by way of general insights about grassroots community organization; providing material supports to supplement a City division's contributions or honorariums; advocating for fair use of the Local Champions' time; and, providing guidance and coaching to the Local Champions. C3's role as a gatekeeper hence defined the terms of the partnership between Local Champions and ResilientTO such that the heterogeneous perspectives on fair compensation never became a problem. Additionally, the use of a standard pay scale and the use of C3 as a formal contractor may help to overcome some of the challenges interviewees mentioned with respect to the City being unsure of how to appropriately budget for these types of public engagements. However, there may be important drawbacks to using an intermediary which fell out of scope for this research, but which may include insecurity of the program resulting from fluctuating funding streams and the priorities or mandates of gatekeeper organizations. We present these as considerations for other City divisions and jurisdictions to take when attempting to replicate this approach.

Ultimately, we present this case study as further evidence in support of the negotiated resilience approach (Harris et al., 2017) and posit that resilience and justice need not inherently be at odds. In fact, in the case of ResilientTO, we find strong evidence that the concepts were inextricable. As one interviewee from the ResilientTO core team befittingly put it: "I consider urban resilience

work to be social justice work”. When taken in conjunction with the findings of Fitzgibbons & Mitchell (2019), we argue that urban experiments like 100RC can provide an important opportunity for cities to break from existing bureaucratic processes and path dependencies and spearhead more equitable strategic planning processes.

## Chapter 4. Thesis conclusions

This thesis has explored issues of social equity and justice in the planning processes that surround urban resilience. It has examined both a wide, global sample of cities, and an in-depth, local case study. The goal of this research was to test a popular hypothesis in critical resilience scholarship that the approach is inherently at odds with justice. The cautions afforded by critical scholars are valid, and crucial for researchers and practitioners to bear in mind while pursuing resilience work. This thesis, however, rejects this false dichotomy, and finds that resilience can be an instrument of justice provided the conditions are right. Those conditions are as follows.

1. *Resilience can be an instrument of procedural justice when it affords disempowered residents an opportunity to have power and voice in city-building processes.* Justice scholars have long argued that it is an injustice when the needs and interests of oppressed groups are represented and communicated by people who benefit from their oppression (Fraser, 1995, 1997; Honneth, 2004; Schlosberg, 1995, 2007; Young, 1990). In the context of urban planning, where this theory of participatory justice intersects with the “right to the city” (Lefebvre, 1968), it is clear that any strategy that is considered procedurally just – resilience or otherwise – ought to meet the fundamental criteria of empowering oppressed residents in the process of constructing the plan. Manuscript 1 demonstrated that few cities met this criteria, but Manuscript 2 highlights the approach taken by one city that did. Future research documenting the in-situ outcomes of the 100RC City Resilience Plans would be necessary in order to discern the extent to which resilience planning influences distributive and recognitional justice, although the findings of the first manuscript suggest that these dimensions of justice were emphasized less in written plan content; hence, one would expect that, without intervention, these would continue to be of secondary importance during plan implementation.

2. *Resilience can most effectively advance the former point when it is viewed as a boundary object, and a subject of negotiation.* In Manuscript 2, we find that ResilientTO took the view that “resilience” has contested, diverse, and locally-specific definitions, all of which are valid. In so doing, they legitimized the participation of less formal civic actors, such as the Local Champions, and advanced a “negotiated resilience” approach (Harris et al., 2017). By emphasizing dialogue, voice and negotiation, ResilientTO drew attention to the inherent contestation and power relations embedded in resilience and created a space for interaction between disadvantaged residents and city bureaucrats.

3. *Resilience may be best positioned to “break the ice” on structural changes to support equity and justice when it is deployed in the context of an urban experiment.* One interviewee commented that they were more effective at influencing a focus on justice and equity in ResilientTO compared to other strategic planning processes that they had taken part in at the City. This interviewee and others postulated that the nimbleness of ResilientTO in this regard could be credited to the fact that it was both new, and framed as an experiment. As such, and without commenting on the wealth of other functional and ethical conundrums that might arise from urban experimentation, we posit that one benefit of urban experiments is that they may provide an important opportunity for public servants to break from path dependencies and advance the type of changes that they already know are necessary for equity.

4. However, the fourth point follows from the previous: *a gatekeeper or otherwise standard protocol for engaging fairly with marginalized residents is necessary to avoid exploitation.* While many city staff members are indeed cognisant of the importance of inclusive planning for a just process, we find that the City of Toronto lacked its own standard or framework for engaging directly with disempowered residents, and city staff were not in

agreement about the most appropriate scope or scale of accommodations that should be offered. In the absence of such a standard, a mediating actor such as C3 may be useful as a “gatekeeper” to disempowered residents, advocating for fair use of their time, providing civic skills and training to participants, and stepping in to fill other deficiencies arising from inadequate City budgeting. Alternatively, a City government could choose to develop their own institutional capacity to contract directly with actors like Local Champions, and future research could focus on conceptualizing or piloting potential interventions to this end.

*5. Justice and resilience are likely to be seen as mutually fulfilling by city staff and partners who are already amenable to the cause of advancing social justice.* In Manuscript 1, we found a piece-meal emphasis on social equity across City Resilience Strategies. Interviewees for Manuscript 2 told us that the decision to emphasize social equity in both strategy content and process was based on two key parameters: 1. Equity was repeatedly identified as a priority for residents during public consultation; and, 2. The staff member who advanced public engagement in NIAs had extensive prior experience with social justice work. We suspect that these factors, as well as access to tools such as the Equality Indicators pilot described in Manuscript 1, might explain why some participating cities heavily emphasized equity while others were silent on the matter. Presumably not all participating cities benefitted from having core staff who put issues of justice at the forefront of their work.

6. Lastly, while they may provide a valuable opportunity to pilot more equitable methods of engagement, *urban experiments should be designed with equity in mind.* There are two branches to this finding, both stemming from Manuscript 1. First, future global urban experiments can advance equity by selecting more even distributions of participating cities from the Global North and South, and by distributing funding across these cities according to need. Second, the

standard resources and supports provided by these initiatives should include tools that trigger participant cities to consider social equity and justice, such as the Equality Indicators. By infusing this consideration in the experiment from the start, participating cities may be better able to manage the unmitigated acts of commission and omission we identified in Manuscript 1, and may seek opportunities to empower residents through opportunities like those we defined in Manuscript 2.

#### 4.1 Contributions to scholarship and practice

Planners, policymakers, and scholars can each find value in the findings of this thesis. The advice this thesis affords to planning practitioners and public servants, first, is to consider the principles of equitable and inclusive participation when planning stakeholder engagement, and second, to consider how the outcomes of plans might be experienced differently by affluent and disadvantaged residents. Appendix A, the analytical criteria used to evaluate plans for Manuscript 1, can be used as a general guideline to this end, as it is effectively a checklist of the principles of justice identified during literature review. This tool could be adapted and used by public servants to reflect on existing plans preceding an amendment or update, and can also be used to inform the creation of new plans.

We implore researchers and practitioners to consider the limitations and scope of this work. Specifically, the interviewees we accessed may have felt obligated to portray the work favourably. Additionally, a more robust exploration of the implications of using an intermediary “gatekeeper” organization is warranted, and a full exploration of the ethical conundrums surrounding urban experimentation fell out of scope for this thesis. Bearing these limitations in mind, we suggest that Resilient Conversations might serve as a model for operationalizing

negotiated resilience in a North American planning context. This case study could hence contribute to providing jurisdictional examples for other North American municipalities to follow when attempting to operationalize negotiated resilience in their own local contexts.

For planning scholarship, too, this framework provides one tool for conducting justice-focused plan evaluations in order to advance “just city” planning (Fainstein, 2011), and can be adapted to suit other theoretical framings and subjects ranging from sustainability to affordable housing. Additionally, resilience is becoming an ever-more popular nomenclature in the realm of urban planning; this interdisciplinary thesis has contributed by providing empirical insights informed by communicative planning theory, justice theory, and socio-ecological systems research, enhancing the linkages between these fields.

On the subject of urban experimentation, this thesis can inform both the design and study of global and local urban experiments. Manuscript 1 and 2 each make specific recommendations for more equitable design and implementation of urban experiments, and also offer the finding that urban experimentation can potentially advance justice by disrupting inflexible bureaucratic processes. This finding warrants future research, and we hope that scholars and practitioners will consider how a justice-focused urban experiment might be most effectively designed to advance this goal.

Lastly, this thesis contributes to the robust scholarship on resilience and socio-ecological systems by providing new empirical insights from a social science perspective. While a plethora of existing research has questioned *whether* resilience can advance justice, this thesis instead contributes findings about *how* resilience can advance justice. In particular, this thesis has focused on procedural and participatory dimensions of justice, but an important area for future

research is to build on these findings by empirically analyzing the distributive justice outcomes of initiatives like 100RC and ResilientTO.

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Appendices

## Appendix A: Analytical and Content Analysis Framework for Just urban futures? Exploring equity in “100 Resilient Cities”

The numbers in Column A of this sheet are the "criteria number/code", and correspond with Row 2 in the "Results by Question and City" Appendix (A.2). A strategy was awarded a full point (1) for thoroughly fulfilling the criteria or demonstrating proactive effort; a half point (0.5) if the criteria was superficially mentioned or partially fulfilled; and, no points (0) if the issue was not acknowledged or discussed.

<b>Recognitional &amp; Distributive Justice</b>		
<b>Acts of Omission*</b>		
1	Are specific populations of interest (eg. vulnerable groups) identified in the strategy?	1
2	If yes, is their vulnerability explored in-depth? (eg. historic or structural reasons for vulnerability explained)	1
3	Are benefits intentionally directed at specific groups?	1
4	Why?	-
5	Are there some benefits that may not be accessible to vulnerable stakeholders? If yes...	-
6	Why / why not?	-
7	Is this acknowledged in the Strategy?	1
8	Is there evidence that the Strategy attempts to mitigate this / improve access?	1
9	Is the Strategy available in the predominant local language and/or major minority languages?	-
	TOTAL	5
<i>*Concept coined (?) by Anguelovski et al. (2016)</i>		
<b>Acts of Commission*</b>		
10	Could any of the proposed actions directly or indirectly negatively affect a vulnerable group? (eg. displacement)	-
11	Does the Strategy acknowledge this potential impact?	1
12	Does any proposed actions attempt to mitigate this impact?	1
13	Does the Strategy propose any actions to correct previous acts of commission or injustice?	1
	TOTAL	3
<i>*Concept coined (?) by Anguelovski et al. (2016)</i>		
<b>Vulnerability</b>		
14	Is vulnerability explicitly defined and explained?	1
15	Does the Strategy's understanding of vulnerability feature socioeconomic characteristics? (versus focus on exposure to threats)	1
16	Does the Strategy feature a map that describes socioeconomic vulnerability or human development?	1
17	Does the Strategy acknowledge how municipal systems / processes exacerbate vulnerabilities? (Structural inequality)	1
18	Who assumes responsibility or accountability for this vulnerability?*	-
19	Are the root causes of vulnerability addressed in the solution, or does the solution attempt to "treat" (rather than prevent) vulnerability?	-
	TOTAL	4
<i>*For example, does the Strategy acknowledge the need to reconcile historic injustices?</i>		
<b>Procedural justice</b>		
<b>Monitoring and Evaluation</b>		
20	Does the Strategy describe a framework for evaluating whether or not its actions have been successful?	1
21	Does it mention that equity considerations will feature as an indicator of success/failure?	1
22	Does the Strategy mention that M&E protocol will be collaboratively designed?	1
23	Is there opportunity for public participation in <i>conducting</i> M&E?	1
	TOTAL	4
<b>Procedural justice (Transparency and Participation)</b>		
24	Is the stakeholder engagement process described?	1
25	Does the Strategy describe during what phases participation took place?	1
26	Does the Strategy describe what mediums or techniques were used for consultation?	1
27	Does the Strategy describe how many people were consulted?	1
28	Were external stakeholders engaged in early problem definition?	1
29	Were external stakeholders engaged in co-creation and solution generation?	1
30	Does the Strategy describe how information was disseminated to the non-participant public? (eg. general public communications)	1
31	Which stakeholders are identified and targeted for consultation?	-
32	Is there evidence that vulnerable groups were afforded an opportunity to self-identify their needs and goals?	1
33	Is there mention of vulnerable residents being engaged as stakeholders or participants?	1
34	Were specific partnerships and/or arrangements achieved with key EXTERNAL stakeholders? (eg. civil society, associations, industry)	1
35	Does the Strategy describe <i>how</i> stakeholders were identified and recruited for engagement? (eg. what rationale was used to recruit some actors over others)	1
36	Are there plans for continued participation, or is the Strategy considered "finished"?	1
	TOTAL	12
	<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>28</b>

Appendix B: Results by Question and City for Just urban futures? Exploring equity in “100 Resilient Cities” (Toronto added)

	Recognitional and Distributive Justice																			Procedural Justice																Total		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35		36	
Amman	1	0.5	1	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	-	-	1	0.5	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	-	0	1	1	0	1	12.5	
Athens	1	1	1	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	-	-	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	-	1	1	1	0	1	17		
Bangkok	1	0.5	1	-	-	-	1	0	-	-	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.5	-	-	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	-	0	0	1	0	0	11	
Bristol	1	0	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	0.5	0.5	0	0	0.5	0	0.5	-	-	0.5	0.5	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	0	0.5	1	1	1	16.5
Byblos	0.5	0	0.5	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	0	0	1	0.5	0	-	-	1	0	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	0	-	0	0.5	0	0	1	11	
Cali	1	0	1	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	1	0	0	0.5	0	0	-	-	1	0.5	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.5	0	-	1	1	1	0	0	13.5	
Christchurch	1	1	1	-	-	-	0.5	0	-	-	0	0.5	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	-	-	0	0	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	-	1	0	1	0	1	18.5	
Da Nang	1	0.5	1	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	-	-	1	0	0	0.5	1	1	1	0	0.5	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	1	10.5	
Dakar	0	0	0.5	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	0.5	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0.5	-	0.5	0	1	0	0.5	8.5	
Dallas	1	1	1	-	-	-	0	1	-	-	0	0.5	1	0	1	1	1	-	-	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	-	0	0	1	0	0	18.5	
Glasgow	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	0	0.5	0	0	1	0	0	-	-	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	21.5
Medellin	1	0	1	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	0.5	1	0	1	0	0	-	-	0.5	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.5	-	0.5	0.5	1	0	1	11
Melbourne	1	1	0.5	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	0	0.5	1	1	0.5	-	-	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	-	0	0	1	0.5	1	16	
Mexico City	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	1	0	0	0.5	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	-	0	0	1	0	1	18.5	
Montreal	0.5	0.5	0	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	0	1	1	0.5	0	-	-	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	-	0	0	1	0	1	12.5	
Norfolk	0	0	1	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	0	0	1	0.5	1	-	-	0.5	0	0	0	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	1	0	0	-	0	0	1	0	1	8.5	
Paris	1	1	0	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.5	-	-	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	0	-	0.5	0	1	0	0	10.5	
Quito	0.5	0	1	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	1	0.5	0	0	0.5	1	0	-	-	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	-	0	0.5	1	0	1	13	
Ramallah	1	1	0.5	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	0.5	1	1	0.5	0	-	-	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.5	-	0	0.5	1	0	1	15.5	
Rio de Janeiro	1	0.5	1	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	-	-	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0.5	0	1	0	-	0.5	0	0	0	0.5	13
Rome	0.5	0	1	-	-	-	1	0	-	-	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	-	-	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	-	0.5	0	0.5	1	1	14.5	
Rotterdam	1	0	0.5	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	0	0	-	0	0	1	0	1	5	
San Francisco	1	0	1	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	-	-	1	0	1	0	1	0	0.5	0.5	1	0.5	0	-	0	0	0	0	1	9	
Santa Fe	1	0.5	1	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.5	-	-	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	-	0	0.5	1	0	1	15.5	
Santiago de Chile	1	1	1	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	-	-	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	-	0.5	0	1	0	1	15.5	
Semarang	1	0	1	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	-	-	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	-	0	0	1	0	1	11	
Surat	1	0.5	0	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0.5	-	0	0	1	0.5	1	8.5	
Thessaloniki	1	0.5	1	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	0.5	0	0	1	0	0	-	-	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	-	0	0	1	0	0.5	12.5	
Toronto	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	24.5
Toyama	1	0.5	1	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	-	0	0	1	0	1	8.5	
Vejle	1	0	1	-	-	-	0.5	0.5	-	-	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	-	-	0.5	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	-	0	0	1	1	1	12.5	
Wellington	1	0	1	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	-	-	0.5	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	0	0	1	0	1	13.5	
TOTALS	28	15	27	-	-	-	7	5.5	-	-	4	6	6.5	5	26	14	10	-	-	21	6.5	4.5	3.5	29	25	27	20	30	27	6	-	8	8	28	6	27		
% of S* that obtained	90	47	85	-	-	-	23	18	-	-	13	19	21	16	84	45	32	-	-	68	21	15	11	94	81	87	63	97	87	19	-	26	26	89	19	85		

\*S = Sample

Appendix C: Inter-rater reliability scores for Just urban futures? Exploring equity in “100 Resilient Cities”

	Rater's original score	As percentage	Author's original score	As percentage	Difference (pts)	Difference (%)	Altered score	After reconciling
Amman	14.5	51.79%	12.5	44.64%	2	7.14%		7.14%
Athens	19	67.86%	17	60.71%	2	7.14%		7.14%
Bangkok	12.5	44.64%	11	39.29%	1.5	5.36%		5.36%
Bristol	8.5	30.36%	16.5	58.93%	-8	-28.57%	17	0.00%
Byblos	11.5	41.07%	11	39.29%	0.5	1.79%		1.79%
Cali	17	60.71%	13.5	48.21%	3.5	12.50%	14	0.00%
Da Nang	11	39.29%	10.5	37.50%	0.5	1.79%		1.79%
Dakar	11	39.29%	8.5	30.36%	2.5	8.93%		8.93%
Dallas	19	67.86%	18.5	66.07%	0.5	1.79%		1.79%
Glasgow	13.5	48.21%	21.5	76.79%	-8	-28.57%	22	0.00%
Christchurch	12.5	44.64%	18.5	66.07%	-6	-21.43%	19	0.00%
Medellin	9	32.14%	11	39.29%	-2	-7.14%		-7.14%
Melbourne	13.5	48.21%	16	57.14%	-2.5	-8.93%		-8.93%
Mexico City	19	67.86%	18.5	66.07%	0.5	1.79%		1.79%
Montreal	11	39.29%	12.5	44.64%	-1.5	-5.36%		-5.36%
Norfolk	10.5	37.50%	8.5	30.36%	2	7.14%		7.14%
Paris	11	39.29%	10.5	37.50%	0.5	1.79%		1.79%
Quito	19.5	69.64%	13	46.43%	6.5	23.21%	13	0.00%
Ramallah	14	50.00%	15.5	55.36%	-1.5	-5.36%		-5.36%
Rio	9.5	33.93%	13	46.43%	-3.5	-12.50%	13	0.00%
Rome	12.5	44.64%	14.5	51.79%	-2	-7.14%		-7.14%
Rotterdam	7	25.00%	5	17.86%	2	7.14%		7.14%
San Francisco	9	32.14%	9	32.14%	0	0.00%		0.00%
Santa Fe	12.5	44.64%	15.5	55.36%	-3	-10.71%	16	0.00%
Santiago de Chile	15	53.57%	15.5	55.36%	-0.5	-1.79%		-1.79%
Semarang	9	32.14%	11	39.29%	-2	-7.14%		-7.14%
Surat	11	39.29%	8.5	30.36%	2.5	8.93%		8.93%
Thessaloniki	9.5	33.93%	12.5	44.64%	-3	-10.71%	13	0.00%
Toyama	4.5	16.07%	8.5	30.36%	-4	-14.29%	8.5	0.00%
Vejle	13.5	48.21%	12.5	44.64%	1	3.57%		3.57%
Wellington	10	35.71%	13.5	48.21%	-3.5	-12.50%	14	0.00%
SUM / AVG	380.5	43.84%	403.5	46.49%	-2.65%	-2.65%		0.69%
PERCENT SIMILAR						97.35%		99.31%

## Appendix D: Semi-structured interview script for Inclusive Resilience: A case study of equity-centred strategic planning in Toronto, Canada

[The interviewer explains the research projects and the goals. Explain that we're interested in perspectives and more normative, "messy" aspects of this work and that most of these things (eg. Participation, vulnerability, resilience) are open to interpretation.]

[The interviewer gains verbal consent for the participant to be audio recorded, and confirm that the participant understands the purpose of the interview.]

Clarifying follow-up questions and/or prompts for elaboration will be asked as required. The interviews will be semi-structured.

1. [Introduce the interviewee and their job title for the audio recording. Ask informally about how their career has led them to this position, and what resilience means in their work.]
2. There are many different understandings of urban resilience, and what it means. Can you describe what the term means to you?

*\*Variations in definition are expected and will be recorded as a finding. Clarification will be provided as necessary.*

3. What strategic planning processes have you been involved with at the City of Toronto?
4. Can you describe what those planning processes looked like?
  - a. Did they make use of Working Groups?
    - i. Were the Working Groups comprised of both internal (City) and external stakeholders?
  - b. Did they make use of Steering Committees?
  - c. How many key stakeholder engagement sessions took place?
  - d. How many public consultations (if any) took place?
  - e. Were any non-experts involved in shaping the initiatives embedded in the plan?
5. Have you been contacted, either personally or as a member of the public, by the City Resilience Office?
  - a. Were you invited to take part in...
    - i. A Working Group?
    - ii. A Steering Committee?
    - iii. A key stakeholder engagement session?
    - iv. A public consultation?
  - b. If you attended any of these: can you describe,
    - i. Who else was in the room?

- ii. What the extent of your involvement was?
    - iii. What questions you were asked?
    - iv. What phases of the ResilientTO project have you been / will you be involved with? (eg. when were you consulted, and for how long?)
  - c. Were you ever invited to participate in a similar group/consultation for a similar reason, but by a different City Division?
    - i. Were the same stakeholders in the room at that meeting?
- 6. **[For interviewees with direct experience with ResilientTO]**

Has the ResilientTO planning process been different or similar from the other plans you've been involved with?
- 7. **[For interviewees with direct experience with ResilientTO]**

Resilience and ResilientTO obviously captures a lot of ground – it deals with environmental problems, social problems, and economic problems. Can you tell us a bit about what it's like working with such diverse stakeholders?

  - a. How do you move forward with resilience planning, even with all of these different, sometimes-competing interests?
- 8. **[For interviewees with direct experience with ResilientTO]**

What mediums have been used for ResilientTO public and stakeholder engagements so far? (eg. Public meetings, online surveys, door-to-door, etc.)

  - a. Which of those methods do you believe garnered the most meaningful and useful contributions from people?
- 9. **[For interviewees with direct experience with ResilientTO]**

Acknowledging that it's still early in the process – is there a plan for ongoing monitoring and evaluation of ResilientTO at this time?

  - a. Is there a plan for public participation in monitoring & evaluation, or other ongoing work stemming from 100RC?
  - b. Do you have a sense, at this stage, of what the key performance indicators, or criteria for assessment, will be?
  - c. What does the process for coming up with those criteria look like? Who decides what metrics are important?

Anything you'd like to add, or anything we've missed that you think would be important?

## Appendix E: E-mail Contact Script and Recruitment Letter

Hello *[participant name]*,

My name is Jo Fitzgibbons. *[If the participant has been met before, e.g. at a public consultation or networking event, remind them of where we met].* I'm a graduate student in the University of Waterloo School of Planning and part of a research team that is studying the process of resilience planning in the City of Toronto. Given *[your involvement with the ResilientTO as a (local champion, committee member, etc),]* I wondered if you would be open to participating in an interview not exceeding 45 minutes, which can take place over the phone or in person (your preference) to share your perspective on the City of Toronto's resilience efforts and the City's strategic planning processes more broadly.

As the attached Letter of Information and Consent explains, we are interested in understanding how "resilience planning" under the guidance of the Rockefeller Foundation's "100 Resilient Cities" differs and/or is similar to existing strategic planning processes. This study has been reviewed by and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee. You are not obligated to participate.

I have attached a document containing further information about the study and an offer to participate, including contact information for me, my supervisor, and the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo. Please do not hesitate to reach out via phone or e-mail with any questions before deciding whether or not you would like to participate.

All the best,

Jo

**Graduate Student Investigator:**

Joanne (Jo) Fitzgibbons  
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1-902-402-7074  
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## Appendix F: Letter of Information and Consent Waiver

**Title of the study:** The process and politics of planning for resilience in Canadian cities

**Faculty Supervisor:**

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To help you make an informed decision regarding your participation, this letter will explain what the study is about, the possible risks and benefits, and your rights as a research participant. If you do not understand something in the letter, please ask one of the investigators prior to consenting to the study. You will be provided with a copy of the information and consent form if you choose to participate in the study.

**What is the study about?**

In light of climate change, security threats, changing demographics and other dynamics that impact cities today, many cities globally are beginning to include planning for resilience in their municipal processes. This research will follow two Canadian cities, Toronto and Vancouver, as they undertake resilience planning with the Rockefeller Foundation's 100 Resilient Cities initiative. Through interviews and document analysis, this research will study how people and organizations interpret, influence and operationalize resilience under the Foundation's program. Our hope is that the findings will guide resilience policy and planning processes in Canadian cities.

**In more detail:**

Large cities are critical economic hubs, supporting diverse and growing urban and suburban populations. At the same time, these cities are vulnerable to both acute shocks (e.g. extreme weather events; disease outbreaks; and, security threats) and chronic stresses (e.g. poorly maintained, aging, infrastructure; aging demographics; and, uneven provision of social services).

In 2013, The Rockefeller Foundation, a US-based philanthropic organization, pioneered 100 Resilient Cities, a network of 100 cities dedicated to building resilience to chronic and acute economic, social, and physical challenges. The foundation has earmarked \$164 million USD to the initiative, and membership in this network spans five continents and now includes four Canadian cities - Montréal, Toronto, Calgary, and Vancouver. As part of acceptance into the 100 Resilient Cities network, each participating city must draft a resilience strategy, which is the output of a six to nine month collaborative planning process led by a "chief resilience officer", hired with funds from The Rockefeller Foundation.

You are invited to share your perspective and experience on a study regarding the politics and process of planning for resilience in Canadian cities. While there are many varying definitions of resilience, this research will use the Rockefeller Foundation's definition, which is "the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses, and systems within a city to survive, adapt, and grow no matter what kinds of chronic stresses and acute shocks they experience." Urban systems, in this context, may refer to cities themselves and/or their embedded physical infrastructure, governance networks, social networks, policy, and/or planning processes.

This research project aims to capitalize on a critical window of opportunity by working with two cities - Toronto and Vancouver - as they develop a Resilience Strategy for the Rockefeller Foundation's "100 Resilient Cities". Specifically, we will:

- 1)** Examine how public, private and community actors involved in Toronto and Vancouver's resilience strategy planning process interpret resilience and envision operationalizing the concept in their respective cities;
- 2)** Analyze how resilience, as an idea and a discourse, potentially disrupts cities' existing urban planning and governance processes; and,
- 3)** Compare empirical results between the case study cities to inform theory and practice.

## I. Your responsibilities as a participant

### **What does participation involve?**

As a participant, you will be invited to participate in an interview with two student researchers not exceeding 1 hour in length to discuss your views and experiences on the politics and process of planning for resilience. More specifically, the interviews will explore the planning process of ResilientTO and compare it with existing City of Toronto planning processes to determine if and how participation in the 100 Resilient Cities program has influenced municipal processes.

Interviews will be audio recorded and transcribed. You can expect to be asked questions similar to:

*There are many different understandings of urban resilience, and what it means. Can you describe how you understand resilience?*

*Have you been invited to participate in a Working Group, Steering Committee, stakeholder engagement, or public consultation by the City Resilience Office?*

*Can you describe your experience with other past strategic planning processes at the City of Toronto? (For example: Did they make use of Working Groups?)*

### **Who may participate in the study?**

In order to participate in this study you must be over 18 years of age and have professional and/or voluntary experience working on issues of resilience or city planning in Toronto or Vancouver.

## II. Your rights as a participant

### **Is participation in the study voluntary?**

Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may decide to leave the study at any time by communicating this to any one of the researchers. Any information you provided up to that point can be deleted or otherwise destroyed, at your request. You may decline to answer any question(s) you prefer not to answer.

You can request your data be removed from the study up until May 2019. After this point, the researchers will be submitting the research for publication and review and will no longer be able to make changes.

**How can I access the results of this study?**

At the bottom of this form, you may choose to consent to being contacted when the results of this research are published. If you consent, you will be contacted with an access link to all open-access publications associated with this research.

In the event that you are unable to access e-mail, please list a phone number as your primary means of contact at the end of this form.

**Will I receive anything for participating in the study?**

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary, and you will not be remunerated for your time or participation.

**What are the possible benefits of the study?**

Our hope is that the findings of this research can help to inform policy and governance processes surrounding planning for urban resilience in the participating cities and beyond. Participation in this study may not provide personal benefits to you.

**What are the risks associated with the study?**

There are no known or anticipated risks associated with participation in this study. You have the right to decline to answer any question, and you may withdraw your participation from the study at any time up until May 2019, after which time the publication and review process will have begun and changes can no longer be made.

**Will my identity be known to others?**

The research team will know your identity. All interviews will be transcribed and interviewees will be assigned a “code” that is used to identify their content, and codes will not be accessible to any individual or organization outside of the research team. With your permission, responses may appear in the final publication, but no indicators of your identity will be included. If you choose to respond to a question with stories or information that could personally identify you, these details will not be included in publications.

**Will my information be kept confidential?**

The dataset without identifiers may be shared publicly. Your identity will be confidential. Identifying information will be removed from the transcripts and codes will be used to identify participants among the research team.

All electronic data will be stored on a USB drive accessible only to the research team. Paper files will be stored in the office of the principal researcher, Dr. Carrie Mitchell. All data including audio recordings, paper files and transcriptions will be deleted after a minimum a 7 year period following the publication of the last paper or thesis associated with this research project.

### III. Questions, comments, or concerns

#### **Who is sponsoring/funding this study?**

This study is funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

#### **Has the study received ethics clearance?**

This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee (ORE# 31483). If you have questions for the Committee contact the Office of Research Ethics, at 1-519-888-4567 ext. 36005 or [ore-ceo@uwaterloo.ca](mailto:ore-ceo@uwaterloo.ca).

#### **Who should I contact if I have questions regarding my participation in the study?**

If you have any questions regarding this study, or would like additional information to assist you in reaching a decision about participation, please contact:

#### **Faculty Supervisor:**

Dr. Carrie L. Mitchell  
Assistant Professor, School of Planning, University of Waterloo  
Fellow, Balsillie School of International Affairs  
EV3-3241, 200 University Ave. W. Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1  
Phone: 519-888-4567 ext. 33027 Fax: 519-725-2827  
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#### **Graduate Student Investigators:**

Joanne (Jo) Fitzgibbons  
M.A. Candidate, School of Planning, University of Waterloo  
1-902-402-7074  
[jmfitzgibbons@uwaterloo.ca](mailto:jmfitzgibbons@uwaterloo.ca)

**You can provide your consent to participate in this study either verbally, or by printing, signing, and scanning the following page.**

#### **Consent**

- I agree to my interview being audio recorded to ensure accurate transcription and analysis.
- I agree to the use of anonymous quotations in any thesis or publication that comes from this research.
- I agree to be contacted about possible participation in future studies associated with this research (for example, for follow-up interviews, clarifying questions, or workshops). I am aware

that my agreement now does not obligate me to take part in any studies, and that at any time I may request that my name and contact information be deleted.

- I would like to be contacted when the results of this research are available.

In providing my signature, I consent to my participation in this study and the use of collected data in the publication of research papers and student theses. I understand the purpose of the study and the scope of my involvement. I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time until May 2019 without repercussion or judgement, and that every effort will be made to ensure that my identity is kept confidential unless I have given consent to disclose it. My signing of this form does not constitute consent to disclose personal information.

By signing this consent form, you are not waiving your legal rights or releasing the investigator(s) or involved institution(s) from their legal and professional responsibilities.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Printed name: \_\_\_\_\_

Preferred contact: \_\_\_\_\_  
(eg. e-mail address, phone number, etc.)

Back-up contact (optional): \_\_\_\_\_  
(eg. e-mail address, phone number, etc.)

### **Verbal consent**

If you choose to provide verbal rather than written consent, we will pose the following questions and your responses will be audio recorded:

- Please state your name.
- Can you confirm that you have read the Letter of Information and Consent, that you understand the purpose of this research, and your rights as a participant?
- Do you agree to this interview being recorded to ensure accurate transcription and analysis?
- Do you agree to the use of anonymous quotations in any thesis or publication that comes from this research?
- Do you agree to be contacted about possible participation in future studies associated with this research (for example, for follow-up interviews, clarifying questions, or workshops).

Joanne Fitzgibbons

- Do you understand that your agreement now does not obligate you to take part in any studies, and that at any time you may request that your name and contact information be deleted?
- Would you like to be contacted when the results of this research are available?

## Appendix G: Glossary of Terms and Acronyms

100RC	100 Resilient Cities – Pioneered by the Rockefeller Foundation.
ACCCRN	Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network, an Asia-focused urban resilience building endeavor led by The Rockefeller Foundation.
C3	Centre for Connected Communities, a non-profit and key implementation partner of ResilientTO, Resilient Conversations and Local Champions.
CoT and/or “the City”	The corporation of the City of Toronto.
CRO	Chief Resilience Officer, a City staff person hired with funds from 100RC to develop a City Resilience Strategy for a member City over a two-year funding period.
IPCC	The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
ResilientTO	The City of Toronto’s office and/or project (used interchangeably) relating to Toronto’s participation in the 100RC network.
NIA	Neighbourhood Improvement Areas, which are 31 priority neighbourhoods identified in the 2015-2020 iteration of the Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategies. NIA’s are often physically and socially marginalized areas with high levels of inequality and poverty. Many of Toronto’s NIA’s have higher proportions of immigrants and racially visible residents.
Local Champions	A network of self-selected grassroots community advocates from Toronto’s Neighbourhood Improvement Areas. Among other responsibilities, they are contracted and trained by C3 to act as community experts and informants in City planning processes.
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals, announced by the United Nations General Assembly in association with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The SDGs provide targets for member nations to focus their development efforts.
SDFA	The City of Toronto’s Social Development, Finance and Administration Division. SDFA leads the Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy and has a mandate focused on community development.
TSNS2020 or TSNS	Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (TSNS), a program of the City of Toronto focused on social and economic equity in Toronto’s 140 neighbourhoods, with a focus on Neighbourhood Improvement Areas and Emerging Neighbourhoods. TSNS2020 is the 2015-2020 iteration of the Strategy.
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme.