Canadian Border Security: Examining Border Services Officer and Traveller Knowledge Concerning Interaction Narratives and Technologization Within the Windsor Borderland

by

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I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
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ABSTRACT

Through contrasting institutional discourses with frontline official and non-official knowledge gleaned from interaction narratives from past social interactions and supplied by border services officers (BSOs) and members of travelling publics circulating at ports of entry in the Windsor, Ontario, Canada borderland, this thesis accomplishes the work of considering border security and mobility governance as an everyday practice (Côté-Boucher, Infantino, and Salter 2014). While previous literature has expertly documented the governmentality of modern borders, its privileging of institutional forms of knowledge means findings are inherently limited in that they ignore subjugated forms of knowledge (Foucault 1972), the role of diverse publics in shaping the field of (in)security, and renders invisible the presence of (in)security in everyday life (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016:43). To this end, this thesis is unique in considering – for the first time – interaction narratives supplied by BSOs and members of travelling publics circulating regularly within a geographically specific borderland. This thesis is also unique in considering how knowledge generated by such narratives potentially challenges institutional discourses supplied by Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA). Lastly, this thesis is also unique in examining how border technologization and digitization potentially influence frontline social interactions between officers and publics, generate additional knowledge concerning the nature of digitized borders, and function to establish a gulf between institutional discourses and localized frontline practices.

This thesis employs a multi-method approach, utilizing: 1) a content analysis and discourse analysis of various primary and secondary institutional documents, 2) content and thematic analyses performed on transcripts generated from in-depth, semi-structured interviews performed with 10 BSOs working in the Windsor borderland, and 3) content and thematic
analyses performed on transcripts generated from in-depth, semi-structured interviews performed with 30 members of travelling publics, the vast majority of whom resided in the Windsor borderland at the time interviews were conducted.

Combined, official and non-official knowledge generated from interaction narratives provided by participants provides several critiques in terms of analyzing institutional knowledge generated by CBSA. Findings generated through interaction narratives indicate: 1) officers have experienced a shift in “lifeworld” (Habermas 1981) alongside shifts in agency mandates toward a neoliberal risk-management model of mobility governance; 2) officers receive very little formal training in terms of frontline interactions; 3) officer training displays a systematic bias toward constructing all interactions as “security moments” designed to fulfill a security mandate, ultimately leaving officers ill-trained in terms of the “facilitation” (CBSA 2018e:8), non-securitized, humanitarian side of border work; 4) despite being couched by CBSA institutional discourses as being professional, courteous, law-abiding, and thorough, much evidence exists to suggest BSOs act in ways differing substantially from this knowledge, including: officers not performing full primary inspections on travellers, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms violations in terms of officers routinely asking travellers about their mobility while outside of Canada, and a variety of negative frontline interactions including: a) aggressive or unnecessary questioning by officers, b) officers presenting a rude or unfriendly demeanor, c) harassment by officers about purchases made abroad, d) officers unfairly or incorrectly applying policies, e) unnecessary examinations, and f) enforcement actions resulting in the seizure of purchased goods; 5) officers are often forced to develop shared ad hoc best practices in terms of social interactions on the frontline, where there is a real danger of BSOs “parroting” the poor practices of just one or two veteran officers; 6) the existence of a substantial gulf between national policy
and training modules and the localized and geographically-specific practices occurring at disparate ports of entry across Canada.

Findings generated in terms of the technologization of contemporary borders suggest border security and mobility governance practices are best understood as forms of simulation (Baudrillard 1981) and cyborg work (Bogard 1996), whereby digitized subjects (Goriunova 2019) – which are not at all representative of human subjects – are taken as irrefutable copies or “dividuals” (Deleuze 1992) by border officers, and ultimately become the unit of analysis under neoliberal risk-management schemes in making decisions possible and rendering the personal narratives and performativity of embodied subjects (travellers) effectively irrelevant. Despite CBSA institutional documents couching technologization in terms of improving efficiency at the border, augmenting officer decision-making, and enhancing security provision, official and non-official knowledge gleaned from interaction narratives generated from perceptions related to past social interactions serves to provide a serious critique of these discourses. This includes knowledge concerning perceived deficits related to border technologization, including: 1) discussions of data errors causing travel problems (duplicated NEXUS card numbers, mistaken warrants in the CPIC database, false travel histories in customs databases, and so forth); 2) the advertised benefits of the NEXUS trusted traveller program (efficiency crossing borders) as being either non-existent or irrelevant; 3) the use of Automated Border Clearance (ABC) kiosks / Primary Inspection Kiosks (PIKs) at major Canadian international airports as serving to produce superficial and robotic frontline social interactions guided exclusively by computer-generated risk codes; and 4) the apparent negative effects of technologization in terms of eroding the ability of officers to make informed decisions on the basis of anything other than information provided by computerized databases.
Combined, findings generated by comparing institutional knowledge with official and non-official interaction narrative knowledge are subsequently considered through the lens of simulation, human and mobility rights, bureaucratic secrecy, and potential policy change. Additionally, slippage between nationalized institutional discourses and localized frontline practices are explained through the lens of neoliberal systems of power and governance. Finally, avenues for future research are discussed in concluding the thesis.
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A doctorate is more than the sum of a handful of classes, comprehensive exams, proposals, drafts, and defences. Likewise, a doctoral recipient is much more than a transcript, a *curriculum vitae*, scholarships, and publications. Academics occasionally lose sight of the fact that successes cannot be attributed to an individual exclusively, but rather is directly correlated with a multitude of connections with various other actors who function to provide an individual a foundation and system of support. Such tireless work is often thankless in that it does not result in credentials, awards, or even public recognition. I would therefore like to use this section to acknowledge all those who have stood by and supported me unquestioningly in my professional and personal life and endeavors as a doctoral candidate.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. List of Abbreviations .................................................. xv
2. Introduction ................................................................... 1-64
5. Cyborg Work: Borders as Simulation ................................ 143-177
7. Conclusion ...................................................................... 214-229
8. Bibliography .................................................................... 230-254
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABC – Automated Border Clearance (kiosks)
ACROSS – Accelerated Commercial Release Operations Support System
ATIA – Access to Information Act (1985)
API/PNR – Advanced Passenger Information / Passenger Name Record
ATIP – Access to Information and Privacy (request)
BSO – Border Services Officer
CBRNE – Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Explosive (materials)
CBSA – Canada Border Services Agency
CCRA – Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
CIC – Citizenship and Immigration Canada
CFIA – Canadian Food Inspection Agency
CPIC – Canadian Police Information System
CSC – Correctional Services Canada
CSIS – Canadian Security Intelligence Service
C-TPAT – Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
FAST – Free and Secure Trade
FOSS – Field Operations Support System
IPIL – Integrated Primary Inspection Line
IRPA – Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
ISP – Internet Service Provider
NAFTA – North American Free Trade Agreement
NCIC – National Crime Information System
OITP – Officer Induction Training Program
PIK – Primary Inspection Kiosks
PIP – Partners in Protection
POERT – Port of Entry Recruitment Training
RCMP – Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RFID – Radio-Frequency Identification
SAWP – Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program
US CBP – US Customs and Border Protection
VTIP – Victim of Trafficking in Persons
INTRODUCTION

The power position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always great, under normal conditions overtowering. The political ‘master’ always finds himself, vis-à-vis the trained official in the position of a dilettante facing the expert. This holds whether the ‘master,’ whom the bureaucracy serves, is the ‘people’ equipped with the weapons of legislative initiative, referendum, and the right to remove officials; or a parliament elected on a more aristocratic or more democratic basis and equipped with the right or the de facto power to vote a lack of confidence… This superiority of the professional insider every bureaucracy seeks further to increase through the means of keeping secret its knowledge and intentions. Bureaucratic administration always tends to exclude the public, to hide its knowledge and action from criticism as well as it can. Prussian church authorities now threaten to use disciplinary measures against pastors who make reprimands or other admonitory measures in any way accessible to third parties, charging that in doing so they become ‘guilty’ of facilitating a possible criticism of the church authorities… Bureaucracy naturally prefers a poorly informed, and hence powerless, parliament – at least insofar as this ignorance is compatible with the bureaucracy’s own interests.

– Max Weber (1922), Pp. 991-993, Chapter XI – Bureaucracy, “Economy and Society”.

In 2004, Bill C-24, The Canada Border Services Agency Act, established Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) as a legal entity and transferred to it several additional powers from its three legacy agencies: Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA), Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) (Parliament of Canada 2004). Officers called “border services officers” (BSOs) became responsible for enforcing over 90 domestic acts and regulations as well as international agreements governing travel and trade. Prior to the establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992, customs officers largely served revenue collection functions through enforcement of taxation on goods at the Canadian border. After NAFTA diminished the taxation function of customs officers, it became more common for the Government of Canada to promote the border enforcement activities of officers as the “first line of defence against drugs, contraband, and illegal firearms” (Pratt 2005:191). Section 5(1) of The Canada Border Services Agency Act formalized these discourses and stated: “The Agency is responsible for providing
integrated border services that support national security and public safety priorities and facilitate the free flow of persons and goods, including animals and plants, that meet all requirements under the program legislation…” Other legislation enabling the powers of BSOs includes the *Customs Act* and the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (IRPA). The *Customs Act* outlines the taxation and enforcement powers of BSOs, including personal searches (s. 98), search of goods and people (s. 99), detention of controlled goods (s. 101), the seizure of goods and conveyances (s. 110), and the power to make criminal arrests (s. 163). The *Act* also outlines various customs offences related to borders, including false statements and evasion of duties (s. 153), hindering a customs officer (s. 153.1) and smuggling (s. 159). IRPA provides border officers with the power to examine applicants (s. 18), outlines migration requirements, and establishes categories of inadmissibility used by officers on the frontline to deny applications and subsequently remove individuals.

BSOs working for CBSA at nearly 1200 ports of entry (including land border offices, international mail processing centres, airports, sufferance warehouses¹, and other service locations) have millions of face-to-face interactions with members of the travelling public every year (Bridge and Lancaster 2015; CBSA 2018c). Over the course of 2015-2016 alone, CBSA processed over 93 million travellers, 16 million commercial shipments, and collected over $30 billion in revenue (CBSA 2016c:1). In the same fiscal year, only 3.2% of all processed travellers and non-commercial goods and 0.08% of all commercial goods were found to be inadmissible to Canada (CBSA 2016c:32). This implies that 97% of all frontline interactions did not result in enforcement actions as a result of customs, immigration, or other laws.

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¹ Sufferance warehouses are third-party facilities (mostly commercial) CBSA officers attend (inland, away from the physical border) to assess and clear goods into Canada.
Frontline interactions have recently received increased public attention in Canada. As a result of an Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) request filed by The Canadian Press, documents related to complaints filed by travellers against BSOs during the 2017-2018 fiscal year became public for the first time (and were widely reported on in the press). As Tutton (2018) documents, there were 105 “founded” cases of complaints related to officer misconduct. Complaints included cases of officers yelling and swearing at travellers, participating in acts of racism, denying travellers access to translators, and, in one case, allegedly yelling at a traveller in medical distress (Tutton 2018). While CBSA subsequently downplayed what spokespersons claimed were the comparatively low number of “founded” cases relative to the total number of all travellers processed, there is a substantial possibility that travellers are hesitant to report negative interactions with officers through official channels for various reasons (not the least of which is potentially fear of future mistreatment at the border). Indeed, as the criminological literature has demonstrated in terms of criminal activity generally, there may be a “dark figure” (Biderman and Reiss 1967) of hidden cases of misconduct that exist in reality but are never officially reported or enumerated. The low number of “founded” cases of complaints is also troubling given CBSA has no independent or arms-length external review body, meaning all investigations related to complaints occur in-house. While the Trudeau Liberal Government is currently promising to advance legislation to establish a National Security and Intelligence Review Agency to hold Canada’s national security agencies (including CBSA) accountable (Tutton 2018), it is unclear what powers of investigation such a body would have, how this body would investigate complaints against officers (if at all), or to what extent CBSA will still be permitted to conduct initial in-house investigations pursuant to complaints.
Examining the Literature

With the aforementioned concerns in mind, this dissertation focuses its lens on interaction narratives supplied by BSOs and members of travelling publics regularly circulating through ports of entry. “Interaction narrative” knowledge includes perceptions of past frontline social interactions supplied via BSOs and travelling publics regularly circulating through ports of entry and engaging in securitized and other forms of social action. Given the volume of travellers processed every year by BSOs, it is perhaps surprising that the literature is noticeably silent in terms of examining interaction narrative knowledge generated through the perceptions of BSOs and publics related to past social interactions at ports of entry across Canada. The literature has largely limited analysis to six key areas: 1) public policy construction and analysis; 2) the governance of global migration; 3) state border governance efforts; 4) the deployment of various technologies at borders; 5) the geospatiality of contemporary borders; and 6) the perceptions of border and immigration officers on topics related to: a) discretion, b) decision-making, and c) security generally.

Research concerning public policy construction and analysis has largely centred on subsequent examinations of the governance of global migration. For example, Bosworth (2016) examines the convergence between criminal and immigration laws and the related criminalization of migration. This phenomenon of rendering migrants as “crimmigrants” (Aas 2012) through criminal law is well-documented in the literature (see for example Bosworth 2013; Salter and Mutlu 2013; Aas 2014). Others have focused on the use of prisons and other carceral spaces of detention located inside and outside of the sovereign state (i.e. offshoring) and designed to warehouse, punish, deny rights, and expel regular and irregular migrants (see for example Bosworth 2014; Mountz and Loyd 2014; Kaufman 2015; Mountz 2015; Bosworth
Other policy research has focused on domestic law and international agreements as they pertain to border security specifically, including analyses focusing on the governance efforts of the state (see for example Ackleson 2009; Vaughan-Williams 2010; Lalonde 2012; Topak et al. 2015; Vollmer 2017).

The literature has also documented the expanded use of technologies of risk at ports of entry in Canada, the United States, and Europe. Particularly, such research has focused on documentation, including passports, ID cards, visas, and the NEXUS trusted traveller program in North America (see Salter 2004; Salter 2006; Sparke 2006; Lyon 2009; Muller 2010b; Salter 2011; McPhail et al. 2012; Bradbury 2013); biometric technologies, including fingerprinting, iris scans, facial recognition, and so forth (see Amoore 2006; Muller 2009; Muller 2010a; Muller 2011; Muller 2013; Popescu 2015; Leese 2018); the development of smart borders in Europe and North America (see Amoore, Marmura, and Salter 2008; Leese 2016); and the use of databases and algorithms on the frontline of enforcement (see Broeders 2007; Dijstelbloem and Broeder 2015; Pötzsch 2015; Topak et al. 2015; Amoore and Raley 2017; Lalonde 2018).

When combined, research discussing offshoring of migration detention as well as technologization away from traditional sovereign borders have subsequently contributed to debates concerning border geospatiality (or lack thereof). Such debates have examined logics of “remote control” (Broeders and Hampshire 2013), deterritorialization (Muller 2010a; Mountz 2011; and Salter and Mutlu 2013), the border as “everywhere” (Lyon 2005), the border as part of a continuum also including other enforcement locales (Vaughan-Williams 2010; Lalonde 2018), and as a form of visual “security performance” (Rumford 2006; de Lint 2008).

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2 Lalonde (2018) is reproduced (in part) as Chapter 5 in this thesis.
Lastly, several recent studies have examined the perceptions of border officers – employed in Canada and elsewhere – regarding discretion, decision-making, and security generally (see for example Côté-Boucher 2013; Pickering 2014; Pickering and Ham 2014; Aas and Gundhus 2015; Côté-Boucher 2016; Côté-Boucher 2018). In terms of the Canadian context, Bouchard and Carroll (2002) examine how immigration officers use both “professional” and “personal” forms of discretion in performing their duties. Officers are left to make discretionary decisions given various ambiguities associated with immigration policies. Pratt and Thompson (2008) determine how race knowledge functions to influence frontline officer discretionary practices. Ambiguities surrounding the meaning of “racial profiling” and an associated slippage between “race” and “nationality” allows officers to officially deny participating in racial profiling while continuing to deploy racialized risk knowledges at the border. Pratt (2010) explores how legal and other knowledge informs the “moment of decision” when frontline officers determine reasonable suspicion for searches at the border. Officer decision-making is shielded from serious scrutiny because the supposed objective nature of employed risk language serves to obscure other knowledges also at play. Côté-Boucher (2013) queried frontline BSOs regarding various aspects of their employment with Canada Border Services Agency, generating key findings regarding how frontline officers negotiated shifts within the governing logics of CBSA mandates from a focus on tax collection to a new emphasis on security, anti-terrorism, intelligence, and so forth. Côté-Boucher’s subsequent research continues with this important work, documenting officer use of discretion within the “new CBSA” (Côté-Boucher 2016) and also “generational borderwork” whereby officers rely on generational categorizations to negotiate change in their workplace (Côté-Boucher 2018).
While the aforementioned literature has employed state, institutional, and frontline official knowledge in exploring contemporary borders, research has remained largely silent in terms of examining frontline non-official knowledge.\(^3\) Limited research in North America has examined non-official knowledge within the context of local borderlands. In the Canadian context, Helleiner (2010) examines non-official border knowledge within the context of the Niagara region of Ontario. Specifically, Helleiner’s (2010) analysis draws upon interviews conducted with 40 Niagara residents between September 2001 and August 2004 in considering how participants experienced changes in border securitization post-9/11. Helleiner’s (2010) findings ultimately demonstrate a need for the literature to contrast non-official knowledge with official knowledge in order to identify points of divergence between official state narratives and community experiences concerning border security. In the US context, Bjelland (2016) conducted interviews with ten families living along the Point Roberts, Washington border. Findings demonstrate that Point Roberts is defined by its international border as a hybrid borderland: “a privileged exurb for U.S. citizens working in Vancouver, a U.S. service center for Canadians, and a seaside retirement community with pockets of isolation and neglect” (Bjelland 2016:516).

Various additional studies in the Canadian context have examined the lived experiences of migrants transiting across international borders, including Somerville (2015) examining how decisions to migrate to Canada are informed by (and in turn shape) migrant networks, with “migrant pioneers” deliberately settling in countries in which their families are not yet located in an attempt to expand their migrant network globally; and Horgan and Liinamaa (2017) analyzing interviews with former Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) participants to determine

\(^3\) See Key Definitions and Theoretical Perspectives subsection below for more details regarding how official and non-official knowledges are defined within this thesis.
how uncertainty regarding legal, immigration, and employment status is personally experienced by migrants. McLaughlin (2009) similarly examines the SAWP program through the lens of migrants in the Niagara Region of Ontario, exploring how legal precariousness contributes to non-citizens being effectively excluded from many of the rights guaranteed to all residents of Canada (including healthcare).

While official knowledge – and particularly interviews with officers – generates important findings on the unfolding of frontline border governance (Loftus 2015), such knowledge is ultimately incomplete in that it largely ignores the perceptions of political subjects of (in)security (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016: 43). By privileging institutional and official knowledge, such research ultimately ignores forms of subjugated knowledge (Foucault 1972, discussed below), the role of diverse publics in shaping the field of (in)security, and makes invisible the presence of (in)security in everyday life (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016: 43). To these points, this thesis will also argue that such research favours a uniform view of borders and security practices, examining public policy and governance technologies as “one-size-fits-all”, uniform approaches, and ultimately ignoring potential local realities and differences in terms of governing ports of entry.

Additionally, while the aforementioned research has focused much attention on public policy as well as governance practices and technologies deployed within modern borders, research has not examined knowledge generated from interaction narratives supplied by officers and members of travelling publics as social actors regularly circulating within spaces of security. While analyses of state and institutional discourses provide evidence of a “governmental” view of modern borders, such research neglects to consider how (and to what extent) this knowledge is actually deployed by agents responsible for border security and mobility governance on the
frontline of enforcement. In other words, while the literature provides an excellent overarching view of how borders likely function, what is missing is any sort of context in terms of how governance efforts might unfold within the social interactions between border services officers and travellers at the frontline of enforcement. This is problematic because while the literature has expertly documented border security through the lens of governmentality, it has also largely failed to consider border security as an everyday practice (Côté-Boucher, Infantino, and Salter 2014). Only by contrasting institutional discourses with interaction narrative knowledge supplied by official (BSO) and non-official (public) perceptions regarding past frontline social interactions can research begin the work of “shedding light on contemporary problematizations of security” (Côté-Boucher, Infantino, and Salter 2014:195) as they relate to borders specifically.

**Purpose**

The thesis that follows will analyze institutional discourses produced by Canada Border Services Agency through the lens of both official and non-official knowledge generated vis-à-vis interaction narratives derived through the circulation of BSOs and members of travelling publics at ports of entry. Particularly, this thesis will focus on two main areas of analysis. First, the thesis will assess institutional discourses concerning the nature of frontline social interactions that occur at ports of entry in Canada. Secondly, the thesis will further assess institutional discourses concerning the effects that increases in border technologization have on frontline social interactions. Relatedly, the dissertation will propose a new theoretical orientation for understanding both technologization and perceptions related to past frontline social interactions occurring between officers and members of travelling publics. As such, this dissertation addresses six overarching key research questions: 1) How do institutional discourses located in CBSA training documents, manuals, policies, and other obtained documents potentially
influence frontline interactions between officers and members of travelling publics? 2) To what extent do frontline officers participate in social interactions that are irreducible to institutional discourses (and particularly from knowledge located in BSO formative training)? 3) How does contemporary border and port of entry technologization potentially influence frontline interactions between officers and members of travelling publics? 4) How should modern border and port of entry technologization be understood theoretically? 5) To what extent does knowledge produced vis-à-vis interaction narratives generated through the circulation of BSOs and members of travelling publics at ports of entry serve to challenge institutional discourses produced by CBSA? 6) How should the literature understand findings generated from the above-mentioned questions through the lens of human and mobility rights?

**CBSA – Hidden in Plain Sight**

It is likely that the literature has remained silent in terms of analyzing interaction narratives generated through perceptions of past frontline interactions given that BSOs are a difficult population to access and recruit to studies. While limited success has occurred in the past (i.e. Côté-Boucher 2013), current success is limited by CBSA policies and procedures that are decidedly unfriendly to academic research participation. Attempts were made (twice) to gain official CBSA approval of this thesis study, which were met twice with refusals. In refusing to officially support the study, an agency representative cited *CBSA Code of Conduct* section 5.1, which states that: “only authorized spokespersons can issue statements or make comments about the CBSA's position on any given subject” (CBSA 2018d). The agency representative also cited section 8, which states:

> We are legally obliged to protect the privacy of individuals and our commercial clients' business information. In doing so, we comply with section 107 of the *Customs Act* and section 8 of the *Privacy Act* in the collection, use, sharing, storage, disclosure, distribution and disposal of any personal information
pertaining to individuals or commercial information pertaining to businesses (CBSA 2018d).

When the researcher sought clarification from CBSA regarding which specific parts of the proposed study violated cited policies and if any revisions to the study procedures could be made to avoid these issues and continue with the research, the agency representative did not reply with a clarification. Subsequent ATIP requests filed by the researcher related to all documents and emails pertaining to this dissertation project revealed an email exchange (now public information as a result of the ATIP request) between the aforementioned agency representative and the Manager of Creative Services at CBSA National HQ in Ottawa. Providing advice on whether or not to support the thesis project, the manager stated (emphasis original):

He mentions conducting one-hour interviews with officers pertaining to their social interactions with members of the travelling public, how they perceive the public. BSOs’ roles are not to socialize with the public they serve nor to necessarily speak to how they perceive the public. They are there to assess travellers and make a determination on admissibility, etc. I’m not sure this is relevant and would probe further as to what is meant by this and why it is being looked at.

From the above email exchange, it appears that national knowledge-brokers interpret the BSO occupation and the actions of officers as strictly following CBSA policies and mandates pertaining to questions posed to the public, determinations made, and other duties performed. The notion that officers’ “roles are not to socialize with the public” demonstrates this strict interpretation. As findings in this thesis will demonstrate below, BSO training documents and other agency materials also reach this same conclusion – that officers strictly “interrogate” or “interview” members of travelling publics and do not “interact” in any other way. Indeed, The Canadian Press story listed above in terms of “founded” complaints filed against officers seriously challenges this strict interpretation of the role and behaviours of BSOs in that there is at least anecdotal evidence to suggest officers do diverge from institutional discourses, policies, and
procedures. In short, the lack of communication and lack of willingness of an agency answerable to the Minister of Public Safety, the Minister of Border Security and Organized Crime Reduction, and to the Parliament of Canada (and therefore to all Canadians) to assist an academic researcher with a project that has received federal government funding (through the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada) is distressing.

Given the inability of researchers to examine the frontline activities of CBSA, the fact CBSA effectively accomplishes a ban against officers speaking out on matters related to their employment (via the Code of Conduct and privacy policies cited above), and the current lack of an independent or arms-length external review body to oversee CBSA activities, it is possible for agency “authorized spokespersons” to carefully craft the image of Canada Border Services Agency that is presented to the media and Canadian public, while also simultaneously avoiding any sort of informed critical analysis or debate concerning these carefully constructed discourses and institutional knowledge. This is reinforced by draconian measures identified in the CBSA Code of Conduct that accomplish the task of preventing officers from sharing opinions related to their employment or CBSA with members of the academic community or the Canadian media. The CBSA Code of Conduct – Chapter 4: Disciplinary Measures and Resolutions of Issues Pertaining to the Code of Conduct – outlines the potential consequences for officers:

A decision regarding disciplinary measures will be determined on a case-by-case basis taking into consideration the nature of the breach and the seriousness of the misconduct. Serious breaches will result in consequences up to and including termination of employment. Some cases of misconduct may result in an employee being found guilty of an indictable offence and liable, on conviction, to fines and/or imprisonment based on legislative and regulatory requirements.

These draconian measures are only further enhanced by CBSA’s ability to hide behind “national security” and “secrecy” imaginaries that essentially render the agency beyond reproach. In short, researchers must resolve to work around the opacity generated by this shroud of secrecy, privacy,
and security, and explore new avenues for critically analyzing the activities and practices of an agency that has, until now, largely been immune to public scrutiny, critical analysis, accountability, and debate. Indeed, the words of Max Weber on the domination of bureaucracies provided at the outset of this thesis are as relevant now in 2019 as they were then in 1922.

Reflecting on Issues of Access and ATIP Requests

Other researchers have had similar difficulties accessing the inner-workings of secret agencies. For example, Côté-Boucher (2013) was only able to secure access to interview BSOs employed by CBSA after an exhaustive search for any sort of connection between the researcher and a frontline border worker. Only after two years of searching was Côté-Boucher able to locate such a connection, and only because she was ultimately connected to the frontline worker through an extended family member (Côté-Boucher 2013:27). As Côté-Boucher (2013:27) acknowledges, “a bit of luck” was involved in ultimately securing access from the agency. Despite having numerous frontline connections and a fair amount of frontline experience myself, CBSA was in no way welcoming or supportive of my research (despite a number of emails sent between myself and local as well as national managers seeking clarification, proposing amendments to my study to allay identified agency concerns, and so forth). In my case? Luck was definitely not on my side.

Several scholars have attempted to negotiate the difficulties associated with accessing secretive organizations by filing Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) requests with Canadian government agencies and departments. The Access to Information Act (hereafter ATIA) gives Canadian citizens, permanent residents, and any person or corporation present in Canada a right to access records of government institutions that are subject to the Act (Government of Canada 2018). According to Walby and Larsen (2012):
Shadowing government employees (see McDonald, 2005) may provide the most in-depth data about how workers work in government agencies and how organizations change over time. However, if shadowing is not possible for lack of entry, or when dealing with agencies that do not allow researchers entry (such as some security and intelligence agencies), [ATIP] requests present a viable means of producing textual data (p. 32).

Such archival analysis serves to reveal governance processes and forms of knowledge that would otherwise be completely opaque to researchers, the academic literature, news media, and Canadian publics. Agencies examined through ATIP requests in relation to borders, security, migration, detention, and policing activities have included (but are not limited to): Canada Border Services Agency (Larsen and Piché 2009; Bond 2017; Lalonde 20194; Moffette and Ridgley 2018; Lalonde 20185), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Monaghan and Walby 2012), Citizenship and Immigration Canada6 (Rehaag 2009), Correctional Services Canada (Larsen and Piché 2009), the Immigration and Refugee Board (Rehaag 2017; Bond 2017), Public Safety Canada (Larsen and Piché 2009), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Monaghan and Walby 2012; Puddister and Riddell 2012; Boyle, Clément, and Haggerty 2015; Boyle and Speed 2018), Transport Canada (Saulnier and Thompson 2016), and 21 agencies and departments (including aforementioned units) as part of a large study on Government of Canada media relations practices (Marland 2017).

Archival analysis of documents garnered from ATIP requests is not without several potential pitfalls. As Walby and Larsen (2012:35) indicate, researches must be aware of differences in terms of how individual agencies define and use vocabulary surrounding requested

4 This refers to an article published in Policing and Society entitled “Border officer training in Canada: identifying organisational governance technologies.” This article is reproduced (in part) as Chapter 3 in this dissertation.
5 This refers to an article published in the British Journal of Criminology entitled “Cyborg Work: Borders as Simulation.” This article is reproduced (in part) as Chapter 5 in this dissertation.
6 Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) was renamed Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) in late-2015.
items. Wording ATIP requests with too wide or too limited a scope can result in either incomplete or unnecessary results. Similarly, researches must also know where records being sought are located within the entire government system of agencies and departments (Walby and Larsen 2012:35). Requesting documents across several units simultaneously can result in unnecessary delays in receiving release packages. Such problems were largely avoidable in this study given the researcher was previously employed by Canada Border Services Agency and had inside knowledge about the types, names, and locations of documents sought through ATIP requests (please see the discussion on reflexivity below for more details). While Walby and Larsen (2012) state that ATIP requests are often flagged for follow-up and questioning regarding wording by ATIP coordinators within government agencies, I did not have this issue while filing requests related to this dissertation research (i.e. requests were simply accepted verbatim by CBSA each time).

Additionally, according to Walby and Larsen (2012:36-37) there is a potential issue with the Hawthorne effect – the phenomenon involving social actors changing their behaviour when they are aware of being subject to analysis or scrutiny. Government departments or agencies may carefully work through problems to avoid producing records that could be subject to an ATIP request (i.e. discussing problems orally rather than via email or printed memo). Indeed, after my research was summarily dismissed twice by CBSA representatives, I filed an ATIP request for all emails and other communications related to discussions about this research project. I found that while some emails were exchanged at National Headquarters in Ottawa (detailed above), the vast majority of local decision-making within the Southern Ontario Region of CBSA had occurred orally (and therefore could not be gleaned from ATIP documents released by the agency). To this I would also add the possibility that agencies may not be releasing all
documents to researchers (despite federal laws mandating federal departments comply with ATIP requests). ATIP requests (much like agencies themselves) are bureaucratic and contain rules and procedures – including inter-agency policies – for completing requests that are largely opaque to researchers and other “outsiders”. In other words, it is difficult to ensure accountability and integrity within ATIP processes (particularly when agencies like CBSA lack any sort of external review body designed to assess and investigate agency activities and adherence to federal law).

Luscombe and Walby (2015) elaborate on the above challenges in discussing how information management practices of policing agencies and the laws that enable their surveillance and intelligence capabilities actually function to curtail ATIP requests. For example, ATIP offices typically have high turnover rates and often new coordinators are unfamiliar with their assigned department or where specifically to locate requested documents (Luscombe and Walby 2015:493). Additionally, ATIP coordinators can obstruct and seek to limit the scope of requests by citing undue burden to the department in terms of filling the request (in terms of cost and/or time and human resource requirements) (Luscombe and Walby 2015:494). Such obstruction has led to lengthy delays in processing files. For instance, during the 2016-2017 fiscal year, 2,326 individual ATIP requests took more than a year to process in each case (Beeby 2018). Additionally, in 2016-2017, 19.3 per cent of all responses were delivered beyond time deadlines established in the ATIA (Beeby 2018).

Federal policing and intelligence agencies like CBSA and the RCMP can also redact or exclude from release many documents that fall under several exceptions within the ATIA, including information related to investigative techniques, information that could be used to facilitate the commission of a crime, and personal information as defined by the Privacy Act.
(Rigakos and Worth 2011:647). Also included in the ATIA are exceptions regarding information related to “methods of, and scientific or technical equipment for, collecting, assessing or handling information” (Government of Canada 2019). Indeed, given my prior familiarity with training and other documents as a former employee with CBSA, it became immediately apparent to me that various pieces of information had been redacted from my fulfilled ATIP requests. This included information related to investigative techniques (the standard primary questions posed by officers, the psychological and other indicators used by officers to form suspicion, indicators related to the falsification of passports and other documents, and information related to risk profiling), information that could be used to facilitate the commission of a crime (information regarding common hiding places in passenger vehicles and other conveyances), and personal information (actual names included within case studies used in officer training modules). While some of these redactions obviously fall within the scope of exceptions outlined in the ATIA, some redactions (like the redaction of primary questions posed by officers) are questionable at best given this information is already widely known by anyone regularly crossing borders.

Nonetheless, I ensured the accuracy of information I received through ATIP requests using three methods. First, I contrasted received documents with my personal experience using these and other documents as a former student border services officer employed by CBSA between 2008 and 2009. Second, in many cases, interviewees (off the record) offered up their own unredacted copies of training and other documents to the researcher. These unredacted documents offered the researcher a point of comparison between released ATIP documents and unredacted documents employed by officers on the frontline and in formative training. Third, certain questions were designed into qualitative interviews with officers (see Methods section below for more details) to attempt to increase the efficiency of the first two methods in ensuring
the accuracy of fulfilled ATIP requests. These questions also allowed officers to serve as informants to point the researcher toward additional documents that might exist. For example, the interview schedule contained questions such as: “What type of training did you receive from CBSA (or the Government of Canada) related to dealing with members of the travelling public?” and “What policies, standard operating procedures, or other documents exist to guide your interactions with members of the travelling public?” Officers regularly cited in answers the same training documents, policies, standard operating procedures, manuals, and other documents that had already been obtained through ATIP requests (see Methods section for more details).

Combined, using these three methods left me very confident that documents received from CBSA as a result of ATIP requests were accurate, free from redaction of necessary information, and featured minimal questionable redactions of additional material. Questionable redactions that did exist were largely superfluous to the main research questions associated with this study and therefore did not negatively impact results.

Results generated from ATIP requests combined with a multi-method approach including qualitative interviews, content analysis, thematic analysis, and discourse analysis (elaborated below) allowed for a triangulation of data related to institutional discourses generated by CBSA. Triangulation is most commonly achieved in research by employing two or more different collection techniques to gather and analyze data (Gravelle 2014:49). Triangulation is often employed to overcome problems associated with validity and reliability. According to Walby and Larsen (2012), triangulation of data in terms of ATIP is achieved when: “The use of [ATIP] requests, interviews, and discourse analysis [is] staggered; information gleaned from one module of data production can inform future data production efforts” (p. 39). While ATIP documents, results from qualitative interviews with frontline officers, and subsequent analyses of transcripts
and documentation did not create a need to refine the research process in this study given the information largely coincided at each level, this harmony nonetheless suggests that information obtained by the researcher using the variety of methods elaborated below was accurate and complete.

A Further Note Regarding Reflexivity

I have already noted above how my personal experiences as a former student border services officer with CBSA allowed me to precisely file and also verify the accuracy of documents received through ATIP requests. These experiences also helped inform various other stages of the research project that are worth noting. Several challenges related to access and the bureaucratic secrecy surrounding CBSA were negotiated through my unique position as an outsider’s insider. According to Gravelle (2014):

Outsider’s insiders refer to those individuals who have previously been a part of the [policing] organisation but have subsequently left through transfer or retirement. Having left the service, such individuals no longer enjoy unprecedented access or cultural acceptability; however, it is likely that outsider’s insiders will retain some influence and contacts within the service” (p. 59).

When I presented the idea for this thesis at a major Canadian academic conference in 2014, one observer asked me, “How can you reconcile the potential weaknesses associated with this study in that you formerly worked as a student BSO and now are proposing to conduct research on CBSA?” My answer today is the same as it was then: “My weakness is my strength.” Many academics, members of the media, and Canadian publics can only speculate about the inner workings of a secretive state agency like CBSA, and therefore also tend to shy away from analyses and critiques related to frontline practices. My insider perspective is unique to the interdisciplinary literature and allows me the rare opportunity to shed light (informed through research) on the inner workings of CBSA. I received training from CBSA on frontline duties,
enabling legislation, human rights, use of force, and safe handling of firearms. I worked for two years on the frontline at the 452 Tunnel Traffic port of entry at the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel, processing hundreds of travellers on a daily basis in the Windsor borderland. I worked alongside many of the officers still employed at Windsor’s ports of entry today. I processed travellers with them, performed vehicle searches with them, seized prohibited goods with them, made arrests with them, performed personal searches with them, and collected intelligence with them. On midnight shifts when the traffic slowed and night descended, I got to know many BSOs personally – and they got to know me too. They had my back, and I had theirs. And when all was said and done, and the Government of Canada cancelled the recruitment of student BSOs at ports of entry in the Southern Ontario Region, I left CBSA with an extraordinary look at processes that few Canadians (and even fewer scholars) are permitted to have. Notable policing scholar James Sheptycki, also in the audience for my presentation, agreed and suggested that I write an ethnography of my frontline experiences. Unfortunately, the very policies and laws CBSA uses to prevent its current officers from speaking out also govern its former officers – so there is not much I can personally speak to. This is why my perspective is often “silent” regarding the findings associated with this thesis. But while this thesis ultimately falls short of a personal ethnography, because I had access to publicly undisclosed processes I knew exactly which documents to ask for, exactly how to interpret their use, exactly how to analyze them; I knew exactly what kinds of questions needed to be posed about the agency and its practices; and I knew exactly how to provide a detailed examination of the undisclosed processes informed by research findings rather than from my own (prohibited) personal observations.

For instance, my personal experiences regarding training, personal frontline interactions, and my observations related to frontline interactions involving other BSOs led me to identify
various “lacks” or gaps in terms of CBSA practices and procedures. First, these observations contributed to various themes I then converted into key research questions associated with this thesis. These questions (elaborated above) specifically focus on issues related to institutional discourses located in training and other documents as potential drivers of officer frontline interactions with publics, the extent to which these official discourses are ignored by officers, the influence of technologization on frontline interactions, and the extent to which interactions occurring between officers and publics challenge institutional discourses. In light of findings related to these questions, it also became necessary to provide the academic literature with an accurate metaphor and theoretical perspective for how border governance unfolds in reality at contemporary borders (again, partially informed by my personal experiences).

Second, my personal experiences and observations also helped inform the methods I initially proposed to explore these key research questions. Firstly, in addressing question one – institutional discourses potentially informing interactions between officers and members of travelling publics – I determined the variety of formative and in-service training modules, manuals, memoranda, and federal policies I had been exposed to during my own formative training and over the course of my frontline experience. I then filed ATIP requests for each document not previously publicly released under the ATIA. Furthermore, I culled additional publicly available information from CBSA and other Government of Canada websites, including corporate documents, website pages, CBSA D Memoranda, and various acts of Parliament. I then analyzed all documents (following the methods outlined in the next section) to identify key institutional themes and discourses contained within the texts of these documents. In further addressing questions one, two – regarding frontline interactions irreducible to training – and three – regarding technologization potentially influencing frontline interactions – I proposed
combining an analysis of documents with qualitative interviews performed with BSOs employed by CBSA along with frontline observations of social interactions between officers and members of travelling publics occurring at ports of entry in the Windsor borderland. Analysis of findings from qualitative interviews and frontline observations would determine whether and to what extent officers employ training modules, manuals, policies, and other documents in interacting with publics as well as whether and to what extent technologization serves to influence or mediate these interactions. Findings generated from qualitative interviews and frontline observations would also answer the fifth question by contrasting such findings with institutional themes and discourses generated from obtained CBSA documents and policies. From such findings, additional conclusions could be reached by the researcher regarding how contemporary border governance should be theorized within the literature.

Third, and perhaps most important to this study, my personal observations and personal experiences as a former student BSO with CBSA helped this study adapt and overcome the challenges associated with accessing a secretive agency for research. Particularly, as a result of repeated refusals from CBSA to participate in or support my research study, significant challenges emerged including recruiting frontline officers and also my inability to access ports of entry to observe actual frontline interactions occurring between officers and members of the public. In short, I am extremely well-versed in exactly how frontline interactions between officers and publics unfold at ports of entry given my former employment within the agency. However, as highlighted above, I am also unable to provide a personal retroactive ethnography of frontline interactions given the prohibitions against current or former officers sharing such information publicly. I navigated these challenges in a number of ways. First, I knew that I could continue soliciting officer participation (as I had before) without agency approval and that a
number of officers would eventually agree to participate. Recruitment, consent, and other research ethics materials associated with the study had already been crafted and approved to solicit officer participation without agency approval (given I anticipated potential problems associated with requesting agency permission). Recruitment and consent documents outlined to potential participants a plethora of measures designed to protect the confidentiality of interviewees, ensure CBSA could not possibly become aware (in any way) of any individual officer participating in the study, and ensure the strict protection and retention of all data resulting from qualitative interviews. The Research Ethics Board (hereafter REB) at my institution also suggested I rely on oral consent exclusively rather than requiring officers to sign consent documents (a suggestion I incorporated). The REB also required I present officers with strong warnings regarding their potential participation in the study. This included the following explicit excerpt outlined on all recruitment and consent forms:

Specifically, it is possible that if CBSA found out about your participation in this study and also discovered you made certain prohibited comments during the interview (i.e. revealing “Protected” information, exposing weaknesses in Canadian border security, etc.) that violate the Value and Ethics Code for the Public Sector and/or the CBSA Code of Conduct, you may be punished as follows according to Code of Conduct Chapter 4: Disciplinary Measures and Resolutions of Issues Pertaining to the Code of Conduct:

If a breach of either Code or the Policy occurs, managers are responsible for reviewing the breach and if required, consulting with Labour Relations and/or referring the case to Personnel Security and Professional Standards to determine appropriate action.

A decision regarding disciplinary measures will be determined on a case-by-case basis taking into consideration the nature of the breach and the seriousness of the misconduct. Serious breaches will result in consequences up to and including termination of employment. Some cases of misconduct may result in an employee being found guilty of an indictable offence and liable, on conviction, to fines and/or imprisonment based on legislative and regulatory requirements.
While such wording ultimately posed additional issues with recruitment (see discussions of sample size in the Methods section below), combined, these explicit warnings alongside a plethora of protections ultimately allowed a handful of officers to reach an informed decision to participate in the study despite the fact I did not have CBSA’s approval in conducting the research. Had I not anticipated (as a result of previously working within the secretive agency that is CBSA) various difficulties associated with obtaining the agency’s permissions and had research ethics documents and consent forms been designed based on the assumption that agency permissions would be obtained, the recruitment of officers to this study would have been impossible.

In terms of lack of access to observe frontline interactions, my former employment as a student BSO (in addition to much discussion with my thesis supervisor) led me to conclude that an adaptation of proposed study methods was required to continue the study. After filing requisite research ethics amendment documents with my institutional REB, another sample of participants was subsequently recruited to participate in qualitative interviews from which findings could be generated to either corroborate or refute knowledge gleaned from qualitative interviews with recruited officers (as well as additionally test institutional discourses related to frontline interactions). This involved recruiting members of travelling publics (see Methods section below for more information) residing and working within the Windsor-Essex County borderland (the same region from which officers were recruited). While obviously not as methodologically strong as conducting frontline observations at ports of entry, the triangulation of methods to confirm findings generated as a result of documents obtained through ATIP requests, interviews with frontline officers and members of travelling publics related to interaction narratives generated from past frontline interactions, and subsequent content,
themetic, and discourse analyses of resulting data (in addition to my own personal experiences as a student BSO with CBSA and also as a regular border traveller) leads me to conclude that findings generated through this study are fairly representative and illustrative of the types and range of social interactions regularly occurring at ports of entry within the Windsor borderland. As further elaborated in the Methods section below, interviews with officers and members of travelling publics also allowed an especially informative inclusion of additional perspectives (in the form of subjugated official and non-official knowledge) not often included within security and border research. Such knowledge also serves to only further test and critique institutional discourses located within training and other documents generated by CBSA and the Government of Canada. Combined, this adaptation of methods allowed the researcher to address all aforementioned key research questions without the necessity of conducting frontline observations (which were subsequently removed as a method of analysis).

Fourth, my personal experiences and observations also contributed to the formation of various questions I ultimately posed to frontline officers (in qualitative interviews – elaborated in the Methods section below) to begin answering various key research questions. Such questions ultimately focused on (among other matters) issues of officer training in related to interacting with travelling publics; the existence (or lack thereof) of policies, manuals, and other documents guiding interactions with travelling publics; the extent to which officers disregard formal training in interacting with publics; officer use of various technologies deployed by CBSA to guide interactions with publics; and so forth. My understanding of the types and range of frontline interactions (garnered from my own personal experience as a former frontline officer and current frequent traveller) also allowed me to develop various questions posed to members of travelling publics to “pull out” information related to the key research questions of this thesis. This
included questions related (but not limited) to: officer attitude, perception of officers, interactions with officers, previous positive experiences, previous negative experiences, perceptions regarding officer training, and experiences involving officers employing technologies of various kinds in frontline interactions.

Finally, my observations and personal experiences as a former frontline officer also contributed to the scope, details, and wording of the ATIP requests I filed with CBSA. In attempting to answer key research questions and triangulate data with findings generated through interviews with officers and members of travelling publics, I knew I had to obtain various previously unreleased documents (elaborated in the Methods section below) related to officer formative training related to frontline interactions, technologization, and enforcement activities generally; frontline manuals, standard operating procedures, and other documents used by officers to guide frontline interactions, the use of technologies, and the unfolding of enforcement-related activities; as well as previously released documents including memoranda, corporate documents, and public policy documents freely available on the CBSA and Government of Canada websites. Further discussion of reflexivity in relation to ATIP requests can be found in the section above.

In short, it is my sincere hope that readers of this thesis will agree that the secrecy surrounding CBSA has been at least partially revealed through the methods employed by and findings generated from this thesis.

Methods

While (as explored above) lack of agency approval severely hampered the progression of this dissertation and ultimately partially contributed to officers declining to participate in the study (along with rather harsh wording concerning potential career consequences associated with
participating mandated by the REB at the researcher’s institution of study), the lack of approval nonetheless proved to be a blessing in disguise. This complication ultimately led the researcher to also consider knowledge generated by non-official travelling publics rather than simply relying on the knowledge of frontline official BSOs alongside analyses of institutional discourses. Combined, interviews with officers and members of travelling publics provided a much more comprehensive and robust picture of interaction narrative knowledge generated from perceptions of past frontline interactions than had this project focused exclusively on knowledge generated by BSOs. While a complete picture cannot be obtained due to the inability of the researcher to observe actual frontline interactions between officers and members of travelling publics, information gleaned from interviews with officers and travelling publics (alongside descriptions contained in various governing documents highlighted below) provides the most comprehensive overview of interaction narratives generated from frontline interactions occurring at Canadian ports of entry completed by a researcher to date. The fact that even Côté-Boucher (2013) – despite identifying an inside connection to secure interviews with officers – was still unable to obtain permission from CBSA to conduct frontline observations highlights the bleak prospects of researchers ever being allowed to analyze actual frontline social interactions at ports of entry. As such, the methods employed within this research study are likely as close to analyzing knowledge generated from frontline interactions as researchers will ever venture.

While each article (or chapter) below will provide specific details regarding the particular methods employed in each distinct part of the study, this section will provide general detail as a matter of summary. A multi-method approach was used for this study. First, to glean information regarding institutional discourses, frontline officer discourses, and discourses generated by travelling publics related to frontline social interactions, training, and technologization, a content
analysis was first performed on various primary and secondary documents garnered through ATIP requests, government and agency websites, government publications, and other sources. Subsequently, a content analysis was also performed on transcripts resulting from in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted with officers and members of travelling publics. Semi-structured interviews were employed to “reflect an awareness that individuals understand the world in varying ways... Researchers can accomplish this through unscheduled probes... that arise from the interview process itself” (Berg 1998:61-62). In each case, content analysis allowed for the systematic identification of the frequency of information related to social interactions, officer training, and technologization at ports of entry. Given lack of specific research literature and theoretical perspectives pertaining to Canadian border services officer training and agency, officer, and public discourses related to frontline social interactions and also technologization, a grounded or “emergent” process of variable identification was used in this study. According to Neuendorf (2002:103), when existing theory or literature does not give a complete picture of possible variables for analysis, the researcher can employ a grounded approach by self-immersion in a representative subset of the content to be examined. “In this way, variables emerge from the message pool, and the investigator is well grounded in the reality of the messages” (Neuendorf 2002:107). This coincides with standard practices in recent policing research that employs a constructionist and inductive approach toward analyzing shared understandings held by officers, policing agencies, and publics in relation to a variety of issues ranging from police misconduct, race, and agency governance structures (see for example Schulenberg and Warren 2009; Powell et al. 2015; and McMillan 2018).

Particularly, in terms of interview data, a phenomenological approach was employed to capture individual self-experience as well as perceptions related to the research questions. “This
process allows for the researcher to derive meaning and themes of phenomena from individuals with similar or shared experiences” (Reynolds and Hicks 2015:470). Phenomenological studies are designed to understand social phenomena from the perspective of social actors involved with the issue that is being researched (Groenewald 2004:44). The researcher’s preconceptions were bracketed in order to ensure questions posed to participants served to gauge the participants’ own experiences and perceptions regarding themes generated from key research questions (Wellman and Kruger 1999:196 as cited in Groenewald 2004:47). Accordingly, interview questions were posed to participants from the perspective of an academic researcher (and not from the perspective of a former BSO). In order to reduce data to locate phenomena of interest, researchers using grounded approaches to coding and analyzing data can employ phenomenological techniques to eliminate data that is irrelevant to answering research questions (Roulston 2014:304). This is a particularly useful tactic for researchers “aiming to represent participants’ stories, [with] interviews edited to represent the central ideas discussed” (Roulston 2014:304). This phenomenological approach has been employed in a variety of recent policing studies involving in-depth qualitative interviews with officers (see for example Birzer 2008; Reynolds and Hicks 2015; Reynolds, Fitzgerald, and Hicks 2018).

Open coding was first used to address the research questions listed above. Coding was therefore “driven by the researcher’s theoretical or analytical interest” (Braun and Clarke 2006:84). Data generated from interviews and documents are broken down into discrete parts, examined, and compared for similarities and differences (Strauss and Corbin 2004:303). This process allowed various “codes” to emerge from the data. Codes were then grouped together in categories to allow for more “focused coding” of interview and documentary data (Strauss and Corbin 2004:305). This grounded approach was also employed to ensure that researcher feelings
and experiences (as a former student border services officer employed by CBSA) would not have an influence on the data analysis. However, as in similar studies in policing conducted by former officers (see for example Reynolds and Hicks 2015), familiarity with CBSA, ports of entry, and BSO work “provided the [researcher] a greater understanding of the experiences and feelings described in the participants’ responses” (Reynolds and Hicks 2015:474).

A discourse analysis was also conducted on coded data generated from government documents as a result of the content analysis described above. This allowed the researcher to generate findings regarding how discourses generated from officer training, frontline manuals, shifting agency mandates, and other sources function in shaping and reproducing BSO social relations, identities, and ideas (Tonkiss 1998:248). The discourse analysis sought to identify the technologies of governance that are employed in shaping officer realities while also considering the implications of these findings within broader structures of power. Miller and Rose (2008:14) state that governmentality serves to reflect on what it means to govern, or otherwise to conduct conduct. An analytics of government examines “what authorities of various sorts wanted to happen, in relation to problems defined how, in pursuit of what objectives, through what strategies and techniques” (Rose 1999:20). Through a discourse analysis of documentation, one can identify language and other signifying systems that are elements in forming and shaping realities and subjectivities, which in turn render reality governable (Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006:89). Governmentality analyses also consider just what rationalities – styles of thinking and ways of rendering reality thinkable – and technologies – assemblages of persons, techniques, and institutions – are employed for the purposes of governing conduct (Miller and Rose 2008:16). The bulk of this work is accomplished in Chapter 3 below.
In terms of selecting primary and secondary documents for analysis, purposive sampling was employed. Purposive sampling is valuable in exploratory research where previous theoretical perspectives and literature are largely absent in that while the researcher will never know if their sample is representative of a population (given randomness is not a feature of purposive sampling) it nonetheless allows the researcher to select cases that are especially informative. Additionally, the value in purposive sampling is that it allows the researcher to select members of a difficult-to-reach, specialized population (like border services officers or government documents that can only be obtained through ATIP requests) (Neuman 2006:222). Finally, purposive sampling allows researchers to conduct in-depth and intensive interviews and examinations toward identifying “insights, anomalies, and paradoxes, which later may be formalized into hypotheses that can be tested by quantitative social science methods” (Hochschild 1981:23-24 as cited in Neuman 2006:222). Particularly in terms of accessing government documents through ATIP requests, the researcher could only employ purposive sampling given that large swaths of documents either have “Protected” classifications (and are not made available for analysis) or have been heavily redacted. Nonetheless, various primary and secondary documents were examined as part of the content and discourse analyses highlighted above. Sources included federal government websites; over 300 pages of government reports; thirty-one training modules consisting of 1324 pages of material from a late-2000s intake of the CBSA Port of Entry Recruit Training (POERT) program; various documents partially released by CBSA under ATIP requests filed by the researcher, including: 1274 pages of material from the CBSA Enforcement Manual, 296 pages of material related to communicating with the public (mostly newer Officer Induction Training Program documents), 471 pages of material from the CBSA People Processing Manual, and 100 pages of material from the CBSA Immigration
Enforcement Manual and associated training documents; over 280 CBSA D Memoranda publicly available on the agency’s website; and various policies, including the *Customs Act* (1985), the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (2001), and the *Canada Border Services Agency Act* (2005).

Second, semi-structured, face-to-face interviews unfolded with two samples from the Windsor-Essex County region in order to compare institutional discourses with interaction narratives generated from knowledge of past frontline social interactions supplied by participants. All interviews were audio recorded, transcribed, and coded in relation to the theoretical and analytical interest of the thesis. Key themes were identified in transcripts first using an open coding method, and second using focused coding (Emerson et al. 1995). For the first sample, in-depth interviews of approximately one hour to one and a half hours in length were conducted with ten BSOs currently or formerly employed at ports of entry in Windsor. As obtaining access to BSOs was challenging, purposive sampling was employed for this study (Weiss 1994:25). Former colleagues of the researcher were interviewed first, as rapport had already been pre-established. Subsequently, this study employed chain-referral sampling to gain access to other potential participants. The chain-referral sampling technique enables the identification and tracing of social networks using a small number of initial contacts who then provide researchers with an ever-expanding set of potential contacts (Spreen 1992; Thomson 1997; Kuzel 1999). Critiques associated with chain-referral sampling strategies (and other forms of purposive sampling) include that they are not generalizable given that the technique will only reach members of a population who are involved in a particular social network, ultimately missing potential participants isolated from these networks (Milliner 2014:174). According to

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7 The researcher worked as a student border services officer through the Government of Canada’s Federal Student Work Experience Program from 2008-2009.
Milliner (2014:174) however, chain-referral sampling can be particularly effective in reaching hard to reach groups within grounded policing studies with research aims of providing insight rather than attempting to generalize findings beyond the sample (or to the entire agency). In total, the researcher forwarded twenty-five invitations to participate in the research and ultimately successfully recruited ten participants – seven current BSOs, two retired officers, and one former officer now employed outside of CBSA.\(^8\) Six officers identified as male, while four officers identified as female.\(^9\) Questions were posed to BSOs related to the key research questions of the study, including questions regarding: 1) frontline interactions with members of the travelling public; 2) training received from CBSA and the Government of Canada related to frontline social interactions; 3) CBSA and Government of Canada policies, standard operating procedures, and other documents designed to guide frontline interactions with the public; 4) deviations from training and policy in interacting with the public; 5) whether and to what extent officers prioritize their disparate duties; 6) how digitized risk technologies used at the frontline influences interactions with members of the travelling public; 7) perceptions regarding which technologies are most important to performing officer duties; 8) the total percentage of all duties involving digitized risk technologies; and 9) how BSOs understand and define “the border”.

Generally, in policing studies involving in-depth and inductive qualitative interviews with officers, 10 to 25 interviews are recommended to obtain saturation (Reynolds, Fitzgerald, and Hicks 2018). Various policing studies employing in-depth interviews with officers fall

\(^8\) It is likely that current officers were hesitant to participate in the project given CBSA did not give its formal approval for the study and given the researcher’s institutional research ethics board mandated the use of strong warnings in study recruitment letters regarding the potential career consequences associated with participating in the study.

\(^9\) Data concerning ethnicity and other sociodemographic characteristics was not gathered for officers participating in this study out of concern for participant confidentiality. Given the (relatively) small size of the Windsor BSO workforce (relative to the entire population of BSOs – see next page for more details), including additional sociodemographic characteristics could potentially allow for the identification of individual officers and also would severely compromise the ethical nature of this study.
within the 10 to 20 interviewee range (see for example Regehr et al. 2003; Aarons, Powell, and Browne 2004; Beletsky, Macalino, and Burris 2005; Olivia and Compton 2010; Spalek 2010; Evans, Pistrang, and Billings 2013). Furthermore, in terms of phenomenological studies, Boyd (2001) and Creswell (1998) recommend in-depth interviews with up to 10 participants (Groenewald 2004:46). Many policing researchers have also attempted to apply a simple working percentage of 5% of the population to ascertain appropriate sample size (Gravelle 2014:70). While specific details regarding number of officers employed at individual ports of entry across Canada are unavailable for public consumption, estimates of staffing levels at Windsor ports of entry can be obtained through recent media reports. An article in 2013 mentions that the Customs and Immigration Union (CIU) – responsible for representing frontline officers, intelligence officers, inland enforcement officers, hearings officers, and support staff – represents “more than 500 workers in Windsor” (Pearson 2013). Given that, across Canada, CBSA has a total workforce of 14,000 employees including 7,700 frontline uniformed officers (55% of the total number of employees), one can conclude that Windsor ports of entry have at least 275 frontline officers rotating between shifts in 24-hour security environments. Therefore, 5% of the Windsor borderland population of frontline officers is roughly 14 officers. Notably, in a similar recent investigation, Broll and Huey (2015) conducted in-depth interviews with 12 police officers from three municipal police departments in Southwestern Ontario to gauge officer perspectives on cyberbullying.

In-depth interviews were also conducted with thirty members of travelling publics familiar with crossing the border and interacting with BSOs. The majority of interviews lasted about 30-45 minutes and were conducted in-person or via Skype. Participants had to be at least

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18-years-old to participate in the study. Again, purposive sampling was employed to, first, identify “key informants” from a variety of age groups and occupational groups. Particularly, this purposive sampling initially focused on identifying five key informants in fields of work involving the informant regularly crossing the border and interacting with border officers, including, for instance, nurses, accountants, and other professionals employed in the United States. Also included in this initial sample of key informants was a commercial transport truck driver who crosses into the United States daily to deliver commercial goods. From this initial sample, chain-referral sampling was again used to gain access to other potential participants. The vast majority of participants (24) were current residents of Windsor Essex-County at the time interviews were conducted. The remaining participants were mostly former long-term residents of Windsor Essex-County. In terms of gender, seventeen participants identified as female, while thirteen identified as male. Self-reported ethnicity of participants included: twenty White, three Arab, three Asian, three Black, and one Latin American. At the time of interviews, participants fell into the following age groups: five were 20-29 years-old, ten were 30-39 years-old, two were 40-49 years old, seven were 50-59 years-old, five were 60-69 years-old, and one was 70-79 years-old. In terms of employment, at the time of interviews participants fell into the following sectors: four in business / finance, four in communications / media, four in education, two in government, four in healthcare, two were post-secondary students, three were employed in the service industry, three in skilled trades, and one in transportation. Four additional participants were retired, and one participant was unemployed at the time interviews were conducted. Questions were posed to members of travelling publics related to the key research questions of this study, including questions regarding: 1) frequency of border crossing; 2) frontline interactions with BSOs; 3) the demeanor of BSOs; 4) perceptions regarding the extent of training
BSOs receive related to interacting with the public; 5) cataloguing the range of technologies travellers believe BSOs use at ports of entry; 6) how the use of digitized risk technologies influences frontline interactions travellers have with officers; 7) membership in trusted traveller programs like NEXUS and FAST; and 8) how members of travelling publics understand and define “the border”.

Prior studies have employed similar sample sizes (see Helleiner 2010; Bjelland 2016) and recruitment methods (see Horgan and Liinamaa 2017) in interviewing non-official borderland populations. The researcher continued conducting interviews until saturation - the point at which collecting additional data provided no new information (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Mason (2010) suggests that grounded theory methodology generally reaches the point of saturation after 20 to 30 interviews have been conducted (Creswell 1998:64 as cited in Mason 2010).

As stated above, the chapters that follow include sections detailing the specific methods employed within each specific article. Ultimately, when interaction narrative knowledge generated from in-depth interviews regarding perceptions related to past frontline social interactions between official and non-official social actors circulating within ports of entry was contrasted with institutional discourses derived from analysis of various documents, this dissertation was able to reach conclusions regarding key – and perhaps systematic (see Lalonde 2012) – differences in terms of how borders, frontline social interactions, technologization, as well as security and mobility governance are constructed by states, institutions, and social actors circulating within these spaces of security (Foucault 1978).
Key Definitions and Theoretical Perspectives

Various key definitions and theoretical perspectives used throughout this thesis must be explored within this introduction to situate the reader appropriately. The following section highlights these key concepts.

Key Definitions

Knowledge

This thesis will seek to identify knowledge through first-hand accounts. While this thesis (as the above discussion of governance suggests) will identify institutional discourses (governmentality) related to the state, its agencies, and associated border governance technologies, it is also particularly interested in the knowledge generated by official and non-official social actors who actually circulate within spaces (the milieu) of security. This knowledge is what Foucault (1972) refers to as subjugated knowledge, or:

…a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naïve knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy… I also believe that it is through the re-emergence of these low-ranking knowledges, these unqualified, even directly disqualified knowledges… and which involve what I would call a popular knowledge… a particular, local, regional knowledge… that it is through the re-appearance of this knowledge, of these local popular knowledges, these disqualified knowledges, that criticism performs its work (p. 82).

In other words, it is precisely because subjugated knowledge is disregarded as irrelevant and subordinate in relation to official knowledge that it serves so well as a radical – and, indeed, unexpected – way to perform critical analysis of taken-for-granted official discourses. As Foucault (1972) proceeds to elaborate, subjugated knowledge performs the work of critical discourse in that they are concerned with a “historical knowledge of struggles” in which, “there lay the memory of hostile encounters which even up to this day have been confined to the margins of knowledge” (p. 83). This thesis will attempt to challenge institutional discourses and
official knowledge of borders, the nature of frontline interactions, and border technologization through the lens of such subjugated knowledge that has, until now, largely been confined to the margins of knowledge related to security.

For the purposes of this thesis, “institutional” knowledge includes knowledge generated by Canada Border Services Agency and the Government of Canada. “Official” knowledge includes knowledge supplied in interviews with federal officers currently or formerly employed by CBSA or its legacy agencies (BSOs). “Non-official” knowledge refers to knowledge generated in interviews with travelling publics (excluding federal employees employed by Canada Border Services Agency).

Publics

Throughout this thesis, non-official suppliers of knowledge related to borders will be referred to by four primary terms: 1) members of travelling publics, 2) travellers, 3) travelling publics, and 4) publics. “Publics” (Calhoun 1997; Warner 2002) dismisses the notion that there can be a homogenous collection of individuals denoted by the term “the public” (as if there is only one public). Rather, as Mahoney, Newman, and Barnett (2010) explain:

[A] public is not best thought of as a pre-existing collective subject that straightforwardly expresses itself or offers itself up to be represented. Rather, we are interested in elaborating on how publics, in the plural (Calhoun, 1997), are called into existence, or summoned. On this understanding, ‘[p]ublics are called into existence, convened, which is to say that they are sustained by establishing relations of attention whose geographical configurations are not given in advance’ (Barnett, 2008, emphasis in original). This emphasizes how publics are formed through processes of address (Warner, 2002; Iveson, 2007) and implies that the precise spatial dimensions and socio-cultural composition of a public cannot be determined in advance of the actions and activities through which it makes its presence felt (p. 2).

This means that publics (in the plural) are not pre-established, coherent groupings that are immediately intelligible (i.e. what is commonly referred to as “the public”), but rather are
assembled and called forward to the extent that they are generated “from the uneasy and impermanent alignments of discourses, spaces, institutions, ideas, technologies and objects” (Mahoney, Newman and Barnett 2010:3). As such the public sphere (and public discourse) is not generated by a single, overarching, homogeneous public, but rather is constituted as a sphere of multiple intersecting heterogenous publics that are only discernible to the extent that they make their presence felt through social action (Mahoney, Newman and Barnett 2010:250). The multiplicity of publics also presumes that no one public is superordinate to or more legitimate than any other public – all publics (when called forth) potentially contribute to public discourse (Mahoney, Newman and Barnett 2010:251). By employing the term “members of travelling publics”, this thesis acknowledges that there is not a homogenous “travelling public”, but rather a multiplicity of potential heterogenous travelling publics that have been constituted here to provide knowledge pursuant to the key research questions of this project.

Key Theoretical Perspectives

While individual articles contained in this thesis (summarized below) will employ theoretical perspectives in disparate ways, several overarching perspectives guiding this research must be discussed at the outset.

Governmentality

Government is “a right way of arranging things in order to lead them, not to the form of the ‘common good’… but to a ‘suitable end,’ an end suitable for each of the things to be governed” (Foucault 1991:95). In other words, governmentality serves to reflect on what it means to govern, or otherwise to conduct conduct (Miller and Rose 2008:14). As Rose (1999) states, an analytics of government examines “what authorities of various sorts wanted to happen, in relation to problems defined how, in pursuit of what objectives, through what strategies and
techniques” (Rose 1999:20). If something appears to require governing, the imposition is that a problem has been constructed, and governmentality examines how certain actions or non-actions of individuals come under the scope of governmental control toward achieving some end. Governmentality analyses also consider just what rationalities – styles of thinking and ways of rendering reality thinkable – and technologies – assemblages of persons, techniques, and institutions – are employed for the purposes of conducting conduct (Miller and Rose 2008:16).

There are three primary ways of governing. The first, punishment, involves the (typically) sovereign use of power against the body, including, for instance, torture and execution (Foucault 1975). The original purpose of punishment was representation – the sovereign act of torture or murder of the body served to reinforce the power of the sovereign over individuals (i.e. the power over life and death). Punishment, according to Foucault (1975) became gentler with the birth of the prison, with the body now confined inside walls. Individual behaviour came to be governed primarily through representations of confinement. Governance predicated on punishment exercises power on individuals rendered as legal subjects capable of voluntary actions (Foucault 1978:21). Discipline then emerged within the panoptic prison design, with the behaviour of individuals trained through constant surveillance by guards who were invisible to prisoners (and thus omniscient and omnipresent). Finally, discipline becomes dispersed outside of the prison through various other social institutions (hospitals, schools, and so forth). Disciplinary forms of power work not to train via the body (as punishment primarily did) but rather via the “soul” – through the threat of constant surveillance, individual behaviour can be governed. Power is exercised on “a multiplicity of organisms, of bodies capable of performances, and of required performances” (Foucault 1978:21).
According to Foucault (1978) one can chart shifts in the ends of government (*raison d’état*) throughout history. Sovereign states exercised power in order to reinforce, protect, and strengthen the principality and also maintain territory (Foucault 1991:93). In this sense, for sovereigns, the end of government is strictly the maintenance of power and sovereign territory over individuals, or, as Foucault (1991) states, “the end of sovereignty is circular: the end of sovereignty is the exercise of sovereignty” (p. 95). By contrast, population emerges as the ultimate end of government (Foucault 1991:100). Social life is rendered governable through the use of statistics, with states seeking to maintain certain regularities within populations through programs of governance (Foucault 1991:100).

While panoptic technologies of governance located within institutions function to govern individual behaviour, the governance of entire populations (the end of government) is an entirely separate concern. Foucault (1978) identifies circulation as one of the fundamental problems with the governance of spaces of security (like the state). Foucault employs the example of “the town” to illustrate his point. The fundamental problem of towns as spaces of security is: 1) the town cannot simply shut down circulation entirely (or it will face economic death), 2) the town cannot simply allow free circulation (or it will face a host of social problems like criminality, disease, and so forth). So governance of the town becomes a problem of circulation, whereby:

> It is simply a matter of maximizing the positive elements, for which one provides the best possible circulation, and of minimizing what is risky and inconvenient, like theft and disease, while knowing that they will never be completely suppressed... and since they can never be nullified, one works on probabilities (Foucault 1978:19).

In other words, since problems with circulation can never be completely eliminated and are considered natural features of social life, “instead of a binary division between the permitted and the prohibited, one establishes an average considered as optimal on the one hand, and, on the
other, a bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be exceeded” (Foucault 1978:6). Such
becomes the problem of government – the security of the population in terms of the maintenance
of averages and bandwidths in terms of problems generated as a result of circulation. This is
further articulated by Foucault’s concept of the milieu:

Finally, the milieu appears as a field of intervention in which, instead of affecting
individuals as a set of legal subjects capable of voluntary actions - which would
be the case of sovereignty - and instead of affecting them as a multiplicity of
organisms, of bodies capable of performances, and of required performances - as
in discipline - one tries to affect, precisely, a population. I mean a multiplicity of
individuals who are and fundamentally and essentially only exist biologically
bound to the materiality within which they live. What one tries to reach through
this milieu, is precisely the conjunction of a series of events produced by these
individuals, populations, and groups, and quasi natural events which occur around
them (Foucault 1978:21).

In other words, while flows circulate within an environment (a space of security) that is
somewhat random, specific flows may be governed through technologies designed to mediate
regularities within populations (statistics). This marks a clear shift in the problem of government
from one centred on governing individuals to one instead focused on governing entire
populations. Thus emerges Foucault’s (1978) concept of biopower, which describes the
mechanisms whereby “biological features of the human species become the object of a political
strategy, of a general strategy of power” (Foucault 1978:1). Biopolitics becomes the governance
strategy employed by states (and others) to govern entire populations within the milieu (or spaces
of security) characterized by the culmination of predictable and unpredictable events
(particularly as a result of circulation). Security of the population within the milieu is achieved
by governing certain natural (or inevitable) features of the population (birth rates, death rates,
criminality, unemployment, and so forth) according to bandwidths (established acceptable levels)
of these features.
Governmentality studies enable a historical perspective that can serve to “discern family resemblances in... ways of rendering problems thinkable at certain times and places” (Miller and Rose 2008:17). Three such “families” of governmentality may be identified: classical liberalism, contemporary welfare liberalism, and advanced liberalism (or neoliberalism). Liberalism as a mentality of rule in general abandons the fantasy of totally administered society in favour of governing through the market, civil society, and rights-bearing citizens, each of which have “their own internal logics and densities, their own intrinsic mechanisms of self-regulation” (Miller and Rose 2008:203). Neoliberal strategies of governance specifically ask whether it is possible to govern at a distance, or “to govern through the regulated and accountable choices of autonomous agents” (Miller and Rose 2008:216). Accordingly, “The enhancement of the powers of the client as customer... specifies the subjects of rule in a new way: as active individuals seeking to ‘enterprise themselves’, to maximize their quality of life through acts of choice...” (Miller and Rose 2018:213-214). Whereas under classical liberalism the state was limited by the inalienable rights of individuals, under neoliberalism, the subject of governance becomes a “behaviouristically manipulable being”, subject to a governmentality “which systematically changes the variables of the ‘environment’ and can count on the ‘rational choice’ of individuals” (Lemke 2001:200). It aspires, then, to “construct prudent subjects whose moral quality is based on the fact that they rationally assess the costs and benefits of a certain act as opposed to other alternative acts” (Lemke 2001:201).

**Neoliberalism and Risk**

Neoliberalism as a logic of governmentality takes biopower to the extreme. In attempting to govern the milieu, neoliberal forms of governmentality seek to not only govern the present but also to predict the future. As Ericson (2007:6) argues, one way societies attempt to control the
future is through “scientific” measures of risk. Given responsible neoliberal subjects require ever-increasing amounts of knowledge to manage uncertainty in social life, data collection (surveillance) proliferates in an attempt to harness risk-management practices in taming the future. Risk unfolds as a neoliberal technology of governance, with individuals and other entities responsibilized in self-governing personal behavior to ensure their own security and prosperity (Ericson 2007:6). Accordingly, a “precautionary logic” develops to attempt to manage certain uncertainties (i.e. eventualities beyond the scope of risk calculation) that are potentially catastrophic in nature (Ericson 2007:22). According to Ericson (2007), precautionary logic and uncertainty serve to fuel “extreme pre-emptive measures for which designated agents are held responsible, and monitored and sanctioned accordingly” (p. 23). Pre-emptive measures create the need for further surveillance, more data collection, and greater risk analysis in a never-ending spiral of amplification. Surveillant assemblages (Haggerty and Ericson 2000) proliferate throughout social life, “engulf[ing] all imaginable sources of harm” (Ericson 2007:35). For more details on risk and neoliberalism, please see the Findings section of Chapter 3 as well as the Literature Review section of Chapter 5.

Societies of Control

Neoliberalism and risk-management schemes also give rise to increased societal digitization to accomplish data collection and analysis necessary to make risk calculations toward the liberal imaginary of predicting (and taming) the future. This has thrust governance logics beyond Foucault to a post-disciplinary age. As Deleuze (1992) contends, there exists two poles in disciplinary societies: “the signature that designates the individual, and the number or administrative numeration that indicates his or her position within a mass” (p. 5). Power in disciplinary societies is exercised through the individual and the mass via institutions.
Conversely, in societies of control, the signature or number is replaced by “a code: the code is a password… The numerical language of control is made of codes that mark access… We no longer find ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals have become ‘dividuals,’ and masses, samples, data, markets, or ‘banks’” (Deleuze 1992:5). Dividuals are generated within databases through the aggregation of bits of data (generated by surveillance technologies demanded by neoliberal risk-management schemes). Dividuals come to form “passwords” (Deleuze 1992) for the purpose of governing mobility. Passwords can be considered as clusters of bits of data that reveal, conceal, and represent nothing but that serve as signs that mark access. Such passwords become “more real than our real selves” (Bogard 1996:21) and are ultimately mistaken as irrefutable copies of the embodied subject (the individual) in digital form. However, such passwords are, in reality, not reflections of the individual, but rather are nothing more than aggregated data derived from prior movements, passages, exchanges, transactions, and associations. This dissertation will innovate on Deleuzian theory by referring to such passwords not as “dividuals” (as data doubles held as irrefutable copies of embodied subjects), but rather as “digitized subjects” or “digital subjects” (Goriunova 2019). As Goriunova (2019) argues, there is a “distance” or gulf that exists between the embodied subject that appears in reality and the digital subject that is derived from databases. This distance does not permit the duplication of perfect digital subjects as personal “shadows” or precise mappings of embodied subjects. Rather:

The story is made of patterns, similarities, models, and clusters, which are sorted, re-arranged, stored, and sold. Therefore, we write ourselves by generating data that is worked upon and then produced as digital subjects, which are inconsistent and not very coherent, and serve different purposes: advertisement, secret services, or consumption. These digital subjects do not coincide with any originating ‘we’. They are rather at a distance. Yet… there continues to be a legal, industrial, and techno-scientific pull to map computed digital subjects onto human beings… After all, an identifiable person can be assigned debt or a prison sentence (Goriunova 2019:12).
In other words, digital subjects are nothing more than the aggregate of past actions and behaviours that are coded as relevant to risk-management practices. Accordingly, a society must code in order to govern circulation (as in Foucault’s milieu). Non-coded circulation (or flows) represent a threat in that they may not be controlled, and therefore serve as “the flood, the deleuge which is the flow that breaks through the barriers of codes” (Deleuze 1971). Risk societies rely on the imaginary of perfect knowledge of flows (of aggregated digital subjects) to attempt to control them in regulating mobility and access. Given that criminal law, immigration law, and other forms of law cannot be applied to digital abstractions, digital subjects are assumed to be directly linked to embodied subjects in order to make the leap necessary to subsequently govern the associated individual.

In summary, neoliberalism and risk-management as governing logics have contributed to the reformulation of populations (of human beings) into digitized, coded flows (taken as irrefutable indivuals that are, in reality, nothing but digital subjects) within societies of control. In essence, the end of government is no longer strictly “population” but also digitized abstractions of populations located in innumerable databases. Biopower is (perhaps) reformulated into “cyberpower” or “binarypower”, with modern neoliberal states governing circulation via controlling the mobility of digitized subjects (rather than individuals). For greater elaboration on the relationship between societies of control and risk, please see Chapter 5.

*Combining Theoretical Perspectives*

The above theoretical analysis was a roundabout way of describing the history of strategies of governance advancing from classical liberalism to neoliberalism; from punishment, to discipline, to control; and from individuals, to populations, and finally to digitized subjects located within databases. This thesis will proceed to locate contemporary borders as well as
frontline practices and interaction narratives within the context of post-panoptic, control, and neoliberal forms of governance predicated on risk-management, digitization, and the construction of risk profiles in the form of digitized subjects within databases. Such arguments will employ the work of Baudrillard (1981), Bogard (1996), and Deleuze (1992) in arguing that contemporary borders are best understood as forms of simulation, increasingly employing cyborg work in governing digitized subjects as the unit of analysis in terms of governing risk, mobility, and human flows. Some brief comments must be made now to defend the use of Baudrillard (1981) in relation to various critiques regarding simulation and simulacra.

Lived Experience and Governmentality

Some have argued that Foucault’s treatment of power as omnipresent implies that his work is too abstract and separate from ‘lived experience’ (of embodied subjectivity) to offer alternatives to power (see for example Sanger 2008:44). However, as Sanger (2008) argues:

Instead, Foucault offers an explanation which focuses on power as productive and only existing insofar as those involved in power relations are free, as in they ‘are faced with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and modes of behavior are available’ (Sanger 2008:45).

While Sanger’s analysis is limited to the question of gender, conclusions reached are directly applicable to this thesis as well. While, according to Sanger (2008), individuals are undoubtedly structured by norms and discourse, women can exercise freedom within systems of governance by questioning the gender binary. Similarly, despite the supposed common-sense nature of technologies of governance predicated on digitized risk analysis, the knowledge of publics is important precisely because lived experience provides a point of analysis and critique for supposedly fixed systems of governance (like the production of digitized subjects or gender) by injecting embodied subjectivity back into seemingly objective, perfect, and closed “black box” (Latour 1999) of scientific activity. By considering interaction narrative knowledge provided by
embodied subjects, this dissertation considers the lived experiences of the subjects of governance as a way of demonstrating the tangible and measurable human consequences of intangible and opaque digitized technologies of governmentality. Only by considering the knowledge of publics (of subjugated knowledge) within systems of governmentality can we begin to discuss alternatives, human rights, freedoms, and shift discussion and debate to a sociological lens (from the supposedly apolitical, benign, and clinical application of risk information). Sociology can point out that risk technologies have tangible effects for embodied subjects, and that technologies of risk unfold not as apolitical tools for determining the truth, but rather as racialized, classist, and gendered tools for rendering truth.

Defending Baudrillard

While Chapter 5 of this thesis will expound on simulation in relation to contemporary border governance practices, some initial comments must be made to defend using Baudrillard’s work. Firstly, how can this thesis combine the work of Michel Foucault alongside the work of a man – Jean Baudrillard – who published a stinging critique infamously entitled Forget Foucault? I have wrestled with this apparent theoretical disjuncture for quite some time and reached the following conclusions. Baudrillard (1976) states: “Foucault unmasks all the final or causal illusions concerning power, but he does not tell us anything concerning the simulacrum of power itself” (p. 50, emphasis in original). In this sense, Baudrillard dismisses Foucault’s historicism of power (summarized partially above) as nothing but a simulated construct. Baudrillard goes on to compare power with currency as ultimately meaningless constructs that are self-referential. He goes on to announce that simulation is a crisis for critical analysis: “But this is the sign that the substance of power, after a ceaseless expansion of several centuries, is brutally exploding and
that the sphere of power is in the process of contracting from a star of first magnitude to a red
dwarf, and then to black hole absorbing all the substance of the real…” (Baudrillard 1976:59).

It is the conclusion of this thesis that neither theorist is fully right, nor is either theorist
fully wrong. Followers of Foucault argue that discourses are powerful in that they serve to
discipline individuals to adopt certain ways of thinking and acting (Rose 2007:143). Is there not
concrete evidence of this in social reality? The university as an institution provides a powerful
example. Why do university students judiciously and liberally provide citations within their
course papers? Because of discourses generated by their institution (the university) regarding
academic integrity, the value of degrees, and the consequences of plagiarism. These discourses –
gradually developed over the history of the university, shaped and moulded by key events – are
undoubtedly powerful in disciplining (and with modern electronic plagiarism-detection
surveillance methods, controlling) the population of students toward properly citing papers. If
one does not properly cite, one cannot receive a degree from one’s institution. If the entire
population of students plagiarizes papers as a matter of routine, then the value of that
institution’s degree subsequently crashes.

On the other hand, what are universities, academic integrity, and the value of academic
degrees if not forms of simulacra? Degrees (like currency) have no actual value as simple pieces
of paper – and students (particularly modern ones) are acutely aware of this fact given the current
labour market. Hence “the cheating of a generation” (Bourdieu 1979:80). “Academic integrity”
similarly has no intrinsic value or properties that make it “real” in any way. Rather, signs of
various types have colonized academia to such an extent that it is now impossible to differentiate
what is “real” from what is “fake”. Nonetheless, academic integrity is laden with powerful
discourses (some of which are produced by official knowledge generated by institutions) and
students continue to strive toward obtaining an (apparently) simulated degree while following (apparently) simulated rules imposed by an (apparently) simulated institution along the way.

In short? It is the argument of this thesis that just because (as Baudrillard argues) social life is increasingly characterized by simulation does not mean we should therefore reject all commonsensical and blatantly obvious evidence of knowledge-power (or governmentality) at play. Regardless of the extent of the “nuclear fallout” of simulation in modern social life, social actors are still clearly disciplined by powerful discourses (simulated or not) toward certain behaviours. Additionally, this thesis does not advocate a pious following of Baudrillard’s assertions that power (and indeed everything) is in fact simulacra. Rather, this thesis employs a “selective reading” of Baudrillard’s (1981) arguments as they have been applied by Bogard (1996) in terms of the simulation of surveillance. By applying simulation to modern borders, this thesis does not (in turn) therefore disregard all evidence of societies of control and governance efforts on the part of the state. Neither does it assume that everything is simulated. Rather, as alluded to above, this thesis sees increasing simulation as potentially characteristic of societies of control as well as neoliberal and risk-management logics of governance. Similarly, this thesis does not advocate strict adherence to Foucault’s genealogy in tracing back discourses and the nature of power and knowledge surrounding borders to the beginning of documented history – such research would inevitably obscure important discourses and knowledge located in the immediate present. In short, devout Foucauldian researchers can be guilty of diving so deeply down the “rabbit hole” of the history of knowledge and power that they ultimately become surrounded by the darkness of the distant past (which obscures more pertinent and pressing knowledge generated in the recent past).
Instead, this thesis will employ *aspects* of governmentality theory *and* simulacra theory toward reaching important conclusions about contemporary borders as well as security and mobility governance in Canada. In doing so, this thesis follows the lead of Giddens (1996) in his deconstruction of grand narratives of social evolutionism (history) in examining the contours of modernity. As Giddens (1996) states, “Deconstructing social evolutionism means accepting that history cannot be seen as a unity, or as reflecting certain unifying principles of organisation and transformation. But it does not imply that all is chaos or that an infinite number of purely idiosyncratic ‘histories’ can be written” (p. 6). Had this thesis employed a pious reading of governmentality and its grand narratives *or* simulation and its inherent chaos (to the exclusion of the opposite perspective), findings would be severely lacking in terms of both context and richness of description. In other words, this thesis is made better by employing aspects of *both* governmentality *and* simulation simultaneously. Some may see this as theoretical gerrymandering, but I see this as refusing to engage in theoretical polemics. This thesis will not *Forget* Foucault, nor will it *Forget* Baudrillard.

Secondly, and more critically, Baudrillard’s critics generally portray his work as post-modernist, lacking in moral seriousness, irrelevant, and obsessed with claims concerning “the mass” (see for example Callinicos 1989; Kellner 1989; Clarke 1991; Norris 1992; Turner 1993; King 1998). It is worth noting at the outset that the vast majority of critiques levied against Baudrillard originate from the 1990s, with very little consideration of his theoretical perspectives over the nearly two decades that have elapsed since. Most of these critiques are therefore mute on various aspects of modern social life, choosing to critique (for example) Baudrillard’s (now) frustratingly dated assertion that television is hyperreal (see King 1998) or Baudrillard’s infamous failed predictions concerning the Gulf War (see Norris 1992) while not analyzing his
theoretical perspectives in relation to more recent contemporary developments and debates surrounding risk society, computerization, digitized forms of surveillance and data collection, the spread of database technology, the increasing importance of mass media, and so forth. Meanwhile, Baudrillard has experienced a resurgence of largely unchallenged applications of his theoretical perspectives within the interdisciplinary literature in exploring aforementioned features of contemporary social life (see for example Taylor 2013; Kline 2016; Lundborg 2016; Smith 2016; Kaneva 2018; and Lalonde 2018). As Kaneva (2018:638) also rightly points out, many of Baudrillard’s critics may be located within the realm of cultural studies. As Turner (1993) also clarifies, many sociologists have also joined the ranks of Baudrillard critics following his bold assertion that the death of the social necessarily involves the end of sociology given its inability to explain modern life.

It is therefore not surprising that sociologists balk at any mention of Baudrillard – the villain who prophesized the very death of their field of teaching and research. But in examining contemporary society, can one actually argue that Baudrillard’s notion of simulation is wrong (full stop)? As Turner (1993) explains, “Baudrillard’s theory of consumption and the hyperreal society offers a perspective on culture which has been generally missing from traditional sociology and Marxism” (p. 84). To that end, Kaneva (2018) also argues that essentialist neo-Marxist and cultural studies are equally inadequate at exploring contemporary society. Accordingly, neo-Marxist and essentialist thought generally accomplish only the work of representation. Baudrillard (1983) discusses the relationship between representation and simulation:

[Representation] starts from the principle that the sign and the real are equivalent (even if the equivalence is Utopian, it is a fundamental axiom). Conversely, simulation starts from the utopia of this principle of equivalence, from the radical
negation of the sign as value, from the sign as reversion and death sentence of every reference. (p. 11, emphasis in original).

As such, when opponents of Baudrillard “see” culture and social life as operating at a representational level, they in turn perpetuate its reality effects – elements of social life are real because they consist of signs, which are also real. This argument becomes rather tautological in nature. Kaneva (2018) refers to this as “the trap of representations” in which essentialist thinking and neo-Marxist studies do not actually accomplish the work of critical analysis at all. Rather, they simply attempt to describe “the nature of social reality” as intelligible within the limited confines of the global marketplace.

Indeed, nonrepresentational theory – developed by Thrift within the context of human geography specifically – argues:

…the emphasis of human geography should be on practices – either on their reproduction (stable repetitions), or on the production of new practices (perhaps inspired improvisations) – because it is practices (performances using materials to hand) rather than representations that are at the root of the geographies that humans make every day (Smith 2003:68).

While Thrift implicates several “poststructuralists” as his inspiration (i.e. Deleuze, Foucault, Bourdieu, Giddens, and Latour), Smith (2003:68) argues that he leaves out others (i.e. Baudrillard, Lyotard, and Derrida) that serve to push beyond representation theory and towards “representational theories” (in the plural). Accordingly, Baudrillard’s simulacrum can be used to “burn signs in the pursuit of that nothing which runs beneath the apparent continuity of meaning” (Smith 2003:69).

For instance, Smith (2003) uses the metaphor of the map and territory (employed also by Baudrillard) to demonstrate the difference between representational critical theory and nonrepresentational critical theory. Baudrillard (1981) identifies the stages of simulation in terms of signs. In stage one, the sign is a reflection of a basic reality. In stage two, the sign masks and
perverts a basic reality. In stage three, the sign masks the absence of a basic reality. In stage four, the sign bears no relation to any reality whatsoever – it is its own pure simulacrum (Baudrillard 1981:11). In terms of the metaphor of the map, during phase one, territories precede maps and maps serve as representations (duplications) of “the real”. In this sense, maps serve to reflect a basic reality. During phase two, maps suddenly precede territories (and begin replacing physical territory as “the real”). Maps now function to pervert a basic reality. To illustrate this point, Smith (2003:74) discusses how an entire county can be effectively erased from reality through cartographer error. In future planning and governance meetings, it is the map that is cited in resolving problems or conflicts (despite its errors, the map is reality – the physical territory no longer matters). This begins the slippage into Baudrillard’s third and fourth phases wherein the map (formerly a representation of the real) becomes more real than reality itself (i.e. becomes the way to “see” and understand a territory – thus rendering the territory effectively irrelevant). The result, according to Baudrillard’s simulation, is that we can no longer distinguish between what is “real” and what is “fake” – the map (no matter what fallacies or inaccuracies went into its construction) replaces the territory irrefutably such that it is the territory in its absence.

As Smith (2003) further elaborates, representational critical theory becomes fixated (exclusively) with the first and second phases of simulation (elaborated above) in considering how the map serves as a “sign” for or “perversion” of reality. Nonrepresentational critical theorists (like Baudrillard) deny the apparent reality the sign of the map represents and instead consider how the map has served not to simply represent reality but rather to replace reality to such an extent that the apparent binary opposition between map (fake) and territory (real) no longer exists. The map (to legislators and policy makers) becomes the unit of analysis for
governance (it serves as a “perfect” reproduction of reality such that it becomes the reality of governance).

In relating the metaphor of the map to borders and surveillance, this thesis argues that essentialist representational critical theorists fail to grasp the realities of an increasingly technologized society where the traditional modes of sociological analysis and social sorting – the socioeconomic classes and various inequalities associated with individuals and groups – are increasingly reduced to irrelevancy within the context of a risk society predicated on surveillance and data collection generated from “the mass” in order to render the digitized subject intelligible. In terms of mobility, for example, essentialist studies of migration (see for example Crépeau and Nakache 2006; Basok 2009; Mountz and Hyndman 2013; Oberman 2016; Kusow 2017; Boyd 2018) tend to emphasize the inequalities faced by individuals when, in reality, plenty of evidence exists to suggest risk society has supplanted the individual with a digitized subject (the only unit of analysis that truly matters). By taking the perspective that the sign and the real are equivalent, essentialist migration studies tend to focus on visible “realities” such as race, gender, country of origin, and class of the individual migrant as the focus of critical analysis. While instances of racist, gendered, nationalist, and classist enforcement and state policies are visible and describable, such “critical analysis” obscures various other inequalities that are only intelligible when we take the radical position of Baudrillard in dismissing the purported “reality” of visible signs (characteristics of living, breathing human beings) in order to attempt to understand how such “realities” are in fact pure simulacra. In terms of migration governance – and as this thesis indicates – visible signs are overshadowed and indeed replaced by simulations (in the form of digitized subjects) that, much like in the metaphor of the map highlighted above, come to serve as the unit of analysis in governing risk, circulation, and human mobility. This point is often
missed by migration scholars focusing on narratives highlighting prima facie evidence of discrimination while glossing over (simulated) systems of oppression occurring beneath the surface (in this case, in a digital space). In short, phase one: the “cartographer” (the coder) has generated the digitized subject to be taken as a “shadow” or direct reference to the embodied subject (individual) it represents, phase two: the digitized subject begins to “stand for” the individual and becomes the unit of analysis for all governance decisions, and stage three and four: the “reality” of the embodied subject becomes obscured and is replaced by the digitized subject that represents it, and the digitized subject ultimately becomes more real than the supposed “reality” it represents.

As Kaneva (2018) argues, the value of Baudrillard’s perspectives does not lie in a comprehensive reading of his entire body of work (an entire academic career could be spent accomplishing this task). Rather, research can selectively employ Baudrillard’s key ideas without necessarily adopting his wholesale anti-realism. Accordingly:

In short, Baudrillard’s theory is anti-representational but, in my view, therein lies its radical potential. At the same time, this anti-representational stance makes his ideas difficult to work with and ‘apply’ in concrete terms. Nevertheless, they offer a productive provocation that destabilizes the familiar patterns of critique rooted in neo-Marxist media and cultural studies (Kaneva 2018:639).

This is exactly the argument this thesis wishes to make in terms of the aims of interdisciplinary studies tasked with examining contemporary borders. By embracing the radical, anti-representational potential of Baudrillard’s notion of simulacra, the death of the social does not necessarily have to coincide with the death of sociology. Rather, in de-emphasizing essentialist and representational forms of critical analysis and understandings of culture and social life and in recognizing that the simulation of surveillance is removing the “individual” and thus also “the social” as a unit of analysis, sociology can accomplish the work of critiquing contemporary
(digitized) social life in relation to borders (and thus also reinforce its modern relevance as a field of study).

If, as Baudrillard argues, simulation is the true nuclear fallout of the social, does it not make sense for sociologists to document this metastasis? Does it not make sense for sociologists to also document the associated rise of the digitized subject and digitized mass and the decreased emphasis on disciplining embodied subjects and groups as subjects of governance? Lastly, how will taking the stance of simply ignoring evidence of simulation (of surveillance, of borders, of digitized subjects, and so forth) benefit sociology as a field of science? The argument underlying this thesis is that ignorance is not bliss – to ignore evidence of phenomena in our social world (no matter how uncomfortable it may be to the field) works completely against our fundamental goal as sociologists. Refusing to acknowledge evidence of phenomena in our social world is not at all informed critical analysis, but rather is simply an act of intentional blindness and a yearning for tired esoteric knowledge out of a desire for self-preservation. We, as sociologists, must follow the work of geographers and media studies academics in looking “beyond the map”, looking beyond representation, and seriously question the assumption that signs are always linked directly to reality.

**Outline of the Thesis**

The sections that follow are arranged as distinct articles of publishable quality that each uniquely contribute to the interdisciplinary border literature and, when combined, produce a narrative about institutional as well as official and non-official frontline knowledge related to modern Canadian borders (specifically within the Windsor borderland). This “sandwich thesis” was arranged in this way to allow the Examining Committee to easily assess the publishable quality of each article on its own merits (rather than as a series of thesis “chapters” that provide a
running narrative). However, the articles cite findings from previous articles throughout and, in totality, are arranged in such a way to provide a running narrative nonetheless. This running narrative is summarized in the paragraphs that follow and also in the Conclusion section of this thesis.

First, institutional knowledge is gleaned from training modules, frontline manuals, memoranda, public policy, and other documents outlined above in the Methods section. Through a content analysis of documentation, I reach several conclusions regarding agency governance technologies that serve to control the behaviour of BSOs at ports of entry. Findings indicate that various governance technologies are employed, including training documents, manuals, public policy, a non-paramilitary-style national governance structure, and a paramilitary-style local governance hierarchy serving to enable, support, and constrain BSO frontline duties, public interactions, as well as potentially officer knowledge concerning publics. Findings also reveal that officers receive very little training related to interacting with travellers on the frontline. Officers also receive very little instruction related to how they should prioritize their disparate duties related to interacting with travelling publics. Findings also suggest that when training is present, these governance technologies – alongside recent shifts in agency organizational governance – contain systematic biases that produce officer worldviews and social interactions that are rooted exclusively in security provision, while leaving BSOs without the tools necessary to handle other types of “facilitation” (CBSA 2018e:8) or humanitarian public interactions that regularly occur at the border. A subsequent discourse analysis of coded documentation revealed that such a bias is likely rooted in larger trends in terms of the spread of neoliberal risk-management schemes to policing agencies as well as private corporations, governments, and other organizations as a feature of “risk society”.

58
These findings are then tested through qualitative interviews with BSOs and members of travelling publics. First, institutional discourses identified above (i.e. the prevalence of security-related training to the exclusion of other forms of interaction training) are combined with additional institutional discourses projecting officers as professional, courteous, law-abiding, and thorough. Second, such institutional knowledge is contrasted with knowledge gleaned from data generated from content and thematic analyses and coding of interview transcripts detailing the phenomenological lived experiences of a sample of frontline official (BSOs) and non-official (travelling publics) populations. Knowledge of frontline social action generated from perceptions of past frontline interactions, officer training in relation to frontline interactions, as well as the existence of borderlands potentially informed by geographical proximity to ports of entry are identified as key themes generated through interviews. When combined, official and non-official interaction narrative knowledge generated through perceptions of past frontline social interactions between BSOs and members of travelling publics confirm many of the previous findings of this study, including: 1) a severe lack of officer frontline interaction training; 2) the necessity of and dangers associated with officers forming collective best practices on the frontline; 3) the notion that officers are ill-trained in terms of handling the facilitative, humanitarian, non-securitized side of frontline border interactions; and 4) existing agency and government policies providing few details in terms of frontline social interactions and how they should or must unfold. Additional findings generated from analysis of interview data suggests the existence of: 1) *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* human rights violations in terms of officers posing secondary intrusive questions as a matter of routine; 2) perceptions generated by travelling publics that BSOs are potentially complacent or lazy; 3) negative interactions involving officer abuse of authority related to: a) aggressive or unnecessary questioning, b)
generally rude or unfriendly demeanor, and c) harassing travellers about purchases made abroad; and 4) the existence of local borderland realities, differences, and demographics. Findings highlighted above seriously call into question identified CBSA institutional discourses surrounding professional, courteous, law-abiding, and thorough BSOs. Findings also call into question existing officer training models. Finally, identified local borderland realities seriously calls into question the relevancy of CBSA’s uniform national training model for officers.

Next, the thesis looks to the issue of continued technologization of borders and how this potentially serves to influence (or control) frontline interactions occurring between BSOs and members of travelling publics. First, the thesis conducts an examination of existing literature concerning debates and metaphors related to contemporary borders. It is argued that existing debates and metaphors (borders as filters, borders as firewalls) are inadequate in describing what is understood and agreed upon in the literature in terms of contemporary borders. The nature of contemporary borders is then catalogued, and the thesis reaches conclusions that modern borders may be characterized by: 1) border work occurring at a variety of state (official) and non-state (unofficial) sites; 2) the continued existence and functioning of traditional, physical borders at the limits of the sovereign state; 3) the governance of borders and mobility achieved through the calculation and analysis of risk information contained in databases (related to findings generated earlier in the thesis about the spread of neoliberal risk-management logics); 4) the responsibilization of various third-parties in collecting and reporting data on behalf of the state; 5) because of risk-management, data collection, and the use of databases (discussed elsewhere in this thesis), borders are inherently part of security continua, working alongside other police and intelligence agencies, enforcement locales, private actors, and so forth in producing ‘security’ (however constructed); 6) the continued function of borders to provide securitization and the
governance of various mobilities and flows (of people, financial instruments, goods, and so forth).

As a result of these conclusions (informed as well by previous findings), this thesis attempts to provide a theoretical orientation and metaphor for border technologization and its potential effects on frontline social interactions. It proposes a refinement of existing theory for contemporary borders, employing Baudrillard’s (1981) concept of “simulation”. The metaphor of the “simulated border” functions to avoid unnecessary binary debates surrounding border geospatiality – which has become something of an obsession for the interdisciplinary border literature in recent memory – while also incorporating aspects of risk society (Beck 1986) and societies of control (Deleuze 1992) in concluding that borders are anything but organic security environments, with the “stretched screens” (Lyon 2009) of border agents serving to produce digitized subjects (Goriunova 2019) that are tested within games of security to govern mobility anywhere in time or space. This metaphor fits well with previous findings generated in the thesis regarding the spread of neoliberal risk-management practices and the concomitant shift in agency mandates, lack of officer training on anything other than “securitized interaction moments”, and the notion that officers are apparently ill-prepared for the “facilitation” side of border work as well as face-to-face social interactions (as evidenced by various instances of officer misconduct). As individuals are increasingly reconceived as digitized subjects contained in databases (which become the unit of analysis for BSOs to examine given they are supposedly scientific, perfect, and irrefutable measures of risk), embodied subject narratives and performativity at ports of entry become increasingly irrelevant to making determinations regarding border security and mobility. Within neoliberal risk-management schemes, most decisions regarding mobility have been reached well before individuals even reach physical borders given levels of risk have been
pre-calculated and encoded in digitized subjects. These digitized subjects are always accessible within databases that are mandatorily employed because of agency policies forcing officers to always scan identity documents and call forth digitized subjects from databases for every traveller crossing the border. It becomes nearly impossible for officers to remove the “lens” of risk, thus reconfiguring the BSO occupation as a form of “cyborg work” (Bogard 1996).

While, as Villegas (2015) indicates, potential migrants mobilize particular strategies to negotiate performances of sovereignty (by the state) within spaces of security like ports of entry (i.e. carrying extra documents, passports, and visas to prove the validity of their travel to Canada; carrying an “adequate” amount of money to appear to be a tourist; avoiding “full confessions” or “full disclosure” with immigration authorities; and so forth), this thesis will point out the increasing futility of these performances in the face of digitized risk-management technologies employed at contemporary borders. Despite the fact Villegas (2015:2360) contends that such performances ultimately affect the outcomes of border encounters, this thesis will argue that while travellers may attempt to give performances at ports of entry in order to “game” the system or “fool” BSOs, they will ultimately be disappointed to find that the performativity of their embodied subjectivity is increasingly rendered effectively irrelevant in the face of technologies designed to grant BSOs pre-emptive knowledge of digitized subjects (taken as irrefutable betayers of risk information). In other words, attempts by embodied subjects to project ‘truth’ by feigning reality is increasingly replaced with digitized technologies supplanting (falsifiable) personal narrative of travellers with risk-management technologies that seek to render truth infallibly.

Finally, findings generated in terms of neoliberal risk-management practices, simulated borders, and the generation of digitized subjects contained in databases are tested through data
generated as a result of aforementioned content and thematic analyses of transcripts derived from in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted with BSOs and members of travelling publics. First, institutional discourses identified above (i.e. the prevalence of security-related training to the exclusion of other forms of interaction training) are combined with additional institutional discourses promoting the increased use of digitized technologies as functioning to: 1) improve efficiency at the border, 2) augment officer decision-making, and 3) enhance security provision. Second, such institutional knowledge is contrasted with knowledge gleaned from data generated as a result of content and thematic analyses and coding of interview transcripts detailing the phenomenological lived experiences of a sample of frontline official (BSOs) and non-official (travelling publics) populations. Ultimately, findings suggest there is much evidence to support claims made earlier in the thesis regarding the spread of neoliberal risk-based schemes, the simulation (Baudrillard 1981) of contemporary borders, and the reconfiguration of the BSO occupation as a form of cyborg work (Bogard 1996). Findings generated from interview data reveal that both frontline officials and non-officials experience a border where the personal narrative and performativity of travellers is increasingly irrelevant, with officer decision-making increasingly supplanted by information about digitized subjects contained in databases. This thesis also documents findings regarding the use of Automated Border Kiosks (ABCs) / Primary Inspection Kiosks (PIKs) – employed at major Canadian airports – as serving to make risk-based calculations and determinations regarding admission, refusal, or the necessity for further examination in advance of (and indeed superseding) any human-to-human social interaction between officers and travelling publics. Findings also explore various dangers associated with increased simulation and cyborg work, including database errors having demonstrable consequences on the mobility and rights of human beings; the colonization of the lifeworld of
BSOs by risk technologies ultimately rendering officers possibly incapable of asking questions, looking for indicators, and making informed decisions on the basis of anything other than digitized information contained in databases; and the associated human rights, privacy, and legal implications that are potentially wide-ranging and extremely troubling.

The Conclusion section of this thesis will combine together the findings from all four individual articles and will further explore modern developments in borders, frontline interactions, and technologization through the lens of neoliberal risk-management schemes as well as human and mobility rights.
Border Officer Training in Canada: Identifying Organizational Governance Technologies

While recent scholarship has begun the difficult task of unpacking the sociology of frontline border policing, literature examining how officers are governed through their training and organizational governance technologies is sparse (particularly in terms of how officers are trained to interact with and form perspectives of the public they serve). This article provides the first concrete examination of border officer training by conducting a content and discourse analysis of various officer training and other documents to determine the contours of organizational governance technologies and how they serve to guide border services officers (BSOs) employed by Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) in interacting with and perceiving of members of travelling publics. Findings indicate that the governance technologies include training documents, manuals, public policy, and a bifurcated agency governance hierarchy serving to enable, support, and constrain BSO frontline duties, public interactions, as well as potentially perceptions. Findings also reveal that officers receive very little training related to interacting with members of the travelling public on the frontline. Officers also receive very little instruction related to how they should prioritize their disparate duties related to interacting with travelling publics. Findings ultimately indicate that when training is present, governance technologies – alongside recent shifts in agency organizational governance – contain systematic biases that produce officer worldviews and social interactions that are rooted exclusively in security provision, while leaving BSOs without the tools necessary to handle other types of public interactions that regularly occur at the border. The implications of these findings are discussed through the lens of the spread of neoliberal risk-management practices characteristic of neoliberalism.

Keywords: border security; governance; training; Canada Border Services Agency; border services officer

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11 This chapter has been adapted from the following publication: Lalonde, Patrick C. 2019. “Border officer training in Canada: identifying organisational governance technologies.” Policing and Society 29(5): 579-598.
Introduction

While much research in the international literature has examined overarching frontline border security and migration-related practices as well as associated public policy (see for example Muller 2011; Aas 2012; Broeders and Hampshire 2013; Mutsaers 2014; Pickering 2014; Aas and Gundhus 2015; Bosworth and Turnbull 2015; Bosworth 2016; and Infantino 2016) very little research has considered how border officers are socialized through training and organizational governance technologies. Much of this research has also not considered how this socialization contributes to officer perceptions related to border security generally, and policing of members of the public specifically. This, in part, has led to calls within the interdisciplinary border literature for researchers to consider how border security is governed as an everyday practice by those appointed to carry out duties related to it (Côté-Boucher, Infantino, and Salter 2014). Such research will necessarily involve an examination of the “stories, perspectives and practices” of the agents responsible for reproducing border culture and practices (Loftus 2015:116).

When border officer training is explored, anecdotal evidence gleaned from interviews with officers is primarily used in the absence of analysis of the training documents employed by border agencies to train frontline officers (see for example Côté-Boucher 2013). Identifying perceptions held by officers (especially those generated through training) becomes particularly salient considering these factors ultimately inform how officers wield considerable amounts of power that effects, among other things, the performance of national security, anti-terrorism, and other policing functions, as well as our rights and freedoms as private citizens and migrants. Examining how officers are socialized to interact with the travelling public is therefore essential.
in beginning the work of “shedding light on contemporary problematizations of security” (Côté-Boucher et al. 2014:197).

In beginning to consider how border officers are socialized, this article may be differentiated from the bulk of the border literature that relies heavily on examinations of public policies, installed digitized technologies at borders, and geographies of exclusion that enable border officers to perform security functions (see for example Muller 2010b; Mountz 2011; Muller 2011; Broeders and Hampshire 2013; Salter and Mutlu 2013; Mountz 2015; Muller 2016; Topak, Bracken-Roche; Saulnier, and Lyon 2015; and Longo 2016), while remaining mostly silent in terms of considering how officers are actually trained to behave and interact with members of travelling publics in performing their duties. This article will therefore build on the work of Côté-Boucher (2013; 2014; 2016) and others dedicated to the sociology of frontline border work in providing the first examination of the full extent of governance technologies designed to mediate officer decisions and social interactions on the frontline of enforcement. This article accomplishes this by conducting content and discourse analyses on the previously unexamined Canada Border Services Agency BSO Port of Entry Recruitment Training (POERT) program, relevant modules from the more recent Officer Induction Training Program (OITP), manuals and other documents employed by officers on the frontline, and Canadian public policy to determine the following: 1) How might organizational governance and other shifts influence officer perceptions and interactions involving publics? 2) How does officer training govern interactions between BSOs and members of travelling publics on the frontline of enforcement? 3) Given that BSOs are required to enforce over 90 domestic policies in addition to international law, how are BSOs instructed to prioritize their duties and then translate policy into enforcement of and interactions with publics?
Literature

Recent scholarship has begun the difficult task of unpacking the sociology of frontline border policing. For example, Bosworth, Fili, and Pickering (2016) use testimonies from detainees and staff at Athens’ Central Holding Centre for immigrants to uncover the extent to which transnational migration policy impacts the people effected by them. Others employ interviews with Frontex and other European border officers alongside examinations of public policy documents and official reports to examine the co-existence of security and humanitarian priorities at European borders (Aas and Gundhus 2015, Hadjimatheou and Lynch 2017).

Pickering and Ham (2014) employ qualitative interviews with immigration officers in Australia to demonstrate how officers employ intelligence-led policing as well as local stereotypes about women and sex work in order to identify “indices of suspicion or ‘out of place or time events’” (O’Connor and de Lint 2009:40). A recent innovative ethnographic examination considers the extent to which increasing “ferocious architecture” at international borders and other spaces of security factor into the relationship between technology and security (Muller et al. 2016).

Some notable Canadian examples of research exploring border officer perceptions include Bouchard and Carroll (2002) examining how immigration officers use discretion, Pratt and Thompson (2008) determining how race knowledge interacts with border officer discretionary practices, and Pratt (2010) exploring the reasons officers use to determine reasonable suspicion for searches at the border. Perhaps the most notable example in terms of frontline examinations of Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has been accomplished in the dissertation and subsequent work of Côté-Boucher (2013; 2014; 2016). In reviewing the Agency and conducting interviews with frontline officers, Karine Côté-Boucher has done much to
advance Canadian literature in the fields of border security and the occupational culture of BSOs. Several of her findings will be explored within the article.

While literature on police officer training, socialization, and organizational governance is robust, such examinations of border agencies are decidedly lacking. According to Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce (2010:189), law enforcement recruits are subjected to intense socialization during training designed to strip individuals of their personal characteristics and produce officers that embrace the ethos of rigid para-military style organizations. Police academies serve as “hot houses” serving to “grow a dense social network of ties within which recruits socialize one another to the identity of police officers” (Doreian and Conti 2017:96). Officers often receive training on high-risk, low-frequency events (i.e. self-defence tactics and weapons training) with far less time dedicated to teaching communication skills, de-escalation, and human behavioural science (Rahr and Rice 2015:5). In short, officers receive training that emphasizes their role as law enforcers within a highly militaristic and bureaucratic structure, while instruction in potentially more progressive roles (i.e. community policing, reducing racial barriers between officers, and so forth) are effectively ignored or do not translate to the frontline (Conti and Nolan 2005, Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010, Conti and Doreian 2014). This is reinforced through reintegrative shaming in which recruits are subjected to cycles of pride and shame, degraded for possessing “civilian characteristics,” and receive status elevation when these characteristics are ultimately discarded (Conti 2009).

While law enforcement recruits are taught a state-designed training curriculum, the presence of a “police culture” (see Loftus 2010) – which begins to be inculcated in the police academy – can intervene in a variety of ways to question or challenge official lessons. Even within the academy, instructors (who are often former or retired officers) bring cynicism and
biases developed over the course of their careers into the classroom, serving to undermine curriculum through parables delivered in the form of war stories from the frontline (Ford 2003:88). Additionally, there is ample evidence that hidden curricula exist within formal training to socialize recruits with certain unofficial values and techniques – masculinity, brotherhood, officer network formation, officer solidarity, and so forth - that may actually be more enduring than official lessons (see Prokos and Padavic 2002; Campeau 2015; Doreian and Conti 2017).

When rookies complete training and begin their probation on the frontline, seasoned officers may inform them that it is necessary to forget what was learned in the academy in order to survive on the streets (Ford 2003:88). Such interactions with seasoned officers serve to reinforce stable patterns of police behaviour from generation to generation of officers (Van Maanen 1975:222). Frontline officers also reinforce unofficial ways of doing police work by sharing war stories throughout the length of their careers regarding effective behaviours for frontline work (see van Hulst 2013; Smith, Pedersen, and Burnett 2014; van Hulst 2017; Schaefer and Tewksbury 2017). As Loftus (2010:8) suggests, officers discover the realities of policing do not match up with prior conceptions (particularly those developed in training), and officers often develop a cynical and pessimistic view of their social world. Accordingly, officers tend to develop a “we versus they” mentality (Skogan 2008:26) in order to cope with the realities of their employment. In relation to the public, “Officers [come] to expect nothing but the worst in human behaviour and [see] themselves as a small minority in the large fight against crime…” (Loftus 2010:8). Even when well-intentioned reforms are introduced in training and elsewhere, they are often resisted by police managers, supervisors, unions, and rank-and-file officers for a variety of reasons (Skogan 2008). Included among these reasons is the belief among officers that
the academics, politicians, and community activists who design policy and implement programming cannot possibly understand the realities of frontline policing (Skogan 2008:26).

Some evidence of an “us versus them” orientation and distinct police culture in terms of BSOs has already been identified by Côté-Boucher (2013). This is particularly evident in terms of rank-and-file opposition to policies developed by civilian policymakers in Ottawa (Côté-Boucher 2013:166-170). Côté-Boucher (2013:253-263) also explores officer training in passing in her detailed dissertation work on CBSA, highlighting how officers experience status degradation and status elevation as part of the curriculum. However, Côté-Boucher ultimately relies on anecdotal evidence supplied by qualitative interviews with officers to provide a rough sketch of how BSOs experience training without exploring actual training programming. A much more detailed account of CBSA organizational structure and training technologies will be necessary in order to begin the work of understanding how officers are trained and socialized within the agency, and whether and to what extent a distinct policing culture (Paoline 2003) presents opposition to lessons provided in officer training.

Methods

Every month across Canada, BSOs working for CBSA at various ports of entry have millions of face-to-face interactions with members of travelling publics (Bridge and Lancaster 2015). It stands to reason to assume that while many of these interactions may seem mundane or repetitious in nature, these social interactions and the perceptions formed by officers in relation to travellers are ultimately shaped and informed through a complex of governance technologies related to officer training, public policy, manuals, and memorandums provided by the Government of Canada. While examining the nature of face-to-face interactions at ports of entry
is ultimately beyond the scope of this article, such interactions should be considered in future research.¹²

Purposive sampling was employed to obtain primary and secondary documents for analysis in this study. Purposive sampling is valuable in obtaining a sample of difficult-to-reach populations (Neuman 2006:222). Given various documents have “Protected” classifications (and are therefore not released) by the Government of Canada and given that additional information is often redacted from documents that are eventually released to researchers (see for example Luscombe and Walby 2015), purposive sampling must be used by researchers in identifying, obtaining, and subsequently analyzing government documents. In short, a “representative” or random sample of documents is not necessarily even theoretically possible given researchers are not even privy to the existence of large swaths of government documents (let alone able to access documents through ATIP requests). Nonetheless, knowledge gained from the researcher’s former employment as a student border services officer with Canada Border Services Agency allowed the researcher to inquire about, request, and also access documents previously unexamined in the literature.

Various primary and secondary documents were examined in answering the three aforementioned research questions. Sources included federal government websites; over 300 pages of government reports; thirty-one training modules consisting of 1324 pages of material from a late-2000s intake of the CBSA Port of Entry Recruit Training (POERT) program; various documents partially released by CBSA under Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) requests filed by the researcher, including: 1274 pages of material from the CBSA Enforcement Manual, 296 pages of material related to communicating with the public (mostly newer Officer Induction

¹² The nature of interaction narrative knowledge generated through frontline social interactions between BSOs and travelling publics is considered in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 within this thesis.
Given the lack of specific literature or theoretical perspectives pertaining to Canadian border services officer training and agency discourses related to frontline social interactions, a grounded or “emergent” approach to content analysis was used. According to Neuendorf (2002:103), when existing theory or literature does not give a complete picture of possible variables for analysis, the researcher can employ a grounded approach by self-immersion in a representative subset of the content to be examined. “In this way, variables emerge from the message pool, and the investigator is well grounded in the reality of the messages” (Neuendorf 2002:107). The researcher first employed open coding to allow key variables to emerge from a sample of documents outlined above. These key variables were generated from the research questions and the research interests of the researcher (Neuman 2006:461). These variables were recorded in an initial codebook. Secondly, axial coding was then used to review initial codes generated from open coding in relation to all documents. Various codes were then amalgamated into larger categories where similarities between codes existed (Strauss and Corbin 2004:305). Given these codes and categories were formed through the lens of aforementioned research questions, emergent variables included (for example): “communication”, “interrogation”, “mandates”, “priorities” and so forth. Finally, focused coding was employed to analyze all documents through the lens of key variables and categories, resulting in the enumeration of all individual instances contained in-text. Furthermore, focused coding resulted in the identification
of especially illustrative incidences of identified variables related to the research questions. Such findings are presented largely as non-inferential (or nonparametric) statistics within the findings. Again, this is because it is impossible to generalize results to all government documents given access and redaction challenges associated with ATIP requests. Therefore, findings are largely descriptive in nature and point to trends located in accessed documents (with no generalization to the entire population of government documents) (Neuendorf 2002:168).

A discourse analysis was subsequently used to identify technologies of governance employed to govern officer frontline behaviour and interactions and to reach conclusions regarding how to situate these findings within a broader power relations context. Discourse analysis is used to identify how language is employed to shape and reproduce social relations, identities, and ideas. As such, “language is viewed as a social practice which actively orders and shapes people’s relation to their social world” (Tonkiss 1998:249). Through discourse analysis, researchers can identify forms of governmentality – language and other signifying systems that are elements in forming and shaping realities and subjectivities, which in turn render reality governable (Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006:89). In conducting a discourse analysis of findings generated from the content analysis identified above, this article moves beyond the “surface level” of enumeration to also consider the power relations behind officer perceptions and frontline interactions in relation to travelling publics. Employing this discourse analysis alongside the aforementioned content analysis allowed for a triangulation of methods to enhance the validity of findings (Gray and Densten 1998:420 as cited in Neuendorf 2002).
Findings

CBSA Organizational Shifts

Canada Border Services Agency serves as an excellent microcosm of similar governance shifts experienced in other policing agencies over the course of the past two centuries. In the case of CBSA however, changes in organizational governance have occurred at an accelerated pace largely over the course of the past three decades. As such, CBSA serves as the perfect agency for exemplifying the importance of considering shifts in governance as a factor potentially influencing officers’ interactions with and perceptions of the public, as well as shifting enforcement priorities on the frontline.

Côté-Boucher (2013:96-102) citing McIntosh (1984) provides an excellent examination of the early history of border security in Canada from the 19th century onward, charting a progression from British-appointed officials policing Canadian ports, the establishment of a customs department after Confederation in 1867, and the establishment of the Department of National Revenue in 1927 (which ultimately served as the forbearer of the short-lived Canada Customs and Revenue Agency in 1999). This article will focus primarily on the (comparatively) fast-pace changes of the past three decades.

As a way of introduction, prior to 1992 and the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), customs officers largely served revenue collection functions through enforcement of taxation on goods at the Canadian border. An audit of the Department of National Revenue performed in 1928 highlighted concerns surrounding commercial smuggling and tax and duty fraud, and indicated a troublesome start for the Department in terms of prevention in that:

A considerable number of the officers appeared to be apathetic to individual smuggling, and made no serious effort to prevent same. Their conduct would
indicate that they had a misconception of their duties… [and] acted as if their sole duty was to receive entries and payment of duties by those willing to pay same’ (Royal Commission on Customs and Excise 1928:18).

A government publication later on in the 20th Century indicates that officers eventually embraced a preventative role, and states that:

[Officers] collect revenue, a traditional function that predates Confederation. They also protect the nation’s industry against injurious foreign competition. And, finally, they guard in many ways, its people’s health, welfare and environment, serving as a first line of defence in these matters on behalf of other government departments (Revenue Canada Customs and Excise 1978:2).

While the document also mentions that officers intercept narcotics, most policing activities are defined in relation to protecting the marketplace against fraudulent goods, pornography, obscene publications, cars not meeting Canadian standards (Revenue Canada Customs and Excise 1978:10), as well as “liquor, furs, electrical appliances, rings, watches, jewellery, firearms, golf equipment and riding tack… and commercial fraud” (1978:16).

After the adoption of NAFTA and the subsequent diminished capacity of customs officers to collect revenue, it became more common for the Government of Canada to promote the border enforcement activities of officers as the “first line of defence against drugs, contraband, and illegal firearms” (Pratt 2005:191). Côté-Boucher (2013) points to the 1995 Canada-United States Accord on Our Shared Borders as the first agreement in North America demonstrating a concrete link between liberalizing trade and the necessity to tighten “controls for illegitimate flows of commodities and persons smuggled through the same border” (p. 110). Accordingly, “The agreement portrayed the signatories as facing ‘external threats related to international terrorism, transnational crime, and drug and people smuggling’ and endeavoured to coordinate immigration, customs and intelligence agencies in order to confront those threats” (Côté-Boucher 2013:110). In May 1997, the passage of Bill C-18, An Act to Amend the Customs
Act and Criminal Code, designated customs officers for the first time as “peace officers”, allowing them to enforce the Criminal Code of Canada and to serve as the “first response” to criminal and dangerous people seeking entry into Canada (Pratt 2005:192).

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 in the United States, the 2001 Canada-US Smart Border Declaration further entrenched the border as a space of security (Foucault 1975), and border agencies as responsible for facilitating the free movement of low-risk individuals and commodities while identifying and pre-empting potential security threats before they arrived in North America (Côté-Boucher 2013:111). In 2004, Bill C-24, The Canada Border Services Agency Act, established Canada Border Services Agency as a legal entity and transferred to it several additional powers from its three legacy agencies: the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA), Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) (Parliament of Canada 2004). Officers now called “border services officers” (BSOs) became responsible for enforcing over 90 domestic acts and regulations as well as international agreements governing travel and trade. BSOs were also provided with handcuffs, pepper spray, batons, protective vests, as well as use-of-force training (CBSA 2008a). In 2006 the Government of Canada announced that it would begin arming BSOs with firearms. The rationale provided was, “Armed officers are better prepared and trained to deal with a broader range of options when responding to potentially dangerous situations” (CBSA 2011b).

Other agreements with the United States – including the (abandoned) 2006 Security and Prosperity Partnership and the 2011 US-Canada Beyond the Border Action Plan: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness – further established the relationship between liberalized trade and the mandate of border security agencies to identify and
pre-empt potential security threats (Lalonde 2012; Côté-Boucher 2013:111). In 2007, the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, requiring all those travelling to the United States (including Canadians) to present passports or other secure documents, furthered this relationship tangentially in Canada. A CBSA publication from 2008 highlights a focus on security, emphasizing pre-approval (risk-based) programs for businesses and individuals (Customs Self Assessment, Free and Secure Trade, Partners in Protection, CANPASS Air), receiving advanced information to stop threats and facilitate “legitimate” travel and trade (Advanced Passenger Information / Passenger Name Record, Advanced Commercial Information, eManifest, Container Security Initiative), and developing intelligence and conducting risk analyses, and innovating the border for the future (biometrics, marine drones, vehicle x-ray equipment, spectrometry equipment, radiation detection technology, detector dogs, and so forth) (CBSA 2008b). The document clearly illustrates that security is now promoted as the primary mandate of BSOs and CBSA, with “Trade and Revenue Administration” mentioned as a half-page afterthought at the conclusion of the 23-page document (a stark contrast with the aforementioned 1928 audit and 1978 agency documents almost exclusively focused on trade and revenue).

In the post-NAFTA era of border security (and particularly since 9/11) Canada has also experienced a diffusion of border security responsibilities. This shift has been well-documented in relation to Canadian, U.S., and European borders in the literature in terms of: 1) exploring “smart borders” (see Amoore, Marmura, and Salter 2008; Côté-Boucher 2008; Topak et al. 2015), including examinations of travel documents (Lyon 2009; Salter 2011; McPhail et al. 2012), the use of biometrics and other risk technologies (Amoore 2006; Broeders 2007; Epstein 2007; Muller 2009; Muller 2010a; Rygiel 2010; Muller 2011; Bigo 2014), as well as databases and computerization more generally (Broeders and Hampshire 2013); 2) examinations of border
geospatiality (or lack thereof), including logics of ‘remote control’ (Broeders and Hampshire 2013), deterritorialization (Mountz 2011; Salter and Mutlu 2013; Mountz and Loyd 2014), the border as ‘everywhere’ (Lyon 2005), the border as part of a continuum also including other enforcement locales (Vaughan-Williams 2010), and as a form of visual ‘security performance’ (Rumford 2006; deLint 2008) pushing security functions ‘beyond the border’ away from their traditional geographical limits. In terms of the Canadian experience, this shift has been accomplished via the deployment of a variety of government, law enforcement, and private security actors alongside CBSA in sharing responsibility for border security (Côté-Boucher 2013:93). Additionally, CBSA has focused on employing “smart borders” in moving border governance beyond its traditional geographical limits, and using data collection methods such as trusted traveller and trading programs that shift responsibility for border security upstream to private actors including commercial carriers and individuals (Côté-Boucher 2013:93).

It is apparent that over time, CBSA has developed from a department that focused largely on tax collection and facilitating trade to an agency that deals (at least in principle) primarily in national security, criminal enforcement, and intelligence. During this time, and as a result of the aforementioned changes in organizational governance, officers have undoubtedly shifted their enforcement priorities and thus also their perceptions of the public. Over the span of three decades, officers potentially worked first as revenue collection agents within the context of borders primarily focused on governing and taxing international trade (pre-1992), secondly as “facilitator agents” at borders primarily focused on liberalized trade and the (relative) free movement of all people and goods (from 1992 until about 1997), and finally as peace officers employed at borders focused upon identifying, pre-empting, and interrupting potential and real security threats while permitting the movement of designated low-risk people and goods (after
1997 and accelerated after 2001). As officers were progressively equipped with the tools necessary to handle various “security moments” (defensive equipment, firearms, enabling legislation, digitized technologies, databases, and so forth) they were simultaneously also trained to deal with a travelling public increasingly characterized as dangerous, unpredictable, and requiring securitization. This undoubtedly contributed to a shift in officer “worldview” (Heyman 1995) and lifeworld (Habermas 1981) over time, from one focused on enforcing a tax-paying public to one ultimately focused on enforcing a criminal and terroristic “public”.

**Identifying the BSO Training and Governance Assemblage**

With aforementioned organizational shifts in mind, this article will provide an in-depth analysis of the actual training documents used by recruits at the CBSA training facility.

Beginning in 1977, the Customs and Excise College opened in Ottawa to provide officers with a 13-week course designed to train officers “in a variety of disciplines, [as] protectors of Canadian jobs and front-line guardians against harmful products, illegal practices and criminal elements, each of which poses a special threat of economics, health, welfare and environmental” (Revenue Canada Customs and Excise 1978:18). CBSA recruits (beginning in 2014) now complete a 5-week online orientation learning component (phase one) followed by an 18-week intensive training program in Rigaud, Quebec (phase two). Now called the Officer Induction Training Program (OITP), recruits learn how to understand and apply relevant policies, procedures, and legislation pursuant to their job; identify appropriate systems for such policies, procedures, and legislation; develop information seeking techniques; perform primary and secondary inspection for immigration, food, plant and animal products, as well as other customs programs; demonstrate control and defensive (self-defence and use-of-force) tactics; demonstrate firearm
skills; and conduct arrests, seizures, detentions, and personal searches and provide grounds for such actions (CBSA 2016b).

For the purposes of this article, obtained documents pertaining to the now-defunct Port of Entry Recruitment Training (POERT) program are still applicable for two primary reasons. Firstly, the new OITP is built on the foundation of POERT and adds the duty firearm training component on the foundation of POERT training while also incorporating applicable policy changes. Secondly, according to CBSA corporate documents, a vast majority of BSOs currently on the frontline were likely trained using iterations of the late-2000s POERT documents obtained by the researcher given that CBSA increased its frontline ranks from 4000 to 7200 officers from 2006 to 2012 – representing an 80% increase overall – prior to the implementation of the new OITP in 2014 (CBSA 2008a; CBSA 2016d). In short, in addition to serving as training documents for the majority of current frontline BSOs, the POERT documents also provide a representative snapshot of the current OITP. Modules from the more recent OITP pertaining to how officers should or must interact or communicate with members of travelling publics were eventually made available (in part) to the researcher after filing an ATIP request with CBSA. These documents shed some additional light on how new recruits are trained.

POERT documents indicate that the majority of current frontline BSOs were specifically trained on 31 unique modules pertaining to the requirements of their employment, including (but not limited to) immigration categories and immigration enforcement; primary inspection; secondary inspection; indicators; firearms; customs and Criminal Code arrest, detention, and personal searches; and so forth. Depending on the module, BSOs are expected to acquire specific

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13 Data gleaned from the 2013-2014 Annual Report to Parliament on the Privacy Act (CBSA 2014a) suggests that there are “over 7200” officers, and the 2016-2017 Departmental Performance Report (CBSA 2017b) states that there are 7240 full-time officers (suggesting slow retirement/replacement rates and growth since the introduction of the OITP).
combinations of eleven unique competencies, including: 1) client service orientation; 2) supporting CBSA values; 3) analytical thinking; 4) dealing with difficult situations; 5) effective interactive communication; 6) self-confidence; 7) information seeking skills; 8) legislation, policies, and procedures; 9) inspection techniques; 10) decisiveness; and 11) agency business systems. During training, officers are also referred to a variety of other documents to supplement information contained in POERT training documents, including the Customs Enforcement Manual, the Immigration Enforcement Manual, the CBSA People Processing Manual, the Customs Tariff, the Customs Act, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the Criminal Code of Canada, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and CBSA D Memoranda, as well as online CBSA intranet material regarding firearms. Together, these documents (and aforementioned POERT training) serve as governance technologies designed to regulate officer duties and activities on the frontline while purportedly providing officers with the eleven competencies mentioned above.

Interestingly, some governance technologies are prioritized over others. For instance, Part 5 Chapter 3 of the Customs Enforcement Manual states:

The primary responsibility of all customs officers remains the enforcement and application of the Customs Act and its regulations as well as the laws of other government departments (OGDs) for which it has responsibility.

The Customs Act will take precedent over the Criminal Code in matters dealing with in personam offences concerning the importation, exportation, or possession of imported/exported goods (p. 2).

While BSOs are to some extent both enabled and restricted as peace officers by provisions in the Criminal Code, the above passage highlights the fact that the Customs Act serves as the most important enabling legislation in terms of BSO duties. This notion is repeatedly reinforced in POERT documents with frequent references to sections of the Customs Act that enable officers in
certain duties. Secondly, POERT training documents make frequent reference to sections of 
\textit{IRPA}, allowing officers to perform immigration-related duties and enforcement at the border.
The \textit{Customs Act} and \textit{IRPA} are therefore the two most important sources governing the actions 
of BSOs on the frontline.

Other sources mentioned above (Customs Enforcement Manual, Immigration 
Enforcement Manual, CBSA People Processing Manual, and CBSA D Memoranda) largely 
serve as “reference manuals” detailing policies and standard operating procedures enabled under 
the \textit{Customs Act} and \textit{IRPA}. These serve as secondary sources governing officer activities and 
reproduce much of the same material BSOs cover in POERT. Particularly, the Customs 
Enforcement Manual contains over thirty independent lists referencing officer duties pertaining 
to disparate enforcement activities ranging from illicit drugs to firearms to child pornography. 
Additionally, the \textit{Customs Tariff} contains rules for classifying the importation of commercial and 
other goods based on the World Customs Organization's (WCO) Harmonized Commodity 
Description and Coding System, and governs officer activities only peripherally given this 
process is now largely automated and given the onus for proper reporting often falls on the 
importer (CBSA 2014b). BSOs, like all peace officers in Canada, are also governed by the 
\textit{Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms}, necessitating officers perform duties while 
respecting rights related to unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8), arbitrary detention or 
imprisonment (s. 9), access to legal counsel (s. 10), and so forth. Rounding out the bottom of the 
hierarchy of governance documents, officers also draw on over 90 domestic policies in addition 
to international law, including for instance the \textit{Foreign Missions and International Organizations 
Act (1991)}, the \textit{Youth Criminal Justice Act (2002)}, the \textit{Anti-Terrorism Act (2001)}, and the \textit{Public 
Safety Act (2002)}.
**Organizational Governance Hierarchy**

While it is true that officers operate with relative autonomy on the frontline of enforcement commensurate to their training as well as aforementioned enabling legislation, CBSA does maintain an organizational governance hierarchy that serves to govern its employees. CBSA is located within the Public Safety Canada portfolio. It is subject to Acts of Parliament and led by the Minister of Public Safety, the Deputy Minister of Public Safety, and the Associate Deputy Minister. Alongside CBSA, other policing and security departments governed within the Public Safety portfolio include the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Correctional Services Canada (CSC), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and the National Parole Board. CBSA is characterized by: 1) a strong, centralized, non-paramilitary national governance hierarchy that provides policies, programming, and operational support across Canada, and 2) a regional paramilitary-style governance hierarchy administering federal policies and programs while conducting frontline operations at ports of entry.

CBSA is headed by an executive consisting of a president and executive vice president. The organization is made up of six branches and one group reporting directly to the president, including: 1) Comptrollership, 2) Corporate Affairs, 3) Human Resources, 4) Information, Science and Technology, 5) Operations, 6) Programs, and the Internal Audit and Program Evaluation group. Each branch is divided up into various divisions generally headed by directors of the organization. Divisions are broken down into sub-divisions or groups usually headed by a manager.

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14 In 2018, the Trudeau Liberal Government established a new Minister of Border Security and Organized Crime. This portfolio “works to ensure that Canada’s borders are well managed in a way that promotes legitimate travel and trade while keeping Canadians safe. The Minister plays a key role in coordinating efforts to reduce gang violence and tackle organized crime” (Public Safety Canada 2018). This portfolio is contained within the Public Safety portfolio, meaning CBSA is also still answerable to the Minister of Public Safety.
The comptrollership and corporate affairs branches house the accounting, finance, and organizational functions of the agency. The daily lives of border services officers as public service employees are influenced in a greater way by subsequent branches. The Human Resources Branch, for instance, contains ten divisions and thirty-three sub-divisions concerned with human resourcing, labour relations, occupation health and safety, recruitment and professional development, employee learning, and administers the Employee Assistance Program (EAP), the Mental Health Program, the Internal Conflict Management System (ICMS), the Office of Values and Ethics, and the Arming Division.

The Information, Science, and Technology Branch greatly influences the frontline activities of BSOs. The branch is composed of twenty-six divisions and 136 sub-divisions responsible for administering the information technology as well as scientific and other technological tools of the entire agency. This includes electronic systems and databases frequently used by officers on a daily basis, including eManifest, Accelerated Commercial Release Operations Support System (ACROSS), immigration systems, query systems, intelligence and investigation systems, and trusted traveler enrollment and passage systems (NEXUS, FAST, and so forth). This branch also administers technologies (such as ionizers) used by officers to swab and scan substances, surfaces, commodities, conveyances, and individuals for trace amounts of narcotics and explosives (CBSA 2015).

Operations Branch consists of ten divisions and twenty-one sub-divisions, overseeing essentially every aspect of BSO frontline duties ranging from clearing commercial goods, processing travelers, seizing illicit or banned commodities, laying Customs Act and/or Criminal Code charges, issuing deportation orders, and so forth. Operations Branch also administers the Criminal Investigations Division, the Inland Enforcement Operations and Case Management
Division, the Intelligence Operations and Analysis Division, and the CBSA Warrant Response Centre, which all provide operational support, intelligence, and analysis to support frontline officers. Programs Branch similarly administers and supports various core pre-border, at-border, and post-border programs administered by the agency. This includes, for instance, advanced commercial processing, postal processing, and trusted traveller and trader programs (including airline compliance, stakeholder engagement and outreach, and traveller compliance).

In total, the CBSA national governance structure consists of (at least) 97 total divisions and 347 sub-divisions, led by 92 directors and 287 managers and staffed by a variety of employees including (but not limited to): policy analysts, team leaders, financial officers, web developers, ATIP processing officers, human resources analysts, learning specialists, forensic chemists, legal counsellors, and program officers. In short, CBSA consists of a strong, centralized, non-paramilitary-style, nationalized governance structure that greatly influences policies, procedures, and technologies governing officers on the frontline.

CBSA also consists of a localized governance structure divided into seven regions across Canada. These include the Atlantic Region, Greater Toronto Area Region, Northern Ontario Region, Pacific Region, Prairie Region, Quebec Region, and the Southern Ontario Region. Regions are generally headed by a combination of a regional director general, an executive director, and director(s). Regional governance structures are generally divided into a local office (or offices) within particular regions providing regional support for national policies and programs provided by the national governance structure outlined above. Regions are then divided into various ports of entry or groups of ports of entry. Ports of entry include land, marine, and air ports where BSOs process travellers on a daily basis. Port operations are governed by more traditional para-military style policing structures. Ports are generally headed
by combinations of directors and chiefs of operations. Superintendents serve as middle-management supervising frontline officers and ensuring day-to-day operations reflect national policy. Trainers also exist regionally to provide regional training functions to frontline officers.

At the bottom of the hierarchy is frontline staff. This includes border services officers, hearings advisors, hearings officers, inland enforcement officers, intelligence officers, and investigators.

It may be concluded that a combination of officer training, legislation, standard operating procedures found in manuals, a centralised national bureaucratic governance structure, and a paramilitary-style regional governance hierarchy featuring numerous actors and operational divisions serve to enable, support, and constrain BSO frontline duties and activities. Future research will need to consider how and the extent to which this unique bifurcated governance structure serves to influence officers on the frontline. Initial research by Côté-Boucher (2013:166–167) suggests a palpable tension between officers on the frontline and the (perceived) bureaucrats of the national governance structure (Ottawa). Such findings are consistent with findings from the policing literature regarding the presence of an ‘us versus them’ mentality, including resistance to the policy work of politicians, academics, and so forth (Skogan 2008). Further analysis and qualitative interviews with officers will also need to consider the extent to which officers are able to form collective perceptions and behaviour independent of the governance efforts (namely how training differs from practice).

**Identifying Frontline Priorities**

Given that BSOs are required to enforce over 90 domestic policies in addition to international law, how are BSOs instructed through the training and other governance technologies highlighted above to prioritize duties and then translate policy into enforcement of members of the travelling public? An analysis of POERT documents resulted in seven instances
of prioritization for BSOs within the thirty-one training modules. This primarily included text identifying a certain duty as “important” in the introduction to a training module. For instance, the introduction to the Controlled Drugs and Substances module indicates, “One of the top priorities of CBSA is the interdiction of controlled drugs and substances” (p. v). Similarly, a module on Inadmissible Categories states in the introduction, “Knowing which foreign nations and which permanent residents are inadmissible is central to the role of a border services officer” (p. 1). In addition to these modules, the Temporary Residents, People at Risk, Examination of Goods, Duties and Taxes, and Refugee Determination System modules are also prioritized in training.

The Canada Border Services Agency Act (2005) enables Canada Border Services Agency as a department of the Government of Canada and sets out priorities in s. 5(1) by stating:

The Agency is responsible for providing integrated border services that support national security and public safety priorities and facilitate the free flow of persons and goods, including animals and plants that meet all requirements under the program legislation… (p. 2).

This section establishes CBSA as the primary agency responsible for policing Canadian borders and assigns national security, public safety, and human and cargo mobility governance mandates. Part 1 Chapter 1 of the Customs Enforcement Manual similarly discusses enforcement priorities, stating:

In order to make effective use of our enforcement resources, the focus of our enforcement activity is directed at prohibited goods (i.e. narcotics, pornography, weapons), counter-terrorism, export control, commercial fraud, and other identified areas of high risk (p. 3).

This section specifically highlights several specific “high risk” areas that CBSA and its BSOs are tasked with enforcing as part of their national security and public safety mandates. Additionally, Part 2 Chapter 3 regarding Firearms and Weapons indicates, “Firearms and weapons are high-
risk commodities and their interdiction is therefore a CBSA enforcement priority” (p. 4). Similarly, Part 2 Chapter 6 entitled “Drugs and Precursor Chemicals” states, “Drugs are a high-risk commodity and the interdiction of illegal drugs is therefore a CBSA enforcement priority” (p. 6). Part 2 Chapter 14 entitled “Child Pornography” makes a distinction between obscene material and child pornography, mandating that in cases where officers find both that BSOs give priority to dealing with the child pornography first given that possession is a serious *Criminal Code* offense (p. 12).

It can therefore be concluded that prioritization ultimately serves to “securitize” certain aspects of BSO duties, including duties primarily related to banned commodities and goods, immigration enforcement, criminal activities, and, to a lesser extent, the payment of duties and taxes, representing only a small fraction of all possible duties enabled through the multitude of policies and laws enforced by CBSA. It is not without coincidence that the prioritized duties are largely enabled by identified primary legislation, namely the *Customs Act*, *IRPA*, and to a lesser extent the *Criminal Code*.

It can also be concluded from this analysis that officers receive very few instructions in their training or within manuals and public policy regarding what specifically should be prioritized in practice, meaning officers are likely to cope with vague instruction by identifying and forming collective perceptions regarding what constitutes a priority on the job. As the aforementioned policing literature has shown, priorities are likely negotiated through officer socialization in terms of informal training mechanisms, recruit and officer social networks formed during training, and continuing officer socialization and network formation throughout the course of a career (including information transmitted through war stories and other mediums). Indeed, previous findings indicate officers often employ discretion as a response to
new complexities generated by automation (Côté-Boucher 2013:178-182). Côté-Boucher (2016) explores how officer decision-making is impacted by organizational change, particularly in terms of risk-based targeting technologies. Additionally, Côté-Boucher 2013:366) demonstrates how officers can shape border control priorities through their use of discretion as well as unions, lobbying efforts, and through the media. However, future research involving qualitative interviews with BSOs should seek to determine how officers generate enforcement priorities at the frontline, how these prioritizations developed, and, most importantly, whether and to what extent these priorities differ from or pose a challenge to those priorities identified in training and other identified governance technologies.

Training and Governance of Social Interactions and Perceptions

Given that a significant portion of BSO duties involve face-to-face interactions with travellers, it may be alarming to discover that officer training provides very little direct instruction on social interactions. Despite “effective interactive communication” being the fourth most popular competency (listed 21 times) across POERT modules (and following only legislation, policies, and procedures – 29 times – analytical thinking – 28 times – and information seeking skills – 28 times), content analysis identified tangible examples of such instruction in just four of the twenty-one modules: People at Risk, Customs/Criminal Code Arrest/Detention and Personal Search, Search and Seizure under IRPA, and primarily in the Secondary Questioning module. When instruction is provided, information is largely procedural and designed almost exclusively for enforcement or intelligence-gathering purposes. For example, s. 1.5 subsection 9 of the Secondary Questioning module emphasizes that:

The interviewer must be able to prepare and present written and oral reports in a clear, complete, concise, and accurate manner. Often an interview is not an end itself. Its full value may only be realized with the timely dissemination of the
obtained information, in a usable form, to the appropriate people or agencies (p. 11).

In this sense, “strong communication skills” are emphasized only to the extent that they may be used for the purpose of report writing for court and intelligence gathering specifically.

Even in terms of discussing what officers should avoid in terms of communications (i.e. inappropriate word choice, lack of objectivity, loss of self-control, stereotyping, and partisanship), BSOs are instructed to follow the guidelines because they facilitate greater access to information and allow officers to gauge the truthfulness of travellers. For example, s. 1.6.5 “Emotional Factors” in the Secondary Questioning POERT training module states:

Your emotional state can impact the effectiveness of an interview.

We all have days when we are upset, tired, annoyed, or are affected by any number of other emotions….

Be aware of your state of mind and do your best to put aside your personal problems so that you can focus on the task at hand.

Our goal is to:

- Project a sympathetic, friendly, and compassionate personality image.
- Win the subject’s trust and create a conversational rapport.
- Create a psychological atmosphere that will facilitate confessing, not one that would discourage a confession (p. 25).

Therefore, maintaining a professional image is only promoted insofar as it is designed to create the type of atmosphere that is conducive to inducing a confession from an individual during an interview. Similarly, s. 5.4.10 “Systematic approach for disrobement of persons” in the Customs/Criminal Code Arrest / Detention and Personal Search POERT training module requires officers to act professionally and with courtesy during personal searches (otherwise known as “strip searches”), showing empathy, answering questions politely, and refraining from making any “unnecessary comments or attempting humour with the traveller” (p. 76-77). Such
requirements are made mostly to facilitate completion of the search and avoid combative reactions from subjects.

Additionally, effective interaction is almost always couched as being natural or innate.

For instance, s. 1.5 “Qualities of an effective interviewer” of the Secondary Questioning POERT module states:

A good interviewer should have an interest in human nature and a personality that enables them to gain the co-operation of the subject. These qualities, and the following desirable character traits, are natural in some interviewers, but where there is a deficiency it can usually be corrected if the interviewer is willing to devote enough time to study and practice (p. 9).

It is generally unclear, however, when trainees would have time to refine any “personality deficiencies” and gain an interest in human nature given such instruction is not provided by CBSA. Other sections of the Secondary Questioning module contain instruction on communicating with what could be called “special populations”. For example, s. 3.2 discusses “guidelines to follow when interviewing a child”, including:

Adopt a less formal line of questioning in order to avoid frightening or intimidating a child by using language the child can understand… Try to speak at the child’s level. Avoid talking down to them… End your interview with a child on a positive and supportive note and with an explanation of why you asked the questions (p. 25).

These guidelines are, generally speaking, vague and do not provide specific instructions or examples of how to achieve stated goals (the ability to speak to a child in the proposed way is assumed to be natural). In terms of s. 5.2 regarding “communicating with people who have disabilities”, the module states:

If you wish to talk to a person with a hearing disability, touch his or her shoulder or arm lightly or wave your hand. This is the equivalent of ‘Excuse me’. Always communicate directly with the person with a hearing disability, even when he or she is accompanied by an interpreter. When the individual is not accompanied by an interpreter, determine how you can best facilitate communication (p. 33).
Again, instructions provided are fairly vague and a “toolkit” for communication is largely not provided to the BSO in the training module, leaving it up to the BSO to discover on the frontline how to best facilitate communication with a person with a hearing disability in the absence of a translator. The training module regarding People at Risk similarly instructs officers to be “sensitive to the personal situation of suspected [trafficking in persons] victims… proceed with extreme tact and sensitivity” (p. 8-11). Again, a toolkit of communication with specific instructions and examples is not provided. Rather, it is assumed that officers innately understand how to be tactful and show the appropriate level of sensitivity to victims. Interestingly, such communication considerations are never made for refugee claimants who may similarly be struggling with emotional and psychological distress as a result of persecution, danger, or war in their home countries, perhaps establishing a dichotomy (in training at least) between those victims deserving of compassion (trafficked persons) and “others” undeserving of empathy (refugees seeking asylum).

Lastly, a training module entitled “Overview of Secondary” makes reference to a vague “educative role” BSOs should play in relation to the public. However, details are not provided regarding when or how BSOs should act as educators or gain skills necessary to become effective teachers. Details are also not provided regarding the most effective techniques for educating members of the public, and such activity is (again) assumed to be an innate ability in the training documents.

While more recent OITP training documents contain additional interaction training, effective interaction and communication are still largely couched in terms of CBSA’s enforcement and intelligence-gathering mandate. Such communication training is mostly found in two modules: 1) Interviewing Techniques and 2) Client Service. The former contains
instruction on how officers should interview members of the public, how active listening
techniques can aide in amassing information, how officers can best detect deception in answers
through both verbal and non-verbal indicators, and how methods of communication and
questioning can lead to compliant and receptive interviewees. In the latter “Client Service”
module, good client service (via communication) is necessitated as a way of making BSO duties
easier given travellers will be “calm” and “cooperative”, allowing the officer to avoid court
challenges based on their perceived behaviour, and facilitating the flow of travellers such that the
officer may “concentrate on high-risk persons or goods” (p. 7).

While the examined legislation, D Memoranda, and Immigration Enforcement Manual
contain no information regarding interacting with travellers specifically, the CBSA Customs
Enforcement Manual makes fifteen such references. Again, such instructions are largely
constructed in terms of fulfilling an enforcement role. For instance, Part 2 Chapter 3 Firearms
and Weapons states:

29. To establish this knowledge fact, the CBSA officer, as part of the primary
examination will specifically ask the traveller if he/she is carrying any weapon
such as pepper spray, mace or knives and advise them of the prohibited status of
such weapons. In many instances, travellers may not realize that certain items are
prohibited and they are not intentionally trying to smuggle them into Canada (p. 5).

In this sense, choice of language is identified as important in terms of interdicting goods given
that travellers may not understand what vague terms like “weapons” mean without specific
examples, which may ultimately negatively impact interdiction, enforcement, and subsequent
convictions. Even in terms of communicating with victims of trafficking in persons (VTIPs),
effective communication is defined in terms of conducting an interview in order to establish
criminality of the trafficker:
Engage in as little questioning as possible, and conduct your interaction with the individual in a non-confrontational manner. Use non-threatening body language. Listen to the VTIP’s story and realize that the truth may take some time to surface as these victims and their families are threatened with violence in the event that they cooperate with the police. Should the officer encounter resistance, questioning should be put on hold (Part 2 Chapter 15, p. 2).

This focus on communication for the purposes of enforcement and intelligence-gathering is confirmed in the POERT module Secondary Questioning, which states, “The reason we interview is to obtain and/or confirm information to make accurate decisions on people and goods” (p. 2). The document subsequently clarifies just what an “interview” entails, stating, “An interview occurs anytime a BSO interacts with a traveller” (p. 2). In essence then, according to CBSA training documents and manuals, potentially any and all interactions between BSOs and members of the travelling public are understood as “interviews” designed to elicit information necessary to make enforcement and admissibility decisions.

Sections of the People Processing Manual related to communication include: Part 1 Chapter 3 Diffusion Techniques, Part 1 Chapter 4 Awareness Issues, Part 2 Chapter 1 Primary Questioning and Immigration Referrals, and Part 2 Chapter 2 Our Missing Children Program. Once again, communication is largely understood in enforcement terms. For example, a section in Part 1 Chapter 3 states: “Communication techniques used to reduce the anger and hostility of an individual are known as defusion (sic) techniques. The objective is not to change the other person, but to calm the person to a level where the border services officer can perform his or her job” (p. 10). Training similar to this is also provided in officer use of force modules. Another section in Part 2 Chapter 1 reads: “In conducting the primary interview in the highway mode, the officer at [the primary inspection line] must ensure that every person is given an opportunity to make a full and complete declaration. Questioning styles such as ‘Anything back?’ for returning residents or ‘Where to today?’ for non-residents are to be avoided” (p. 52).
It is interesting to note that most of the information contained in manuals on interacting with members of the public is also found elsewhere (i.e. training documents) and therefore is not necessarily original or unique. Nonetheless, specific communication instructions for BSOs are provided in only four of the sixty-seven chapters of the People Processing Manual (6% of chapters) or about 15 total pages of specific instruction on how to communicate with members of travelling publics over 471 pages (3% of all material covered). Eight of the fifteen pages deal specifically with communicating under “special” circumstances, mostly related to communicating with people with disabilities (6 pages) and questioning suspected abducted children (2 pages). The rest of the People Processing Manual is reserved for identifying how officers should process travellers in different modes (land, sea, air), the CANPASS program, personal importations, classification of goods, tariffs, the importation of vehicles, and various other topics not pertaining directly to communication with travellers. In short, the People Processing Manual is more concerned with (as its title suggests) “processing” than it is about interacting with members of travelling publics.

In fact, of all the training and other documents examined (over 3700 pages of information), only about 26 pages (less than 1% of all information covered) include “how to communicate” or “how to interact” guides for officers not specifically related to gaining compliance of travellers or administering the enforcement or intelligence-gathering mandates of the agency. Eleven of these pages were located in the new “Client Service” OITP module under fourteen sub-headings, including: 2.4 Courtesy, 3.1 How Communication Works, 3.2 Your Communication Style, 3.3 Communication Barriers, 4.1 What is a Difficult Situation, 4.2 Communicating in Difficult Situations, 4.3.1 Dealing with Emotional Travellers or Situations, and 4.3.2 Dealing with Travellers who Oppose, Provoke or Challenge You. Therefore, most
officers currently on the frontline did not receive this instruction as part of POERT. Interestingly, while the “Client Service” OITP module is the primary interaction lesson provided to BSOs, CBSA projects the lesson will take just 4 hours and 30 minutes of the 18 weeks recruits are being trained and tested at the CBSA College in Rigaud, Quebec (i.e. about 0.6% of all time spent training). As mentioned above, an additional fifteen pages of communication guidelines were located in the People Processing Manual. Even when including enforcement or intelligence-gathering interaction instruction with the above findings, a grand total of about 95 pages of information (2.6% of all information examined) contain any interaction or communication content whatsoever.

Regardless of which metric above you choose to consider, a very small fraction of all BSO training, frontline manuals, public policy, and other documents prepare BSOs in any way for interacting with travelling publics as an officer on the frontline. This stands in stark contrast with the vast amount of time (likely the majority of their careers) BSOs will spend interacting with members of travelling publics within an inordinately social occupation. Furthermore, POERT modules (and presumably OITP modules as well) display a systematic bias towards considering communication and social interaction as tools CBSA officers may use in order to elicit confessions, gathering intelligence, and ultimately produce enforcement actions. In this way, officer training falls into the same trap as much of the literature in universally portraying border interactions as “security moments” designed to fulfill a security mandate. This reflects much of the aforementioned findings from the policing literature, namely, officers receive training that emphasizes their role as law enforcers within a highly militaristic and bureaucratic structure, while instruction in potentially more progressive roles (i.e. community policing, reducing racial barriers, and so forth) are effectively ignored or do not translate to the frontline
While the securitization of border activities and interactions is, of course, palpable and inescapable at the physical border, it is likely the case that the vast majority of interactions between BSOs and members of travelling publics are inherently mundane in nature and ultimately do not elicit confessions or information designed to fulfill an intelligence or enforcement mandate. In fact, we know the vast majority of interactions at the border do not lead to enforcement or intelligence-gathering activities at all. In the 2013-2014 fiscal year, only 2.97% of all examined individuals were inadmissible for customs or immigration reasons (CBSA 2014c:36). Additionally, out of the over 100 million travellers and 14 million commercial importations BSOs processed in that year (CBSA 2014c:1) only about 1.3% of all individuals and 3.17% of all commercial goods examined resulted in customs infractions or enforcement actions (CBSA 2014c:36).

Furthermore, trusted traveller programs like NEXUS in North America create comparatively relaxed border social interactions that can hardly be referred to as “security moments” designed to elicit information or lead to enforcement actions. In programs such as NEXUS, the vast majority of information is provided upstream by the traveller at the time of the application process, and subsequent interactions at the physical border can only be described as a “formality” rather than as an “interview”. Indeed, in 2013-2014, 98.78% of all trusted traveller members were found to be in compliance with border legislation (CBSA 2014:31). In short, while officer training, manuals, and other documents conjure up an image of a “wild west” of frontline border security for border services officers and recruits, in actuality security moments may in fact be few and far between amidst a vast ocean of routine social interactions between BSOs and travellers.
While (perhaps) preparing BSOs adequately for their enforcement and intelligence duties, CBSA training and other documents leave officers without the tools necessary for the non-securitized or “facilitation” (CBSA 2018e:8) side of border work, such as the “humanitarian border” identified by Walters (2011) or the vague “educative” role promoted by the Agency itself. Findings in this article indicate that BSOs are arguably undertrained and therefore ill-prepared to interact with any number of humanitarian crisis cases, asylum seekers, victims of trafficking, abducted children, people with disabilities, travellers requiring instruction on a variety of border-related topics, travellers simply importing goods and paying taxes, emotional or angry traveller not requiring use of force options, and other equally important duties and scenarios beyond security and intelligence. As such, BSO training effectively ignores the fact the BSO occupation is a form of “emotional labour” in which officers are responsible for projecting a standardized affect (confidence, knowledgeability, even-temper, professionalism, and so forth) while simultaneously managing the emotions of travellers they interact with (see Hochschild 1983). Such findings also reflect findings from the policing literature that police training academies often focus on high-risk, low-probability training (i.e. use of force training) while simultaneously neglecting the facilitative side of police work (i.e. communication, de-escalation, community engagement, and so forth) (Conti and Nolan 2005; Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010; Conti and Doreian 2014; Rahr and Rice 2015).

Finally, such findings can be used to situate how CBSA governance technologies are (en)folded into existing frontline governance structures, namely, the “zone of frontier government” (O’Connor and de Lint 2009:40) characterized by the exercise of sovereignty as well as strategies of control, surveillance, and risk management as overarching border frameworks. These strategies can also be situated within broader socioeconomic power trends.
related to the spread of neoliberal and risk-management logics of governance. Various uncertainties emerge as a consequence of modernity and free market economics. Neoliberalism embraces uncertainty (as a feature of innovation) but wishes also to tame associated threats and insecurities of various kinds. Risk emerges as a ‘scientific’ way to harness uncertainties and produce ‘security’ by obtaining data and knowledge towards predicting the future (rendering uncertainties “knowable” and thus controllable). Ericson (2007) documents the spread of risk logics to government departments, policing agencies, corporations, and even to individuals as self-governing neoliberal consumers of risk. The spread of risk logics to agencies responsible for border and immigration enforcement has been well-documented in the literature (see for example Amoore and Hall 2009; Amoore 2011; Amoore 2013; Broeders and Hampshire 2013; Amoore and Raley 2017). Much of the work of Muller (2010a; 2010b; 2011; 2013) also considers this trend. Subsequent shifts in agency mandates (highlighted above in this study in the case of CBSA) increasingly reconceptualizes a generally law-abiding public as a potentially dangerous, criminal, and terroristic public as surveillance mechanisms proliferate to “know” individuals; collect, collate, and analyze data; and govern mobility according to risk.

In addition to failing to adequately prepare frontline BSOs for the ‘facilitative’ side of border work, identified training and other documents display a systematic bias toward intelligence and interrogation work that can be read as being symptomatic of broader trends associated with neoliberalism, risk, and the diffusion of surveillance technologies away from traditional sovereign border sites (see for example Walters 2006b; Johnson et al. 2011). As CBSA continues to shift from legacy agency mandates to mandates associated with securitization, risk, and pre-emption of threats as a result of broader neoliberal risk-based practices and technologies, the nature of border work (as well as officer perceptions and frontline
interactions) is also systematically changing to reflect these trends. Discourses surrounding potential additional mandates, including (for example) communication, de-escalation, community engagement, educating the public, managing personal and traveller emotions, managing the boredom associated with routine work, dealing with sick or disabled travellers, and handling English as a Second Language (ESL) travellers, are incompatible with forms of governance (and associated technologies) employing neoliberal risk-management modes of power. Such considerations simply do not factor into the “calculus” of risk and are therefore irrelevant to contemporary border work. Such ‘facilitation’ (CBSA 2018e:8) border work is enveloped and indeed consumed by security and intelligence-related surveillance and risk-management technologies and practices designed to render travellers (read: “threats”) knowable.

Future research should consider how increased automation and pre-emption of border governance practices – as a result of neoliberal risk-management practices – further intensifies this gulf in the ability for BSOs to successfully interact with the travelling public in both securitized and non-securitized moments.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Conclusion}

While much research has focused on examining overarching frontline border security and migration-related practices as well as associated public policy, very little research has considered how border officers are socialized through training and organizational governance technologies. While the policing literature is rife with examinations of police officer socialization, the border literature has much work to do in this regard. Border research has also not considered how socialization contributes to officer perceptions related to border security generally, and policing

\textsuperscript{15} Please see Chapter 5 “Cyborg Work: Borders as Simulation” and Chapter 6 “Examining Frontline Official and Non-Official Interaction Narratives Concerning Digitized Risk Technologies Employed at the Canadian Border” for an examination of increased technologization.
and interacting with members of the public specifically. This article ultimately adds to the literature by carrying forward the work of Karine Côté-Boucher and others in examining the sociology of frontline border work. The article accomplished this by providing the first examination of the full extent of governance technologies designed to mediate officer decisions and social interactions on the frontline of enforcement. This was achieved by conducting content and discourse analyses of the previously unexamined CBSA BSO POERT programme, relevant modules from the more recent OITP, manuals and other documents employed by officers on the frontline, as well as Canadian public policy in considering CBSA organizational shifts, how officers are instructed to interact with the public, and the prioritization of duties related to the public.

Findings indicate that organizational governance shifts over the course of the last three decades within CBSA have shifted priorities from tax and duty collection to an agency that deals (at least in principle) primarily in national security, criminal enforcement, and intelligence. These shifts have resulted in a concomitant shift in officer duties and officer worldview in that conceptualizations have undoubtedly shifted from policing a taxpaying public to dealing with a travelling public increasingly characterized as dangerous, unpredictable, and requiring securitization. Findings also identified the training and governance assemblage designed to manage frontline BSOs, and indicated that a combination of training documents, manuals, public policy, and a paramilitary-style governance hierarchy serves to enable, support, and constrain BSO frontline duties, public interactions, as well as potentially perceptions.

Additional findings indicate that the Customs Act and IRPA are prioritized as the two most important parts of the assemblage governing the actions of BSOs on the frontline of enforcement. Furthermore, prioritization of duties ultimately unfolds across training documents,
manuals, and public policy to “securitize” certain aspects of BSO duties, including duties primarily related to banned commodities and goods, immigration enforcement, banned criminal activities, and, to a lesser extent, the payment of duties and taxes. Due to the lack of prioritization information offered to officers, it is possible that BSOs also develop collective prioritizations through interacting with the travelling public on the frontline of enforcement (as the policing literature also suggests in terms of public police officers). This theory will require testing in future research.

Finally, content and discourse analyses of officer training, manuals, and other documents revealed that BSOs receive very little training related to interacting with members of travelling publics on the frontline. When such training is infrequently provided, officers largely receive instructions only insofar as they serve to support officers in gathering information and collecting intelligence necessary to complete enforcement actions. Collectively, such systematic bias towards portraying the border as the “wild west of frontline security” vis-à-vis CBSA governance shifts, the training and technologies, as well as in other manuals and documents ultimately produces officer worldviews and social interactions that are rooted exclusively in security provision while leaving BSOs largely unable to handle other “facilitative” types of public interactions that regularly occur at the border. This reflects prior research in the policing literature and also suggests the BSO occupation is not framed as a form of ‘emotional labour’ (Hochschild 1983) in training. In addition, such inadequacies can be read as being symptomatic of broader socioeconomic power trends associated with neoliberalism, risk, and the diffusion of surveillance technologies away from traditional sovereign border sites in that the ‘facilitation’ side of border work is incompatible with (and irrelevant to) risk-management modes of power.
This article is inherently limited in terms of the researcher not being allowed direct access from CBSA to examine how social interactions between BSOs and members of travelling publics actually unfold at the border, as well as whether and to what extent officers develop collective enforcement priorities and styles of social interaction irreducible to officer training and standard operating procedures found in manuals. As the policing literature suggests, officer socialization continues throughout the length of a career, and long after training has ended. In turn, it is also possible that official lessons provided to BSOs do not always translate directly into frontline border practices.

Directions for future research include comparing the findings from the content and discourse analyses above to results from qualitative interviews with frontline officers and members of travelling publics to examine whether and to what extent BSOs employ their training at the border, how priorities are (in)formed by frontline activities and social interactions with travelling publics, and whether and to what extent governance technologies actually influence social interactions as well as perceptions held by officers in relation to publics. Such findings can be contrasted with findings identified in this article to test whether and to what extent securitized perceptions produced by various governance technologies are actually translated into social interactions occurring at the frontline. Finally, given that securing access to government documents is a slow and tedious process, the results from this project will be updated as additional documents become available through ATIP requests that either confirm or lead to a revision of current findings.

- END OF ARTICLE -

Please see Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 for results of qualitative interviews related to officer governance and interaction narratives generated through frontline social interactions between BSOs and members of travelling publics.
“From Seat to Street”: Questioning Canadian Border Practices Through Official and Non-Official Interaction Narrative Knowledge

This article combines findings concerning institutional discourses and officer governance (generated from Lalonde 2019) with interaction narrative knowledge produced by frontline officials and non-officials gleaned from qualitative interviews designed to elicit perceptions regarding past frontline interactions at borders, officer training in relation to frontline interactions, as well as the existence of borderlands potentially informed by geographical proximity to ports of entry. When combined, official and non-official interaction narrative knowledge generated through the circulation of BSOs and members of travelling publics within ports of entry confirm many of the findings of Lalonde (2019), including: 1) a severe lack of officer frontline interaction training, 2) the necessity of and dangers associated with officers learning best-practices on the frontline; 3) the notion that officers are ill-trained in terms of handling the “facilitation”, humanitarian, non-enforcement side of frontline border interactions; and 4) existing Agency and government policies providing few details in terms of frontline social interactions and how they should or must unfold. Other findings suggest the existence of: 1) Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms human rights violations in terms of officers posing secondary intrusive questions as a matter of routine, 2) perceptions generated by travelling publics that BSOs are potentially complacent or lazy, 3) negative interactions involving officer abuse of authority related to: a) aggressive or unnecessary questioning, b) generally rude or unfriendly demeanour, and c) harassing travellers about purchases made abroad; and 4) the existence of local borderland realities and differences that call into question CBSA’s uniform national training model for officers. These findings are discussed in relation to being symptomatic of broader socioeconomic power trends employing neoliberal risk-management forms of governance.

**Keywords:** border security; CBSA; officer training; interaction narratives
Introduction

Much of the interdisciplinary border literature can be said to focus its lens on official or institutional discourses. As such, the literature has largely examined public policy construction, state governance efforts, and the deployment of various technologies at borders (see for example Muller 2010b; Muller 2011; Broeders and Hampshire 2013; Bosworth and Turnbull 2015; Bosworth 2016); the governance of global migration (see Mountz 2011; Aas 2012; Salter and Mutlu 2013; Mountz and Loyd 2014; Mountz 2015); and, to a lesser extent, the perceptions of border and immigration officers tasked with frontline border enforcement (see for example Côté-Boucher 2013; Pickering 2014; Pickering and Ham 2014; Aas and Gundhus 2015; Côté-Boucher 2016; Côté-Boucher 2018). While official knowledge – and particularly interviews with officers – provide important knowledge on the unfolding of frontline border governance (Loftus 2015), such knowledge is ultimately limited in that it largely ignores the perceptions of the political subjects of (in)security (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016:43). By privileging institutional and official knowledge, such research ultimately ignores forms of subjugated knowledge (Foucault 1972), the role of diverse publics in shaping the field of (in)security, and makes invisible the presence of (in)security in everyday life (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016:43). To these points, this article would also argue that such research favours a uniform view of borders and security practices, examining public policy and governance technologies as “one-size-fits-all” approaches and ultimately ignoring potential local realities and differences in terms of governing ports of entry.

As such, this article will examine borders by utilizing a 360-degree lens employed by contrasting non-official knowledge and perceptions with official knowledge to consider how borders – as spaces of security (Foucault 1978) – are actually understood by the social agents
circulating within them. First, this article will build on the work of Lalonde (2019)\textsuperscript{17} by considering prior findings concerning border services officer (BSO) training and governance practices employed by Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) in light of new findings regarding official and non-official interaction narrative knowledge generated through perceptions of past social interactions supplied by social actors (BSOs and members of travelling publics) regularly circulating through ports of entry. Second, this article will analyze the results of content and thematic analyses performed on coded transcripts generated from in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted with ten BSOs currently or formerly employed at ports of entry in Windsor, Ontario. Third, this article will provide the results of content and thematic analyses performed on coded transcripts generated from thirty in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted with members of travelling publics, the majority of whom were current or former residents of the Windsor-Essex County region at the time interviews were conducted. This article will specifically address three key research questions: 1) How do BSOs and members of travelling publics perceive of and understand the frontline social interactions that occur at ports of entry in Windsor? 2) How does official and non-official interaction narrative knowledge generated through the circulation of BSOs and publics through ports of entry compare to institutional agency discourses? 3) How does geographical proximity to specific ports of entry potentially inform localized knowledge related to the nature of borders? This article will also discuss how findings related to these research questions might inform future policy debates concerning CBSA, the training of BSOs, and the protection of rights, freedoms, and privacy at ports of entry.

\textsuperscript{17} This article is reproduced as Chapter 3 “Border Officer Training in Canada: Identifying Organizational Governance Technologies” within this thesis.
Literature Review

Much previous interdisciplinary border research has focused its lens almost exclusively on official knowledge. Such analyses tend to examine public policy construction, state governance efforts, and the deployment of various technologies at borders (see for example Muller 2010b; Muller 2011; Broeders and Hampshire 2013; Bosworth and Turnbull 2015; Bosworth 2016); the governance of global migration (see Mountz 2011; Aas 2012; Salter and Mutlu 2013; Mountz and Loyd 2014; Mountz 2015); and, to a lesser extent, the perceptions of customs and immigration officers tasked with frontline border enforcement (see for example Côté-Boucher 2013; Pickering 2014; Pickering and Ham 2014; Aas and Gundhus 2015; Côté-Boucher 2016; Côté-Boucher 2018). Research analyzing official knowledge has generated important findings in terms of tracing how governments and agents of the state “see” (Scott 1998) modern borders. In terms of the Canadian context, Bouchard and Carroll (2002) examine how immigration officers use both “professional” and “personal” forms of discretion in performing their duties. Officers are often left to make discretionary decisions given various ambiguities associated with existing immigration policies. Pratt and Thompson (2008) determine how race knowledge functions to influence frontline officer discretionary practices. Ambiguities surrounding the meaning of “racial profiling” and an associated slippage between “race” and “nationality” allows officers to officially deny participating in racial profiling while continuing to employ racialized risk knowledges at the border. Pratt (2010) explores how legal and other knowledge informs the “moment of decision” when frontline officers determine reasonable suspicion for searches at the border. Officer decision-making is shielded from serious scrutiny because the supposed objective nature of employed risk language serves to obscure other
knowledges also at play. Côté-Boucher (2013) queried frontline BSOs regarding various aspects of their employment with Canada Border Services Agency, generating key findings regarding how frontline officers negotiate shifts within the governing logics of CBSA mandates from a focus on tax collection to a new emphasis on security, anti-terrorism, intelligence, and so forth. Côté-Boucher’s subsequent research continues with this important work, documenting officer use of discretion within the “new CBSA” (Côté-Boucher 2016) and also “generational borderwork”, whereby officers rely on generational categorizations to negotiate change in their workplace (Côté-Boucher 2018).

While, as discussed above, institutional discourses have generated key findings surrounding the nature of border work, non-official knowledge is noticeably absent from aforementioned analyses. As Newman (2006) argues:

Borders should be studied not only from a top-down perspective, but also from the bottom up, with a focus on the individual border narratives and experiences, reflecting the ways in which borders impact upon the daily life practices of people living in and around the borderland and transboundary transition zones (p. 143).

Such analysis would serve to challenge official discourses through the lens of the lived experiences of individuals (and publics) who circulate within borderlands. Such arguments are echoed by Vaughan-Williams and Stevens (2016:43), in that while official or institutional discourses inform important findings on the unfolding of frontline border governance (Loftus 2015), such knowledge is ultimately limited in that it effectively ignores the perceptions of political subjects of (in)security. By privileging institutional and official knowledge, such research ultimately ignores forms of subjugated knowledge (Foucault 1972), the role of diverse publics in shaping the field of (in)security, and makes invisible the presence of (in)security in everyday life (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016: 43). To these points, this article also argues that such research favours a uniform view of borders as well as security and mobility governance.
practices as employing “one-size-fits-all” universal technologies, ultimately ignoring potential localized realities and differences in terms of governing ports of entry within specific borderlands.

Limited research in North America has examined non-official knowledge within the context of local borderlands. In the Canadian context, Helleiner (2010) examines non-official border knowledge within the context of the Niagara region of Ontario. Specifically, Helleiner’s (2010) analysis draws upon interviews conducted with 40 Niagara residents between September 2001 and August 2004 in considering how participants experienced changes in border securitization post-9/11. Helleiner’s (2010) findings ultimately demonstrate a need for the literature to contrast non-official knowledge with official knowledge in order to identify points of divergence between official state narratives and community experiences concerning border security. In the U.S. context, Bjelland (2016) conducted interviews with ten families living along the Point Roberts, Washington border. Findings demonstrate that Point Roberts is defined by its international border as a hybrid borderland: “a privileged exurb for U.S. citizens working in Vancouver, a U.S. service center for Canadians, and a seaside retirement community with pockets of isolation and neglect” (Bjelland 2016:516). Various additional studies in the Canadian context have examined the lived experiences of migrants transiting across international borders, including Somerville (2015) examining how decisions to migrate to Canada are informed by (and in turn shape) migrant networks, with “migrant pioneers” deliberately settling in countries in which their families are not yet located in an attempt to expand their migrant network globally; and Horgan and Liinamaa (2017) analyzing interviews with former Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) participants to determine how uncertainty regarding legal, immigration, and employment status is personally experienced by migrants. McLaughlin
(2009) similarly examines the SAWP program through the lens of migrants in the Niagara Region of Ontario, exploring how legal precariously contributes to non-citizens being effectively excluded from many of rights guaranteed to all residents of Canada (including, for instance, healthcare).

Building on the work of Helleiner (2010) and Bjelland (2016) examining non-official borderland knowledge, studies concerning the lived experiences of migrants, as well as studies considering official border officer knowledge, this article will contrast the institutional discourses of CBSA with the frontline official knowledge of localized border services officers and the non-official knowledge of borderland residents and travellers to address the three aforementioned key research questions.

Methods

Windsor was selected as the primary region of study for several key reasons. First, Windsor is unique to Canada in that it is home to five ports of entry – the Ambassador Bridge, the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel, Windsor International Airport (YQG), the Detroit-Windsor Truck Ferry, and a commercial train tunnel.18 Second, Windsor ports of entry are among the busiest along the Canada-United States border in terms of total volume. The Ambassador Bridge ranks second for total traveller volumes entering Canada and is number one for commercial vehicle volumes (CBSA 2018b). The Detroit-Windsor Tunnel is also unique in that it is the only underwater international tunnel for automobile traffic in the world, processing about 12,000 vehicles per day and over four million vehicles per year (Detroit-Windsor Tunnel 2018). The Tunnel is also unique in that it directly links the downtown cores of two major North American

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18 Canada Border Services Agency also administers two “off-site” locations in Windsor, including the Ambassador Bridge Commercial Offsite for commercial vehicle inspections, and also an inland immigration and intelligence office.
cities – Windsor, Ontario and Detroit, Michigan. As such, the Tunnel is an important gateway for the approximately 6,700 Windsor-Essex County residents who commute across the border daily to work in Detroit (Wilhelm and Reindl 2018). The Tunnel also provides an important gateway for Windsor-Essex County residents attending cultural and sports events in Downtown Detroit and also shopping in Detroit’s suburbs. In short, the daily lives of Windsor-Essex County residents are inextricably linked to the Canada-United States border, the Windsor region itself serves as one of the highest-volume borderlands in North America, and given residents frequently travel across local borders, they therefore have a large sample of frontline social interactions with BSOs to draw from in participating in this study.

Semi-structured, face-to-face, in-depth interviews unfolded with two samples generated from the Windsor-Essex County region to answer the three key research questions: 1) How do BSOs and members of travelling publics perceive of and understand the frontline social interactions that occur at ports of entry in Windsor? 2) How does official and non-official interaction narrative knowledge generated from perceptions of past frontline interactions occurring between BSOs and publics circulating through ports of entry compare to institutional agency discourses? 3) How does geographical proximity to specific ports of entry potentially inform localized knowledge related to the nature of borders? All interviews were audio recorded, transcribed, and coded, with coding “driven by the researcher’s theoretical or analytical interest” (Braun and Clarke 2006:84). Content analysis, or a method for analyzing the frequency of information or symbols contained in text, was employed in developing codes (Neuman 2006:44). Given previous literature has largely not examined (theoretically or empirically) the key research questions highlighted above, a grounded process of variable identification was employed. This

19 Windsor residents travel to Downtown Detroit so often that Windsor Transit operates a special Tunnel Bus that shuttles Canadians across the border and back throughout the day, seven days per week.
allowed the researcher to analyze a subset of interviews and identify variables emerging from the message pool (Neuendorf 2002:103). Once a variety of codes were initially identified, the entire sample of transcribed interviews were subsequently analyzed first through a process of open coding and second using focused coding (Emerson et al. 1995).

For the first sample, in-depth interviews of approximately one hour to one and a half hours in length were conducted with ten BSOs currently or formerly employed at ports of entry in Windsor. As obtaining access to BSOs was challenging,20 convenience sampling was employed for this study (Weiss 1994:25). Former colleagues of the researcher were interviewed first, as rapport had already been pre-established.21 Subsequently, this study employed chain-referral sampling to gain access to other potential participants. The chain-referral sampling technique enables the identification and tracing of social networks using a small number of initial contacts who, in turn, provide researchers with an ever-expanding set of potential contacts (Spreen 1992; Thomson 1997; Kuzel 1999). Following standard recruiting practices in recent policing literature, purposive sampling was employed to ensure that only individuals who are currently or were formerly frontline BSOs were included in the sample (see for example Regehr et al. 2003; Reynolds and Hicks 2015; Galovic et al. 2016). In total, the researcher forwarded twenty-five invitations to participate in this study and ultimately successfully recruited ten participants – seven current BSOs, two retired officers, and one former officer now employed outside of CBSA.22 Generally, in policing studies involving in-depth and inductive qualitative

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20 Gaining access to BSOs was further complicated by CBSA twice refusing to assist the researcher with recruiting candidates or officially endorse the study.
21 The researcher worked as a student border services officer through the Government of Canada’s Federal Student Work Experience Program from 2008-2009.
22 It is likely that current officers were hesitant to participate in the project given CBSA did not give its formal approval for the study and given the researcher’s institutional research ethics board mandated the use of strong warnings in study recruitment letters regarding the potential career consequences associated with participating in the study.
interviews with officers, 10 to 25 interviews are recommended to obtain saturation (Reynolds, Fitzgerald, and Hicks 2018). Various policing studies employing in-depth interviews with officers fall within the 10 to 20 interviewee range (see for example Regehr et al. 2003; Aarons, Powell, and Browne 2004; Beletsky, Macalino, and Burris 2005; Olivia and Compton 2010; Spalek 2010; Evans, Pistrang, and Billings 2013). In a similar recent investigation, Broll and Huey (2015) conducted in-depth interviews with 12 police officers from three municipal police departments in Southwestern Ontario to gauge officer perspectives on cyberbullying.

Interview questions were posed to BSOs on subject matter related to the key research questions of the study, including questions regarding: 1) frontline interactions with members of travelling publics; 2) training received from CBSA and the Government of Canada related to frontline social interactions; 3) CBSA and Government of Canada policies, standard operating procedures, and other documents designed to guide frontline interactions with publics; 4) deviations from training and policy in interacting with publics; 5) whether and to what extent officers prioritize their disparate duties; and 6) how BSOs understand and define “the border”.

In-depth interviews were also conducted with thirty members of travelling publics familiar with crossing the border and interacting with BSOs. Key informants known to the researcher were interviewed first to initially access key groups of frequent border travellers (i.e. nurses, accountants, and lawyers living in Windsor-Essex County and employed in the United States). Subsequently, chain-referral sampling was employed to gain access to other potential participants (including colleagues and acquaintances of initial participants). Purposive sampling was employed to access a variety of individual participants, ranging widely in terms of occupation, age group, and gender. Previous studies have employed similar sample sizes (see Helleiner 2010; Bjelland 2016) and recruitment methods (see Horgan and Liinamaa 2017) in
interviewing non-official borderland populations. The researcher continued conducting interviews until saturation - the point at which collecting additional data provided no new information (Glaser and Strauss 1967).

The majority of interviews lasted about 30-45 minutes and were conducted in-person or via Skype. Participants had to be at least 18-years-old to participate in the study. The vast majority of participants (24) were current residents of Windsor Essex-County at the time interviews were conducted. Four additional participants were residents of other Ontario municipalities – Kitchener (2), Toronto (1), and London (1) – and two additional participants were residents of Bangkok, Thailand and Charlotte, North Carolina (respectively). The participants from Toronto, London, Bangkok, and Charlotte were all formerly long-term residents of Windsor who subsequently moved elsewhere for employment (all within the past 5 years). One Kitchener resident had not lived in Windsor, but regularly crossed borders in Windsor when visiting friends in the Windsor Essex-County region and in Michigan. The final resident of Kitchener had little experience travelling through Windsor, but had ample experience travelling through Pearson International Airport in Toronto after returning to Canada from abroad (and was referred to the researcher by another participant). Ultimately the researcher sent thirty-three invitations to participate in the study and successfully recruited thirty participants.

Questions posed to members of travelling publics were related to the key research questions of this study, including questions regarding: 1) frequency of border crossing, 2) frontline interactions with BSOs, 3) the demeanor of BSOs, 4) membership in trusted traveller programs like NEXUS and FAST, 5) perceptions regarding the extent of training BSOs receive related to interacting with the public, and 6) how members of the public understand and define “the border”.
Additional findings highlighted throughout the article were gleaned as a result of a thematic analysis performed on interview data as well as various primary and secondary documents obtained by the researcher. Thematic analysis of interview and other data is common practice in a variety of contemporary policing research studies (see for example Muller, Maclean, and Biggs 2009; Broll and Huey 2015; Powell et al. 2015; Broll 2016). Analyzed documents included federal government websites; over 300 pages of government reports; 31 training modules consisting of 1324 pages of material from a late-2000s intake of the CBSA Port of Entry Recruit Training (POERT) program; various documents partially released by CBSA under Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) requests filed by the researcher, including: 1274 pages of material from the CBSA Enforcement Manual, 296 pages of material related to communicating with the public (mostly newer OITP documents), 471 pages of material from the CBSA People Processing Manual, and 100 pages of material from the CBSA Immigration Enforcement Manual and associated training documents. Following the example of Broll and Huey (2015), Braun and Clarke’s (2006) method of thematic analysis was employed in reading through a sample of documents and identifying initial promising themes emerging from the text. Next, open coding was employed to identify initial descriptive and analytic themes. Focused coding was then used to collapse themes into overarching categories until a “story” of the research emerged (Broll and Huey 2015:163). Thematic analysis was guided by the research questions and an inductive approach was used to allow key themes (and subsequent categories) to “emerge” from the data (Strauss and Corbin 2004). Themes at the manifest (directly observable in the text) and latent (underlying the text) levels were considered and identified (Boyatzis 1998).
Findings

1. Social Interactions and Interaction Narratives

Institutional Discourses

While institutional documents, policies, and procedures contain little information regarding how officers should or must interact with members of travelling publics and generally focus on communication as a tool in expediting enforcement and intelligence-gathering duties (see Lalonde 2019), some documents do provide details regarding how officers should behave (generally) on the frontline. For example, s. 1.6.5 “Emotional Factors” in the Secondary Questioning POERT training module states: “Our goal is to: 1) Project a sympathetic, friendly, and compassionate personality image” (p. 25). Similarly, an excerpt from the “Communication” lesson delivered as part of the Control and Defense Tactics (self-defence) course outlines: “1) Always use an appropriate tone of voice. 2) Be professional. 3) Keep language simple, understandable, and precise. 4) Empathize with the client and be respectful.”

The more recent Officer Induction Training Program (OITP) contains further details regarding frontline interactions. A “Job Aid: Officer’s Skills” handout included within OITP modules outlines appropriate behaviours for interviewers in s. 1.1.7 Professional Appearance and Demeanor: “A firm, deliberate and business-like manner of speech and attitude will create a proper environment for the conduct of a successful interview…” (p. 2). The same handout outlines in s. 1.1.9 that

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23 This information was contained on a PowerPoint slide excerpt released by CBSA as part of ATIP request A-2016-01232 filed by the researcher. This information is publicly available through the Government of Canada’s ATIP website.

24 The vast majority of BSOs currently on the frontline were likely trained using iterations of the late-2000s POERT documents obtained by the researcher given that CBSA increased its frontline ranks from 4000 to 7200 officers from 2006 to 2012 – representing an 80% increase overall – prior to the implementation of the new OITP in 2014 (CBSA 2008a, CBSA 2016d). Data gleaned from the 2013-2014 Annual Report to Parliament on the Privacy Act (CBSA 2014a) suggests that there are “over 7200” officers, and the 2016-2017 Departmental Performance Report (CBSA 2017b) states that there are 7240 full-time officers (suggested slow retirement/replacement rates and growth since the introduction of the OITP).
officers should be self-controlled”: “The interviewer requires an exceptional degree of self-control to avoid displays of genuine anger, irritation or weariness…” (p. 20). The “Client Service” OITP module provides further direction, including mandating “Service at the CBSA”: “People that cross the border expect and deserve the same level of service that you would expect from a service provider, whether it be a government official, a retail salesperson or a flight attendant” (p. 9). The same module outlines expectations for officers in terms of listing various strategies to demonstrate courtesy to travellers:

Treat travellers in a respectful, professional and considerate manner… Be sensitive and responsive to cultural differences… Be aware of the traveller’s reactions and emotions and adapt your communication style, mode and tone accordingly. Greet traveller in both languages. Actively listen to travellers when they are speaking and do not interrupt. Do not act judgmental or make assumptions (especially based on stereotypes). Show empathy when the travellers is frustrated or concerned… Provide a conclusion – advise the traveller of your decision and thank him” (p. 14).

Further guidelines in this module provide information on how officers should behave in difficult situations, including (but not limited to): “4. Be patient… 5. Manager your own anger, annoyance and stress. Don’t become part of the problem… 6. Don’t make provocative statements… 7. Respect the traveller…” (p. 23).

While institutional discourses provided to officers in formative training demand that officers act within the laws of Canada and the mandate of the agency, and that officers act as service providers to “clients”, maintain professionalism, manage personal emotions, and so forth, only by examining frontline official (BSO) and non-official (traveller) knowledges related to frontline social interactions can this article continue the work of Lalonde (2019)25 in examining

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25 This article is reproduced as Chapter 3 “Border Officer Training in Canada: Identifying Organizational Governance Technologies” within this thesis.
the relationship between officer training, agency governance efforts, and how border work actually unfolds at localized ports of entry.

**Travelling Public Interaction Narratives**

The majority of members of travelling publics interviewed characterized frontline interactions with officers (primarily at Windsor ports of entry) as overwhelmingly pleasant, professional, routine, and even mundane. Participants often (unprompted) contrasted their experiences with BSOs with interactions with U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers, which they tended to characterize as rude, militant, excessive, and even abusive. For some participants, the mundane nature of interactions with Canadian officers was presented as a positive in terms of crossing the border. Situations in which travellers had quick interactions with officers and were only asked a few short questions were similarly portrayed as positive. For other participants, mundane – and at times nearly non-existent – social interactions with Canadian officers were indicative of complacency, boredom, or lack of effort on the part of BSOs. For example, Victoria – a 30-year-old consultant in the medical marijuana industry – stated:

> I commuted from Windsor to Detroit when I [went to school] for two years [in Michigan] and then I lived there for the rest of the time. But there were times I would come [back to Canada] at night and the guy slides open his window, he’s got chewing tobacco and he’s reading a book, ‘You got anything? Alright.’ And then closes [the window]. Your interactions are less than a minute every time, and sometimes less than 15 seconds <laughs>. And I’m like, ‘Ok, yeah, I have a big car load of weed or something.’ Right? Like you have no idea. So I don’t know if it’s laziness or complacency or what.

For Victoria, short interviews featuring just one question posed by the BSOs she interacted with were indicative of laziness, complacency, and potentially a security threat to Canada. Jessica, a 28-year-old nurse, similarly noted that officers only ever ask a few questions and then release her:
They’re mostly apathetic to my existence once they see me… I pull up, they take my passport, and they ask me what I was doing in the States. How long I was [in the United States]. And then I drive through and that’s that. And I’ve only ever been stopped once.

Much like Victoria, Jessica finds the lack of questioning and secondary examination by officers to be indicative of officer apathy in terms of processing her as a traveller. Olivia, a 22-year-old hospital records clerk, noted a similarly quick experience at the Canadian border:

“Usually they say, ‘Where did you go?’ And then you say, ‘Target.’ And then they say, ‘How much did you spend?’ And then you say, ‘One hundred and fifty [US Dollars].’ And he says, ‘Alright, have a nice day.’”

The vast majority of participants noted a similar experience – that officers in Windsor typically ask between two to five questions before releasing travellers into Canada.

Various other participants also reported that officers at Windsor ports of entry regularly ask travellers where they travelled while outside of Canada. When describing an average interaction with officers, Aliya, a 29-year-old fast food restaurant manager and executive assistant at a local property management company, said, “It’s not overly-friendly, just kind of like, ‘Hi, how’s it going? Where were you?’” Beverly, a 60-year-old teacher with a local school board, explained, “The young lady [BSO] we had yesterday, she was – we thought for sure when we got up there that she was going to be horrible – but she was smiling at us and laughing at us when she found out where we were. She was pleasant.” Much like Beverly, other participants also considered this line of questioning friendly and assumed that officers were simply expressing interest in their travels. For example, Pam, a 60-year-old retired teacher, stated, “Like when we came back from vacation; they were friendly – they asked us questions about where we were.” In this sense, participants often did not consider questions regarding traveller mobility abroad to be characteristic of an interrogation effort by the officer, but rather simply resulting from an organic and friendly conversational interest on the part of the BSO.
The above findings are important for two primary reasons. First, the perception among some participants that officers are potentially complacent or lazy is troubling given officer training documents (specifically the Primary Questioning module of the POERT program) state: “There are several mandatory questions, each related to one or more of the legacy organizations within the CBSA that must be asked of every person seeking to come into Canada” (p. 1, emphasis added). While the exact wording of questions is considered Protected information by the Government of Canada, there are ten mandatory questions officers must ask residents of Canada at primary inspection. Knowledge provided by members of travelling publics suggests that officers working at Windsor ports of entry are ignoring this directive, instead focusing on just two to five questions (on average) during frontline border interactions. This may be of concern to CBSA and the Government of Canada given certain criminal convictions and subsequent court cases may hinge on officers performing a full and complete primary inspection (something that is apparently not a matter of routine at Windsor ports of entry).

Second, and perhaps most concerning, mobility rights guaranteed to all Canadian residents in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms designate that BSOs (according to Chapter 3, Part 3 – Reporting, Questioning, and Referral of the CBSA Enforcement Manual) should not be asking Canadian residents questions such as, “Where were you?” or “What were you doing in the United States?” as a matter of routine. According to the Enforcement Manual, officers are only enabled to ask such questions when suspicions arise after they have already posed mandatory primary questions. Knowledge generated by members of travelling publics suggests that BSOs are routinely employing this question alongside two or three mandatory primary questions. This is troubling from a human rights perspective given, as Chapter 3 Part 3 of the Enforcement Manual indicates: “Individuals are not obligated, however, under any
circumstances, to answer any questions that do not relate to their immigration status, to the goods in their possession, or to the lawful duties of the BSO” (p. 4). Given participants from Windsor-Essex County did not state any objections regarding this line of questioning, seemed to consider questions about location abroad a routine and legal line of questioning, and, indeed, appear to readily provide answers to these questions, it is doubtful that Canadian residents are even aware that their Charter rights are potentially being violated by officers. This is another finding that should be of interest to CBSA given Charter violations often contribute to dismissals in criminal court cases in Canada. Such findings also potentially suggest that border-related law and human rights legislation have not been properly promulgated to Canadian residents in the Windsor borderland.

While members of travelling publics overwhelmingly stated the majority of their interactions with BSOs at ports of entry in Windsor were positive and professional, participants considered several types of interactions to be negative. These negative interactions fell into a number of distinct categories: 1) aggressive or unnecessary questioning by officers, 2) officers presenting a rude or unfriendly demeanor, 3) harassment by officers about purchases made abroad, 4) officers unfairly or incorrectly applying policies, 5) being subjected to unnecessary examinations, and 6) enforcement actions resulting in the seizure of purchased goods. Complaints regarding unnecessary questioning by officers were usually attributed to officers “just having a bad day”, and as aberrations in an otherwise smooth border-crossing experience. For example, Charles, a 30-year-old accountant, stated:

Some officers – when they have bad days – will be short and ask for things that they may not need. Or have extra-long questioning. Or search your vehicle even though you said you didn’t purchase anything. I can’t think of a very specific example because I don’t cross all that much anymore and it hasn’t happened in a long while. Just they have a general attitude sometimes of, ‘I’m in charge, don’t
fuck with me!’ You know, ‘You’re going to do what I say!’ And they don’t do anything to make you feel at ease.

According to Charles, the majority of negative interactions with officers can be excused by the assumption that the officer is simply having a bad day on the job (and is taking out frustrations on travellers). In this sense, negative interactions are not necessarily the result of, for instance, inadequate training or lack of proper supervision, but rather are simply one-off outliers explained completely through the lens of officer personal psychology. Complaints regarding officers presenting a rude or unfriendly demeanor were usually minor, ranging from officers not giving greetings, not comforting anxious first-time travellers, refusing to explain to travellers the customs process, and confronting travellers in an aggressive manner when performing vehicle searches. One traveller, Jennifer – a 58-year-old self-employed bookkeeper – recounted a particularly negative experience at length in which she and her boyfriend were stopped at primary inspection, accused of being intoxicated, were accused of questioning the BSO’s authority and knowledge whenever they attempted to defend themselves, were subsequently swarmed by officers with hands on their firearm holsters as well as a CBSA port vehicle with amber lights flashing, and her boyfriend (the driver) was subjected to a demand for a breathalyzer test for alcohol (which ultimately registered far below the legal limit). Jennifer (the passenger) was also accused of being intoxicated despite not operating the vehicle. Jennifer emphasized the rude demeanor of the primary officer and other officers involved. After her boyfriend ultimately passed the approved screening device (breathalyzer) test, the officer inquired further about purchases the couple had made, leading to a further negative encounter:

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26 It is important to note this incident occurred prior to changes in the Criminal Code of Canada in 2019 allowing Canadian peace officers to conduct demands for breath samples without the necessity for indicators of intoxication and also reasonable and probable grounds. At the time this incident occurred, the Criminal Code and case law mandated that officers have reasonable and probably grounds (generated from indicators) before demanding a breath sample.
And the other thing is that we had $40 worth of groceries. And [my boyfriend] admitted, ‘We have $40 worth of groceries and half a case of beer.’ And then the guy yelled, ‘Next time – leave the alcohol over there!’ And slammed the window. And [my boyfriend] is like, ‘How can he tell me what to buy and what not to buy?’ Like it was just a nightmare.

In addition to performing a questionable demand for breath sample, Jennifer was also disturbed by the fact the officer overstepped his official duties in lecturing the couple about purchases they had made abroad. While most complaints about officer demeanor were minor in nature, Jennifer’s case was an extreme and traumatizing example that she stated has subsequently caused her boyfriend to avoid travelling outside of Canada (in fear of what will happen when he returns).

Interestingly, other travellers also reported negative interactions in the form of officers lecturing them about purchases made abroad. Such interactions typically involved a BSO overstepping their official taxation and inspection duties by lecturing members of travelling publics about where they should and should not be shopping (in addition to stating personal economic beliefs). For instance, Peter, a 30-year-old teacher, stated:

I went shopping in Detroit with some friends for groceries. And we were coming back with like $120 of groceries total in the car. And the officer starts asking us questions and then after we told him about the groceries he started lecturing us about how we should be buying groceries in Canada and supporting the Canadian economy rather than buying in the US. And I got really pissed off. I was driving the car and I had to bite my tongue not to tell him back, ‘That’s none of your business!’

Peter ultimately found statements related to his groceries made by the BSO to be a violation of his privacy rights and potentially an overstep of officer official duties. Rodger, a 37-year-old pastor, similarly reported an instance in which an officer lectured him about not making purchases from the Ambassador Bridge Duty Free Store given the officer involved did not
support the viewpoints and activities of the owner of the Bridge and the Store. Ultimately, Rodger recounted that the officer: “…basically told me not to purchase stuff at the Duty Free – like get it somewhere else in Detroit. Don’t support the business there.” Rodger’s retelling of the incident was particularly disturbing given his story involved a Canadian federal officer attempting to intervene directly in free enterprise occurring completely outside of the BSO’s jurisdiction (in this case, on the American side of the Ambassador Bridge) and in reaction to personal prejudices. Such findings should also cause alarm to CBSA given one major BSO duty and agency mandate is to: “facilitate the free flow of persons and goods… that meet all requirements under the program legislation” (CBSA 2011a). Analysis of BSO training documents, CBSA manuals, online corporate documentation, and other documents examined as part of the content and thematic analyses associated with this study revealed no mention of any enabling legislation or mandate permitting officers to state personal, editorial, economic and social beliefs or to criticize Canadian residents for their economic practices or purchases made abroad.

When members of travelling publics were asked in interviews to estimate how much training (of about 900 total hours of initial training) officers receive regarding interacting or communicating with the public, the vast majority of participants (over 70%) made estimates of between 50 and 450 or greater hours (with the mode between 50 and 100 hours of training). Few made estimates of under 10 hours (6%). About 24% of participants stated they either believed

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27 Manuel ("Matty") Moroun is the billionaire owner of the Ambassador Bridge Company, which owns Ambassador Bridge as well as Duty Free stores located on Bridge property. His company has critiqued CBSA and US CBP in the past for what they deem to be improper officer staffing levels causing traffic backups on the Bridge. The company has also criticized the US and Canadian governments for delaying its plans to build a twin span next to Ambassador Bridge. For more details, please see Joann Muller’s (2012) Financial Post column entitled “Why one rich man shouldn't own an international bridge.”
communicating with the public to be an intrinsic skill or that officers likely learn public interaction skills on the frontline. When participants were subsequently presented with findings from Lalonde (2017:14)\textsuperscript{28} that less than 1% of all BSO formative training focuses on communication and interactions, most participants (predictably) expressed shock and confusion over the low total, often asking the researcher to explain what information is therefore included in training. One participant – Amelia, a 51-year-old government employee in an agency outside of CBSA – was particularly confused:

I mean, [I work] for the government. We were specifically trained on how to – we had six weeks of training on this is how you deal with people. We’re not customer service. But we also had to learn the laws and everything as well. But they literally trained us on how to say things to people, because you’re not customer service. You have certain ways you have to say stuff, and it’s not an easy approach to call people up and say, [quote redacted to protect identity of participant]. So they trained us how to do it. I would think it would be the same idea with border officers, but apparently not.

Amelia proceeded to indicate to the researcher that the vast majority of her public service training was related to interacting with members of publics. Such findings suggest that training levels related to interaction training vary widely between individual government agencies in regular contact with publics. Given knowledge supplied by residents of the Windsor-Essex County region identifies various negative interactions with officers, the apparent violation of Canadian residents’ Charter rights through improper questioning techniques, and perceptions of officers as potentially complacent or lazy in their lack of questioning and examination of travellers, it is perhaps time CBSA considers expanding interaction training to reaffirm agency mandates and address gaps between federal policy and localized officer practices on the frontline. This will be explored further below.

\textsuperscript{28} This article is reproduced as Chapter 3 “Border Officer Training in Canada: Identifying Organizational Governance Technologies” within this thesis.
**BSO Interaction Narratives**

Interviews with BSOs currently or formerly employed at ports of entry in Windsor tended to reinforce much of the knowledge generated from interviews with Windsor-Essex County publics. Much like members of travelling publics, BSOs stated that the majority of frontline interactions are professional and polite in nature. BSOs regularly noted in interviews that they did not recall receiving any specific formative training on interacting with the public. Officers occasionally mentioned that they did receive training on “de-escalating” potentially combative travellers as well as training on interrogation and questioning, but indicated such sessions did not contain specific information on social interactions generally. BSO 001 provided an explanation for lack of training:

> They don’t really teach you how to deal with the public, if that makes sense? I think they rely on the fact that you should be mature and you should have enough common sense that you should be personable enough to talk to people and be able to figure it out... I think the [agency’s] reliance on your own self-learning to figure shit out and how to talk to people is also problematic. It is. I mean, I don’t know a great way to train someone how to diffuse a difficult situation, but a lot of it’s kind of put on the person like, ‘Strap on a pair and see what you can do!’

In this sense, BSO 001 summarizes lack of officer training on social interactions as being related to CBSA’s assumption that such interactions are simply common sense and that BSOs should be able to figure out their own methods for interacting with publics. Most officers also reinforced assumptions made by Lalonde (2019)\(^{29}\) that officers are expected to learn best practices on the frontline of enforcement. Additionally, while officers confirmed that the two major manuals controlling officer behaviour are the *CBSA Code of Conduct* and the *CBSA People Processing Manual*, BSOs further confirmed findings from Lalonde (2019) that these documents contain

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little actual information on how officers should interact with travellers. BSO 007 stated he was asked to familiarize himself with the *People Processing Manual* during his formative training, however: “There’s not so much by way of guidelines on what to say and how to say it – in so much as this is the expectations for people dealing with CBSA. So it’s not very explicit.” BSO 002 similarly concluded: “There are guidelines in terms of how to process documentation or process previous seizures or whatever. There are guidelines about programs. That’s basically what they are entirely focused on – programs. It isn’t about people or dealing with people at all.”

According to interviewed BSOs, CBSA manuals and procedures are almost entirely focused on “how to” guides for enforcement actions, with little information provided on expectations for frontline social interactions.

Findings from Lalonde (2017:14) indicated that of the approximately 900 hours of formative training BSOs received as part of Port of Entry Recruitment Training program (and the newer OITP), only about 4.5 hours (0.6% of all training) are spent instructing officers on how to interact with members of travelling publics. The majority of this training was found to be concerned with “special cases”, including processing travellers with disabilities, victims of trafficking, and suspected abducted children (Lalonde 2019:14). BSO 003 echoed findings reached in Lalonde (2017:15) that current BSO interaction training focuses almost exclusively on intelligence-gathering and enforcement-related activities, and therefore leaves officers ill-prepared for the “facilitation” (CBSA 2018e:8), non-enforcement, humanitarian side of border work:

Especially with our new kids – that’s why they need mentoring from veteran officers… ‘Oh, you have dog food in the car. CFIA says you must have your pet with you. I’m sending you back’… What’s the big deal? What’s the important part of enforcement there? Is education better? You know, instead you can go, ‘If you come through you are supposed to have your pet with you. Ok? Alright. Have a nice day’… We still get people, you know, ‘Mom just got brought into the
hospital.’ And they’re coming back to deal with them. Do you really need to hold those people up and ask them how much currency they’re carrying? No. ‘Good luck with your mom. I hope everything works out for you.’ ‘I’m sorry for your loss.’ You know? It’s just the simple touches. And because our newer people are drilled in Rigaud, you know, ‘You have ten minutes to do a primary and you must ask these questions’ – they forget that there are human beings coming through the border and how to treat them as such.

In addition to highlighting agency priorities surrounding interrogation and enforcement and subsequent lack of training on humanitarian interactions, this answer also illustrates that veteran officers have learned to not conduct full primary inspections (contrary to CBSA policies and procedures) at their own discretion in compassion-related situations. This suggests that, as Lalonde (2019) indicates, officers may be developing their own collective priorities and methods for interacting with the public on the frontline that are irreducible (and incompatible) with lessons learned in formative training. An account provided by BSO 002 detailed a disturbing incident involving witnessing a supervisor mistreating a refugee claimant at a port of entry, providing evidence that even veteran officers may also be ill-trained and unprepared in terms of handling the humanitarian, non-enforcement side of frontline border interactions:

When we went to the supervisor and said we both had to work the claimant… she was all pissed off because she was losing two officers who needed to go work [primary inspection] lines the next hour. And the supervisor… started yelling and screaming and pointing at this poor guy and asking, ‘You think you can come to my fucking country and steal all our fucking jobs and benefits?’ And the more she yelled the more this guy just cowered in fear. She broke him down as a man. And we cried for him (myself and the other officer). We literally cried for him. I mean, this guy thought he was coming to Canada to start a new life, and was fleeing whatever persecution or danger or whatever in his home country. And this is how he is greeted to Canada? I always keep that in the back of my mind now when dealing with people. I felt so bad for that guy. It wasn’t right at all.

The fact that BSO 002 was so disturbed and was brought to tears by this particular incident reveals how gross and inhumane the actions of the supervisor were in terms of handling a refugee claimant potentially requiring extra sensitivity and care (rather than accusation and
condemnation). Rather surprisingly to the researcher, a few of the officers who participated in this study also expressed similar frustrations to those identified by travellers in terms of personal interactions they have had when crossing the border as civilians (outside of their uniform) and interacting with fellow officers (i.e. their co-workers) at primary inspection. For instance, BSO 005 recounted an interaction in which her freedom of mobility and freedom of association

*Charter* rights were violated by a fellow officer:

> [New officers] are really bad with, ‘What was the purpose of your trip?’ [And I respond] ‘business’ or ‘pleasure’. That’s the only answer you have to give them. And they’re not picking up on those cues. They’re not picking up that somebody knows their rights when they respond, ‘Pleasure’. And that was the [problem] I had with this girl. Because she asked me and I said, ‘Pleasure.’ And she said, ‘Well where did you go?’ ‘Well that’s none of your business.’ And she *lost* it. She freaked out on me. And that’s what I said to her – you should have been satisfied with my answer that I was away for pleasure. She goes, ‘Well I need to know where you went so I can know if you bought anything.’ And I said, ‘Well you didn’t even ask me if I bought anything’… And so after all that everybody had calmed down and her next question was, ‘Who did you meet?’ Again, none of your business. She was such a witch.

While BSO 005 knew that CBSA policies and *Charter* rights dictate that officers must only ask secondary intrusive questions *after* gaining suspicions following mandatory primary questions (and BSO 005 could articulate this to the officer involved), findings from above indicate that members of travelling publics are generally unaware of these restrictions and often answer invasive questions without protest. Again, such findings should be troubling to CBSA given criminal court cases could be dismissed in instances where *Charter* rights have been violated. The quote above should provide particular cause for concern for CBSA given findings generated through interviews with members of publics concerning *Charter* right violations were corroborated by BSOs in recounting interactions with their own colleagues.

Finally, several BSO participants in this study pointed out the potential dangers in terms of officers not learning interaction skills during formative training and instead exclusively
learning best practices on the frontline. BSO 007 articulated these dangers to the researcher in what the participant referred to as “parroting”. When a new officer arrives at a port of entry and has not been provided with education concerning best practices during formative training in Rigaud, Quebec, the officer can be susceptible to emulating the behaviours of just one officer. Rather than participating in critical analysis (which could potentially be informed by formative training, if it existed) and watching, listening to, and learning best practices from a variety of veteran officers, new recruits have the tendency to strictly learn how to interact with travellers from just one or two officers. This is particularly a problem, according to BSO 007, when new officers are paired by CBSA with just one or two “shadow” officers who supervise and guide their activities when they initially arrive at their assigned port of entry. BSO 007 stated:

What I would always say to people is try very hard to work with different people when you start out. You’re going to be drawn to people that, you know, they appear captivating or I really like how that person carries themselves. Regardless of those temptations, force yourself to work with different people. That’s number one. Number two, and related to the first piece of advice, is don’t try to emulate one person and say, you know, Patrick is a really good officer so I’d really like to work exactly like Pat. Try really hard to take the things you like about Pat, the things you like about Bob, the things you like about Mark, and make your own style. Try not to parrot, but try to develop your own style based on the best things you see and the worst things you see… What we’re seeing out of some (not all) new recruits is that they [receive] this basic set of in-service training from just one or two people… Well that whole group of people who just started work is at the mercy of this one person’s individual style… [And] when you’re coming in on your first day, you’re sitting there saying, ‘Wow, this is the person that [the agency] thought to put as their face. There must be some credibility here.’ And [recruits] take that too literally (in my opinion).

According to the participant, rookie officers mistakenly believe their shadows are the face of the agency and are therefore teaching them best practices. This is particularly a danger when officers are only paired with one or two examples out of the entire pool of officers working at a port of entry (with differing levels of training, frontline experience, and so forth).
In short, officers participating in this study provided official frontline knowledge that confirmed much of the non-official knowledge supplied by members of travelling publics in the Windsor borderland. In turn, official and non-official frontline knowledge provides a serious challenge to the official and institutional discourses located in CBSA training modules, policies, manuals, and corporate documents in terms of officers acting within the laws of Canada and the mandate of the agency while also acting as service providers to “clients”, maintaining professionalism, managing personal emotions, and so forth. Frontline official and non-official knowledge gleaned from interview data suggests several activities – officers not conducting full primary inspections, violating freedom of mobility Charter rights, lecturing travellers about goods purchased abroad, instances of officers not managing personal emotions and yelling at travellers (and, in one case, a refugee claimant) – that are irreducible to institutional discourses regarding frontline interactions identified above. Frontline knowledge suggests that serious legal, human rights, and policy deviations are occurring in the Windsor borderland, and further suggests that a substantial gap exists within CBSA between its nationalized formative training model and the localized frontline practices of officers.

While one might be tempted to “see” aforementioned findings as simple aberrations, instead such instances may actually be considered symptomatic of broader power trends in terms of the spread of neoliberal risk-management forms of governance. The present neoliberal socioeconomic order seeks to tame various uncertainties (generated as a result of modernity) in order to spur innovation and economic development. In order to tame uncertainties, data must be collected and analyzed toward predicting the future (Aradau and van Munster 2007). In terms of the problem of securitization and mobility governance, various surveillance technologies proliferate to collect information on individuals, collate information and databases, and analyze
As risk logics spread through government departments, private corporations, and other organizations, risk-management schemes also spread in order to manage uncertainty and pre-empt threats. Such trends have been well-documented in the interdisciplinary border literature (see for example Amoore 2011; Amoore 2013; Amoore and Hall 2009; Amoore and Raley 2017; Broeders and Hampshire 2013). These trends have also been well-documented in the work of Muller (2010a; 2010b; 2011; 2013). Subsequent shifts in agency mandates (highlighted in Lalonde 2019 in the case of CBSA) increasingly reconceptualizes a generally law-abiding public as a potentially dangerous, criminal, and terroristic public as surveillance mechanisms proliferate to “know” individuals; collect, collate, and analyze data; and govern their mobility according to risk.

In terms of border and mobility governance, risk-management schemes push surveillance technologies away from the border to an ever-increasing variety of unofficial (non-government) sites. Risks are pre-empted and prevented from becoming mobile at sites far in advance of the sovereign limits of states (see for example Walters 2006b; Johnson et al. 2011). Those who do reach the limits of the sovereign state (i.e. traditional sovereign borders) are increasingly governed through pre-emptive risk information contained in databases. As such, digitized risk information becomes the dominant method through which officers police the mobility of subjects of governance. Securitization, intelligence, and risk become dominant features of border work to support the neoliberal control of migration governance efforts. Other considerations – issues related to lack of officer training in terms of frontline social interactions, instances of officer abuse of powers, instances of human rights violations in officer questioning, and lack of training in the “facilitation” side of border work (i.e. communication, de-escalation, community engagement, educating the public, dealing with sick or disabled travellers, and so forth) – are
incompatible with (and irrelevant to) modes of governance (and associated technologies) utilized as part of neoliberal risk-management practices. As such, these “aberrations” may actually be understood as part of a larger trend shifting border work from human-to-human interviews to a form of “cyborg work” (Bogard 1996) predicated on digitized, pre-emptive risk information contained in electronic databases and utilized by officers in making determinations. It is no wonder then that a slippage exists between institutional discourses and frontline practices given the increased emphasis on pre-emptively policing a public increasingly conceptualized as risky, dangerous, and threatening under neoliberal risk-management schemes.

2. The Local Nature of Borders and Borderlands

As recent research suggests, borders are anything but uniform spaces of security. Increasingly, evidence suggests that borders have broken through their former physical locations at the geographical limits of the sovereign state and have since metastasized to an ever-increasing swath of social life. Institutional discourses within CBSA promote additional pre-emptive measures designed to push risk assessments away from physical borders, allowing the agency to identify and intercept risks in advance of ports of entry, subsequently allowing officers to focus attention on a decreased number of high-risk cases arriving at physical borders (see for example CBSA 2016f:19). When participants were asked how they define “the border”, members of travelling publics regularly presented borders in one of three ways: 1) as a geographical line separating nations (particularly the United States and Canada), 2) as specific ports of entry, and 3) as a metaphysical division between Canadian and American ideologies. Knowledge of borders as geographical lines and also as specific ports of entry was found to be heavily influenced by the borderland in which participants live and work. For instance, participants frequently mentioned the Ambassador Bridge and Detroit-Windsor Tunnel ports
specifically in their definitions. A few participants also mentioned other geographically close ports of entry, including the Blue Water Bridge between Sarnia, Ontario and Port Huron, Michigan, and the Peace Bridge between Fort Erie, Ontario and Buffalo, New York. Participants rarely mentioned international airports in definitions of borders as ports of entry, instead citing land ports of entry the majority of the time. Such definitions are likely informed by the fact Windsor residents regularly travel across land borders to use the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport (DTW) to travel abroad rather than the nearest major Canadian international airport, namely Pearson International Airport (YYZ) in Toronto.  

Border services officers participating in this study offered similar knowledge concerning the nature of borders. Generally, definitions provided identified borders as: 1) a geographical line separating Canada and the United States, 2) non-specific ports of entry, and 3) also including the vast expanse between official ports of entry. Officers were far less likely than travellers to name specific ports of entry, instead pointing out various types of crossings (i.e. land, air, and sea) as well as large expanses where ports do not exist. This is likely due to the fact that official knowledge (gleaned from formative training, ongoing training, communications from CBSA, and interactions with other officers across Canada) supersedes any potential geographical bias officers might have. For instance, BSO 003 stated:

> It hurts me to say this but “the border” in a customs and immigration CBSA realm is the individual permanent border crossing stations manned by CBSA and US CBP on the opposite side. That huge expanse in between official border points - doesn’t exist to us. It’s not our purview. It’s not our concern. Even though – from my marine [enforcement] time – knowing that illegal immigration is taking place there. Smuggling is taking place – of people and goods. I know that CBSA’s order is that the port of entry is the border. Everything else doesn’t exist.

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30 DTW is 36km away, which is a short 30-minute drive from the Canada/US border. YYZ (352km away and a comparatively longer 3.5-hour drive) likely rarely entered definitions as a port of entry due to lack of geographical proximity and use by Windsor residents.
BSO 003 demonstrates a more nuanced understanding of the nature of borders when compared to members of travelling publics by also highlighting largely unpoliced spaces between official ports of entry. Indeed, the Customs and Immigration Union (CIU) – the union that represents all BSOs in Canada – recently called on the Government of Canada and CBSA to expand the duties of officers to also include patrols of the land between official ports of entry (see CBC News 2018). Other officers highlighted that Windsor ports of entry are treated as “special cases” within CBSA given the uniquely high volume of travellers and commercial goods officers must process daily within the region. Relatedly, BSO 002 challenged current training practices as not reflective of local realities:

Now [training is] basically ‘from seat to street’. They go straight from Rigaud to the frontline. And what I learned during my integration period (and what they don’t learn now) is that there is a big difference between port policies and federal policy. Port policies are what you use on a daily basis. I would tell [rookies] to forget all the shit they tell you in Rigaud and just listen to and watch senior officers. People in Ottawa designing federal policies haven’t ever even worked line / curb so they have no idea what they’re talking about.

According to BSO 002, federal policies are often out-of-touch in terms of comprehending and reflecting the localized realities of specific ports of entry. The fact this BSO recommends rookie officers should simply disregard all information they learned in Rigaud highlights the extreme nature of the gap BSOs perceive between federal policy and local realities. Several other officers also emphasized the local realities of border work as deviating substantially from institutional discourses gleaned from training, policies, and manuals developed at the national level. BSO 005 challenged national policies regarding maintaining a “client-service” orientation on the frontline:

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31 This duty is currently performed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
32 “Line / curb” is a colloquial term used by officers to describe working on the frontline and rotating between primary inspection (“line”) and secondary inspection (“curb”) every hour. Curb is derived from the notion that secondary inspection areas have sidewalks (featuring curbs) that members of travelling publics stand on while their vehicles are being examined.
[Ottawa is still] about very kind service without looking at where we’ve gone. And it might work at other border crossings – it might work at other ports. Port policy was a big thing when I went to Rigaud. It was, ‘Everybody does it this way except for you guys in Windsor.’ Because we were a bigger port – we did things differently. And we still do. And national policy doesn’t always work. And I think we still have a lot of old-school managers who still are from the old days and still believe in ‘the customer is always right’ mentality. We’re not Home Depot! <laughs>.

In this sense, national policies related to social interactions with members of travelling publics (the “customer is always right” mentality) may be incompatible with the high-volume localized realities of Windsor ports of entry handling millions of travellers every year. BSO 010 even suggested that his social interactions with travellers are informed more by local borderland demographics than the national, uniform model of interactions provided by CBSA policymakers:

One thing I would say is that our training basically assumes everyone is the same. Like, ‘Ok sir / mam, I understand you are upset. Let me explain why this is happening.’ Well, that’s not going to work with everyone, you know? Some people you have to speak at their level, you know? Especially in Windsor – we have a lot of inner-city people crossing. And when you’re trying to be all officious with them, it just doesn’t resonate… Sometimes you have to adapt the language to fit the situation and to build rapport with the client. And that sometimes means if I notice the guy is dropping an F-bomb every four words (because that’s normal to them), then I’d drop a couple F-bombs too… But obviously the agency wouldn’t really support us swearing around clients because it’s not ‘professional’ or whatever. Well, acting ‘professionally’ doesn’t always work, you know? And it isn’t applicable to every port – the demographics of Windsor is different than like the East Coast or BC or whatever.

Accordingly, it is apparent that the social interaction “toolbox” provided to officers by CBSA is also incompatible with the demographic and socioeconomic realities of the Windsor borderland, thus presenting potential language and comprehension problems between BSOs and the local publics they serve. Again, such findings indicate that Lalonde (2019) is correct in assuming that officers likely develop their own collective methods (irreducible to formative training) for processing members of travelling publics at ports of entry.
Together, geographically-specific definitions offered by members of travelling publics and geographically non-specific definitions provided by officers illustrates a gulf between non-official and official knowledge in terms of the nature of borders. If officer definitions are any indication of how CBSA “sees” borders, there is a vast difference between the abstracted and non-geographically specific ports of entry and vast borderless “wastelands” of the agency and the geographically specific and named ports of entry as understood by travellers. Such findings could potentially inform how CBSA and the Government of Canada articulate border security, customs and immigration policy changes, and other related concerns to the public. Offering region-specific information rather than simply articulating information using a one-size-fits-all Canada-wide approach may be beneficial in terms of relating with borderland publics.

Additionally, findings generated from interviews with officers in this study reflect findings from Côté-Boucher (2013) in terms of BSOs perceiving a substantial gap between the institutional discourses located in agency training, policies, manuals, and corporate documents, and the official frontline knowledge of officers charged with enforcing agency mandates at ports of entry. Such findings illustrate a need for CBSA to seriously consider how it will address local borderland realities and differences in terms of providing formative training designed to prepare officers for frontline work. When combined with frontline knowledge suggesting that serious legal, human rights, and policy deviations are occurring in the Windsor borderland, one can readily see there exists a substantial gap within CBSA between its nationalized, one-size-fits all formative training model and the localized, borderland-specific, frontline practices of officers.
Conclusion and Discussion

While this study has limitations in that its convenience samples are not representative of the entire population of officers or members of various travelling publics in the Windsor-Essex County region, and also in terms of the researcher not having direct access to analyze actual frontline interactions occurring between officers and publics on the frontline, the findings nonetheless demonstrate how non-official knowledge can be used to call into question institutional discourses, programs, policies, and technologies of governance promulgated by state knowledge-makers. In conducting in-depth interviews with members of travelling publics and BSOs in the Windsor-Essex County region and examining interaction narrative knowledge generated through perceptions on past social interactions occurring between BSOs and publics circulating through ports of entry, the findings of this study point to several troubling realities within the Windsor borderland that demarcate a substantial gulf between institutional knowledge and frontline official and non-official knowledge. In totality, the findings presented above confirm many of the findings from Lalonde’s (2017) examination of CBSA training documents, manuals, and other documents, including, for example: 1) a severe lack of officer frontline social interaction training; 2) the necessity of and dangers associated with officers learning best-practices on the frontline rather than in the classroom; 3) the notion that officers are almost exclusively trained in interactions designed to facilitate eliciting confessions, gathering intelligence, and completing enforcement duties, and are ill-trained in terms of handling the “facilitative”, humanitarian, non-enforcement, and non-securitized side of frontline border interactions; and 4) existing agency and government policies provide few details in terms of how officers should or must interact with travellers in performing their frontline duties. Aforementioned findings have also indicated new areas for research as well as CBSA and
Government of Canada attention in terms of: 1) *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* violations in terms of officers posing secondary intrusive questions as a matter of routine before they have posed mandatory primary questions or gained suspicions as a result of answers made by travellers, 2) the perception that BSOs are potentially complacent or lazy as evidenced by interactions in which officers do not perform a complete primary inspection and then release the traveller, 3) negative interactions involving officer abuse of authority related to: a) aggressive or unnecessary questioning, b) generally rude or unfriendly demeanor, and c) harassing travellers about purchases made abroad (including issuing editorial comments outside of the scope of BSO duties), and 4) the existence of local borderland realities and differences. Aforementioned findings should be particularly important to Canadian citizens and residents in light of the Trudeau Liberal Government’s promise to form an external-review body for Canada Border Services Agency, and in light of The Canadian Press recently publishing a series of articles highlighting the variety of complaints filed by travellers against BSOs and CBSA (see Tutton 2018).

Findings ultimately suggest that additional or remedial training regarding interactions with members of travelling publics may be necessary in order for CBSA and the Government of Canada to ensure officers are completing their duties within the mandates of the agency and according to the laws of Canada (particularly pertaining to the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*). Additionally, findings suggest that various officer misconduct issues and human rights abuses may be symptomatic of broader socioeconomic trends and governance models based on neoliberal risk-management schemes. As such, officers are increasingly tasked with using pre-emptive risk information derived from a variety of sources and collated in databases in policing the mobility of publics increasingly constructed as risky, dangerous, and threatening.
within neoliberal risk-management forms of governance. When risk is propelled to the forefront of officer work and decision-making, significant slippage can occur in terms of officer conduct and also the maintenance of human rights (which become irrelevant concerns under risk-management forms of governance). Additionally, when combined with findings concerning the local realities of the Windsor borderland, the aforementioned results suggest that CBSA should explore including some local, port-specific formative training within its Officer Induction Training Program rather than attempting to strictly administer all training using a national, uniform, one-size-fits-all approach at the CBSA College in Rigaud, Quebec. Given regional differences in the nature of social life as well as unique demographics and complexities surrounding individual ports of entry across Canada, it is doubtful that the current incarnation of the national training program captures the intricate realities of individual and geographically disparate borderlands. As such, it is also doubtful frontline officers are provided with a complete toolkit for handling the range of social realities and social interactions found at individual ports of entry, ultimately leaving it up to BSOs to learn and develop their own best practices over time. Informal frontline learning strategies are questionable given knowledge concerning frontline abuses of power and human rights violations presented in this study. Future research should continue the work of considering how non-official and official frontline knowledge and the intricacies of local borderlands call into question institutional discourses and current governance practices related to borders, border security, and mobility governance. Additional research should also consider how institutional discourses surrounding increased technologization of border governance practices differ from localized official and non-official frontline knowledge, as well as potentially further intensifying the apparent gulf (identified by Lalonde 2019 and in
this study) in the ability of BSOs to successfully interact with travelling publics in both securitized and non-securitized moments on the frontline.  

- END OF ARTICLE -

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33 Please see Chapter 6 for an examination of border technologization and its associated effects on frontline social interactions.
Cyborg Work: Borders as Simulation

Much recent research has focused on examining various binary contradictions and employing metaphors pertaining to border security. Ultimately, this article argues that existing debates and metaphors are inadequate in describing what is understood and agreed upon in the literature in terms of borders. This article proposes a refinement of existing theory for contemporary borders, employing Baudrillard (1981) concept of ‘simulation’. The metaphor of the ‘simulated border’ functions to avoid debates surrounding geospatiality while also incorporating aspects of risk society and control in concluding that borders are anything but organic security environments, with the ‘stretched screens’ (Lyon 2009) of border agents serving to produce digitized subjects (Goriunova 2019) that are tested within games of security to govern mobility anywhere in time or space.

Keywords: border security; borders; theory; simulation; risk; control
Introduction

Much of the contemporary literature in the interdisciplinary field of border studies has focused attention on the changing nature of borders from several contexts. These shifts have been well-documented in relation to the Canadian, United States, and European literature in terms of: 1) the development of ‘smart borders’ (see Amoore, Marmura, and Salter 2008; Côte-Boucher 2008), including examinations of travel documents (Salter 2004; Salter 2006; Sparke 2006; Lyon 2009; Muller 2009; Salter 2011; McPhail et al. 2012) and the use of biometrics and other risk technologies (Amoore 2006; Broeders 2007; Muller 2009; Muller 2010a; and Muller 2011); 2) examinations of border geospatiality (or lack thereof), including employment of logics of “remote control” (Broeders and Hampshire 2013), deterritorialization (Muller 2010a; Mountz 2011; and Salter and Mutlu 2013), the border as ‘everywhere’ (Lyon 2005), the border as part of a continuum also including other enforcement locales (Vaughan-Williams 2010), and as a form of visual ‘security performance’ (Rumford 2006; de Lint 2008) pushing security functions “beyond the border” away from their traditional geographical limits; and 3) the securitization of refugees, irregular migrants, and citizenship (see for example Bigo 2002; Coutin 2005; Coutin 2010; Dauvergne 2007; Mountz 2008; Salter 2008; Duffield 2010; and McNevin 2010).

Various binary debates as well as metaphors have been employed in the literature to attempt to explore borders theoretically while also incorporating the aforementioned disparate findings. Such metaphors have conceptualized borders as “filters” (Muller 2011) and as “firewalls” (Walters 2006a). This article will argue these metaphors have varying levels of success in avoiding pitfalls associated with the aforementioned literature, namely being unable to reconcile debates in the literature surrounding binary border mandates as well as opposing geographical imaginaries. Border binaries also fail in incorporating previous findings related to a
harmonized security-economy nexus, notions of risk, and also fall into a “territorial trap” (Agnew 1994) that only serves to obscure other research.

This article ultimately proposes a revised theory and metaphor for contemporary border governance toward producing a representation more consistent with what is presently known (and agreed upon) in the field of borders and border security. The works of Baudrillard (1981) on simulation and Bogard (1996) on the simulation of surveillance will be especially instructive. By performing a content analysis of border training documents and manuals obtained via Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) requests filed with Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), this article will carry forward the argument that borders proceed as simulations, reducing personal narrative to binary data that allows for the governance of mobility and flows via risk within societies of control (Deleuze 1995), while also making borders transmutable anywhere social life is securitized irrespective of considerations of time and/or space.

**Literature Review**

**Border Binaries**

As Newman (2006:176) indicates, notions of difference and “othering” in the form of binary pairings (inside versus outside, here versus there, and so forth) characterize much of the contemporary border discourse. Many of these binary distinctions have been brought about, as Rumford (2006:155) contends, by a renewed theoretical focus on the changing nature of borders originating from many of the themes central to contemporary social theory, including globalization, cosmopolitanism, networked communities, mobilities, and flows. Parker and Vaughan-Williams (2009:584) in citing Derrida (1976) locate the seduction of binaries in their ability to produce a sense of security and certainty (pure imaginaries).
Such debates unfold in several zero-sum arguments related to governing borders, including: 1) security versus economy, 2) open borders versus closed borders, 3) separating a coherent inside from a chaotic outside, and 4) borders as geospatially specific versus borders as virtual or diffused. The first three binaries fall apart for two primary reasons. Firstly, recent literature suggests that border policies have moved toward coupling security and economic concerns not in opposition but rather as a mutually reinforcing (and indistinguishable) pair in the form of the security-economy nexus (see for example Coleman 2005; Sparke 2006; Lalonde 2012; Ashby 2014; and Leese 2016). Secondly, and relatedly, the nearly universal acceptance in border literature that risk has come to dominate border policing and mobility governance efforts (see for example Muller 2010a; Muller 2011; Aas 2012; Amoore 2013; Broeders and Hampshire 2013), means binaries as well as distinctions like “open” versus “closed” are replaced by the governance of flows via data, which presupposes circulation.

The fourth binary requires closer examination. The assertion that borders have moved beyond the territorial limits of the sovereign state is well-supported in the literature (i.e. Mountz 2011; Broeders and Hampshire 2013; Salter and Mutlu 2013). For instance, Broeders and Hampshire (2013) discuss the contemporary digitization of the border as a refinement of the logic of “remote control”, in which “states project their immigration control measures overseas so that they identify and process would-be immigrants well before they arrive at the territorial border” (p. 1202). Through such digitization, associated security and control technologies as forms of governance have spread away from physical borders, and borders are said to experience a concomitant shift from territorial boundaries of states to a potentially infinite number of sites (Broeders and Hampshire 2013:1207).
The debate surrounding deterritorialization of borders is ultimately an uneasy one. While Lyon (2005) (in)famously declares “the border is everywhere”, Vaughan-Williams (2010), for instance, concludes that the “offshoring” of borders and security does not necessarily eradicate “commonsensical geographical notions about the location of borders” (p. 1074). Vaughan-Williams demonstrates this by exploring the UK’s configuration of the border as part of a “security continuum” that accommodates the continued use of physical borders alongside other enforcement locales. Others (Rumford 2006; de Lint 2008) point to the physical border as an important site of “security performances” for states wishing to display to their citizenry that they have control over the flow of people and goods into and out of a state. In essence then, this literature contends that physical borders serve at the very least as sites for “security theatre” (Schneier 2006:38 as cited in Zedner 2009:22) in the form of ritualistic shows (or acts) of security.

Ultimately, it can be concluded that the interdisciplinary study of borders falls into what Agnew (1994) refers to as the “territorial trap”, or “the set of geographical assumptions that have combined to obscure the historicity and mutability of political space and territory” (Walters 2006a:141). In other words, the interdisciplinary obsession with border geospatiality has served to obscure research focused on other aspects of borders and security.

**Border Metaphors**

Walters (2006b) cites Balibar’s (2002) notion of the “ubiquity of borders” in suggesting that rather than disappearing, borders are actually proliferating and becoming: “‘a grid ranging over the new social space’ rather than a line separating it from outside” (Balibar 2002:84-85 as cited in Walters 2006b:199). Walters (2006a) develops the firewall metaphor as a possible alternative that avoids fixation with notions of geography. Firewalls basically function to identify
“risky” (or black-listed) data and subsequently, “Malicious packages are blocked, returned or perhaps ‘quarantined’” (Walters 2006a:152). Simultaneously, firewalls allow “green-listed” data to move about the network. The firewall also has the ability to examine “grey-listed” (or unknown) data and compare it against black-listed data for similarities, making decisions about whether to allow or deny the data based on risk. Thus the firewall metaphor allows moving beyond notions of borders as “walls” to instead employing a filter logic in which borders ultimately aspire not to simply arrest movement, but rather “to produce and distribute both mobility and immobility” (Walters 2006a:152).

Unfortunately, this metaphor only partially explains contemporary borders. Remote control implies that risky subjects and commodities are often intercepted by visa offices, airlines, commercial carriers, and so forth before they reach physical borders. Firewalls do not function via remote control to block packets before they leave their “source location”. Rather, firewalls block packets of data at the back end – the gateway of the network – much like physical borders. Additionally, the firewall is completely “responsible” for blocking risky data, and third parties such as ISPs, businesses, or individuals are largely uninvolved in protecting other third-party networks. Furthermore, while borders use databases to analyze risk associated with mostly known individuals (developed further below), firewalls must analyze disguised data packets against security cases the firewall (or other firewalls) have documented in the past. In short, unlike borders, firewalls are largely “flying blind”, without third-party assistance, as they combat risks at the gateway of the network exclusively. In trying to avoid issues of geography, Walters (2006a) ultimately ends up describing traditional sovereign borders exclusively.

Muller (2011:104) argues that as governance efforts shift from governing migration toward instead governing mobility under neoliberal risk-management strategies, borders should
be imagined more as filters rather than as limits. As voluntary risk-management programs such as NEXUS in North America become more prevalent, the border begins to act as a filter, separating mobilities based on membership rights in what Muller (2010b:80) calls “multi-speed citizenship”. The border identifies “safe citizenship” and serves to sort or filter according to an individual’s digitized citizenship, or “netizenship” (Muller 2010b:83).

While the filter metaphor arguably avoids binary oppositions and geographical arguments while also adequately representing how trusted trader and traveler programs function, this metaphor also only partially explores how borders function to govern mobility. Filters are generally designed as membranes used to govern the flow of substances. They act to separate unwanted particles that are dissimilar to the desired substance. Other particles are confined within the membrane while the desired substance is permitted to flow through to its final destination. Filters work to separate different physical properties from each other. They do so by being able to interrupt dissimilar particles. Unlike borders, which tend to allow the movement of certain levels of risk, filters are low-tech in that they are generally not “programmed” to discern between different levels of potentially “risky” particles – they simply act to block all potentially risky particles (regardless of their actual risk). When water is filtered, a particle of dirt that poses little threat to human health will be blocked just as often as a deadly toxin like lead. Also, similar to the firewall metaphor, filters only work where installed and tend to protect a certain reservoir or space (inside) from exterior particles (outside), which ignores the use of modern technologies of remote control to arrest flows before they can reach filters.

**Risk, Control, and Contemporary Borders**

Beck (1992) noted that society may increasingly be characterized as a “risk society”. Risk is defined as “a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced
by modernization itself” (Beck 1992:21). While Beck’s analysis is limited to ecological, economic, and terroristic threats, Aradau and van Munster (2007) expand on risk society by identifying a “dispositif of risk” that “creates a specific relation to the future, which requires the monitoring of the future, the attempt to calculate what the future can offer and the necessity to control and minimize its potentially harmful effects” (p. 97-98). Risk logics therefore serve to link a continuum of a variety of everyday and extraordinary risks ranging from petty crime to terrorism, in turn encapsulating large swaths of social life under the umbrella of calculability, prediction, and pre-emption (Aradau and van Munster 2007:98). As Ericson (2007) further notes, the modern neoliberal economic order is predicated on managing various uncertainties produced as a consequence of modernity itself. Risk emerges as a ‘scientific’ way to manage uncertainties and produce ‘security' by ascertaining data and knowledge (of various kinds) towards predicting the future (and therefore making uncertainties ‘knowable’, controllable, and preventable). As Ericson (2007) points out, however, security is a liberal imaginary that can never be perfected. Accordingly, “Efforts to convert uncertainty into risk expose the limits of knowledge and extent of uncertainty. As a result, security is never an end-state but always a fragile process” (Ericson 2007:217). This produces forms of counter law I – laws that erode existing laws (i.e. the US Patriot Act) – and counter law II – surveillant assemblages – in an effort to constantly enhance data collection capabilities, render uncertainties knowable, and calculate risk toward predicting the future (Ericson 2007:24). Ericson and Haggerty (1997:117) describe this as an “amplifying spiral” of surveillance. Surveillance intrudes previously ‘private’ spaces in order to render subjects knowable and calculable in terms of risk. The more surveillance encompasses an ever-increasing swath of social life, the more uncertainties and insecurities are identified, which only produces further need for surveillance to penetrate deeper into social life to manage these
additional uncertainties. This process will only continue in an amplifying spiral given that perfect security (life without uncertainty) is simply an imaginary and is impossible to achieve – particularly in neoliberal societies predicated on uncertainty for economic entrepreneurship and risk-taking endeavors.

Risk logics, according to Ericson (2007) have spread to government departments, police agencies, corporations, and even to individuals as self-governing neoliberal consumers of risk and risk products. The spread of pre-emptive risk logics in relation to disaster preparedness scenarios (for instance) has been well-documented in the literature (see for example Collier 2008). The spread of risk logics to agencies responsible for border and immigration enforcement has also been well-documented in the literature (see for example Amoore and Hall 2009; Amoore 2011; Amoore 2013; Broeders and Hampshire 2013; and Amoore and Raley 2017). This trend has also been well-documented in the work of Muller (2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2013). Similarly, the concept of societies of control (Deleuze 1992) has been well-linked to risk society and dispositifs of risk within the interdisciplinary security literature (see for example Adey 2009; Hallsworth and Lea 2011; Salter 2013; Lyon 2014; Kaufmann 2016; Hagmann 2017). Walters (2006b) specifically links logics of risk employed at modern borders to Deleuze’s (1992) notion of control societies (elaborated further below). Disciplinary societies (as described by Foucault 1975) featured institutional control, employing the prison, the classroom, and the hospital ward (for example) as spaces for disciplining the behaviours of individuals and groups. Conversely, societies of control govern behaviour in a much more fluid, non-spatio-temporal way. It abandons the institutional and spatial governance efforts of disciplinary societies in favour of a form of power operating through a ‘digital order’ (Walters 2006b:190). Furthermore, control societies abandon the human subject of governance (the individual and the mass) in favour of a
digitized and abstract subject – the ‘dividual’ (Walters 2006b:191). Control also effectively abandons the ‘soul-training’ of individuals and masses characteristic of disciplinary governance in favour of surveillance, data collection and storage, and the construction of the dividual. According to Walters, features of control society are readily identifiable in terms of modern borders. For instance, efforts to collect pre-emptive data and govern risk have led to the ‘displacement’ or ‘remote control’ of borders away from the geographical limits of the sovereign state to a variety of other places (Walters 2006b:193-194). Additionally, various technologies like NEXUS, photo-ID and biometric ‘proximity cards’, and so forth combine to form a control assemblage that employs “concepts (e.g. risk), materials which it comprehends as ‘flow’, scanners, codes, passwords, security professionals, gateways and databanks” (Walters 2006b:197). As migrants are reconfigured as coded flows (dividuals), the “border appears [less] as threshold or gateway into a nation/society so much as one among many sorting points, nodes within a wider, albeit thinner social space” (Walters 2006b:199). Johnson et al. (2011) further this notion, documenting how control logics replace disciplinary logics in terms of border security, “finitely grading and risk scoring forms of movement” (p. 64). Algorithmic risk models designed by mathematicians, software engineers, and computer scientists produce alerts on screens of analysts and border officers. “Understood in this way, the writing of the border via data and risk scores does not aspire to a virtual border at all, but rather to the capacity to reduce the multiplicity and uncertainty of a life to an actionable and realizable security decision” (Johnson et al. 2011:64). Risk and control logics are inextricably tied together as features of contemporary border security and mobility governance.
Revising Border Theory

Any revised metaphor for borders should be able to accommodate for existing knowledge of contemporary borders agreed upon in the interdisciplinary borders and security literature. This includes: 1) the work of bordering and related border technologies unfolds at an increasing variety of official state sites in addition to unofficial public and private non-state sites (both within individual nation states and around the world); 2) traditional physical, sovereign, and geographic borders persist and continue to perform various governance functions (regardless of the aforementioned developments); 3) borders and mobility are governed by and through the calculation and analysis of risk vis-à-vis information contained in databases; 4) borders operate by responsibilizing third parties (individuals, airlines, commercial carriers, and so forth) in collecting and reporting data on behalf of the state; 5) vis-à-vis the use of databases and information in governing risk, borders are inherently part of security continua, working alongside other policing and intelligence agencies, enforcement locales, private actors, and so forth in producing “security” (however currently conceived); and 6) borders continue to provide the function of securitizing and governing various mobilities and flows (of people, financial instruments, commercial goods, and so forth).

In addition, this revised metaphor must also consider borders within the context of governance. The literature has undoubtedly established borders as technologies of governance (see for example O’Connor and de Lint 2009; Pratt 2010; Aas 2012; Rygiel 2012a) including as tools in biopolitical governance (Rygiel 2010; Vaughan-Williams 2010). Governmentality analyses consider just what rationalities – styles of thinking and ways of rendering reality thinkable – and technologies – assemblages of persons, techniques, and institutions – are employed for the purposes of governing conduct (Miller and Rose 2008:16). In terms of
biopolitics – or the governance of life itself – borders function not by simply isolating and enclosing individuals to execute disciplinary power over them, but rather function to permit circulation, flow, and movement while identifying and cancelling out dangerous circulations (Vaughan-Williams 2010:1078). As such, biopolitical borders are seen as conforming to characteristics of Deleuze’s (1995) control society, in which governance is no longer confined to institutions (as was characteristic of disciplinary societies) but rather is increasingly “more supple, dispersed, and nebulous” (Walters 2002:574).

**Social Simulacra**

While early social interactionists like Erving Goffman posited that social interaction and indeed social life unfolds within “theatres” as if one is examining actors on a stage, Baudrillard (1981) argues instead that the theatre has been displaced by what he calls “the satellization of the real” (Baudrillard 1981:149). Whereas theatre is employed to feign or dissimilate reality, simulation instead serves to employ logics of control alongside abandoning distinctions between “real” and “fake” in “an operation [designed] to deter every real process by its operational double, a metastable, programmatic, perfect descriptive machine which provides all the signs of the real and short-circuits all its vicissitudes” (Baudrillard 1981:4). The real never has to be feigned again given simulation is opposed to representation, employing the “sign” not as an equivalent but rather as the negation or replacement of every reference (Baudrillard 1981:11). The sign does not simply stand in for the “real”, rather, it removes the real and becomes indistinguishable from it.

Simulations in the realm of security unfold as a planned model of infallibility characteristic of maximal security and deterrence (Baudrillard 1981:65). The object of the game of security is the simulation of certain risks, threats, and events becoming real (prevention),
adapting to their hypothetical inevitability (resilience), and ultimately pre-empting them from becoming real. According to Bogard (1996), surveillance has also entered the realm of simulation, with technologies like computer profiling serving to simulate surveillance “in the sense that they precede and redouble a means of observation” and produce “surveillance in advance of surveillance, a technology of ‘observation before the fact’” (p. 27). And ultimately, simulations come to govern “the social” in its entirety: “This is the true nuclear fallout: the meticulous operation of technology serves as a model for the meticulous operation of the social. Here, too, nothing will be left to chance” (Baudrillard 1981:63, emphasis original).

The simulation of security in relation to borders is explored by de Lint (2008). He concludes that a sovereign may employ simulation to generate “monsters” that do not exist in reality (de Lint 2008:177). In terms of borders specifically, de Lint employs a Foucauldian perspective in concluding that the border is a site of performance whereby the sovereign (vis-à-vis petty sovereigns) can stage political violence alongside the frugality associated with liberalism in producing logics of exclusion (de Lint 2008:180). The border is a stage serving to “cut down abject others or to manipulate subjects / individuals / cohorts with shocking discretionary displays” (de Lint 2008:180). However, de Lint conceptualizes simulation (and thus also borders) within the context of the theatre of early social interactionism, as a way of “acting out” and producing metastable border logics elsewhere (de Lint 2008:181). He neglects to consider that simulation does not simply work to produce a stage to screen the performance of the sovereign for all to see, but rather simulation (as Baudrillard would contend) serves to remove the stage completely and replace it with something else entirely, namely an abstraction.

Simulation is also employed by Vaughan-Williams (2010) in examining the virtuality of the sovereign ban characteristic of the biopolitics of border security. As the sovereign shifts from
governing via discipline to instead “regularizing” life through biopower, security begins to function not by arresting movement but rather by permitting circulation and flow (Vaughan-Williams 2010: 1078). Accordingly, border policies have shifted from an “old border” mentality characterized exclusively by governing mobility at physical borders to a “biopolitical apparatus of security in its mobility and enhancement of liberal subjects’ movement” (Vaughan-Williams 2010:1078). Borders become characterized within the context of a continuum, spreading to a variety of sites away from traditional physical borders in attempting to govern mobility. Border security is therefore explained within the context of Baudrillard’s (1981) simulation, with neoliberal subjects made virtual (and thus manageable) through technologies of pre-emption, including, for instance, “algorithmic models of risk management based on the profiling of populations” (Vaughan-Williams 2010:1080).

Vaughan-Williams’ discussion of simulation is limited to the extent it does not provide a concrete explanation of how simulation has served to replace the “reality” of border security with signs. His metaphor hinges on several taken-for-granted conclusions that require closer examination. For instance, Vaughan-Williams never makes clear how the virtuality of identity is used by border agents within the continuum to produce the sovereign ban (other than vague conclusions that pre-emption and risk are somehow involved). Vaughan-Williams (2010:1077) also employs Walters’ (2006a) problematic conception of the firewall as a metaphor for how border security continua function. Lastly, Vaughan-Williams seems to default to a panoptic understanding of the simulation of borders despite his reliance on biopolitics to frame his argument. He does not consider how simulated borders function within post-panoptic societies of control.
The Simulation of Surveillance

It is through this conceptualization that contemporary borders are best explored – not as sites par excellence for security performances, but rather as part of the simulation of security and surveillance whereby there is no longer a distinction between “reality” and “fantasy”. According to Bogard (1996:9), simulations allow the gap between virtual control and actual control to disappear. What Bogard refers to as telematics societies (societies that perform governance functions “at a distance”) employ simulation technologies toward cutting the time of the transmission of data to zero (Bogard 1996:9). Accordingly:

This, for Baudrillard, is our own era, where the circulation of sign-images dominate, but rather than being ‘false’ images, now have the function of concealing the fact that reality itself is absent behind its representation (Bogard 1996:11). Bogard refers to this as panoptic imagery whereby the architecture of control and orders of space and time characteristic of institutions (see Foucault 1975) are replaced by “cyberarchitectures” as well as coding designed to produce images onscreen anywhere and anytime (Bogard 1996:19). Reality becomes whatever is programmed within the simulation, with images (or signs) in the simulation serving not as copies of “the real”, but rather as replacements for “the real” (Bogard 1996:20). Derrida (1972) discusses the importance of signs in that: “The sign represents the present in its absence… The sign, in this sense, is deferred presence” (p. 9).

Signs are ultimately coded and stored in databases as data doubles or dividuals (Deleuze 1992). Indeed, as Dijstelbloem and Broeders (2015) indicate, the inclusion / exclusion dichotomy is no longer useful in terms of describing border control technologies. Rather, in terms of migration, “the insider–outsider distinction is being replaced by a much more heterogeneous handling of technologically constructed non-publics” (Dijstelbloem and Broeders 2015:23). Accordingly:
To the authorities at least, [the signs] would become in some ways more real than
our real selves, because they would stand in for and verify the reality of those
selves in ways that are, or have the potential to be, absolutely certain…
Simulation, in fact, would in such cases carry surveillance, the unmasking of
reality, to its logical limit and conclusion – perfect information on individuals,
perfect exposure, and perfect discipline (Bogard 1996:21).

As such, security and surveillance has shifted from governing corporeal bodies (individuals) to
instead governing digitized simulations (dividuals) that promise perfect knowledge and control
of the individuals they are associated with (by abstraction). According to Bogard, dividuals are
reproduced like a photocopy through a Xerox (photocopier) machine in that “Any original only
exists, for the Xerox, to copy, and thus, for all it cares, as a copy” (Bogard 1996:45). The clone
of the original serves as a perfect repetition of the original such that it is understood to
(irrefutably) stand in for the original. However, as Goriunova (2019) argues, there is a “distance”
or gulf that exists between the embodied subject that appears in reality and the “digitized
subject” that is derived from databases. This distance does not permit the duplication of perfect
digital subjects as personal “shadows” or precise mappings of embodied subjects. Rather:

The story is made of patterns, similarities, models, and clusters, which are sorted,
re-arranged, stored, and sold. Therefore, we write ourselves by generating data
that is worked upon and then produced as digital subjects, which are inconsistent
and not very coherent, and serve different purposes: advertisement, secret
services, or consumption. These digital subjects do not coincide with any
originating ‘we’. They are rather at a distance. Yet… there continues to be a legal,
industrial, and techno-scientific pull to map computed digital subjects onto human
beings… After all, an identifiable person can be assigned debt or a prison
sentence (Goriunova 2019:12).

Accordingly, through linking digitized subjects held by officials as dividuals directly linked with
embodied subjects (individuals), the supposedly irrefutably identified person can therefore be
governed, confined, and incapacitated through various technologies of control within the
criminal justice system, immigration enforcement, social welfare administration, and social life
generally. As such, digitized subjects (which are nothing more than aggregated and analyzed data) are processed as if they are individuals, and ultimately become understood (by authorities of various kinds) as the replicated identity of embodied subjects. Databases proliferate to handle incessant collection of data and refine digitized subjects as necessary. These technologies serve to simulate surveillance in that they generate a single profile (a digitized subject) from infinitesimal data points derived from various sources (Bogard 1996:27). Such virtual systems, according to Bogard (1996:23) are indifferent to human history and personal narrative. The image of the digitized subject becomes the undisputed “history in advance” for authorities to review (Bogard 1996:23). According to Bogard (1996:44) all this promises full front-end control by infallibly guaranteeing certain flows in advance while abandoning the need for strategies of monitoring and security performances. Simulated technologies of surveillance ultimately attempt to produce “the transcendence of limits of time, space, life and death, and the body” (Bogard 1996:51). As such they are transmutable – anyone can plug into such databases anywhere and immediately call forth digitized subjects and manage flows with or without the presence of individuals.

**Border Simulacrum and Control**

**Borders as Simulacrum**

Borders proceed exactly in the way Bogard (1996) demonstrates that surveillance is simulated. According to the principles outlined above: 1) the work of bordering and related border technologies unfold at an increasing variety of sites, and 2) traditional physical borders persist and continue to perform various functions. States increasingly perform mobility and border governance at a distance, employing visa offices overseas, international policing agencies, third-party commercial carriers, airlines, academic institutions, social welfare agencies, and a
variety of other actors in both policing mobility and assisting in information collection on individuals, corporations, and commodities. Such diffusion, as Ericson (2007:4) contends, develops in an attempt to reconcile the fact that “security” is very much an imaginary given it requires knowledge of a future that is ultimately unknowable. Such reliance on telematic policing means states must solve the problem of governing mobilities and flows in advance of and also at physical borders. To this end, as Bogard (1996:9) illustrates, surveillance (and indeed policing functions) related to borders can be simulated to eliminate the gap between virtual and physical control and cut the time of the transmission of data to zero.

Such simulation is perfected by the third principle of modern borders, namely, borders and mobility are governed by and through the calculation and analysis of risk. As Ericson (2007:6) argues, one way societies attempt to control the future is through “scientific” measures of risk. Data collection proliferates in an attempt to harness risk-management practices in governing the future. Risk unfolds as a neoliberal technology of governance, with individuals and other entities responsibilized in self-governing personal behavior to ensure their own security and prosperity (Ericson 2007:6). In terms of borders (and following the fourth principle outlined above), states responsibilize a variety of third parties (visa offices, passport agencies, international policing agencies, third-party commercial carriers, airlines, private citizens, and so forth) in providing data collection functions in advance of physical borders. Accordingly, technologies of governance such as carrier sanctions redesign such spaces as “semi-formal spaces of migration control…” (Walters 2006b:194). These third parties ultimately become part of border security assemblages – in the style of Haggerty and Ericson’s (2000) surveillant assemblage – and, by extension, security continua that rely (in part) on borders (the fifth principle outlined above). Such data collection contributes to the formation of digitized subjects.
in databases. These images (or signs) as part of simulation are considered by authorities to be
dividuals that serve not as copies of ‘the real’, but rather as replacements for ‘the real’ (Bogard

Whenever someone enters the border security assemblage (when attempting to obtain a
visa, when checking in at the airport, when arriving at a physical border, and so forth), their body
and personal narrative no longer serve as an identity for analysis. Rather, much like the Xerox
machine, the original exists only insofar as it brings forth its supposed replacement (the digitized
subject) onto the “stretched screens” (Lyon 2009) of border agents. Personal narrative and
embodied subject performativity are rendered increasingly irrelevant as agents already have what
is perceived to be a “history in advance” (Bogard 1996:23), which is used to govern mobility via
risk.

Long before individuals reach physical borders, they have already become part of the
border security assemblage, the simulation of security, and have been coded as digitized subjects.
They have (in many ways) been pre-selected prior to arrival. Consider travelers intending to
travel to another country via an airport. Even before they are permitted to board an airplane,
individuals are already rendered as digitized subjects. This process begins when individuals
attempt to obtain travel documents (i.e. passports), serving the function of creating digitized
subjects in databases and also cross-referencing new digitized subjects with established profiles
contained in existing databases. In many cases, individuals must also secure a visa prior to
departure in order to travel to their destination country. This part of the border assemblage allows
agents to further cross-reference (now established) digitized subjects with various databases to
assess risk, allows for the collection of biometrics for positive identification on the front end (at
the visa office) and eventually on the back end (at the physical border), and tracks the movement
(including failed attempts) of digitized subjects. Lastly, responsibilized private agents working for airlines at international airports collect data that serves to further establish identity at check-in and adds this information to databases for border officials to examine prior to and during arrival, and also further cross-references the digitized subject with prior established international and nation-specific databases such as no-fly lists.

The aforementioned methods serve to digitize and ultimately limit (and exclude) mobility in a variety of ways. Passport and visa controls enforced by petty sovereign (Butler 2004) state actors serve to exclude: 1) risky others, for example, certain classes of criminals and those suspected of terrorism who are banned from obtaining a passport from their country of origin or a visa from their destination country, 2) those without the ability to establish prior identity (i.e. those without birth records and other required identity documents), 3) those (primarily) in the global south too poor to afford a passport or visa processing and/or unable to access passport and visa offices, and 4) individuals from certain “banned” countries unable to obtain a visa. Private agents working for airlines (and other carriers) also function as private petty sovereigns (see Amoore and de Goede 2005, de Goede 2007), working to provide security functions on behalf of the state to further exclude: 1) individuals too impoverished to afford tickets or without access to an international airport, 2) individuals without a valid visa or identity document, 3) anyone carrying weapons and/or dangerous goods at security checkpoints, 4) unlimited travel based on carrier routing, 5) those digitized subjects deemed too risky to fly (i.e. on a no-fly list), and 6) cases of mistaken identity wherein digitized subjects share certain data points (i.e. name, date of birth, and so forth) with other banned individual(s).

In short, before reaching a physical border, travelers transiting through airports – depending on their citizenship and visa requirements of the destination country – may be
subjected to no fewer than three identity verifications, one biometric data collection, three identity cross-references with pre-established databases to assess risk, and a multitude of ways to be excluded from travel before even boarding an airplane. International arrivals customs and immigration checkpoints at airports are therefore only receiving a very small and pre-coded fraction of travelers out of all possible travelers in the world. According to Duffield (2010), it is through such mechanisms that the policing of migration alongside global development governance can be seen as complicit in producing a “planetary order” confining large swaths of the global (south) population in situ. In essence, the vast majority of airport arrivals are “ideal” types of pre-coded and known (digitized) flows that pass all checks and balances and comply with risk-management technologies. They hold the proper passwords necessary for mobility within the simulation (explored below). While those arriving at land borders are theoretically subject to less prior scrutiny, the potential “flood” of mobility is still controlled in a variety of ways via producing digitized subjects and within simulated borders. This process is enhanced by policies such as the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative that mandate the use of passports at borders, serving to construct digitized subjects regionally in advance of travel.

_Borders as Control_

As borders unfold at an increasing variety of sites and risk is employed to accomplish telematic mobility governance and attempt prediction, borders as technologies of governance effectively abandon exclusive reliance on back-end disciplinary governance in favour instead of front-end control. As Deleuze (1992) contends, there exists two poles in disciplinary societies: “the signature that designates the individual, and the number or administrative numeration that indicates his or her position within a mass” (p. 5). Power in disciplinary societies is exercised through the individual and the mass via institutions. Conversely, in societies of control, the
signature or number is replaced by “a code: the code is a password…” The numerical language of control is made of codes that mark access… We no longer find ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals have become ‘dividuals,’ and masses, samples, data, markets, or ‘banks’ (Deleuze 1992:5). Individuals are replaced in border simulations by digitized subjects generated in databases through aggregating bits of data. Digitized subjects come to form “passwords” (Deleuze 1992) for the purpose of governing mobility. Passwords can be considered as clusters of bits of data that reveal, conceal, and represent nothing but that serve as signs that mark access – they are pure simulation. To agents responsible for border governance, such passwords become “more real than our real selves” (Bogard 1996:21) and are ultimately mistaken as irrefutable first-order simulations (or copies) of the individual. However, such passwords are, in reality, not reflections of the individual, but rather are nothing more than aggregated data derived from prior movements, passages, exchanges, transactions, and associations. In other words, digitized subjects are nothing more than the aggregate of past actions and behaviours that are coded as relevant to risk-management practices. Accordingly, a society must code in order to control flows. Non-coded flows represent a threat in that they may not be controlled, and therefore serve as “the flood, the deluge which is the flow that breaks through the barriers of codes” (Deleuze 1971). Risk societies rely on the imaginary of perfect knowledge of flows to attempt to control them and regulate mobility and access.

Baudrillard (1981) makes the connection between simulation and societies of control abundantly clear through his examination of an early reality TV program focused on the Loud family. While portrayed as an organic and “raw” examination of the American family simply going about life as if cameras were not present (something Baudrilliard sees as simple utopian fantasy), Baudrillard (1981:51) indicates that the family was already hyperreal in their very
selection for filming. The family was not randomly selected but rather represented a statistical aggregation of the “ideal American family”. Much like border subjects, in many ways, the family was “known” and pre-selected as ideal subjects. They represented (through aggregated data) the characteristic “profile” of the American family.

Baudrillard demonstrates how the “truth” regarding the life of the family was ultimately replaced by the “truth” of the TV. In short, the TV (much like the stretched screens of border agents) serves to render truth (Baudrillard 1981:51-52). This, to Baudrillard, represents the end of the panoptic gaze and its replacement by “the manipulative truth of the test which probes and interrogates, of the laser that touches and then pierces, of computer cards that retain your punched-out sequences…” (p. 52). Much like the governance of borders through risk, it is no longer the historical narrative of the individual that matters, but rather the pre-coded and value-laden assumptions within simulations that test perceived infallible data located in the profile of the digitized subject. This, according to Baudrillard (1981:52) represents the end of the panoptic system that relied on a despotic gaze within a defined social space, and its replacement by a society of control that abandons attempts to render individuals transparent in favour of rending them predictable.

As simulations shift governing efforts toward digitized subjects, it is no longer necessary for individuals to be always seen, heard, and recorded. Rather, it becomes necessary to develop a “system of mapping” whereby the collection of data contributes to controlling mobility vis-à-vis digitized subjects. The data characterizing digitized subjects comes to replace the panoptic image of the individual as the focal point of control. The individual does not need to be actively surveilled at physical borders to produce decisions regarding mobility. Rather, infinitesimal data points can be collected (including by non-state, third-party actors) indefinitely to ascertain the
risk of the digitized subjects and govern mobility with or without the physical presence of the individual. The population is no longer governed via the violence and surveillance of the state against individuals characteristic of disciplinary institutions. Rather, biopolitical post-panoptic governance unfolds as a system of deterrence designed to control the mobility of digitized subjects within simulations (Baudrillard 1981:53-54). Submission of the individual is no longer necessary, as individuals are instead deterred from participating in ‘risky’ behaviours that have the potentiality of producing data points that could generate a risky digitized subject with a password excluding mobility.

**Identifying Simulations and Cyborg Work**

As Côté-Boucher, Infantino, and Salter (2014) argue, there is a need for the literature to consider how border security is governed as an everyday practice by those appointed to carry out duties related to it. The strength of theoretical perspectives (like the simulation of borders) can only be derived by considering how they function in relation to the everyday practice of “bordering”. Recent analyses have examined how border officers in Canada employ risk toward reaching determinations. This has included employing risk through advanced commercial information (Côté-Boucher 2013:155-158) as well as surveillance technologies used to produce advanced identification of individuals (Côté-Boucher 2008). A content analysis of training documents and manuals obtained by the researcher through ATIP requests filed with CBSA was performed to further test the simulation metaphor. According to the “Indicators” CBSA Port of Entry Recruitment Training (POERT) program module:

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35 Obtained POERT documents are still applicable for two reasons. First, the new OITP is built on the foundation of POERT. Second, according to CBSA corporate documents, the vast majority of BSOs currently on the frontline were trained using iterations of the late-2000s POERT documents obtained by the researcher given that CBSA increased its frontline ranks from 4000 to 7200 officers from 2006 to 2012 – representing an 80% increase overall – prior to the implementation of OITP in 2014.
One of the main purposes of indicators is to distinguish high-risk travelers from low-risk travelers. Through the use of questioning, document examination, lookouts, enforcement bulletins, intelligence bulletins, database results, and contraband detection tools, [officers] will be able to identify multiple indicators which will allow [them] to determine which travelers pose the highest risk (p. 1).

When identity documents are scanned by officers into CBSA Integrated Primary Inspection Line (IPIL) computer systems, databases present officers with digitized subjects in return. Risk information is provided about digitized subjects that automatically leads to further customs and/or immigration processing and searches (irrespective of questions posed by the officer). Various alerts concerning the digitized subject – lookouts based on intelligence information gathered, previous customs seizures, previous immigration matters, outstanding arrest warrants, or lost or stolen identity documents – produce a level of risk that mandates further processing (CBSA 2015:20-22). This is confirmed in the “Referrals” POERT module, which states, “A mandatory referral is a referral that a BSO must make for further documentation or examination by Customs… or on behalf of other government departments” (p. 23). The module then lists several types of mandatory customs referrals, including: 1) documentation/permit requirements, 2) payment of duties and taxes, 3) inability of the officer to reach the point of finality with a traveler (including issues surrounding identity), and 4) when a lookout exists on a vehicle license plate or traveler name (p. 23). This module also lists categories for individuals requiring a mandatory referral for immigration secondary, including (but not limited to): people included in inadmissible classes in sections 34 to 42 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for reasons of security, violating human rights, serious criminality, general criminality, organized crime, health, financial risk, and so forth (p. 3-7). By employing telematics, CBSA officers are able to reduce the transmission of data to zero. Digitized subjects (particularly in the case of lookouts) are produced in advance, including through aggregated risk information gleaned from
third-party data collection, other agency intelligence information, and private citizen “tips”.

Officers scan identity documents into databases and obtain histories in advance in the form of digitized subjects in return. The officer essentially has no choice in terms of action with mandatory referrals – the narrative and performativity of the embodied subject is rendered effectively irrelevant by the risky digitized subject (and incompatible password) visible on the officer’s screen.

When border officers ask individuals questions related to their travel and associated declarations, agents are not asking questions to the individual (the body) to provide a narrative toward making a determination regarding mobility. Instead, officers are asking questions to the individual to essentially test the risk level of the digitized subject. Even if the individual provides low-risk answers to queries, the high-risk digitized subject identified by IPIL databases mandates a referral with the assumption that the person is deceiving the agent and is not being forthcoming. As such, a high-risk digitized subject with a “hit” in the database (as outlined above) will always result in a referral for further processing (regardless of how the individual answers questions) (CBSA 2015:20-22). Conversely, if an individual provides high-risk answers despite their digitized subject presenting as a low or unknown risk, they are also highly likely to be referred by the agent to test (and refine if necessary) the information contained in their digital profile. Basically, the only way an individual is allowed to proceed without further scrutiny is if the low-risk answers they provide to questions confirm their low-risk digitized subject.

Subsequent secondary customs and immigration searches and questioning serve to further “test” and refine (as necessary) the digitized subject. In short, the “fate” of travellers has been coded in databases and is largely determined before they reach physical borders or answer questions posed by officers.
Additionally, most of the interactions occurring between border agents and individuals are coded and pre-determined in many ways. Officers ask a variety of pre-determined, mandatory questions designed (as stated above) to test the level of risk generated by the digitized subject. The social interactions that ensue cannot be described as ‘organic’ in any way. Travelers are limited in how they may answer these questions and ultimately personal narratives – which may serve to “clarify” the individual – are excluded in favor of concise answers from which the officer may glean whether the individual presents the same level of risk posed by their digitized subject. If an individual refuses to present their digitized subject or answer questions and participate in the “test”, the traveler is automatically deemed risky and referred for further examination (and potentially detained or excluded). What may appear to the casual observer as an organic information-seeking exercise is actually a highly coded and simulated interaction within a space of security.

It is through such simulations based on advanced information and risk that border agents can be seen as participating in “cyborg work” (Bogard 1992: 115) whereby perceived inefficiencies and problems associated with officer decision-making are designed out by governing officers from inside the simulation – namely by coding the simulation to produce automated responses to digitized subjects without allowing for officer discretion. Despite the fact CBSA officers indicate distrust for risk technologies and insist that they ultimately make determinations by asking questions (Côté-Boucher 2013: 172-179), it is without doubt that the lifeworlds (Habermas 1981) of border agents have been colonized by risk to the extent that it is virtually impossible for officers to reach common understandings regarding mobility without reference to the digitized subjects.
Recently, CBSA installed machines at borders in Canada that read RFID-enabled identity documents (and call forth digitized subjects) at a distance before individuals reach primary inspection (CBSA 2014c:37). Such technologies thrust risk calculations to the forefront of the primary inspection process and provide officers with tailor-made risk-based decisions in advance of questioning. Where RFID readers are absent, agency policies mandate the manual scanning of identity documents and collection of data pertaining to “Name (first, middle, last), Date of Birth, Nationality/Citizenship, Gender, Document information (type, number and country of issuance)” as well as “Biographic Entry Data” for every individual officers process (CBSA 2016e). According to Chapter One Part Two “Primary Processing” in the CBSA People Processing Manual, “All persons entering Canada at a site equipped with the IPIL system must be queried in IPIL. The officers must query each person by capturing the information from a machine-readable travel document or by manually keying the person’s information” (p. 31, emphasis original). Furthermore, the introduction of Automated Border Clearance (ABC) kiosks\(^{36}\) at Canada’s busiest international airports in Vancouver (2009), Montreal (2012), and Toronto (2013) further indicate how Canadian borders and officer decision-making are governed via simulations and risk. According to Chapter 10 Part 2 “Primary Processing” in the CBSA People Processing Manual, travelers scan identity documents and self-declaration forms (E311) at ABC kiosks. The kiosks generate a risk score and referral code for the traveler, and:

The system generated results of the risk assessment and the traveler’s responses on the E311 [form] will determine if a referral to secondary processing is warranted. The kiosk will generate a receipt (copy of E311) and the traveler proceeds to the BSO performing document verification function to present their travel document and kiosk receipt… The BSO shall not release travelers if a secondary referral code is printed on the kiosk receipt but should direct the traveler to the BSO at triage (p. 151).

\(^{36}\) ABC kiosks are known elsewhere as Primary Inspection Kiosks (PIKs).
In this way, control over decision-making and the generation of secondary examinations is increasingly shifting from human officers to computers (kiosks) while also decreasing officer discretion (by mandating officers accept decisions generated by kiosks). Indeed, a CBSA internal document reported on by CBC in 2019 indicated that 93% of all airport secondary customs examinations and 88% of all airport immigration secondary examinations occurring in 2017 were generated by kiosks (with only 7% and 12% of customs and immigration examinations generated by BSOs, respectively) (Dyer 2019). Combined, RFID readers, policies mandating officers scan all identity documents, and ABC kiosks produce technologies of automation that serve to double-down on computerized risk-management practices that govern the actions of officers vis-à-vis risk within the simulation. In short, risk management pervades and governs officer decision-making regardless of their perceived levels of complicity. While the aforementioned analysis pertains exclusively to CBSA, the employment of risk-management practices, databases, RFID technologies, and document readers by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Frontex, and other Western border agencies implies these practices are likely widespread.

Additionally, the strength of the simulation metaphor for the governance of mobility and borders lies in its direct applicability not only to Canada Border Services Agency and other border agencies, but also to other fields of policing and security. Examples of such security simulation can be found in disaster and resilience planning scenarios that completely obscure the distinction between real and fake while supporting goals of maximal security and deterrence in making life programmatic (see for example Anderson 2010; Walklate, Mythen, and McGarry 2012; Bourbeau 2013; Coaffee 2013). Whether security actors are participating in scenarios or “real-world” events, their actions and behavior in each case become indistinguishable and guided through risk. O’Malley (2010) documents the increased use of “telemetric policing” models such
as traffic light cameras issuing fines to drivers through license plate databases. Such modes of policing replace the individual with the digitized subject as the focal point of power within “simulated space”. Accordingly, such simulations ultimately serve to produce “simulated justice” whereby individuals are no longer permitted recourse. In fact, the individual need not even be physically present at the time of the offence to be fined, with “deeming provisions” within legislation placing a reverse onus on the “offender” to prove “either that the vehicle was not speeding or that another individual owned or drove it at the time of the offence” (O’Malley 2010:800). Similarly, many policing agencies have now adopted intelligence-led policing models driven by data collection. Initiatives like the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Criminal Intelligence Program function by collating information from investigations and “other sources” (i.e. phone records, bank statements, ISP data, and other third-party data), which is ultimately analyzed by criminal intelligence analysts to produce threat assessments (RCMP 2014). Such models of policing are inherently simulated and operate within the society of control in that, once again, the digitized subject serves as the unit of analysis in terms of identifying and acting on risk. Lastly, the use of ASBOs, licensing (Valverde 2003; Valverde 2012), zoning (Valverde 2011; Hubbard and Colosi 2012; Crofts et al. 2013), and recent innovations such as off-limits orders (Beckett and Herbert 2008; Palmer and Warren 2014) are employed in urban environments to control conduct vis-à-vis employing logics of risk and computerization in excluding digitized subjects from mobility within various public and private social spaces.

Simply put, simulation not only characterizes how contemporary borders are governed, but rather is symptomatic of governance efforts generally within the society of control. Such reliance on digitization and risk technologies in producing simulations is troubling for several reasons. Simulations ultimately unfold at the will (intentional or not) of software programmers.
Taylor (2003), in examining virtual worlds, concludes that a simulated environment exists the way it does because a human coded it to be so. The dangers for humans in terms of border simulations are easily identifiable. In short, mobility is only permitted insofar as it meets the “embedded values” (Taylor 2003:28) promoted in a simulation’s coding. As Lessig (1999) illustrates, the code – software and hardware that serve to render cyberspace – functions to set the terms by which digitized life within cyberspace is experienced. Code is not static but rather malleable, and this malleability can function to change the nature of cyberspace in rendering digitized life fundamentally governable (Lessig 1999:2). Accordingly, embedded values (including just what is considered ‘risky’) can possibly be adapted and changed. The current processes through which recoding is accomplished speaks to its undemocratic nature and potential for abuse:

The code regulates. It implements values, or not. It enables freedoms, or disables them. It protects privacy, or promotes monitoring. People choose how the code does these things. People write the code. Thus the choice is not whether people will decide how cyberspace regulates. People – coders – will. The only choice is whether we collectively will have a role in their choice – and thus in determining how these values regulate – or whether collectively we will allow the coders to select our values for us (Lessig 1999:3).

This speaks to the potentially undemocratic nature of the coding and recoding of cyberspace. While coders are able to embed values within coding, our inability (or unwillingness) to govern these coders – and thus also govern the embedding of values within code – is potentially problematic in terms of protecting our rights and freedoms when we are (re)constructed as digitized subjects (including anonymity, free speech, individual control, and so forth) (Lessig 1999:1). In short, virtually any digitized subject can be rendered risky (and thus immobile) by recoding the parameters of the simulation. Rather than risk locating the truth, what is ‘true’ becomes generated by risk, with risk being particularly vulnerable to social definition and
construction in ways that are far from scientific or objective (Beck 1992:22-23). This conclusion raises further concerns about data “function creep” (Haggerty and Ericson 2006) and a general lack of avenues for individuals to “exit” simulations or seek judicial remedies for established risky digitized subjects. In short, simulations and the coding of digitized subjects render as fantasy any desire to manage or conceal “spoiled identity” (Goffman 1963).

Indeed, it seems as if these concerns have played out in reality in terms of CBSA’s use of ABC kiosks in Canadian airports. A recent Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) internal investigation into potential bias and discrimination on the part of its officers and ABC kiosks revealed much evidence of machine bias. The report illustrates that while Iranian travellers (for example) were no more likely than Danish travellers to be referred by a human officer, they were on average about twenty times more likely to be referred for a customs secondary examination and six times more likely to be referred for immigration purposes (Dyer 2019). This suggests an inherent bias in the coding of ABC kiosks based on country of origin (and potentially ethnicity). Additionally, the report suggests that ABC machines may be incorrect in referring travellers (based on risk) about 60% of the time, and that ABC facial matching technology also produces false positives and false negatives (Dyer 2019). The error rate for facial matching technology was redacted from the released version of the report by CBSA under exceptions granted under the Canadian Access to Information Act. However, a recent study of major facial recognition technologies suggests that error rates may be as high as 35% for darker-skinned women and 12% for darker-skinned males (compared to rates no higher than 1% for lighter-skinned males) (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018:9). Collectively, such findings suggest that machines employing risk and biometric facial-recognition technologies (like ABC kiosks) may employ algorithms that
contain racialized and gendered biases that subsequently produce erroneous, racialized, and gendered secondary referrals.

**Conclusion**

The aforementioned metaphor of simulation works for contemporary borders given it incorporates (as described above) each of the six principles agreed upon in the literature concerning contemporary border security. As borders unfold at an increasing variety of sites, simulation is ultimately employed to close the gap between virtual and physical governance of mobility. Risk is employed to accomplish telematic mobility governance and attempt prediction, with digitized subjects ultimately produced in databases that serve as the unit of analysis for agents within the border security assemblage. To constantly acquire and refine data and thus also ascertain the level of risk posed by digitized subjects, a variety of third parties are responsibilized in collecting and reporting data on behalf of the state. These third parties are responsibilized along with the state in serving as part of larger security continua that rely (in part) on borders to securitize an ever-increasing range of social life in feeding into neoliberal demands for data required for risk-management efforts focused on prediction and pre-emption. Such demands and the “routine failure of risk”, as Ericson (2007:12) contends, simply produces further pressure to collect more data to feed the continuum and govern risk. Diffusion of the continuum (including borders) in securitizing additional non-traditional sites becomes necessary to feed the insatiable appetite for data. Risk and insecurity only produce more risk and insecurity in an ever-amplifying spiral of securitization. Simulation, then, serves to make virtuality possible, producing digitized subjects, controlling mobility under the guise of perfect predictability, and securitizing more and more social life through risk. While the aforementioned analysis exclusively considered the mobility of individuals, conclusions are transferable to mobility of all
things governed through risk, including (but not limited to) financial instruments, commercial goods, and information.

The simulation of borders also coincides with Deleuze’s (1992) description of the society of control. As institutions characteristic of disciplinary society are increasingly abandoned as the model of governance of individuals and masses, the “dividual” – assumed to be a perfect copy of the embodied subject rather than the imperfect and distanced “digitized subject” that the profile represents in reality – is produced within the society of control. Power in societies of control is exercised not through the individual within institutions, but rather through the digitized subject. The data characterizing digitized subjects comes to replace the panoptic image of the individual as the focal point of control. In terms of border simulations, the individual does not need to be actively surveilled at physical borders to produce decisions regarding mobility. Rather, infinitesimal data points can be collected (including by non-state third-party actors) indefinitely to ascertain the risk of the digitized subject, generate passwords, and govern mobility through control.

Lastly, the simulation metaphor also avoids debates surrounding binary border mandates and geographic imaginaries that have plagued recent interdisciplinary border literature. Simulation can accommodate (at the same time) the continued existence of traditional sovereign borders alongside “diffusion” to a potentially infinite number of non-traditional and/or third-party sites. Debates surrounding the changing importance of physical borders within the context of telemetric borders are also increasingly irrelevant given that potentially each and every site contributes equally to the simulation of surveillance, the border security assemblage, and the production, analysis, and refinement of digitized subjects. Each site (whether at the frontier of the nation state or elsewhere) is coded to govern flows and mobilities according to the
simulation. Borders are not really “moving” or “spreading”. Rather, simulated borders are truly anywhere and anytime as part of security continua that serve to securitize an ever-increasing range of social life. This is the major conclusion that Vaughan-Williams (2010) and de Lint (2008) do not fully consider in discussing the simulation of borders – namely, via simulation borders exist anywhere social life is already securitized, anywhere security continua have already reached, and anywhere life and mobility are already simulated. It is through this conclusion that Baudrillard’s (1981) dystopian supposition – that the true nuclear fallout is simulation of our entire social world – becomes realized. Through simulation and virtuality, borders, as Lyon (2005) contends, are truly everywhere.

- END OF ARTICLE -
Examining Official and Non-Official Interaction Narratives Concerning Digitized Risk Technologies Employed at the Canadian Border

This article combines findings concerning institutional discourses with knowledge of frontline officials and non-officials gleaned from qualitative interviews to discuss the technologization of modern Canadian borders, as well as the extent to which institutional discourses and official and non-official frontline knowledge differ in terms of technologization of ports of entry. Ultimately, findings suggest there is much evidence to support claims made by Lalonde (2018) regarding the simulation (Baudrillard 1981) of contemporary borders and the reconfiguration of the BSO occupation as a form of cyborg work (Bogard 1996). Findings generated from interview data reveal that both frontline officials and non-officials experience a border where the personal narrative and performativity of the embodied subject traveller is increasingly irrelevant, with officer decision-making increasingly supplanted by information about digitized subjects (Goriunova 2019) contained in databases. Findings also explore various dangers associated with increased simulation and cyborg work, including database errors having demonstrable consequences on the mobility and rights of human beings; the colonization of the lifeworld of BSOs by digitized risk technologies ultimately rendering officers incapable of asking questions, looking for indicators, and making informed decisions on the basis of anything other than databases; and the associated human rights, privacy, and legal implications that are potentially wide-ranging and extremely troubling.

Keywords: border security; technologization; digitization; simulation; cyborg work
Introduction

Much contemporary border research has focused its lens on official knowledge, including the construction of public policy, state governance efforts, and the deployment of various technologies at borders (see for example Muller 2010b; Muller 2011; Broeders and Hampshire 2013; Bosworth and Turnbull 2015; Bosworth 2016); the governance of global migration (see Aas 2012; Salter and Mutlu 2013; Mountz and Loyd 2014; Mountz 2015); and, to a lesser extent, the perceptions of border and immigration officers tasked with frontline border enforcement (see for example Côté-Boucher 2013; Pickering 2014; Pickering and Ham 2014; Aas and Gundhus 2015; Côté-Boucher 2016; Côté-Boucher 2018). While examinations of official knowledge have served to generate important knowledge in the interdisciplinary border research, such findings are limited in that they largely ignore the perceptions of political subjects of (in)security (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016:43). By privileging institutional knowledge, such research ultimately ignores forms of subjugated knowledge (Foucault 1972), the role of diverse publics in shaping the field of (in)security, and makes invisible the presence of (in)security in everyday life (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016:43).

As such, this article will examine the technologization of contemporary Canadian borders by contrasting institutional discourses with official and non-official frontline knowledge to consider how digitized border risk technologies are actually understood by social agents circulating within these “spaces of security” (Foucault 1978). First, this article will build on the work of Lalonde (2018)37 by considering prior findings concerning border technologization, including the simulation (Baudrillard 1981) of borders – whereby digitized subjects (Goriunova 2019) contained in databases come to replace individuals as the unit of analysis on the frontline.

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37 This article is reproduced as Chapter 5 “Cyborg Work: Borders as Simulation” within this thesis.
within neoliberal risk-management forms of governance – and the reformulation of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) border services officer (BSO) occupation as a form of “cyborg work” (Bogard 1996). Second, this article will analyze the results of a content analysis performed on coded transcripts generated from in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted with ten BSOs currently or formerly employed at ports of entry in Windsor, Ontario. Third, this article will analyze the results of a content analysis performed on thirty in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted with members of travelling publics, the majority of whom were current or former residents of the Windsor-Essex County region at the time interviews were conducted. The article will therefore address five key research questions: 1) How do BSOs and members of travelling publics perceive of digitized risk technologies employed at ports of entry? 2) How do institutional discourses regarding digitized risk technologies contrast with interaction narrative knowledge generated through perceptions of past social interactions occurring between BSOs and publics circulating through ports of entry? 3) To what extent can it be said that technologization contributes to the simulation of modern borders? 4) To what extent is technologization reconstituting the BSO occupation as a form of cyborg work? 5) How should the literature view border technologization through the lens of human rights, freedoms, privacy, and so forth?

**Literature Review**

Much of the interdisciplinary border literature has analyzed various programs and policies related to the technologization of modern borders. Particularly, such research has focused on documentation, including passports, ID cards, visas, and the NEXUS program in North America (see Salter 2004; Salter 2006; Sparke 2006; Lyon 2009; Muller 2010b; Salter 2011; McPhail et al. 2012; Bradbury 2013); biometric technologies, including fingerprinting, iris
scans, facial recognition, and so forth (see Amoore 2006; Muller 2009; Muller 2010a; Muller 2011; Muller 2013; Popescu 2015; Leese 2018); the development of smart borders in Europe and North America (see Amoore, Marmura, and Salter 2008; Leese 2016); and the use of databases and algorithms on the frontline of enforcement (see Broeders 2007; Dijstelbloem and Broeder 2015; Pötzsch 2015; Topak et al. 2015; Amoore and Raley 2017; Lalonde 2018). According to Ceyhan (2008), technologization – the process whereby identification technologies, surveillance, and risk assessment have become centrepieces of security policies and programs – has shifted the subject of migration and other forms of governance from marginal populations (i.e. immigrants) to also include entire populations, “meaning that all individuals are subject to technological identification and surveillance” (p. 103). Providing examples from France, the United States, and the European Union, Ceyhan (2008) demonstrates how electronic identification and surveillance tools (including biometric scanners, ‘smart’ cards, computer chips, CCTV, wiretaps, and so forth) are considered the “ultimate solution” for dealing with uncertainties generated by globalization and contemporary terror threats. Underpinning technologization are three interconnected logics: 1) a logic that security is achievable through the identification of threats and dangers and by intercepting risky people; 2) a logic that security involves managing flows of people, goods, and transportation; and 3) a logic of “ambient intelligence” promoting the integration of microprocessors into social life to make life more comfortable for individuals (Ceyhan 2008:108). This produces an increased appetite for information and data collection towards predicting the future as well as the pre-emption and prevention of threats of various kinds. According to Ericson and Haggerty (1997:117), this increased appetite is actually insatiable, and produces an “amplifying spiral” of surveillance. Neoliberal risk-management logics increasingly envelope large swaths of social life under an umbrella of calculability,
prediction, and pre-emption in attempting to effect security (Aradau and van Munster 2007:98). As Ericson (2007) indicates, however, ‘security’ is simply a liberal imaginary that is never fully achievable and simply results in more instances of insecurity and a greater need for surveillance and data collection.

Much recent research has documented the importance of risk-based algorithms as technologies increasingly designed to govern securitized social life. According to Bellanova (2017), ‘algorithmic governmentality’ is:

…a governance steered by learning machines and intelligent computing systems that are able to automatically capture and process data from multiple sources, using statistical calculations that humans and socio-political institutions are by and large no longer able to understand and master (p. 330).

Increasingly, algorithms operate on the level of ‘big data’. Aradau and Blanke (2017) argue that predictive big data technologies are increasingly adopted by security professionals and represent a shift from disciplinary and biopolitical governmentality. ‘Connecting the dots’ after the fact is no longer sufficient for security professionals who now seek to ‘find the needle in the haystack’ by promising the predictive potential of big data (Aradau and Blanke 2017:376). Accordingly, “Predictive analytics draws on techniques of traditional statistics, but also machine learning, artificial intelligence, and data mining in order to automate ‘data-driven algorithms [that] induce models from the data’” (Abbott 2014:3 as cited in Aradau and Blanke 2017:379). Such algorithms seek data from a variety of heterogenous sources and works on the assumption of ‘collect it all’ (Crampton 2015 as cited in Aradau and Blanke 2017:379). Big data as a governmental apparatus differs from disciplinary and biopolitical governance in that it operates on the level of “pure relationality, of geometrical connection [between data points] as simultaneously similarity and difference” (Aradau and Blanke 2017:385). Increasingly, then, analysis of big data promises a ‘nothing personal’ approach in which “no personal information
about individuals or groups of individuals [is used], eliminating any personal liberties and profiling concerns” (Aradau and Blanke 2017:385). Such methods promise that being identified as a potential “subject of concern” is less about personal sociodemographic factors (i.e. race, gender, social class, and so forth) and more about being included within a certain “cluster of concern” constantly being calculated and refined as the algorithm acts on new and old data from a variety of heterogenous sources across time and space.

While such technologies promise neutrality, the reality is that they are “socio-political and cultural artefacts that are transforming how we live, work and think about social problems” (Hannah-Moffat 2018:2). A recent Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) internal investigation into potential bias and discrimination on the part of its officers and primary inspection kiosks (PIKs) – machines used to perform primary inspections based on computerized risk assessments of air travellers at major Canadian airports – revealed much evidence of machine bias. Out of two million secondary customs inspections performed in 2017 by CBSA on airport travellers, only about 140,000 (7% of all referrals) were generated by border services officers (BSOs) – the rest were generated by PIKs (Dyer 2019). Immigration secondary inspections were similarly ordered by PIKs 88% of the time (Dyer 2019). The report illustrates that while Iranian travellers (for example) were no more likely than Danish travellers to be referred by a human officer, they were on average about twenty times more likely to be referred for a customs secondary examination and six times more likely to be referred for immigration purposes (Dyer 2019). This suggests an inherent bias in the PIK system – and the algorithms these machines use – based on country of origin (and potentially ethnicity). Additionally, the report suggests that PIK machines may be incorrect in referring travellers (based on risk) about 60% of the time, and that PIK facial matching technology also produces false positives and false
negatives (Dyer 2019). The error rate for facial matching technology used by PIKs was redacted from the released version of the report by CBSA under exemptions granted under the Canadian Access to Information Act. A study conducted on three leading facial recognition technologies at MIT in 2015 provides potential insight into error rates. The study suggested that while machines had error rates of no more than 1% for lighter-skinned men, for darker-skinned women the error rates were between 20% and 35% (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018:9). Additionally, dark-skinned males had error rates between 0.7% and 12% (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018:9). While lighter-skinned men experienced a false positive rate of no more than 1.1%, darker-skinned women experienced false positives at a rate between 16.3% and 25.2% (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018:9). Darker-skinned males experienced radically different rates of false positives across the three examined technologies, including rates of 1.2%, 7.9%, and 17.7%, respectively (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018:9). Collectively, such findings suggest that machines employing risk and biometric facial-recognition technologies (like PIKs) may be employing algorithms that contain racialized and gendered biases that subsequently produce erroneous, racialized, and gendered secondary referrals.

As stated above, exemptions under the Access to Information Act have severely hampered academic research or media analysis of the algorithms and technologies used by Canada Border Services Agency and other federal policing and security agencies. According to section 15(1) part (f) of AITA, the Government of Canada may refuse to disclose information related to “methods of, and scientific or technical equipment for, collecting, assessing or handling information” related to the defence of Canada or intelligence related to foreign states or citizens of foreign states. This means that despite academic analysis regarding the functioning of algorithms used by security and other agencies gleaned from the Canadian and international
literature (see for example Amoore 2009; Amoore 2011; Salter 2013; Eubanks 2017; Aradau and Blanke 2017; Hannah-Moffat 2018), the nature of risk algorithms used by CBSA in particular (and outside of airport security governance specifically) has been effectively “black boxed” (Latour 1999). While we can speculate about the type and range of coded variables potentially contributing to “risk flags” generated by algorithms – flight route, payment type, passport used, country visited, and so forth (Amoore 2011) – and can also comment on outputs (in terms of embodied subjects “caught up” in predictive technologies), the “inner workings” of this processes are nonetheless largely opaque to researchers (see for example Hildebrandt and Gutwirth 2008; Leese 2014; Gillespie 2016; Introna 2016). The fact the Government of Canada can use section 15(1) of AITA to avoid releasing information regarding how PIK machines work, how CBSA databases calculate risk, which variables are held as “important” to predicting risk, which sources (or surveillance mechanisms) for data collection are employed, how predictive algorithms are coded, and so forth means that academic work on Canadian border algorithms is largely speculative.

Much research has nonetheless focused its lens on documenting the increased use of pre-emptive risk-management technologies at Canadian and other borders. Muller (2009) discusses the overarching consequences of technologization in relation to contemporary borders. As biometric passports, trusted traveller and trader programs like NEXUS and FAST, as well as RFID identification technologies increasingly became the norm, border security and migration governance simultaneously shift from being predicated on a frontline visa / passport / immigration regime towards a pre-emptive, risk-based, surveillance scheme divorced from traditional geographic sovereign limits of the state (Muller 2009:75). This, according to Muller (2009), produces a proliferation of borders to a variety of non-traditional sites (such as airline
check-in desks) enabling a pre-assessment of risk long before one crosses a physical border. Technologies such as PIKs used by CBSA are enabled by such pre-emptive technologies designed to collect and analyze risk data long in advance of physical borders. Vaughan-Williams (2010) likewise explores the simulation of contemporary borders whereby borders employ panoptic risk logics as a “biopolitical apparatus of security in its mobility and enhancement of liberal subjects’ movement” (Vaughan-Williams 2010:1078). Borders spread to a variety of non-traditional sites (away from the limits of the sovereign state) to form a continuum of surveillance designed to pre-emptively assess risk and permit circulation and flow. The subjects of contemporary border surveillance are therefore reconceived as virtual (digitized) neoliberal subjects made manageable through technologies of pre-emption, including, for instance, “algorithmic models of risk management based on the profiling of populations” (Vaughan-Williams 2010: 1080). Finally, Lalonde (2018)\textsuperscript{38} refines Vaughan-Williams’ conclusion that borders are simulated by applying pre-emptive risk logics and technologies employed by Canada Border Services Agency as evidence of simulation within societies of control (Deleuze 1992). In this sense, contemporary border security and immigration governance schemes have shifted beyond panoptic surveillance and frontline determinations to pre-emptive, control-based, digitized surveillance and pre-packaged risk-based decisions generated from databases.

Despite the importance of this research in documenting the contemporary technologization of border security and migration governance practices as well as the use of big data and algorithms in contemporary modes of securitization, prior research has largely failed to examine how this technologization is experienced and understood by the social actors who actually circulate within spaces of security. The interdisciplinary border literature typically

\textsuperscript{38} This article is reproduced as Chapter 5 “Cyborg Work: Borders as Simulation” within this thesis.
presents findings related to analyzing actual physical technologies, the analysis of policies related to technologization, and considering the human rights and privacy implications associated with the unfolding of digitized risk technologies at contemporary borders. Koslowski (2005), for example, examines the US-Canadian Smart Borders declaration post-9/11 and documents the subsequent deployment of pre-emptive border technologies at US and Canadian ports of entry. Examined technologies include the expansion of the NEXUS trusted traveller program, NEXUS RFID-enabled cards and card readers, the use of biometrics in permanent resident cards and other travel documents, enhanced sharing of advanced passenger information (API) between US and Canadian airline databases, the US advanced Container Security Initiative, the creation of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and Free and Secure Trade (FAST) to provide commercial carriers with trusted status in exchange for advanced reporting of cargo information, and so forth (Koslowski 2005). Muller (2010a) examines the development of the “biometric state” and the creation of “virtual borders” through the unfolding of biometrics and other risk-based technologies at borders. According to Muller (2010a), these technologies produce pre-emptive governance logics and contribute to the proliferation of borders into everyday life (i.e. commercial spaces such as airports). Ajana (2012) argues that pre-emptive, risk-based, biometric technologies are reconfiguring citizenship as “biometric citizenship”, which is centred simultaneously on notions of neoliberal and biological citizenship. Vaughan-Williams (2010) concludes that the “offshoring” of borders and security via pre-emptive technologies does not necessarily eradicate “commonsensical geographical notions about the location of borders” (p. 1074). Vaughan-Williams exemplifies this by exploring the UK’s configuration of the border as a “security continuum” that accommodates the continued use of the physical border as part of a continuum that also includes other enforcement locales. This
continuum and the offshoring of borders is accomplished through deploying technologies such as advanced airline passenger data reporting and policing overseas as well as biometrics (fingerprints and iris scans) used to link potential migrants to immigration and asylum databases in order to deny mobility to those who are deemed risky (Vaughan-Williams 2010).

Two recent studies have queried frontline officials on the subject of digitized risk technologies. First, in the Canadian context, Côté-Boucher (2013) briefly explores BSO perceptions related to pre-emptive technologies. Findings suggest that officers lack confidence in the terms of low-risk determinations generated by criminal, immigration, and border crossing databases (Côté-Boucher 2013:176). Accordingly:

Given the incomplete, even sometimes erroneous information contained in those databases, as well as the variety of private and public actors who contribute information to these systems with no overview process regarding their validity and up-to-date quality, officers’ caution might be well-inspired. In any case, it confirms a repeated pattern of distrust of accessible data and a preference for the use of discretion (Côté-Boucher 2013:177).

While such findings indicate BSOs distrust official databases, findings also suggest that the vast majority of officers interviewed nonetheless believed that customs and immigration databases are useful in terms of performing duties on the frontline (Côté-Boucher 2013:329). Additionally, Côté-Boucher (2013:330-332) suggests generational differences are at play in terms of officer perceptions in that more senior officers tended to see technologization as responsible for eroding officer questioning and decision-making skills at the frontline. While this research is valuable in documenting how actors responsible for unfolding mobility and security governance efforts at ports of entry perceive of technologization, such findings are inherently limited in that they privilege official knowledge while effectively ignoring non-official knowledge.

In a second recent study, Bourne, Johnson, and Lisle (2015) conducted interviews, observations, and ethnographic research with engineers and scientists responsible for developing
the EU-funded Handhold project, designed to create a handheld device for border officers in order to detect the presence of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear explosive (CBRNE) threats at the frontline. According to Bourne, Johnson, and Lisle (2015), it is impossible to understand “the operation of security technologies at the border without understanding how such devices were funded, designed, crafted, adapted, and tested before being deployed” (p. 321). Findings suggest that various assumptions are ultimately worked out in the laboratory, enrolling funders, scientists, and engineers in calibrating how devices will “give words” to CBRNE substances, and how these alerts will be presented to human border agents on the frontline (Bourne, Johnson, and Lisle 2015:321). In this sense, sovereign border decisions take place in the laboratory long in advance of the frontline, with ports of entry also reformulated as laboratories once devices are delivered (Bourne, Johnson, and Lisle 2015:322). While this study identifies knowledge-brokers functioning independent of institutional discourses, the findings nonetheless still privilege official knowledge in the form of scientists and engineers contracted by states to design frontline technologies. Absent is any consideration of non-official knowledge in terms of how travellers circulating within spaces of security experience and understand these technologies.

While aforementioned examinations of official knowledge have generated important findings in the interdisciplinary border literature, such findings are ultimately limited in that they largely ignore the perceptions of political subjects of (in)security (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016:43). By privileging institutional and elite knowledge, such research ultimately ignores forms of subjugated knowledge (Foucault 1972), the role of diverse publics in shaping the field of (in)security, and makes invisible the presence of (in)security in everyday life (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016:43). This study will therefore contrast institutional
discourses with frontline official and non-official interaction knowledge to determine how social actors who actually circulate within spaces of security understand border technologization.

**Theoretical Orientation**

Lalonde (2018) attempts to carry forward the analysis of the technologization of borders by presenting contemporary borders through the lens of Baudrillard’s (1981) concept of simulation. Simulations unfold by employing logics of control alongside abandoning distinctions between “real” and “fake” in “an operation [designed] to deter every real process by its operational double, a metastable, programmatic, perfect descriptive machine which provides all the signs of the real and short-circuits all its vicissitudes” (Baudrillard 1981:4). In other words, simulation employs the “sign” not in reference to another object, but rather as the negation or replacement of every reference (Baudrillard 1981:11). The sign ultimately replaces the “real” as its perfect copy. The use of digitized subjects within contemporary border governance technologies provides an excellent example of how simulation functions within spaces of security. Contemporary borders are simulated to the extent that the digitized subject – contained in computerized databases employed by border officers on the frontline – becomes the unit of analysis, replacing the individual, and ultimately creating an insatiable need for the metastasis of pre-emptive data collection surveillance technologies deep into social life in order to refine and test digitized subjects. Individuals exist within the simulation only insofar as their mobile bodies (Rygiel 2012:150) can be used to call forth their digitized subjects for analysis. The personal historical narrative of the individual is ultimately replaced by the construction and analysis of risk data contained within the digitized subject and stored within various databases.

39 This article is reproduced as Chapter 5 “Cyborg Work: Borders as Simulation” within this thesis.
Much evidence exists to suggest that the insatiable need for the metastasis of pre-emptive data collection has shifted border surveillance work to a variety of non-traditional sites away from ports of entry in order to produce and refine digitized subjects. Research and news media have documented the downloading of sovereign border and migration enforcement powers to: local, state/provincial, and federal policing agencies as well as intelligence services, consular and asylum authorities, and visa officers (Coleman 2007; Archibold 2010; Walsh 2014; Glouftsios 2018); private citizens through the use of toll-free confidential reporting numbers (Walsh 2014); and private industry – particularly the commercial transportation and shipping industries – through state policies and sanctions surrounding carrier liability (Walters 2006a; Walsh 2014). Anecdotal evidence suggests other institutions have also been implicated, with data collected for the purpose of border security and mobility governance originating from healthcare information (Adams and Proskow 2014; CBC News 2014; OPC 2017), registrar offices at colleges and universities (Steffenhagen 2013; Topping 2014; LeBlanc 2017), landlords (Walsh 2014), and the private banking industry (FINTRAC 2015). Additionally, various instances of pre-emptive, risk-based border governance technologies employed at ports of entry and elsewhere are identified by Lalonde (2018:1371-1374), including: CBSA policies mandating that BSOs scan all identity documents for every traveller in order to pull forth digitized subjects from databases; a range of “hits” related to digitized subjects in databases resulting in mandatory referrals of individuals and commodities to secondary inspection (i.e. intelligence lookouts, previous customs seizures, previous immigration enforcement matters, outstanding arrest warrants, stolen identity documents, and so forth); the presence of pre-determined lines of questioning designed to generate a limited range of responses from travellers; RFID machines installed at ports of entry designed to read identification documents at a distance before individuals reach officers; the
installation of Automated Border Clearance (ABC) kiosks – known elsewhere as Primary Inspection Kiosks or PIKs – at major Canadian airports, designed to process and question travellers in advance of human BSOs; and mandatory referrals to secondary inspection whenever ABC kiosks / PIKs generate referral codes after conducting risk calculations.

The aforementioned evidence collectively suggests that the BSO occupation may increasingly be considered a form of cyborg work (Bogard 1996:115) whereby perceived inefficiencies and problems associated with officer decision-making are designed out by governing officers from inside the simulation – namely by coding the simulation to produce automated responses to digitized subjects without allowing for officer discretion or interpretation. It is without doubt that the lifeworld (Habermas 1981) of border agents have been colonized by neoliberal risk-management forms of governance to such an extent that it is virtually impossible for officers to reach decisions concerning mobility and admissibility without reference to digitized subjects and databases. This article will contrast institutional discourses with frontline official and non-official interaction narrative knowledge concerning the technologization of borders in light of these recent theoretical developments in the interdisciplinary border literature.

**Methods**

The Windsor Essex-County region was selected as the primary area of study for several key reasons. First, Windsor is unique in that it is home to five ports of entry – the Ambassador Bridge, the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel, Windsor International Airport (YQG), the Detroit-Windsor Truck Ferry, and a commercial train tunnel.\(^{40}\) Second, Windsor ports of entry are among the

\(^{40}\) Canada Border Services Agency also administers two “off-site” locations in Windsor, including the Ambassador Bridge Commercial Offsite for commercial vehicle inspections, and also an inland immigration and intelligence office.
busiest along the Canada-United States border in terms of total volume. The Ambassador Bridge ranks second for total traveller volumes entering Canada and is number one for commercial vehicle volumes (CBSA 2018b). The Detroit-Windsor Tunnel is also a high-volume port of entry for automobile traffic, and directly links the downtown cores of two major North American cities – Windsor, Ontario and Detroit, Michigan. As such, the Tunnel is an important gateway for the approximately 6,700 Windsor-Essex County residents who commute across the border daily to work in Detroit (Wilhelm and Reindl 2018). The Tunnel also provides an important gateway for Windsor-Essex County residents attending cultural and sports events in Downtown Detroit and also shopping in Detroit’s suburbs. In short, the daily lives of Windsor-Essex County residents are inextricably linked to the Canada-United States border, the Windsor region itself serves as one of the highest-volume borderlands in North America, and residents frequently transit across local borders and therefore have a wealth of frontline interactions with BSOs and border technologies to draw from in participating in this study.

Semi-structured, face-to-face, in-depth interviews were conducted with two samples from the Windsor-Essex County region in order to answer five key research questions: 1) How do BSOs and members of travelling publics perceive of digitized risk technologies employed at ports of entry? 2) How do institutional discourses regarding digitized risk technologies compare to interaction narrative knowledge generated through the circulation of BSOs and publics at ports of entry? 3) To what extent can it be said that technologization contributes to the simulation of modern borders? 4) To what extent is technologization reconstituting the BSO occupation as a form of cyborg work? 5) How should the literature view border technologization through the lens

41 Windsor residents travel to Downtown Detroit so often that Windsor Transit operates a special Tunnel Bus that shuttles Canadians across the border and back throughout the day, seven days per week.
of human rights, freedoms, privacy, and so forth? All interviews were audio recorded and subsequently transcribed.

For the first sample, in-depth interviews of approximately one hour to one and a half hours in length were conducted with ten BSOs currently or formerly employed at ports of entry in Windsor. As obtaining access to BSOs was challenging, convenience sampling was employed for this study (Weiss 1994:25). Former colleagues of the researcher were interviewed first, as rapport had already been pre-established. Subsequently, this study employed chain-referral sampling to gain access to other potential participants. The chain-referral sampling technique enables the identification and tracing of social networks using a small number of initial contacts who, in turn, provide researchers with an ever expanding set of potential contacts (Spreen 1992; Thomson 1997; Kuzel 1999). In total, the researcher forwarded twenty-five invitations to participate in the research and ultimately successfully recruited ten participants – seven current BSOs, two retired officers, and one former officer now employed elsewhere. A range of questions were posed to BSOs related to the key research questions of this study, including questions related to: 1) how technologies used at the frontline influence interactions with members of the travelling public, 2) perceptions regarding which technologies are most important in performing frontline duties, and 3) the total percentage of all duties involving the use of technologies.

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42 Gaining access to BSOs was further complicated by CBSA twice refusing to assist the researcher with recruiting candidates or officially endorse the study.
43 The researcher worked as a student border services officer through the Government of Canada’s Federal Student Work Experience Program from 2008-2009.
44 It is likely that current officers were hesitant to participate in the project given CBSA did not give its formal approval for the study and given the researcher’s institutional research ethics board mandated the use of strong warnings in study recruitment letters regarding the potential career consequences associated with participating in the study.
In-depth interviews were also conducted with thirty members of the travelling public familiar with crossing the border and interacting with BSOs. The majority of interviews lasted about 30-45 minutes and were conducted in-person or via Skype. Participants had to be at least 18-years-old to participate in the study. The vast majority of participants (24) were current residents of Windsor Essex-County at the time interviews were conducted. Four additional participants were residents of other Ontario municipalities – Kitchener (2), Toronto (1), and London (1) – and two additional participants were residents of Bangkok, Thailand and Charlotte, North Carolina (respectively). The participants from Toronto, London, Bangkok, and Charlotte were all formerly long-term residents of Windsor who subsequently moved elsewhere for employment (all within the past 5 years). One Kitchener resident had not lived in Windsor, but regularly crossed borders in Windsor when visiting friends in the Windsor Essex-County region and in Michigan. The final resident of Kitchener had little experience travelling through Windsor, but had ample experience travelling through Pearson International Airport in Toronto when returning to Canada from abroad (and was referred to the researcher by another participant). Participants were again initially recruited via convenience sampling of key informants known to the researcher (including participants who cross the border daily to work in the United States). Additional participants were then recruited via chain-referral sampling generated from referrals made by initial participants. Ultimately the researcher sent thirty-three invitations to participate in the study and successfully recruited thirty participants. Questions were posed to members of travelling publics related to the key research questions of this study, including questions regarding: 1) cataloguing the range of technologies travellers believe BSOs use at ports of entry, 2) how the increased use of these technologies influences frontline
interactions travellers have with officers, and 3) membership in trusted traveller programs like NEXUS and FAST.

Each set of transcribed qualitative interview data was subsequently analyzed via a content analysis designed to identify frequently-occurring information or symbols contained in text (Neuman 2006:44). A grounded process of variable identification was employed in conducting the content analysis. This allowed the researcher to analyze a subset of interviews and identify variables emerging from the message pool (Neuendorf 2002:103). Open coding was then performed utilizing initially identified variables from the sample. Axial coding was subsequently employed to focus researcher attention on the coded themes identified from open coding (Neuman 2006:462). Finally, selective coding was employed to identify cases that were especially illustrative of identified codes (Neuman 2006:464). A grounded (or inductive) method of analysis was used to allow key codes and illustrative cases to “emerge” from the data (Strauss and Corbin 2004). This method was particularly useful to the researcher given the breadth and depth of research literature related to the aforementioned key research questions is extremely limited in nature (Neuendorf 2002:103).

Subsequent thematic analysis of interview data as well as obtained POERT training documents,\(^45\) CBSA manuals (such as The CBSA People Processing Manual and the CBSA Enforcement Manual), and agency websites and corporate documents allowed the researcher to identify key manifest (directly observable) and latent (underlying) themes from the data.

\(^45\) Documents obtained from the now-defunct Port of Entry Recruitment Training (POERT) program are still applicable for two primary reasons. Firstly, the new OITP is built on the foundation of POERT and adds the duty firearm training component on the foundation of POERT training while also incorporating applicable policy changes. Secondly, according to CBSA corporate documents, the vast majority of BSOs currently on the frontline were likely trained using iterations of the late-2000s POERT documents obtained by the researcher (CBSA 2008a, CBSA 2016a).
(Boyatzis 1998). Following Braun and Clarke’s (2006) method of thematic analysis, the researcher analyzed an initial sample of interview data and documents through the lens of aforementioned research questions in identifying primary themes. Subsequently open coding and focused coding were used to identify descriptive and analytic themes and overarching categories. Finally, a “story” of the research (related to the research questions) emerged (Broll and Huey 2015:163).

Findings

Institutional Discourses

While few details are provided in BSO training documents or CBSA manuals regarding technologization, discourses located within CBSA corporate documents reveal official agency knowledge related to increased technologization at Canadian ports of entry. Generally, discourses gleaned from corporate documents exemplify that increases in technologization and digitization are presented by the agency as: 1) improving efficiency at the border, 2) augmenting officer decision-making, and 3) enhancing security provision. For instance, in CBSA’s 2016-17 Departmental Results Report, an update is provided on progress related to the agency’s Electronic Manifest (or eManifest) program. The eManifest program is designed to simplify the process through which small- to medium-sized businesses electronically transmit pre-arrival cargo information through the Internet to CBSA as part of advanced reporting requirements (CBSA 2018a). The Departmental Results Report provides information on the intended benefits of the program:

1) Enhance CBSA’s capacity to provide a pre-arrival risk determination of goods arriving to Canada, 2) Improve the efficiency of administering pre-arrival determinations by using an improved risk assessment capability. 3) Provide the CBSA with the ability to conduct more effective enforcement activities. 4) Enable the CBSA to provide faster, more efficient frontline processing for legitimate commercial trade (CBSA 2018a).
Benefits here are couched in terms of pre-emotion, the efficiency of risk assessments, and enhancing the speed by which non-risky trade is able to transit through ports of entry. The CBSA 2017-2018 Department Plan similarly highlights CBSA innovation in producing a suite of CanBorder smartphone and tablet applications designed to allow travellers to complete declarations in advance of arriving at ports of entry:

CanBorder apps, the CBSA’s series of mobile apps, is geared towards improving border security, streamlining service, reducing border wait times and alleviating congestion for travellers entering Canada. The newest app, eDeclaration, allows travellers to complete their customs declaration in advance of arriving at the primary inspection line (PIL). Using the app will save travellers roughly 40% of the projected processing time upon arrival (CBSA 2017a:19).

Again, benefits of pre-emptive risk-based technologies are couched in terms of efficiency and border security. A privacy impact assessment performed by CBSA in 2016 on the Interactive Advanced Passenger Information (IAPI) initiative details the purposes of expanding CBSA’s Advance Passenger Information/Passenger Name Record (API/PNR) program:

The Interactive Advance Passenger Information (IAPI) initiative supports the perimeter security initiatives under the Canada–United States declaration entitled Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness (Action Plan). The Action Plan aims to, amongst other things, address threats earlier in the travel continuum, to enhance Canada’s security and to facilitate the flow of legitimate goods and people into Canada. The IAPI initiative allows the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to obtain passenger information prior to a commercial flight's departure to Canada, and provide a board/no-board message to the carrier (CBSA 2016a).

Such findings confirm results from previous research (identified above) that various pre-emptive technologies are designed to push border and mobility governance away from ports of entry in order to identify, intercept, and prevent the mobility of risks in advance of the sovereign limits of the state. Such technologies are couched as improving efficiency in terms of the flow of legitimate travel and trade at the border, which in turn allows frontline officers to focus enhanced
attention on high-risk cases. This is further enhanced by programs like NEXUS and FAST, which are designed to identify and facilitate the movement of designed low-risk travellers and traders so officers can focus increased resources on high-risk travellers (CBSA 2012).

With institutional discourses related to improving efficiency, augmenting officer decision-making, and enhancing security provision in mind, the article now turns to the results of interviews with frontline non-officials (members of travelling publics) and officials (BSOs).

**Knowledge of Members of Travelling Publics**

A content analysis of CBSA training documents, manuals, and corporate documents determined that officers employ over 30 risk-based and other technologies in addition to nearly 30 individual computerized databases on the frontline. Members of travelling publics tended to underestimate the range of technologies employed at the Canadian border. Travellers often stated in interviews that they were generally unaware of specific technologies employed by BSOs. When members of travelling publics did mention specific technologies, they usually limited discussion to one or two individual technologies, often citing objects that were overtly visible at ports of entry participants had travelled to. Travellers specifically identified: document / passport scanners, computer databases, license plate scanners, CCTV cameras, and ABC kiosks at Canadian international airports. Members of travelling publics generally articulated the perceived benefits of technologization in terms of efficiency and also more accurate decision-making by officers at primary inspection. For instance, Thomas, a 58-year-old retired auto worker and small business owner, articulated why he felt he was subject to harsher examination by border officers in his youth:

Well I think it could have been a number of things. It could have been because I was a younger person. So they assumed a lot more than what they should have – I did not have any criminal record nor have I ever had a criminal record. But I don’t think they had access to that information as quickly as they do now. So that made
them question… Because they didn’t have information and information gives you knowledge, right? So [databases] made it that much easier for them to process us.

According to Thomas, it was possible that officers harassed him in his youth given that risk technologies – in the form of criminal information databases – simply did not exist for officers to determine that he was non-risky (leading to a focus instead on his youth as a feature of risk).

Frank, a 61-year-old parts marketer for an automobile manufacturer, similarly argued that officers now ask him fewer questions than in the past because of frontline digitized risk technologies:

Well they scan your ID every time you come through, right? Whether it’s a passport, your NEXUS card, whatever. Unlike before when you held up a birth certificate or whatever… And where that helps – a lot of times you used to get questioned. And I say ‘a lot of times’ in terms of twenty or thirty years ago before they had the electronic scanning and that there, [BSOs would ask]: ‘Well how do I know how long you were away? Do you have a receipt from the hotel or anything to prove that you’ve been gone 48 hours?’ I don’t get asked anything like that right now. And I think a lot of it has to do with they’ve got your ID… I’ve heard from somebody working there [at the border] – how true it is I don’t know – but that one side actually talks to the other electronically (that might be or might not be the case). So I find it helps it to go a lot smoother going through.

In this case, Frank portrays officers in the past as essentially “stumbling in the dark” in terms of analyzing risk given the apparent lack of technological infrastructure and information sharing at the time. Officers in the present are portrayed as “illuminated” by digitized risk information generated from a variety of sources and held within accessible databases. Several participants, however, indicated that digitized risk technologies employed at the border have significant drawbacks. This generally included discussions of data errors causing travel problems, the NEXUS trusted traveler program and associated technologies being pointless or without tangible benefits, and databases and digitized risk technologies generally creating robotic (cyborg) officers.
Several participants indicated that they (or an acquaintance) had experienced delays at the border as a result of data errors contained in databases used by CBSA. Jim, a 33-year-old recent law school graduate, said he was once stopped because his NEXUS card number was flagged when a female traveller – who had (apparently) the same NEXUS card number – had recently experienced problems at the border. He said, “I don’t see how that could happen but… I was like, ‘Well, that’s obviously not me.’” The lack of common sense exercised by the officers involved in his case confused Jim. Victoria, a 30-year-old consultant in the medical marijuana industry, was actually arrested by BSOs for a mistaken outstanding warrant in the CPIC database:

[They said,] ‘You have an outstanding warrant for your arrest. We’re placing you under arrest and we’re detaining you!’ And I’m like, ‘What is happening?’… The charges were all dropped because [the police] determined it was a civil matter. But it is still on my record. It’s still on my CPIC and everything… So it pisses me off now because they’re always like, ‘Were you ever charged with a crime?’ And technically I was, right? So it just follows you for life even though I was never convicted and the charges were unfounded when you look at it from that perspective.

Despite the Canadian legal system clearing Victoria for improperly laid charges, she still experiences problems at ports of entry as a result of data points in the CPIC database indicating a prior criminal charge and issued outstanding warrant. These problems have also spilled over to Victoria’s interactions with CBSA’s equivalent in the United States – US Customs and Border Protection (US CBP) – given CBP also has access to CPIC. Other participants also indicated they have had similar data error issues with US CBP. Charles, a 30-year-old accountant, stated:

Another example I can think of is one time I was crossing and they scanned my passport… And the information that popped up on the screen indicated that I had travelled to Texas in the past two weeks. And the officer asked me how Texas was. And I said that I didn’t go to Texas. And they said, ‘Well, your passport was used to board a plane to Texas’… So he referred me to secondary. And apparently it turned out to be a false alarm that he was just misreading the system.
While Charles indicated that he normally crosses the border without being subject to examination, in this case false passport data ultimately led the officer to refer Charles to secondary inspection for an exam. The experiences of Jim, Victoria, and Charles were echoed by other participants, and points to problems associated with increased digitization of border governance efforts and associated reliance on databases to accomplish border work (Lalonde 2018). Once individuals are reconfigured as digitized subjects in databases, their digitized subjects become the unit of analysis for border officers, rendering the personal narratives and performativity of embodied subjects (travellers) effectively irrelevant (Lalonde 2018:1372).

Ultimately, this simulation of border surveillance and policing produces very few avenues for those deemed “risky” to either exit the simulation or seek judicial remedies (Lalonde 2018:1375). Victoria’s case in particular provides evidence that the technologization of borders and surveillance generally contribute to a “once a risk, always a risk” designation that ultimately irreversibly impacts the mobility rights of border subjects (with few available avenues for recourse).

When asked as part of this study about membership in the NEXUS trusted traveller program – which uses biometric and other technologies to pre-screen and designate certain travellers as “low-risk” – most members of travelling publics stated that they felt the advertised benefits of the program (namely, efficiency crossing borders) are either non-existent or irrelevant. For instance, John, a 58-year-old CEO of a local non-profit organization, indicated that rules associated with NEXUS thwart the technological benefits of the program:

I used to be a member of NEXUS years ago when I was doing more business travel. But in order to go through the NEXUS lane everybody in the car has to have a NEXUS card. And, you know, normally I’m going across with somebody else and they don’t have a NEXUS card. So I don’t have one. I didn’t renew mine.

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46 This article is reproduced as Chapter 5 “Cyborg Work: Borders as Simulation” within this thesis.
47 The researcher applied for (and received) a NEXUS membership to gain context for this study.
Sometimes there’s a long lineup [of vehicles] and it would be nice to go through the NEXUS lane, but it’s not clear to me that it’s always faster.

According to John, the exclusivity of the NEXUS program and lack of measurable benefits in terms of expedited movement across borders ultimately renders the advertised benefits of the program irrelevant. Others similarly indicated that they are usually not delayed long during questioning at ports of entry, so investing in a membership program promising less time spent at the border seems pointless. Aliya, a 29-year-old fast food restaurant manager and executive assistant at a local property management company, was asked if she would ever consider enrolling in NEXUS: “Honestly? Based on my own interactions – I don’t think so. Like, officers usually only ask, ‘How long away? Did you purchase or receive anything?’ I feel like it would be the same [with NEXUS].” Jessica, a 28-year-old nurse, similarly responded, “Well from what I understand it just helps you to get through quicker, and I always get through quick anyway – so no.” This assertion that interactions at ports of entry in the Windsor borderland are usually quick in nature was prevalent among responses by participants in the study, as was answers highlighting the associated perceived futility of the NEXUS program. Corporate documents back up the perception of members of travelling publics that increased efficiency in terms of time savings are minimal. The 2015-2016 CBSA Departmental Performance Report quotes an average time savings of just 34 seconds in NEXUS lanes versus regular primary inspection lanes (CBSA 2016c:29).

Several members of travelling publics also explained to the researcher that digitized risk technologies employed at ports of entry seems to be functioning to make social interactions with
officers increasingly robotic and less organic. This enhances theoretical claims made by Lalonde (2018) that the BSO occupation is increasingly becoming a form of cyborg work, with the lifeworld (and hence decision-making) of officers increasingly viewed through the lens of technologization, digitization, databases, and digitized subjects. In terms of illustrating the robotic nature of technologically-mediated frontline interactions with officers, participants often cited Automated Border Clearance (ABC) kiosks they have interacted with when returning to Canada at Pearson International Airport (YYZ) following overseas trips. For example, Emily, a 31-year-old grad student, documented her typical border experience arriving at YYZ from abroad:

So now, because they have the new automated system, there’s much less person-to-person interaction I find. So usually I go fill out the form, take the picture (I guess) at the end? At the beginning? Whatever. You fill out the forms on the screen and [the kiosk] prints out a number on the paper. No idea what that number means… And then you give [the paper] to an officer and they look at it and they say, ‘Ok!’ And I keep walking. And that’s pretty much the summary.

Such findings indicate that officer discretion and decision-making is increasingly being replaced by risk-based determinations generated by artificial intelligence. Other participants who have travelled through YYZ echoed the conclusion that ABC kiosks are contributing to less questioning by BSOs and fewer face-to-face interactions with human beings. Rodger, a 37-year-old pastor, documented what he perceived to be the very strange experience of interacting with ABC kiosks as forms of artificial intelligence, and the subsequent effects on frontline social interactions with BSOs:

Because our flight was late, we got in at like 5am. And I had to figure out how to plug myself into a machine where it like holds my hand and I put my passport inside of it and it starts to move. And it wasn’t working properly. And it was

48 Members of travelling publics provided these conclusions unprompted. The researcher did not pose questions about simulation or cyborg work in order to ensure that knowledge provided by travellers was strictly derived from personal experience alone (and not informed or biased by prior research findings).
49 This article is reproduced as Chapter 5 “Cyborg Work: Borders as Simulation” within this thesis.
going up and down and trying to line me up [for a picture]. And then every human interaction I had was just handing them something. I think there was another – they hand you something, then you hand that to someone else. I probably handed something to like four different people and they didn’t say a word to me… Because there’s physical interaction with the screen – it’s not just tapping the screen. There’s some kind of like intimacy that happens with the robot <laughs>. We share an embrace <laughs>… It’s like an episode of Black Mirror. So that was just disorienting not expecting it and then having to do it. And then feel like, oh, all the human people are kind of like robots too – I handed them something, they handed me back something, and it happened like four times. And then I was free to go. No words were exchanged at all.

In this sense, Rodger articulated the bizarre experience of having an intimate (and perhaps invasive) interaction with an artificial intelligence and then comparatively superficial (or non-existent) social interaction with human officers afterwards. According to Rodger, border officers seemed to solely rely on the printout generated by the kiosk, making decisions regarding admissibility strictly based on the information provided by the machine (and without posing questions and analyzing the traveller’s responses). The perception that officers are asking fewer questions as a result of digitized risk technologies was also shared by travellers who exclusively cross land borders in Windsor and therefore have never interacted with ABC kiosks. Jack, a 65-year-old retired power line technician, stated:

I think sometimes the technology circumvents what their job is. They put your name in a system, and if something happened in Detroit that night [and the suspect] had the same last name as you, they’re going to pull you over. I don’t think that’s the way the system should be run… It’s less their thoughts, and more of a database bias.

According to Jack, officers appear to be biased by information contained in databases, deferring to decisions generated by information technology rather than rendering their own determinations. Jennifer, a 58-year-old self-employed bookkeeper, contrasted her divergent experiences in terms of interacting with officers employed by Canada Border Services Agency and U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
Coming back [to Canada]? Sometimes I don’t think it’s really strict enough – like I don’t think they ask enough. Sometimes it’s just too easy. You know what I mean? You pull up, sometimes they just swipe [your passport] and say, ‘Buy anything?’ And we’re like not waiting at all. Whereas if you go over there [to the United States] they seem to interrogate you and they seem to know exactly where you live and your relationships and stuff. Where they just don’t take anything for granted. Whereas here – sometimes I just think it’s too easy to come back into the country.

These findings further suggest that officers in Canada increasingly render decisions based on determinations made by artificial intelligence (in this case, risk information generated by scanning traveller passports) rather than through questioning and interrogating travellers. In short, members of travelling publics who regularly cross borders in the Windsor-Essex County region often cited perceived deficits of border technologization - data errors; an irrelevant NEXUS trusted traveler program; and impersonal, computerized cyborg work – as outweighing any potential benefits in terms of efficiency and more accurate decision-making (i.e. the provision of security while facilitating legitimate travel and trade) that the agency asserts this digitized risk-based technology provides. While many participants reported that such technologies are potentially beneficial, those who have had direct negative experiences with the use of border technologies provide a much bleaker outlook in terms of digitization and its corporeal effects.

**Knowledge of Frontline Officers**

Border services officers participating in the study tended to reinforce the knowledge provided by members of travelling publics in relation to border technologies. BSOs also tended to underemphasize the extent of digitized risk technologies on the frontline, usually choosing to highlight a few key technologies rather than the entire range. Officers tended to discuss technologies they readily employ on a daily basis on the frontline, including the Integrated Primary Inspection Line (IPIL) system, the CPIC and US NCIC criminal databases, the FOSS
immigration database, the Cargo Management System (CMS) database, computer-generated
lookouts, and document scanners. Interestingly, several officers identified a technology not
officially mentioned in CBSA training documents or manuals – the Internet – as being highly
influential in performing frontline duties. For example, when asked which frontline technologies
he felt were most important in performing his duties, BSO 007 stated:

I would have to say access to the Internet. There’s just so much information there
that’s relevant to everything we’re doing. Whether, for example, if you’re
performing a customs inspection – the ability to verify goods, origin, price.
Particularly with people buying cars, boats – you could search those things to see:
were they for sale? Where were they for sale? Someone who’s coming back from
a road trip – you can route that out and ask: are they going through source areas?
Or does their routing even make sense? From an immigration context – social
media is all open sourced, so having that ability really opened the doors for us.

In this sense, despite the presence of over 30 CBSA and other department databases containing
official customs, immigration, criminality, and intelligence data, BSOs regularly employ an
unofficial data source – the Internet – as the most important source of intelligence data necessary
to verify declarations and perform officer duties. Particularly interesting is the fact BSOs employ
social media data in terms of immigration enforcement – a finding that should be explored in
greater detail in future interdisciplinary border research.

In terms of the pros and cons of frontline technologization, BSO 008 – a former officer of
5 years who ultimately moved on to another occupation – highlighted what he perceived to be
the benefits and drawbacks of employing digitized risk technologies on the frontline:

Well it’s helpful obviously. So when I was on primary [inspection], I could see if
someone had prior customs or immigration problems, I could see if a lookout had
been issued for the individual or the vehicle, etc. And that stuff can be really
helpful in terms of making a referral… But on the other hand, technology can be a
bit of a pain in the ass as well. Like some of the lookouts we had to respond to
were based on such shaky evidence (or no evidence at all) but we would have to
refer the person and do a search regardless… And then I also feel like some
officers relied on technology more than on their questioning in terms of primary
inspection. Like, yeah, the technology can help you. Sure. But if you’re not asking
the right questions and if you’re staring at your computer screen instead of looking inside the vehicle for indicators – well you are going to miss a lot.

In this sense, findings indicate the presence of digitized risk technologies may be a double-edged sword for officers, providing pertinent risk information during certain interactions while also providing irrelevant or misleading risk information during other interactions. These findings are contrary to official discourses that highlight the supposed consistent efficiency and intelligence benefits derived from pre-emptive risk information. Particularly, official discourses surrounding efficiently allocating human resources may be especially dubious if misleading risk information sends BSOs down “rabbit holes” that do not generate enforcement actions.

Several officers reinforced knowledge gleaned from interviews with members of travelling publics regarding digitized risk technologies potentially changing the nature of BSO work in a negative way. The majority of participants indicated that increases in technologization at the frontline has become a significant handicap for newer officers. For instance, BSO 005 stated:

And that’s why I think the [new recruits from the] OITP [Officer Induction Training Program], I think they need to shadow those of us who have been there. Those of us who have done that. You know? And I think for these guys? Technology is not helping. Because they’re relying on the technology part of the job as opposed to the actual interaction with people. They’re watching the screens looking for name hits and plate hits and whatever – they’re not looking at what’s going on in the car… And I think that’s where too much technology is not a good thing. It’s a false sense of security. Like they’re not looking at the big picture. They’re not looking at, wow, the passenger – this doesn’t look right.

These findings suggest that new recruits (as a result of their formative training) become highly reliant on database information and consider the risk information presented on their computer screens exclusively rather than gleaning information from oral questioning and visual identification of indicators. BSO 007, who has moved into an intelligence role, echoed this
response, stating that officers he speaks with in an official capacity are often unable to articulate why they released a particular traveller without citing database information:

I think technology has been a little detrimental… For example, in my line of work now away from the frontline, you might have somebody who entered the country and we may say, ‘How did this person come in?’ And you might reach out to that officer and they might say, ‘Well, you know, they didn’t flag in my system.’ So because the system didn’t flag, if there’s nothing that comes up in that standard ten or whatever amount of questions [they ask], you know, we’re not digging. And it’s very easy to become complacent. And I’ve seen it now from this end of the fence – there can be really blatant things staring at you and even the best officers are capable of letting things go. You’re just not paying attention and you’re relying on technology.

Such findings suggest that – as Côté-Boucher (2013:329-332) indicates – while officers do find risk-based technologies useful in performing their duties, BSOs nonetheless project hesitancy and skepticism toward pre-emptive, risk-based database information as well as its apparent negative effects in terms of eroding the ability of officers to make informed decisions based on asking questions and looking for indicators. Côté-Boucher (2013) suggests this bifurcation may be generated by generational differences between officers, and knowledge produced from interviews with officers above suggests that this may be true, with a noticeable divide drawn between officers with frontline experience (and originally trained under the POERT program) and rookie officers (emerging from the new OITP).

**Conclusion and Discussion**

While officers in the Windsor-Essex County region did not mention ABC kiosks – likely because these machines are not employed at ports of entry in Windsor – combined, the results of interviews with officers and members of travelling publics suggest that there is much evidence to support the conclusion that border work is increasingly reconfigured as a form of cyborg work (Bogard 1996). As CBSA continues to employ and explore the expansion of pre-emptive, risk-
based technologies catalogued by Lalonde (2018)\textsuperscript{50} and elsewhere, BSO decision-making will increasingly be mediated through the lens of databases, risk scores, lookouts, digitized subjects, and so forth. Evidence already suggests that CBSA is increasingly removing decision-making from BSO duties by reassigning such tasks to computers, machines, and databases. This has largely been accomplished by instituting mandatory referrals generated as a result of database information (i.e. intelligence lookouts, previous customs seizures, previous immigration interactions, outstanding warrants, and lost or stolen documentation alerts), referral codes generated by ABC kiosks, and computer-generated random examinations (Lalonde 2018:1373-1374). In such cases, irrespective of officer questioning and the personal narratives provided by travellers, BSOs must refer travellers for secondary inspection. Such work is also accomplished by expanding traveller enrolment in pre-emptive risk-management programs such as NEXUS. Such programs function to provide officers with tailor made decisions regarding mobility by collecting risk data (including traveller biometrics) in advance of physical borders and by designating enrolled travellers as “low-risk”. This explains the emphasis by CBSA and the Government of Canada on increasing enrolment in the NEXUS program despite its apparent lack of tangible and measurable benefits (as identified in this study). Indeed, corporate documents indicate that Trusted Traveller Programs (TTPs) like NEXUS “provides the Agency with mechanisms that allow it to address increasing traveller volumes by expediting processing of low-risk, pre-approved travellers coming to Canada, and permitting the Border Service Officers (BSOs) to focus efforts on travellers of unknown and potentially high-risk (sic)” (CBSA 2017c). The fact this increased cyborg work is readily perceived as potentially negative by both officers\footnote{\textsuperscript{50}This article is reproduced as Chapter 5 “Cyborg Work: Borders as Simulation” within this thesis.}
and travellers should be of great interest to policy-makers as plans for increased digitization and pre-emption of border surveillance and security governance forge on.

Additionally, findings in this article further suggest that contemporary border governance increasingly unfolds within the realm of simulation (Baudrillard 1981), with digitized subjects contained in databases replacing individuals as the unit of analysis for frontline officers. As the responses of both officials and non-officials demonstrate, the personal narrative and performativity of embodied subjects (travellers) crossing borders is increasingly irrelevant, with officer decision-making to release or refer the individual increasingly colonized by information about the digitized subject generated by computers, machines, and databases.

The potential dangers of the simulation of borders and the reconfiguring of the BSO occupation as a form of cyborg work are numerous. As members of travelling publics indicated, database errors have real consequences on the mobility and rights of human beings crossing borders (especially when data errors are taken as irrefutable evidence of risk by frontline officers). As border services officers indicated, digitized risk technologies may be colonizing the lifeworld of BSOs to such an extent that it is rendering officers incapable of asking questions, looking for indicators, and making informed decisions on the basis of anything other than digitized risk-management information contained in databases. The human rights and legal implications of these findings are potentially enormous and troubling. As Lalonde (2018:1375) points out, few avenues for recourse exist for individuals to challenge or reverse the riskiness portrayed (even betrayed?) by their “associated” digitized subject contained within various databases employed by BSOs. Additionally, the construction of risk in databases is anything but scientific or objective. In short, mobility is only permitted insofar as it meets the “embedded values” (Taylor 2003: 28) promoted in a simulation’s coding. As Lessig (1999) illustrates, the
code – software and hardware that serve to render cyberspace – functions to set the terms by which digitized life within cyberspace is experienced. Code is malleable for coders, and this malleability can function to change the nature of cyberspace in rendering digitized life governable (Lessig 1999:2). Accordingly, embedded values (including just what is considered ‘risky’) can possibly be adapted and changed. Our apparent inability (or unwillingness) to govern coders means that coders are ostensibly able to select values for us, speaking to the potentially undemocratic nature of governance in cyberspace (Lessig 1999:3).

In short, embedded values can be changed by database coders without judicial or legislative approval or oversight. Digitized subjects can therefore be rendered risky (and thus immobile) through processes of recoding the parameters of the simulation. The consequence to individuals is that it is virtually impossible to fully comprehend and discipline personal behaviour (as a neoliberal subject) within the rules of the “game” of security and surveillance given these rules are unpredictable, largely invisible, and can change arbitrarily and undemocratically. Rather than risk locating the truth, what is “true” becomes generated by risk, with risk being particularly vulnerable to value laden assumptions and constructions that are far from scientific or objective (Beck 1986:22–23).

While this study had limitations in that its convenience samples are not representative of the entire population of officers or members of travelling publics in the Windsor Essex-County region, and also in terms of the researcher not having direct access to analyze actual frontline interactions involving the use of digitized risk technologies occurring between social actors on the frontline, the findings nonetheless demonstrate how official and non-official frontline knowledge can be used to call into question institutional discourses generated from programs, policies, and technologies of governance employed by the state and its agencies. In conducting
in-depth interviews with travellers and BSOs in the Windsor-Essex County region, this research, despite its limitations, indicates the presence of several troubling realities in terms of border technologization within the Windsor borderland and potentially elsewhere in Canada. Particularly the benefits of technologization promulgated by the state – improved efficiency, better officer decision-making, enhanced security provision, and so forth – are questionable at best (and fictitious at worst) when considered through the lens of official and non-official interaction narrative knowledge produced via the circulation of BSOs and members of travelling publics at Windsor ports of entry.

- END OF ARTICLE -
CONCLUSION

Through contrasting institutional discourses with frontline official and non-official interaction narrative knowledge generated through perceptions of past frontline social interactions between border services officers (BSOs) and members of travelling publics circulating at ports of entry in the Windsor borderland, this thesis has accomplished the work of considering border security and mobility governance as an everyday practice (Côté-Boucher, Infantino, and Salter 2014). While the literature has expertly documented the governmentality of modern borders, its privileging of institutional forms of knowledge means findings are inherently limited in that they ignore the role of diverse publics in shaping the field of (in)security, silencing subjugated forms of knowledge, and rendering invisible the presence of (in)security in everyday life (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016:43). To this end, this thesis is unique in considering – for the first time – interaction narrative knowledge generated through the circulation of BSOs and members of travelling publics within a geographically specific borderland. This thesis is also unique in considering how interaction narrative knowledge generated from perceptions of past frontline interactions potentially challenges institutional discourses supplied by Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA). Lastly, this thesis is also unique in examining how border technologization and digitization generated through neoliberal risk-management models of governance potentially influence frontline social interactions, generate additional knowledge concerning the nature of digitized borders, and function to establish a gulf between institutional discourses and localized frontline practices.

Such research is vitally important to the interdisciplinary border literature in that previous research has remained largely silent in terms of analyzing interaction narratives generated through circulations at ports of entry given that BSOs are a difficult population to access and
recruit to studies. This can mostly be attributed to the notion that CBSA – ironically, the agency that polices Canadian borders – has erected walls between its officers and academia (as well as the Canadian media) that make it nearly impossible to access frontline official knowledge-makers. By citing CBSA Code of Conduct section 5.1 – mandating that only authorized spokespersons can issue statements or make comments about CBSA – and section 8 – complying with provisions of the Privacy Act – and by instituting draconian measures in the form of consequences for any officer who dares speak out (career consequences up to and including termination, possible conviction of an indictable offence, possible liable suit, and possible post-conviction fines and prison time), CBSA has effectively insulated itself as a bureaucracy from any sort of informed critical analysis or debate concerning the agency’s limited and carefully constructed public discourses as well as institutional knowledge. This is only further enhanced by CBSA’s ability to hide behind “national security” and “secrecy” imaginaries that essentially render the agency beyond reproach. Combined, these tactics constitute clandestine processes that – as Weber (1922) identifies – is a characteristic feature of bureaucracies generally. If the outsider can be kept in darkness in terms of the inner workings of state agencies, the outsider is therefore powerless against institutional knowledge and discourses. The outsider can only begin to speculate (using policy analysis and so forth) in attempting to critique the agency; to which the agency will inevitably always respond that the outsider is uninformed and a non-official. Institutional knowledge is protected by secrecy, which serves only to reproduce and reinforce such knowledge (by dismissing outsiders) in a never-ending spiral.

While many are quick to critique scholars conducting research on organizations that they were formerly members of, my unique position as a former student border services officer with Canada Border Services Agency (between 2008 and 2009) and my current standing as an
“outsider’s insider” (Gravelle 2014:59) provided me with an extraordinary opportunity to examine the processes previously undisclosed to travelling publics. As a former officer, I hold knowledge unique to the academic literature that informed several aspects of this thesis from key research questions, to methodology, to the wording and filing of ATIP requests with CBSA, to generating and posing interview questions, and finally in analyzing data and presenting results. My current position as an outsider’s insider presented initially as a burden to this study – I was not able to secure the level of access to CBSA and frontline social interactions that the research questions and resulting methodology demanded. Afterwards, my current position (informed by my past experiences within the agency) helped me overcome issues with lack of access (including officer recruiting problems, issues with research ethics, and the inability to perform frontline observations) and in informing subsequent methods employed. This included analyzing subjugated knowledge in the form of non-official perspectives generated through qualitative interviews with members of travelling publics. Finally, as with other policing studies conducted by former officers, my knowledge “provided [me] a greater understanding of the experiences and feelings described in the participants’ responses” (Reynolds and Hicks 2015:474). In short, in terms of analyzing secretive agencies like CBSA, the literature can only serve to benefit from research conducted by former officers and current outsider’s insiders. It is my sincere hope that with the increased emphasis on co-operative education programs – designed to place undergraduate and graduate students within government agencies and other organizations – that future master’s and PhD candidates as well as other scholars will have the courage and fortitude to use their real-world experiences as tools to generate quality research and expose secretive processes.
A number of important findings were generated from this thesis. Underlying each of these findings must be a discussion of their relationship with neoliberalism and risk-management as greater trends in governance and power. As world economic systems under liberal systems of governance shifted from Keynesian welfare models to post-Keynesian advanced liberal schemes, the subject of governance shifted from the citizen requiring protection from the state to the subject of (in)security (Rose and Miller 2008). No longer the guarantor of social and economic security, the state is reconfigured under neoliberal economics as a laissez-faire actor guaranteeing only a framework for “free” social and economic life within which autonomous actors self-govern their own destinies. Within such schemes, “insurance against the future possibilities of unemployment, ill health, old age, and the like, becomes a private obligation” (Rose and Miller 2008:214-215). Given the various threats generated as a result of modernity, risk emerges as a scientific way to manage insecurities by “knowing” the future. By collecting data through various pre-emptive methods of surveillance, information can be collected, collated, and analyzed within electronic databases and harnessed to make predictions about the future. This, in theory, allows enterprising subjects the ability to manage uncertainty and maximize their own potential as neoliberal citizens. Such risk-management logics have subsequently spread throughout private industry, government, policing agencies, and other organizations to similarly govern additional insecurities associated with modernity. Pre-emptive risk-based measures create the need for further surveillance, more data collection, and greater risk analysis in a never-ending spiral of amplification. Perfect security is simply a liberal imaginary, implying that (in)security will be the only constant (Ericson 2007). Surveillant assemblages (Haggerty and Ericson 2000) proliferate as a result throughout social life, “engulf[ing] all imaginable sources of harm” (Ericson 2007:35).
Canada Border Services Agency is not immune to these shifts in governance. As a result of the agency’s recent formation in 2004, CBSA serves as a perfect microcosm to allow a real-time analysis of shifts that have occurred over centuries in other policing agencies. In shifting from an agency focused mostly on taxation prior to the signing of NAFTA and the subsequent terror attacks of September 11, 2001 to an agency dealing in national security and intelligence, CBSA’s infancy as an agency is marked with the language of risk, prediction, pre-emption, and securitization. BSOs began focusing on matters of security related to narcotics, weapons, human trafficking, international terrorism, transnational crime, and intelligence-gathering, and officers were increasingly equipped with the associated “tools of the trade” (i.e. batons, pepper spray, handcuffs, Kevlar vests, firearms, databases, and so forth). As agency and officer mandates shifted, so too did constructions of travelling publics – from taxpayers to potential criminals, terrorists, and risks. Various governance structures and technologies of governance (officer training modules, frontline reference manuals, CBSA memoranda, federal legislation, and so forth) emerge as the primary mechanisms through which this shift is formalized and controlled on the frontline of enforcement. The “facilitation” (CBSA 2018e:8) side of border work – communication, de-escalation, community engagement, educating the public, dealing with sick or disabled travellers, and so forth) are disregarded within officer formative training and other forms of governance. They are replaced with an emphasis on securitization, with communication and social interaction on the frontline reconceptualized as tools BSOs may use in order to elicit confessions, collect intelligence, and ultimately produce enforcement actions (i.e. arrests, seizures, deportations, and so forth). This shift was found to be a systematic bias in that the “facilitation” side of border work is incompatible with (and irrelevant to) modes of governance (and associated technologies) predicated on neoliberal risk-management practices, prediction,
and pre-emption. Ports of entry thus emerge as the “wild west of frontline border security”, with all interactions between officers and travelling publics constructed as “security moments” designed to fulfill security mandates; collect intelligence; predict, intercept, and interdict threats; and control dangerous publics.

It is through shifts in mandates toward a neoliberal risk-management order that borders are reconceptualized as simulations. As digitized technologies of surveillance proliferate and spread throughout social life, databases emerge as the primary way of collating and analyzing risk information. Relatedly, individuals and groups (the subjects of governance under Keynesian models of governance) are supplanted with digitized subjects (the subject of governance under neoliberal, risk-management models of governance). Digitized subjects are generated within databases through the aggregation of bits of data (generated through the spread of surveillance throughout social life). Digitized subjects come to form “passwords” (Deleuze 1992) for the purpose of governing mobility. Passwords can be considered as clusters of bits of data that reveal, conceal, and represent nothing but that serve as signs that mark access. Such passwords are held as “dividuals” – by governance authorities – that are “more real than our real selves” (Bogard 1996:21) and are ultimately mistaken as irrefutable copies of the embodied subject (the individual) in digital form. Biopower (having power over populations and human bodies) is reformulated into “cyberpower” or “binarypower”, with modern neoliberal states governing circulation vis-à-vis the control of digitized subject mobility. Given such shifts, technologies of pre-emptive border surveillance shift from the limits of the sovereign state (i.e. physical borders and ports of entry) to an ever-increasing variety of non-governmental sites. Evidence suggests that various third-parties are established as private petty sovereigns, collecting surveillance data on behalf of the state. Various institutions have been implicated, with information culled from
healthcare data (Adams and Proskow 2014; CBC News 2014; OPC 2017), registrar offices at colleges and universities (Steffenhagen 2013; Topping 2014; LeBlanc 2017), landlords (Walsh 2014), and the private banking industry (FINTRAC 2015).

Furthermore, pre-emptive risk-management border governance technologies are employed regularly at Canadian ports of entry. Such technologies include: CBSA policies mandating that BSOs scan all identity documents for every traveller in order to pull forth digitized subjects from databases; a range of “hits” related to digitized subjects in databases resulting in mandatory referrals of individuals and commodities to secondary inspection (i.e. intelligence lookouts, previous customs seizures, previous immigration enforcement matters, outstanding arrest warrants, stolen identity documents, and so forth); the presence of pre-determined lines of questioning designed to generate a limited range of responses from travellers; RFID machines installed at ports of entry designed to read identification documents at a distance before individuals reach officers; the installation of Automated Border Clearance (ABC) kiosks at major Canadian airports, designed to process and question travellers in advance of human BSOs; and mandatory referrals to secondary inspection whenever ABC kiosks generate referral codes after conducting risk calculations. The advanced collection of surveillance data by various third-party petty sovereigns, the unfolding of various pre-emptive risk-management border governance technologies at the frontline, and the mandatory use by officers of digitized, pre-packaged, pre-analyzed, and pre-determined mobility decisions in the form of digitized subjects contained in databases collectively suggests that the BSO occupation is increasingly reconfigured as a form of “cyborg work” (Bogard 1996). Perceived inefficiencies and problems associated with officer decision-making are designed out by governing officers from inside the simulation – namely by coding databases to produce automated responses to
digitized subjects without allowing for officer discretion or interpretation. It is without doubt that the lifeworld (Habermas 1981) of BSOs has been colonized by neoliberal risk-management forms of governance to such an extent that it is virtually impossible for officers to reach decisions concerning mobility and admissibility without reference to digitized subjects and databases.

Indeed, results generated in this thesis from qualitative interviews conducted with officers and travelling publics within the Windsor borderland suggest that these developments are beyond the realm of speculation and theorizing – the slippage of CBSA and its officers into neoliberal, risk-management schemes of governance is regularly experienced, perceived, and documented through social interactions occurring at ports of entry. First, institutional discourses constructing BSOs as service providers to “clients”, professionals, and experts at managing emotions differs greatly from aforementioned formative training as well as the personal experiences described by travelling publics and BSOs. For instance, knowledge generated from interview data suggests that various BSO activities – officers not conducting full primary inspections, violating freedom of mobility Charter rights, lecturing travellers about goods purchased abroad, instances of officers not managing personal emotions and yelling at travellers (and, in one case, a refugee claimant) – are irreducible to institutional discourses regarding frontline interactions identified above. Similarly, findings in this thesis reflect findings generated by Côté-Boucher (2013) in terms of BSOs perceiving a substantial gap between the institutional discourses located in nationally-generated agency training, policies, manuals, and corporate documents, and the official frontline knowledge of officers charged with enforcing agency mandates at localized ports of entry. Such findings illustrate a need for CBSA to consider how it will address local
borderland realities and differences in terms of providing formative training designed to prepare officers for frontline work.

Additionally, knowledge generated from interviews with travelling publics and BSOs also provided real-world evidence of the increased technologization and simulation of digitized, neoliberal, risk-management borders. Travelling publics provided evidence regarding database errors, an irrelevant NEXUS trusted traveller program, and the increasingly impersonal, computerized cyborg work that seriously question institutional discourses surrounding the perceived benefits of such technologies – improved efficiency in terms of the flow of legitimate travel and trade at the border, which in turn allows frontline officers to focus enhanced attention on “high-risk” cases. Findings generated through interviews with BSOs also provided additional critiques of institutional discourses, reflecting findings generated by Côté-Boucher (2013:329-332) that officers project hesitancy and skepticism toward pre-emptive, risk-based database information as well as its apparent negative effects in terms of eroding the ability of officers to make informed decisions based on asking questions and looking for indicators.

Combined, findings related to interaction narratives and technologization generated from official knowledge provided by frontline BSOs and subjugated knowledge generated by members of travelling publics suggests a slippage between nationalized training and manuals and the local unfolding of governance practices at Windsor borderland ports of entry. When considered through the lens of risk-management schemes generated through neoliberalism, it is no wonder that such a slippage exists between institutional discourses and frontline practices. Given the increased emphasis on pre-emptively policing a public increasingly conceptualized as risky, dangerous, and threatening as well as the correlated emphasis on pre-emptive digitized technologies of surveillance, the BSO as a “service provider, professional, and emotion
manager” discourse is incompatible with (and, indeed not useful to officers in terms of) the realities of frontline mobility governance. Officers are therefore forced to develop their own collective techniques for managing various uncertainties generated by interactions occurring through the lens of digitized risk data. The “facilitation” side of border work gives way to security and intelligence-related pre-emptive forms of surveillance, data collection, and analysis toward reaching decisions regarding mobility irreducible to the efforts of BSOs. Relatedly, subjects of governance are reconfigured as digitized subjects contained within databases – pure simulations that supposedly represent (as “dividuals”) the riskiness of their referent irrefutably. While the promise of simulated borders is efficiency, significant slippage exists between discourses surrounding pre-emptive technologization generated by the state and the realities of the frontline – namely, skeptical results, greater uncertainty, and further “doubling-down” on pre-emption. BSOs – unable to “see” travellers outside of the lens of the digitized risk information they so skeptically employ, and also largely untrained in the “facilitation” side of border work – are necessarily forced to reconcile institutional discourses with the realities of localized frontline border work via collective ad hoc adaptations totally outside of lessons learned within formative training. Given this slippage, it is totally understandable why one BSO in this study stated he recommends to rookies that they: “forget all the shit they tell you in Rigaud and just listen to and watch senior officers. People in Ottawa designing federal policies haven’t even worked line / curb so they have no idea what they’re talking about.”

This vast gulf between national policy and localized frontline practice is regularly perceived by BSOs and was first reported by Côté-Boucher (2013) (and was reported again in this thesis). Furthermore, the findings generated from this thesis also indicate that the effects of this vast gulf are also perceived by travelling publics transiting across ports of entry managed by
CBSA. During the five plus years between the Côté-Boucher (2013) study and this study, Canada Border Services Agency has made little effort toward adding additional localized formative training for BSO recruits or in rectifying the aforementioned gulf. Rather, it seems CBSA is content with a “business as usual” approach in doubling-down on its national, uniform, one-size-fits-all training program administered at the CBSA College in Rigaud, Quebec. Given regional differences in the nature of social life as well as unique demographics and complexities surrounding individual ports of entry across Canada, it is doubtful that the current incarnation of the national training program captures the intricate realities of individual and geographically disparate borderlands. As such, it is also doubtful frontline officers are provided with a complete toolkit for handling the range of social realities and social interactions found at individual ports of entry, ultimately leaving it up to BSOs to learn and develop their own collective ad hoc best practices over time. Informal frontline learning strategies are questionable given identified knowledge concerning frontline abuses of power and human rights violations presented in the findings of this study. The question remains: will CBSA ever acknowledge the important work of Côté-Boucher (2013) and this thesis and revamp its training program accordingly? Given glacial adaptation over the past five years, progress seems (at best) doubtful.

In terms of the literature, this thesis has demonstrated how analyzed subjugated knowledge speaks to the reality effects of simulation – while digitized subjects may be the contemporary subjects of governance, embodied subjects (individuals) are the ones suffering the effects of neoliberal risk-management models of mobility governance. As this thesis has demonstrated, simulated surveillance and borders serve to produce and reproduce real-world human rights, mobility, and life chance consequences for living, breathing, human beings. This knowledge could not have been gleaned through analysis of institutional discourses exclusively.
It also could not have been gleaned through interviews with frontline officers exclusively. Only travelling publics as subjugated knowledge-generators – frequently ignored by border and mobility research – could serve to illuminate the tangible effects of simulated borders. Many scholars have critiqued risk knowledge as socially constructed, potentially biased, undemocratically created, and subjective in nature. Indeed, findings generated through subjugated knowledge in this study provides much support for these critiques.

Combined, interviews with officers and members of travelling publics challenge institutional discourses by identifying various dangers associated with the simulation of borders and the reconfiguring of the BSO occupation as a form of cyborg work. As members of travelling publics indicated, database errors have real consequences on the mobility and rights of human beings crossing borders (especially when data errors are taken as irrefutable evidence of risk by frontline officers). As border services officers indicated, risk-based technologies may be colonizing the lifeworld of BSOs to such an extent that they are rendering officers incapable of asking questions, looking for indicators, and making informed decisions on the basis of anything other than digitized information contained in databases. The human rights and legal implications of these findings are potentially enormous and troubling. As neoliberal risk-management technologization and surveillance expands and digitized subjects increasingly become the way decisions concerning mobility are generated and subsequently employed by BSOs, border securitization and the policing of mobility as governing practices become increasingly opaque and obscured. Accordingly, members of travelling publics and border officers are likely increasingly unaware of which specific data points coalesce to render digitized subjects “risky” and therefore immobile. Such opacity serves to maintain and reproduce bureaucratic secrecy within CBSA, where perhaps only a few select agents of the state have knowledge concerning
the “recipe of risk”. Officers and travellers are increasingly separated from corporeal social interactions and are supplanted within a digital realm of risk and decision-making that is decidedly incorporeal and abstract. The consequences in terms of mobility rights are potentially devastating. If it is true that individual narratives are increasingly replaced by risk information portrayed and betrayed by digitized subjects (pure simulations), it therefore becomes impossible for individuals to manage personal behaviour or maintain appearances in frontline border interactions given the “rules of the game” are unknown, potentially constantly shifting, and are largely unpredictable. Any attempts at self-governance are potentially futile guesses at what could or might be considered risky behaviour at any given moment in time (definitions that can readily change without notice). This futility is only further enhanced by the notion that frontline social interactions are becoming increasingly irrelevant within simulated borders, meaning much border and mobility “security work” now occurs away from borders and is therefore largely invisible and unintelligible to travelling publics and border officers. Combined, these findings suggest that the meagre rights guaranteed to members of travelling publics at ports of entry (especially those contained in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) are increasingly rendered irrelevant and non-existent in the face of pre-emptive, risk-based, and simulated mobility governance. Additionally, bureaucratic opacity and the irrelevancy of human rights within simulated border governance are only further confounded by the fact few avenues for recourse exist for individuals to challenge or reverse the riskiness portrayed by their associated digitized subjects contained within various databases employed by BSOs.

While conclusions generated in this thesis pertaining to interaction narratives, simulation, and human rights were generated in relation to CBSA and Canada exclusively, findings generated here are likely also applicable to other states also employing neoliberal risk-
management technologies of governance. Indeed, much evidence exists to suggest the United States (Amoore 2006; Epstein 2008; Muller 2010; Salter and Mutlu 2012; Popescu 2015), the European Union (Aas 2006; Broeders and Hampshire 2013), and Australian (Wilson and Weber 2012) borders are characterized by a variety of pre-emptive surveillance technologies designed to produce risk information toward governing mobility. While, undoubtedly, additional research is needed to attempt to determine whether and to what extent slippages between formative training and localized frontline practices exist in other jurisdictions beyond Canada, certainly the unfolding of risk knowledge by a variety of states around the world suggests that similar effects are also likely occurring beyond Canadian sovereign borders.

Future research should continue the work of examining non-official subjugated knowledge in terms of challenging institutional discourses surrounding security, technologization, and borders. Particularly, future studies should build on this thesis by attempting larger-scale, more representative samples of local borderland populations to glean additional important non-official knowledge. Future research could also continue this work outside of the Windsor borderland, identifying other localized realities, differences, and knowledges related to borders and state governance practices in regions across Canada. Researchers – no matter what the level of difficulty involved – should also continue to leverage contacts and lobby states to allow access to “secret” agencies and agents such as CBSA and its BSOs. Finally, much work is left to be done in terms of the technologization, digitization, and simulation of contemporary borders and border governance efforts within the context of societies of control (Deleuze 1992), risk society (Beck 1986), and the rise of network society (Castells 2003). Accordingly, key areas for future research include: 1) systematically cataloguing and critically analyzing the entire spectrum of pre-emptive, digitized, risk-based technologies
employed within contemporary logics of border governance in terms of the Canada / United States border, 2) identifying the extent to which such technologies have metastasized away from traditional sovereign border sites, and demonstrating how the “tentacles of the security state” (Fekete 2004:6) increasingly colonize the social lives of Canadians, migrants, as well as the daily operations of corporations (see O’Connor and de Lint 2009), 3) investigating how contemporary border governmentality operates within societies of control, risk society, and network society, and how this ultimately serves to impact the lives, mobility rights, and freedom of human beings as well as productivity and viability of corporations, and 4) demonstrating how the “ferocious architecture” (Muller et al. 2016: 76) of pre-emptive technologies installed and used at physical borders serves to amplify the need for data collection and continued metastasis of border surveillance.

Finally, in employing Baudrillard’s (1981) concept of simulation, this thesis moves beyond the bulk of the sociological literature that often chooses to ignore the applicability of the concept due to a host of critiques generated (now) long ago. “Forgetting Baudrillard” and simply allowing copies of Simulacra and Simulation to collect dust in the depths of stacks found in institutional libraries is not a solution to the complexities associated with reconciling his work in relation to the field of sociology. Rather, it is important for the research literature to expound on simulation, attempt to apply simulacra to contemporary social life, and consider phenomena like technologization, computerization, and digitization through this critical lens. As social processes such as policing, border security, and mobility control increasingly rely on digitized risk information generated through neoliberal models of governance, simulation emerges as a powerful way to document the extent of metastasis of surveillance deep into social life. Through such a lens, we can begin speaking of whether and to what extent our digitized selves can lay
claim to digitized rights, digitized mobilities, and digitized freedoms. Without the lens of simulation? Sociology can only analyze our social world at face value – we cannot possibly understand or begin to explain the social consequences of the binary flows circulating all around us.
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