

A Window into October:
Examining the Framing of the October Crisis of 1970 in Canada's English-Language Newspapers

by

Corah Lynn Victoria Hodgson

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AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

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ABSTRACT

Much of the historiography on the October Crisis has centred around whether the War Measures Act (WMA) represented a necessary deployment of available legislation to crush a threat to national order and security, or an unjustified assault upon civil liberties. Explorations of the media's presentation of the crisis have produced divergent conclusions, are largely quantitative rather than qualitative in nature, and do not account for regional differences in the media interpretations of the events. This study deploys a content analysis of the editorials in Canada's most widely circulated English-language newspapers in October 1970 to interrogate how they framed the crisis, evaluated how the government handled developments, and compared to other regional interpretations. Careful attention was accorded to whether the civil libertarian discourse that dominates the historiography was present in contemporary evaluations of the crisis or is a *post facto* academic construction.

This study concluded that a national discourse existed about the crisis in some respects. English-Canadian newspaper editors unanimously framed the FLQ as terrorists, fanatics, and a criminal "cancer" who threatened Canada's societal and democratic order and whose villainy was clear in their targeting of such innocent and virtuous victims. Descriptions appeared frequently of a populace fearful of the group's potential to escalate further and united in support of the government's measures. Newspapers in each region, particularly Atlantic Canada, initially framed the government as facing a dilemma in its decision of whether to capitulate to terror. The papers from Western Canada, Eastern Canada, and Montreal soon shifted to advocate firmly for a hard-line and law-and-order response to terrorism, and pledged their support for the WMA. Although these papers demonstrated some concern about civil liberties, the WMA's effectiveness, and the government's secrecy (particularly towards the end of October), they continued to endorse the emergency measures as defensible and necessary. By contrast, the *Toronto Daily Star* and *Globe and Mail* recommended the government negotiate for the victims' release and critically approached the WMA with civil liberties concerns, elucidations of the measures' dangers, and doubts which outweighed their support. An "alien conspiracy" framing was more prominent in Western and Eastern Canada than in Central Canada, where editors concentrated their attention on identifying the crisis' internal roots and offering recommendations on how they should be remedied. While anti-FLQ sentiments pervaded the nation, and pro-government and "alien conspiracy" framings formed a dominant discourse throughout much of Canada, it is clear that the historiographical debate on the WMA bore its roots in October 1970. Revealing a more complex discourse than that noted in previous studies, this finding is also significant given the media's capacity, through framing, agenda-setting, and priming, to influence popular opinion and the public's comprehension of issues and events.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BC - British Columbia

CBC - Canadian Broadcasting Corporation

CFB - Canadian Forces Base

FLQ - Front de libération du Québec

FRAP - Front d'action politique

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDP - New Democratic Party

PEI - Prince Edward Island

PFLP - Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PQ - Parti Québécois

UN - United Nations

WMA - War Measures Act

INTRODUCTION

It was hardly an exaggeration when the *Toronto Daily Star* deemed on October 16, 1970 that Canada faced “one of the worst crises” it had ever known.¹ By that time, a Quebec-based separatist group’s near decade-long spree of bombing federal targets had evolved into ghastly tactics. British trade commissioner James Cross and Quebec labour minister Pierre Laporte had been abducted, seized from their very residences, and the group claiming responsibility, the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ), taunted authorities and law enforcement officials with communiqués restating their intention to execute their hostages unless their demands were met. At the request of the provincial government, the Canadian military had descended upon Quebec. The provincial and Montreal municipal governments, anxious at the prospect of further escalations in the group’s tactics, pleaded with Pierre Trudeau’s federal Liberal government to institute the War Measures Act (WMA). Criminalizing prior or enduring involvement with the FLQ, suspending Canadians’ civil liberties and rights, and bequeathing enhanced capabilities upon law enforcement to arrest and detain, federal cabinet effected the legislation on October 16.²

Capitalizing upon the sensationalism of the happenings in Montreal, the news media across Canada reported heavily on the evolving situation, bringing the crisis and its interpretation into the homes of citizens across the country. In the decades since the crisis, a handful of scholars have interpreted this press reaction and the messages that newspapers conveyed to Canadian audiences. A more substantial focus has been devoted to nuancing the dialogue respecting whether the federal reaction to the crisis, exemplified in the invocation of the WMA, was an appropriate response to the urgent need to crush terrorist forces threatening the social and political fabric of Canadian society, or a blatant and iniquitous assault on Canadians’ civil rights and liberties. To determine whether this dialogue existed in contemporary recounts and examinations of the crisis, I conducted a content analysis of the most widely circulated English-language dailies throughout Canada, between October 5 and October 31, 1970, analyzing how they framed the developing crisis for readers.³

An examination of these newspapers reveals that readers of the twelve dailies were exposed to a national framing of the FLQ and October Crisis in several respects. From coast to coast, the vast majority of editors framed the crisis in terms which, from the crisis’ commencement, emphasized a stern, “law and

¹ “Trudeau proclaims War Measures Act: FLQ Outlawed, 238 Arrested - Raids launched in 5 cities in search for kidnapers,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 16, 1970.

² Michael D. Behiels and Matthew Hayday, “Introduction to Section 5: The FLQ Crisis,” in *Contemporary Quebec: Selected Readings & Commentaries*, ed. Michael D. Behiels and Matthew Hayday (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011), 197.

³ This segment of the introduction, with amendments, is excerpted from Corah Lynn Hodgson, “The October Crisis - Deconstructing the Narrative Presented to English Canadians Through the *Toronto Daily Star* and *The Globe and Mail* (essay, St. Jerome’s University, University of Waterloo, 2016), 2-4.

order” perspective, endorsing and defending a hard-line stance against terror. This framework affirmed the villainy and dangers of the terrorist FLQ, asserting the gravity and perils of the situation, the group’s capacity to inflict further terror, and the government’s urgent duty to crush a terrorist organization that was actively seeking to dismantle Canada’s societal and democratic institutions and structure. Appeals for political and national unity in opposition to this foe appeared with frequency throughout English Canada. Throughout October, however, the editorial staffs increasingly juxtaposed this “pro-hard-line” narrative with demands that the government exercise greater caution to avoid the increasingly conspicuous infringements of civil rights. Accompanying these concerns were demands that the federal government offer a more thorough defence or rationalization of its emergency measures, as well as an explanation of the police’s apparent failure to exercise exceptional powers with any notable or significant success. Nonetheless, most newspapers across English Canada saw these concerns as secondary to and bookended within the papers’ enduring defence of the government’s response to the crisis and implementation of the WMA. Even as concerns arose about the government’s conduct, thus framing a discourse and debate regarding the necessity and appropriateness of this exceptional measure, the papers remained firm in constructing the WMA as entirely justifiable and defensible throughout October.

This narrative framing of the crisis dominated all the papers examined with the notable exception of Ontario’s two leading publications: the *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Daily Star*. While concurring with the framing of the FLQ as a terrorist, perilous, and legitimate menace to Quebeckers, Canadians, and their societal and political foundations, the two Toronto publications were alone in initially advocating that the federal government negotiate with the FLQ. Once the government implemented the WMA and affirmed that it had no intent to pursue such a course, the *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Daily Star* only briefly and tenuously voiced their support for the measures. These expressions of support were far surpassed, in quantity and detail, by an unparalleled concern for civil liberties, emphasis on the WMA’s dangers, apparent police ineptitude, and concerted demands that the government offer more details on what justification it had for invoking the act. The Toronto publications represented the only papers to explicitly argue in opposition to authorities’ approach to the FLQ’s program of terror. In so doing, the publications demonstrate that the historiographical debate on the WMA’s necessity and effectiveness had emerged in the public discourse during the crisis itself.

This discourse occurred within the newspapers’ broader and overarching tendency to largely ignore the origins of the crisis and FLQ in terms of the economic, social, and political roots of its grievances. As such, editorials rarely offered any suggestions about how authorities could address legitimate grievances over the long-term. Instead, the editors evinced a penchant for framing the crisis as an alien conspiracy, indicative of tensions stemming from an international revolutionary and terrorist malaise, and adopting the tactics and ideologies of the foreign practitioners of that fervour. Indeed, the papers consistently

depicted a Canadian populace fervently supportive of the government's response to the crisis, appalled by the manifestation of terrorism in Canada, and of whom the FLQ was merely a fringe minority unrepresentative of the Quebec mainstream. In this respect, editors in Ontario and Quebec offered the exception. With their descriptions of the crisis as being not shocking but rather foreseeable and expected, more numerable and detailed efforts to assess the crisis' systemic roots, and greater attention to recommending long-term resolutions beyond the perpetrators' apprehension, Central Canadian editors exhibited a deeper comprehension of the crisis' origins. Even within these papers, however, the framing of the FLQ as an unrepresentative and marginal minority, and depiction of the FLQ as an entity of foreign ideology and tactics, appeared and endured.

Consequently, the controversy which continues to dominate the historiography about whether the government's hard-line response to the FLQ and its invocation of the WMA was an indefensible abrogation of civil liberties, or a justifiable and imperative attempt to squash a dangerous terrorist group, was initially presented by the nation's dominant English-language publications in October 1970. Although all Western Canadian, Eastern Canadian, and Montreal-based papers proclaimed their support for the government and WMA, each contained elements of the civil liberties discourse. The editorial tendency to frame terrorism and revolutionary violence as an international phenomenon or ailment afflicting and corrupting the previously innocent Canada further enabled this discourse. With the exception of editorials in Ontario and Quebec, English-Canadian newspaper editors accorded minimal attention to the crisis' roots or prospective long-term solutions. Hence, while Western and Eastern Canadian publications approached the crisis with comparable anti-FLQ, pro-government, pro-WMA, and alien conspiracy framings, the Montreal publications deviated from that nation-wide discourse by more broadly examining the provenance of the crisis. The Toronto publications presented the most notable divergences from this discourse in their sweeping criticism of the government and WMA, as well as their deeper reflection upon the crisis' roots.

CHAPTER I: ESTABLISHING THE FOUNDATIONS

Historiographical renderings of the October Crisis

The predominant theme in existing historiographical renderings of the October Crisis analyzes the appropriateness of the government's response to the developing situation, particularly respecting the October 16, 1970 proclamation of the War Measures Act.⁴ Historian Dominique Clément has aptly noted that invoking this act persists as “one of the most controversial human rights crises in Canadian history.”⁵ The thrust of this scholarly debate centres around the core question of whether to frame the WMA's invocation as the government's necessary resort to an accessible legislative implement in order to squash a terrorist group threatening to dismantle Quebec and Canada, or an unjustified and horrifying infringement upon civil rights and liberties.

A particularly compelling (and one of the first) explorations of this question, which elucidated the “pro-WMA” stance, originated in Gérard Pelletier's 1971 book *The October Crisis*. As the Secretary of State in Trudeau's cabinet during the crisis, Pelletier insisted that the FLQ constituted a severe disruption of and challenge to the Canadian democratic system that would topple the existent power structure unless promptly crushed. By his assessment, Canadian society bore the hallmarks of democracy and British liberalism, of a system that grants citizens the capacity to influence the government through voting and their freedoms of press, speech, and the individual. Pelletier testified that the FLQ functioned in opposition to democracy, for – as reviewer Kevin Lee Pinkoski summed – they “ignore[d] the existing political tools and f[ou]nd them useless to their goals.” It similarly opposed individual freedoms, since Felquistes' ignorance of the democratic process signalled their intent to only elevate their own liberty, and their employment of violence subjected all Canadians to potential harm. Since this violence was a “form of political protest” existing outside the legally-sanctioned means available in the Canadian system, Pelletier identified that the group had the capacity to undermine liberalism in Canada. If the FLQ were successful in doing so, Pelletier cautioned that the nation would have disintegrated into an “irrational society” in which segments of the population were consistently engaged in combat for “power, and self-affirmation” and individual citizens rendered politically powerless.⁶ As such, Pelletier maintained that the WMA constituted “the *least bad* solution” to a severe and imminent crisis that urgently required government action, and demanded a severe response given how the group's “ascending curve” of

⁴ See Behiels and Hayday, 197-201.

⁵ Dominique Clément, *Canada's Rights Revolution: Social Movements and Social Change, 1937-82* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 105.

⁶ Gérard Pelletier, *The October Crisis* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), 30-42, quoted in Kevin Lee Pinkoski, “The Historiography of the Front de Liberation du Quebec: Frameworks, ‘Identity’ and Future Study,” *Constellations* 3, no. 2 (May 2012): 196-197, <https://ejournals.library.ualberta.ca/index.php/constellations/article/viewFile/17207/13705>.

violence throughout the 1960s had produced a clear “state of emergency” and the threat of “uncontrollable civil disorder.”⁷ Acceding to the FLQ’s demands, Pelletier argued, would have only encouraged other cells and movements to assume similar violent tactics. As such, the WMA had been necessary both to prevent the “great number of conscious or unconscious FLQ sympathizers” in Quebec from being “drawn into violent action,” and in fulfillment of the government’s obligation to abide by Bourassa’s request for assistance.⁸

Dan Loomis concurred with this portrayal of the FLQ in his 1984 work *Not Much Glory: Quelling the FLQ*. By his analysis, the FLQ was “an organization which, in peace time, was dedicated to violence and the terrorist overthrow of government,” and was diametrically opposed to the continuation of “our value system, our form of democracy, our economic institutions, our social structures, our political system, and, ultimately, Canada.” He lauded Trudeau for preventing what “could have been a long and bloody [war] had it not been quenched by determined Canadian leaders [such as he] wholly prepared to meet the challenge.” Loomis identified the rallies of October 14 and 15 as indicative of the intensifying attempts of the FLQ revolutionaries “to mobilize the population,” and an inevitable prelude to the group’s pronouncement that “they had formed a *de facto* regime to replace a government that had broken down.” By Loomis’ assessment, insurrection had been unquestionably apprehended.⁹ Figures estimating the group’s total membership and sympathizers as being at least 2,000 to 3,000 Quebeckers, the FLQ’s steady escalation of activities since 1963, and its clear intent – demonstrated by the kidnappings – to follow “the pattern of Mao Tse-Tung’s revolutionary struggle” towards either an “attempted *coup de main*” or a “full-scale civil war,” had all demonstrated the crisis’ severity.¹⁰ The WMA had become necessary given that numerable intellectuals in Quebec were beginning to justify the FLQ’s tactics in light of their grievances, and that the Montreal police were “exhausted and showing signs of serious demoralization, such as engaging in wildcat strikes.” Together, these had created a situation in which the populace was losing faith in authorities’ capacity to ensure law and order, further necessitating the WMA.¹¹ Fortunately, in Loomis’s view, Lester B. Pearson and Trudeau devised appropriate means to confront the threat to democracy and “the rule of law” which the group posed as it sought to “destroy ... Canada as we know it.” He suggested that the government action had successfully “turned back and neutralized” the FLQ “in such

⁷ Gérard Pelletier, *The October Crisis*, trans. Joyce Marshall (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), 13; 15; 81; 83; 85.

⁸ Pelletier, 97; 111; 113; 115; 135.

⁹ Dan G. Loomis, *Not Much Glory: Quelling the FLQ* (Toronto: Deneau, 1984), 21; 10-11; 14; 156-157.

¹⁰ Loomis, 29; 24-25; 135.

¹¹ Loomis, 136.

a fashion that Canadian democracy was preserved,” the group effectively deconstructed, and (as H. D. Munroe reviewed) “the threat of domestic terrorism in Canada ended for good.”¹²

Historians Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, in their 1989 book *Canada Since 1945*, also justified the Trudeau government’s response. The authors referenced the government’s understanding that the FLQ possessed significant caches of dynamite and arms, provided evidence for a deteriorating will in Quebec to “resist revolutionary violence,” and refuted popular theories that the government employed the crisis as an excuse to crush the nascent separatist movement and “discredit the PQ.” Consequently, the authors suggested that “it is difficult to understand what else, legally and politically, could have been done” in the face of an incipient yet mounting terrorist threat, and when accessions would only encourage further terror and violence. The government was obligated to “uphold the law and its application,” and had a “duty to try to manage conditions, including public opinion, so that danger to the fabric of the Canadian state is avoided or repaired.” Since complying with the terrorists’ demands would thus be absurd, and constitute a complete abrogation of those responsibilities, the authors concluded that the government’s efforts to prevent the emergence of a parallel government and “put down manifestations of support for revolution and terror” was the “wise” and “proper” response.¹³

In the last two decades, some authors have continued to justify and support the government’s actions in response to a body of terrorists intent on the eradication of Canadian democracy. In 2010, William Tetley (a minister in Trudeau’s cabinet during the crisis) published *The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View*, in which he constructed the FLQ, in Pinkoski’s words, as constituting “an attack on Canadian unity.”¹⁴ Accordingly, he appraised that the government’s handling of the crisis was entirely justifiable and the most appropriate course of action available.¹⁵ Tetley defended the provincial decision to call in the army as having relieved the citizenry’s increasing anxiety and allowed the police to devote themselves purely to investigating the kidnapers, and supported the declaration of an “apprehended insurrection.” Given the evidence of an increasing possibility of insurrection, Tetley argued that not proclaiming the measures “would have been exceedingly unwise, if not dangerously irresponsible.”¹⁶ As such, Tetley devoted much of his work to justifying the invocation of the WMA. The infringements upon civil liberties were minor and nominal, Tetley intoned, and brought predominantly positive consequences in halting the FLQ’s

¹² Loomis, 167; 154; Loomis, quoted in H. D. Munroe, “The October Crisis Revisited: Counterterrorism as Strategic Choice, Political Result, and Organizational Practice,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21, no. 2 (2009): 289, doi: 10.1080/09546550902765623.

¹³ Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, *Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics and Provincialism*, revised edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 370-374.

¹⁴ Pinkoski, 198.

¹⁵ William Tetley, *The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), back cover; Marcel Martel, Review of *The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View*, by William Tetley, *Left History* 12, no. 2 (2007): 185, <http://lh.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/lh/article/viewFile/14988/14035>.

¹⁶ Tetley, back cover; 65; 79.

program of violence and demonstrations seeking to encourage violence, producing a much-needed period of calm, and encouraging the press “to act with calm and discretion for the first time.”¹⁷ Furthermore, it represented the most suitable approach given the abduction of two politicians, the federal government’s general lack of information regarding the group, the media’s contribution to heightening the tension, and the police’s need for assistance in maintaining order.¹⁸ Tetley further identified the inappropriateness of the alternative courses of action, arguing that acceding to the FLQ would have “imperiled” the entire “basis of government and justice in the province” and encouraged further terrorism, while creating a legislative alternative to the WMA or amending the Criminal Code would have required time the government did not possess.¹⁹ While “[m]ost Canadian historians cite this event as an unjustified assault on civil rights and political liberty,” a book synopsis insisted that Tetley’s work “challenges this assumption.”²⁰

Thus, there is a substantial body of historical literature that seeks to construct or frame the federal government’s response, and particularly its proclamation of the WMA, as a necessary and inherently justifiable effort to quell a prospectively destructive terrorist threat. The majority of Canadian historians have framed the October Crisis and the WMA with a divergent lens, however, opting to depict the government’s reaction as enabling the gratuitous violation of Canadian civil liberties. This viewpoint has dominated the discourse since the months immediately after the event. Indeed, in the same year as Pelletier’s defence of the government, the contributors to Abraham Rotstein’s 1971 *Power Corrupted: The October Crisis and the Repression of Quebec* were unanimous in portraying the FLQ threat in October 1970 as insufficiently acute to warrant the government’s authoritarian reaction. They further denounced Trudeau for either overreacting to the danger posed by the FLQ or manipulating the situation into a crisis to demolish the legitimate separatist spirit of the Quebec population.²¹ Pierre Vallières expanded upon this perspective in his 1977 book *The Assassination of Pierre Laporte*, in which the former FLQ theoretician posited that Trudeau’s government fabricated and orchestrated the October Crisis so that he could invoke the WMA and thereby annihilate the separatist movement and Quebec nationalism. That the Parti Québécois had achieved such success during the 1970 provincial election was, by Vallières’ theorizing, “enough ... to trigger the mobilization of the armed forces.” In the opinion of federal authorities, he alleged, the nationalist impulse among French-Canadians was a “conspiracy against

¹⁷ Tetley, 88; 91-92; 74-75; 78-79.

¹⁸ Tetley, 91-92; 74-75.

¹⁹ Tetley, 57-58; 84-86.

²⁰ Tetley, back cover.

²¹ Herbert Quinn, Review of *Power Corrupted: The October Crisis and the Repression of Quebec*, edited by Abraham Rotstein, *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 3 (September 1972): 475, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3231857?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

democracy” that necessitated crushing.²² As such, the police, military, and federal government had cooperated to “prepare” the crisis and manage its escalation, ensuring through its facilitation of the two political kidnappings that the crisis would reach sufficient height to justify the proclamation of emergency measures.²³ Indeed, the government intended to deploy the WMA as a means by which to administer a sort of “political shock treatment” to Quebeckers in order to “extract from them immediately and unequivocally a full disclosure of their long-term political objectives.”²⁴ The deployment of the armed forces into Quebec and subsequent manhunt was intended to serve “the political purpose of deterring the Québécois once and for all from aspiring ... to independence,” by “perfecting the repressive machinery across the country” and “disorganizing and dislocating as much as possible the groups promoting Quebec nationalism.”²⁵ Thus, by Vallières’ conspiratorial assessment, “[t]he October crisis was not an accident of history, but the premeditated execution of a plan whose central purpose was to wreck the hopes of the Québécois for a future as a self-governing people.”²⁶ Jean-François Cardin concurred with this theory in his 1990 book *Comprendre Octobre 1970: Le FLQ, La Crise et le Syndicalisme*. Intoning that “October 1970 provided the authorities a perfect opportunity to undertake a repression operation against the nationalist left of Quebec,” Cardin depicted the WMA as indicative of the government’s intent to reinforce the federal government’s supremacy “over a province that had become too contentious and nationalist for its taste.”²⁷

Political scientist Denis Smith’s 1971 book *Bleeding Hearts, Bleeding Country: Canada and the Quebec Crisis* had arrived at much the same judgment. He assessed that the asperity of the happenings of October 1970 did not justify Trudeau’s response, as the FLQ had simply intended to liberate their companions from prison and “test” the authorities, not provoke (as historian Herbert Quinn wrote in a review of Smith’s work) a “mass revolutionary uprising.” Condemning Bourassa’s inability to free himself from the yoke of Ottawa’s control and Trudeau’s “inflexible” federalism, Smith concluded that many of the situation’s undesirable consequences could have been prevented had the authorities exercised more restraint and intuitiveness.²⁸ Indeed, the ultimate futility and ineffectiveness of the WMA were proven in that the kidnappers were apprehended not following the “emergency police sweep” which the WMA permitted, but following weeks of “normal police activity.” Similarly, politicians’ inability from the initial days of the crisis to provide evidence sufficiently justifying their responses testified to a

²² Pierre Vallières, *The Assassination of Pierre Laporte: Behind the October '70 Scenario*, trans. Ralph Wells (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1977), 14; 55.

²³ Vallières, 17-18; 21-22.

²⁴ Vallières, 22.

²⁵ Vallières, 17; 31.

²⁶ Vallières, 173.

²⁷ Jean-François Cardin, *Comprendre Octobre 1970: Le FLQ, La Crise et le Syndicalisme* (Montreal: Éditions du Méridien, 1990), 255, quoted in Munroe, “The October Crisis Revisited,” 289-290.

²⁸ Quinn, 475-476.

decision-making process that lacked “a reasoned ... careful calculation of alternatives.”²⁹ When the government “immorally” refused to negotiate for the lives of the hostages, despite that such negotiations would have been “desirable” to protect the “sanctity of life” and liberty as the government was obligated to do, Smith identified that the two abductees ultimately became “insignificant pawns in a much broader struggle to maintain the integrity of the state.”³⁰ Their status as such was exhibited particularly in John Turner’s consistent assertion that the “erosion of public will” necessitated the WMA. Smith took significant issue with this defense, that did not describe the need for the act on the grounds of “a state of insecurity or panic,” but rather eroding confidence within the opposition parties who desired to confront the situation differently. As such, Smith identified the government’s reaction to the crisis as representing “[t]he use of emergency powers to suppress that political option ... [in] a partisan act directed against democratic opponents and the general opinion which they sought to influence. It was an act of intimidation rather than a responsible act of democratic authority.”³¹ Ultimately, the lesson Smith perceived as emerging from the imposition of this act, both in 1942 to evict Japanese Canadians and in October 1970, “was that the real danger to a democratic society when panic arises is the state’s readiness to appease that panic by disregarding civil liberties unjustly and unnecessarily.”³²

Ron Haggart and Aubrey E. Golden, in their 1979 book *Rumours of War*, suggested that the WMA facilitated “abuse[s] of government power” and “arbitrary police power” that practically translated into a situation of internment.³³ In their eyes, little evidence justified the Act’s invocation. The existing crimes and punishments under the *Criminal Code* were sufficient to prosecute the terrorists under such charges as criminal conspiracy, theft, and the possession of dynamite or illegal arms. The “principle of fresh pursuit” and the search warrant were available to the police to investigate and apprehend criminals, and the WMA failed to offer any practical power of arrest or search and seizure to which the police did not already have access. The kidnapers were eventually discovered and apprehended not as the result of the powers provided by the WMA but following “ordinary diligent and competent police work,” aided by the group’s clearly “amateur” conduct. Furthermore, FLQ terrorists were successfully prosecuted during the 1960s, and the police conducted approximately two hundred raids daily in the five days following Cross’ abduction. This high rate of police activity suggested that they did not need extraordinary means to overstep “cumbersome legal machinery” in order to function efficiently in a time of crisis.³⁴

²⁹ Denis Smith, *Bleeding Hearts...Bleeding Country: Canada in the Quebec Crisis* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1971), xiii; 4-5.

³⁰ Smith, *Bleeding Hearts...Bleeding Country: Canada in the Quebec Crisis*, 13-14; 45.

³¹ Smith, *Bleeding Hearts...Bleeding Country: Canada in the Quebec Crisis*, 145-146.

³² Smith, *Bleeding Hearts...Bleeding Country: Canada in the Quebec Crisis*, 79.

³³ Ron Haggart and Aubrey E. Golden, *Rumours of War* (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1979), 260; 263.

³⁴ Haggart and Golden, 261-263; 251-253.

Even if the police had required emergency powers to address the situation, Haggart and Golden revealed that the original legislation was created only to be utilized in “support [of] a military action, not a police action,” and “was never intended as a tool to root out criminals.”³⁵ Thus the authors discerned hidden motivations driving the implementation of the act – predominantly, that the chaos and divisions within the Quebec cabinet required a means by which “to restore political order” and address the “erosion of the public will to resist” by providing Bourassa with “a new reason not to negotiate.”³⁶ According to these authors, “[t]he inescapable conclusion is that a major intention of the Government was precisely what happened, the detention of hundreds of persons who could not be accused even of advocating the policies of the FLQ, but who certainly could be accused of opposing the Government’s policies toward the FLQ.” This resulted in mass infringements upon civil liberties, in which “persons could be detained quite literally for being in the wrong bed at the wrong time, or for having rented the wrong apartment.”³⁷ Hundreds of people were arrested not for terrorism but for possessing “wrong-headed political beliefs.” Detainees were denied legal counsel, bail, and the capacity to communicate with their families as the consequence of the invocation of an act that apparently served no practical necessity but for allowing the government to “deal a blow to the philosophy of separatism.”³⁸

Political scientist David Charters, in his 1997 analysis of the organizational structure, composition, and methods of the FLQ, assessed that the group suffered from a lacking “continuity of leadership or experience,” amateur membership, and inadequate “security and discipline” that rendered cells vulnerable to police infiltration and dismantling. Its impulsivity, resulting in premature and reckless action, faulty comprehension of “revolutionary theory,” and “lack of direction and discipline” over individual cells and members further weakened its potential. These organizational failures created a group “unable to translate their goals into the strategy, organization, action and results that would produce a successful national liberation war.”³⁹ Consequently, Charters concluded that, “[g]iven what is known now about the size and the goals of the FLQ at the time,” the government’s identification of the situation during October as an “apprehended insurrection” and subsequent invocation of the WMA “seems overblown.”⁴⁰

Dominique Clément’s “The October Crisis of 1970: Human Rights Abuses under the *War Measures Act*” mounted one of the most recent and explicit condemnations of the government reaction to the crisis. Citing the denial of due process, suspension of habeas corpus, inability of detainees to communicate with counsel or family, and unjust retroactivity of the offence, Clément highlighted the small number of

³⁵ Haggart and Golden, 101.

³⁶ Haggart and Golden, 261; 257-258.

³⁷ Haggart and Golden, 265.

³⁸ Haggart and Golden, 249; 266; 259.

³⁹ David A. Charters, “The Amateur Revolutionaries: A Reassessment of the FLQ,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 1 (March 1997): 138-140, doi: 10.1080/09546559708427393; 147.

⁴⁰ Charters, 153.

detainees actually charged with and/or convicted of an offence – of the four hundred ninety-seven people detained, merely sixty-two were charged and eighteen convicted – as evidence of the danger in granting authorities sweeping powers.⁴¹ These flagrant abuses of civil rights were not restricted to Quebec. Clément intoned that, across Canada, legal authorities placed restrictions upon the content of student newspapers and confiscated those papers that failed to comply. Media employees were fired for insubordination or dismissed for “lack of objectivity.” Furthermore, Clément asserted that the federal government consistently pressured and intimidated the news media into reporting on the crisis in particular terms, thus violating freedom of the press.⁴² Police raided an Ottawa woman’s home following her engagement in a protest against the act, and bans were proposed and effected in Toronto and British Columbia that threatened teachers who expressed “sympathy with the FLQ” with termination, further limiting their freedom of speech. The Vancouver mayor even boasted “that he would use the emergency powers to run hippies and draft dodgers out of town.”⁴³

This encroachment upon the civil liberties of Canadians was not restricted temporally to the official duration of the October Crisis. Clément observed that the escalation of the FLQ’s activity throughout the 1960s occurred in parallel with an escalation in the RCMP’s response to the group. Inserting informants into cells, conducting mass raids, and executing preventative arrests were components of the RCMP’s utilization of “extreme [and increasingly abusive] tactics in their pursuit of the FLQ.” These tactics elicited condemnation from civil rights groups who denounced the Quebec police force and RCMP for “holding people for interrogation without warrant,” forcing one individual “to incriminate himself for a series of bomb attacks,” forcibly detaining suspects for days, and utilizing raids to confiscate membership lists from separatist parties.⁴⁴ Not only did the WMA engender the violation of Canadians’ civil liberties, rights, and freedoms throughout the nation, Clément contended, but those infringements existed within the context of “[a] history of violent protest and police abuse of individual rights [that] preceded the kidnappings.”⁴⁵ Accordingly, Clément’s work contributes to a long-standing debate about whether the WMA and government response was a justified response to terrorism or an indefensible refutation of civil liberties.

⁴¹ Dominique Clément, “The October Crisis of 1970: Human Rights Abuses under the *War Measures Act*,” in *Contemporary Quebec: Selected Readings & Commentaries*, ed. Michael D. Behiels and Matthew Hayday (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011), 208-210.

⁴² Clément, “The October Crisis of 1970,” 210-211.

⁴³ Clément, “The October Crisis of 1970,” 211-212.

⁴⁴ Clément, “The October Crisis of 1970,” 205-206; 207.

⁴⁵ Clément, “The October Crisis of 1970,” 204.

The functions of the news media

An emerging body of scholarship also analyzes the role of the news media during the October Crisis. In political and societal crises, scholars have long recognized the importance of examining the media's impact on popular discourse and comprehensions of the situation.⁴⁶ In his 1922 book *Public Opinion*, journalist Walter Lippmann theorized that "the real environment" or world which people occupy and in which they live "is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance," and that humans are "not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations."⁴⁷ Consequently, humans have to reconstruct their environment "on a simpler model before we can manage with it," or develop, in essence, "a pseudo-environment" to which the individual responds with their behaviour.⁴⁸ Such a pseudo-environment, or conceptualization and mental representation of their environment, is "whatever we believe to be a true picture" and what humans thus "treat as if it were the environment itself."⁴⁹ Therefore, an individual's behaviour, actions, feelings, and thoughts are predicated, in part, "not on direct and certain knowledge, but on pictures made by himself or given to him" and how he imagines the world to which he is to respond.⁵⁰ Public opinion thus becomes definable as "[t]hose pictures which are acted upon by groups of people, or by individuals acting in the name of groups."⁵¹ Lippmann argued that an integral interpreter or intermediary in the construction of pseudo-environments and public opinion is the media and press, for "the press is the chief means of contact with the unseen environment" and offers an image to its readers "of all [of] the outer world in which we are interested."⁵²

Lippmann's understandings of the media's instrumentality in shaping individual and public conceptualizations or mental maps of the world and of environments beyond their immediate reach still resonate. Media communications scholars continue to depict the media as "*channels* through which information is transmitted and received," forums for public knowledge and engagement,⁵³ and as "intellectual windows on the world" for citizens to perceive what is happening beyond their direct experience and sight.⁵⁴ The media transforms or evolves social problems into "public issues" through

⁴⁶ This historiographical analysis is primarily – with additions and amendments – excerpted from Hodgson, 4-13.

⁴⁷ Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: Macmillan, 1922; Reprint, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991), 15; 16.

⁴⁸ Lippmann, 15; 16.

⁴⁹ Lippmann, 27; 4.

⁵⁰ Lippmann, 25; 27.

⁵¹ Lippmann, 29.

⁵² Lippmann, 320.

⁵³ Michael X. Delli Carpini, "Mediating Democratic Engagement: The Impact of Communications on Citizens' Involvement in Political and Civic Life," in *Handbook of Political Communication Research*, ed. Lynda Lee Kaid (Mahwah, NJ: LEA Publishers, 2004), 398.

⁵⁴ David H. Weaver, Doris A. Graber, Maxwell E. McCombs, and Chaim H. Eyal, *Media Agenda-Setting in a Presidential Election: Issues, Images, and Interest* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), 3.

their exposure and dissemination to the public⁵⁵ and, as one of society's primary "image-making institutions," influences how members of any given social system perceive the events and issues of their world and develop their worldviews.⁵⁶

Arthur Siegel noted in the prelude to his groundbreaking analysis of Canadian media during the October Crisis that the press serves as a key medium to integrate the citizen "into the political sphere." Through its emphasis on certain occasions and construction of those occasions through particular perspectives, "the press helps to define the political issues of the day and plays a role in fashioning the relevance of politics for the individual."⁵⁷ Since an individual's awareness of the happenings of the world is predominantly derived from the media, an editor's decision of what "news" will appear in their newspaper, and the terms in which that news is framed, have a significant influence "in shaping political reality."⁵⁸ This occurs through a process that media communications scholars have identified as "agenda-setting," which intones that the media alters citizens' political judgments by influencing the audience's assessment of an issue's importance.⁵⁹

Any discussion of agenda-setting necessarily commences with an understanding of agendas: "a general set of political controversies that will be viewed at any point in time as falling within the range of legitimate concerns meriting the attention of the polity,"⁶⁰ or "issues or events that are viewed at a point in time as ranked in a hierarchy of importance."⁶¹ As such, the media serves to inform or direct the public about which issues or events to consider and think,⁶² with the media's designation of "increased salience" to an issue shaping popular weight given to that issue.⁶³ Thus, the issues most dominant in a person's

⁵⁵ James W. Dearing and Everett M. Rogers, *Communication Concepts 6: Agenda-Setting* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996), 2.

⁵⁶ Andrew D. Cameron and John A. Hannigan, "Mass Communications in a Canadian City," in *Communications in Canadian Society*, 2nd ed., ed. Benjamin D. Singer (Vancouver: Copp Clark, 1975), 87.

⁵⁷ Arthur Siegel, "Canadian Newspaper Coverage of the FLQ Crisis: A Study on the Impact of the Press on Politics," (PhD thesis, McGill University, 1974), 2-3.

⁵⁸ Siegel, "Canadian Newspaper Coverage of the FLQ Crisis," 2-3; 4; 142.

⁵⁹ Vincent Price, David Tewksbury, and Elizabeth Powers, "Switching Trains of Thought: The Impact of News Frames on Readers' Cognitive Responses," *Communication Research* 24, no. 5 (October 1997): 485, doi: 10.1177/009365097024005002; Much of this paragraph is excerpted from Hodgson, 14.

⁶⁰ Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1983), 14.

⁶¹ James W. Dearing and Everett M. Rogers, "Agenda-Setting Research: Where Has It Been, Where Is It Going?" *Annals of the International Communication Association: Communication Yearbook 11* 11, no. 1 (1988): 556, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23808985.1988.11678708>.

⁶² Elihu Katz, "Introduction: The State of the Art," in *Public Opinion and the Communication of Consent*, ed. Theodore L. Glasser and Charles T. Salmon (New York: Guilford Press, 1995), xxii.

⁶³ Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, "The Agenda-Setting Function of the Press," in *The Emergence of American Political Issues: The Agenda-Setting Function of the Press*, ed. Donald L. Shaw and Maxwell E. McCombs (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1977), 12.

mind at a particular moment are considered reflective of those issues most dominant in the media.⁶⁴ Phrased differently, agenda-setting purports that the public learns from the media “perspectives about the relative importance and prominence [or salience] of the various elements in each day’s news,” and thus the media “direct[s] public attention to some issues and events and away from other issues and events.”⁶⁵

The media thereby influences, through its own priorities and “agenda,” public priorities and preferences.⁶⁶ Through decisions of how to display its news – and which news to display – newspapers play a fundamental role in the shaping of political reality, not merely informing readers as to the issues at hand but offering cues of the significance to accord those issues through the quantity of details offered about a story and its positioning in the newspaper.⁶⁷ In so doing, the media can influence the setting of issues upon the public’s agenda and understanding of what societal issues are most salient, facilitate the establishment of a broadly sweeping popular consensus on the concerns and interests common to the populace, and thereby influence the creation of public opinion.⁶⁸ By the same means, scholars have noted a “second-order agenda-setting” function, whereby the media can heighten public concern regarding a particular facet or element of that issue, at the expense of others, by according it particular attention.⁶⁹ Either agenda-setting function effectively “filters” or “selects” which issues and sub-issues assume a salient position on the public agenda, with high public attention to a matter helping to elevate that issue on the broader political agenda.⁷⁰

The notion of priming also reinforces that the media’s priorities subsequently influence the public’s priorities, dictating which issues citizens assess and use to judge the performance of individuals in the public arena. According to priming, the media’s dissemination and reporting of news influences “the standards by which governments, presidents, policies, and candidates for public office are judged ... [b]y

⁶⁴ Katz, xxii; Maxwell E. McCombs, “Newspapers Versus Television: Mass Communication Effects Across Time,” in *The Emergence of American Political Issues: The Agenda-Setting Function of the Press*, ed. Donald L. Shaw and Maxwell E. McCombs (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1977), 104-105; 89; 92; 96-97.

⁶⁵ Weaver et al., 5.

⁶⁶ Weaver et al., 4; Terence H. Qualter, “The Role of the Mass Media in Limiting the Public Agenda,” in *Manipulating Public Opinion: Essays on Public Opinion as a Dependent Variable*, ed. Michael Margolis and Gary A. Mauser (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1989), 142; Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media,” *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 36, no. 2 (Summer 1972): 176, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2747787>; Dearing and Rogers, “Agenda-Setting Research: Where Has It Been, Where Is It Going?,” 556.

⁶⁷ McCombs and Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media,” 176.

⁶⁸ Qualter, 140-141; Maxwell McCombs and Amy Reynolds, “News Influence on Our Pictures of the World,” in *Media Effects: Advances in Theory and Research*, 2nd ed., ed. Jennings Bryant and Dolf Zillmann (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), 1.

⁶⁹ Thomas E. Nelson, “Issue Framing,” in *The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media*, ed. Robert Y. Shapiro and Lawrence R. Jacobs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 195-196.

⁷⁰ Peter van Aelst, “Media, political agendas and public policy,” in *Handbook of Political Communication*, ed. Carsten Reinemann (Berlin: De Gruyter-Mouton, 2014), 237; See also Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); David Taras, *The Newsmakers: The Media’s Influence on Canadian Politics* (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1990), 3.

calling attention to some matters while ignoring others.”⁷¹ As such, the media compels audiences to typically evaluate public officials or policies in accordance with their performance respecting the issues which the media had made most salient at the time of judgment.⁷² In other words, when the media accords particular attention to a certain issue or domain, the public becomes increasingly primed with that issue or domain, rendering citizens more likely to consider and prioritize that issue or domain in their broader assessments of political figures.⁷³ This reflects the human tendency, when confronting a decision or issue for analysis, to rely upon such heuristics as utilizing “information that is most *accessible* in memory, information that comes to mind spontaneously and effortlessly when a judgment must be made,”⁷⁴ or – in other words – those aspects to which citizens had been primed.⁷⁵

The media’s function is not restricted to the reporting and dissemination of the happenings of the public world to the private individual. It has the capacity to direct readers and audiences to certain topics or issues that they should consider, think about, or prioritize. Bernard Cohen proclaimed in 1963 that while the media “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, ... it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think *about* the world looks different to different people, depending ... on the map that is drawn for them by writers, editors, and publishers of the papers they read.”⁷⁶ The editor, through their selection of the topics about which audiences will read, is “putting a claim on their attention, powerfully determining what they will be thinking about, and talking about.”⁷⁷

Media effects studies also theorize how the media can be remarkably influential upon how citizens perceive, interpret, and subsequently act upon world happenings, in a process which scholars call “framing.” Broadly speaking, framing entails the selection of “some aspects of a perceived reality” which, through their emphasis, “make[s] them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.”⁷⁸ A media frame, according to sociologists William Gamson and Andre Modigliani, is

⁷¹ Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, *News that Matters: Television and American Opinion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 63; See also Zhongdang Pan and Gerald M. Kosicki, “Priming and Media Impact on the Evaluations of the President’s Performance,” *Communication Research* 24, no. 1 (February 1997): 9, doi: 10.1177/009365097024001001.

⁷² Pan and Kosicki, “Priming and Media Impact on the Evaluations of the President’s Performance,” 9; 3; 22-25; Matthew Mendelsohn, “The Media’s Persuasive Effects: The Priming of Leadership in the 1988 Canadian Election,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 27, no. 1 (March 1994): 84, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423900006223>.

⁷³ Jon A. Krosnick and Donald R. Kinder, “Altering the Foundations of Support for the President Through Priming,” *The American Political Science Review* 84, no. 2 (June 1990): 497, <https://pprg.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/1990-Altering-the-Foundations-of-Support-for-the-President-Throug.pdf>.

⁷⁴ Krosnick and Kinder, 499; See also Mendelsohn, 85.

⁷⁵ Mendelsohn, 85.

⁷⁶ Cohen, 13.

⁷⁷ Cohen, 13; Much of this paragraph is excerpted from Hodgson, 14-15.

⁷⁸ Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 4 (December 1993): 52, doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x.

“a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events,” connecting them and suggesting “what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue.”⁷⁹ Accordingly, media framing entails “selecting and highlighting some features of reality while omitting others,”⁸⁰ thus emphasizing particular “aspects of a perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient in a communicating text.”⁸¹ In so doing, the media assembles “a narrative that highlights connections among them [the selected elements] to promote a particular interpretation” of the issue under discussion.⁸² This concept of framing prompted sociologist Todd Gitlin to describe the media as “not passive mirrors of the society” but “mobile spotlights” upon it, selectively highlighting certain issues or elements of an issue while ignoring others, adopting “a certain frame,” and rejecting or downplaying “material that is discrepant.”⁸³

Framing thus functions not only explicitly (by invoking a particular position upon an issue or matter)⁸⁴ but also less overtly by heightening the salience or seeming importance of particular facets of an issue or ideas about it.⁸⁵ The media’s deployment of frames thereby increases the likelihood that audiences “will perceive the information, discern meaning and thus process it, and store it in memory,” and thereafter recall it in the formulation of their own opinions or perceptions.⁸⁶ As such, frames (when deployed with success) “encourage target audiences to think, feel, and decide in a particular way,”⁸⁷ and influence the frames that readers utilize in their personal interpretations and discussions of issues and events.⁸⁸ They facilitate and aid in the construction of social reality⁸⁹ and organization of the world – for the journalists reporting, editorialists commenting, and public reading.⁹⁰ Media frames can substantively impact how audiences understand, comprehend, and feel about events,⁹¹ as well as readers’ preferences, attitudes,⁹² and subsequent behavioural decisions.⁹³

⁷⁹ William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, “The changing culture of affirmative action,” in *Research in Political Sociology - Volume 3*, ed. R. G. Braungart and M. M. Braungart (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1987), 143, quoted in Dietram A. Scheufele, “Framing as a Theory of Media Effects,” *Journal of Communication* 49, no. 1 (January 1999): 106, doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.1999.tb02784.x.

⁸⁰ Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” 53.

⁸¹ Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” 52.

⁸² Robert M. Entman, “Framing Media Power,” in *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, ed. Paul D’Angelo and Jim A. Kuypers (New York: Routledge, 2010), 336.

⁸³ Todd Gitlin, *The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making & Unmaking of the New Left* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 49.

⁸⁴ Nelson, 190-191; 195.

⁸⁵ Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” 53; Entman, “Framing media power,” 336.

⁸⁶ Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” 53.

⁸⁷ Entman, “Framing media power,” 336.

⁸⁸ Scheufele, 105; Gaye Tuchman, *Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality* (New York: The Free Press, 1978), ix; 1-2.

⁸⁹ Denis McQuail, *Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction*, 3rd ed. (London: Sage, 1994), 331.

⁹⁰ Gitlin, 7.

⁹¹ Price, Tewksbury, and Powers, 481.

Through such framing, priming, and agenda-setting effects, scholars have noted the media's potential to directly influence the political arena. Media actors can influence politicians in various ways: as citizens reliant upon the media themselves for news⁹⁴ who reference the media as an indicator of the public's thoughts on an issue;⁹⁵ for cues on the media's "attributions of responsibility;"⁹⁶ and for proposed solutions to public problems.⁹⁷ By shaping public opinion and the public agenda, and thereby influencing the political agendas and potentially policies of public figures, the media can thus possess an "agenda-building" effect.⁹⁸ This function (alongside agenda-setting, priming, and framing) gives the news media substantial power to shape and influence citizens' perspectives, discourse, thought, behaviour, and public opinion, as well as the broader social and political climate and situation.

The media in October 1970

The media's power becomes strikingly apparent when one applies this framework to the October Crisis. The Canadian press certainly informed the public about government and FLQ activities, conferred further meaning on those behaviours through editorials, and offered the public an outlet for individual citizens to articulate their own perspectives in letters to the editor.⁹⁹ Furthermore, as negotiations between

⁹² van Aelst, 235; Alexander Coppock, Emily Ekins, and David Kirby, "The Long-lasting Effects of Newspaper Op-Eds on Public Opinion," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 13 (2018): 59-87, doi: 10.1561/100.00016112.

⁹³ Shanto Iyengar, *Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 11-13.

⁹⁴ van Aelst, 234.

⁹⁵ David Protess, Fay Lomax Cook, Jack C. Doppelt, James S. Ettema, Margaret T. Gordon, Donna R. Leff, and Peter Miller, *The Journalism of Outrage: Investigative Reporting and Agenda Building in America* (New York: Guilford Press, 1991), quoted in van Aelst, 234; Martin Linsky, *How the Press Affects Federal Policy Making* (New York: Norton, 1986), quoted in Itzhak Yanovitzky, "Effects of News Coverage on Policy Attention and Actions: A Closer Look Into the Media-Policy Connection," *Communication Research* 29, no. 4 (August 2002): 422, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1953/4b22e1cc38a3b43d59e91107ba018e22cf15.pdf>.

⁹⁶ Iyengar, *Is Anyone Responsible?*, 136-140.

⁹⁷ Vincent Price and David Tewksbury, "News Values and Public Opinion: A Theoretical Account of Media Priming and Framing," in *Progress in the Communication Sciences*, Vol. 13, ed. G. A. Barnett and F. J. Boster (New York: Ablex, 1997), 204; 182-183; 198; Yanovitzky, 426.

⁹⁸ Dearing and Rogers, "Agenda-Setting Research," 556; Christiane Eilders, "The impact of editorial content on the political agenda in Germany: Theoretical assumptions and open questions regarding a neglected subject in mass communication research," *WZB Discussion Paper*, No. FS III 97-102 (1997): 8-10, <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/49825/1/246100885.pdf>. For instance, in a study of drunk driving from 1978 to 1995, communications scholar Itzhak Yanovitzky concluded that increased media coverage of the drunk-driving issue in the early 1980s "attracted greater policy attention to this issue" and compelled policy makers to produce urgent short-term resolutions. The issue's waning in the media beginning in the later 1980s similarly coincided with a shift in policy preferences to longer-term solutions, thereby suggesting the media's impact both upon "cognitive elements (policy attention) ... [and] behavioral elements (policy actions)" (Yanovitzky, 422; 423; 444-445). Martin Linsky had similarly observed that media, by collectively concentrating upon a particular issue, could impact American policymaking by elevating the sense of urgency around the matter and thereby accelerating or adjusting policymakers' timetables (Martin Linsky, *Impact: How the Press Affects Federal Policymaking* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1986), 107-112, quoted in van Aelst, 242).

⁹⁹ Christopher Hewitt, "The Dog That Didn't Bark: The Political Consequences of Separatist Violence in Quebec, 1963-70," *Conflict Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (1994): 14.

the government and FLQ faltered and the press became the “channel of communications between (1) the F.L.Q. and the authorities, (2) the F.L.Q. and the public, and (3) the authorities and the public,” the news media also served the function of “draw[ing citizens] into the crisis in an intimate matter.”¹⁰⁰ Thus, throughout the October Crisis, the media was both a mirror and a mold, not only serving to “reflect” public attitudes and impressions but to “shape” them as well.¹⁰¹

Previous scholars have incorporated an awareness of the media’s functions during the October Crisis into their analyses of various facets and complexities of the event. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, in “The Terrorists’ Best Ally: The Quebec Media Coverage of the FLQ Crisis in October 1970,” recounted the media’s instrumentality to the terrorist cause, with democratic freedoms of speech and the press permitting the group to promulgate its aims and activities to the public. Terrorist groups need publicity to convert sensational acts into front-page news, thus forcing governments to respond by publishing “their own views in order to mobilize public support for their decisions.”¹⁰² As media and communications scholar Marc Raboy interjects, much FLQ and government behaviour during the crisis was aimed at a similar objective – the manipulation of the media into “serv[ing] a political purpose.” The FLQ employed the competition for ratings between two rival radio stations in Montreal to guarantee broadcast of its communiqués and to establish initial communication links with governments and the public. Subsequently, the federal government’s invocation of the WMA may be seen as a desperate endeavour to re-establish and reassert “its control over public communications.”¹⁰³

As Ronald Crelinsten noted, the FLQ was remarkably successful in its media strategy. By utilizing the news media “as the sole channel of communication and refusing to name an intermediary” with which the government could negotiate in the early days of the crisis, “the FLQ forced the government to negotiate in public.” This solidified the group’s prominence in public awareness,¹⁰⁴ seeking to reconstruct the group as “equal partners in a political dialogue” rather than as “marginal criminals.”¹⁰⁵ Cohen-Almagor argued that particular French “organs of the media” in Quebec abused the power that this role afforded the press, prompting him to characterize the crisis’ coverage in *Le Devoir* and *Quebec-Presse* as “problematic and irresponsible.” The media exacerbated tensions by framing the FLQ in sympathetic terms, pressing the

¹⁰⁰ Siegel, “Canadian Newspaper Coverage of the FLQ Crisis,” 226.

¹⁰¹ Hewitt, 14.

¹⁰² Raphael Cohen-Almagor, “The Terrorists’ Best Ally: The Quebec Media Coverage of the FLQ Crisis in October 1970,” *Canadian Journal of Communication* 25, no. 2 (2000), <http://www.cjc-online.ca/index.php/journal/article/view/1154/1073>.

¹⁰³ Marc Raboy, *Missed Opportunities: The Story of Canada’s Broadcasting Policy* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990), 204.

¹⁰⁴ Ronald D. Crelinsten, “Power and Meaning: Terrorism as a Struggle over Access to the Communication Structure,” in *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, ed. Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart (Aberdeen: Aberdeen UP, 1987), 420-421, quoted in Charters, 153-154.

¹⁰⁵ Ronald D. Crelinsten, “The Internal Dynamics of the FLQ During the October Crisis of 1970,” in *Inside Terrorist Organizations*, ed. David C. Rapoport (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 71.

government to negotiate (and attempting to engage in negotiations themselves) as well as impeding police investigations by publishing unsubstantiated rumours, delaying receipt of communiqués, and destroying fingerprints and other forms of evidence on those communiqués through incautious handling. Cohen-Almagor thus asserted that the media's behaviour "forced the government to contemplate possible procedures for monitoring the media," and contributed to the panic that resulted in the over-arrests under the WMA.¹⁰⁶ In contrast to the French-Canadian media's tendency to voice their approval of the FLQ's separatist cause and attempt to press the government into conceding to the demands, Cohen-Almagor suggested that English-Canadian newspapers more commonly framed the crisis with "cautious approval" for the WMA. Emphasizing the need to maintain Canadian unity, these papers also highlighted American reactions to the crisis and fixated on the "manhunt for the terrorists" rather than the French-Canadian concern for "civil rights issues."¹⁰⁷

Intercultural and interlingual comparisons of how English and French-Canadian newspapers presented the crisis are increasingly common in the historiography. Guy Lachapelle, in *Claude Ryan et la violence du pouvoir*, analyzed the digression in *Le Devoir's* tone from one initially "critical of Ottawa" to one that, following the proclamation of the WMA, became critical of the infringements of civil liberties it constituted "but not in a manner that questioned the legitimacy of the Canadian or Quebec states."¹⁰⁸ In one of the most exhaustive and renowned investigations of the media response to the crisis, Arthur Siegel noted that themes of law and order, the invocation of the WMA, and the progress of negotiations were all prevalent in newspapers across Canada. Similarly frequent were the themes relating to international responses to the happenstances, the crisis as a situation foreign to Canada yet indicative of a larger worldwide trend of terrorist revolutionary movements, the need for Canadian unity, and how the crisis affected the Canadian political system.¹⁰⁹ Although Siegel observed that French and English newspapers accorded relatively equivalent proportions of their publications to reporting and commenting upon the developing crisis,¹¹⁰ he noted significant disparities in how each framed the crisis. French papers showed a greater concern for exploring the reactions of international dignitaries and press, and greater resentment at the intrusion of external governments and authorities into what they perceived as a local matter. English dailies placed greater emphasis on the manhunt for the kidnappers and reprinted coverage from both English and French newspapers, while French-language dailies were more concerned with the maintenance of citizens' civil rights and tended to only reprint commentaries from other French

¹⁰⁶ Cohen-Almagor.

¹⁰⁷ Cohen-Almagor.

¹⁰⁸ Behiels and Hayday, 200-201.

¹⁰⁹ Siegel, "Canadian Newspaper Coverage of the FLQ Crisis," 65-66; 51.

¹¹⁰ Siegel, "Canadian Newspaper Coverage of the FLQ Crisis," 72-73.

newspapers.¹¹¹ Compared to the French dailies, the English newspapers provided less coverage of protests against the government's response, more overt and unqualified hostility to the FLQ and terrorism, and a far less unanimous approach to negotiations than the wide support evidenced in the French newspapers.¹¹²

English-Canadian dailies also reported more extensively on the activities and opinions of the authorities in Toronto and Ottawa than the French-Canadian papers, whose predominant focus was upon the opinions of notable Quebec personalities.¹¹³ Placing greater emphasis on the preservation of national unity as opposed to the "regional perspective" adopted in French papers, English papers prioritized the need for law and order and pursuit of the kidnappers in contrast to the urgings for a negotiated settlement trumpeted by some French papers in Quebec. The English papers' concern with American perceptions of the crisis contrasted with French papers' higher interest in European responses to the crisis, and the English interest in the national economic implications of the crisis differed from the French propensity to draw attention to the "historic and contemporary economic and social injustices experienced by French Canadians."¹¹⁴ In short, Siegel assessed that the French and English dailies differed in their framing of the crisis in every theme under consideration with the exception of concern for the hostages' well-being, upon which there was a national consensus.¹¹⁵

Historian Christopher Hewitt concurred with these findings, noting that English papers throughout Canada tended to depict the FLQ unfavourably. They offered consistent support for the government's uncompromising attitude towards the FLQ, particularly after Laporte's murder, at which time initial concerns regarding the infringement of civil rights faded. In contrast, French publications were conspicuously divided, with *La Presse* displaying a persistently "hardline stand" against the FLQ and the possibility of the government capitulating to blackmail. By comparison, *Le Devoir's* initial support for negotiating with the terrorists evolved after Laporte's death into a horrified admission of the need to implement extraordinary measures, and *Quebec-Presse* insisted throughout the crisis that the FLQ was accurate in their categorization of Quebec society and its violence justified.¹¹⁶

Gérard Pierre Holdrinet's extensive study into differing editorial reactions to the crisis concluded that "the single greatest determinant of how a newspaper reacted ... to the crisis was geographical location."¹¹⁷ He found that while Quebec and Ontario newspapers concentrated on the apparent need to address the crisis' root causes through social reform and the peril of over-reaction on behalf of the authorities, thus

¹¹¹ Siegel, "Canadian Newspaper Coverage of the FLQ Crisis," 80-83.

¹¹² Siegel, "Canadian Newspaper Coverage of the FLQ Crisis," 83-84; 90-92; 94.

¹¹³ Siegel, "Canadian Newspaper Coverage of the FLQ Crisis," 85-87; 89-91.

¹¹⁴ Siegel, "Canadian Newspaper Coverage of the FLQ Crisis," 95-97; 234-235.

¹¹⁵ Siegel, "Canadian Newspaper Coverage of the FLQ Crisis," 230.

¹¹⁶ Hewitt, 15-16.

¹¹⁷ Gérard Pierre Holdrinet, "Editorial Reactions of Ten Canadian Dailies to the FLQ Crisis of 1970," (M.A. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1971), ii; 3.

displaying a liberal approach to the crisis, newspapers from other provinces evidenced a greater emphasis on “the need for law and order.” French-language newspapers tended to include more editorial comments on developments, particularly after Laporte was kidnapped, while English papers increased the frequency and depth of their editorial analyses only after the federal government invoked the WMA. Originally demanding that law and order prevail, these editorials “de-emphasized that issue” with the proclamation of the emergency measures.¹¹⁸ Noting that French papers evidenced a greater concern for the social impacts of the crisis and minor indignation at federal involvement in a provincial affair, he concluded that English papers showed a greater tendency to highlight the insufficiency of the Trudeau government’s publicly proclaimed causes for instituting the WMA.¹¹⁹ Holdrinet also observed that Laporte’s abduction generally prompted shifts in how the media portrayed the crisis. The most pronounced shifts were in *La Presse*, *Le Devoir*, and the *Globe and Mail*, which all “de-emphasize[d] the need for law and order” and became “more preoccupied with the possibilities of excessive reaction by the authorities.” In contrast, the other newspapers that he analyzed almost unanimously emphasized law and order while downplaying the “need for social reform and ... concern for the safety of the kidnap victims.”¹²⁰ After the invocation of the WMA, Holdrinet observed that most papers showed heightened concern about risks that the government might respond excessively.¹²¹

Lori Fitch’s comparison of the *Toronto Daily Star* and *La Presse* contests most of these previous findings. She revealed that the Toronto newspaper placed a surprisingly large emphasis on the transgression of civil liberties, importance of “political freedom,” and concern for the hostages’ lives through consistent reporting on and encouragement of the progress of the negotiations. Meanwhile, she suggested that the Montreal paper adopted an unexpectedly conservative leaning by reiterating the need to heed the “democratic social contract,” advocating for political change through elected representatives, and emphasizing the manhunt for the terrorists. *La Presse* further “stressed the importance of the protection of the majority, even if it meant the temporary suspension of individual liberties,” and subsequently offered broad support for the decisions to call in the army and invoke the WMA.¹²²

The handful of studies that have critically examined the news media’s construction of the October Crisis of 1970 have yielded divergent findings, and largely have consisted of quantitative rather than qualitative analyses. Most studies to date have focused on contrasting English-language and French-language media approaches to and depictions of the crisis, without any substantial or prolonged

¹¹⁸ Holdrinet, ii-iii; 44-45; 53-57.

¹¹⁹ Holdrinet, 38-39; 41; 49.

¹²⁰ Holdrinet, 44-45.

¹²¹ Holdrinet, 56-57.

¹²² Lori Fitch, “Newspaper Coverage of the FLQ Crisis by *La Presse* and the *Toronto Daily Star*,” (M.A. thesis, Université du Québec, 1997), 71-72; 98-100. Much of this “The media in October 1970” section is drawn, with amendments and additions, from Hodgson, 15-21.

interrogation or exploration of regional differences *within* linguistic groupings. As such, the extent to which English-language newspapers showed any regional variation in their coverage of the crisis, or whether there existed any significant differentiation in coverage within such regional classifications, remains relatively unexplored.

The current study and its methodology

This thesis seeks to interrogate and ascertain how the most prominent and widely circulated English-language daily newspapers prevailed upon English-Canadians, from coast to coast, to perceive and comprehend the October Crisis. I accord particular attention to discerning the extent to which readers between provinces and regions received divergent interpretations and analyses of the crisis, drawing particularly from the theory of framing to investigate which facets of the October Crisis received heightened coverage in the press, how those sub-issues were discussed, and which elements were ignored. How did the nation's most dominant publications present and frame the crisis, the FLQ, and the governmental response for English-Canadian readers? What themes in, facets of, approaches to, and stances upon the crisis did the publications privilege or emphasize in their editorials? Which received little attention, and what impression of the governments and FLQ did these paint for readers? To what extent, and to what forces, did the publications seek to accredit responsibility for escalation in tensions during the crisis? What resolutions – if any – did they identify as necessary? What were the newspapers' initial responses to the abduction of James Cross? Did, and if so how did, that construction, interpretation, and framing of events shift with Pierre Laporte's abduction, the deployment of the Canadian Forces into Ottawa and Quebec to facilitate the maintenance of law and order, the invocation of the War Measures Act, and the revelation of Laporte's murder? As it became apparent that the provincial and federal governments were assuming a hard-line, law-and-order stance to face the emergent terrorist threat, did publications endorse or decry that stand, and on what basis? When media outlets reflected upon the proclamation of the WMA, did their coverage of the emergency measures concentrate upon the abrogation of civil rights it enabled, or were the measures more predominantly constructed as a necessary response to quell and crush a terrorist threat? Ultimately, how do the narratives emerging in the papers compare to those emphasized by historians in their renderings of the crisis? Was the civil libertarian emphasis present in contemporary depictions of the crisis, or was it a *post facto* construction by historians temporally divorced from developments in October 1970?

In seeking the answers to these questions, my examination deploys a content analysis of the most widely circulated English-Canadian dailies, investigating the material with a framing-oriented lens. This predominantly qualitative approach is supplemented with informal quantitative analyses of the themes arising in excerpts under examination, facilitating an assessment of the relative prominence of particular

themes and any regional variation in that prominence. The newspapers were selected on the basis of the *1970 Ayer Directory of Newspapers, Magazines, and Trade Publications* (as well as the 1972 edition), using their details about “the average net paid circulation per issue [of each publication] (after deducting all left-over, unsold, returned, file, sample, exchange, or advertisers’ copies, and special editions).”¹²³ From these statistics, I selected the most broadly circulated English-language daily from each province, with the top two publications selected from Ontario and Quebec by virtue of those publications also representing several of the highest overall circulations nation-wide.

The following publications comprise the foundations of this analysis, and enable an exploration of the interpretations of the crisis most dominantly presented to Canadians across the country. Western Canada is represented by the *Vancouver Sun* (published all evenings but Sunday, with an average circulation of 254,033 in 1968 and 225,146 in 1971),¹²⁴ the *Edmonton Journal* (published all evenings but Sunday, with a circulation of 145,682 in 1968 and 152,534 in 1971),¹²⁵ the *Regina Leader-Post* (published all evenings but Sunday, with a circulation of 60,369 in 1968 and a circulation of 62,133 in 1971),¹²⁶ and the *Winnipeg Free Press* (published all evenings but Sunday, with a circulation of 131,919 in 1968 and 130,835 in 1971).¹²⁷ Selected from Central Canada were the *Toronto Daily Star* (published all evenings but Sunday, with a weekday circulation of 371,955 and Saturday circulation of 462,950 in 1968, and weekday circulation of 374,720 and Saturday circulation of 491,310 in 1971),¹²⁸ the *Globe and Mail* (published all mornings but Sunday, with a weekday circulation of 255,751 and Saturday circulation of 255,647 in 1968, and a weekday circulation of 263,622 and Saturday circulation of 263,626 in 1971),¹²⁹ the *Montreal*

¹²³ Ayer Press, *1970 Ayer Directory: Newspapers, Magazines and Trade Publications*, ed. Leonard Bray (Philadelphia: N. W. Ayer & Son, Incorporated, 1970), vii; Ayer Press, *1972 Ayer Directory of Publications* (Philadelphia: N. W. Ayer & Son, Incorporated, 1972), 4. While the 1970 Directory drew its statistics of circulation from 1968 reports, the 1971 Directory also compiled its statistics from 1968 circulation period reports (Ayer Press, *1971 Ayer Directory: Newspapers, Magazines and Trade Publications* (Philadelphia: N. W. Ayer & Son, Incorporated, 1971), v) and the 1972 Directory’s figures were compiled from 1971 reports (Ayer Press, *1972 Ayer Directory of Publications*, 4). Although there is a lack of circulation statistics from 1970 specifically, the 1968 and 1971 report figures were unanimous in their identification of the provinces’ and nation’s most widely circulated papers, and thus the source base was selected upon a consultation of both.

¹²⁴ Ayer Press, *1970 Ayer Directory*, 1184; Ayer Press, *1972 Ayer Directory of Publications*, 868.

¹²⁵ Ayer Press, *1970 Ayer Directory*, 1171; Ayer Press, *1972 Ayer Directory of Publications*, 860.

¹²⁶ Ayer Press, *1970 Ayer Directory*, 1270; Ayer Press, *1972 Ayer Directory of Publications*, 925.

¹²⁷ Ayer Press, *1970 Ayer Directory*, 1191; Ayer Press, *1972 Ayer Directory of Publications*, 873. All the aforementioned circulations were premised upon the average from the six-month period preceding September 30, 1968 or 1971, according to the newspaper publishers’ Audit Bureau of Circulations statements (Ayer Press, *1970 Ayer Directory*, vii; 1184; 1171; 1270; 1191; Ayer Press, *1972 Ayer Directory of Publications*, 4; 868; 860; 925; 873.

¹²⁸ Ayer Press, *1970 Ayer Directory*, 1236; Ayer Press, *1972 Ayer Directory of Publications*, 903.

¹²⁹ Ayer Press, *1970 Ayer Directory*, 1232; Ayer Press, *1972 Ayer Directory of Publications*, 900. The circulation statistics for both Toronto publications for 1968 were comprised of the average from the three-month period prior to March 31, and the three months preceding June 30, based upon the publishers’ Audit Bureau of Circulations statements (Ayer Press, *1970 Ayer Directory*, vii; 1232; 1236). The circulation of both Toronto papers for 1971 were

Star (published all evenings but Sunday, with a weekday circulation of 182,592 and Saturday circulation of 210,126 in 1968, and a weekday circulation of 179,266 and Saturday circulation of 209,112 in 1971),¹³⁰ and the *Montreal Gazette* (published all mornings but Sunday, with a circulation of 132,738 in 1968 and 135,323 in 1971).¹³¹ From Eastern Canada, the newspapers analyzed were the *Saint John Telegraph-Journal* (published all mornings but Sunday, with a circulation of 28,684 in 1968 and 29,640 in 1971),¹³² *Saint John's Evening Telegram* (published all evenings but Saturday and Sunday, with a weekday circulation of 24,271 in 1968 and weekend circulation of 45,339, and a weekday circulation of 26,296 and weekend circulation of 48,320 in 1971),¹³³ *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* (published all mornings but Sunday, with a circulation of 69,481 in 1968 and 66,773 in 1971),¹³⁴ and the *Charlottetown Guardian* (published all mornings but Sunday, with a circulation of 16,356 in 1968 and 16,381 in 1971).¹³⁵ The selection of the aforementioned publications enables an examination and consideration of the nation's most widely circulated newspapers, the most broadly circulated dailies of each province and region, and, subsequently, the most extensively-circulated interpretations and framings of the October Crisis of 1970.

It is imperative to contextualize a study of the media's rendering of a particular crisis in terms of the media's prominence within the community in question, at the time under consideration. Nation-wide statistics compiled in surrounding years suggest that Canadians in October 1970 would have widely and rapidly consulted newspapers for updates on and interpretations of the crisis' developments.¹³⁶ Media

premised upon the average from the six-month period preceding September 30, according to the newspaper publishers' Audit Bureau of Circulations statements (Ayer Press, 1972 *Ayer Directory of Publications*, 4; 903; 900).

¹³⁰ Ayer Press, 1970 *Ayer Directory*, 1256; Ayer Press, 1972 *Ayer Directory of Publications*, 916.

¹³¹ Ayer Press, 1970 *Ayer Directory*, 1252; Ayer Press, 1972 *Ayer Directory of Publications*, 913. The circulations of both Montreal papers were premised upon the average from the six-month period preceding September 30, according to the newspaper publishers' Audit Bureau of Circulations statements (Ayer Press, 1970 *Ayer Directory*, vii; 1256; 1252; Ayer Press, 1972 *Ayer Directory of Publications*, 4; 916; 913).

¹³² Ayer Press, 1970 *Ayer Directory*, 1195; Ayer Press, 1972 *Ayer Directory of Publications*, 876.

¹³³ Ayer Press, 1970 *Ayer Directory*, 1197; Ayer Press, 1972 *Ayer Directory of Publications*, 877.

¹³⁴ Ayer Press, 1970 *Ayer Directory*, 1199; Ayer Press, 1972 *Ayer Directory of Publications*, 879.

¹³⁵ Ayer Press, 1970 *Ayer Directory*, 1241; Ayer Press, 1972 *Ayer Directory of Publications*, 906. All the aforementioned circulations were premised upon the average from the six-month period preceding September 30, according to the newspaper publishers' Audit Bureau of Circulations statements (Ayer Press, 1970 *Ayer Directory*, vii; 1195; 1197; 1199; 1241; Ayer Press, 1972 *Ayer Directory of Publications*, 4; 876; 877; 879; 906). Notably absent, of course, from the source base for this examination are any publications from Canada's Northern region, comprised then of the Yukon and Northwest Territories. These publications are excerpted in the current study due to their minimal circulation at the time, particularly in comparison to the other publications from Southern Canada under analysis. Indeed, the highest-circulated publication, and only daily, in the Yukon was the *Yukon News*, with a reported circulation of 4,381 in 1968 (Ayer Press, 1970 *Ayer Directory*, 1274) and no recorded circulation in 1971 (Ayer Press, 1972 *Ayer Directory of Publications*, 929). There was no daily-published newspaper in the Northwest Territories at the time, with the broadest-circulated newspaper being the *Yellowknife News of the North*, which published on Thursdays with a circulation of 2,450 in 1968 (Ayer Press, 1970 *Ayer Directory*, 1275) and 4,000 in 1971 (Ayer Press, 1972 *Ayer Directory of Publications*, 928).

¹³⁶ Leonard Kubas and the Communications Research Center, *Newspapers and their Readers - Volume I, Research Publications: Royal Commission on Newspapers* (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, Supply and Services Canada, 1981), ix, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/bcp-pco/Z1-1980-1-41-1-eng.pdf; 4.

communications scholars have widely concluded that the newspaper readership, per Canadian household, had peaked in 1950,¹³⁷ and subsequently declined in the percentage of participating households¹³⁸ as the television supplanted it as Canadians' predominant source of worldly and national news.¹³⁹ Despite the gradual decline in the newspaper's prominence and "per household readership" since the mid-20th century, however, data of newspaper readership and circulation indicates that newspapers continued to play an integral and enduring role in the Canadian social tapestry in 1970.¹⁴⁰ Circulation statistics reveal that, among the estimated 5,514,000 households in Canada in 1969, the overall national circulation of Canadian daily newspapers was 4,549,000, producing a "circulation per household" rate of 0.825.¹⁴¹ By 1971, the rate had declined slightly, but remained significant – for the estimated 5,779,000 Canadian households in 1971, there was a total circulation of 4,692,000, creating a "circulation per household" rate of 0.812.¹⁴² Nation-wide statistics which Toronto's Communications Research Centre compiled in 1980 and 1981 similarly reveal a reliance upon the newspaper that may certainly be considered more or less suggestive of the reliance a decade prior.¹⁴³ In that study, 89% of Canadians had reported reading, at minimum, one daily newspaper each week, with the average issues read per capita totalling 6.4 per week.¹⁴⁴ Approximately 54% had responded that they possessed "a strong newspaper affiliation," indicating that they had firmly agreed that "newspapers are a regular part of my daily life," while 69% identified themselves as "heavy" readers of at least five issues a week, and 64% documented themselves as "committed" readers of four to five of the weekday daily issues.¹⁴⁵ Respondents had furthermore indicated allotting an average of fifty-three minutes each weekday and sixty-six minutes each weekend to reading dailies.¹⁴⁶ Given newspapers' significant role in 1970 Canada, an analysis of the print news media's framing of the October Crisis offers the prospect of deeper understanding of the dominant and prominent interpretations provided to Canadians, through their most trusted and read media sources, at an integral moment in the nation's history.

¹³⁷ Garth S. Jowett and Barry R. Hemmings, "The Growth of the Mass Media in Canada," in *Communications in Canadian Society*, 2nd. ed., ed. Benjamin D. Singer (Vancouver: Copp Clark, 1975), 248-249.

¹³⁸ Kubas and the Communications Research Center, 4; ix; Communic@tions Management Inc., "Requiem for the Print Edition," Communications Management Inc., published November 30, 2017, 2-4, http://media-cmi.com/downloads/CMI_Discussion_Paper_Requiem_for_the_Print_Edition_113017.pdf; Communic@tions Management Inc., "Sixty Years of Daily Newspaper Circulation Trends - Canada, United States, United Kingdom - Numbers, Trends, Public Policy, Will There be a Plateau?" Communications Management Inc., published 2011, 4-12, http://media-cmi.com/downloads/Sixty_Years_Daily_Newspaper_Circulation_Trends_050611.pdf.

¹³⁹ Jowett and Hemmings, 250; Communic@tions Management Inc., "Requiem for the Print Edition," 2; Communic@tions Management Inc., "Sixty Years of Daily Newspaper Circulation Trends, 4.

¹⁴⁰ Jowett and Hemmings, 250.

¹⁴¹ Jowett and Hemmings, 248-249.

¹⁴² Jowett and Hemmings, 248-249.

¹⁴³ Kubas and the Communications Research Center, ix; 91-92.

¹⁴⁴ Kubas and the Communications Research Center, 11; 12.

¹⁴⁵ Kubas and the Communications Research Center, 11; 12.

¹⁴⁶ Kubas and the Communications Research Center, 13; 11.

Due to restrictions of time and scope, I have accorded primary consideration to the most immediate national response to and interpretation of the crisis, with the publications under examination ranging temporally from October 5, 1970 (the date of James Cross' abduction) until October 31, 1970. Although both reporters' articles documenting developments, and editorial interpretations, were examined for this time period, I focus my analysis on editorials as an expression of the newspaper's institutional stance on the issues at play.¹⁴⁷ Communications scholars have widely noted the intended function of newspaper editorials: as a public elucidation of the newspaper's stance, opinion, perceptions, construction of, and ideological positioning upon a particular issue or social environment,¹⁴⁸ and mechanism which facilitates readers in structuring their own posture towards the issue.¹⁴⁹ As discourse scholar Teun A. van Dijk observed, editorials are structured and composed with a particular goal orientation, namely to persuade, through its arguments, the reader as to the validity of its opinion and to encourage the further dissemination and assumption of that opinion.¹⁵⁰ Editorials explicitly seek to sway readers' social cognitions, usually in such a way as to "try to reproduce their own (group) attitudes and ideologies among the public at large."¹⁵¹ In addition to explicitly conveying the editors' opinion, the very selection of an issue as the basis of an editorial – and, by the same measure, the lack of selection of other issues – serves as an implicit signal to readers "that the newspaper attributes particular social or political significance" – or "relevance" – "to such an event."¹⁵² In other words, through the selection of a particular issue, or facet of an issue, as worthy of editorial commentary, publications accord it salience or relevance, thereby influencing audiences' perceptions of which issues are most salient in a process reminiscent of agenda-setting.¹⁵³ Academic studies observe how editorials can function to develop or proliferate discriminatory

¹⁴⁷ Note that, due to this analysis' concentration upon the papers' stances as public institutions upon the October Crisis, only unsigned editorials were included in this examination. Opinion pieces attributed to staff writers or members of the editorial staff, op-eds, and opinion columns are not included in these tallies or analyses, since such material reflects the opinion and stance of a particular writer or editor rather than the paper at large.

¹⁴⁸ Eilders, 4; Teun A. van Dijk, "Race, riots and the press: An analysis of editorials in the British press about the 1985 disorders," *International Communication Gazette* 43 (1989): 252, <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.uwaterloo.ca/10.1177/001654928904300305>; Teun A. van Dijk, "Opinions and Ideologies in Editorials" (paper presented at The 4th International Symposium of Critical Discourse Analysis, Language, Social Life and Critical Thought, Athens, December 14-16, 1995), <http://www.discursos.org/unpublished%20articles/Opinions%20and%20ideologies%20in%20editorials.htm>; Teun A. van Dijk, "Racism and Argumentation: Race Riot Rhetoric in Tabloid Editorials," in *Argumentation Illuminated*, ed. Frans H. van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, J. Anthony Blair, and Charles A. Willard (Amsterdam: Sic Sat, Internal Centre for the Study of Argumentation, 1992), 243; Elisabeth Le, *Editorials and the Power of Media: Interweaving of socio-cultural identities* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2010), xi; Frances Henry and Carol Tator, *Discourses of Domination: Racial Bias in the Canadian English-Language Press* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 93.

¹⁴⁹ van Dijk, "Opinions and Ideologies in Editorials;" Lippmann, 355.

¹⁵⁰ van Dijk, "Race, riots and the press," 230-231.

¹⁵¹ van Dijk, "Racism and Argumentation," 244.

¹⁵² van Dijk, "Race, riots and the press," 230-231.

¹⁵³ Eilders, 5; i.

prejudices regarding minority groups,¹⁵⁴ “Orientalize” conceptualizations of societal “outsiders,”¹⁵⁵ affect public assessments or evaluations of political aspirants in electoral campaigns,¹⁵⁶ and more broadly influence the citizenry’s policy preferences, attitudes, and opinions.¹⁵⁷

According to political scientist David Myers, editorials therefore serve to “both reflect and attempt to lead public opinion,”¹⁵⁸ or, as communications scholar Christianne Eilders observed, “influence the agendas and attitu[d]es of citizens and political actors.”¹⁵⁹ In their expression and direction of opinion, they seek to “attack, defend or give advice to the authorities”¹⁶⁰ through their evaluation of political actors’ conduct and recommendations of avenues of future action.¹⁶¹ Consequently, editorials can influence both the formation of public opinion and of policy.¹⁶² From this observation, van Dijk identified three categories or classifications of editorials. “Definition” editorials “define the situation” and offer a summary description of “What happened,” while “Explanation” editorials seek to “explain the situation” and outline “Why did it happen” with respect to the issue, event, or any action taken. Finally, “Evaluation and Moral” editorials offer predictions of “What will happen” or recommendations as to “What should be done?”¹⁶³ I use this subdivision in my analysis to determine the extent to which editorials focused on the current crisis, its roots, and/or the steps the government should take once the immediate terrorist threat had subsided.

Editorials thus offer the most explicit and overt indications of a newspaper’s stance during a crisis, and the understandings and perceptions it seeks to cultivate among readers. Consequently, an analysis of the editorial reactions to and depictions of the October Crisis of 1970 enables an exploration of what facets of the crisis the editors deemed most significant and worthy of highlighting for Canadians. Their examination facilitates a survey into the interpretations of the crisis with which citizens were presented,

¹⁵⁴ van Dijk, “Race, riots and the press,” 252; 230; van Dijk, “Racism and Argumentation,” 248; 243-244; 255-256.

¹⁵⁵ Foad Izadi and Hakimeh Saghaye-Biria, “A Discourse Analysis of Elite American Newspaper Editorials: The Case of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 31, no. 2 (April 2007): 140, doi: 10.1177/0196859906298073.

¹⁵⁶ Russell J. Dalton, Paul A. Beck, and Robert Huckfeldt, “Partisan Cues and the Media: Information Flows in the 1992 Presidential Election,” *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 1 (March 1998): 124, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2585932>; James N. Druckman and Michael Parkin, “The Impact of Media Bias: How Editorial Slant Affects Voters,” *Journal of Politics* 67, no. 4 (2005): 1030, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00349.x.

¹⁵⁷ Eilders, 11; 2-3.

¹⁵⁸ David S. Myers, “Editorials and the Economy in the 1992 Presidential Campaign,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 26, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 435, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27551590>.

¹⁵⁹ Eilders, 2.

¹⁶⁰ van Dijk, “Race, riots and the press,” 232.

¹⁶¹ van Dijk, “Racism and Argumentation,” 244.

¹⁶² Eilders, 2.

¹⁶³ van Dijk, “Race, riots and the press,” 231.

which, in accordance with the concepts of framing, agenda-setting, and priming, shaped how citizens viewed, comprehended, and constructed both the immediate and underlying developments and issues.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴ Eilders, 6. It far exceeds the scope of this study to seek to determine or even hypothesize as to the practical and tangible effect of these specific editorial reactions, or even of the newspapers more broadly, upon Canadian public opinion with respect to the October Crisis. Nevertheless, scholarly theorizations that editorials are able to impact the populace's appraisal, grasp, and opinion of an issue or event through the frames applied render analyses of the media's depiction of such key historical events as the October Crisis worthwhile.

CHAPTER II: ATLANTIC CANADA OBSERVES THE OCTOBER CRISIS

Among the most widely circulated English-language newspapers from the three regions that I analyze across Canada, the October Crisis received the least editorial coverage and attention from the four leading newspapers in the Atlantic provinces: the Saint John's *Telegraph-Journal*, St. John's *Evening Telegram*, Halifax *Chronicle-Herald*, and Charlottetown *Guardian*.¹⁶⁵ These four publications contained thirty-seven editorial responses addressing the FLQ crisis in some capacity, the majority of which postdated Laporte's abduction and the WMA's implementation.¹⁶⁶ Several broad themes emerged from this corpus of editorial opinion. The FLQ was generally depicted as a legitimate threat to national security, through descriptions of the group as savage and violent terrorists who were launching an offensive against Canadian society and democracy, responsible for the vile attacks against the innocent and noble abductees, and threatening to escalate the crisis further. Initially, the papers framed the government as faced with the dilemma of whether to capitulate to terrorist demands. After the WMA's invocation, however, the Atlantic Canadian newspapers' dominant framing of the crisis defended the government's response to terror, according only minimal attention to civil liberties concerns, doubts about the WMA's effectiveness, and criticisms of government conduct. The Atlantic Canadian papers' overarching approach to the October Crisis also constructed the crisis as indicative of a terrorism foreign to the Canadian experience. Reminiscent of criminology's "alien conspiracy" theory, these papers offered little analysis of the systemic origins of the FLQ's grievances, depicting the group as a minority unrepresentative of the Quebec mainstream whose

¹⁶⁵ This may be attributable to the papers' smaller page counts (and less detailed coverage of the crisis), or the fact that, aside from the dispatch of soldiers from CFB Gagetown to participate in the army's aid to the civil power role, neither the crisis nor the WMA seems to have bore any considerable impact upon the daily realities of life in Eastern Canada. See, for instance, "It Could Change An Election," *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 23, 1970 for concerns in the *Telegraph-Journal* regarding the prospective impact the deployment of soldiers from CFB Gagetown, and those soldiers' inability to vote in the coming New Brunswick election, would possess upon the electoral process and results in that province. The greater editorial coverage of the events in New Brunswick may also stem from that province's high French-speaking population. The 1971 census revealed that 33.8% of the New Brunswick population reported speaking French as their mother tongue, higher than the national average and higher, certainly, than the reported 0.7% in Newfoundland, 6.6% in Prince Edward Island, and 5.0% in Nova Scotia (Statistics Canada, "1996 Census: Mother tongue, home language and knowledge of languages," Statistics Canada, last modified December 2, 1997, <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/971202/dq971202-eng.htm>).

¹⁶⁶ The *Evening-Telegram* offered the least editorial reflection among the Atlantic region publications, publishing five editorials: the first on October 7 following Cross' abduction, the second on October 13 subsequent to Laporte's disappearance, and the remaining three following the invocation of the WMA. The *Guardian* published six editorials reflecting upon the crisis, all following the Laporte abduction, half of which succeeded the proclamation of the WMA, and all of which were concentrated between October 13 and October 20. The *Telegraph-Journal* provided twice that editorial coverage, devoting twelve editorials to the developments of October 1970 (nine of which followed the invocation of the WMA). Offering its readers the greatest quantity of interpretation of the events was the *Chronicle-Herald*, which published fourteen editorials in October, all but three reflecting upon events following the WMA's proclamation. Though Cross' abduction elicited some attention, and Laporte's abduction provoked more, it was the invocation of the WMA that triggered the greatest surge in attention among the Eastern Canadian papers.

activities were connected to foreign tactics, movements, and ideologies, and thus had been a “shock” to and unexpected in Canada.

Framing the FLQ - The descriptors used

The *Telegraph-Journal*, *Charlottetown Guardian*, *Evening Telegram*, and *Chronicle-Herald* were unanimously and consistently condemnatory of the FLQ in their framing of the organization. In the immediate aftermath of Cross’ abduction, the papers denounced the kidnappers as “extremists,”¹⁶⁷ “fanatics,”¹⁶⁸ and “terrorists.”¹⁶⁹ The *Evening Telegram* spoke of Cross’ “irresponsible captors” as representative of “a terrorist arm of the separatist movement” and “terrifying visions of barbarism,”¹⁷⁰ while the *Chronicle-Herald* painted a portrait of “desperate political fanatics, dedicated to the excision of Quebec from Canada.”¹⁷¹ Editorials thus described the group’s activities as an “outrage,”¹⁷² consisting only of “savagery,”¹⁷³ “insane violence,”¹⁷⁴ and “politically-motivated lawlessness.”¹⁷⁵ This immediate portrayal of the group as comprised of terrorists may have stemmed, at least in part, from the group’s known history of terrorist acts in Quebec. Indeed, the *Telegraph-Journal* immediately framed the FLQ within their storied legacy of violence and terror in Quebec. As the paper recounted for its readers, the extremists “had frequently resorted to bombings in the past; there had been killings and woundings,” and two plots which police had discovered earlier in the year to abduct for ransom the American consul-general and a trade commissioner from Israel.¹⁷⁶ Such descriptors persisted in the papers’ discussions of the FLQ following Laporte’s abduction. In addition to continuing to classify the group as “terrorists,”¹⁷⁷ “extremists,”¹⁷⁸ and “fanatics,”¹⁷⁹ the papers also applied the moniker of “revolutionaries.”¹⁸⁰ Editors

¹⁶⁷ “It Happened In Canada,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 7, 1970; See also “Canada: A time of trial,” *Evening Telegram* (St. John’s, NL), October 19, 1970.

¹⁶⁸ “It Happened In Canada,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 7, 1970; “Terrorism in Canada,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 7, 1970.

¹⁶⁹ “It can happen here!,” *Evening Telegram* (St. John’s, NL), October 7, 1970.

¹⁷⁰ “It can happen here!,” *Evening Telegram* (St. John’s, NL), October 7, 1970.

¹⁷¹ “Terrorism in Canada,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 7, 1970.

¹⁷² “Terrorism in Canada,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 7, 1970.

¹⁷³ “It can happen here!,” *Evening Telegram* (St. John’s, NL), October 7, 1970.

¹⁷⁴ “It Happened In Canada,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 7, 1970.

¹⁷⁵ “Terrorism in Canada,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 7, 1970.

¹⁷⁶ “It Happened In Canada,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 7, 1970.

¹⁷⁷ “FLQ Goes Too Far,” *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 13, 1970; “Can this be Canada?,” *Evening Telegram* (St. John’s, NL), October 13, 1970; “The enemy within,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 14, 1970; “FLQ’s free publicity,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 15, 1970; “...Go On And Bleed,” *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 15, 1970.

¹⁷⁸ “Now is the time...,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 16, 1970.

¹⁷⁹ “FLQ’s free publicity,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 15, 1970.

¹⁸⁰ “The enemy within,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 14, 1970.

described the group as demonstrating a “ruthless inhumanity,”¹⁸¹ and constituting a “violent,”¹⁸² “desperate,”¹⁸³ and “terrifying” foe¹⁸⁴ composed of “a desperate and murderous minority.”¹⁸⁵

The range of epithets applied to the FLQ again increased following the WMA’s proclamation and Laporte’s murder, and became demonstrably more severe in their reproach. In addition to the popular characterizations of the group as “terrorists,”¹⁸⁶ “revolutionaries,”¹⁸⁷ and “extremists,”¹⁸⁸ the editorials framed the group as consisting of “anarchists,”¹⁸⁹ lowly “criminals,”¹⁹⁰ “insurrectionists,”¹⁹¹ “assassins,”¹⁹² “political murderers,”¹⁹³ and “bandits.”¹⁹⁴ These individuals were, according to these papers, “violent,”¹⁹⁵ “desperate and fanatical,”¹⁹⁶ and practitioners of revolution, political murder, and “mindless politically-oriented vandalism.”¹⁹⁷ Editorials decried the FLQ’s “cold-blooded savagery” and “brutal madness,”¹⁹⁸ and particularly the group’s commission of the “foul deed” of Laporte’s murder¹⁹⁹ “for which no punishment on earth is really adequate.”²⁰⁰ For the *Evening Telegram*, Laporte’s murder served as a “grim attestation to the ferocious singlemindedness and determination” of the FLQ. Such “[m]isguided zealots, ... professional killers, misfits, fanatical idealists or thugs” comprised a “cancer” which necessitated speedy excision from the social and political body.²⁰¹ This framing of the FLQ as a “cancer” or illness frequently appeared in editorials following Laporte’s murder, with papers variously

¹⁸¹ “The enemy within,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 14, 1970.

¹⁸² “Now is the time...,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 16, 1970.

¹⁸³ “FLQ’s free publicity,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 15, 1970.

¹⁸⁴ “Can this be Canada?,” *Evening Telegram* (St. John’s, NL), October 13, 1970.

¹⁸⁵ “FLQ Goes Too Far,” *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 13, 1970.

¹⁸⁶ “Confrontation,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 17, 1970; “A grave situation,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 17, 1970; “Cold-blooded murder,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 19, 1970; “Cold-Blooded Savagery,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 19, 1970; “Resolute purpose,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 20, 1970; “Reason Enough,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 31, 1970.

¹⁸⁷ “Confrontation,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 17, 1970; “Youth’s other voice,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 22, 1970; “The thin green line,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 24, 1970; “Reason Enough,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 31, 1970.

¹⁸⁸ “And Sudden Death,” *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 19, 1970; “Cold-Blooded Savagery,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 19, 1970.

¹⁸⁹ “Confrontation,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 17, 1970.

¹⁹⁰ “Confrontation,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 17, 1970; “And Sudden Death,” *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 19, 1970.

¹⁹¹ “Resolute purpose,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 20, 1970; See also “It Is Not A Police State,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 19, 1970.

¹⁹² “The nation mourns,” *Evening Telegram* (St. John’s, NL), October 20, 1970.

¹⁹³ “Resolute purpose,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 20, 1970.

¹⁹⁴ “And Sudden Death,” *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 19, 1970.

¹⁹⁵ “The thin green line,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 24, 1970.

¹⁹⁶ “The Police Can’t Go It Alone,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 21, 1970.

¹⁹⁷ “Youth’s other voice,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 22, 1970.

¹⁹⁸ “Cold-Blooded Savagery,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 19, 1970.

¹⁹⁹ “Where is the unity?,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 31, 1970.

²⁰⁰ “And Sudden Death,” *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 19, 1970.

²⁰¹ “Canada: A time of trial,” *Evening Telegram* (St. John’s, NL), October 19, 1970.

referring to the crisis as reflective of Quebec's "current sickness"²⁰² or to the group as an "anti-confederation cancer."²⁰³ Throughout the East Coast editorial reactions to the October Crisis, the publications were unanimous in their framing of the FLQ as terrorists, fanatics, and extremists, as a violent, savage, brutal, and cancerous force which deserved little sympathy but aroused concern.

Framing the FLQ as an affront and challenge to Canadian society and democracy

The editorials under examination also framed the group as posing a significant and determined threat to the democratic institutions of Quebec and Canada. In the *Telegraph-Journal's* assessment, the FLQ was deploying terror "as a weapon against our whole society"²⁰⁴ and sought, through its escalating terrorist program, to propel the tensions in Quebec "into open insurrection and threats of even greater violence" with the aim of the "utter destruction of the nation."²⁰⁵ The *Evening Telegram* described the FLQ as "threatening the unity and security of the nation" and imperilling the "democratic system and way of life."²⁰⁶ For the Charlottetown *Guardian*, the FLQ was seeking "the destruction of a united Canada."²⁰⁷

The *Chronicle-Herald* was most vehement in framing the FLQ as a serious threat to national security and order. The publication painted the FLQ as "dedicated to the excision of Quebec from Canadian confederation,"²⁰⁸ and "the violent, even murderous overthrow of constitutional government in Quebec" and Canada.²⁰⁹ The FLQ sought to implement "an alien dictatorship" in place of the legitimate democratic government,²¹⁰ and demanded "total revolution" and the toppling of Quebec's democratic institutions as well as the capitalist system at large.²¹¹ It was thus not merely two lives at stake in the FLQ's game of terror, but "the security of constitutional democracy" in the province and nation. The FLQ was launching an assault upon "[p]arliamentary democracy, the rule of law, the whole fabric of justice based on a judiciary that is free from political pressures, the right of individuals to protection under the law - all these and other hard-won rights."²¹² Consequently, the *Chronicle-Herald* observed that democracy in Quebec was in great "peril"²¹³ on account of this "murderous challenge to constitutional government" and the

²⁰² "Replacing War Measures Act," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 29, 1970.

²⁰³ "Urgent, or academic?," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 21, 1970.

²⁰⁴ "A Clouded Thanksgiving," *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 12, 1970.

²⁰⁵ "Confrontation," *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 17, 1970.

²⁰⁶ "Canada: A time of trial," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 19, 1970.

²⁰⁷ "FLQ Goes Too Far," *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 13, 1970.

²⁰⁸ "Terrorism in Canada," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 7, 1970.

²⁰⁹ "Revolutionaries' inter-com," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 30, 1970.

²¹⁰ "Cold-blooded murder," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 19, 1970; See also "Youth's other voice," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 22, 1970.

²¹¹ "The enemy within," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 14, 1970.

²¹² "The enemy within," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 14, 1970.

²¹³ "Now is the time...," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 16, 1970.

“democratic processes in that province and outside it.”²¹⁴ The Atlantic Canadian editorials unambiguously framed the FLQ as a menace to government institutions and national security, painting a portrait of an organization seeking the destruction and dismantling of the social, democratic, and constitutional order.

Framing the victims as innocent martyrs

In contrast to this image of the terrorist, savage, and dangerous FLQ, the editorials in Atlantic Canadian newspapers tended to depict Cross and Laporte in terms that emphasized their innocence and, in the case of the latter, constructed him as a martyr. The *Chronicle-Herald*, in its first editorial reaction to the abductions, rendered Cross as an innocent man completely undeserving of his abduction: “a man whose reason for being in this country was to promote trade between Canada - and in particular Quebec - and Britain.”²¹⁵ Following Laporte’s kidnapping the Nova Scotian newspaper described the abductees as “two innocent and worthy men,”²¹⁶ and the Quebec minister’s death produced his portrayal as a “helpless victim.”²¹⁷ In a vein similar, the *Guardian* emphasized the undue familial suffering that the abductions had caused. Indeed, the paper highlighted the stresses on the Cross and Laporte families as they anxiously awaited news of any developments, describing the family members as “suffer[ing] in agonizing silence,” and thereby heightening the FLQ’s depiction as imbued with evil.²¹⁸

Following Laporte’s death, the Atlantic Canadian newspapers, particularly the *Evening Telegram*, martyred the slain minister. While the *Guardian* lauded Laporte’s service as “a great Canadian statesman and political reformist,”²¹⁹ and emphasized his contributions to Quebec and Canada, the *Evening Telegram* was even more explicit. “Quebec,” it lamented, “has a martyr now, a French-Canadian slain in cold blood by his own compatriots, in the name of a cause they are pledged to advance by bullet instead of ballot.”²²⁰ Laporte had died for a “way of life,” the paper later extolled.²²¹ In framing Laporte, and the victims more generally, in such a manner – with emphasis on their innocence, calibre, and martyrdom – the papers further consolidated their conceptualization of the FLQ as brutal villains.

Framing the government as facing a dilemma

Partially by virtue of such descriptions of the victims, early Atlantic editorial responses to the October Crisis, reacting to the abductions of Cross and Laporte, tended to acknowledge the federal and provincial

²¹⁴ “Urgent, or academic?,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 21, 1970.

²¹⁵ “Terrorism in Canada,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 7, 1970.

²¹⁶ “The enemy within,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 14, 1970.

²¹⁷ “The nation mourns,” *Evening Telegram* (St. John’s, NL), October 20, 1970.

²¹⁸ “Time For Faith,” *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 17, 1970.

²¹⁹ “Unity Prevails,” *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 20, 1970.

²²⁰ “Canada: A time of trial,” *Evening Telegram* (St. John’s, NL), October 19, 1970.

²²¹ “The nation mourns,” *Evening Telegram* (St. John’s, NL), October 20, 1970.

governments as confronting an unenviable dilemma. Following Cross' abduction, the *Telegraph-Journal* framed the government as facing "an agonizing dilemma" and quondary in its decision "whether to consider giving in to seemingly impossible demands, including disclosure to the FLQ of the person's identity who betrayed a previous group of terrorists, or to let an innocent man face probable death."²²² The same day's issue of the *Evening Telegram* depicted the Quebec and Ottawa governments as perched upon "the horns of a dilemma," stemming from the government's responsibility for the security and safety of international diplomatic officials. "If they yield to the terms of the terrorists," the paper warned, the government would "open the door to unlimited blackmail and coercion from that source," yet refraining from acceding "could cost an innocent victim his life," and potentially spark ceaseless reprisals.²²³ On the same day, the *Chronicle-Herald* noted that the Canadian government now encountered "the same terrible dilemma" that had confronted the governments of the citizens abducted during the Palestinian guerrillas' hijacking of four airliners in September. Certainly, the FLQ's demands were "preposterous" and "[i]t seldom pays to give in to blackmail," but if the government refused to submit, the life of James Cross – for whose safety the Canadian government bore a responsibility – would be "in grave danger."²²⁴ Once the *Chronicle-Herald* had concluded that national and provincial security could not be surrendered in bargains with terrorists, the October 14 paper continued to recognize that the authorities were confronting "a brutal, heart-rending choice," and a "dilemma" which aroused Canadians' sympathy.²²⁵

When the Charlottetown *Guardian* first assessed the crisis on October 13, it did so through a similar "dilemma" framework. The question confronting authorities as to whether "any of the demands of the criminals [should] be met" constituted, for the paper, "a dilemma." Comparable to the dilemma noted by the St. John's publication, the PEI paper indicated that if the government were to continue its refusal to accede to the demands, "two innocent men may suffer further." If officials acquiesced, however, further kidnappings could result, for "surrender to terror only fosters the spread of terror." The reality that "there is no guarantee that the two men will be released" made the double-edged sword even more biting.²²⁶

This framing of the government's initial alternatives as a dilemma, typically revolving around the concern for the hostages' lives as opposed to the urgency to discourage further terrorism, is notable for how it illuminates the relative objectivity with which the papers approached the crisis. The papers appeared cognizant of the benefits and downfalls of either capitulating or refusing to accede to the

²²² "It Happened In Canada," *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 7, 1970.

²²³ "It can happen here!," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 7, 1970.

²²⁴ "Terrorism in Canada," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 7, 1970.

²²⁵ "The enemy within," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 14, 1970.

²²⁶ "FLQ Goes Too Far," *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 13, 1970.

terrorists' demands, and hence refused to advocate either alternative. This is intriguing given that such a framing of the crisis as a "dilemma" was relatively unique to Eastern Canada.

Framing a nation in fear of further escalation

Contributing to this dilemma was considerable anxiety about the extremity of the methods that the FLQ would employ in their quest against federalism, and simultaneous construction of the FLQ as a viable threat to the democratic fabric of the Canadian nation. Anticipating that Cross' abduction would inspire a creeping progression of violence, the *Chronicle-Herald* and *Telegraph-Journal* asserted on October 7 that regardless of how the crisis developed, all diplomats and other public figures in Canada would require enhanced personal protection. Such security measures were, by the latter paper's characterization, "essential and overdue,"²²⁷ and of particular necessity given the simultaneous fears emerging of the FLQ conducting a program of assassination. The *Evening Telegram* recounted the story of French-Canadians training amongst the Palestinian guerrillas and their intent to "return to Canada for the sole purpose of spearheading violence, even to the point of assassinating Canadian leaders." Cross' abduction, the paper cautioned, "marks a new trend in the policies of the FLQ," indicative of the group's broader turn to "savagery" as they bolstered their prior tactics of the bombing of armouries, mailboxes, and commercial and public buildings, with abductions. The "next move," the paper warned, "might very well be skyjacking, within Canada on national airlines."²²⁸ Clearly, the FLQ was not a threat to be taken lightly.

Tensions rose further following Laporte's abduction. The Charlottetown *Guardian* observed that the terrorism in Quebec could only escalate further and produce the murder of the hostages,²²⁹ and the *Evening Telegram* feared that such "executions" would embolden other extremists. "In Quebec," the paper warned, "such an action might well hearten the fanatical extremists, and create among other groups a climate of fear" that could advance "the cause of an independent Quebec."²³⁰ Indeed, according to these editorials, the threat posed by the FLQ extended far beyond that facing the two hostages. The economy could suffer, the *Chronicle-Herald* decried, with the further inhibitions to international and Canadian investment in Quebec that the crisis would provoke.²³¹ The "backbone of the Canadian federation," namely its railway and air transport systems, had been threatened with an imminent offensive in a document reportedly circulated among the French press "by the [FLQ's] European delegation," the

²²⁷ "Terrorism in Canada," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 7, 1970; "It Happened In Canada," *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 7, 1970.

²²⁸ "It can happen here!," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 7, 1970.

²²⁹ "FLQ Goes Too Far," *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 13, 1970.

²³⁰ "Can this be Canada?," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 13, 1970.

²³¹ "Terrorism in Canada," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 7, 1970.

Charlottetown *Guardian* intoned.²³² As the *Telegraph-Journal* observed, the FLQ's escalating activities had illuminated its intent to progress towards "open insurrection" and "even greater violence."²³³

Observations about popular support for the FLQ may have exacerbated such fears. On October 17, the *Guardian* observed the "frightening" endorsement which hundreds of students from Montreal universities offered to the FLQ. "God help us," it lamented, "if thinking students support an organization which has been responsible not only for bombings and kidnappings but even murder" and advocated the "violent overthrow of democratic government."²³⁴ Overall, these conditions prompted the *Evening Telegram* to note with concern the prophesizing of some Quebeckers that the crisis would devolve into civil war. Citizens' pronouncements that the current crisis did "not quite" constitute "a civil war as yet" served, for the St. John's paper, as "a gloomy enough omen of what may be in store for that province and the nation as a whole." By the paper's declaration, Quebec was teetering "on the razor's edge."²³⁵

This anxiety regarding the crisis' potential for further escalation persisted following the revelation of Laporte's murder. Concern was immediately directed onto Cross' increasingly uncertain fate. While Cross was presumed alive, the *Evening Telegram* worried that "his future fate must be looked at with a new concern in the wake of the Laporte tragedy,"²³⁶ and the *Chronicle-Herald* reflected upon the "deep anxiety" pervasive amongst Canadians as to Cross' fate.²³⁷ In addition to this concern for the existing hostage, anxiety endured as to the FLQ's capacity to conduct further abductions, with the *Telegraph-Journal* intoning that "[d]iplomats and government officials everywhere [are] uneasily wondering where the brutal madness will appear next."²³⁸ An enduring tendency among these editorials was to express concern about the extent to which the crisis could escalate further, through economic repercussions, more abductions, murder, air piracy, assaults on national transport systems, and broader insurrection and civil war. In so doing, the papers framed the FLQ as a legitimate threat, capable of inflicting severe damage.

Framing the government's hard-line response as the most appropriate course of action

An examination of the editorials in the Eastern Canadian publications reveals a broad-sweeping and dominant framing of the government's hard-line response to the FLQ terrorists as both appropriate and defensible. Indeed, of the twenty-six editorials assuming a stance either in support or in criticism of the government's response, twenty-three defended some element of the government's hard-line stance: all six editorials from the *Guardian*, two of the three from the *Evening Telegram*, all seven from the *Telegraph-*

²³² "'...Go On And Bleed,'" *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 15, 1970.

²³³ "Confrontation," *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 17, 1970.

²³⁴ "Time For Faith," *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 17, 1970.

²³⁵ "Can this be Canada?," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 13, 1970.

²³⁶ "Canada: A time of trial," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 19, 1970.

²³⁷ "Cold-blooded murder," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 19, 1970.

²³⁸ "Cold-Blooded Savagery," *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 19, 1970.

Journal, and eight of the ten in the *Chronicle-Herald*. The predominant framing of the government's firm response and the WMA was positive and sympathetic to the government.

Few editorials commented upon the government's decision to deploy the Canadian Armed Forces into Ottawa, Montreal, and Quebec City in an aid to the civil power capacity. Those that reflected upon the development did so favourably and with unqualified support. The *Chronicle-Herald* characterized the deployment of the Armed Forces into Ottawa to assume security and protective duties at government structures, as well as the residences of prominent public figures and foreign diplomats, as emblematic of Trudeau "doing his duty in ensuring that the heart of Canada's government will be properly protected." As such, it was "clearly" defensible and necessary in a region in which the regular police forces were already "stretched to the limit."²³⁹ Observing the climate of anxiety regarding the crisis' potential to escalate further, the *Evening Telegram* framed the mass deployment of army and police forces as positive and justifiable responses of a government utilizing its available mechanisms "to help preserve a democratic system and way of life obviously imperiled by ruthlessness and force."²⁴⁰ The *Chronicle-Herald* concurred, describing Defence Minister Donald Macdonald's intent to review the federal government's planned reduction of its armed forces to 83,000 as "welcomed." Its classification of such a reduction as "unrealistic" given the necessity to commit some 7,000 soldiers to what could become "an "open-ended" anti-terrorist role" in Ottawa and Montreal, and the army's simultaneous obligations to NATO and UN peacekeeping missions, suggested that the paper supported the military's role in the fight against terror.²⁴¹

From some of its earliest commentary on the crisis, the St. John's *Evening Telegram* situated itself as a staunch supporter of a hard line against terror. As early as October 13, the *Evening Telegram* suggested editorially that it would support the government's assumption of hard-line, emergency powers to quell the terrorist threat bubbling in Quebec. "The government has tried to reason with the terrorists and it has not worked," the paper indicated, with appeals "to their humanity and sense of justice" having proved futile. The authorities had been unsuccessful in contending with the terrorist threat, the paper hypothesized, due to the "enormous difficulty" which their necessity "to function inside the framework of the accepted rules of law and order governing a normal democratic society in peacetime" posed. The FLQ operated exterior to such bounds, unconstrained by the law and its "restraints or inhibitions," and thus the paper suggested "the creation of emergency powers as in wartime" to place the opponents on a more even keel.²⁴²

Once the government proclaimed the emergency measures, and the curtain of the WMA fell upon Quebec, the Newfoundland publication remained firm in advocating the measures' necessity. Though

²³⁹ "FLQ's free publicity," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 15, 1970.

²⁴⁰ "Canada: A time of trial," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 19, 1970.

²⁴¹ "The thin green line," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 24, 1970.

²⁴² "Can this be Canada?," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 13, 1970.

“drastic” and “even frightening,” the undisputed escalation of the FLQ’s terrorist propensities, combined with uncertainties and anxieties regarding how the crisis could escalate further, compelled the *Evening Telegram* to conclude that proclaiming the WMA “seems to have been the only way.” If legitimately elected governments permitted themselves “to be manipulated by terror and blackmail,” the world would inevitably descend into anarchy, and thus capitulation was no viable option for a government contending with terrorism. For the *Evening Telegram*, the murder thus rendered “academic” the opinions of any “who had misgivings that the federal government over-reacted to a provincial problem” or “who had any lingering doubts about the gravity of the situation.”²⁴³ Although these comments represent the sum of the paper’s stance upon the WMA, the editorials supported the government’s response. This support derived from the necessity to accord authorities a more even footing with a group operating outside the bounds of the law, and avert the anarchy that would follow from any capitulation to terrorist manipulation.

Despite its initial conceptualization of the crisis as presenting the government with a dilemma, the proclamation of the WMA elicited the *Telegraph-Journal*’s immediate support. In its earliest editorial reflecting upon the invocation of the WMA, the paper defended the measures as constituting an overdue response to what had been long accumulating violence and provocation. Canada had, according to its October 17 editorial, “made the obvious choice” between either surrendering “some of her freedom ... to anarchists with bombs or to a government that will restore it when the crisis passes.” The proclamation of such emergency measures were defensible, the paper intoned, given that it constituted not the response merely to two abductions but rather to “years of mounting provocation until all the forces of law and order were challenged by criminals whose aim is utter destruction of the nation.” This patience “had to end somewhere,” and the FLQ’s preaching of hate, murder, and terror drew the proverbial line in the sand.²⁴⁴

The *Telegraph-Journal* later justified the government’s hard-line stance in that acceding to the FLQ’s demands would only provoke further violence and terrorism. Surrendering to terrorist demands would have created an environment in which it “never would ... have been possible to walk in safety in our country or any other,” as it would inspire any individual bearing a grievance to “simply engineer another kidnapping, confident that viciousness would win.”²⁴⁵ The paper reiterated such a defence in its October 24 editorial, indicating that the Canadian government’s refusal to capitulate represented a “clear” decision. “[W]hen two lives must be balanced against the appalling consequences of giving in to kidnapers time and time again,” the paper editorialized, the government possessed a duty to refuse.²⁴⁶

²⁴³ “Canada: A time of trial,” *Evening Telegram* (St. John’s, NL), October 19, 1970.

²⁴⁴ “Confrontation,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 17, 1970.

²⁴⁵ “Cold-Blooded Savagery,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 19, 1970.

²⁴⁶ “There Is No Magic Answer,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 24, 1970.

The *Telegraph-Journal* offered various other justifications in brief succession. An October 19 editorial defended the emergency measures as the necessary attempts of “a free society” to protect “itself from those who would destroy it.”²⁴⁷ The same editorial justified the measures as the response to the existing laws’ insufficiency, noting that the laws which protected Canadians in times of peace “were being used as a shield to keep FLQ terrorists out of jail” and aid in their campaign to “destroy the state.”²⁴⁸ Supportive of the police’s heightened powers under the emergency measures, an October 21 editorial chastised the public for not aiding the police more adequately in their manhunt by reporting the suspicious activity they had witnessed at the St. Hubert residence in which Laporte had been held and potentially killed. Far from criticizing police’s emergency powers under the WMA, the editorial argued that citizens possessed a greater responsibility in enabling and facilitating the police’s exhibition of such extraordinary powers.²⁴⁹

The newspaper also visibly sought to assuage any concerns regarding the status of civil liberties in Canada. Civil liberties had merely been “suspended, not cancelled,” the *Telegraph-Journal* assured its readers, and Canada would restore the full breadth of Canadian liberties “when the sedition is rooted out.”²⁵⁰ By its assessment, the WMA had possessed greater assurances and protections of civil liberties than any alternate courses of government action. The very fact that the WMA included “extraordinary powers, that everyone recognizes them as such, and that the whole nation awaits a return to normalcy” constituted solid evidence that the WMA had been a most effective and appropriate mechanism to use in this crisis. Certainly, it was superior to any amendment to the Criminal Code, since the WMA’s sweeping nature provided its infrequent invocation with a gravitas that a section of the Criminal Code would not possess. Indeed, the WMA was an instrument which no one thought should be “used lightly” or “kept in force one minute longer than need be.” Its extreme nature and shock-value thus ensured its limited usage and, ultimately, the protection of liberty, as opposed to a Criminal Code amendment that risked tempting authorities with its “permanently available shortcut to special powers.”²⁵¹ In its assurances that authorities would restore civil liberties, depiction of the WMA as a warranted response to years of escalation, indications that accessions would only produce further terrorism, and characterization of existing laws as insufficient, the *Telegraph-Journal* framed itself as a firm advocate of the government’s stance.

The *Guardian* also demonstrated enduring support for the government’s “tough-on-terror” stance. The paper first addressed the governmental response in an October 13 editorial. Though not explicitly voicing its own position on the government’s courses of action, its reference to three other Canadian editorials suggested its support for the government’s refutation of the terrorists’ demands. Cited were a Montreal

²⁴⁷ “It Is Not A Police State,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 19, 1970.

²⁴⁸ “It Is Not A Police State,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 19, 1970.

²⁴⁹ “The Police Can’t Go It Alone,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 21, 1970.

²⁵⁰ “It Is Not A Police State,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 19, 1970.

²⁵¹ “A Built-In Protection,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 20, 1970.

paper's argument that the potential for further abductions was a sufficient demonstration of why no level of government should accede to blackmail, and another editorial characterizing the FLQ as posing "a threat to the existence of every Canadian and to his constitutional right to the pursuit of happiness." The paper concluded with reference to an Ontario newspaper's position that further acts of terror would inevitably necessitate the introduction of "a police state" in which "peace will be enforced at the cost of considerable loss of public freedom and civil liberties."²⁵² The *Guardian's* presentation of these editorials in support of the hard-line response to terror, without reference to any publications advocating for negotiations with the FLQ, suggests support for the government's firm stance in the current crisis.

By its October 15 editorial, this slight ambiguity in the paper's approach to the dilemma had faded in favour of a more explicit argument against approaching the terrorists with anything other than unyielding toughness. Recounting the recent political discourse, the editorial indicated that while Ontario premier John Robarts may have been "a little harsh" in advocating "total war" against the FLQ, he was "correct" in indicating it was now the time "to stand and fight." At the very least, the government should "[s]tand and resist," meet "force with force," and not permit the "security of Canada" to "be bargained away on criminals' terms" or allow the crisis to escalate with the group's plotted destruction of the transportation infrastructure. "The time for firmness is now," the *Guardian* concluded, if Canadians sought to forestall the dissemination of terror across the nation. Thus, "no Canadian" – and not, evidently, the *Guardian* – "will argue with the Prime Minister's statement that it's more important to keep law and order in society than to be worried about weak-kneed people who don't like the looks of an army."²⁵³

The paper continued to voice its support for and defence of the government's actions. Its October 17 editorial sought to reassure readers that Trudeau had indicated that he was implementing only those measures that the current crisis demanded, rather than "all of the powers in the act which gives the government the right to suspend basic civil liberties." It seemed to justify the measures to maintain public faith in the government, noting that "in times of national crisis ordinary Canadians must have faith" that their democratically-elected leaders "have the ability to make prudent decisions." The paper argued that the decision should elicit praise, for "it takes courage to make a decision which could seriously affect the political futures of both Mr. Trudeau and Mr. Bourassa."²⁵⁴ Continuing to emphasize the courage of the government's response, the *Guardian* deemed the results of the House of Commons' overwhelming vote on October 19 in favour of the WMA as "reassuring" because it signalled that Canada would never permit violence and terror to replace the ballot box as the means by which to effect change.²⁵⁵ Although, like the *Evening Telegram*, the *Guardian* was limited in the degree to which it vocalized its stance upon the

²⁵² "FLQ Goes Too Far," *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 13, 1970.

²⁵³ "...Go On And Bleed," *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 15, 1970.

²⁵⁴ "Time For Faith," *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 17, 1970.

²⁵⁵ "Unity Prevails," *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 20, 1970.

government's response to the FLQ crisis, the editorial team defended its reaction. It did so on the basis of the need to prevent the crisis' further escalation, have faith in the government, and recognize the government's courage in its handling of the crisis.

The *Chronicle-Herald* also initially announced its support of the government's stern reproach of terror. Like the other Atlantic Canadian papers, which had witnessed the transition from a framing of a governmental "dilemma" to a proclaimed support of the government's law-and-order opposition to the terrorists following Laporte's kidnapping, that abduction similarly appeared to mark a turning point in the *Chronicle-Herald's* approach to the crisis. While its October 7 editorial spoke only of the dilemma which the Canadian and Quebec governments now faced in their decision whether to negotiate for the release of Cross, its editorial resumption of the discussion one week later reflected its support for a tough stance against the FLQ. Given that it was not merely the "lives of two innocent and worthy men" that were at stake, but rather the broader "security of constitutional democracy" in Quebec and Canada, "the security of the province of Quebec and the realm of Canada cannot be bargained away on the kidnappers' terms." Thus, although the paper advocated that every available effort should be made to persuade the FLQ to spare the lives of their hostages, the Nova Scotian publication affirmed that it was imperative that the government remain determined "that a clique of revolutionaries shall not blackmail their way into power in this country."²⁵⁶ When the government invoked the WMA, the editors noted that "[o]nly a very grave situation within Quebec and Canada could justify" such extreme measures with their limitations on Canadian freedoms. In that respect, the proclamation had been clearly justifiable. The "abominable kidnappings," repeated threats to the hostages' lives, "open defiance of constitutional authority," and "uncertainties and dangers of trying to deal with different cells of a violent revolutionary movement" had all served to generate "a situation which is clearly grave and probably was deteriorating."²⁵⁷

Laporte's murder cemented and firmed the *Chronicle-Herald's* defence of the government's response to the crisis and the necessity of taking a hard line. The politicians, coupled with the police and armed forces personnel to represent constitutional authority, were enacting and utilizing laws with the objective to protect the Canadian population from the "persons bent, at any cost, on the destruction of our chosen type of [democratic] society, and its substitution by an alien dictatorship."²⁵⁸ Another editorial, sharing the *Guardian's* stance, praised Trudeau's capacity to make the "difficult decisions" to approach the FLQ with a tough line. In his defiance of the FLQ's efforts to compel Canada to abide by its terms, Trudeau "may have struck a blow not only against "apprehended insurrection" in Canada, but against international

²⁵⁶ "The enemy within," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 14, 1970.

²⁵⁷ "A grave situation," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 17, 1970.

²⁵⁸ "Cold-blooded murder," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 19, 1970.

acts of piracy and assassination.”²⁵⁹ Reiterating the *Guardian*’s call for faith in the government, an October 20 editorial refuted the “extreme critics” who were portending that the WMA had transformed Canada into a “military dictatorship,” recommending that citizens “should have faith that those who carry out this legislation will do so with good sense.”²⁶⁰ On October 22, another editorial characterized the WMA as the government’s well-supported effort “to protect the fundamental freedoms on which democracy and good government are based,” and found it “encouraging” how the nation’s “silent majority” had expressed its unity with the government’s approach to the crisis.²⁶¹ Even as the paper’s stance upon the government’s conduct appeared to later sour (as discussed below), it continued to laud elements of the government’s response. It classified the WMA’s prohibition of the publication of FLQ objectives and communiqués as “sensible” and the product of “the sufficient reason that this organization is bent on the violent, even murderous overthrow of constitutional government.”²⁶² In its depiction of the government’s hard-line response as necessary to protect national security, portrayal of the crisis as sufficiently grave to warrant the WMA, pleas for the citizenry to have faith in the government, and lauding of Trudeau’s response to the crisis, the *Chronicle-Herald* had initially framed the governmental response as appropriate.

A handful of more broadly-shared framings emerged in the newspapers’ varied defences of the federal government. Indeed, some editorials criticized the government for not having implemented a hard-line response quickly enough. An October 17 editorial in the *Telegraph-Journal* chastised that many Canadians had perceived that their nation had been patient for “too long:”

She [Canada] sat still while terrorists planted bombs in mail boxes and office buildings, raided armories and banks, looted dynamite stores ... She was grimly restrained when anarchists inflamed the radical fringe of students into campus riots and destructive orgies ... She put up with demonstrations, insults and pelting of public personalities right up to the prime minister with bottles and rotted vegetables ... She braced and waited when Montreal police went on strike ... She watched calmly while a party dedicated to breaking up the country tried to use the country’s democratic elections to take Quebec out of Confederation - tried and failed ... And then, as predicted, the revolutionaries who hoped to seize control of the separatist Parti Québécois if it was elected took the next step into open insurrection and threats of even greater violence.²⁶³

The WMA’s invocation was not only a response to the abductions of Cross and Laporte, but an overdue reaction “to years of mounting provocation until all the forces of law and order were challenged by criminals whose aim is utter destruction of the nation.”²⁶⁴ The *Guardian* made a similar argument when it

²⁵⁹ “Resolute purpose,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 20, 1970.

²⁶⁰ “Resolute purpose,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 20, 1970.

²⁶¹ “Youth’s other voice,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 22, 1970.

²⁶² “Revolutionaries’ inter-com,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 30, 1970.

²⁶³ “Confrontation,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 17, 1970.

²⁶⁴ “Confrontation,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 17, 1970.

editorialized that the FLQ was “a despicable minority who have unfortunately been appeased for too long.”²⁶⁵ Although more nuanced in their support, both editorials appeared to justify the government’s long-overdue sternness to terror.

Support for further firming of the government’s approach illustrated the newspapers’ support for a hard-line approach. Though not directly referencing the current crisis, the *Guardian* noted on October 15 that Canadians were inundated daily with news reports of murders, sexual assaults, violent robberies, and kidnappings. The paper recommended a resumption of the justice system’s “old-fashioned” emphasis on punishment, and encouraged Justice Minister John Turner to consider elevating the minimum sentences for such offences, in order to deliver a stronger deterrent against violent crime.²⁶⁶

The PEI newspaper later became more explicit in its encouragement of a sterner reproach of terror. In an October 19 editorial, it lamented the days of capital punishment, implying that its abolition had contributed to Laporte’s assassination. Attesting that “this whole business” would serve to “make certain other people take a longer look at what has happened as a result of their actions of the past,” namely the eradication of capital punishment, the paper indicated that the possibility of “going to the scaffold” posed a far more significant deterrent to murder than “the few years he would have to spend in penitentiary.” For some, “the delight and satisfaction of murder would far outweigh” a prison sentence, and thus, when “fear of punishment” had likely possessed greater deterring power than mere police activities, the *Guardian* recommended the resumption of capital punishment.²⁶⁷ The *Evening Telegram* adopted a similar stance in its October 19 editorial. As it suggested to those politicians considering the legislation which would supplant the WMA, such measures “might well reconsider amending the law passed in November, 1967” which had restricted capital punishment to those convicted of murdering prison guards or policemen. As the paper described, it was an “irony,” and seemingly unjust, “that the slayers of Mr. Laporte and the potential killers of any top figure in the state ... can only go to jail for such a crime.” The paper intoned that such a consideration was warranted “[i]f one can judge from opinion across the country,” suggesting that this support for the reinstatement of capital punishment, and the hardening further of the government’s hostility to terror, spread beyond these editorial staffs.²⁶⁸

In line with these overt expressions of approval for the government’s hard-line stance, other editorials indicated their support by criticizing the opposition’s stand or actions. The *Guardian* suggested that many individuals perceived the NDP and Conservative opposition to the WMA not as an expression of legitimate concerns but merely opportunism “to make “political hay” in their opposition” to Trudeau’s government, in the hopes of garnering more support from Quebec electors. The paper intoned that seemed

²⁶⁵ “Unity Prevails,” *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 20, 1970.

²⁶⁶ “Examine The Minimum,” *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 15, 1970.

²⁶⁷ “And Sudden Death,” *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 19, 1970.

²⁶⁸ “Canada: A time of trial,” *Evening Telegram* (St. John’s, NL), October 19, 1970.

particularly evident given that the opposition parties' provincial counterparts had supported Trudeau's response.²⁶⁹ The murder of Laporte, in particular, discredited the oppositions' denouncement of the WMA for editors in Atlantic Canada. Recounting T. C. Douglas' likening of the implementation of the emergency measures as using "a sledgehammer to crack a peanut," the *Guardian* concluded its October 19 editorial with the harrumph: "Some peanut."²⁷⁰ The *Telegraph-Journal* similarly likened those who refused to believe Bourassa's defence of the WMA to those "convinced to this day that Hitler is alive in South America, or that the massive Warren Report on President Kennedy's assassination is a vast conspiracy of concealment of the "real facts." Such opponents, the paper suggested, sought to wield the measures as a "handy club" against the federal and Quebec governments.²⁷¹

A handful of editorials similarly conveyed their defence of the government through their refutations of condemnations of the apparent abrogation of civil liberties that its response entailed. On October 19, the *Telegraph-Journal* refuted suggestions that "we are now living in a police state" as the product of either a complete lack of awareness of "what is going on in Canada" or utter miscomprehension of "what a police state is." A police state, the editorial argued, entailed the police's possession of complete power and their deployment of that power "at their own discretion or at the direction of a dictator." This clearly did not apply to Canada when Parliament and the Legislatures remained and the military and police continued to operate at the discretion and under the direction of the civil authority.²⁷² The October 20 issue of the *Chronicle-Herald* contained a dismissal of the "extreme critics" who sought to depict the emergency measures as having effected Canada's dissolution into a "military dictatorship."²⁷³

Even when the papers acknowledged concerns about civil liberties, they framed their suspension as being of no fault of the government. The *Telegraph-Journal* emphasized that the blame lie instead with the terrorists and anarchists,²⁷⁴ describing how the true endangerment to civil liberties derived not from the government, which sought to defend such liberties, but from "the revolutionaries who would destroy them permanently." When emotions had settled, and calm and rational thought restored, "most people will surely see that terrorists and anarchists who would slaughter a man in cold blood would never surrender power once they had seized it," unlike the elected governments.²⁷⁵ Considered in conjunction with the editors' defence of the decision to utilize the armed forces, depiction of the government's stance as overdue and of insufficient firmness, and the papers' justifications of the WMA, the Eastern Canadian editorials offered a sweeping and dominant defence of the government's response to the October Crisis.

²⁶⁹ "Time For Faith," *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 17, 1970.

²⁷⁰ "And Sudden Death," *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 19, 1970.

²⁷¹ "Reason Enough," *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 31, 1970.

²⁷² "It Is Not A Police State," *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 19, 1970.

²⁷³ "Resolute purpose," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 20, 1970.

²⁷⁴ "It Is Not A Police State," *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 19, 1970.

²⁷⁵ "Reason Enough," *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 31, 1970.

Framing the governmental response as ineffectual and inappropriate

Two editorials in these newspapers indicated a concern and wariness respecting the WMA's enabling of civil liberties violations, anticipating the debate that now dominates the historiography. In an October 17 editorial, the *Chronicle-Herald* cautioned that the government bore an obligation to forestall the anti-FLQ efforts from ballooning "into a witchhunt against political non-conformists" or attempts "to restrict, unnecessarily, freedom of the press."²⁷⁶ The *Evening Telegram* warned on October 29 that the WMA had been producing an inflammatory effect in other regions, as its "sweeping powers" had encouraged "some forms of misuse [and] even repression," particularly in British Columbia.²⁷⁷

These two editorials were the only examples among the Atlantic Canadian publications of civil rights concerns. Nevertheless, the editors of these two publications expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the WMA as a means to attack a terrorist organization. The *Evening Telegram*, in its same October 29 editorial, observed that the additional powers granted to the police under the WMA had neither demonstrably aided the police in locating Cross nor salvaged Laporte's life. If anything, the measures "may have hastened his murder."²⁷⁸ While not overtly condemning the implementation of the WMA, the *Chronicle-Herald* expressed a similar concern, regarding the lack of substantive or clear progress in the police's efforts to quell the terrorism. Despite their "special powers" and the fact that the army had "relieved [them] of major security duties," the police had not succeeded in apprehending the kidnappers. Although recognizing that the "unwillingness of informants to come forward" may have been partly responsible for this failure, the editorial team expressed doubt in the efficiency of the WMA, noting that perhaps the failure could be accredited to "the fact that the WMA is ineffective in these circumstances."²⁷⁹

²⁷⁶ "A grave situation," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 17, 1970.

²⁷⁷ "Replacing War Measures Act," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 29, 1970. It was irrefutable that a repressive sentiment had emerged in Vancouver with the invocation of the WMA and the nation's devotion to dismantling the FLQ. Vancouver Mayor Tom Campbell had expressed his intention to utilize the WMA to target "people trying subversive undertakings," including the Vancouver Liberation Front, Maoists, "yippie groups," draft dodgers, and drug pushers ("Mayor sees use of war act in city: Liberation Front, yippies are possible targets," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 17, 1970). Further concerns respecting citizens being penalized for their political convictions had accelerated with the B.C. government's October 21 decision to command, via cabinet order-in-council, the dismissal of any public school, college, or university instructors who expressed support for the FLQ's policies or the violent overthrow of democratic governments, with the implicit threat that institutions refusing to do so would no longer receive government funding (Iain Hunter, "'Fire teachers preaching revolution' - Schools get gov't order," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 23, 1970). Even before such regulations were enforced, chemistry teacher Arthur Norton Olsen had found himself the first casualty of the WMA outside of Quebec, when he was fired from a high school in Dawson Creek on account of complaints he had conveyed his endorsement of the FLQ and contravened the WMA (Canadian Press, "Teacher fired over claims he expressed FLQ support," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 22, 1970; "BC teacher fired after FLQ statements," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 22, 1970; Canadian Press, "Teacher Fired," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 22, 1970; Canadian Press, "Students complained to board: Pro-FLQ teacher fired," *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 22, 1970; Gordon Aalborg, "Journal Peace River Bureau: Pupils back teacher fired in FLQ row," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 23, 1970; October 27, 1970; "Fired teacher states case," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 30, 1970).

²⁷⁸ "Replacing War Measures Act," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 29, 1970.

²⁷⁹ "Where is the unity?," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 31, 1970.

A further element of this dissatisfaction with the governmental response and reaction was the mounting concern, particularly in the *Evening Telegram*, about the public's urgent need for further information. Despite Canadians' initial anticipation that officials would offer evidence of the FLQ's plot to establish a "parallel government" within Quebec, Minister of Defence Donald Macdonald had acquiesced that no specific plot had been discovered. Rather, he had indicated that the theft of weapons had "justified the belief of an "apprehended insurrection" and the government needed "to nip it in the bud." Combined with the surging rumours of a plan among Quebecois elite to replace the Quebec government with an FLQ-sympathetic "provisional government," and the government's refusal to comment, the paper indicated on October 29 that such developments were "doing some damage to the government's credibility and provoking a more insistent call for the speedy withdrawal of the WMA."²⁸⁰

In all, three editorials in the *Chronicle-Herald* and *Evening Telegram* questioned the adequacy or suitability of the federal government's response, whether in its disregard for civil liberties, the inefficiency of its emergency measures, or its failure to provide sufficient disclosure to the public of the extent of the crisis. That these editorials came at the end of October suggests that editorial opinion began to sour as the crisis wore on, given their strong initial support for the measures. That such concerns were raised in only three of the thirty-seven total editorials, compared with twenty-three editorials which supported the measures, indicates that the dominant media discourse regarding the FLQ crisis in Atlantic Canada was supportive of the government and its handling of the events. Furthermore, while the *Chronicle-Herald* and *Evening Telegram* voiced mild concerns about the WMA and the tight-lipped governmental approach, in no editorial – beyond the initial "dilemma" framework – did the Eastern Canadian papers demonstrate a support for any approach to the crisis other than a hard-line stance against terror.

Framing Canadians as shocked, yet supportive of the government's stance

According to the Eastern Canadian editorials, Canadians had been "shocked,"²⁸¹ "shaken,"²⁸² and "appalled"²⁸³ by the developments of October 1970, and left "reeling"²⁸⁴ from the startling and "stunning impact"²⁸⁵ of the abductions and murder. Yet the editors affirmed that the populace overwhelmingly

²⁸⁰ "Replacing War Measures Act," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 29, 1970.

²⁸¹ "FLQ Goes Too Far," *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 13, 1970; "Can this be Canada?," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 13, 1970; "Canada: A time of trial," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 19, 1970; See also "Terrorism in Canada," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 7, 1970; "Cold-Blooded Savagery," *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 19, 1970; "Cold-blooded murder," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 19, 1970; "Where is the unity?," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 31, 1970.

²⁸² "The enemy within," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 14, 1970.

²⁸³ "The enemy within," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 14, 1970.

²⁸⁴ "Where is the unity?," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 31, 1970.

²⁸⁵ "It Happened In Canada," *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 7, 1970.

supported the government and WMA. Five editorials – one each from the *Guardian*, *Chronicle-Herald*, and *Evening Telegram*, and two from the *Telegraph-Journal* – expressed this view. According to the *Guardian*'s October 13 editorial, the federal and provincial governments' refusal to accede to the terrorists' demands was "drawing much support," fuelled by "insistence that the government stand firm in the face of terror."²⁸⁶ Six days later, the *Telegraph-Journal* concluded that "[m]ost Canadians obviously agree with the stand of the government" against a group which had cultivated "universal hatred."²⁸⁷ The same paper expressed that Bourassa's defence of the measures in response to the FLQ's assassination plots would "convince most Canadians that extraordinary measures were required."²⁸⁸ For the *Evening Telegram*, the murder of Laporte had bolstered Canadians' "resolve to see this cancer cut from the body politic."²⁸⁹ Similarly, the *Chronicle-Herald* spoke of the government's invocation of the WMA as having incurred "the overwhelming support of the population."²⁹⁰ Thus, all editorials seeking to gauge the populace's response to the implementation of the WMA concluded with a depiction of Canadians as wholeheartedly supportive of the government's response.

Framing the nation's need for unity

Pleas for national unity emerged in Atlantic Canadian editorials respecting the crisis, raising questions whether those papers' support for the WMA reflected a shared commitment to foster such unity. Three editorials (in the *Evening Telegram*, *Chronicle-Herald*, and *Guardian*) emphasized the need for national unity in the crisis' wake. The *Chronicle-Herald* pled for Canadians to accord "some positive meaning" to Laporte's murder by uniting "into a new sense of nationhood and interdependence," and in recognition that the nation's democratic system, as the chosen system in Canada, must "be nurtured and protected."²⁹¹ As the "Canadian family" endured the FLQ's test of Laporte's murder, the *Evening Telegram* expressed hope that it would foster "a more united and determined people, committed to preserving Confederation and the way of life for which he died."²⁹² On the basis of the House of Commons' sweeping vote in favour of the WMA, the *Guardian* praised that "Pierre Laporte has not died in vain," with his death having incited "a unity, a sense of purpose and a will which will overcome any challenge."²⁹³

²⁸⁶ "FLQ Goes Too Far," *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 13, 1970.

²⁸⁷ "Cold-Blooded Savagery," *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 19, 1970.

²⁸⁸ "Reason Enough," *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 31, 1970.

²⁸⁹ "Canada: A time of trial," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 19, 1970.

²⁹⁰ "Youth's other voice," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 22, 1970.

²⁹¹ "Cold-blooded murder," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 19, 1970.

²⁹² "The nation mourns," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 20, 1970.

²⁹³ "Unity Prevails," *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 20, 1970.

Framing terrorism as a construct and phenomenon foreign and alien to Canada

It may strike the contemporary reader as curious that the newspapers voiced such shock at the abductions in October 1970 when the FLQ had been conducting its well-publicized program of terror since 1963.²⁹⁴ Despite Quebec and Canada's pre-existing acquaintanceship with the FLQ, it appears from the editorials that the Atlantic Coast publications had continued to perceive terrorism as a construct foreign and alien to Canada. Saint John's *Telegraph-Journal*, for instance, emphasized that Cross' abduction represented an act of terror "unprecedented in the Commonwealth, ... a sort of thing most people always thought of as belonging to distant countries where revolutions were the rule rather than the exception."²⁹⁵ Similarly, the *Chronicle-Herald* conceded on October 7 that while such political abductions for ransom could happen "in Bolivia, Brazil or Argentina, perhaps, and certainly in the Middle East," the prospect of such a travesty occurring in Canada could only be met with the outraged presumption, "Surely not!"²⁹⁶ An October 13 editorial in the *Evening Telegram* also emphasized this international element, noting that the abductions of recent days had dispelled any illusions that Canada was exempt from "'the dreadful things' associated with other lands."²⁹⁷ Editorials described a Montreal in which an unprecedented number of soldiers and policemen patrolled its streets, in quantities "[n]ever [seen] in history."²⁹⁸ Referring to Laporte's murder as "only the second political assassination in Canada" since Confederation, the *Evening Telegram* conformed with the newspapers' broader tendency to construct terrorism as a plague foreign to the Canadian experience to which the nation had unfortunately not been "immune."²⁹⁹ Thus, the editorials reflected upon the FLQ terrorism as a phenomenon wholly unexpected in the Canadian context.

In addition to framing terrorism as an international phenomenon foreign to the Canadian experience, the newspapers exhibited a clear propensity to privilege examinations into the FLQ's connections with and inspiration from international revolutionary movements and ideologies. Several editorials, for instance, emphasized the presumed integral role of international terrorist conspiracies in inspiring the shroud of violence which had descended upon Quebec. For the *Telegraph-Journal*, the FLQ had certainly

²⁹⁴ "Frightening effects: Bombings, deaths marked rapid rise of terrorism," *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970; See also Canadian Press, "U.K. Trade Commissioner Kidnapped," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 6, 1970; Canadian Press, "Gunmen Snatch Envoy," *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 6, 1970; Canadian Press, "Separatists seek \$500,000 ransom: Terrorists seize diplomat," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 6, 1970; Canadian Press, "Quebec Cabinet Plans Action In Kidnapping: Terrorists Seize British Attache," *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 6, 1970; Canadian Press, "Quebec terrorists under surveillance," *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 6, 1970; Canadian Press, "'Political Prisoners' Release Demanded: Que. Kidnappers Want \$500,000," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 6, 1970.

²⁹⁵ "It Happened In Canada," *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 7, 1970.

²⁹⁶ "Terrorism in Canada," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 7, 1970.

²⁹⁷ "Can this be Canada?," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 13, 1970.

²⁹⁸ "It's An Exception Now," *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 27, 1970.

²⁹⁹ "The nation mourns," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 20, 1970.

been “agitated anew by the wave of political kidnappings in Central and South America, and by the success of some groups in compelling governments to meet their demands.” Consequently, the FLQ had derived great encouragement “from the specular airliner hijackings and the drama of the Jordan desert, and by the fact that great nations finally capitulated and freed Palestinian commandos.”³⁰⁰ The *Evening Telegram* specifically identified Cross’ abduction as indicative of a bubbling “home-grown terror,” yet still referenced the recent discovery of young French-Canadians receiving training in terror from the Palestinian guerrillas in the Middle East.³⁰¹ The *Chronicle-Herald* similarly framed the FLQ as a group with “undoubted Communist leanings, and probably international Communist financial backing.”³⁰²

Other editorials sought to contextualize and frame the FLQ more broadly within an international malaise of revolution and unrest. The *Chronicle-Herald* identified the group as constituting “a part” of the international wave of assassinations and air piracy,³⁰³ while the *Telegraph-Journal* framed such terrorism and savagery as “a disease that can spread” as extremists recognized the success of their counterparts’ tactics and adopted them for their own usage.³⁰⁴ On October 19, while reaffirming the shock with which Canadians had been observing the developments in Quebec, the *Evening Telegram* emphasized that the crisis was symptomatic of an international affliction. Although noting that “[i]t has long been recognized that there is a plague of lawlessness, violence and insurrection all around the world,” the editorial indicated that the surging extremism was a shock in the “pleasant, moderate, peaceable” Canada.³⁰⁵ Thus, in addition to having received inspiration from international terrorist causes, groups, and activities, several Atlantic Coast editorials also framed the eruption of unrest and violence in Quebec as a component or offshoot of such broader international waves of revolution and insurrection.

Appearing in a remarkable ten editorials – three in the *Telegraph-Journal*, three in the *Chronicle-Herald*, and four in the *Evening Telegram* – this description of the FLQ’s terrorism as international and

³⁰⁰ “It Happened In Canada,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 7, 1970. This is undoubtedly a reference to the aircraft hijacking which occurred in the first days of October. In what the *Vancouver Sun* deemed “the most spectacular aircraft hijacking operation in history,” the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) had successfully demanded the exchange of seven guerrillas from penal institutions in West Germany, Switzerland, and Britain in return for almost four hundred passengers of three hijacked Trans World Airlines, Swissair, and British Overseas Airways Corporation aircrafts held hostage in Jordan throughout much of September (Associated Press, “Return of seven closes out Mideast hijacking saga,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 1, 1970; Associated Press, “Seven Arab hijackers freed,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 1, 1970; Associated Press, “Britain Frees Girl Guerrilla,” *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 1, 1970; Reuters, “West frees Arabs,” *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 1, 1970; Associated Press, “Hijackers set free in Europe,” *Montreal Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 1, 1970; NYT Service, “Two months in Israel, two Algerians freed,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 15, 1970). A fourth hijacking, of a Pan American World Airways Boeing 747, had culminated with the airliner being exploded in Cairo shortly following the passengers’ escape through the escape chutes (Associated Press, “Return of seven closes out Mideast hijacking saga,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 1, 1970).

³⁰¹ “It can happen here!,” *Evening Telegram* (St. John’s, NL), October 7, 1970.

³⁰² “Recognizing Chairman Mao,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 20, 1970.

³⁰³ “Resolute purpose,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 20, 1970.

³⁰⁴ “Cold-Blooded Savagery,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 19, 1970.

³⁰⁵ “Canada: A time of trial,” *Evening Telegram* (St. John’s, NL), October 19, 1970.

foreign to the Canadian experience resembled the alien conspiracy theory that prevailed among the same period's perceptions of the American mafia. Criminologist Dwight C. Smith Jr. reviewed that American comprehensions of, and thus public policy regarding, the mafia since the late 19th century had revolved around "a recurring apprehension that somewhere 'out there' is an organized, secret, alien group that is poised to infiltrate our society and to undermine our fundamental democratic beliefs."³⁰⁶ In discussions of the mafia, this generally involved framing such organized criminals as bearing their roots in Sicily and elsewhere in Italy and, from there, seeking to extend their activities into the United States.³⁰⁷ The framing of the FLQ is reminiscent of this alien conspiracy theory, in its emphasis on terrorism as foreign and a shock to Canada, and its depiction of the FLQ as inspired by and possessing vast connections to international revolutionary ideologies and groups. The aforementioned framing of the FLQ as a "cancer" or "illness" to which Canada was not "immune" also reflects such a standpoint by depicting terrorism as a foreign substance or entity which had invaded and was corrupting the hitherto innocent Canadian nation.

Framing the October Crisis as the result of internal systemic factors

Few Eastern Canadian editorials devoted any considerable effort to examining or delving into the root causes which had contributed to the development of the current crisis and the FLQ's proclaimed grievances. Compared to the ten editorials which discussed the international inspiration, connections, and origins of the FLQ terrorism, a mere three – one in the *Evening Telegram* and two in the *Chronicle-Herald* – sought to identify and interrogate the internal factors which had contributed to the rise of the violent separatist faction. For the *Evening Telegram*, the initial victimization of a British official revealed "the incident for what it is, a horrifying emphasis on the Anglo-French divisions in the nation and on the strong aspirations for a **Quebec libre**," and thus a clear targeted boiling of "home-grown terror."³⁰⁸ The *Chronicle-Herald* commented that "[i]t may well be that the separatist extremists see an economically depressed Quebec, with high unemployment and vacated factories, as fruitful ground for their own assumption of power," but did not expand upon the root causes beyond this slight recognition.³⁰⁹ A later editorial in the Nova Scotian publication accorded responsibility for the crisis not to any particular socioeconomic condition in Quebec, but rather the broader Canadian permissiveness. On October 22, its editorial on the matter argued that all Canadians were partially and "unwittingly" responsible for the crisis. According to the newspaper, the populace had been imperilling democratic governments and freedoms "[t]hrough apathy, laziness, indifference, complacency, a tendency to downgrade democracy

³⁰⁶ Dwight C. Smith Jr., "Mafia: The Prototypical Alien Conspiracy," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 423, no. 1 (January 1976): 81, doi: 10.1177/000271627642300108, 75; 76.

³⁰⁷ Smith, "Mafia: The Prototypical Alien Conspiracy," 81; 83-84.

³⁰⁸ "It can happen here!," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 7, 1970.

³⁰⁹ "Terrorism in Canada," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 7, 1970.

and ridicule politicians, ... and an excessive tolerance of destructive and violent dissent.”³¹⁰ These brief references to the crisis’ roots in internal tensions, the Quebec economy, and the Canadian attitude constituted the only editorial efforts, in any of Eastern Canada’s most widely circulated English-language publications, to explore the crisis as resulting from internal deficiencies or dissent. This lack of prolonged or widespread attention to assessing the internal sources of the FLQ’s discontent promoted the further framing of the October Crisis as an alien conspiracy.

Framing the FLQ as not reflective of Quebecers more broadly

In a similar vein, several editorials in the Eastern Canadian newspapers took great pains to differentiate the FLQ from Quebecers, thus marginalizing and “othering” the terrorists.³¹¹ The *Evening Telegram* cautioned against imagining the FLQ as being representative or reflective of the Quebec separatist movement, expressing that the terrorist group’s new tactics “will be flatly condemned by even the most ardent Quebec separatists” who relied upon democratic means and the ballot-box as means to effect change.³¹² The *Chronicle-Herald* also suggested that the terrorism would “repel” innumerable separatists of a more moderate stripe,³¹³ and the *Guardian* sought to distance the FLQ from the remainder of Quebec and Canada through its depictions of the group as a “few mad dogs” and “a despicable minority.”³¹⁴ Another editorial cautioned against permitting the crisis to evolve into greater intergroup tensions, with the paper expressing anxiety that the backlash against the FLQ would mushroom “into an English-Canadian condemnation of all French-Canadians or all Quebec” and noting that the government bore the responsibility to forestall the battle against the FLQ from devolving into such more generalized racial tensions.³¹⁵ Again, this framing of the crisis as the actions and convictions of a small minority of Quebecers promoted the image of the crisis as remote and restricted. This is an intriguing observation given that it suggests that the editorial discourse upon the October Crisis was predominantly episodic as

³¹⁰ “Youth’s other voice,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 22, 1970.

³¹¹ The media’s tendency to “other” groups involved in terrorist incidents has been the focus of numerable studies post-9/11. For how the media has tended to frame terror in terms emphasizing the link between terrorism and the Islamic faith, see, for instance, Sofia Hayati Yusof, Fauziah Hassan, Md Salleh Hassan, and Mohd Nizam Osman, “The Framing of International Media on Islam and Terrorism,” *European Scientific Journal* 9, no. 8 (March 2013): 104-121, <https://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/viewFile/881/924>; Sasha K. Campbell, “Domestic Terrorism in the Canadian News Media: a Framing Analysis of Canadian-Connected Terrorism in 2013 Newspaper Articles” (M.A. thesis, University of Waterloo, 2015); Kimberly A. Powell, “Framing Islam/Creating Fear: An Analysis of U.S. Media Coverage of Terrorism from 2011-2016,” *Religions* 9, no. 9 (2018): 1-15, <https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/9/9/257>; Kimberly A. Powell, “Framing Islam: An analysis of media coverage of terrorism since 9/11,” *Communication Studies* 62 (2011): 90-112, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10510974.2011.533599>.

³¹² “It can happen here!,” *Evening Telegram* (St. John’s, NL), October 7, 1970.

³¹³ “Terrorism in Canada,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 7, 1970.

³¹⁴ “Unity Prevails,” *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 20, 1970.

³¹⁵ “A grave situation,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 17, 1970.

opposed to thematic, focusing specifically upon the current crisis with little protracted attention to situating the crisis' emergence within the broader socioeconomic and sociocultural conditions.³¹⁶

Framing the nation's next steps beyond the shock and grief of October 1970

Atlantic newspapers offered few suggestions about how Canada should move forward, beyond the crushing of the FLQ and prospective resumption of capital punishment. Only three editorials offered any indication of how the nation should proceed after the abductors and murderers were apprehended and prosecuted. Although the *Evening Telegram* recognized the necessity of “wiping out the causes, real or fancied, that pollute and distort the minds of men” and which had allowed “such a callous disregard for human life” to take root, it did not examine those causes or recommend how they should be addressed.³¹⁷ The *Telegraph-Journal* argued only for the consideration among the United Nations General Assembly of the proposal of a pledge among all members “not to receive and harbor kidnappers who arrive within their borders; and further, to arrest and bring them to trial.”³¹⁸ The *Chronicle-Herald* simply chastised the government's opposition for devoting themselves to interrogating the government for its response to the crisis as opposed to aiding in the search for remedies to the unnamed issues facing Quebec and Canada.³¹⁹

In summary

The four Atlantic Canadian papers were unanimous in framing the FLQ in condemnatory and unsympathetic terms, applying the descriptors of terrorists, extremists, fanatics, and violent and savage murderers and bandits, while constructing the image of a dangerous foe which, like a cancer, required prompt excision from the national body. The group posed a direct and significant challenge to Canadian democratic institutions and society, intending to push the nation to insurrection and its ultimate

³¹⁶ This classification is drawn from previous studies of the media's framing of terrorist events in particular. Political scientist Shanto Iyengar was one of the first to characterize frames as either thematic – “plac[ing] public issues in some more general or abstract context” with an attention to the issue's “general outcomes or conditions” – or episodic – appearing more like “a case study or event-oriented report” with its focus upon the details of one particular case rather than, for instance, the issues which precipitated that event (Iyengar, *Is Anyone Responsible?*, 14-15). This is a classification which has persisted into studies on terrorism in the media. See Zizi Papacharissi and Maria de Fatima Oliveira, “News Frames Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of Frames Employed in Terrorism Coverage in U.S. and U.K. Newspapers,” *International Journal of Press/Politics* 13, no. 1 (January 2008): 52-74, doi: 10.1177/1940161207312676; Powell, “Framing Islam: An analysis of media coverage of terrorism since 9/11,” 105-108). The means by which a particular issue is framed is important given how it may influence how readers subsequently assess the roots of or responsibility for the rise of that issue. Studies have concluded that episodic framings tend to engender among readers individualistic and personal “attributions of responsibility” for the issue or crisis, whereas thematic framings elicit situational, systemic, and societal accordance of blame (Joseph N. Cappella and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 84; Iyengar, *Is Anyone Responsible?*, 2-3; 15-16; Price and Tewksbury, 203-204). Thus, this is an avenue worthy of further study with respect to the October Crisis.

³¹⁷ “Canada: A time of trial,” *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 19, 1970.

³¹⁸ “There Is No Magic Answer,” *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 24, 1970.

³¹⁹ “Where is the unity?,” *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 31, 1970.

dismantling, and thus constituted a legitimate threat to the national order. In contrast to this image of the terrorist and brutal FLQ, the papers martyred Laporte and emphasized the innocence and worthiness of the victims and suffering of the families, in a frame which heightened the wickedness and depravity of the FLQ. Perhaps encouraged by this villainization of the FLQ, the editorials framed the nation as steeped in anxiety regarding the crisis' potential to escalate further. By documenting the increasing fears that the FLQ would provoke an economic downturn and broad-scale civil war and insurrection, and commit further abductions, selective assassinations, air hijackings, the hostages' murder, and attacks against national transport systems, the papers presented the FLQ as a viable threat to the nation's survival.

In framing the governmental response to the developments of October 1970, the Atlantic Canadian newspapers evinced a tendency early in the month to acknowledge the positive and negative aspects of both of the Trudeau government's courses of action – negotiating with the terrorists or refusing to accede to their demands. In weighing the impossibility of the FLQ's demands and the potential for concessions to encourage further violence, against the government's obligation to its diplomatic personnel and the threat to the victim's lives, the papers thus depicted the government as facing a dilemma. However, once the federal government called the army into Ottawa and Quebec in an aid to the civil power capacity and proclaimed the WMA, twenty-three of the twenty-six editorials that assumed a stance on the crisis aligned themselves in support of the government's response. The papers defended the decision to deploy the armed forces, depicted the government's hard-line reaction as overdue and insufficiently firm, and dismissed the political opposition and claims that the measures had transformed Canada into a police state or military dictatorship. In so doing, and through various justifications of the WMA, these editorials framed the government's assumption of a firm opposition to terror and the invocation of the WMA as defensible and appropriate. Two editorials expressed a concern respecting the WMA's potential to enable the abrogation of civil liberties, two raised doubts about the WMA's effectiveness in saving the hostages, and one contested the government's failure to provide the public with sufficient details of the extent of the crisis. That such concerns respecting the WMA appeared in merely three editorials in Atlantic Canada, divided between two papers, suggested a souring of opinion towards the WMA in the final week of October – but gave no indication of deviation from or disapproval of the newspapers' broader tough-on-terror stance. This finding of broad Eastern Canadian editorial approval of the government's hard-line stance and invocation of the WMA supports the conclusions of Cohen-Almagor, Siegel, and Hewitt.

Other framings appeared in the Atlantic Canadian editorials that sought to contextualize the crisis both internally and internationally. Five editorials, representative of all four newspapers, framed the Canadian populace as supportive of the government's invocation of the WMA and its refusal to accede to the FLQ, even as several framed the nation as shocked by the abductions. Three expressed the urgent necessity of national unity and solidarity in a time of crisis, also supporting Cohen-Almagor and Siegel's findings that

English-Canadian newspapers tended to emphasize this theme. Many editorials treated terrorism as a construct foreign or alien to Canada (confirming Siegel's similar conclusion). Indeed, ten editorials in the *Telegraph-Journal*, *Chronicle-Herald*, and *Evening Telegram* emphasized the FLQ's apparent international inspirations and connections, framing the crisis as an extension or outgrowth of the international waves of insurgency and revolutionary fervour. By comparison, few editorials discussed the internal roots of the FLQ's dissent and grievances, instead treating the FLQ as a minority group far divorced from the Quebec mainstream. Consequently, the Eastern Canadian editorials appear to have framed the FLQ crisis as a product of an alien conspiracy and ideology that had invaded an innocent Canadian nation with the intent to dismantle it. Thus, among the three classifications of editorials which van Dijk delineated, the Atlantic Canadian newspapers included few "Explanation" editorials seeking to "explain the situation" and conclude why it occurred. "Evaluation and Moral" editorials were also rare, with few recommendations regarding the government's future steps beyond the prosecution of the abductors.³²⁰ Such a framing could, of course, not merely influence how Canadians themselves perceived of the crisis, its roots, and its most appropriate resolutions, but also how the Canadian and Quebec governments responded to the crisis beyond the immediate capture of the terrorists responsible.

³²⁰ van Dijk, "Race, riots and the press," 231.

CHAPTER III: WESTERN CANADIAN FRAMINGS OF THE OCTOBER CRISIS

Compared to the thirty-seven editorials that appeared in the Atlantic Canadian publications, Western Canada's four leading English newspapers – the Regina *Leader-Post*, Vancouver *Sun*, *Edmonton Journal*, and *Winnipeg Free Press* – contained fifty-seven editorials. The timing of these editorials was similar to those of Eastern Canada, in that while some editorials responded immediately to Cross' abduction, and Laporte's abduction provoked further comment, the newspapers commented upon and interpreted the developments persistently only after Ottawa invoked the WMA and Laporte was killed. In this regard, the *Winnipeg Free Press* constituted the outlier, with Laporte's abduction seeming to spark the shift for its editors towards editorializing on the matter with regularity and consistency.³²¹

³²¹ Among these newspapers, the *Leader-Post* contained the fewest editorials regarding the FLQ crisis, publishing nine, primarily concentrated in the month's final ten days. The *Edmonton Journal* offered twelve editorials, all but two published from October 16 onward. The *Sun* and *Winnipeg Free Press* editorialized on the crisis with the greatest frequency. The former provided thirteen editorials analyzing the events, boasting one on October 7, one on October 14, and the remaining eleven after the WMA's implementation, while the *Winnipeg Free Press* contained the greatest analysis of events with twenty-three editorials. This paper demonstrated the most consistent coverage of the crisis, publishing one editorial prior to Laporte's abduction, four post-abduction and pre-WMA, and twenty-eight dispersed throughout the days following the WMA's invocation. It is difficult to assess why such variations occurred in the degree of coverage accorded to the events of October. Saskatchewan was relatively untouched by the crisis, perhaps contributing to the scant coverage of the events, while some 1,000 paratroopers of the Canadian Airborne Regiment had been relocated from Edmonton to St. Hubert to aid the police (Canadian Press, "Commandoes, paratroops moved to Montreal area," *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 16, 1970). The more substantial coverage in the Vancouver *Sun* may be expected, given the intent of Vancouver Mayor Tom Campbell to deploy the WMA in an assault against his political opponents, the provincial passage of the order-in-council to dismiss the province's pro-FLQ and pro-revolution instructors, and the placing of a motion before Vancouver's city council encouraging the prohibition of any insurgent or subversive demonstrations or rallies upon public property ("City council; Bid to ban protests withdrawn," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 27, 1970; Nick Hills, "B.C.'s use of War Act can only do harm - Turner," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 27, 1970). Those developments, as well as the WMA more broadly, had provoked tangible backlash in British Columbia, in the October 17 protest of approximately 500 to 1,000 dissenters, primarily associated with the Vancouver Liberation Front, against the act ("Courthouse crowd protests war act," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 17, 1970; "Protestors outside court vow support for the FLQ," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 19, 1970), and in the provincial NDP's and Young Socialists' opposition to the WMA's threat to civil rights ("NDP fears abuse of War Act powers," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 19, 1970; "Left wingers thought targets of War Act," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 20, 1970; "Barrett supports Douglas on War Measures stand," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 22, 1970). As such, the relatively high coverage of the crisis in Vancouver may be attributed to the degree to which the emergency measures possessed tangible impacts in the provincial political and social sphere. By the same token, the greater attention to the crisis in Winnipeg may be connected to the crisis' practical impact on that province. An estimated four hundred troops of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery were relocated from CFB Shilo to St. Hubert to aid in the maintenance of civil order (Ronald Lebel, "Disagrees with Trudeau: Choquette won't identify 314 suspects in prisons," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 22, 1970), and a sign proclaiming "Freedom for the FLQ" in the window of a Winnipeg book store had prompted police demands to remove the sign and the owner's decrying of the loss of free expression (Canadian Press, "FLQ sign stays," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 17, 1970; "Police tell bookshop to remove poster," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 17, 1970). That latter incident had incited debate in Manitoba as to the necessity and suitability of the WMA, with papers publishing the October 17 march of some two hundred youth down Portage Avenue in protest of the emergency measures ("More Than 200 March," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 19, 1970), and the establishment of an "ad hoc committee to protect civil liberties" among University of Winnipeg students and staff ("Civil Liberties Group Formed," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 17,

Cumulatively, the Western Canadian renditions of the October Crisis were highly comparable to the framings adopted in Eastern Canada. Portraying the FLQ in similarly condemning terms, emphasizing the terrorists' threat to the Canadian nation, heightening their villainy contrasted to their victims' innocence and honour, and affirming the group's capacity to inflict further terror, the Western Canadian newspapers rendered the FLQ as a tenable and authentic threat. Although not devoting themselves as thoroughly to the "dilemma" framework so prominent in Eastern Canada, the Western Canadian editorials concurred with their Atlantic counterparts in broadly endorsing the government's response and invocation of the WMA. More editorials voiced concerns regarding the WMA than in Eastern Canada, centring on civil liberties infringements, questions as to the WMA's effectiveness, and the government's problematic secrecy regarding the crisis, although this framing remained minimal compared to that defending the government's measures. The Canadian populace emerged, again, as a body immensely supportive of the government's handling of the crisis, even as it reeled in shock at the events, and that shock at terrorism's inroads in Quebec was one factor demonstrating the papers' "alien conspiracy" comprehension of the FLQ. Indeed, Western Canadian editorial staffs approached the terrorists with an "othering" focus similar to that appearing in Eastern Canada, distancing the FLQ from the Quebec mainstream and emphasizing the foreignness of the group's tactics and ideology. With the notable exception of the *Edmonton Journal*, the Western Canadian papers devoted greater efforts to stressing this alien nature of the FLQ rather than seeking to explore its systemic grievances and origins of unrest. Overall, the Western Canadian editorials depicted the FLQ, WMA, and October Crisis in terms broadly analogous to those utilized in Eastern Canada, dominantly endorsing the government's handling of the crisis while (with the exception of the *Edmonton Journal*) framing the crisis as more of an "alien conspiracy" than the product of internal systemic factors.

Framing the FLQ - The descriptors used

In the crisis' initial days, as the nation shuddered in horror at its affliction with political abductions, the Western Canadian editorials characterized the FLQ as "terrorists,"³²² "criminals,"³²³ "extremists,"³²⁴

1970). It appears that the greater the crisis' permeation into a province, the greater that province's editorial reaction to its developments. The *Free Press*' greater coverage of the crisis may have also stemmed from the higher percentage of French residents in the province, with Manitoba boasting a French population of 6.1% in 1971, compared to 3.4% in Saskatchewan, 2.9% in Alberta, and 1.7% in British Columbia (Statistics Canada, "1996 Census: Mother tongue, home language and knowledge of languages").

³²² "The terrible decision," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 7, 1970; "Agonizing choice," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 7, 1970; "The abduction of Mr. Cross," *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 7, 1970; "Death for Treason," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 8, 1970.

³²³ "Agonizing choice," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 7, 1970.

³²⁴ "The abduction of Mr. Cross," *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 7, 1970; "Death for Treason," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 8, 1970.

and the “lunatic”³²⁵ or “manic fringe of the separatist movement.”³²⁶ Cross’ abduction appeared as a “cruel”³²⁷ or “heinous crime,”³²⁸ an outrage,³²⁹ and a “brutal”³³⁰ and “repugnant” action fuelled only by “crazed aims.”³³¹ For the *Sun*, the FLQ’s adoption of political abductions appeared demonstrative of the group’s capability and acumen. Such abductions were described as “diabolically ingenious,” particularly in their “selection of a representative of a foreign country as the pawn.” Such targets played upon the host government’s responsibility for the safety of foreign diplomats and representatives within its boundaries, thus producing internal and external pressure upon the government to comply with the ransom demands.³³² Hence, the FLQ were not merely terrorists, extremists, and criminals, but cleverly devious and capable ones at that.

After Laporte’s abduction, depictions of the FLQ diversified but remained entrenched in their broader derogatory framing. The FLQ continued to appear as “terrorists”³³³ and “extremists,”³³⁴ as well as “brutish and unscrupulous men,” a “murderous fanatical minority,”³³⁵ “criminal racist fanatics,”³³⁶ and “a group of megalomaniacs engaged in acts of treason.”³³⁷ The *Edmonton Journal* applauded Parti Québécois leader René Lévesque’s profile of the FLQ as “a type of sewer rat with which every society is afflicted” as an “apt description” of the organization.³³⁸ Condemning any effort to elevate the FLQ beyond its base identity of terrorists, the *Leader-Post* and *Winnipeg Free Press* described its imprisoned members not as “political prisoners” but “convicted dynamiters, bombers, bank robbers, and terrorists,”³³⁹ and sheer criminals detained “because they broke the law.”³⁴⁰ The *Sun*, meanwhile, continued to

³²⁵ “The abduction of Mr. Cross,” *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 7, 1970.

³²⁶ “The terrible decision,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 7, 1970.

³²⁷ “The terrible decision,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 7, 1970.

³²⁸ “Agonizing choice,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 7, 1970.

³²⁹ “The terrible decision,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 7, 1970; “Death for Treason,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 8, 1970.

³³⁰ “Death for Treason,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 8, 1970.

³³¹ “Agonizing choice,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 7, 1970.

³³² “The terrible decision,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 7, 1970.

³³³ “Outrage,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 12, 1970; “Mechanism’s the word,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 14, 1970; “Time of trial,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 14, 1970; “Intellectual sterility,” *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 14, 1970; “Convicted criminals the correct term,” *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 14, 1970; “Go on and bleed,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 16, 1970; “Stand firm,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 16, 1970; “A Tough Line,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 15, 1970; “A choice between evils,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 17, 1970; “Visit Postponed,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 17, 1970; See also “What Political Prisoners?,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 14, 1970.

³³⁴ “Grasping the Nettle,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 16, 1970; “Desperate Cure,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 17, 1970.

³³⁵ “Mechanism’s the word,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 14, 1970.

³³⁶ “Go on and bleed,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 16, 1970.

³³⁷ “Visit Postponed,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 17, 1970.

³³⁸ “Stand firm,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 16, 1970.

³³⁹ “Convicted criminals the correct term,” *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 14, 1970.

³⁴⁰ “What Political Prisoners?,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 14, 1970.

emphasize the FLQ's capabilities in describing the group as "skilled, and obviously well dug-in,"³⁴¹ even as the papers identified the abductions as "horrifying"³⁴² "outrages"³⁴³ and "one of the most despicable of crimes."³⁴⁴

Laporte's murder cemented these constructions of the FLQ's immorality and viciousness. While still termed "terrorists,"³⁴⁵ extremists,³⁴⁶ and "fanatics,"³⁴⁷ the papers now framed the group as "assassins,"³⁴⁸ "traitors,"³⁴⁹ "anarchists,"³⁵⁰ "grisly extortionists,"³⁵¹ and representative of the "sinister underground."³⁵² The descriptors of "madmen"³⁵³ and "maniacs"³⁵⁴ implied a group beyond control, and whose escalation was tied to a psychological root. Their "fiendishly cruel,"³⁵⁵ "demented," "inhuman,"³⁵⁶ and "cold-blooded"³⁵⁷ actions had inspired fear. The same editorials condemned Laporte's death as a "senseless,"³⁵⁸ "ghastly and barbaric act,"³⁵⁹ and indicative of "revolutionary violence"³⁶⁰ and "tragic lawlessness in Quebec."³⁶¹

Beyond this, the *Edmonton Journal* adopted a combative understanding of the crisis, describing the country as "at war" with the terrorist faction.³⁶² Similar to editorials in Atlantic Canada, Western Canadian treatments used medical terms to construct the FLQ as a disease or illness. The *Leader-Post* termed the group "a cancer in our society" demanding elimination,³⁶³ while the *Free Press* classified the

³⁴¹ "A choice between evils," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 17, 1970.

³⁴² "Time of trial," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 14, 1970.

³⁴³ "Mechanism's the word," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 14, 1970.

³⁴⁴ "Mechanism's the word," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 14, 1970.

³⁴⁵ "Unified by grief and horror," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 19, 1970; "Right to know," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 24, 1970; "Montreal's reply," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 27, 1970; "Telling All," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 28, 1970. See also "A regrettable necessity," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 20, 1970; "For the sake of emphasis," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 22, 1970; "The Public Should Be Told," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 26, 1970.

³⁴⁶ "Challenge and Response," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 20, 1970.

³⁴⁷ "Death Knell of Separatism," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 19, 1970; "A regrettable necessity," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 20, 1970.

³⁴⁸ "Canada or anarchy," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 19, 1970. See also "Challenge and Response," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 20, 1970.

³⁴⁹ "To Secure Democracy," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 19, 1970.

³⁵⁰ "Canada or anarchy," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 19, 1970.

³⁵¹ "Unified by grief and horror," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 19, 1970.

³⁵² "Canada or anarchy," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 19, 1970.

³⁵³ "Unified by grief and horror," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 19, 1970.

³⁵⁴ "A regrettable necessity," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 20, 1970.

³⁵⁵ "Many questions, few answers," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 27, 1970.

³⁵⁶ "The over-riding concern," *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 21, 1970.

³⁵⁷ "Death Knell of Separatism," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 19, 1970.

³⁵⁸ "Unified by grief and horror," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 19, 1970.

³⁵⁹ "Canada or anarchy," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 19, 1970.

³⁶⁰ "Unified by grief and horror," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 19, 1970. See also "A regrettable necessity," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 20, 1970.

³⁶¹ "A regrettable necessity," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 20, 1970.

³⁶² "Canada or anarchy," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 19, 1970.

³⁶³ "A unified front," *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 22, 1970.

FLQ as an outgrowth of “[t]he disease of separatism”³⁶⁴ and spoke of a nation succumbing to the “contagions of the world.”³⁶⁵ This conceptualization of the FLQ as a cancerous affliction, as terrorists, extremists, fanatics, and a savage and inhuman foe, aligns with the group’s depictions in Atlantic Canada. The emphasis upon the group’s violence, destruction, and cruelty, combined with the *Sun*’s depiction of the group’s intelligence and skill, constructed a framing of the FLQ as a formidable adversary.

Framing the FLQ as an affront and challenge to Canadian society and democracy

Exacerbating the FLQ’s potential to inflict substantial damage and violence was its intent, according to the Western Canadian papers, to dismantle the nation’s democratic system and, indeed, its entire societal and political structure. The FLQ sought to challenge and demolish the Canadian democratic governmental system. Adopting the language of United Church of Canada moderator Dr. Robert McClure, the *Sun* described the FLQ as seeking to “dislocate the whole machine of government.”³⁶⁶ The *Free Press* emphasized that the FLQ considered itself “at war with Canada and with the Quebec government,” resolving “to weaken government by intimidating and mocking it; to destroy Canada.”³⁶⁷ Through their demands for the release of convicted criminals, the *Leader-Post* proclaimed that the FLQ sought the subversion of “the political and judicial processes of a democratic nation.”³⁶⁸ For the *Sun*, Laporte’s assassination was indicative of the FLQ’s “repudiation” of and intent to eradicate the democratic ideals that Laporte symbolized.³⁶⁹ In its place, the *Edmonton Journal* observed that the group intended to establish their own regime, warning that “[m]en who gain power by terror will rule by terror.”³⁷⁰ As such, the *Edmonton Journal* conceived of a group which “threatens the total nation” by seeking to establish a rule devoid of all humanity or mercy.³⁷¹

The FLQ not only imperilled Canada’s governmental institutions, but the very existence of an integrated Canadian nation. The *Sun* described the FLQ as seeking to unravel “our ... national fabric,”³⁷² and launching an attack upon “our beliefs and institutions.”³⁷³ The group had thus incited “a time of national peril”³⁷⁴ in which “the safety of the nation is at stake” due to the emergence of an organization seeking to establish itself as a “parallel power”³⁷⁵ and assault “the Canadian entity.”³⁷⁶ Readers of the

³⁶⁴ “Desperate Cure,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 17, 1970.

³⁶⁵ “To Secure Democracy,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 19, 1970.

³⁶⁶ “The terrible decision,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 7, 1970.

³⁶⁷ “Death for Treason,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 8, 1970.

³⁶⁸ “Convicted criminals the correct term,” *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 14, 1970.

³⁶⁹ “Unified by grief and horror,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 19, 1970.

³⁷⁰ “Time of trial,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 14, 1970.

³⁷¹ “Canada or anarchy,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 19, 1970.

³⁷² “The terrible decision,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 7, 1970.

³⁷³ “Go on and bleed,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 16, 1970.

³⁷⁴ “Unified by grief and horror,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 19, 1970.

³⁷⁵ “For the sake of emphasis,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 22, 1970.

Edmonton Journal learned of the FLQ's intent "to destroy our society and our nation,"³⁷⁷ and the paper's comparison of the crisis to the Second World War in terms of its significance to the nation's future.³⁷⁸ The *Winnipeg Free Press* similarly warned that the FLQ posed a threat to the entirety of "Canadian society,"³⁷⁹ which it sought to destroy³⁸⁰ by fraying national allegiances and pitting citizens against each other.³⁸¹ In framing the FLQ as a menace to the nation's political institutions, and the Canadian entity and society more broadly, Western Canadian editors framed the FLQ in terms comparable to the Eastern Canadian editorials.

Framing the victims as innocent martyrs

Also reflective of the Eastern Canadian editorials, the four Western Canadian publications editorially framed Cross and Laporte in terms emphasizing their innocence and commendable natures. The *Sun* described Cross as an "innocent bystander"³⁸² and Cross and Laporte as "innocent men."³⁸³ The *Edmonton Journal* similarly reflected solemnly upon the targeting of such "innocent victims."³⁸⁴ The editorials also emphasized the hostages' value as individuals and officials, particularly with respect to Laporte. The *Winnipeg Free Press* mourned the loss of "a distinguished French-Canadian federalist,"³⁸⁵ while the *Edmonton Journal* lamented Laporte's death as the first casualty in the war with the FLQ, classifying him as "[a] fine journalist and parliamentarian" who had been "killed senselessly and brutally to a useless purpose."³⁸⁶ Meanwhile, the *Sun* described him as having been "chosen by terrorists as the surrogate victim for us all," whose life was thus "symbolic of the democratic decencies and his murder by madmen as a token of repudiation of those ideals."³⁸⁷ In doing so, the *Sun* showed the same tendency to martyrize Laporte as Eastern Canadian editorials. Thus, although devising a narrative frame for the hostages was clearly not a priority among the Western Canadian papers, those editorials which did characterize the victims emphasized their innocence.

³⁷⁶ "A regrettable necessity," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 20, 1970.

³⁷⁷ "Justified action," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 17, 1970.

³⁷⁸ "Canada or anarchy," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 19, 1970.

³⁷⁹ "A Tough Line," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 15, 1970.

³⁸⁰ "To Secure Democracy," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 19, 1970.

³⁸¹ "Death for Treason," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 8, 1970.

³⁸² "The terrible decision," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 7, 1970.

³⁸³ "A choice between evils," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 17, 1970.

³⁸⁴ "Time of trial," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 14, 1970.

³⁸⁵ "Challenge and Response," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 20, 1970.

³⁸⁶ "Canada or anarchy," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 19, 1970.

³⁸⁷ "Unified by grief and horror," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 19, 1970.

Framing the government as facing a dilemma

Similar to five editorials in Eastern Canada, the concern for Cross and Laporte contributed to an initial conceptualization within four Western Canadian editorials of the government as facing a dilemma in its decision whether to capitulate to the terrorist demands. The *Edmonton Journal*, in its first editorial on the abductions, evinced such a frame. Capitulating to terrorist blackmail would be “loathsome,” for once the government established the precedent and “the FLQ terrorists have tasted success, there’s no telling where it will end.” More abductions, threats, and demands would occur, motivating other groups to adopt the techniques. “It would be anarchy,” the *Journal* concluded, and “intolerable.” There was “a human life at stake,” and not acceding to the terrorists’ demands could produce Cross’ death, an “agonizing” outcome humanitarily and for how it would hamper international relations by signalling to foreign governments “that we can’t guarantee the safety of their representatives while in Canada.” Accordingly, the government’s decision was an “agonizing choice.”³⁸⁸

The other three Western Canadian papers also initially characterized the government as embroiled in a dilemma,³⁸⁹ with the *Leader-Post* indicating that only those individuals “closest to the action can say what should be done.”³⁹⁰ Such classifications of the “dilemma” were followed with arguments advocating a hard-line stance. As such, the *British Columbian*, *Manitoban*, and *Saskatchewan papers* viewed the crisis as a dilemma nominally rather than practically. With the exception of the *Edmonton Journal*, which objectively delineated both alternatives available to authorities, the Western Canadian papers did not adopt the “dilemma” framing with comparable frequency and depth as Eastern Canadian editors.

Framing a nation in fear of further escalation

As the *Edmonton Journal* described, part of the government’s dilemma arose from concerns that the FLQ’s terrorist program would escalate to more frequent and more destructive attacks against democracy, the nation, and its citizenry. Western Canadian editors shared this anxiety regarding the crisis’ potential to deteriorate further and for further abductions. The *Sun*, like the *Telegraph-Journal*, worried that, if the FLQ terrorists were allowed to proliferate, further abductions could be “expect[ed]” and even “the “selective assassination” of prominent Canadian politicians.”³⁹¹ Since previous abductions in Latin America and Jordan had “led to actual murder, as a means of coercing governments,” the *Winnipeg Free Press* indicated that the prospect of political murder constituted “a new danger to society.”³⁹² Together

³⁸⁸ “Agonizing choice,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 7, 1970.

³⁸⁹ “The terrible decision,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 7, 1970; “Outrage,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 12, 1970.

³⁹⁰ “The abduction of Mr. Cross,” *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 7, 1970.

³⁹¹ “The terrible decision,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 7, 1970.

³⁹² “Death for Treason,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 8, 1970. Such concerns of assassinations recalled those noted as having appeared in the Atlantic Canadian papers, specifically the *Evening Telegram*.

with the threat of additional abductions, these concerns for the safety of prominent figures provoked the *Winnipeg Free Press* to insist on the need for “more adequate safeguards for diplomatic personnel” in Canada,³⁹³ and the *Leader-Post* to urge “the utmost protection” of diplomats and politicians in Canada.³⁹⁴ The *Sun* painted Canadians “everywhere” as “in fear for themselves or their families,”³⁹⁵ intimating a broader panic about how far the crisis might devolve.

Other editorials centred on concern for the hostages’ well-being. On October 14, the *Leader-Post* observed a “tension and great anxiety about the fate of the two men.”³⁹⁶ Following Laporte’s murder, this concern refocused on the mounting consternation over whether Cross would meet a similar fate, with the *Sun* similarly noting on October 27 that “hope wanes for the safety of James Cross.”³⁹⁷

Beyond these specific threats of abductions, assassinations, and murder, several editorials mirrored a general anxiety regarding the extent to which the FLQ’s activities could intensify. The *Winnipeg Free Press* ominously characterized the abductions as instigating a “new wave of terrorism”³⁹⁸ and potentially a new “pattern of political violence,”³⁹⁹ much like how the *Evening Telegram* had described the abductions as representing a new trend in the FLQ’s tactics. For some papers, these broader concerns centered on how the crisis would affect the nation more generally. For instance, the *Edmonton Journal*’s concerns focused on the “untold damage” and defacement that the FLQ’s conduct would bring upon the Quebec and Canadian image as a society and land premised upon law and order. Expressing unease regarding how the crisis would surely deter immigration to and investment in Quebec,⁴⁰⁰ the paper foretold that not only were Cross and Laporte’s lives at stake, but the nation’s “dignity and honor.”⁴⁰¹ Thus, like the Atlantic Canadian editorials, the Western Canadian papers expressed apprehension about how the crisis could intensify in scope and destructiveness, emphasizing many of the same fears about the potential for further abductions, assassinations, new waves of terrorism, and blows to the Canadian reputation and economy.

Framing the government’s hard-line response as the most appropriate course of action

Having recognized the crisis’ potential to deepen, the *Leader-Post*, *Edmonton Journal*, *Sun*, and *Free Press* presented the government’s stance against the FLQ through predominantly positive frames. Of the

³⁹³ “Death for Treason,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 8, 1970.

³⁹⁴ “The abduction of Mr. Cross,” *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 7, 1970. Such recommendations were also reminiscent of the *Chronicle Herald* and *Telegraph-Journal*.

³⁹⁵ “Unified by grief and horror,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 19, 1970.

³⁹⁶ “Convicted criminals the correct term,” *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 14, 1970.

³⁹⁷ “Many questions, few answers,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 27, 1970.

³⁹⁸ “Outrage,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 12, 1970.

³⁹⁹ “Death for Treason,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 8, 1970.

⁴⁰⁰ “Agonizing choice,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 7, 1970.

⁴⁰¹ “Stand firm,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 16, 1970. This concern echoes that observed in Atlantic Canada, wherein the *Chronicle-Herald* had noted the detrimental economic impact the crisis could bear.

forty-two editorials assuming an attitudinal stance on the government's response, thirty-three positively assessed the government's posture. This pro-government framing of the crisis was, statistically, the dominant perspective throughout October. Two of the four *Leader-Post* editorials favoured the government (with both those critical of the measures only voicing discontent regarding the government's secrecy rather than the WMA itself). Seven of the eight *Edmonton Journal* editorials adopted a similar stance on the crisis, as did eight of the fourteen *Sun* editorials, and sixteen of the eighteen *Free Press* editorials. The dominant framing within Western Canadian papers constructed the government's tough-on-terror stance as the appropriate response to a crisis seemingly dwindling from control.

Unlike in Eastern Canada, the government's decision to deploy the Armed Forces to aid the civil power did not elicit any substantial or concerted assessment in the Western Canadian editorials. The only reference to the military's deployment in the crisis appeared in two *Winnipeg Free Press* editorials. Describing how the crisis had compelled the Department of National Defence to rethink its plans to downsize the military, the *Free Press* recommended that it consider strengthening the militia to "take over at least some of the duties now being shouldered by regular troops" in an emergency. "There will be other crises" which necessitated defence forces, the editorial intoned, along with "our commitments to our friends and allies." Accordingly, the editorial recommended increasing the strength of Canada's reserve forces so that the country could address internal homefront crises.⁴⁰² The *Winnipeg Free Press* reiterated its support for deploying the Canadian forces in an aid to the civil power role in its October 27 editorial, praising the Defence minister's wise decision to reconsider military cuts in light of the crisis. Indicating that Canadians must be prepared for a future terrorist emergency, the paper's lauding of this reassessment⁴⁰³ indicated its support for a militaristic stance against terror.

The Regina *Leader-Post* contained the fewest editorials in Western Canada endorsing the government's stance in the crisis. Its first effort to come to grips with assessing the most appropriate response to the FLQ was in its October 14 editorial. While not expressly voicing support for the government's tough stance, the paper clearly implied its disapproval of any capitulation to the FLQ by characterizing the group's blackmail as requiring that "political and judicial processes ... be subverted and smashed by officials sworn to uphold them."⁴⁰⁴ On October 21, the *Leader-Post* made its defence of the hard line more explicit. It did so through a two-pronged approach: framing the government as having had no alternative but to respond sternly to the FLQ, and framing the WMA as the only legislation available to do so. The paper described the government as having been "forced to invoke" the WMA, due to the severity of the FLQ's activities and threat. By the *Leader-Post*'s assessment, the WMA had been justified

⁴⁰² "Too Much Cutback," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 24, 1970.

⁴⁰³ "Realistic Readiness," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 27, 1970.

⁴⁰⁴ "Convicted criminals the correct term," *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 14, 1970.

to address the crisis with requisite haste, given the “over-riding concern” that the perpetrators be urgently “brought to justice” and the FLQ “uprooted.”⁴⁰⁵ Hence, the *Leader-Post* situated itself in defence of the government and WMA, dismissing negotiations with the FLQ because these would repudiate the democratic processes, and framing the hard line and WMA as the only options available to the government.

The *Edmonton Journal* likewise positioned itself among the government’s supporters, publishing seven editorials justifying its measures. Following its initial expression of the government as facing a dilemma on October 7, its October 14 editorial firmed its support for a hard line against the FLQ, assuming a definitive stance opposed to any capitulations. While these two lives were “important,” and demanded “[a]ll reasonable efforts” to effect their return, the paper cautioned against serious accessions. Not only were the editors uncertain that capitulations would save the hostages, but any submission would promote the FLQ’s resumption of such tactics with “more outrageous demands,” signalling the nation’s descent towards anarchy and the FLQ’s “rule by terror.” The *Journal* exhorted Canadians to aid in the defeat of the terrorists by supporting “their governments in a firm refusal to surrender to blackmail.”⁴⁰⁶ This defence of a hard-line stance due to the need to prevent further terror and anarchy persisted throughout October. The paper contended on October 16 that the nation could not “afford to surrender to the tactics of terror,” and thus “[t]his is no time to give in” to the FLQ or to those who opposed the government’s stern response.⁴⁰⁷ Three days later, the paper again defended the measures as necessary, describing the situation as “boil[ing] down to Canada or anarchy,” and requiring that the state “be supreme and assert its complete authority against terrorists who would destroy it” to enforce its own inhumane rule. “The FLQ cannot prevail and must be eliminated,” the paper intoned, and thus the arming of the nation’s soldiers and police with emergency powers was entirely defensible.⁴⁰⁸

The *Edmonton Journal* also defended the WMA in the absence of any readily available and more suitable legislation. On October 21, the paper asserted that temporary civil liberties suspensions were “a sad necessity” against internal enemies, and when “the situation demanded action possible at present only under the War Measures Act.”⁴⁰⁹ The *Journal* endorsed the government’s response to the crisis, defending the WMA on account of the need to forestall future terror, and as having been without alternative.

After depicting the Canadian government as embroiled in “one of the most perplexing dilemmas of our time” in its decision whether to negotiate for Cross’ release, the *Vancouver Sun* also supported a hard line response on the same basis as the *Evening Telegram*, *Telegraph-Journal*, *Edmonton Journal*, and *Leader-*

⁴⁰⁵ “The over-riding concern,” *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 21, 1970.

⁴⁰⁶ “Time of trial,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 14, 1970.

⁴⁰⁷ “Stand firm,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 16, 1970.

⁴⁰⁸ “Canada or anarchy,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 19, 1970.

⁴⁰⁹ “Emergency powers,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 21, 1970. In this respect, the paper echoed the *Leader-Post*.

Post. This sternness was necessary to deter further terrorist and anarchical acts. Surrendering to terrorists would not ensure the hostages' well-being, the paper echoed, and would only serve to bolster the terrorists' ranks, fabricate "bigger and bolder demands," and eventually create "rule by gangster." The \$500,000 ransom demanded by the FLQ would "[f]inance ever-greater outrages," and the released "political prisoners" would commit more bombings, enable an escalation in recruitment by illustrating the capacity to commit "crime without punishment," and inspire the FLQ to conduct further abductions and selective assassinations. Consequently, the government's decision centred around the question of "whether to jeopardize many lives, indeed our whole national fabric, in what might have been a vain hope of saving one life," with its refusal to capitulate constituting "the right decision."⁴¹⁰

Given the paper's firm stance against capitulation, the *Sun* decried how the government's capitulation to elements of the FLQ's demands suggested a wavering in its hard-line stance.⁴¹¹ "[D]angerous days," the paper warned, were imminent if the federal government's resolve "is deteriorating as abjectly as events suggest." In its concessions, the government had accorded the FLQ a "stature, a credibility and a degree of equality with democratically elected government that is obscenely out of keeping with the perpetration of one of the most despicable of crimes." Such abductions, the paper indicated, could not be permitted to overrule the maintenance of democracy, and thus the *Sun* decried the concessions as indicative of the government's gradual fall to rule by "gangsterism."⁴¹² It continued to firmly oppose capitulation in the October 16 issue, where the *Sun* condemned the government's negotiations as a "cowardly and self-destructive course of compromise." Only through Ottawa's resumption of a tough-on-terror stance could Canada "return to stability, law and order," and thus the paper argued that "[i]f the unhappy choice had to be made between government by gangsterism and reduction of the freedom of

⁴¹⁰ "The terrible decision," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 7, 1970.

⁴¹¹ Indeed, this editorial followed the federal government's October 8 concession of permitting the French CBC television and radio stations in Montreal to broadcast the FLQ manifesto ("Proof demanded Cross is alive - Quebec call hints at deal in kidnap case," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 9, 1970). Together with the Quebec government's appointment of attorney Robert Demers to negotiate with FLQ lawyer Robert Lemieux, it is comprehensible why the *Sun* perceived the government's drift to a conciliatory stance (Steve Kowch, "Demers briefed on role," *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 13, 1970; "Quebec gov't, terrorists make contact - FLQ negotiator: 'No bargaining,'" *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 13, 1970; Bob Hill, "Crucial talks open with FLQ," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 13, 1970; Canadian Press, "Go-Between Named; Quebec Makes Move," *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 13, 1970; Canadian Press, "Face-to-face negotiations break kidnap deadlock," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 13, 1970; Canadian Press, "Bourassa moves for negotiations - Demers named mediator," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax, NS), October 13, 1970; Russ Peden, "Demers Kidnap Mediator - Bourassa Says Demers Will Meet FLQ Man Soon," *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 13, 1970; Canadian Press, "FLQ Begins Negotiations - Kidnappers, Quebec Govt. Appoint Representatives," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 13, 1970; George Radwanski, "Apparent break in deadlock - Bourassa appoints a negotiator - FLQ reaction awaited as jail cell talks held," *Montreal Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 13, 1970; Ronald Lebel and Lewis Seale, "Cabinet's lawyer talks to Lemieux," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 13, 1970).

⁴¹² "Mechanism's the word," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 14, 1970.

dissidents to attack our beliefs and institutions,” the latter was most feasible.⁴¹³ This enduring opposition to negotiations is reminiscent of that witnessed in the *Leader-Post* and *Edmonton Journal*.

The *Sun* also championed the WMA because of the lack of alternatives. This justification assumed a prominent role in the paper’s defence of the WMA, appearing in four editorials. Reacting to the WMA, the *Sun* argued that the time required to pass an act specifically targeting the FLQ and limiting liberties “as little as possible” would have produced measures which were “too little and almost certainly too late.”⁴¹⁴ Laporte’s “premeditated killing” and the threats that Cross would meet a similar fate had illustrated “the need for speed” in the government’s response, and since this threat of escalation had “left no time for the passage of less sweeping legislation,” the WMA had offered the only option available.⁴¹⁵ The paper continued to defend the WMA as the “only legislative weapon in the government’s arsenal” available to protect law-abiding Quebec and national unity “without waiting for the drafting and passage of a special act aimed at the Front de Liberation du Quebec,”⁴¹⁶ and as the only alternative available to a government which “had to act quickly.”⁴¹⁷ Accordingly, the *Sun* regularly insisted that the government’s decision to invoke the WMA, as opposed to formulating legislation specific to the FLQ, had been most appropriate. This, combined with the paper’s opposition to negotiations, for how engaging in such would only elevate the FLQ’s status and encourage further terror, revealed the British Columbian publication to be staunchly supportive of a firm stance against terror.

The *Winnipeg Free Press* was particularly fervent in its promotion of a firm stance against terror, with sixteen of its twenty-three editorials containing some defence of an unyielding approach to the FLQ. From the onset, the paper advocated for the government’s assumption of a consolidated stand against the FLQ. Addressing the crisis for the first time on October 8, it argued that the FLQ’s activities satisfied the legislative requirements for a prosecution for treason, thus indicating its endorsement of combatting the group with a tough, legalistic stance.⁴¹⁸ With Laporte’s abduction, this support for firm opposition to the FLQ intensified. Reflective of the *Evening Telegram*, *Telegraph-Journal*, and other Western Canadian publications, the *Free Press* endorsed the government’s stern opposition to the FLQ on the basis of the need to prevent further terrorism. If the government capitulated to the terrorists, the paper acknowledged, it would “whet their appetite,” encourage more daring terrorist exploits, and promote further abductions, which “cannot be permitted to happen.”⁴¹⁹ Negotiating and acceding would moreover constitute the government’s abdication of its obligations and “oaths of office,” and “compromis[ing] with treason”

⁴¹³ ““Go on and bleed,”” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 16, 1970.

⁴¹⁴ “A choice between evils,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 17, 1970.

⁴¹⁵ “Unified by grief and horror,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 19, 1970.

⁴¹⁶ “A regrettable necessity,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 20, 1970.

⁴¹⁷ “Wait for the new statute,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 24, 1970.

⁴¹⁸ “Death for Treason,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 8, 1970.

⁴¹⁹ “Outrage,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 12, 1970.

would only propel the nation towards anarchy.⁴²⁰ Consequently, even prior to the WMA's invocation, the paper announced its support for any civil liberties infringements the government deemed necessary to quash the terrorist threat. If the government felt it necessary to curtail civil liberties through, for instance, wiretapping, the *Free Press* conceded that such sacrifices were necessary to contend with "an emergency of this nature" and "the threat it poses to Canadian society."⁴²¹ The *Free Press* thus endorsed Trudeau's stern approach to terror and any civil rights curtailments required to restrain the situation.

Once the WMA descended upon the nation, the *Free Press* continued to affirm that such restrictions upon civil liberties were justifiable under the present circumstances. The paper observed on October 16 that "there are times when some of the rights we hold most dear must be placed in suspension," and this situation was "one of them."⁴²² The following day, it acknowledged that society had been presented with two alternatives – anarchy, or "a period of repressive government measures" – and "there really is no choice."⁴²³ On October 19, it insisted that until the FLQ was smothered, Canadians "must accept the short-term disciplines required by it so that democracy in the long term may be secure."⁴²⁴ Hence, according to the *Winnipeg Free Press*, any infringements of civil rights and liberties under the WMA were defensible given the alternative.

Demonstrating the same framing which had emerged in the *Leader-Post*, *Edmonton Journal*, and *Sun*, the *Winnipeg Free Press* justified the WMA on account of the lack of legislative alternatives available for implementation with comparable expediency. This justification was particularly prominent in the *Free Press*, appearing in six editorials. Reflecting upon some politicians' suggestions that the government would have been wiser to pass emergency legislation tailored to the specific situation, the Manitoban paper reminded readers that "one of the needs of the situation was speed." Passing such legislation would have consumed considerable time, during which the FLQ "would have gone underground, instigated new outrages and accelerated their program of violence," creating "no choice" but to invoke the WMA.⁴²⁵ On October 19, the *Free Press* reiterated that if the government's response "was to be immediate," as the severity of the situation had mandated, "this was the only course open" when no peacetime government had ever considered it necessary to create a "standby statute to deal with dangers which always seemed academic." Any efforts to devise special legislation would have been untenable since the FLQ would certainly "not cease and desist from savagery while we busy ourselves with social blueprints."⁴²⁶ As the month progressed, the paper continued to defend the WMA as "the only tool to hand" to contend with a

⁴²⁰ "A Tough Line," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 15, 1970.

⁴²¹ "A Tough Line," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 15, 1970.

⁴²² "Grasping the Nettle," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 16, 1970.

⁴²³ "Desperate Cure," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 17, 1970.

⁴²⁴ "To Secure Democracy," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 19, 1970.

⁴²⁵ "Desperate Cure," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 17, 1970.

⁴²⁶ "To Secure Democracy," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 19, 1970.

crisis “of such gravity that there was no time for the government to draft peacetime legislation that would deal with the situation,”⁴²⁷ and the only “means at hand” at a time demanding the government’s urgent action⁴²⁸ to “prevent further trouble.”⁴²⁹ Clearly, a primary component of the *Free Press*’ justification of the WMA was the dearth of any more tailored legislation available for implementation with a comparable rapidity. Considered with its arguments that suspending civil rights was necessary in the circumstances, and that harsh measures were required to deter future anarchy, this depiction of the government’s lack of alternatives situated the *Free Press* as supportive of an uncompromising opposition to the FLQ.

Like in the *Telegraph-Journal* and *Guardian*, one Western Canadian editorial (in the *Sun*) argued that the government’s hard-line response to the FLQ, while appropriate, was overdue. The *Sun*’s depiction of the WMA as representative of government “at last” equipping “itself to fight fire with fire and match ruthlessness with ruthlessness,” implied its approval of a stern opposition to terror and assertion that this opposition had not been adopted with sufficient haste. Had the nation “had our house in order” and not treated the FLQ’s crimes as occupying “the no-man’s-land of the Canadian political and social entity” rather than the “common crimes” they were, the WMA would have been unnecessary and thus avoided.⁴³⁰ In other words, the paper suggested that had the government adopted a firmer stance in opposition to the FLQ with more haste, and punished their activities as crimes rather than treating them leniently as social or political crimes, the crisis may have been forestalled.

Also reflective of a framing which had briefly emerged in the *Guardian* and *Evening Telegram*, one editorial in the *Free Press* argued that the government’s hard-line stance was not sufficiently firm or stern. The Manitoban paper noted on October 15 that the reinstatement of the death penalty could potentially constitute “the only effective answer” to individuals seeking to utilize terror to “threaten the nation.”⁴³¹ While endorsing a tough-on-terror stance, the *Free Press* had recommended the government further cement its opposition to terror with the reinstatement and reintroduction of capital punishment.

For some Western Canadian publications, the emergency measures were further justifiable because Canadians needed to have faith in their elected government. Comparable to the two editorials in the *Guardian* and *Chronicle-Herald* that had justified the WMA on this basis, one editorial in the *Edmonton Journal* and three in the *Sun* adopted a comparable defence. For the *Journal*, it was urgent that Canadians disregard any worries of the government having over-reacted, and instead had to “take on faith” that the measures had been necessary to maintain “peace, order and good government,” thus according authorities

⁴²⁷ “No Longer than Necessary,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 22, 1970.

⁴²⁸ “Emergency Powers,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 23, 1970.

⁴²⁹ “The Public Should Be Told,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 26, 1970.

⁴³⁰ “Go on and bleed,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 16, 1970.

⁴³¹ “A Tough Line,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 15, 1970.

their “deserved” support.⁴³² The *Sun* expressed a similar perspective, assuring readers that Trudeau’s “record in defence of civil liberties is the guarantee of his sincerity” in his promises to utilize only the segments of the emergency regulations required, and to revoke them at the foremost opportunity.⁴³³ The government, as the *Sun* later reiterated, “must be trusted to use its unusual powers,” given the horror of the opponent it faced, the urgent need to destroy such terrorism, and Trudeau’s “reassuring” promise to utilize the powers “as little and as leniently as possible.”⁴³⁴ These editorials, though minute in numerical scope, are notable for how they entreated the public to support the WMA due to the pure necessity of Canadians to have faith in the government during a tumultuous time.

Like the Atlantic Canadian papers, several editorials in Western Canada demonstrated their support for the government and the WMA’s invocation by chastising and dismissing the opposition. Ten editorials – two in the *Sun*, four in the *Winnipeg Free Press*, three in the *Edmonton Journal*, and one in the *Leader-Post* – indicated their support for the government through their adoption of such a frame. Indeed, several Western editorials framed the opposition as only opposing the government and WMA for partisan political reasons to bolster their own support. Comparable to the *Guardian*’s dismissal of the NDP and Conservatives as seeking only to “make political hay,” the *Edmonton Journal* condemned Lévesque’s pro-negotiations stance (and opposition to any federal interference) as suspicious. Since the PQ would benefit from tensions between the Quebec and federal governments, the paper indicated that Lévesque’s stance had sought “to make political capital” out of the crisis by blaming the Trudeau government for “any settlement delay, and by insinuating that the Quebec government, without pressure from the “outside,” would have reached a solution.”⁴³⁵ The NDP also came under fire, as the *Edmonton Journal* argued that its “ridiculous” opposition to the WMA reeked of “a smell of politics,”⁴³⁶ and the *Free Press* submitted that the party’s opposition to the act had been politically irresponsible. Reviewing the party’s proposed legislation to supplant the WMA, the *Free Press* noted that the NDP’s plan lacked any substantial divergences from the WMA, with the only “essential difference” being the NDP’s vague necessitating of “a full description of the critical circumstances” and group(s) involved, and the proclamation’s limitation to the region concerned. Otherwise, the proposed legislation’s requirements were ones which the government “could reasonably claim that it had met” in the crisis and were inclusive of the powers “now being used,” suggesting to the *Free Press* that the NDP had “had no strong case for opposing” the WMA.⁴³⁷ The paper later berated Deputy NDP Leader David Lewis for his “naïve” and

⁴³² “War measures,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 16, 1970.

⁴³³ “A choice between evils,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 17, 1970.

⁴³⁴ “Unified by grief and horror,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 19, 1970. See also “For the sake of emphasis,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 22, 1970.

⁴³⁵ “Stand firm,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 16, 1970.

⁴³⁶ “Justified action,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 17, 1970.

⁴³⁷ “No Strong Case,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 29, 1970.

“irresponsible” speculation that the government had panicked or “acted for some reason other than the safety and security of Canada” in implementing the WMA, scolding his “imaginative scenarios” as intending only “to damage the Quebec government” and attack the federal government.⁴³⁸

Aside from constructing the governments’ opponents as only opposing the hard-line stance and WMA with purely political motivations, the papers dismissed claims that the WMA unduly infringed upon civil liberties. The *Edmonton Journal* dismissed civil liberties concerns as “academic, for no war ... is fought without temporary abridgement of such liberties,” and argued that the time for citizens to question and doubt whether the governments had “unduly violated such rights” existed only in elections pursuant to the crisis’ conclusion.⁴³⁹ Similarly, the *Winnipeg Free Press* discounted concerns of over-reactions and civil liberties infringements, cautioning the opposition to “be responsible enough to recognize the inherent difficulties of the situation.” If the government appeared to be inordinately cautious respecting the release of detainees, it would incite criticisms of rights infringements, while the opposite response could lead to accusations of irresponsibility. Hence, it was “only realistic to expect that in so hard a situation, mistakes will be made.”⁴⁴⁰ For the *Journal* and *Free Press*, the concerns emerging respecting the suspension or abrogation of civil liberties were either inevitable given the difficulties of the circumstances, or a concern to be postponed until after the war had been waged and the enemies exterminated.

Reminiscent of the Eastern Canadian editorials, a common theme in the Western Canadian efforts to discredit opposition to the WMA was their attempt to suspend any belief that the measures had imperiled Canadian democracy. The *Edmonton Journal* characterized claims that the WMA had suspended Canada’s constitution as “ridiculous” and refuted suggestions that the measures had “suspended democracy” when Trudeau remained responsible to the public and Commons. The paper also dismissed those individuals in the province who opposed the WMA as consisting mostly of “people with no interest in Canada as a nation,” implying that any individual who desired Canada to remain united would support the WMA.⁴⁴¹ These arguments contributed to the overall narrative seeking to discredit the opposition, through their constructions of critics as seeking only to further their own political support, and dismissal of characterizations of the WMA as having unfairly diminished civil liberties. Cumulatively, these editorials framed the opposition’s arguments as dismissible, untenable, and unsound, thereby reinforcing the papers’ broader stances in favour of the governmental response to the FLQ.

Framing the governmental response as inciting concern and potentially inappropriate

Compared to these thirty-three editorials which defended the government’s approach to the crisis and

⁴³⁸ “The Lewis Plot Thickens,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 30, 1970.

⁴³⁹ “Canada or anarchy,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 19, 1970.

⁴⁴⁰ “Emergency Powers,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 23, 1970.

⁴⁴¹ “Justified action,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 17, 1970.

invocation of the WMA, fifteen expressed some concern or doubt regarding how authorities were confronting the crisis. The *Sun* was relatively balanced in offering eight pro-WMA editorials compared to seven voicing some concern regarding the measures' invocation, primarily regarding the repressive spirit the measures were nurturing in British Columbia and the populace's need for more information about the measures and their implementation. The *Leader-Post* was similarly balanced, publishing two editorials of each framing (although the paper's concerns revolved around the government's necessity to take the populace further into its confidence). For the *Edmonton Journal* and *Winnipeg Free Press*, the pro-WMA editorials far outweighed those voicing concern as to authorities' conduct in the crisis, with the two and four editorials they respectively published expressing some concern or challenge being surpassed by the seven and sixteen editorials endorsing the measures. The papers voiced this concern in terms of the unease regarding civil liberties infringements, the misuse of the WMA by authorities removed from the crisis, demands for further governmental disclosure regarding the extent of the crisis, and doubts surrounding the efficacy of police activity. Overall, however, no Western Canadian paper argued that the government should not have adopted a firm response to terror, or that the WMA was an unjustified mechanism to address the crisis. Though voicing concerns regarding authorities' response, the Western Canadian papers remained supportive of the WMA and hard-line reaction, finding fault instead with the flaws within those measures and their deployment by authorities removed from the crisis.

Eleven editorials voiced concerns regarding the civil liberties infractions coming to light due to police activities under the WMA. Compared to the mere two editorials in Eastern Canada reflecting similar civil-liberties-centred concerns, the WMA's purported diminishment of civil rights garnered greater concern in the Western provinces. The *Sun*, on October 22, observed the release of fifty of the over three hundred individuals who had been detained under the WMA, indicating that one could assume such numbers, and the probable release of more innocents, "to be a measure of the degree to which the arbitrary interference with personal liberties has fallen on the demonstrably innocent." It was "disquieting to know that so many Canadians have been jailed without probable cause," but the *Sun* still deemed such errors "inevitable" and defended the WMA as necessary "under the threat of mass terror" and a "parallel power."⁴⁴² Concern that innocent individuals may have been swept up within the police's dragnet prompted the *Winnipeg Free Press* to urge the establishment of a committee to review the evidence against each detainee.⁴⁴³ In addition to this detainment of innocents, the *Edmonton Journal* conveyed further concerns in advising the government to "make clear to overzealous enforcers of the War Measures Act ... that it did not proclaim the act to provide a chance for witch-hunting or censorship," though it did not specify which incident had

⁴⁴² "For the sake of emphasis," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 22, 1970.

⁴⁴³ "Emergency Powers," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 23, 1970.

prompted that concern.⁴⁴⁴ Other papers expressed more general anxiety or caution about the condition of civil liberties. Indeed, the *Journal* decried the WMA's excessive geographical scope, since "a crisis in Quebec doesn't warrant suspension of civil rights in Alberta,"⁴⁴⁵ while the *Free Press* encouraged the government to not keep the WMA "alive a moment longer than necessary" when "[c]ivil liberties have been fought for too long and too bitterly to permit them to be abrogated for any longer" than needed.⁴⁴⁶ Though illustrating various civil rights concerns ranging from the detention of innocents, possibility of a witch-hunt and censorship, and the excessive scope of the measures, it is notable that no paper contested the WMA's defensibility. Indeed, descriptions of civil rights concerns centered on the WMA's inherent faults, rather than blaming the government for having necessarily invoked the measures.

Particularly disconcerting in Western Canada, especially for the *Sun*, was the repressive spirit which the WMA wrought across the nation, as provincial governments – particularly British Columbia's – sought to misuse the emergency measures. Despite the *Sun*'s supportive tone respecting the WMA, in five editorials it condemned its application beyond its intended extent, raising concerns regarding the civil liberties infringements the measures were enabling in locales removed from the crisis' epicenter. For instance, the *Sun* denounced Vancouver Mayor Tom Campbell's intent to utilize the WMA "to further his vendetta against local hippies and draft dodgers" as the "irresponsible," "damnable," contemptuous, and "crude" use of "a national tragedy" to shore local support.⁴⁴⁷ Later, the *Sun* decried the B.C. government's order-in-council dismissing pro-FLQ and pro-revolutionary instructors as an overreaction to a situation those institutions' authorities could handle independently, and as questionably democratic, for how it had been "submitted to nobody ... for consultation or ratification" and violated all notions of reliance upon "due process of law."⁴⁴⁸ The order-in-council was "clumsy and needless," the *Sun* chastised, particularly when the federal government had warned against "extraneous witch-hunts" and efforts to utilize the crisis to pursue "all manner of repressive and otherwise illegal side issues," and thus deemed the legislation the very sort of "crude demonstration ... of raw power" which could "bring government into disrepute."⁴⁴⁹ Having noted such eagerness among politicians "to twist" the WMA "to unrelated and/or undemocratic ends,"⁴⁵⁰ and "tamper with civil liberties for what they conceived or advertised to be the best of reasons," the *Sun* urged that the WMA's replacement be an act itself, rather than a segment of the Criminal Code, to forestall similar abuses.⁴⁵¹ In addition to these five editorials in the *Sun*, the *Winnipeg Free Press* also

⁴⁴⁴ "Right to know," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 24, 1970.

⁴⁴⁵ "Crisis law," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 30, 1970.

⁴⁴⁶ "No Longer than Necessary," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 22, 1970.

⁴⁴⁷ "A regrettable necessity," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 20, 1970.

⁴⁴⁸ "Wait for the new statute," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 24, 1970.

⁴⁴⁹ "Nothing will come of it," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 28, 1970.

⁴⁵⁰ "Many questions, few answers," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 27, 1970.

⁴⁵¹ "Only under lock and key," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 30, 1970.

chastised the British Columbian and Vancouver regimes for their willingness to manipulate the WMA for their own political gains, recounting Campbell's intentions and the order-in-council as illuminative of the WMA's "shortcomings" and "the kind of misuse to which it can be put."⁴⁵² Again, these civil liberties concerns and criticisms of the WMA derived not from any error or fault in judgment in the government's invocation of the act, but from its misuse and abuse among other authorities. Indeed, the primary concern regarding the WMA centred not on its necessity but its inherent flaws enabling such misuse. Although reflective of the civil rights element of the historiographical discourse on the crisis, and suggestive of the greater concern for civil liberties infringements in Western Canada as opposed to Eastern Canada, such concerns did not detract from the papers' defence of the government's hard-line response and WMA.

Doubts regarding the emergency measures, however, emerged in Western Canada in late October. More than in the Eastern Canadian editorials, the government's urgent necessity to disclose to the Canadian populace the true extent of the "apprehended insurrection" plaguing Quebec emerged as a dominant theme in the Western Canadian publications. In the final weeks of October, nine editorials (concentrated in the *Sun* and *Winnipeg Free Press*) focused on this surging discontentment and unease respecting the public's inaccessibility to the full details of the extent of the crisis and WMA's use.

One facet of this displeasure arose respecting the government's failure to adequately keep Canadians apprised of how the WMA was being implemented. As Canada approached one week under the WMA, the *Sun* observed on October 22 that "the public deserves and would welcome" some statement "giving all possible details of the use of these emergency powers to date," to dispel misunderstandings and misinformation.⁴⁵³ Other editorials chastised the government for failing to disclose the complete spectrum of details leading to the WMA's invocation. An October 27 editorial in the *Sun* portrayed a Canada "waiting for some definite answers," and "legitimate[ly]" demanding more details on the "apprehended insurrection" that had prompted the WMA. The paper lent its voice to such demands, noting "it should be possible ... to lift more than a tiny corner of the veil of secrecy held so firmly in place by Mr. Trudeau and the Quebec administration."⁴⁵⁴ It was particularly imperative that the government do so given that the lack of information was confusing the situation by permitting rumours to ferment among the populace. As reports emerged of a plot among a group of prominent Quebecers to supplant Bourassa's government with a "provisional government" more conciliatory to the FLQ,⁴⁵⁵ the *Sun* commented that Trudeau's

⁴⁵² "New Act Needed," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 28, 1970.

⁴⁵³ "For the sake of emphasis," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 22, 1970.

⁴⁵⁴ "Many questions, few answers," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 27, 1970.

⁴⁵⁵ These rumours first emerged in the media in the October 26 *Toronto Star*. Citing information from "[t]op-level sources" that "a group of influential Quebecers had set out to see whether they might supplant the legitimately elected provincial government [in Quebec] with what they conceived of as an interim administration having enough moral authority to restore public order," the paper suggested that the WMA had thus partially been an effort to

“reticence in the Commons” to respond to such rumours was according them “undue weight in the rest of the country” and offering “an impression of deliberate concealment.” As such, the *Sun* questioned again “whether the time has not come” for Trudeau “to take the public into his full confidence.”⁴⁵⁶

The *Free Press* expressed a similar urgency that the government disclose a fuller image of the extent of the crisis that had necessitated emergency measures. The paper indicated that the government bore the responsibility “to keep the public - which has given it such strong backing - in the picture as much as possible,” and thus at his earliest permissible opportunity, “Trudeau should disclose the exact information which led his government to take the drastic step of invoking the Act.”⁴⁵⁷ Indeed, when the public had offered authorities their support “on trust,” on the basis that the government would expediently disclose the reasons necessitating “such strong measures,” the public thus had “the right to know” the facts that prompted the sudden proclamation of the WMA. The majority of Canadians were not convinced that the act had been proclaimed merely on the facts already known to the public and House, since the abductions “were not enough to bring out thousands of armed troops” and dynamite and arms had been disappearing for years without necessitating emergency measures, and hence they were demanding and entitled to further explanation.⁴⁵⁸ The absence of such details was allowing gossip and rumours to diffuse and exacerbate tensions,⁴⁵⁹ for instance regarding the FLQ’s apparent associations with a Montreal political party.⁴⁶⁰ Consequently, the *Free Press* reiterated its appeal for Trudeau “to take the Canadian people into his confidence about what really happened” and justify the WMA’s proclamation.⁴⁶¹

In spite of its enduring editorial support for the Trudeau government and WMA, the *Edmonton Journal* began to express similar demands for further information and details on October 24. For the Alberta paper, this necessity centred around the government’s democratic obligation to furnish citizens with the information they required to assess the adequacy of the government’s response. Government

forestall such a coup which “could have ended in the destruction of democracy in Quebec” (“Behind War Measures: Plan to supplant Quebec government caused Ottawa to act,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 26, 1970).

⁴⁵⁶ “Since I was three years old,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 29, 1970.

⁴⁵⁷ “No Longer than Necessary,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 22, 1970.

⁴⁵⁸ “The Public Should Be Told,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 26, 1970.

⁴⁵⁹ “New Act Needed,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 28, 1970.

⁴⁶⁰ “The Public Should Be Told,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 26, 1970. These accusations were related to the Front d’action politique (FRAP). The first elucidation of this purported connection had emerged in an October 21 radio interview with Jean Marchand, in which the Regional Economic Expansion Minister had verbalized to a Vancouver broadcaster that the FRAP was campaigning in the election as a “front” for the FLQ (“FLQ active in Montreal vote,” Marchand says,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 22, 1970; “FLQ link alleged in Montreal vote; Marchand says anti-Drapeau party front for terrorist organization,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 22, 1970). Drapeau, in two radio interviews the following day, accused the socialist-oriented party, which offered his most dominant opposition with thirty-one candidates campaigning for forty-six council seats, of having “sympathy for” and being linked with the FLQ. He ominously predicted that “blood would run in the streets” if the FRAP achieved any substantial electoral gains (Canadian Press, “Drapeau fears bloodshed,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 22, 1970; Canadian Press, “Drapeau fears blood bath,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 22, 1970; Canadian Press, “Blood would run’ - Drapeau,” *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 22, 1970).

⁴⁶¹ “New Act Needed,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 28, 1970.

officials had issued “some disquieting statements,” the paper intoned, notably Justice Minister John Turner’s admission that “it may never be possible to tell Canadians why the War Measures Act was proclaimed.” While this was justifiable as the crisis continued, postponing a thorough explanation was unacceptable for how it would deny “the public the information it needs to decide ultimately whether the government’s conduct was justified,” and thus deny true democracy.⁴⁶²

Even if the government could not yet take Canadians into its confidence, the *Leader-Post* argued that the government was obligated to at least provide Parliament’s opposition leaders with fuller disclosure. For instance, in the final days of October, the *Leader-Post* reflected the uncertainties with the government’s silence in the editorial “All leaders should know.” Question periods in the House of Commons had devolved into repeated opposition attempts to solicit more details from Trudeau’s government regarding the reasons for the WMA, with Trudeau consistently refusing to entertain such requests and to confirm or deny rumours. Observing this repartee, the *Leader-Post* chastised the government for “playing cat-and-mouse games in the House of Commons,” in a time in which “it should immediately take into its confidence the leaders of the three opposition parties” who “should be kept fully informed of all the facts in the government’s hands.” Only by doing so could “the endless speculation and guessing” cease.⁴⁶³ The paper reiterated this insistence in its final editorial of October. Noting that the NDP opposed the WMA due to the adequacy of the treason and sedition laws, while the government asserted such laws did not possess sufficient teeth, the *Leader-Post* indicated that evidently the government – but not the opposition – had details demonstrating that the crisis possessed “a seriousness that goes beyond the acts dealing with treason and sedition.” This affirmed “the case for the other party leaders to be told.”⁴⁶⁴

Hence, the Western Canadian papers evidenced a mounting concern regarding the government’s failure to take Canadians into its confidence. While the *Sun* demanded further details of the WMA’s implementation, all four papers demonstrated some anxiety regarding the government’s failure to disclose the true extent of the crisis which had conspired to produce the WMA’s invocation. Whether due to the government’s obligation to offer to the public the information required to democratically evaluate its representatives, or how the lack of details was exacerbating the situation by enabling rumours, the papers demanded more information. The prominence of such disquiet may suggest a souring of opinion or emergent doubt among the newspapers, particularly the *Sun* and *Winnipeg Free Press* in which this consternation was most frequent, regarding the appropriateness of the government’s response to the FLQ.

⁴⁶² “Right to know,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 24, 1970.

⁴⁶³ “All leaders should know,” *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 29, 1970.

⁴⁶⁴ “Take party leaders into confidence,” *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 31, 1970.

Similarly indicative of the emergence of doubts respecting the WMA were the concerns raised in two editorials regarding the police's apparent failure to utilize the measures with any quantifiable success. In so doing, the papers reflected a similar theme to that which emerged in three Eastern Canadian editorials. The October 24 issue of the *Edmonton Journal* conveyed a mild discontent over the lack of any tangible results from the investigations, expressing that even with the army's aid and the "extraordinary powers of arrest, detention and search," the police had not been capable of apprehending the terrorists.⁴⁶⁵ The *Sun*'s October 27 editorial was more explicit in its bewilderment as to the police's lack of success in their manhunt. Canadians, it suggested, were "genuinely puzzled to account for the failure of the massed police forces of Quebec, backed by the armed forces, to catch even one of the suspects" in the abductions and murder. It was unclear what this revealed of the crisis and its perpetrators – whether it demonstrated insiders alerting the FLQ of police activities, the culprits' entrenchment "beyond the reach of the law," the group's cunning, or police ineptitude.⁴⁶⁶ Though not as explicitly as the *Evening Telegram*, which had suggested that the WMA was not only ineffective in aiding the police but had potentially contributed to Laporte's murder, these two Western Canadian editorials are redolent of an emerging doubt regarding the utility of the WMA in the crisis. It bears noting that, despite these doubts, the papers did not argue that the WMA had been unwarranted or unjustified, or suggest that an alternative course of action would have been more appropriate. While indicative, then, of the presence in October 1970 of a discourse critical of the government's response to the crisis, all four Western Canadian papers clearly positioned themselves in support of the hard-line response and WMA.

There also existed, in the Western Canadian publications, a handful of editorials critical of the government's long-term handling of the FLQ threat. This criticism appeared in two editorials, in the *Sun* and *Leader-Post*, which criticized the government for permitting the crisis to intensify to the extent of necessitating emergency measures. Recalling Bourassa's promise to reveal the details of the conditions that had resulted in the WMA's proclamation, the *Sun* pondered whether he would also account for how the FLQ was "permitted to become so firmly dug in that it suddenly became essential to call in the troops and invoke the most fearsome federal legislation to try to oust them."⁴⁶⁷ This implied that the government bore some responsibility for the crisis due to how it had unsuccessfully confronted terrorism throughout the 1960s. The government's failure to sufficiently recognize the FLQ's threat was, for the *Leader-Post*, even more glaring in its failure to respond adequately to the FLQ's escalation of activities throughout 1970. Indeed, the FLQ had devised a well-publicized plot to abduct an American diplomat, and yet "only the most elementary precautions were taken to protect persons in the diplomatic service," making it

⁴⁶⁵ "Right to know," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 24, 1970.

⁴⁶⁶ "Many questions, few answers," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 27, 1970.

⁴⁶⁷ "Many questions, few answers," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 27, 1970.

apparent that “someone in authority is at fault” for approaching the known extremist threat with an undue lightness that enabled Cross’ abduction.⁴⁶⁸ Since these editorials did not situate the papers on either side of the discourse surrounding the aptness of the hard-line approach, they were not included in the above tally seeking to analyze the prominence of the two sides of the discourse. They remain notable, however, in suggesting that the government itself was partially accountable for the current crisis through its failure to adequately respond to the FLQ’s emergence and signalled intent to escalate.

Framing Canadians as shocked, yet supportive of the government’s stance

In a similar framing to that which appeared with prominence in Atlantic Canada, the editorials in the British Columbian, Saskatchewan, Albertan, and Manitoban papers depicted the nation as one united in awe. Indeed, the papers characterized the FLQ’s activities as having “shocked” Canada,⁴⁶⁹ rattled and startled citizens,⁴⁷⁰ and unified the nation in questioning “[i]s this really Canada?”⁴⁷¹ Comparable to editorial opinion in Atlantic Canada, this shock and consternation did not detract from Canadians’ apparently dominant support for the government’s hard-line stance against terror and invocation of the WMA. Sixteen editorials in the Western Canadian papers referred to the public as having aligned itself in support of the government during this trying time, illustrating that this framing was more prominent than in Atlantic Canada, in which that theme was evident in five editorials.

Even prior to the government’s proclamation of the WMA, the government’s reluctance to accede to the terrorist demands and seeming inclination to adopt a law-and-order stance reportedly culled favour with the Canadian public. In his firm insistence that society must protect itself against any parallel power seeking to challenge the democratically elected rule, the *Winnipeg Free Press* anticipated that Trudeau could “expect the support of most Canadians in the stand he has taken.”⁴⁷² In the brief window between the proclamation of the WMA and the revelation of Laporte’s murder, the editorials described a populace vastly supportive of the emergency measures. After the government invoked the act, the *Free Press* argued that any “adverse reaction” to the WMA or belief in the government’s over-reaction would be tempered by the “overwhelming support of the action by Canadians,”⁴⁷³ who were “prepared to accept” the measures when the alternative was anarchy.⁴⁷⁴ The *Sun* asserted that the public reaction to the WMA had demonstrated “that the majority of Canadians ... accept that he [Trudeau] acted in good faith in

⁴⁶⁸ “The abduction of Mr. Cross,” *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 7, 1970.

⁴⁶⁹ “Agonizing choice,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 7, 1970; “Death for Treason,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 8, 1970; See also “To Secure Democracy,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 19, 1970.

⁴⁷⁰ “Death Knell of Separatism,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 19, 1970.

⁴⁷¹ “Agonizing choice,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 7, 1970.

⁴⁷² “A Tough Line,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 15, 1970.

⁴⁷³ “Grasping the Nettle,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 16, 1970.

⁴⁷⁴ “Desperate Cure,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 17, 1970.

response to urgent pleas from the authorities in Quebec and Montreal,”⁴⁷⁵ while the *Edmonton Journal* concluded that “[t]he great majority of Canadians will support” Trudeau’s case in proclaiming the WMA.⁴⁷⁶

Laporte’s tragic murder appeared to only affirm this popular support for the government. While some Western Canadian editorials implied the populace’s support by illuminating their distaste for the FLQ – in the *Sun*’s portrayal of Canadians as united “in revulsion” at the murder⁴⁷⁷ and the *Edmonton Journal*’s declaration that “all the nation cries out” in opposing the deed⁴⁷⁸ – other editorials explicitly framed the public as in the government’s corner. The *Winnipeg Free Press* observed that the WMA’s proclamation had solicited the support “of the great majority of the Canadian people,” who had accepted the WMA’s necessity.⁴⁷⁹ Trudeau enjoyed “the support of the great majority” of the citizenry⁴⁸⁰ or “strong public support,”⁴⁸¹ with the “formidable surge of public opinion” being evidenced in the House’s overwhelming vote approving the WMA.⁴⁸² When sixteen members of the federal NDP party voted in opposition to the measures on October 19, the *Sun* suggested that such a position was “clearly not in keeping with the mood of the country.”⁴⁸³ Later, following Montreal mayor Jean Drapeau’s stunning victory in the October 25 municipal election, the *Sun* interpreted the victory as revealing that Montrealers “not only do not share the alarm” respecting the WMA, “but positively endorse the move.”⁴⁸⁴ The *Leader-Post* described the FLQ’s crimes as having “united people of all ethnic origins in the country in their determination to support the government in its actions to eliminate” the FLQ,⁴⁸⁵ while the *Edmonton Journal* asserted that Western Canada was “overwhelmingly in support of the actions taken,”⁴⁸⁶ reflective of the “wide public support” that the government was receiving nationwide for the WMA.⁴⁸⁷ All four Western Canadian newspapers painted the portrait of a nation pledging unyielding support to its government’s response to the crisis.

Framing the nation’s need for unity

One can predict that the Western Canadian editorials would have observed this apparent national unity

⁴⁷⁵ “A choice between evils,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 17, 1970.

⁴⁷⁶ “Justified action,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 17, 1970.

⁴⁷⁷ “Unified by grief and horror,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 19, 1970.

⁴⁷⁸ “Canada or anarchy,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 19, 1970.

⁴⁷⁹ “No Longer than Necessary,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 22, 1970.

⁴⁸⁰ “The Public Should Be Told,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 26, 1970.

⁴⁸¹ “New Act Needed,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 28, 1970.

⁴⁸² “Challenge and Response,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 20, 1970.

⁴⁸³ “A regrettable necessity,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 20, 1970.

⁴⁸⁴ “Many questions, few answers,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 27, 1970.

⁴⁸⁵ “A unified front,” *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 22, 1970.

⁴⁸⁶ “Canada or anarchy,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 19, 1970.

⁴⁸⁷ “Right to know,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 24, 1970.

favourably, given their recognition that the crisis necessitated such a unified opposition to the FLQ. In ten editorials, the four papers presented readers with a framing identifying national unity as imperative in this time of crisis. An October 19 editorial in the *Sun* offered an early expression of this need, when it encouraged the “men of goodwill in Parliament to close ranks at a time of national peril” by offering unanimous support to the WMA during that day’s vote on the measures. Such was essential for how it would demonstrate that the FLQ’s efforts to destroy Canada had only served to draw its components tighter and more cohesively together.⁴⁸⁸ The *Free Press*, in an editorial published the same day, expressed discontent over the opposition’s initial response to the WMA, denouncing the “shabby display of politics put on by some members ... when the crying need was for a show of national unity and solidarity.”⁴⁸⁹

This need for unity incited ire at the opposition, and particularly the NDP, for not providing the government with requisite support. When sixteen members of the federal NDP party voted against the WMA during the October 19 vote in Parliament, the *Sun* chastised the party. Robert Stanfield and the Conservatives, in their willingness to set aside their misgivings about and criticisms of the measures in favour of realizing the necessity for “a day of unity,” had conducted themselves most appropriately, adopting a stance which was “wholly praiseworthy” and exhibitiv of a “responsible appreciation of the Quebec crisis.” Substantially less responsible had been the NDP’s failure to accord the same support to the WMA. In the editorial staff’s perspective, it was “unfortunate” that the New Democrats had refused to approve the measure, when “[a] unanimous vote would have given the world a stronger impression of Canada’s determination to root out political terrorism.” Indeed, their opposition had not reflected the national mood or “the known facts about the tragic lawlessness in Quebec.”⁴⁹⁰ The NDP found itself similarly under attack in the *Leader-Post*. Expressing that given the nation’s situation “the government should have had the unanimous support of Parliament,” the *Leader-Post* applauded Stanfield for being cognizant of the need to set aside his reservations in favour of presenting “a solid front of support in dealing with the FLQ.” When considering this need for unity, the paper “regretted” that the NDP members had failed to support the government,⁴⁹¹ particularly given that Parliamentary unity and solidarity was “essential” in such a situation as that which the government currently faced.⁴⁹²

Beyond this necessity for unity among the nation’s political leaders, a handful of editorials in the *Leader-Post* and *Edmonton Journal* urged similar solidarity and harmony amongst the general populace. Two editorials pleaded that English-Canadians should not allow the crisis to colour their perceptions of or incite a backlash against French-Canadians. “There should be no backlash,” the *Leader-Post* argued, with

⁴⁸⁸ “Unified by grief and horror,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 19, 1970.

⁴⁸⁹ “Death Knell of Separatism,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 19, 1970.

⁴⁹⁰ “A regrettable necessity,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 20, 1970.

⁴⁹¹ “The over-riding concern,” *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 21, 1970.

⁴⁹² “A shameful statement,” *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 23, 1970.

the paper expressing hope that the crisis could usher into the annals of history a period in which citizens united to redress grievances and remedy intolerances.⁴⁹³ Observing that the FLQ sought to inflame intergroup tensions, the *Edmonton Journal* urged English-Canadians to not perceive the group as characteristic of French-Canadians who were, primarily, as equally fervent in their belief in the law as English-Canadians. The crisis could not be allowed “to deflect us from the essential job of building a nation” in which the French and English could harmoniously co-reside, and thus the editorial demanded that Canadians prohibit the FLQ’s objectives of inciting “backlash” and “bigotry.”⁴⁹⁴ Further, the *Edmonton Journal* pronounced its longing on October 19 that this drawing together of the nation in crisis would inspire a long-standing surge in national unity. It voiced its hope that “there will emerge ... a new unity for troubled Canada” following “this intrusive outrage,”⁴⁹⁵ indicating that such unity would prove “a valuable result of a desperate situation.”⁴⁹⁶ An October 28 editorial in the *Sun* affirmed a similar need for unity, arguing that the tragedy “will not be without good results if it opens people’s eyes in both parts of Canada to the need they have for each other.”⁴⁹⁷ In addition to the need for political unity, a handful of Western Canadian editorials also promoted solidarity among the general populace. In their inclusion of ten editorials touching upon this necessity of political and social unity in a time of crisis, the Western Canadian papers demonstrated a greater prioritization of this framing than in Eastern Canada, where three editorials adopted a similar frame. Such perceptions about the need for unity prompted questions about how such pleas may have been correlated with the papers’ own support for the measures.

Framing terrorism as a construct and phenomenon foreign and alien to Canada

The shock expressed in the papers appeared to stem, in part, from the conceptualization promoted among several Western Canadian editorials – nine overall – of terrorism as a phenomenon alien to the Canadian experience. Prominent in this framing was the belief that the tactic of political abductions had originated in and spread to Canada from other international revolutionary movements. The *Edmonton Journal*’s assessment following Cross’ abduction that “Canadians can no longer be smug in the mistaken belief that political kidnappings happen only in distant, lesser-known countries”⁴⁹⁸ reflected this conceptualization of terrorism as foreign to Canada. So too did the *Winnipeg Free Press*’ observation that the abductions had dispelled the preconception that “it can’t happen here,” in a nation presumed “immune from the perils and contagions of the world.”⁴⁹⁹ The *Leader-Post* noted that Cross’ kidnapping “brings

⁴⁹³ “A unified front,” *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 22, 1970.

⁴⁹⁴ “Time of trial,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 14, 1970.

⁴⁹⁵ “Canada or anarchy,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 19, 1970.

⁴⁹⁶ “Quebec’s future,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 22, 1970.

⁴⁹⁷ “Too precious to lose,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 28, 1970.

⁴⁹⁸ “Agonizing choice,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 7, 1970.

⁴⁹⁹ “To Secure Democracy,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 19, 1970.

close to home the lawlessness which has been rife in recent months” in America, Jordan, and Latin America,⁵⁰⁰ while the *Free Press* spoke of the FLQ as “eager to import the revolution techniques developed in the outside world”⁵⁰¹ – notably the “modern terrorist techniques” of abductions that had been witnessed in Latin America and Jordan.⁵⁰² The *Sun* similarly associated the abductions with foreign terror that had been imported into Canada when describing Cross’ abduction as illuminative of “[t]he spread to Canada of the diplomatic kidnapping outrage” from North Africa and Latin America,⁵⁰³ which the *Edmonton Journal* echoed in depicting the tactic as having “spread to Canada.”⁵⁰⁴ According to the *Sun*, the FLQ’s assumption of such tactics had been the resultant of terrorist activities elsewhere. Through their success in coercing governments to release detained guerrillas in return for hostages, international revolutionary movements had demonstrated that crime could occur “without punishment” and emboldened such “violent minorities of the world” as the FLQ.⁵⁰⁵ Thus, several Western Canadian editorials conceptualized the FLQ’s new tactics as being rooted in international revolutionary movements.

In addition to internationally inspired tactics, editorials noted the foreign roots of other facets of the FLQ. The *Winnipeg Free Press* described the group’s structure as internationally inspired, noting that it had “drawn on an international revolutionary experience” to adopt “a cellular structure” difficult to infiltrate.⁵⁰⁶ The *Leader-Post* focused upon the group’s foreign ideological inspirations in characterizing the FLQ as “Quebec Maoists,”⁵⁰⁷ while the *Sun* accepted External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp’s contention that the FLQ was driven not by French-Canadian nationalism but “international anarchists and nihilists” seeking to deploy perceived French-Canadian grievances to advance international revolution.⁵⁰⁸ For the *Winnipeg Free Press*, the broader revolutionary impulse propelling the FLQ was not native to Canada, which had merely succumbed to “the perils and contagions of the world.”⁵⁰⁹ This proposition recalls the alien conspiracy theory, with its suggestion that terrorism and revolutionary violence were international “contagions” which had spread into Canada to corrupt it. Combined with the tendency to construct the FLQ’s tactics, structure, and ideology as foreign, as well as the aforementioned framing of the FLQ as a cancer or disease which had spread to Canada from international origins, the papers clearly perpetuated a framing of the FLQ crisis as an alien conspiracy rather than the product of native tensions.

⁵⁰⁰ “The abduction of Mr. Cross,” *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 7, 1970.

⁵⁰¹ “Challenge and Response,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 20, 1970.

⁵⁰² “Death for Treason,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 8, 1970.

⁵⁰³ “The terrible decision,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 7, 1970.

⁵⁰⁴ “Law and order,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 16, 1970.

⁵⁰⁵ “The terrible decision,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 7, 1970.

⁵⁰⁶ “To Secure Democracy,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 19, 1970.

⁵⁰⁷ “British viewpoints,” *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 24, 1970.

⁵⁰⁸ “Unified by grief and horror,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 19, 1970.

⁵⁰⁹ “To Secure Democracy,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 19, 1970.

Framing the October Crisis as the result of internal systemic factors

Compared to these nine editorials framing the crisis as the product of foreign revolutionary movements or inspiration, six sought to interrogate the systemic and structural roots of the crisis. Quantitatively, this suggests a deeper recognition of the crisis' internal roots than in Atlantic Canada, in which merely three editorials sought to examine such roots compared to the ten demonstrating an alien conspiracy framing. However, the majority of Western Canadian editorials providing some analysis of the crisis' roots did so only tenuously and fragmentarily. The *Sun* referred to the FLQ's efforts to "exploit the real or imagined grievances of some French-Canadians," without delineating such grievances,⁵¹⁰ and tenuously referenced the "two-races problem," Quebecers' impression that they were unequal Confederate partners, their unique cultural aspirations, and the province's notable economic challenges.⁵¹¹ While not explicitly associating such economic difficulties (and the cultural impulse for *la survivance*) to the development of the crisis, the implied connection is clear. The *Winnipeg Free Press* recognized the interplay within the crisis of systemic factors with a similar vagueness. Recognizing that crime and discontent blossomed under "evil social conditions," the paper condemned critics who chastised the WMA for failing to address the crisis' roots, indicating that the societal ills were "so deep-rooted" that no individual government or immediate policy could do more than contribute to their gradual elimination.⁵¹² Thus, while not offering any significant analysis of these ills and the reforms required, the *Free Press* appeared to acknowledge the role of certain societal, economic, and political factors in sparking the crisis. A subsequent editorial on October 21 submitted that "[t]here may have been injustices to Quebec in the past," without expanding upon the nature of such injustices.⁵¹³ Thus, while several editorials did appear to recognize broader economic, political, and social grievances as at the root of the current discontent plaguing Quebec, the majority of such attempts were undeveloped and rather tenuous in nature.

The *Edmonton Journal* was more explicit in exploring the crisis through the framework of societal and economic grievances, offering the most comprehensive effort in either Eastern or Western Canada to interrogate the internal roots of the crisis. Its October 22 editorial offered a remarkably concerted analysis, describing Quebec as enduring the psychological and social strain of emerging from a "semi-feudal past" to the realization "that French-speaking Canadians will probably always be a minority in the nation." It portrayed the province as suffering from "a lagging economy and endemic unemployment." The province had experienced, for the prior fifteen years, an "intolerable" unemployment rate twice that of Ontario or any Prairie province. This was "bound to result in social unrest," particularly given the expectation that ten to twelve percent of the province's labour force would be unemployed in the coming

⁵¹⁰ "Unified by grief and horror," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 19, 1970.

⁵¹¹ "Too precious to lose," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 28, 1970.

⁵¹² "To Secure Democracy," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 19, 1970.

⁵¹³ "Ill-Informed," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 21, 1970.

winter, suppressing further a per capita income which was already beneath the Canadian average. Part of the responsibility for this, the editorial conceded, lay with the federal government, which had too frequently devised solutions for national economic concerns that failed to consider how they would disproportionately impact the Maritime provinces and Quebec.⁵¹⁴

Intriguingly, not all editorials concurred with the *Edmonton Journal's* assessment of the roots of the crisis, and the federal government's contribution to those roots. Of the Western Canadian editorials that did interrogate the crisis' internal origins, three constructed Quebec itself as responsible for the grievances. For instance, the *Winnipeg Free Press* submitted that while "[t]here may have been injustices to Quebec in the past ... many Canadians outside the province would argue that these at least in part were the result of the province's institutions rather than of deliberate oppression by other Canadians."⁵¹⁵ As the *Sun* continued in its own exploration of the crisis' roots, "[w]e come back to the past flaws in French-Canadian attitudes to the demands of modern life, the failure above all to bring their educational system into line with modern industrial and technological needs."⁵¹⁶ Both editorials indicated – with some regionalism – that the grievances to which the FLQ were responding originated not from any federally-inflicted injustices, but from flaws in the French-Canadian institutions and attitudes.

In a similar vein, the *Winnipeg Free Press* accorded some responsibility for the current tensions to the separatist movement and Parti Québécois. Contesting the alien conspiracy theory in other editorials, the *Free Press* deemed it essential that, once the FLQ was crushed, Canada confront such "unpleasant realities" as the fact that the FLQ and its ideology "did not suddenly appear from nowhere or from Cuba." Rather, the FLQ had evolved and developed from "an existing movement, headed by respectable, far-from lawless people who thought Quebec had no future within Confederation and sought, by peaceful means, to transform it into a separate, independent state." The creation and rise of the PQ had established the party at the head of "a movement they c[ould ...] not control," exciting radical students and groups, embracing extremists "ready to use any means," and encouraging the "naïve" conviction "that common sense would govern everything and induce everyone to comport himself in the finest democratic fashion." As such, the *Free Press* questioned Lévesque's judgment in creating and leading the PQ, for he had failed to balance "the theoretical advantages" of separation with the "risks involved in a partitionist course."⁵¹⁷ This segment maintained that the true roots of the crisis emanated from the flaws in Quebec's social and political reality, as opposed to any fault of the Canadian government.

Such assessments of the internal factors which had contributed to the development of the October Crisis were nevertheless rare, present in merely six editorials. Aside from one editorial in the *Edmonton*

⁵¹⁴ "Quebec's future," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 22, 1970.

⁵¹⁵ "Ill-Informed," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 21, 1970.

⁵¹⁶ "Too precious to lose," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 28, 1970.

⁵¹⁷ "Challenge and Response," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 20, 1970.

Journal, the editorials either presented only a brief and summary note of Quebec's grievances, or sought to divert responsibility to Quebec itself.

Framing the FLQ as not reflective of Quebeckers more broadly

In line with the alien conspiracy framing, the Western Canadian papers promoted a conceptualization of the FLQ emphasizing their "otherness" and distance from the majority of the Quebec and Canadian population. Indeed, frequent emphasis was accorded to the group's minority status. The *Sun* referred to the FLQ as "a minority of minorities,"⁵¹⁸ "murderous fanatical" and "violent minority,"⁵¹⁹ "handful of criminal racist fanatics," and "rag-tag covey of mail-box bombers."⁵²⁰ In the *Leader-Post* the FLQ emerged as a "minority group"⁵²¹ and "small group of assassins and anarchists,"⁵²² while the *Free Press* described it as representing "a small minority of Quebeckers."⁵²³ Clearly, the editorials took great pains to frame the FLQ as encompassing only a tiny number of Quebeckers. For the *Winnipeg Free Press*, Montreal Mayor Jean Drapeau and his Civic Party's remarkable victory in the municipal election of October 25, 1970⁵²⁴ was partly indicative of Montrealers' desire to demonstrate that the FLQ's "activities are the work of a mere handful of men; that they in no way represent the feelings and attitude of the

⁵¹⁸ "The terrible decision," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 7, 1970.

⁵¹⁹ "Mechanism's the word," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 14, 1970.

⁵²⁰ "Go on and bleed," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 16, 1970.

⁵²¹ "Convicted criminals the correct term," *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 14, 1970.

⁵²² "Canada or anarchy," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 19, 1970.

⁵²³ "Ill-Informed," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 21, 1970.

⁵²⁴ Newspapers across the nation had reported with rapt attention the Civic Party's seizure of the municipal leadership in a "landslide" (Canadian Press, "Drapeau Wins Smashing Victory - Montreal Mayor Gets Fifth Term," *Telegraph-Journal* (Saint John, NB), October 26, 1970; Canadian Press, "Drapeau Gets 5th Term As Mayor Of Montreal - Early Results Show Landslide Victory," *Guardian* (Charlottetown, PEI), October 26, 1970; Mark Daly, "Who will be watchdog of city hall?," *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 26, 1970) or "clean sweep" of all fifty-two council seats (Richard Levesque, "Win a 'rejection of false prophets,'" *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 26, 1970; James Stewart, "Trudeau praises election victor as candidate of national unity - A clean sweep for Mayor Drapeau," *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 26, 1970), as it had "crushed all opposition ... to register one of the most stunning electoral victories in Montreal history" (Canadian Press, "Drapeau in sweep - Mayor crushes does to win fifth term," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 26, 1970; Canadian Press, "Drapeau registers complete victory," *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 26, 1970; Canadian Press, "Landslide victory for Drapeau," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 24, 1970; Canadian Press, "Drapeau Crushes Opposition - Mayor's Party Wins Every Seat In Montreal's Civic Elections," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 26, 1970). Drapeau himself had received 92% of the vote (Canadian Press, "Drapeau registers complete victory," *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 26, 1970; Bob Hill, "Drapeau wins 92% support in Montreal," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 26, 1970; "Clean sweep for Civic Party; Drapeau gets more than 90% of vote," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 26, 1970), and his Civic Party, according to a Canadian Press report, "carried every council seat with support from roughly 80 per cent of the voters" (Canadian Press, "Drapeau in sweep - Mayor crushes does to win fifth term," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 26, 1970; Canadian Press, "Drapeau registers complete victory," *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 26, 1970; Canadian Press, "Drapeau Crushes Opposition - Mayor's Party Wins Every Seat In Montreal's Civic Elections," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 26, 1970; Canadian Press, "Landslide victory for Drapeau," *Evening Telegram* (St. John's, NL), October 24, 1970).

citizens of Canada's largest city."⁵²⁵ Similarly, the *Edmonton Journal* characterized Drapeau's vast margin of victory as illuminative of the Montreal populace refuting the FLQ's claims to represent Quebecers. They had sought to do so through offering their fervent support to "a man identified with tough opposition to the FLQ," thereby clearly demonstrating that "they want no part in terrorism or politics conducted by means of murder."⁵²⁶

Editorials also took strides to situate the group as external to the mainstream of Quebec. For the *Sun*, the crisis had illuminated Quebec as a province of "decent people ... beset by murderous fanatics,"⁵²⁷ while the *Leader-Post* contended that "[r]easonable Canadians realize that the FLQ's actions are as regrettable to Quebec as to any other part of Canada."⁵²⁸ The *Winnipeg Free Press* deemed the staunch support offered by Quebec Members of Parliament for the WMA as "indicative" that it was Quebecers who were "the most grieved" by Laporte's "cold-blooded" murder.⁵²⁹ The *Edmonton Journal* offered a similar observation as to the FLQ's marginality within Quebec, extending it to urge against any exacerbation of intranational tensions. Noting that the FLQ was attempting through its terrorist actions to pit English and French-Canadians as adversaries, the *Journal* urged Canadians not to view the abductions as typical of Quebecers and French-Canadians. Most French-Canadians were "no more responsible for the actions of the tiny terrorist minority than are the people of Alberta for the criminals in our midst." As such, the editorial argued that this crisis could not be allowed to inhibit the construction of a nation rooted in the harmonious co-existence of its "two founding peoples," and urged Canadians to refuse to satisfy the FLQ's desire for "backlash" and "bigotry."⁵³⁰ While the *Journal* was novel in overtly voicing the concern that the crisis would hamper the relationship between Canada's founding nations, it fit into the broader urge to frame the FLQ as not reflective or representative of the vast majority of Quebecers.

The editorials sought to "other" the FLQ further by differentiating the group from the separatist movement they purported to represent. In so doing, the *Sun* described the FLQ as "the manic fringe of the separatist movement,"⁵³¹ while the *Winnipeg Free Press* depicted the group as existing "on the fringe of a legal separatist movement,"⁵³² which itself represented only "a minority of Quebecers,"⁵³³ thereby reinforcing the group's marginality. The *Edmonton Journal* identified the "small group of assassins and anarchists" which comprised the FLQ as "distinguishable from the Quebec separatists who have used

⁵²⁵ "Montreal's Answer," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 27, 1970.

⁵²⁶ "Montreal's reply," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 27, 1970.

⁵²⁷ "A regrettable necessity," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 20, 1970.

⁵²⁸ "A unified front," *Leader-Post* (Regina, SK), October 22, 1970.

⁵²⁹ "Death Knell of Separatism," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 19, 1970.

⁵³⁰ "Time of trial," *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 14, 1970.

⁵³¹ "The terrible decision," *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 7, 1970.

⁵³² "Death for Treason," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 8, 1970.

⁵³³ "Ill-Informed," *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, MB), October 21, 1970.

political means to seek their ends.”⁵³⁴ The Western Canadian editors deliberately emphasized the FLQ as a radical minority, divorced from both the Quebec mainstream and the separatist movement from which it sought to feed. Thirteen of the fifty-seven editorials in the Western Canadian newspapers contained some exemplar of the framing of the FLQ as marginal and unrepresentative of Quebec (compared to the Atlantic Canadian publications, in which three of the thirty-seven editorials contained such a theme).

Framing the nation’s next steps beyond the shock and grief of October 1970

Reflective of the alien conspiracy discourse, framing of the FLQ as a fringe minority group, and the minimal attention to delineating the internal factors that had contributed to the crisis’ development, Western Canadian editorials offered few recommendations of how the province and nation should address the FLQ crisis beyond prosecuting its perpetrators. Merely two editorials sought to extend the discourse on the crisis into suggestions of how to address the grievances underlying the FLQ’s program. The most concerted effort to offer recommendations arose from the *Edmonton Journal*, unsurprising given the paper was also the source of the most thorough examination of the social, psychological, and economic strains which had contributed to the FLQ’s surge. Noting that while the WMA and deployment of the armed forces had constituted a “necessary response to terrorism,” the paper argued on October 22 that the emergency measures did not comprise the long-term solutions required to address the province’s legitimate grievances. Consequently, the *Journal* offered recommendations on further action to redress such issues, and offer a more long-lasting solution to the crisis than simply crushing the FLQ. “Part of the answer,” the editorial indicated, was to continue the pursuit of ensuring French-Canadians received equitable and understanding treatment. Resolutions to Quebec’s economic grievances, particularly the unemployment rates, were sorely required, demanding the federal government assume “[a] more regional approach” to the economy cognizant of the specific needs, for instance, of the provinces to Ontario’s east, which “may also need extra cash help this winter.”⁵³⁵ Otherwise, only the *Sun* offered any recommendations, insisting that a heightened and dispersed reformist impulse in Quebec would ease the tensions fuelling the crisis.⁵³⁶ In this minimal discourse on the means by which to target the crisis’ origin, the Western Canadian editorials again were comparable to the Eastern Canadian framing of the crisis.

In summary

In fifty-seven editorials, the four Western Canadian papers devoted more extensive editorial coverage to the FLQ crisis in the month of October 1970 than the four Eastern Canadian publications. In so doing,

⁵³⁴ “Canada or anarchy,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 19, 1970.

⁵³⁵ “Quebec’s future,” *Edmonton Journal* (Edmonton, AB), October 22, 1970.

⁵³⁶ “Too precious to lose,” *Sun* (Vancouver, BC), October 28, 1970.

the *Winnipeg Free Press*, *Leader-Post*, *Edmonton Journal*, and *Sun* adopted several of the same narrative framings of the crisis as Eastern Canadian editors. Indeed, the Western Canadian papers tended to frame the FLQ in the same condemnatory terms, depict the group as posing a legitimate challenge to the Canadian nation, and emphasize the victims' innocence and commendability in terms that further vilified the FLQ. The group's noted capacity to escalate further affirmed its stature as an authentic threat, capable of orchestrating additional abductions, selective assassinations, the hostages' murder, the intensification of terror, and the ensuing economic challenges. Perhaps linked to this conceptualization of the FLQ as a legitimate threat, and the crisis as bearing the potential to spiral from control, the papers offered widespread support to the WMA. Thirty-three of the forty-two editorials which assumed some stance on the crisis indicated their support for the government's measures, reflective of the support for the WMA noted in Hewitt and Cohen-Almagor's studies. Dominant themes included expressions of the need to have faith in the government, dismissal of the oppositions' arguments, support for the death penalty in the *Winnipeg Free Press*, and the *Sun*'s arguments that the hard-line stance should have been invoked sooner. Editorial opinion opposed negotiations because capitulating to terrorist demands would encourage further terror and anarchy. In turn, editors defended the WMA because of the lack of legislative alternatives. The papers depicted a Canadian public that broadly supported the government and WMA, and described national unity as instrumental in this time of crisis, echoing the findings of Cohen-Almagor and Siegel.

While this pro-government and pro-WMA stance was dominant among the editorials, it was not the only discourse present. Fifteen editorials – less than half the number of those supportive of the WMA, yet still notable – framed the measures in terms reminiscent of the anti-WMA framing which now dominates the historiography. The Western Canadian papers raised concerns about threats to civil liberties more frequently than their Eastern Canadian counterparts, with eleven editorials voicing unease regarding the provincial abuse of the WMA, detainment of innocents, and necessity to avoid censorship and witch-hunts. Other doubts appeared in two editorials about the WMA's effectiveness given the lack of any quantifiable success in the police investigations, while nine disputed the government's secrecy surrounding the war measures, the latter of which recalled the similar concern noted in Holdrinet's study. Together these formed a corpus of editorials questioning the WMA's efficacy, although such doubts were often tempered with caveats or explanations that it was not the government to blame for the civil rights concerns, but the WMA's flaws and the provincial authorities' misuse of the act. Even among the editorials critical of the WMA and the government's stance, no editorial staff argued that the WMA had not been an appropriate or necessary response to the FLQ.

Similarly reflective of the Atlantic editorials was the alien conspiracy framing which, supporting Siegel's findings, dominated all of the Western Canadian papers with the exception of the *Edmonton Journal*. The FLQ appeared in the papers as a minority and fringe group neither representative nor

reflective of the broader Quebec populace. While nine editorials stressed the foreignness of the FLQ's tactics, structure, and ideology, only six editorials examined the systemic grievances which had contributed to the FLQ's rise. Half of these were concentrated in the *Edmonton Journal*, indicating not only that it was the only paper to construct the crisis as the product of internal grievances rather than foreign influences, but that the "alien conspiracy" framing dominated the other three Western Canadian papers. Only two editorials – one of which was in the *Journal* – offered any suggestions on how to address the crisis in the long-term. Indeed, beyond the alien conspiracy framework, only the *Edmonton Journal* offered any concerted effort to examine the crisis through either an Explanation, or an Evaluation and Moral, framing lens. As in the Eastern Canadian editorials, this conceptualized the crisis as restricted in origins, scope, and resolution, limited to the FLQ, and which would thus conclude with their apprehension. In this sense, the *Leader-Post*, *Sun*, and *Winnipeg Free Press*' framing of the crisis was thematic only insofar as they connected the crisis to international movements and ideologies, while the *Edmonton Journal* married its episodic coverage of events with a handful of detailed thematic explorations of internal grievances.

While the Western Canadian newspapers' general framing of and stance on the October Crisis was thus comparable to that presented to Eastern Canadian readers, there were some novel departures. The Eastern Canadian editorials were more likely initially to frame the government as confronting a dilemma, and accorded more attention to the decision to call in the army to aid the civil power, although the *Free Press* did indicate its support for the army's future resumption of such a role. Western Canadian papers offered more of a dialogue respecting the WMA in terms of containing more editorials expressing some concern regarding the emergency measures – while the Atlantic Canadian publications contained six editorials critical of the government's response and two voicing concerns regarding civil rights, the Western publications provided fifteen and eleven editorials respectively. Similarly, the Western Canadian papers were more critical of the government's failure to reveal to citizens the extent of the "apprehended insurrection," suggesting the emergence of some doubts about the government's conduct during the crisis. The same papers were more likely to describe the public as supportive of the government's stance (sixteen editorials as opposed to five), and express the necessity of national unity in such trying times (ten editorials compared to three). Although neither region accorded any substantial examination to the crisis' internal roots, twice as many editorials in the Western papers – concentrated in the *Journal*'s unparalleled analysis – contained such a theme. Generally, however, the broad contours of the Western and Eastern Canadian editorial constructions and framings of the crisis were comparable in their predominant endorsement of the government's hard-line stance and invocation of the WMA, and with their portrayal of the crisis within an "alien conspiracy" framework.

CHAPTER IV: OBSERVING THE OCTOBER CRISIS IN CENTRAL CANADA

The four most circulated English newspapers in Central Canada in 1970 – the *Globe and Mail*, *Toronto Daily Star*, *Montreal Star*, and *Montreal Gazette* – offered ninety-two editorials that interpreted and analyzed the crisis for readers.⁵³⁷ Although the papers adopted many of the same framings of the FLQ as did coverage in other regions, in several key respects the Central Canadian papers adopted novel and unparalleled frames. While the Montreal papers reflected the nationwide tendency to support the government’s hard-line response, the Toronto papers were uniquely critical and disapproving of the government in urging that the government negotiate for the hostages’ release, and framing the WMA as “dangerous,” excessive, ineffective, and enabling undue civil liberties violations. The Ontario and Quebec papers also provided a broader analysis of the roots of the crisis, relied less frequently on an “alien conspiracy” framing, and recommended long-term measures to redress the FLQ’s grievances.

Framing the FLQ - The descriptors used

The Central Canadian newspapers framed the FLQ in deprecating terms, emphasizing the group’s inhumanity and brutality. Directly following Cross’ abduction, the papers characterized the FLQ as comprised of “terrorists,”⁵³⁸ “fanatics,”⁵³⁹ “criminals,”⁵⁴⁰ “extremists,”⁵⁴¹ and members of a “pestilent organization.”⁵⁴² The abduction appeared as “mad and heartless,” a “violation of human decency”⁵⁴³ and an “outrage.”⁵⁴⁴ In the early stage of the crisis, the *Globe and Mail* and *Montreal Star* chided any efforts to legitimize the FLQ and its actions as being “political” in nature. The Toronto paper denounced efforts to frame the FLQ in terms of “political crimes and guerrillas” when there existed “only crimes and

⁵³⁷ This greater prioritization of the crisis in Central Canada is to be expected, when the crisis was centred in Quebec and Ontario, as the seat of the federal government that assumed a dominant role in the proceedings. These ninety-two editorials were distributed relatively evenly between the four publications. Both the *Globe and Mail* and the *Montreal Gazette* published twenty-four editorials on the crisis throughout October, while the *Toronto Daily Star* and *Montreal Star* distributed twenty-two each. These papers offered the most temporally consistent coverage of the crisis, with all papers but the *Globe and Mail* publishing two editorials each following Cross’ abduction (the *Globe and Mail* published one), and all publishing approximately one editorial a day from October 12 onwards.

⁵³⁸ “FLQ KIDNAPPING: James Richard Cross ransom must be paid,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 6, 1970; “Ugly, but no surprise,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 7, 1970; “The only choice,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 8, 1970; “Don’t blame Quebec,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 8, 1970.
⁵³⁹ “The dilemma posed by an abduction,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 6, 1970; “The only choice,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 8, 1970.

⁵⁴⁰ “Ugly, but no surprise,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 7, 1970; See also “Don’t blame Quebec,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 8, 1970.

⁵⁴¹ “Ugly, but no surprise,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 7, 1970.

⁵⁴² “FLQ KIDNAPPING: James Richard Cross ransom must be paid,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 6, 1970.

⁵⁴³ “The dilemma posed by an abduction,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 6, 1970.

⁵⁴⁴ “FLQ KIDNAPPING: James Richard Cross ransom must be paid,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 6, 1970.

criminals,” and refused to frame Cross’ abduction as “a political act” rather than a simple crime.⁵⁴⁵ The *Montreal Star* also refuted any attempt to classify jailed FLQ members as “political prisoners,” indicating that “[t]he terrorists in jail in Quebec are criminals, arrested and tried on criminal charges,” and the FLQ’s attempts to accord them different descriptors illuminated only the “distortion in the minds of today’s fanatics.”⁵⁴⁶

After Laporte’s abduction the Central Canadian newspapers deepened their denunciation of the FLQ. Editorials continued to frame the FLQ as “terrorists,”⁵⁴⁷ “extremists,”⁵⁴⁸ and “fanatics,”⁵⁴⁹ but supplemented these descriptors with “lawless,”⁵⁵⁰ “outlaws,”⁵⁵¹ “bandits,”⁵⁵² “anarchists,” “nihilists,”⁵⁵³ and “desperadoes.”⁵⁵⁴ While the *Globe and Mail* reduced the FLQ’s activities to “raw gangsterism,”⁵⁵⁵ the Montreal publications described the group as conducting “organized terror”⁵⁵⁶ and “guerrilla crimes,”⁵⁵⁷ and exhibiting “wild and irrational behavior.”⁵⁵⁸ The *Montreal Star* dismissed the FLQ’s ideology, indicating that it possessed “a helter-skelter, erratic, irresponsible, outdated view of life and the world,”⁵⁵⁹ had presented itself through a manifesto that was wholly anachronistic and “filled with clichés,”⁵⁶⁰ and sought to create a government “out of despotism tempered by assassination.”⁵⁶¹ Again attacking any effort to view the FLQ through rose-coloured glasses, the *Toronto Daily Star* maintained

⁵⁴⁵ “Ugly, but no surprise,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 7, 1970.

⁵⁴⁶ “The only choice,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 8, 1970.

⁵⁴⁷ “All Quebec held for ransom,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970; “Pierre Laporte,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970; “There is no soft line,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 12, 1970; “LAPORTE KIDNAPPING: Our safety demands smashing the FLQ,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 12, 1970; “FLQ ‘BANDITS’: Keeping apart crime and politics,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 14, 1970; “Not time to strike,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 15, 1970; “Use the law we have,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 15, 1970; “WAR MEASURES ACT: Civil liberties mustn’t be lightly suspended,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 16, 1970; “The basic challenge to today’s society,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 17, 1970; “WAR MEASURES ACT: Must Canada suffer along with the FLQ?,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 17, 1970.

⁵⁴⁸ “The extremists,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 16, 1970.

⁵⁴⁹ “LAPORTE KIDNAPPING: Our safety demands smashing the FLQ,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 12, 1970.

⁵⁵⁰ “The basic challenge to today’s society,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 17, 1970.

⁵⁵¹ “Not time to strike,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 15, 1970.

⁵⁵² “We are not divided,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 14, 1970.

⁵⁵³ “The terror tactics work against cause,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970.

⁵⁵⁴ “The terror tactics work against cause,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970; “FLQ ‘BANDITS’: Keeping apart crime and politics,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 14, 1970.

⁵⁵⁵ “We are not divided,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 14, 1970.

⁵⁵⁶ “All Quebec held for ransom,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970.

⁵⁵⁷ “Pierre Laporte,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970.

⁵⁵⁸ “The terror tactics work against cause,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970.

⁵⁵⁹ “The terror tactics work against cause,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970.

⁵⁶⁰ “The terror tactics work against cause,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970.

⁵⁶¹ “The extremists,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 16, 1970.

that the FLQ were not “political prisoners” but “criminals, convicted of criminal acts.”⁵⁶² An editorial on October 14 elaborated that Trudeau had been correct in refusing to label them as such, when they were “bandits or worse.” These men, the *Star* intoned, were not imprisoned because of their beliefs, but for criminal acts. It was “falsehood and flattery,” offering “an unearned dignity,” to define such bombers, gunmen, and terrorists as “political prisoners.”⁵⁶³ Other editorials emphasized the clear danger that the group posed, with the *Toronto Daily Star* indicating that Laporte’s abduction had constituted “an alarming revelation of the terrorists’ conspiratorial strength and audacity.”⁵⁶⁴

Following Laporte’s murder, editorials continued to frame the group as “terrorists,”⁵⁶⁵ “extremists,”⁵⁶⁶ and “fanatics,”⁵⁶⁷ but the enmity heightened with their employment of such terms as “murderers,”⁵⁶⁸ “vile criminals,”⁵⁶⁹ “madmen,” and “lunatic killers.”⁵⁷⁰ The murder had exposed the group as ruthless,⁵⁷¹ cowardly, villainous,⁵⁷² vicious,⁵⁷³ dangerous,⁵⁷⁴ murderous,⁵⁷⁵ and “a determined and fanatical enemy.”⁵⁷⁶

⁵⁶² “LAPORTE KIDNAPPING: Our safety demands smashing the FLQ,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 12, 1970.

⁵⁶³ “FLQ ‘BANDITS’: Keeping apart crime and politics,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 14, 1970.

⁵⁶⁴ “LAPORTE KIDNAPPING: Our safety demands smashing the FLQ,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 12, 1970.

⁵⁶⁵ “A nation mourns,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970; “The work of cowards,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970; “LAPORTE SLAYING: A terrible blow to a troubled country,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970; “The facts of terror,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 20, 1970; “The inspiring tone of a prime minister,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 20, 1970; “Law for urban terror,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 23, 1970; “TERRORIST CANCER: Use scalpel, not axe,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 23, 1970; “Cooling it: the public’s response,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 24, 1970; “Not in the Criminal Code,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 24, 1970; “The election: Now, to work,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 26, 1970; “Audacity at the airport,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 26, 1970; “LENIN CANCELLATION: Poor, timid CBC,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 28, 1970; “Jobs, economic growth priorities for Quebec,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 30, 1970; “WAR MEASURES ACT: Give us the facts,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 30, 1970; “Goblins under guard,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 31, 1970; “FLQ ROUNDUP: ‘Raiding blind’ is no answer,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 31, 1970.

⁵⁶⁶ “Too overwhelming a victory,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 27, 1970.

⁵⁶⁷ “The Laporte death and its symbolism,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970; “Pierre Laporte,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 20, 1970; “TERRORIST CANCER: Use scalpel, not axe,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 23, 1970; “Cooling it: the public’s response,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 24, 1970.

⁵⁶⁸ “The Laporte death and its symbolism,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970; “The work of cowards,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

⁵⁶⁹ “A crisis escalated,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 23, 1970.

⁵⁷⁰ “LAPORTE SLAYING: A terrible blow to a troubled country,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

⁵⁷¹ “LAPORTE SLAYING: A terrible blow to a troubled country,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970; “By law or terror? The answer is given,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970.

⁵⁷² “The work of cowards,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

⁵⁷³ “TERRORIST CANCER: Use scalpel, not axe,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 23, 1970; “WAR MEASURES ACT: Give us the facts,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 30, 1970.

⁵⁷⁴ “TERRORIST CANCER: Use scalpel, not axe,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 23, 1970.

⁵⁷⁵ “WAR MEASURES ACT: Give us the facts,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 30, 1970.

⁵⁷⁶ “By law or terror? The answer is given,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970.

The *Montreal Star* insisted that the FLQ possessed an “unreasoned terrorist mentality,” and “sick minds,” since “[o]nly perverted men could plan [such] a cold-blooded execution.”⁵⁷⁷ The papers thus condemned Laporte’s death as a “black deed,”⁵⁷⁸ “cold-blooded murder,”⁵⁷⁹ “crime of brutality and infamy,”⁵⁸⁰ “brutal, contemptible act,”⁵⁸¹ and a response which was “savage and diabolical” and illustrative only of “horror and depravity.”⁵⁸²

The *Montreal Gazette* and *Globe and Mail* (similar to the *Edmonton Journal*) framed the FLQ as a group with which Canadians were at war. While the former warned that the FLQ had “declared war on all Quebecers,”⁵⁸³ the Toronto paper framed provincial and national institutions as “in a state of siege.”⁵⁸⁴ Otherwise, Central Canadian papers prominently framed the FLQ as a cancer or ailment with which Quebec and Canada were afflicted. The *Montreal Gazette* described the group’s “cancerous FLQ cells” as infecting “the body politic,”⁵⁸⁵ and for the *Toronto Daily Star*, Trudeau’s comparison of the FLQ “to a cancer in the nation’s body” was held up as a “true” analogy.⁵⁸⁶ The *Globe and Mail* indicated that a premier metaphor for the FLQ would “present Canada as a ... body contending with a cancer cell,” capable of “the destruction of the whole” and necessitating “medicine’s most powerful weapons” to combat it.⁵⁸⁷ Overall, the Central Canadian editorials painted the FLQ in similar terms to those used in other national papers, framing the group as terrorists, extremists, fanatics, criminals, a “cancer” requiring excision, and a legitimate and ruthless foe with whom the entire nation was at war.

Framing the FLQ as an affront and challenge to Canadian society and democracy

Central Canadian papers depicted the FLQ as dangerous because it posed a threat not merely to the hostages, or even to Montrealers, but to Quebec, Canada, and their entire social and political systems. Democracy itself was at stake. The *Montreal Gazette* decried the FLQ as endangering and seeking to destroy “[e]very democratic institution,” in violating “every civilized tradition” and “every precept of a free and civilized society” as it challenged “duly elected authority and every decent human impulse.”⁵⁸⁸ The *Montreal Star* warned that the FLQ’s extortion attempts threatened democracy’s “most basic

⁵⁷⁷ “The Laporte death and its symbolism,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970.

⁵⁷⁸ “A nation mourns,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970.

⁵⁷⁹ “Montreal’s answer to terrorism,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 24, 1970.

⁵⁸⁰ “The Laporte death and its symbolism,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970.

⁵⁸¹ “Pierre Laporte,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 20, 1970.

⁵⁸² “The Laporte death and its symbolism,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970.

⁵⁸³ “All Quebec held for ransom,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970.

⁵⁸⁴ “Ugly, but no surprise,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 7, 1970.

⁵⁸⁵ “All Quebec held for ransom,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970.

⁵⁸⁶ “TERRORIST CANCER: Use scalpel, not axe,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 23, 1970.

⁵⁸⁷ “Incredible powers,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 17, 1970.

⁵⁸⁸ “All Quebec held for ransom,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970. See also Oct 24 - MG - Montreal’s answer to terrorism; Oct 26 - MG - The election: Now, to work; Oct 31 - MG - The facts speak for the government.

principles.”⁵⁸⁹

The FLQ also imperilled the broader social and political order. “Justice and order in Quebec, and the integrity of Canada itself, are in jeopardy,” the *Toronto Daily Star* cautioned, and “law and justice are plainly in grave danger in Quebec, as terrorism prospers.”⁵⁹⁰ The *Montreal Gazette* iterated that the FLQ was assaulting “[t]he whole fabric of law and order,”⁵⁹¹ imperilling the “political and social unit of Canada,”⁵⁹² seeking to undermine its societal foundations,⁵⁹³ and menacing the “rule of law.”⁵⁹⁴ For the *Montreal Star*, such activities reflected the FLQ’s intent to “create the type of social collapse which is needed to justify their kind of action.”⁵⁹⁵ Moreover, the *Globe and Mail* framed the FLQ as seeking to deploy violence in order “to destroy our society,”⁵⁹⁶ and intent on “bringing down the Government and society by force” and supplanting it with “a brutal and absolute tyranny.”⁵⁹⁷ Comparably, the *Toronto Daily Star* condemned Laporte’s murder as a “critical assault on the foundation of our country, on the security and freedom of each of us,”⁵⁹⁸ while the *Montreal Gazette* emphasized the threat against national unity specifically, noting that the FLQ sought to “break up this country” through its violence.⁵⁹⁹ Overall, in a framing comparable to other Canadian regions, the Ontarian and Quebec publications characterized the FLQ as posing a distinct, tangible, and concerted threat to the province and nation’s democratic system, rule by law and order, broader political and social order, and national unity.

Framing the victims as innocent martyrs

Emphasizing the villainy and repugnance of the FLQ, the Central Canadian papers (like those elsewhere in Canada) highlighted the innocence and exemplary virtues of the victims of terrorism. Descriptions of Cross and Laporte characterized them as “helpless,”⁶⁰⁰ “innocent,”⁶⁰¹ or “harmless” victims, clearly undeserving of their plight.⁶⁰² The *Toronto Daily Star* mourned that Laporte represented

⁵⁸⁹ “The only choice,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 8, 1970.

⁵⁹⁰ “WAR MEASURES ACT: Civil liberties mustn’t be lightly suspended,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 16, 1970.

⁵⁹¹ “Not time to strike,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 15, 1970.

⁵⁹² “The only course for Quebec,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 17, 1970.

⁵⁹³ “The terror tactics work against cause,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970.

⁵⁹⁴ “By law or terror? The answer is given,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970. See also “Montreal’s answer to terrorism,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 24, 1970.

⁵⁹⁵ “Cooling it: the public’s response,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 24, 1970.

⁵⁹⁶ “Incredible powers,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 17, 1970.

⁵⁹⁷ “The work of cowards,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

⁵⁹⁸ “Pierre Laporte,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 20, 1970.

⁵⁹⁹ “The facts speak for the government,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 31, 1970.

⁶⁰⁰ “The only course for Quebec,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 17, 1970.

⁶⁰¹ “LAPORTE SLAYING: A terrible blow to a troubled country,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970. See also “The only choice,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 8, 1970.

⁶⁰² “The only choice,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 8, 1970. These descriptions of Cross as “hopeless” and “harmless” were the only framings of the British diplomat, with dominant attention being accorded to Laporte.

“the most noble human side of the turbulent changes in Quebec over the past three decades.” He had exhibited a deep conviction and devotion to his people, province, and country, which had propelled him from legal study, to a career in journalism exposing “the corruption and repression” of the Duplessis regime, to a political career as “a crusader for action” against the province’s ills.⁶⁰³ The *Globe and Mail* similarly depicted Laporte as “one of the group of Quebecers who first sincerely tried to correct the injustices in Quebec.” Echoing the *Daily Star*, the *Globe and Mail* highlighted that Laporte had been “one of the few journalists who dared to cross swords” with the “despot[ic]” Duplessis, and later, in the Liberal government, had demonstrated a strong devotion to reducing the inequities of Quebec through political, professional, and social reform.⁶⁰⁴ His virtue as a civil servant concerned with Quebeckers’ rights, his belief in democracy and liberalism, and his humanitarian efforts against societal disparities had elicited comparisons in the *Montreal Star* to the Kennedys and to Martin Luther King. Having similarly sought to “clean up” political and social injustices, and been “in the midst of striving for answers to many of his nation’s, and the world’s, perplexities,” Laporte’s murder had been comparably “shocking,” “savage and diabolical.”⁶⁰⁵

In a solemn front-page editorial, the *Montreal Gazette* explicitly sought to martyrize Laporte. It described a nation mourning a man in whom his colleagues and compatriots had recognized “the essence of all they held dear.” Laporte had been “an exemplary family man, warm and outgoing, possessed of a deep sense of compassion” who, in his public life, was “a fierce and determined enemy of tyranny.” His “foul” murder, and “his martyrdom” for “the cause of freedom” for which he had been such a strong advocate, had demonstrated the necessity to crush the FLQ.⁶⁰⁶ The *Toronto Daily Star* did not agree, casting Laporte as “a victim, not a martyr,” not “someone who fell in a heroic struggle but as a plain, hardworking man who was innocent of any crime.” That rendered his death “all the more terrible,” the Toronto publication intoned, since his murder “strikes us the most insupportable death of all” for how “[w]hat happened to him could have happened to anyone.”⁶⁰⁷ Regardless of whether editorials portrayed Laporte as a martyr, they emphasized the victims’ innocence and accorded focus to describing Laporte as a virtuous man seized too soon by vile criminals.

Framing a nation in fear of further escalation

With the exception of the *Montreal Star*, which fixated on the events of October 1970, the Central Canadian papers expressed anxiety regarding how the crisis could escalate further. In this respect, the

⁶⁰³ “Pierre Laporte,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 20, 1970.

⁶⁰⁴ “The work of cowards,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

⁶⁰⁵ “The Laporte death and its symbolism,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970.

⁶⁰⁶ “A nation mourns,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970.

⁶⁰⁷ “LAPORTE SLAYING: A terrible blow to a troubled country,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

papers were comparable to others across the nation. One concern arose regarding the potential for the crisis to devolve into further revolutionary violence, with the *Toronto Daily Star* warning that “[t]he advance tremors of revolutionary upheaval are with us.”⁶⁰⁸ The *Montreal Gazette* warned that each Quebecker was now vulnerable to “being snatched from his home by armed thugs” or victimized by a dynamite attack.⁶⁰⁹ Until the FLQ terrorists were apprehended, the *Globe and Mail* warned that “[e]veryone in the country” with an “anti-revolutionary” attitude or stance “is jeopardized,”⁶¹⁰ since the FLQ “has stated readiness to seize more” hostages.⁶¹¹ Accordingly, the *Toronto Daily Star* approved of the precautions adopted in Ottawa’s Rockcliffe suburb (filled with senior civil servants and foreign diplomats) where authorities recommended that parents keep their children at home during Halloween rather than risk encountering “dangerously real demons.”⁶¹²

Reminiscent of the Eastern Canadian concern that the crisis would erupt into a civil war, the *Globe and Mail*, *Toronto Daily Star*, and *Montreal Gazette* expressed unease that the FLQ’s program of terror would invite broader and more widespread conflict. The *Globe and Mail* indicated that Quebeckers’ impatience for social justice accorded groups like the FLQ a risk “magnified a thousand times” for their capacity “to drive the rest of us into opposing camps.”⁶¹³ The *Toronto Daily Star* voiced concern about the FLQ’s capacity to draw more Quebeckers into its grasp, noting that terrorism could prosper and elicit “sympathy or acceptance among large sections of the population that are either politically illiterate or morally blind.”⁶¹⁴ For the *Montreal Gazette*, fear of an expanding crisis revolved around the possibility of terrorist acts inviting counter-terrorism. A plethora of “loose talk of individual retaliation” gave rise to such worries, although the *Gazette* warned that it “must be avoided at all costs,” for no individual was justified in seizing the law in their own hands.⁶¹⁵

From the start of the crisis, newspapers worried about the hostages’ fates. The *Toronto Daily Star* had initially supported negotiations as the sole means by which to ensure Cross and Laporte survived their ordeal.⁶¹⁶ Lamenting that Cross’ fate remained unclear, the *Gazette* indicated on October 8 that Montreal “can only hope that respect for human life will prevail” and that Cross would “be returned safely to his

⁶⁰⁸ “Only in national unity can Quebec find salvation,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

⁶⁰⁹ “All Quebec held for ransom,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970. It justified these fears with the FLQ’s threat of further abductions and the thievery that year of “several thousand sticks of dynamite” (“The only course for Quebec,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 17, 1970).

⁶¹⁰ “Ugly, but no surprise,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 7, 1970.

⁶¹¹ “There is no soft line,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 12, 1970.

⁶¹² “Goblins under guard,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 31, 1970.

⁶¹³ “Incredible powers,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 17, 1970.

⁶¹⁴ “WAR MEASURES ACT: Civil liberties mustn’t be lightly suspended,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 16, 1970.

⁶¹⁵ “All Quebec held for ransom,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970.

⁶¹⁶ “FLQ KIDNAPPING: James Richard Cross ransom must be paid,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 6, 1970; “LAPORTE KIDNAPPING: Our safety demands smashing the FLQ,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 12, 1970.

family.”⁶¹⁷ The *Globe and Mail* emphasized six days later that two lives were in danger,⁶¹⁸ and the following day reiterated that both men were held “on the threat of death.”⁶¹⁹ Following Laporte’s murder, this concern fixated on Cross’ safety.⁶²⁰

Like the *Edmonton Journal* and *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, the *Toronto Daily Star* was distressed that the tensions in Quebec would further harm an already struggling Quebec economy. The paper wearily predicted that Cross’ abduction and its suggestion of political instability would jeopardize efforts to attract foreign investment into Quebec, and thus hinder attempts to increase employment.⁶²¹ Alongside the anxieties about the hostages’ well-being, the potential for further revolutionary violence and abductions, and the prospect that the crisis could expand to draw further Canadians into the fray, the papers demonstrated considerable angst about the potential for the crisis to degenerate further.

Framing the government as facing a dilemma

Reminiscent of the tendency of the Eastern and, to a lesser extent, Western Canadian editorials to depict the governments as facing a dilemma regarding whether to accede to terrorist demands, two of the four Central Canadian papers briefly adopted such a framing. The *Montreal Star* portrayed the government as facing “a massive dilemma.” Juxtaposing the need to ensure Cross’ safety were the “moral or ethnical” complications of “bowing to the kidnappers’ demands,” when capitulating would necessitate the release of the identity of an alleged FLQ informer. This would expose that informer’s life “to hazard” and represent the “trading of one man’s security for another, and who on this earth can make such an omnipotent decision?”⁶²² On the same day, the *Toronto Daily Star* recognized the dilemma that Cross’ abduction presented, observing that refusing to capitulate would produce “every reason to fear that Mr. Cross will be killed, like the German ambassador to Guatemala and an American representative in Uruguay earlier this year.” Acceding to ransom demands, however, would “make a mockery of Canadian justice,” release “desperate men who are all too likely to commit further crimes,” and encourage further abductions for subsequent releases. Nevertheless, the paper urged the government to negotiate for Cross’ release.⁶²³ This certainty about the most appropriate response continued in its October 12 editorial, where

⁶¹⁷ “Wait and hope,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 8, 1970.

⁶¹⁸ “We are not divided,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 14, 1970.

⁶¹⁹ “Use the law we have,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 15, 1970.

⁶²⁰ “Pierre Laporte,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 20, 1970.

⁶²¹ “Don’t blame Quebec,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 8, 1970.

⁶²² “The dilemma posed by an abduction,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 6, 1970.

⁶²³ “FLQ KIDNAPPING: James Richard Cross ransom must be paid,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 6, 1970.

the paper acknowledged that authorities faced a “cruel dilemma” but persisted in urging the government to capitulate to FLQ demands.⁶²⁴

Only the *Montreal Star* and the *Toronto Daily Star* framed the governments as facing a dilemma due to the FLQ’s activities.⁶²⁵ The *Montreal Star* was most reminiscent of Eastern Canadian framing, delineating arguments for and against negotiations without making an explicit recommendation of action. The *Daily Star*’s approach to the dilemma was more akin to that of the Western Canadian papers, with their tendency to nominally frame the crisis as a dilemma while offering an assessment as to the most suitable course of action. Appearing in only three editorials between two papers, however, this framing was not as prominent in Central Canadian depictions of the crisis as it was elsewhere in the country.

Framing negotiations as a necessity

The *Toronto Daily Star*’s recommendation that the government negotiate with and make concessions to the FLQ represented a frame unique to the two Toronto publications, which each contained two editorials (published prior to the invocation of the WMA) urging the government to negotiate for the hostages’ release. In both papers, this pro-negotiation posturing was the dominant initial framing of the crisis prior to the proclamation of the WMA, unaccompanied by any recommendations that the government should promptly approach the FLQ with a hard-line, tough-on-crime stance.

The *Toronto Daily Star* directly advocated for negotiations with the FLQ. Although cognizant of the government’s dilemma, its first editorial on the crisis on October 6 explained “we believe that the government should - after bargaining for a reduced ransom - meet the kidnapper’s demands.” Diplomats like Cross were “under Canada’s protection,” and securing his release was both a priority and “an obligation of honor.” A hard line against the FLQ would only be warranted after his safe return, at which point a “massive police drive by both federal and provincial authorities to smash this pestilent organization” would be necessary.⁶²⁶ Hence, the editorial staff’s stance on the government’s courses of action favoured immediate negotiations to effect Cross’ safe return, followed by a hard-line stance to crush the organization. This support for negotiations persisted after Laporte’s abduction. An October 12 editorial asserted that assuring the hostages’ survival would “almost certainly” require some bargaining with the FLQ. “We believe that is the right course,” the paper indicated, because any alternate action would likely lead to the murder of either or both of the hostages. Although conceding that it was “all too probable” that this course of action would invite further extortion, no greater safety existed in “standing

⁶²⁴ “LAPORTE KIDNAPPING: Our safety demands smashing the FLQ,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 12, 1970.

⁶²⁵ This framing was not as dominant in the Central Canadian newspapers as it was in Eastern Canada, where it appeared in all four papers.

⁶²⁶ “FLQ KIDNAPPING: James Richard Cross ransom must be paid,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 6, 1970.

adamantly on principle” when the government’s refusal to negotiate for Cross triggered Laporte’s abduction. “Public safety from these fanatics can only be won by smashing the FLQ with tough and thorough police work,” it argued, and the released hostages would be able to share details about their experiences in captivity. To achieve this end, the paper suggested that the government should offer to release into exile some of the FLQ’s so-called “political prisoners.”⁶²⁷

The *Globe and Mail* also favoured negotiations. Its October 7 editorial suggested “Ottawa and Quebec have no other course open to them,” when “Canada’s overriding obligation is to protect foreign diplomats and must be met - although all efforts should be bent to minimizing the cost.”⁶²⁸ After Laporte’s abduction, the October 12 editorial maintained that the government faced two alternatives regarding freeing the prisoners: “to allow them to escape the charges that face them or the penalties” imposed upon them, or refusing to release them and “accept[ing] the forfeit of Mr. Cross’ life should the kidnapers carry out their threat.” Between these options, the editors opined that “we would have chosen a deal on the release of at least some of the prisoners.” Canada had an “obligation to protect the representatives of other countries who come to do business in our midst,” which required Canada “to accept whatever humiliations lie in the way of reasonable rescue.” Failing to do so would have “grave consequences in our diplomatic community.”⁶²⁹

The only other suggestion of a pro-negotiation stance in Central Canada appeared in the *Montreal Gazette* editorial on October 13, in which the paper reflected upon Bourassa’s October 11 statement about “carefully keeping open the possibility for negotiation” with the FLQ. The paper indicated that the government was “quite properly ... thoroughly committed to making every effort within its power to protect the victims.”⁶³⁰ The editorial was vague whether the paper supported the government acceding to the FLQ’s demands, or supported the *appearance* of negotiations to occupy and delay the FLQ while the police conducted their investigations. Accordingly, the Montreal paper did not explicitly recommend acceding to FLQ demands like the two Toronto publications, which prioritized the humanitarian and political obligation components of the crisis.

Framing the government’s hard-line response as the most appropriate course of action

The pro-negotiations stance in the Toronto papers stood in near diametrical contrast to the two Montreal papers. Among the *Montreal Gazette*’s twenty-four editorials on the crisis, twelve assumed some attitudinal stance on the appropriateness of hard-line measures, nine contained support for the

⁶²⁷ “LAPORTE KIDNAPPING: Our safety demands smashing the FLQ,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 12, 1970.

⁶²⁸ “Ugly, but no surprise,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 7, 1970.

⁶²⁹ “There is no soft line,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 12, 1970.

⁶³⁰ “Opening the way,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 13, 1970.

government's stern opposition to terror and/or the invocation of the WMA, and only four invoked some measure of concern. Even prior to the WMA's proclamation, the *Gazette* had supported emergency measures. In light of the FLQ's threat to the democratic system, "civilized tradition," and safety of Quebecers, the paper argued that "[t]he government should not hesitate to assume whatever powers it requires" to destroy the terrorist organization. Though the powers would be arbitrary, and "repugnant to a free society," they were preferable to remaining vulnerable to individuals seeking to destroy democracy. Nor should the courts be lenient, "as they sometimes have been in the past," but punish such criminals to the law's full extent and "rid ourselves" of the FLQ "as quickly as we can."⁶³¹ The *Gazette* indicated its advance support of whatever law-and-order measures the government deemed necessary to crush the FLQ, and the most severe punishment of its members that the law allowed.

With the proclamation of the WMA, the *Gazette*'s support for the firm line remained staunch. It argued that the WMA was entirely justifiable in the nation's war against the FLQ. On October 17, the paper affirmed that when "the unpunished use of violence" constituted the most severe "danger to liberty," the FLQ's long reign of terror, threat of further abductions, and possession of thousands of stolen dynamite sticks justified the extraordinary powers wielded by the federal government under the WMA. Terrorists "cannot be stopped unless the society in which they operate shows that it will not yield to threats and intimidation," and the *Gazette* insisted that there was "no question" that authorities needed WMA powers to crush terrorism "if society is to be freed of the threat of continuing terrorism." Not only was the WMA justified given the threat of further terror in Quebec, but also the possibility that insurrection would spread across Canada. When Canadians resided under "the same system of criminal law and justice," the editorial argued, successful attempts to subvert that system in one region would encourage dissident groups to adopt similar tactics in other regions.⁶³² Thus, the *Gazette* echoed the Edmonton, Vancouver, Winnipeg, Charlottetown, St. John's, and Saint John papers by insisting that the WMA was defensible to prevent further anarchy and terrorism in Canada.

Otherwise, the *Gazette* framed the WMA and broader harsh response to terror as necessary to protect Canadian freedoms and laws. Laporte's murder had illuminated the extent to which the FLQ was threatening the freedom of all Canadians, and had illustrated that the "calculated use of terror must be ruthlessly suppressed."⁶³³ The paper defended the WMA as an effort to preserve a "rule of law" under assault from "enemies who are prepared to go to any extreme to spread fear and undermine confidence in legitimate government" in order to impose their own regime.⁶³⁴ When all citizens' "rights and liberties stem from the rule of law," the WMA presented "the guarantee of the retention of those rights and

⁶³¹ "All Quebec held for ransom," *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970.

⁶³² "The only course for Quebec," *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 17, 1970.

⁶³³ "A nation mourns," *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970.

⁶³⁴ "By law or terror? The answer is given," *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970.

liberties for the majority against threat from a minority committed to the use of terror.”⁶³⁵ Simply stated, the editors framed the WMA as the protector, rather than the detractor or suspender, of civil liberties.

For the *Montreal Gazette*, like several of its counterparts elsewhere in Canada, the WMA’s proclamation was defensible because there were no alternatives to manage the crisis. On October 20, the *Gazette* asserted that the measures were necessary on account of unique challenges posed by urban life and liberalism. Terrorists thrived in a liberal society under the shelter of “the very civilities which they have undertaken to destroy,” with urbanity further offering advantages in its anonymity, plethora of hiding locations, readily available transportation and communication, and convenient access to clothing, arms, food, and shelter. Although the WMA could not restrict the benefits which the large urban atmosphere offered to terrorists, authorities had no choice but to “resort to arbitrary measures of arrest and detention,” and to impose restrictions in a liberal society that enabled terrorists, “if terrorism is to be stamped out.”⁶³⁶ The enduring challenges that police faced in apprehending the FLQ illustrated that even if the WMA was “too strong, there is nevertheless no other statute that is strong enough to cope with this problem.”⁶³⁷

Overall, the *Montreal Gazette* maintained a firm support of authorities’ rigid opposition to terror and the WMA. Due to the extent of the FLQ’s threat to the Quebec populace and its institutions, and the necessity to quash the organization as rapidly as possible, the paper insisted that it was imperative to pursue the perpetrators with the full weight of the justice system. It endorsed the WMA, arguing that the measures were necessary due to the dangers to Canadian civil liberties if governments did not punish violence, end the FLQ’s long reign of terror, and prevent the spread and escalation of terrorism.

The *Montreal Star* also demonstrated an enduring endorsement of the government’s hard-line response to the crisis and proclamation of the WMA. In a comparable ratio to the *Gazette*’s nine editorials supporting a hard line and four voicing some degree of concern, the *Montreal Star* offered eleven editorials endorsing the stern response and six illustrating some measure of concern. Considered among the paper’s total twenty-two editorials, thirteen of which assumed a notable stance on the crisis, it is apparent that, quantitatively, the pro-hard-line and pro-WMA stance dominated the *Montreal Star*’s evaluations of the crisis of October 1970.

In the immediate wake of Cross’ abduction, the *Star* sternly opposed the FLQ. Early editorial assessments of the government’s communications with the FLQ revealed the paper’s opposition to capitulation, classifying the FLQ’s demands as being “virtually impossible to meet”⁶³⁸ and insisting that the government had “no choice” but to reject them. No government, the paper intoned, “could permit

⁶³⁵ “Labor’s Establishment misread its support,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 26, 1970.

⁶³⁶ “The facts of terror,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 20, 1970.

⁶³⁷ “The facts speak for the government,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 31, 1970.

⁶³⁸ “The dilemma posed by an abduction,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 6, 1970.

itself to be blackmailed in this fashion,” or allow the majority to fall under the command of a minority. In its refusal to yield to extortion that “would threaten the most basic principles of democratic rule,” the federal and provincial governments had “properly” approached the issue “in a sharp and hard light.”⁶³⁹ In its firm opposition to capitulation to demands it perceived as “irrational” and “unrealistic,” the *Montreal Star* promoted a firm and unyielding approach to the FLQ.

The paper’s opposition to any negotiation with the terrorists hardened with Laporte’s abduction. The October 12 editorial indicated that a modern democratic society shouldered the duty “to fight back any attempt at wild and irrational behavior designed to undermine its foundations.” The government could not capitulate, despite the lives on the line, because doing so would “open the door to future blackmail of this kind” and thereby propel society down “the slippery slope of anarchy.”⁶⁴⁰ This echoed the *Montreal Gazette* and most other English-Canadian newspapers that endorsed a steely response to terror to forestall further anarchy, violence, and terror.

The *Montreal Star* immediately pledged its support for the government’s implementation of the WMA. In an October 16 editorial, the paper characterized the invocation of emergency measures as “inevitable,” given the FLQ’s terrorist program’s steady progression from bombings to hostages and threats of murder. Allaying concerns about the WMA’s endangerment to Canadian civil liberties, the *Star* assured that the emergency powers were “subject to scrutiny by Parliament and presents no long-range threat to individual rights.” As such, “[o]ur response now is in large measure a vote of confidence in legal government.”⁶⁴¹ Throughout the month, the paper defended the measures because “no lawless group should be allowed to throw constitutional order into disarray,”⁶⁴² insisting that the perverted and cold-blooded murder of Laporte had laid to rest any doubts about the necessity of emergency powers.⁶⁴³ The *Star* indicated on October 22 that “[w]e do not dispute the need ... for sweeping police powers,”⁶⁴⁴ and affirmed two days later that the WMA had been “necessary” to facilitate the police investigation and prevent the spread of terror.⁶⁴⁵

Comparable to the *Montreal Gazette* and other papers, the *Montreal Star* endorsed the WMA on the grounds that the government lacked alternatives. The Criminal Code could not contain the situation. Debating emergency measures prior to their implementation might have seemed ideal, but the *Star* acknowledged that such discussions would have deprived authorities of “the speed and element of surprise they needed in their hunt for the abductors.” Thus, the WMA had been justifiable due to the

⁶³⁹ “The only choice,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 8, 1970.

⁶⁴⁰ “The terror tactics work against cause,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970.

⁶⁴¹ “Emergency action was inevitable,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 16, 1970.

⁶⁴² “The basic challenge to today’s society,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 17, 1970.

⁶⁴³ “The Laporte death and its symbolism,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970.

⁶⁴⁴ “Rights fundamental even in emergency,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 22, 1970.

⁶⁴⁵ “Cooling it: the public’s response,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 24, 1970.

unparalleled speed with which it could be invoked. It also represented the federal government's only option, given the Quebec government's demand for such measures. Since Quebec had requested Ottawa's aid, "Ottawa had no alternative but to accede to the request," because disregarding the "appeal would have shattered the foundation of confederation."⁶⁴⁶ This defence continued into the month's final days, when the *Star* affirmed that the WMA had been defensible "for the adequate reason that no other instrument lay to hand," and both Montreal and Quebec had requested its invocation.⁶⁴⁷

Comparable to the Charlottetown, Halifax, Edmonton, and Vancouver papers, the *Montreal Star* supported strong federal action to maintain popular faith in the government. The *Star* urged Canadians to accept that the government invoked the WMA "on the basis of knowledge which it has accumulated," even if those details were not yet available to the public.⁶⁴⁸ Since Trudeau was a renowned civil libertarian, the *Star* assured Canadians that he had inevitably conducted significant "soul-searching and analyzing before consenting" to the WMA. Accordingly, the nation need not fear the act when it was being wielded in sure and trustworthy hands.⁶⁴⁹

Like the *Montreal Gazette*, the *Montreal Star* positioned itself as a staunch advocate of and ally to the government. From the onset of the crisis, editorials framed a firm response to terror as essential. With Laporte's death, the paper argued that the government had a duty to repel subversive efforts, when capitulation would send the nation upon a "slippery slope" toward further terror. The *Star* affirmed its support for the WMA, describing the measures as inevitable, necessary, without alternative, posing no long-standing threats to civil freedoms, and deserving only of the populace's faith in the government.

Compared to the Montreal newspapers, the two Toronto publications were substantially less supportive of the government's tough stance on terror. Following its initial advocacy for negotiations with the FLQ (itself a departure from the Montreal papers' consistent opposition to such yielding), the *Toronto Daily Star* produced only six editorials indicating support for a hard-line approach and/or WMA (half of the twelve editorials assuming some stance on the crisis). In contrast, ten editorials expressed some degree of concern or disapproval about the government's response to the FLQ (or all twelve, if one includes the two editorials advocating for negotiations). Clearly, the *Toronto Daily Star* was not nearly as unequivocal or devoted in its support for the law-and-order stance on terror and the WMA as its Montreal counterparts, offering instead a dialogue reminiscent of the two historiographical approaches to the crisis

⁶⁴⁶ "The inspiring tone of a prime minister," *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 20, 1970.

⁶⁴⁷ "A warning about retaining controls," *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 29, 1970.

⁶⁴⁸ "Emergency action was inevitable," *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 16, 1970.

⁶⁴⁹ "The inspiring tone of a prime minister," *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 20, 1970. These two editorials in the *Star* offered the only elucidations in Central Canada of the argument supporting the WMA on account of the populace's need to have faith in the government. Particularly compared to the Western Canadian papers, in which three editorials in the *Sun* and one in the *Edmonton Journal* had defended the measures on such a basis, this framing did not assume a comparable prominence in Central Canada, considering the greater numeracy of the Central Canadian editorials.

that have followed since 1970.

The *Toronto Daily Star* approved some elements of the hard-line stance against terror. The paper advocated on October 6 for “a massive police drive by both federal and provincial authorities to smash this pestilent organization once and for all, and to put its members behind bars,” to occur after negotiations had netted Cross’ return.⁶⁵⁰ This stance persisted following Laporte’s abduction, with the paper indicating that, once negotiations had secured the hostages, “public safety from these fanatics can only be won by smashing the FLQ with tough and thorough police work.”⁶⁵¹ The paper’s initial stance on the crisis, through supporting the immediate necessity of negotiations, did situate the law-and-order pursuit of the criminals as a necessary, albeit secondary, step.

The *Daily Star*’s stance appeared to shift with Laporte’s murder, recognizing the undesirability of negotiations and suggesting tenuous tolerance of the WMA. Since Laporte’s murder had revealed a stronger FLQ than the paper had hitherto expected, to release a single “FLQ criminal” in exchange for the hostages would have been “interpreted - and therefore would [have] be[en] - a great victory for the FLQ,” inviting “chaos in Quebec and its separation from Canada.”⁶⁵² In addition to reversing its initial stance on the favourability of negotiations, Laporte’s murder convinced the *Daily Star* that “almost any measure is justified” to “rid the country of these lunatic killers,” and thereby demonstrated that the WMA “may well have been necessary.”⁶⁵³ Although the WMA was unsuitable for the crisis, having been designed for a broad-scale and protracted war rather than a minute “secret society,” an October 23 editorial suggested that the government could “hardly be condemned” for invoking the act when “[i]t was the only emergency legislation on the books.”⁶⁵⁴ In short, the WMA was justifiable due to the lack of alternatives.

Although not the *Daily Star*’s most dominant approach to the WMA, the paper defended some elements of the government’s response to the conflict. Its initial reaction to the crisis had affirmed the necessity of a law-and-order opposition to the FLQ, only following negotiations to secure the hostages’ release. After Laporte’s murder, the paper recognized the downfalls of negotiations, the justifiability of measures to rid of ruthless individuals, and the lack of legislative alternatives to the WMA. The paper’s support was more tenuous and less dominant than in the newspapers from Western or Atlantic Canada, or

⁶⁵⁰ “FLQ KIDNAPPING: James Richard Cross ransom must be paid,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 6, 1970. Such a response would be “overdue,” demonstrating the only instance in Central Canada of the “hard-line response as overdue” framing common to other regions.

⁶⁵¹ “LAPORTE KIDNAPPING: Our safety demands smashing the FLQ,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 12, 1970.

⁶⁵² “WAR MEASURES ACT: Civil liberties mustn’t be lightly suspended,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 16, 1970.

⁶⁵³ “LAPORTE SLAYING: A terrible blow to a troubled country,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

⁶⁵⁴ “TERRORIST CANCER: Use scalpel, not axe,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 23, 1970.

from Montreal. Its presence, however, suggests a clear dialogue within the paper respecting the appropriateness of approaching the FLQ with a hard-line and the WMA.

Comparable to the *Toronto Daily Star*, yet unlike the publications from Montreal and elsewhere in Canada, the *Globe and Mail* framed the government's decision to firmly approach the FLQ in generally doubtful if not negative terms. Among the paper's eighteen editorials taking a stance upon the most suitable means to redress the tensions, six articulated approval for the government's response, and sixteen elucidated doubts or criticisms regarding that response (seventeen if one includes those editorials initially demanding the government negotiate with the FLQ). Clearly, while a dialogue did exist in the *Globe and Mail* as to the suitability of the government's response to the FLQ, the paper was dominantly critical of the government.

The only support arose from six brief passages in the editorials. After supporting negotiations in its October 7 and 12 editions, the *Globe and Mail* appeared to warm itself – albeit slightly – to a law-and-order stance against the FLQ. On October 15, the paper supported the use of the law against the terrorists, when it criticized Trudeau's government for not deploying the laws of treason and sedition to “br[ing] under the law” those FLQ apologists and supporters who, in their public declarations, were inflaming and exacerbating the situation.⁶⁵⁵ Immediately after the WMA's proclamation, the paper indicated that the “drastic and dangerous” powers could only be tolerated “if we can believe that the Government has evidence that the FLQ is strong enough and sufficiently armed to escalate the violence that it has spawned.” The paper accepted “the Government's assurance that it has such evidence.”⁶⁵⁶

Laporte's murder somewhat convinced the *Globe and Mail* of the WMA's necessity. On October 19, the paper indicated that in light of the slaying, there would be few Canadians – presumably including the paper's editors – “who would have the Government now go one inch further to meet the [FLQ's] demands.”⁶⁵⁷ The following day, the paper noted that while “[w]e do not agree with” the NDP members who voted in opposition to the WMA, “we do respect them” for exhibiting the “courage to act according to their conscience.”⁶⁵⁸ On October 23, the *Globe and Mail* framed the WMA as a “necessary but extraordinary move against the vile criminals,”⁶⁵⁹ and later characterized itself as “among” those who supported the government's response and proclamation of the WMA.⁶⁶⁰

These brief offerings of support represent the totality of the *Globe and Mail*'s approval of the government's response to the crisis. In its early criticism of the government for not deploying the available laws, the paper appeared supportive of a law-and-order confrontation of FLQ supporters. Later,

⁶⁵⁵ “Use the law we have,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 15, 1970.

⁶⁵⁶ “Incredible powers,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 17, 1970.

⁶⁵⁷ “The work of cowards,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

⁶⁵⁸ “Make it very hard to be arbitrary,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 20, 1970.

⁶⁵⁹ “A crisis escalated,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 23, 1970.

⁶⁶⁰ “All the facts,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 24, 1970.

when the paper conveyed its acceptance that the WMA had been necessary and disagreement with the NDP's opposition to the measures, the *Globe and Mail* positioned itself as supportive of the WMA. However, the brief and often unelaborated nature of this support, and its appearance in merely six editorials, illustrate that the *Globe and Mail's* dominant approach to the crisis was one of concern and doubt, as is demonstrated below.

The *Montreal Gazette*, *Montreal Star*, and *Toronto Daily Star* all supported the government's decision to deploy the army in an aid to the civil power role. One editorial in each paper defended the military's role in the current crisis. The *Montreal Star* quickly implied its approval, noting that the soldiers had assumed guard duties to relieve the "overworked police" and enable them to perform their regular duties.⁶⁶¹ The *Toronto Daily Star* was more explicit in supporting the soldiers' deployment, describing it as necessary "to relieve the strain on the overworked police" and arguing that they had minimized "the danger that irresponsible left-wingers might stir up riots among Montreal students."⁶⁶² For the *Montreal Gazette*, its support echoed that voiced in Winnipeg and Halifax, by suggesting the unsuitability of reducing the military's numerical strength when the army would continue to be necessary to address threats to the internal order. This was a time when "[t]he politics of confrontation and, unfortunately, of violence are becoming part of the Canadian way of life," and when it would be "foolhardy to believe that bombings, kidnappings and other violent crimes for so-called political motives will not be attempted again." Consequently, the *Gazette* perceived any decline "in the number of trained and combat-ready men capable of defence against internal disorder" to be "a reckless undertaking."⁶⁶³

Overall, the Toronto papers clearly diverged from the Montreal publications, and from those across Canada. While the *Montreal Gazette* and *Montreal Star* were comparable to the Western and Eastern Canadian publications in supporting the government's firm response to terrorism and invocation of the WMA, the *Toronto Daily Star* and *Globe and Mail* – while containing elements of that framing – privileged criticisms of the government. Both Toronto papers initially endorsed negotiations to ensure the hostages' release, shifting with Laporte's murder to nominally support the WMA while, as evidenced below, expressing a dominant concern regarding the government's conduct.

Framing the governmental response as ineffectual and inappropriate

The Toronto and Montreal papers demonstrated varying concerns regarding the WMA's effectiveness and appropriateness as a response to terror. This critical framing was more prominent in the Toronto papers, in which sixteen of the *Globe and Mail's* eighteen stance-taking editorials expressed concern or

⁶⁶¹ "Emergency action was inevitable," *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 16, 1970.

⁶⁶² "WAR MEASURES ACT: Give us the facts," *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 30, 1970.

⁶⁶³ "Canada's depleted forces," *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 29, 1970.

doubt about the measures (seventeen if one includes those editorials advocating for negotiations), and ten of the *Toronto Daily Star*'s twelve editorials did the same (all twelve, if one includes the pro-negotiations editorials). In contrast, the *Montreal Gazette* and *Montreal Star* respectively voiced such concerns in only four of the twelve, and six of the thirteen, editorials that situated themselves on either side of the debate. Both cities' publications touched upon the themes of police ineptitude, civil liberties concerns, and the government's necessity to disclose a broader picture of the crisis to Canadians. However, the Toronto papers showed qualitatively more concern about the WMA, directly opposed the WMA, blamed the government for the crisis' escalation, and placed greater emphasis on civil liberties concerns and the police's failure to utilize the measures with any success.

Reminiscent of the *Sun* and *Leader-Post*, the *Globe and Mail* blamed authorities for contributing to and enabling the crisis' development.⁶⁶⁴ "The Government had not prepared itself, as it should have," the paper intoned, "to protect its people" against a group whose destructive nature was clear from its seven years of robbing, bombing, killing, and pronounced intent to overthrow the government.⁶⁶⁵ Admitting no security system could entirely prevent an abduction, the paper was firm that "God knows we should be able to do a better job." The discovery of the plot against an American diplomat should have incited a plan to guard consular and public officials, and Cross' abduction should have inspired measures that would have protected Laporte.⁶⁶⁶ Thus, the paper chided the government for its "failure, in the face of more than adequate warning, to provide even the flimsiest kind of protection."⁶⁶⁷ Although not testifying to the *Globe and Mail*'s stance on the defensibility of the government's hard-line measures, these excerpts are notable for their attribution of responsibility to the government for the abductions, insisting that, in failing to act with haste to documented threats, the government had contributed to the crisis' development and escalation.

Unparalleled in other papers, the Toronto publications explicitly argued in opposition to the WMA. Responding on October 16 to speculation that the government was considering invoking the measures, the *Globe and Mail* attacked the prospect as "[d]rastic and dangerous" for how it would enable the government to do "[a]lmost anything" it desired, "pass almost any laws restricting" liberties, and send the nation careening towards a police state.⁶⁶⁸ In the wake of the WMA's invocation, the *Toronto Daily Star* chided the government because while "the FLQ has to be crushed ... we believe this could have been done without abrogating all of our civil liberties." The government had bypassed the democratic process and

⁶⁶⁴ Note: The newspapers in which the *Globe and Mail* blamed the government for enabling the crisis' escalation are not included in the above tally of the papers' positioning on the suitability and defensibility of the government's hard-line response, since they do not explicitly advocate in favour of or in opposition to such stern measures.

⁶⁶⁵ "The work of cowards," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

⁶⁶⁶ "There is no soft line," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 12, 1970.

⁶⁶⁷ "Use the law we have," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 15, 1970.

⁶⁶⁸ "Drastic and dangerous," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 16, 1970.

“ignored” Parliament by invoking the WMA without prior consultation, and the WMA had “reversed the traditional process of justice, which assumes that a person is innocent until he is proven guilty.”⁶⁶⁹

The WMA furthermore evoked substantial concerns for the Toronto papers about the condition of civil liberties in Canada. Such concerns were evident in their characterization of the WMA as occasioning “massive threats to freedom,”⁶⁷⁰ as “drastic and dangerous,” and “a denial of the very rights which Mr. Trudeau once wanted to enshrine in the Constitution.”⁶⁷¹ More specific anxieties regarding threats to certain civil liberties also indicated the papers’ concern. The *Globe and Mail* demanded the publication of the names of those detained under the act and why they were detained, citing concerns that the WMA would be abused “to settle old scores not related to the FLQ manhunt”⁶⁷² or “hamper legitimate political opposition.”⁶⁷³ Its demands for a body to ensure prisoners’ welfare spoke to its concerns about the detainees’ treatment,⁶⁷⁴ and the editors feared that authorities would use the measures to target all governmental opposition, including unions, youth, and the poor.⁶⁷⁵ The paper’s cautioning that the WMA could be used to curtail freedom of the press, despite the need for “unfettered reporting,” reflected unease as to how the measures could spiral into further civil liberties infringements.⁶⁷⁶ Such apprehension was not unfounded when the detainment of hundreds of Quebeckers incommunicado, denied their legal ability to access legal counsel, had produced “anxious moments” for family and friends.⁶⁷⁷

The *Toronto Daily Star* voiced similar concerns about how the WMA enabled the abrogation of civil liberties. Its editors spoke of the WMA as granting the government “virtually dictatorial powers,”⁶⁷⁸ and subjecting citizens’ “dearly purchased rights” to the state’s arbitrary decisions.⁶⁷⁹ Deeming the WMA “a suspension of civil liberties” and “of all legal procedures,” the *Daily Star* intoned that it enabled “the arbitrary decisions of policemen and minor government officials” to supplant “the statutes of Parliament and the decisions of the courts as the law of the land.”⁶⁸⁰ Even as the nation reeled from Laporte’s loss,

⁶⁶⁹ “WAR MEASURES ACT: Must Canada suffer along with the FLQ?,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 17, 1970.

⁶⁷⁰ “Not in the Criminal Code,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 24, 1970.

⁶⁷¹ “Incredible powers,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 17, 1970.

⁶⁷² “One way to ease the agony,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 21, 1970. See also “Incredible powers,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 17, 1970; “TRUDEAU’S OBLIGATION: Justify war powers,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 22, 1970; “A crisis escalated,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 23, 1970.

⁶⁷³ “Incredible powers,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 17, 1970.

⁶⁷⁴ “A crisis escalated,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 23, 1970.

⁶⁷⁵ “A crisis escalated,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 23, 1970.

⁶⁷⁶ “Canada needs the facts,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 17, 1970.

⁶⁷⁷ “Ottawa must be specific,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 31, 1970. See “Enough washing of hands,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 29, 1970 for a similar argument.

⁶⁷⁸ “WAR MEASURES ACT: Civil liberties mustn’t be lightly suspended,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 16, 1970.

⁶⁷⁹ “LAPORTE SLAYING: A terrible blow to a troubled country,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

⁶⁸⁰ “WAR MEASURES ACT: Give us the facts,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 30, 1970.

the *Daily Star* reiterated that the government's powers "arouse our uncertainty, for our civil liberties ... cannot be lightly surrendered."⁶⁸¹ Comparable to the *Globe and Mail*, it urged reviews of all arrests and detentions under the WMA and the publishing of the names of those detained to ensure authorities were being "careful and discriminating" in applying the act.⁶⁸²

Moreover, the Toronto papers were concerned about how regional authorities were abusing the emergency situation. The *Globe and Mail* denounced as unreasonable the proposition of Toronto Board of Education trustee Herbert Barnes to effect the dismissal of all instructors advocating terrorist overthrows of government. That proposition, and the British Columbian government's similar resolution, were ignorant of the law, since advocating such overthrow was criminalized in Section 60 of the Criminal Code. They were also "dangerous," since the instructors would be fired without any hearing and the employee would bear the onus to demonstrate their innocence.⁶⁸³ The *Daily Star* similarly characterized Barnes' motion as "unnecessary" when the WMA already subjected such teachers to punishment, and "potentially dangerous" in how it could mimic McCarthyism by freezing education with its witch-hunts.⁶⁸⁴

For the Toronto editors, the police's apparent ineptitude in conducting its manhunt raised further doubts regarding the WMA's wisdom, necessity, and effectiveness. For the *Globe and Mail*, this concern appeared simply in an editorial on the October 24 robbing of \$120,000 in banknotes at Montreal International Airport, suggesting that the perpetrators' "unreal" escape called into question the effectiveness of the police's dragnet.⁶⁸⁵ The *Toronto Daily Star* was more consistently critical of the police's conduct under the WMA. "Ottawa must be embarrassed," it commented, "by the apparently meagre results of the police sweep," for they had failed to capture the abductors or any significant members.⁶⁸⁶ On October 23, its editors observed that "it is becoming questionable," when the arrests had succeeded only in detaining "seemingly respectable people," whether the measures "have really helped."⁶⁸⁷ Once it was revealed that no charges had been placed against any of the 397 individuals detained under the WMA, the *Daily Star* criticized that the police's lack of success was exacerbating "doubts over official policy in the Quebec crisis." While such a mass round-up produced the inevitability that "some innocent people" would be swept up, it was "astonishing that two weeks' interrogation and searching did not turn up enough information to support charges before this." The entire police manhunt

⁶⁸¹ "Pierre Laporte," *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 20, 1970.

⁶⁸² "TRUDEAU'S OBLIGATION: Justify war powers," *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 22, 1970.

⁶⁸³ "Put away that rope," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 27, 1970.

⁶⁸⁴ "No witch hunts," *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 27, 1970.

⁶⁸⁵ "Audacity at the airport," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 26, 1970.

⁶⁸⁶ "TRUDEAU'S OBLIGATION: Justify war powers," *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 22, 1970.

⁶⁸⁷ "TERRORIST CANCER: Use scalpel, not axe," *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 23, 1970.

had appeared to be “aimless,” directionless, and a failure when the manhunt had seemingly not “broken or crippled the FLQ,” Cross remained a hostage, and the abductors prevailed at large.⁶⁸⁸

The final area of concern voiced in the Toronto papers was the constant discontent with authorities’ failure to be completely transparent with Canadians regarding the true extent of the crisis. The *Daily Star* first voiced this concern – and its doubts as to the WMA’s necessity – on October 16, when it urged the government to further justify the WMA since “a request by these governments [of Quebec and Montreal] is not, in itself, sufficient justification.”⁶⁸⁹ Its editors urged Trudeau “to take the public into his confidence and clearly establish the need for the drastic measures,” warning his support would evaporate if he failed to demonstrate why the measures had been requisite.⁶⁹⁰ On October 22, the *Daily Star* reaffirmed that the government owed Canadians “some solid, documented justification” for the WMA,⁶⁹¹ a demand that persisted in its October 30 lament that it was imperative the government offer “a much more complete and candid statement about the Quebec crisis than they [Canadians] have been given.” Since the WMA had been the “most drastic action ever undertaken by a Canadian government in peacetime,” the rumours of a plot to establish a provisional government were “too important a matter to be left in doubt and suspense,” and demanded an urgent statement on their role in the WMA’s proclamation.⁶⁹²

The *Globe and Mail* similarly attacked the government for its refusal to loosen its tight lips respecting the crisis’ severity. The paper chided the government for how its “secrecy on specifics” was exacerbating the rumours swirling through the populace, and demanded Trudeau “clear the atmosphere by presenting the facts.”⁶⁹³ His refusal to expand upon the reports of a provisional government “or confirm ... or deny them” was only fuelling such rumours.⁶⁹⁴ Combined with the papers’ blaming of the crisis’ development upon the government’s lack of action, and the concerns for civil liberties, regional repression, and police ineptitude, these demands for further information portrayed the Toronto papers as critical of the government’s response to an extent unseen in any other paper examined.

Such criticisms of the government’s response and emergency measures were less prominent in the Montreal papers, which remained favourable to the government’s handling of the crisis. Though not blaming the government for the crisis’ escalation or arguing against the WMA as the Toronto papers had done, the Montreal publications still expressed concerns about civil liberties, the manhunt’s lack of success, and the government’s failure to disclose sufficient details to the populace.

⁶⁸⁸ “FLQ ROUNDUP: ‘Raiding blind’ is no answer,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 31, 1970.

⁶⁸⁹ “WAR MEASURES ACT: Civil liberties mustn’t be lightly suspended,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 16, 1970.

⁶⁹⁰ “LAPORTE SLAYING: A terrible blow to a troubled country,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

⁶⁹¹ “TRUDEAU’S OBLIGATION: Justify war powers,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 22, 1970.

⁶⁹² “WAR MEASURES ACT: Give us the facts,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 30, 1970.

⁶⁹³ “Too much rage for reason,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 28, 1970.

⁶⁹⁴ “Usually reliable sources,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 30, 1970.

The Montreal editors' concerns for civil liberties were more sporadic, and less frequent, than those of the Toronto publications, emerging prominently in only three editorials. The *Montreal Gazette's* concerns were limited to one editorial, which indicated that the WMA – in permitting police to conduct arrests and detentions on mere suspicion – created vast opportunity for abuse, when Quebec Justice Minister Jérôme Choquette could not “always know of abuses when they do occur.”⁶⁹⁵ In the *Montreal Star*, all civil liberties concerns were bookended with reaffirmations that the WMA was necessary. After reiterating that the WMA had constituted the most effective mechanism to suppress terror, the *Star* cautioned that its enabling of “arrest without warrant” was dangerous, for how it deprived liberty “without prior judicial sanction” and without requiring “reasonable grounds” to believe an offence had occurred. Dangerous too was “detention without arraignment,” for how it left detainees at the “mercy” of police, unable to appeal to counsel or the magistrate. Reports had arisen that detainees had been “unacceptabl[y]” denied counsel for days, and thus the editors urged that police be subjected to “careful scrutiny and ... exacting judicial supervision.”⁶⁹⁶ The *Star* later reiterated that civil rights abuses had occurred under the WMA, despite its justifiability, again focusing on how prisoners were being detained incommunicado for days, “stripped ... of the right to counsel” due to so-called “administrative difficulties.” Like the Western and Eastern Canadian editorials, the *Star* blamed the WMA rather than the government for such infringements, noting that the measures did not explicitly provide for public or judicial surveillance of their enactment.⁶⁹⁷

In addition to this minimal focus on civil liberties concerns, the Montreal papers also accorded relatively little attention to the police's failed manhunt. Compared to that theme's prominence in the Toronto papers, and appearance too in the Western and Eastern Canadian publications, this discontent appeared only once in the *Montreal Gazette*. Though not directly chastising the police, the *Gazette* admitted that the FLQ and its stolen weapons remained “at large,” due to a “lack of police success” which was exacerbating the public's doubts as to what the WMA had accomplished.⁶⁹⁸

The Montreal editors' primary criticism of the government revolved around its restrictions on the flow of information to Canadians. On October 24 the *Montreal Gazette* indicated that, as the public could only “wonder and ... speculate” at the rumours of a provisional government and the FLQ's infiltration of “every strategic place” in Quebec, there existed “[a]n absolute need” for Trudeau “to give the country a fuller description of the emergency” that had provoked the WMA. Addressing the rumours was imperative to ensure they “are given as little scope as possible.”⁶⁹⁹ While the WMA was “an extremely harsh statute whose use must be justified with the most cogent explanations,” the paper criticized Trudeau

⁶⁹⁵ “Law for urban terror,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 23, 1970.

⁶⁹⁶ “Rights fundamental even in emergency,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 22, 1970.

⁶⁹⁷ “Emergency powers: lessons to learn,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 31, 1970.

⁶⁹⁸ “The facts speak for the government,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 31, 1970.

⁶⁹⁹ “Public should be told the facts,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 24, 1970.

for “giving his critics the brush-off in the House of Commons.” Instead, the prime minister should have utilized the opportunities to document the extent of the threat in Quebec. In so doing, he could have responded to criticism that the WMA had been unnecessary, and stemmed the “series of leaks and rumors” and the confusion they were perpetuating.⁷⁰⁰ Since the “absence of official and reliable information” only heightened these rumours and turmoil, the *Gazette* urged Trudeau to reveal more of the evidence that had compelled the government to invoke the WMA.⁷⁰¹

The *Montreal Star* was not concerned about the lack of information available to the public, but about misinformation and rumour mongering. The paper chastised the authorities for making statements “that only tend to continue tension or to cause a suspicion that perhaps Ottawa is trying to justify the severity of its measures.”⁷⁰² The public deserved to be informed, “either now or in the future,” whether and to what extent a plot existed for some takeover of governmental authority. In the meantime, it was essential that officials cease their inappropriate warnings that the true reasons for the WMA would never be revealed.⁷⁰³ The *Star* castigated Drapeau for his unsupported and vague comments about the provisional government rumour, arguing that he “owes it to the federal and provincial governments, and the general community, to share” any information he had about such a plot.⁷⁰⁴ This discontent at the government’s lack of transparency was the Montreal editors’ dominant criticism of the government, while the police failure and the WMA’s civil rights concerns elicited minimal attention. Its stance upon the government’s response remained favourable, in contrast with the Toronto papers’ criticism and doubt of the government.

Framing Canadians as supportive of the government’s stance

In eighteen editorials, divided relatively evenly between the Toronto and Montreal publications, the Central Canadian papers framed the populace as supportive of the government’s unyielding approach to terror. As the *Montreal Gazette* expressed, the nation was willing to accept the government’s actions “on faith,”⁷⁰⁵ and had “fully accepted”⁷⁰⁶ its “tough policy without question.”⁷⁰⁷ Even the *Toronto Daily Star* and *Globe and Mail*, themselves critical of the government’s positioning, conceded that the populace endorsed the authorities’ response. As the *Daily Star* reviewed, Canadians approved of Trudeau’s “drive

⁷⁰⁰ “The facts speak for the government,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 31, 1970.

⁷⁰¹ “Limiting currency of rumor,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 29, 1970.

⁷⁰² Specifically, the *Montreal Star* referred to declarations from such ministers as John Turner that much of the evidence that had prompted the WMA would never be disclosed to the public, and Marchand’s suggestion (refuted by Trudeau) that the FRAP was connected to the FLQ (“Cooling it: the public’s response,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 24, 1970).

⁷⁰³ “Cooling it: the public’s response,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 24, 1970.

⁷⁰⁴ “Drapeau on revolt,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 29, 1970.

⁷⁰⁵ “Public should be told the facts,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 24, 1970.

⁷⁰⁶ “The facts speak for the government,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 31, 1970.

⁷⁰⁷ “Limiting currency of rumor,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 29, 1970.

to destroy the FLQ,”⁷⁰⁸ he possessed “widespread public support for the steps he has taken,”⁷⁰⁹ and the citizenry “as a whole” had accepted his explanation of the act’s necessity.⁷¹⁰ The *Globe and Mail* conceded that few Canadians would oppose the government’s rejection of the FLQ’s demands,⁷¹¹ when the public supported the government’s contention that it required “wide authority to deal with whatever further menace existed.”⁷¹²

As elsewhere in the nation, Drapeau’s victory in the Montreal election was presumed to be indicative of the populace’s support for the authorities during the crisis. The *Montreal Gazette* deemed the results of the election demonstrative of the populace’s desire for law and order,⁷¹³ and endorsement of the governments’ “strong leadership” in the crisis.⁷¹⁴ The *Montreal Star* described his success as illustrative of the public’s solidarity with the Civic Party and Drapeau, and its commitment to democracy.⁷¹⁵ For the *Daily Star*, the sweep symbolized Montrealers’ rejection of “the separatists and FLQ sympathizers of the Front d’Action Politique,” and endorsement of the authorities’ “strong stand” against the FLQ.⁷¹⁶ Such attention to framing the governmental stance as eliciting public support may be attributable to the crisis’ immediacy in Ontario and Quebec, and broader interest in assessing the public’s reaction to the events.

Framing the nation’s need for unity

To a lesser extent than in Western or Eastern Canada, the Central Canadian publications – namely the *Montreal Gazette* and *Toronto Daily Star* – framed the crisis as necessitating the populace’s unity in a tumultuous time. For the *Gazette*, this need for unity rendered the medical specialists’ opposition to the government over its intent to introduce a medicare program inappropriate and inexcusable. The paper urged the specialists to culminate their strike, intoning that “[n]ow is the time for unity,” for citizens to “unite behind government and police” as they defended Quebec from “outlaws.”⁷¹⁷ Otherwise, the papers focused on the need for a more national unity. The *Gazette* described such unity as necessary to allow society to surmount the crisis “without fatal damage,”⁷¹⁸ while the *Toronto Daily Star* indicated that the

⁷⁰⁸ “WAR MEASURES ACT: Civil liberties mustn’t be lightly suspended,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 16, 1970.

⁷⁰⁹ “LAPORTE SLAYING: A terrible blow to a troubled country,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

⁷¹⁰ “WAR MEASURES ACT: Give us the facts,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 30, 1970.

⁷¹¹ “The work of cowards,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

⁷¹² “All the facts,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 24, 1970.

⁷¹³ “Resounding vote for law and order,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 27, 1970.

⁷¹⁴ “Giant task faces Quebec government,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 28, 1970.

⁷¹⁵ “The Civic Party’s democratic mandate,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 26, 1970.

⁷¹⁶ “DRAPEAU VICTORY: A nation reassured a city hogtied,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 26, 1970.

⁷¹⁷ “Not time to strike,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 15, 1970.

⁷¹⁸ “By law or terror? The answer is given,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970.

nation's survival demanded that "English and French Canadians pull together" for their survival.⁷¹⁹ Since this pro-unity framing emerged from only three editorials (two of which appeared in the *Montreal Gazette*), this theme was notably less prevalent than in Western or Eastern Canada, where ten and three editorials respectively trumpeted the essentiality of unity.

Framing the October Crisis as the result of internal systemic factors

To an extent unseen in Western or Eastern Canada, the Central Canadian papers focused upon the internal and systemic roots of the October Crisis. While the Western and Eastern Canadian publications respectively offered six and three editorials exploring such a frame, the Ontario and Quebec papers provided a deeper interpretation of the crisis' origins in sixteen editorials. Editors referred to the crisis as the result of "an internal conflict,"⁷²⁰ "disparities in our society,"⁷²¹ "imbalances between Canada's two founding cultures,"⁷²² and "the injustices in Quebec" which the FLQ had sought to use to elicit support.⁷²³ The *Toronto Daily Star* attributed tensions to intercultural conflict, noting that "[t]he existence of two vigorous cultures in a single state produces conflict" and that the current turbulence illuminated that "the Canadian experiment has not been wholly successful."⁷²⁴ For the *Montreal Star*, the conflict boiled down to the flawed education system and the disaffected youth it produced. Schools accorded insufficient attention to "the complex issues in Canada's current crisis." This lack of honest and dedicated efforts to exploring the nation's economic, social, and political issues had contributed to students' pessimism, negativism, and drift towards Maoism, Marxism, and violence.⁷²⁵ Though varying, both papers spoke to a social element underlying the developing tensions in Quebec.

Most editorials examining the crisis' roots did so from an economic perspective. The *Toronto Daily Star* argued that the tensions stemmed from the province's "economic problems," notably its mass unemployment,⁷²⁶ and thus it was integral for the government "to hold out the pride, the jobs, the housing" which French-Canadians "desperately need." It was the lack of those elements that had "allowed the FLQ to flourish."⁷²⁷ Cautioning that poverty provided fertile soil in which terror could prosper, the *Daily Star* noted that such soil abounded in Quebec. The province had contained 41% of Canada's unemployed in 1969, as well as an unemployment rate generally 50 to 100% higher than Ontario's. In

⁷¹⁹ "Only in national unity can Quebec find salvation," *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

⁷²⁰ "The only choice," *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 8, 1970.

⁷²¹ "Marchand on FRAP," *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 22, 1970.

⁷²² "Incredible powers," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 17, 1970.

⁷²³ "The work of cowards," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

⁷²⁴ "Pierre Laporte," *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 20, 1970.

⁷²⁵ "Honest approach," *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 26, 1970.

⁷²⁶ "WAR MEASURES ACT: Must Canada suffer along with the FLQ?," *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 17, 1970.

⁷²⁷ "Only in national unity can Quebec find salvation," *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

particular, French-Canadians and youth under twenty-five suffered from high rates of unemployment. These issues allowed the FLQ to easily cultivate the belief that the fault lie in capitalism or “the English,” and find a sympathetic ear with its promises of socialism, equality, and provincial independence.⁷²⁸ The *Globe and Mail*, citing similar unemployment statistics and observing that Quebec’s unemployment rate was anticipated to reach 10 to 12% that winter, argued that “[o]ne of the underlying causes of disaffection in Quebec has been the economic disparities suffered.”⁷²⁹ For the *Montreal Star*, the FLQ had made “incisive points” regarding the urgency for unemployment and housing reform in Quebec, and had thus struck a chord with many Quebeckers.⁷³⁰ Its program had tapped into the “tremendous gaps and discrepancies” in the city, finding purchase in the 38% of Montrealers living “on or below the poverty line,” the 400% rise in welfare recipients over the decade, the 240,551 illiterate adults, and the high percentages of undernourished and emotionally or physically challenged slum youth.⁷³¹

The *Montreal Gazette* took a different stance on the crisis’ roots, accrediting terrorism not to high unemployment, excessive poverty, and the need for economic growth, but to the fact that Quebec was “on the verge of beginning to move ahead.” Bourassa’s success in the Quebec election, commitment to generating 100,000 new jobs within a year, and promising developments on Quebec’s economic scene⁷³² had prompted the FLQ to sense “they were beginning to lose what little support they had.” Consequently, they had launched their current activities to “reassert themselves.”⁷³³ The FLQ’s program was rooted not in the province’s economic woes but authorities’ *success* in addressing them.

Framing the October Crisis as expected and of no surprise

The framing of the abductions as being a shock to Canadians was not as prevalent in Central Canada. This stance appeared only briefly in the *Montreal Gazette*’s description of Cross’ disappearance as “shocking,”⁷³⁴ and its portrayal of Laporte’s abduction as “a shock and an affront to the community.”⁷³⁵ Instead, the *Montreal Star* and *Globe and Mail* described the crisis as having been expected or anticipated, suggesting a more thematic – rather than episodic – conceptualization of the crisis. For the *Montreal Star*, terrorism had been “bound to take this form here sooner or later” due to the use of such

⁷²⁸ “UNEMPLOYMENT IN QUEBEC: Economics and the legacy of terror,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 21, 1970.

⁷²⁹ “Unemployment first,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 21, 1970.

⁷³⁰ “The basic challenge to today’s society,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 17, 1970.

⁷³¹ “Law and order or social justice?,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 28, 1970.

⁷³² These included manufacturing investment, the push for the construction of a Ste. Scholastique jetport, a \$600 million capital expansion of the iron mine industry, and active exploration of the prospects for developing the James Bay waters for the sale of hydro power to America (“Jobs, economic growth priorities for Quebec,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 30, 1970).

⁷³³ “Jobs, economic growth priorities for Quebec,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 30, 1970.

⁷³⁴ “A shocking crime,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 6, 1970.

⁷³⁵ “Pierre Laporte,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970.

tactics in other countries.⁷³⁶ The *Globe and Mail* argued that the crisis had been expected due to internal, rather than international, indications of its imminence. Earlier that year, the police had foiled FLQ plots to seize American diplomat Harrison Burgess and another diplomat for ultimatums nearly identical to those demanded for Cross and Laporte. Even without those prior schemes, “it should have been obvious” that an abduction was possible given how the FLQ’s terrorism had progressed through the 1960s.⁷³⁷ Whether due to the international malaise of violence, or internal indications of the FLQ’s escalation, the *Globe and Mail* and *Montreal Star* adopted the novel approach that the political abductions were foreseeable, rather than shocking.

Framing terrorism as a construct and phenomenon foreign and alien to Canada

Despite this recognition of the internal, systemic factors which had contributed to the crisis’ development, all papers but the *Globe and Mail* abided by the broader tendency to frame the crisis as an “alien conspiracy.” For instance, several papers emphasized the foreignness of the FLQ’s tactics to Canada, and their origins in international terrorist practices. The *Montreal Gazette* described Cross’ abduction as a crime “unprecedented in our experience”⁷³⁸ and “foreign to Quebec.”⁷³⁹ The *Toronto Daily Star* framed Cross’ abduction within the creeping endemic of “violence and disorder ... around the globe,” depicting political abductions as “one of the most repulsive innovations of Latin American terrorists” which had been “naturalized” at home.⁷⁴⁰ Editorials on Laporte’s murder emphasized the alien nature of political assassinations. The *Montreal Star* observed that Laporte’s death constituted “the first political assassination in more than a century” in Canada,⁷⁴¹ as did the *Toronto Daily Star*.⁷⁴²

The FLQ’s ideology was also foreign, having seemingly derived from international revolutionary movements and creeds. The *Montreal Gazette* proclaimed that “[t]he ideology of the FLQ is as foreign to Quebec as the tactics it employs,”⁷⁴³ which the *Toronto Daily Star* echoed in lamenting that Laporte had been killed “to satisfy the demands of a foreign ideology.”⁷⁴⁴ Connections were often made between the FLQ and foreign ideological movements, with the *Montreal Star* identifying the FLQ as “Maoists,” “nihilists,” and – due to its “end justifies the means” approach – comparable to Joseph Stalin.⁷⁴⁵ The

⁷³⁶ “The dilemma posed by an abduction,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 6, 1970.

⁷³⁷ “Ugly, but no surprise,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 7, 1970.

⁷³⁸ “Wait and hope,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 8, 1970.

⁷³⁹ “All Quebec held for ransom,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970.

⁷⁴⁰ “FLQ KIDNAPPING: James Richard Cross ransom must be paid,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 6, 1970.

⁷⁴¹ “The Laporte death and its symbolism,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970.

⁷⁴² “Only in national unity can Quebec find salvation,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

⁷⁴³ “All Quebec held for ransom,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970.

⁷⁴⁴ “LAPORTE SLAYING: A terrible blow to a troubled country,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

⁷⁴⁵ “The terror tactics work against cause,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970.

Daily Star described the FLQ as having drifted “into something like the Maoist version of communism,” thus representing a “larger lunacy” as opposed to anything “peculiarly French Canadian,” and even observed that the FLQ bore “international connections” with groups in Algeria, Cuba, and America.⁷⁴⁶

Otherwise, a handful of papers characterized the FLQ as representative of the international surge of revolutionary fervour. In addition to classifying the FLQ’s activities as indicative of a “larger lunacy,”⁷⁴⁷ the *Toronto Daily Star* referred to a “violence and disorder” which had “spread around the globe,”⁷⁴⁸ and described the crisis as illustrating “that Canada is not free from the spreading infection of violence.”⁷⁴⁹ For the *Montreal Star*, terrorism’s spread to Quebec had been inevitable when so many nations recently had “felt the mad and heartless acts of hijackers or abductors.” Indeed, “what we are witness to,” according to the *Star*, was not “an isolated act of Quebec fanatics” but a “manifestation of international anarchy,”⁷⁵⁰ with Laporte’s murder demonstrating to Canadians that “the world of violence has embraced us.”⁷⁵¹ The framing of the FLQ as a cancer or ailment supported this “alien conspiracy” conceptualization of the group as an international endemic that had spread to and corrupted Quebec. Although this frame’s appearance in eleven of the region’s ninety-two editorials reveals it to be a dominant theme in Central Canada, it was nonetheless less prevalent than in Western and Eastern Canada, in which the “alien conspiracy” framing emerged in nine of fifty-seven, and ten of thirty-seven, editorials.

Framing the FLQ as not reflective of Quebecers more broadly

Despite their greater attention to the systemic factors contributing to the October Crisis, the Central Canadian papers reflected the same tendency as the other publications across Canada to frame the FLQ as a minority unrepresentative of Quebec. Comparable to the thirteen Western Canadian editorials containing such a theme, and greater than the four editorials in Eastern Canada, the Toronto and Montreal newspapers contained fourteen editorials constructing the FLQ as an unrepresentative minority. Ten of these appeared in the Montreal papers, unsurprising given that Montrealers and Quebecers inevitably possessed a more vested interest in differentiating the FLQ from mainstream Quebec.

There was a concerted effort among Montreal and Toronto editors to frame the FLQ as a minority. The Toronto papers described the FLQ as “small,”⁷⁵² a group composed of “a tiny fringe”⁷⁵³ and “criminal

⁷⁴⁶ “Don’t blame Quebec,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 8, 1970.

⁷⁴⁷ “Don’t blame Quebec,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 8, 1970.

⁷⁴⁸ “FLQ KIDNAPPING: James Richard Cross ransom must be paid,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 6, 1970.

⁷⁴⁹ “Thanksgiving,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 12, 1970.

⁷⁵⁰ “The dilemma posed by an abduction,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 6, 1970.

⁷⁵¹ “The Laporte death and its symbolism,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970.

⁷⁵² “Incredible powers,” *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 17, 1970; “TERRORIST CANCER: Use scalpel, not axe,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 23, 1970.

⁷⁵³ “Don’t blame Quebec,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 8, 1970.

few,”⁷⁵⁴ whose membership contained only “a few hundred.”⁷⁵⁵ Montreal editors described the FLQ as “small but determined”⁷⁵⁶ and a “minority,”⁷⁵⁷ comprising “a few men”⁷⁵⁸ and “a handful of fanatics.”⁷⁵⁹

In addition to representing a numerical minority, the Montreal papers explicitly differentiated and distanced the FLQ from the separatist movement. The *Montreal Gazette* argued that the outrage among the “overwhelming majority” of the Quebec populace – including most separatists – at the FLQ’s activities was indicative of “a difference between Quebec nationalism and the kind of thinking and feeling exemplified by the FLQ.”⁷⁶⁰ The *Montreal Star* similarly marginalized the FLQ. They were not “separatists,” and not like such “responsible groups” as the PQ which sought to effect political change through “legitimate means.” Rather, the FLQ were “anarchists, Maoists, nihilists, or whatever current term one can apply to men who act ... at the expense of a cause” and who distorted separatism’s objectives to their own needs.⁷⁶¹

The papers moreover attempted to establish the FLQ as a marginal “other” to the broader Quebec populace. The *Montreal Gazette* described the group as having “no place in Quebec,” and being “totally rejected by the vast majority of Quebecers.”⁷⁶² For the *Toronto Daily Star*, Quebec’s election of the provincial Liberal party that year had illustrated that the FLQ could not be considered “representative of the Quebec people or of any substantial fraction of them.” Indeed, the PQ had garnered “only” 25% of the vote, and the FLQ represented “only a tiny fringe” of that party’s supporters.⁷⁶³ The *Montreal Star* affirmed that the FLQ’s violence found few sympathetic ears among Quebecers, who had been “as shocked and sick at heart as the rest of the country.”⁷⁶⁴ In framing the FLQ as a minority unreflective of either the separatist movement or the broader Quebec populace, the Central Canadian newspapers, particularly those in Montreal, constructed the group as existing on the fringe of the Quebec mainstream.

⁷⁵⁴ “Don’t blame Quebec,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 8, 1970.

⁷⁵⁵ “Don’t blame Quebec,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 8, 1970; “WAR MEASURES ACT: Give us the facts,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 30, 1970.

⁷⁵⁶ “The facts of terror,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 20, 1970.

⁷⁵⁷ “The only choice,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 8, 1970; “The facts of terror,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 20, 1970; “Montreal’s answer to terrorism,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 24, 1970; “Labor’s Establishment misread its support,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 26, 1970; “The Civic Party’s democratic mandate,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 26, 1970.

⁷⁵⁸ “The terror tactics work against cause,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970.

⁷⁵⁹ “The Laporte death and its symbolism,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970.

⁷⁶⁰ “By law or terror? The answer is given,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970.

⁷⁶¹ “The terror tactics work against cause,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970.

⁷⁶² “All Quebec held for ransom,” *Gazette* (Montreal, QC), October 12, 1970.

⁷⁶³ “Don’t blame Quebec,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 8, 1970.

⁷⁶⁴ “The Laporte death and its symbolism,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 19, 1970.

Framing the nation's next steps beyond the shock and grief of October 1970

Stemming from this greater recognition of the crisis' internal roots, the Central Canadian papers offered more concerted efforts to recommending measures by which the government could address these grievances in the long-term. While the Western Canadian papers had contained only two editorials seeking to do so, and the Eastern Canadian publications three, Montreal and Toronto readers received ten editorials offering some recommendations on how to redress the underlying grievances. These efforts were concentrated in the *Montreal Star* and the two Toronto papers.

Reflective of the prominent assessment that Quebec's economic woes had spawned the FLQ and the crisis, several papers indicated that the province's tenuous economic situation should constitute the government's primary concern moving forward. For the *Montreal Star*, it was imperative that social reform immediately follow the suppression of the FLQ, commencing with the concerns of deficient housing and excessive unemployment noted in the FLQ's manifesto.⁷⁶⁵ A subsequent editorial indicated that "[w]e need programs of social and economic advancement,"⁷⁶⁶ recommending pressure on the Montreal government to address the high poverty rate, dependence on welfare, mass illiteracy, and inadequate housing and hygiene.⁷⁶⁷

The Toronto editors concurred with the need for economic and social reforms. The *Globe and Mail* suggested that if the government had any hope of retaining Canadian unity beyond the crisis, it was integral that it "move swiftly and dramatically to help solve the economic problems of Quebec," including its high rate of unemployment.⁷⁶⁸ The paper urged Finance Minister Edgar Benson and Trudeau to remedy that crisis by accelerating efforts "to stimulate the economy," or adjusting assistance programs to help unemployed and low income Quebecers.⁷⁶⁹ The *Toronto Daily Star* agreed, advising the federal government "to hold out the pride, the jobs, the housing French-Canadians so desperately need" in order "to alleviate the causes which allowed the FLQ to flourish in the first place."⁷⁷⁰ Once the crisis had been quelled, the editors indicated that "Premier Robert Bourassa's most crucial task is the creation of thousands of new jobs in Quebec," to resolve the unemployment rates and poverty from which terrorism had bloomed. To assist this effort, the *Daily Star* proposed that Trudeau's government first "cushion hardship by raising unemployment insurance benefits," then attack unemployment by "putting more federal money into housing; ... reviving the municipal winter works program ... ; and ... manipulating our

⁷⁶⁵ "The basic challenge to today's society," *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 17, 1970.

⁷⁶⁶ "Drapeau on revolt," *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 29, 1970.

⁷⁶⁷ "Law and order or social justice?," *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 28, 1970.

⁷⁶⁸ "WAR MEASURES ACT: Must Canada suffer along with the FLQ?," *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 17, 1970.

⁷⁶⁹ "Unemployment first," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, ON), October 21, 1970.

⁷⁷⁰ "Only in national unity can Quebec find salvation," *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

floating dollar to a somewhat lower level to make more exports and jobs for Canadians.”⁷⁷¹

In addition to this economic reform, the *Toronto Daily Star* suggested an ideological or societal reform of the French-English relationship in Canada. To overcome the separatist impulse in Quebec, the paper demanded the promotion of “a real community of interest and goals” and a “joint purpose ... common to all Canadians.”⁷⁷² Cognizant of how the FLQ had illuminated the gulf between the “two solitudes,” the *Daily Star* urged “that we pledge our energies to the renovation of our national community” to ease the conflict. This renovation would require educational reforms to better develop a “sense of nation” and redress the “sharply opposed” perceptions of Canadian history – and thereby divergent value systems – with which French and English students were inculcated.⁷⁷³ The *Toronto Daily Star* proposed further educational reforms, to remedy the lack of free discussion and debate that was contributing to youth pessimism and violence in Quebec. Educational institutions should “stimulate independent research and free discussion ... [,] encourage active participation in the political process as a means of effecting change,” and maintain an openness to all ideas that would “help restore the faith of young people in a free society.”⁷⁷⁴ These recommended reforms to the economy and French-English relationship suggest that the Central Canadian editors accorded more attention to proposing future courses of action than their regional counterparts.

In summary

The Central Canadian publications offered the most distinct interpretation of the October Crisis. In several respects, the *Montreal Star*, *Montreal Gazette*, *Toronto Daily Star*, and *Globe and Mail* echoed other regional papers (and each other). The editors framed the FLQ as a terrorist, fanatical, and criminal cancer, emphasizing their threat to the democratic system and villainizing them further by describing the victims’ innocence, helplessness, and virtue. Though not citing the same fear of selective assassinations as that described by Eastern and Western Canada editors, the Central Canadian papers recognized the

⁷⁷¹ “UNEMPLOYMENT IN QUEBEC: Economics and the legacy of terror,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 21, 1970.

⁷⁷² “Only in national unity can Quebec find salvation,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 19, 1970.

⁷⁷³ “TWO SOLITUDES: Can we bridge the gulf of distrust?,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 29, 1970. According to the editors, the education system was remarkably localized. A survey of Canadian studies had found that the teaching of Canadian history diverged between French and English provinces. In all provinces but Quebec, students had been instructed in a “history of consensus which focusses [*sp.*] on “neat little acts of Parliament” and blurs the existence of any conflict in the development of Canada,” while French students in Quebec learned minimally of such Parliamentary acts in favour of developing a greater “emotional involvement with the French destiny in Canada” and “a passionate sense of protecting and preserving French language and culture.” As such, assessments on the importance of such events as Confederation and figures as Sir John A. Macdonald had diverged substantially, with French students rarely identifying either as a source of pride or importance (“TWO SOLITUDES: Can we bridge the gulf of distrust?,” *Toronto Daily Star* (Toronto, ON), October 29, 1970).

⁷⁷⁴ “Honest approach,” *Montreal Star* (Montreal, QC), October 26, 1970.

crisis' potential to escalate further through additional abductions and violence, the hostages' murder, the crisis' economic impact, and the populace's division.

Comparable to the other papers (although to a lesser extent than in Eastern Canada), a handful of Central Canadian editorials framed the crisis as presenting a dilemma for the government, even as most advocated some specific action. All papers depicted a public supportive of the government, and all but the *Globe and Mail* – which offered no comment – supported the army's deployment to aid the civil power. When assessing the government's response to the FLQ, Montreal editors adopted frames comparable to those utilized in Western and Eastern Canada. They immediately endorsed a stern approach to terror, and defended the WMA in light of the FLQ's threat and history of terror, the lack of alternatives, and the necessity to halt the spread of terror and protect Canadian freedoms, thus confirming Cohen-Almagor, Siegel, and Hewitt's findings. This dominant pro-WMA stance appeared in a discourse with the demands for fuller government disclosure as to the crisis' extent (as had appeared in Holdrinet's study), as well as the briefer concern for civil liberties and anxiety regarding the police's failed manhunt.

The Toronto papers diverged from this otherwise national framing of the WMA and authorities' response to the FLQ. Unlike any other paper, the *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Daily Star* initially urged the government to negotiate with the FLQ for the hostages' safe return, with the *Daily Star* only conceding to a hard-line stance once negotiations had secured their release. Although Laporte's murder compelled the editors to nominally and briefly frame the hard-line response as tolerable, they blamed authorities for the crisis' escalation, opposed the "dangerous" WMA, chastised the police's apparent ineptitude, and persistently demanded safeguards to ensure the measures were not abused. Unlike the Montreal papers, whose concerns had been concentrated around the need for fuller disclosure and bookended by affirmations of the WMA's necessity, the dominant discourse in Toronto entailed a sharp criticism of the measures. Thus, the *Toronto Daily Star* and *Globe and Mail* constituted the outliers to the more national framing of the crisis, which endorsed and urged a hard-line opposition to terror. This finding adds nuance to that of Cohen-Almagor's study, which had observed in English media an approval of the WMA and dominant focus on law and order rather than civil liberties concerns.

In other respects, the Central Canadian editors' approach to the crisis differed from their western and eastern counterparts. Although declarations of the need for unity appeared in the Central Canadian papers, reflecting Cohen-Almagor and Siegel's studies, they did so with less frequency. Rather than reflecting the popular framing of the abductions as a "surprise" or "shock," two editorials explicitly described the crisis as having been foreseeable in light of the international waves of violence and the FLQ's previous activities. This represented only one indication of the Central Canadian papers' overall deeper comprehension of the crisis. Analyses of the crisis' internal and systemic origins assumed a prominence unseen in any other region, and explored such factors as intercultural tensions, deficiencies in the

education system, economic grievances, and the increasing success of the province's reformist impulse. Simultaneously, fewer analyses relied upon the "alien conspiracy" framework compared to in Western and Eastern Canada. This, combined with the papers' unparalleled number of "Evaluation/Moral" editorials suggesting means by which to address the FLQ's systemic grievances, indicated that the Central Canadian papers possessed a more thematic and comprehensive understanding of the crisis' roots. It is ironic then that the papers, particularly in Montreal, still sought to marginalize and "other" the FLQ by emphasizing their minority and unrepresentative status in the province. While conforming to the "typical" national framing in several key respects, the Central Canadian newspapers (particularly the Toronto publications) offered divergent interpretations of the crisis for their readers.

ASSESSING AND CONCLUDING

The historiographical debate that has developed since the October Crisis of 1970 regarding whether the government's uncompromising reaction to the tensions was an indefensible abuse of civil liberties, or a necessary effort to dismantle a dangerous terrorist group, was not invented by scholars. The historiography extends a debate that was already being presented to Canadians from coast to coast by the dominant English-language newspapers in October 1970. English-Canadian newspaper editorial discourse on the crisis and invocation of the WMA was generally supportive of the federal government's firm stance against the FLQ. The *Western Canadian*, *Eastern Canadian*, and *Montreal* papers all opposed government negotiations with the terrorists and supported a hard-line response, with sentiment becoming even firmer after Laporte's abduction and murder. Editors framed the WMA as a necessity to confront a menacing terrorist threat and prevent the proliferation of anarchy and terror, and (in *Western* and *Eastern Canadian* publications) as being an overdue response to mounting violence. For a handful of *Atlantic* and *Western* editorial staffs, the government's hard-line response was insufficiently firm, with the crisis warranting a sterner response including the resumption of capital punishment. Together with the *Montreal* papers, they urged the populace to have faith in the government and emphasized the lack of legislative alternatives to the WMA. The papers also dismissed political opposition to the federal government and denied that the WMA constituted any severe or long-lasting infringement of civil liberties. Several of these defences would later appear in the historiographical endorsements of the WMA by Dan Loomis, Gérard Pelletier, William Tetley, Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, who defended the measures owing to the FLQ's intent to overthrow Canada's political, economic, and social structures.⁷⁷⁵ Tetley reiterated the "no alternatives" theme in his defence of the WMA.⁷⁷⁶ The recurring expression of the need for national unity in such tenuous times – to protect democracy and offer meaning to Laporte's death – is of particular interest. Reflecting Cohen-Almagor⁷⁷⁷ and Siegel's⁷⁷⁸ findings of a similar theme in English newspapers during the crisis, the pervasiveness of this frame – particularly in *Western Canada* – raises questions about the extent to which that demand was influenced by, or alternatively influenced, the papers' institutional stances upon the WMA.

Editors' widespread endorsement of a firm government approach to the FLQ corresponds with the negative conceptualization of the FLQ amongst all publications under examination. Echoing what Arthur

⁷⁷⁵ Loomis, 21; 10-11; 14; Gérard Pelletier, *The October Crisis* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), 30-42, quoted in Pinkoski, 196-197; Bothwell, Drummond, and English, 370; 372-374; Tetley, back cover.

⁷⁷⁶ Tetley, 78-79; 83-86; 92.

⁷⁷⁷ Cohen-Almagor.

⁷⁷⁸ Siegel, "Canadian Newspaper Coverage of the FLQ Crisis," 66.

Siegel and Christopher Hewitt observed to be the English media's unqualified enmity of the FLQ,⁷⁷⁹ all publications in this study discussed the FLQ in condemnatory terms as a group of ruthless, savage, dangerous, and cruel terrorists, extremists, fanatics, and criminals. All dailies presented a nation besieged and barraged by terrorists intent on supplanting existing societal and political structures with their own dictatorship. In contrast to some historiographical commentators, who have condemned the WMA as an overreaction to a group not planning any "mass revolutionary uprising,"⁷⁸⁰ the publications clearly conceived of the FLQ's intent to impose a mass program of insurrectionist upheaval that threatened Canada's democratic, legal, and social institutions and structure. The FLQ victims were depicted as innocent men of laudable calibre, and Laporte a martyr for democracy. The editorials expressed the pervasive fear that the terrorist group would escalate the situation through further abductions, selective assassinations, the hostages' murder, economic ramifications, and open terrorism and insurrection. Although David Charters would later analyze the FLQ's ignorance of "revolutionary theory," minimal discipline or instruction of cells and members, and amateur and impulsive conduct to argue that the WMA had been "overblown,"⁷⁸¹ the English-language newspapers did not share this appraisal. Rather, the media perceived of the group as a dangerous and cruel conglomeration of terrorist criminals who had both committed the unforgiveable assault of esteemed men and who were capable of inflicting further untold damage in their efforts to dismantle Canada's political and socio-economic structure.

While quantitatively and qualitatively the dominant discourse in Eastern Canadian, Western Canadian, and Montreal, some editorials opposed this pro-government stance. In Western Canada, Montreal, and the Atlantic provinces, editors' initially staunch support for the government weakened slightly as wariness emerged regarding the WMA's potential to enable civil liberties abuses such as witch-hunts, censorship, and the arrest of innocent civilians. These possibilities prompted several papers to demand the establishment of committees to review the arrests and conditions of detainment. The WMA's potential for abuse appeared as a subject of concern particularly in Western Canada, centring around the British Columbian order-in-council and Vancouver mayor Campbell's intent to deploy draconian measures against his own political foes. Editorials in each region raised doubts about the WMA's effectiveness given the police's failure to apprehend the criminals, criticized the government for being inappropriately secretive, and urged it to be more transparent about the tensions that had prompted the WMA's invocation. These criticisms were often voiced in concert with affirmations that the WMA was necessary, and the number of editorials offering support far outweighed the number expressing concern about the government's conduct.

⁷⁷⁹ Siegel, "Canadian Newspaper Coverage of the FLQ Crisis," 92; Hewitt, 15-16.

⁷⁸⁰ Quinn, 475-476.

⁷⁸¹ Charters, 138-140; 133; 153.

In contrast to this predominant support for the government across most of English Canada, the Toronto papers positioned themselves in support of negotiating with the FLQ and were later critical of the imposition of the WMA. Although concurring that the FLQ was a dangerous terrorist menace, the *Toronto Daily Star* initially indicated that it would only support the law-and-order pursuit of the FLQ once negotiations had secured the hostages' release, with the *Globe and Mail* similarly advocating for negotiations. The *Toronto Daily Star's* stance became firm when the government invoked the WMA, acceding that perhaps the legislation was a necessary step against terror. Nevertheless, it concurred with the *Globe and Mail* that the WMA was a drastic and dangerous measure enabling the abrogation of civil liberties, equipping authorities with excessive powers, and promoting a repressive spirit among provincial authorities. Echoing the concerns which had arisen in the other national papers, the Toronto publications chastised the WMA for failing to produce any substantive police successes. Several other editorials, also reflecting broader concerns nation-wide, voiced unease at how the government was justifying and defending the WMA, urging the government to dispel the secrecy surrounding the measures and keep the public more apprised of the situation in terms confirming the similar finding of Gérard Pierre Holdrinet.⁷⁸² In this respect, the editorials offered early iterations of several key features of the historiographical criticisms of the WMA. Denis Smith and Abraham Rotstein's works would later challenge the governments' reasoning of the WMA to argue that the crisis had not been sufficiently severe to justify the measures,⁷⁸³ and Smith would invoke similar criticisms of the government's secrecy to demonstrate that its decision-making lacked "a reasoned ... careful calculation of alternatives."⁷⁸⁴ The criticisms of the police anticipated the later arguments of Smith, as well as Ron Haggart and Aubrey Golden, that the police's apprehending of the FLQ following ordinary police activity rather than the sweeps conducted under the measures proved the ineffectiveness of the WMA.⁷⁸⁵ Similarly anticipatory were developing concerns about the abrogation of civil liberties, which Haggart and Golden would later emphasize to conclude that the WMA enabled "abuse[s] of government power" and "arbitrary police power,"⁷⁸⁶ and on the basis of which Dominique Clément would condemn the measures.⁷⁸⁷ Clearly, a dialogue around evaluations of the necessity, justifiability, and effectiveness of the government's response and emergency measures had commenced in October 1970. This discourse was present within the Montreal and Western and Eastern Canadian papers, in that their dominant support for the WMA increasingly faltered under the weight of the concerns that emerged near the end of October. The debate also was evident in the broader national dialogue on the crisis, in which the Toronto editors' criticism of

⁷⁸² Holdrinet, 38; 39; 41.

⁷⁸³ Quinn, 475-476.

⁷⁸⁴ Smith, *Bleeding Hearts...Bleeding Country*, 4-5.

⁷⁸⁵ Smith, *Bleeding Hearts...Bleeding Country*, xiii; 5; Haggart and Golden, 251-252; 262.

⁷⁸⁶ Haggart and Golden, 260; 263.

⁷⁸⁷ Clément, "The October Crisis of 1970," 208-210.

the government's conduct and response opposed the more dominant English-Canadian support for the government.

Newspapers displayed a broader tendency to frame the crisis as an alien conspiracy. Particularly in the Western and Eastern Canadian dailies, terrorism was constructed as not so much the result of internal or systemic issues but the corruption by an international revolutionary malaise. The publications in Western and Eastern Canada framed the crisis as an unexpected "shock" to Canada. Terrorism was something that occurred elsewhere. The FLQ appeared as an entity encouraged by or connected to international movements and an international revolutionary malaise, representing only a minority fringe of Quebecers and separatists. Its tactics, structure, and ideology, the papers intoned, were foreign in origin. This alien conspiracy framing was furthered by the minimal attention in either region – with the exception of the *Edmonton Journal* – to the real social, economic, and political grievances behind the group's creation and rise, and the tendency to classify the FLQ as a creeping "cancer" or "ailment." Only Toronto and Montreal papers departed from this stance, as they did not depict the crisis as comparably "shocking" and accorded far more substantial attention to examining the crisis' systemic and internal seeds. Even still, the Central Canadian papers – particularly in Montreal – reiterated that the FLQ was a minority not indicative of the broader Quebec, and reflected the same tendency to describe the group as a cancer fed by foreign tactics, ideologies, and revolutionary fervour (although not to the same extent as in Western or Eastern Canada).

This editorial discourse thus seemed to privilege what van Dijk classified as "Definition" editorials. Only Central Canadian papers accorded any concerted attention to interpreting the crisis through an "Explanation" or "Evaluation and Moral" lens, examining the systemic origins of the crisis. As such, the editorial discourse was largely episodic. Refraining from situating the FLQ and its activities within broader political, social, and economic concerns in Quebec, the Western and Eastern Canadian publications offered a thematic framing of the crisis only insofar as they sought to situate the FLQ within the worldwide revolutionary malaise. Cumulatively, this seems to promote an understanding of the crisis as an isolated phenomenon, reinforcing an image of the October Crisis as not indicative of any broader Quebec grievances but as restricted in scope to the FLQ and the two abductions and one murder it had perpetrated. Further promoting this image was the tendency to frame the FLQ in such psychological terms as "madmen," "fanatics," "maniacs," and "lunatics," which similarly promoted a restricted conceptualization of the crisis by implying that the group's origins were psychological rather than sociological or systemic issues. Overall, this narrative frame suggested that Canadian society did not suffer from tensions stemming from its own flaws and faults, but rather from international revolutionary and terrorist malaise that was spreading to and corrupting Canada. If adopted by the public and policy

makers, such a conceptualization of the crisis could bear substantial impacts upon how the populace and its political representatives sought to confront and resolve the crisis, in the short and long terms.

Content analysis of the nation's most widely circulated English-language newspapers in October 1970 thus confirms several elements of broader analyses conducted by Siegel, Fitch, and Holdrinet. However, it simultaneously exposes a substantially more nuanced discourse between the "civil liberties" and "necessity of law and order" outlooks than has previous scholarship. Beyond the variations in how the French and English media approached the crisis, which have been subject to previous analysis by such scholars as Cohen-Almagor, Hewitt, and Siegel, this study reveals intralingual and provincial variations within the English-language media. While Cohen-Almagor observed the sparse attention to "civil rights issues" and "cautious approval" among English newspapers for the WMA,⁷⁸⁸ and both Siegel and Hewitt documented the broad support among English publications for a hard-line stance,⁷⁸⁹ the papers examined here revealed a more complex narrative. Indeed, the tendency (especially in Eastern Canada) to initially frame the crisis as a "dilemma," the Toronto editors' criticism of the government, and the civil liberties concerns raised throughout the nation (albeit to varying extents) suggest the occurrence of more debate and dialogue than previous studies have suggested. Furthermore, this study revealed unanticipated themes, such as the framing of terrorism as an alien conspiracy, and exposed regional variations in the extent to which this framing dominated the discourse. Although most of the publications conformed with Siegel's finding of minimal interest in English media to the "historic and contemporary economic and social injustices experienced by French-Canadians,"⁷⁹⁰ this was not the case in all papers examined. The Ontario and Montreal publications, and even one notable editorial in the *Edmonton Journal*, offered deeper conceptualizations and interrogations of the crisis' roots beyond the foreign malaise of revolution.⁷⁹¹ Accordingly, the historiography examining the media during the October Crisis – such an integral area of study given the media's capacity to impact the public and politicians' understandings of and approaches to society and its issues – necessitates further nuancing.

Historical studies of the media also inform and test communications concepts and theories. When communications scholars have demonstrated the media's capacity to influence public opinion, attitudes, and policies through agenda-setting, framing, and priming, exploring newspaper constructions of historical events allows scholars to interrogate how citizens experienced, understood, and interpreted them. Of course, it is beyond the breadth of this study to assess to what degree the newspapers' coverage of the crisis possessed a practical and tangible influence upon the individual reader, the political arena, or the broader public opinion on and conceptualization of October 1970. Scholars have noted a variety of

⁷⁸⁸ Cohen-Almagor.

⁷⁸⁹ Siegel, "Canadian Newspaper Coverage of the FLQ Crisis," 95-97; Hewitt, 15-16.

⁷⁹⁰ Siegel, "Canadian Newspaper Coverage of the FLQ Crisis," 235; 95.

⁷⁹¹ Holdrinet, 53-54.

factors which mediate the media's effects upon a reader, including the degree to which arguments align with an individual's own self-schema,⁷⁹² the extent to which audiences discuss the issues with others,⁷⁹³ the perceived credibility of the media, and the extent to which the issue's salience is confirmed or refuted by "personal experience or other communication channels."⁷⁹⁴ Frames have varying success depending upon the extent to which their language and ideas resonate with the culture, are advocated or endorsed publicly by other sponsors,⁷⁹⁵ and are repeated with stability over extended periods of time.⁷⁹⁶ Thus, despite the prevalence of certain frames in the media's coverage of the October Crisis, it is difficult to assess the extent to which the newspapers practically influenced English-Canadian understandings of the crisis in October 1970.

However, there are indications that the impact of media effects would have been particularly notable in the environment that pervaded following Cross' abduction. Communications scholars S. J. Ball-Rokeach and M. L. DeFleur note that the public's dependency upon the media is elevated during periods of accelerated, increased, or widespread societal change, instability, and conflict. Such situations provoke an increased "ambiguity" among citizens regarding what a particular event "means or how to interpret it."⁷⁹⁷ Matthew D. Matsaganis and J. Gregory Payne expand upon this theory in their communications studies, arguing that the media is of particular relevance when the public experiences a "problematic environ," leaving people less confident in their capacity to understand and react to their surroundings and thereby reliant upon political and media leadership for assurance and direction.⁷⁹⁸ The newspaper editorials illuminated a sense that the FLQ presented a concerted threat, and complaints about government secrecy suggest a populace reliant upon the media. In such a case, the lack of information available to the public for use in assessing the issue would, according to Maxwell McCombs and Amy Reynolds, produce a

⁷⁹² John T. Cacioppo, Richard E. Petty, and Joseph A. Sidera, "The effects of a salient self-schema on the evaluation of proattitudinal editorials: Top-down versus bottom-up message processing," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 18, no. 4 (July 1982): 324-325, [https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031\(82\)90057-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(82)90057-9).

⁷⁹³ Jack M. McLeod, Lee B. Becker, and James E. Byrnes, "Another Look at the Agenda-Setting Function of the Press," *Communication Research* 1 (1974): 155, <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.uwaterloo.ca/10.1177/009365027400100201>.

⁷⁹⁴ Dearing and Rogers, "Agenda-Setting Research," 569.

⁷⁹⁵ William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, "Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach," *American Journal of Sociology* 95, no. 1 (July 1989): 5-7, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2780405>.

⁷⁹⁶ Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Kumulation, Konsonanz und Öffentlichkeitseffekt: Ein neuer Ansatz zur Analyse der Wirkung der Massenmedien," *Publizistik* 18 (1973): 26-55, quoted in Eilders, 14.

⁷⁹⁷ S. J. Ball-Rokeach and M. L. DeFleur, "A Dependency Model of Mass-Media Effects," *Communication Research* 3, no. 1 (1976): 7, <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.uwaterloo.ca/10.1177/009365027600300101>; 9-10; Stuart N. Soroka, "Issue Attributes and Agenda-Setting by Media, the Public, and Policymakers in Canada," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 14, no. 3 (September 2002): 281, https://journals-scholarsportal-info.proxy.lib.uwaterloo.ca/details/09542892/v14i0003/264_iaabmtpapic.xml.

⁷⁹⁸ Matthew D. Matsaganis and J. Gregory Payne, "Agenda Setting in a Culture of Fear: The Lasting Effects of September 11 on American Politics and Journalism," *American Behavioral Scientist* 49, no. 3 (November 2005): 384-385, doi: 10.1177/0002764205282049.

greater “need for orientation” among the populace. The greater an individual’s need for further details or directional cues to help orientate their approach to or understanding of an issue, the greater the likelihood of that individual “attend[ing] to the mass media agenda” in search of that orientation.⁷⁹⁹ McCombs and Reynolds explain that such media effects assume further strength with respect to “unobtrusive issues,” or “those issues that we know about only through the media” and not through any personal or daily experience.⁸⁰⁰

Given theoretical insights from communications studies, it is likely that editorial opinion on the FLQ crisis influenced the public’s conceptualization and understanding of the crisis, given the social and political climate of October 1970. This seems particularly likely given that so much of the crisis itself was played out through the news media, which developed into the channel or medium through which the opposing sides communicated with each other and with the public, drawing citizens “into the crisis in an intimate matter.”⁸⁰¹ The twelve newspapers examined illustrate how English Canada’s leading newspaper editors constructed and interpreted the crisis for readers. In exploring how Canadians were prevailed upon to comprehend the tensions, and some of the discourses occurring in the public sphere among some of society’s premier shapers of public opinion, these publications offer another window into October, and into a particularly tumultuous and divisive time in Canada’s history.

⁷⁹⁹ McCombs and Reynolds, 8-9.

⁸⁰⁰ McCombs and Reynolds, 8.

⁸⁰¹ Siegel, “Canadian Newspaper Coverage of the FLQ Crisis,” 226.

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