

# **Assessing Legitimacy Within Collaborative Water Governance: How, When, and by Whom?**

by

Natalya Melnychuk

A thesis  
presented to the University of Waterloo  
in fulfillment of the  
thesis requirement for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
in  
Social and Ecological Sustainability

Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2017

©Natalya Melnychuk 2017

## EXAMINING COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

The following served on the Examining Committee for this thesis. The decision of the Examining Committee is by majority vote.

External Examiner	Dr. Steven Bernstein Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto
Supervisor	Dr. Robert de Loë Professor, School of Environment, Resources and Sustainability, University of Waterloo
Internal Member	Dr. Jennifer Clapp Professor, School of Environment, Resources and Sustainability, University of Waterloo
Internal-external Member	Dr. Neil Craik Associate Professor, School of Environment, Enterprise and Development, University of Waterloo
Other Member	Dr. Derek Armitage Professor, School of Environment, Resources and Sustainability, University of Waterloo

## **AUTHOR'S DECLARATION**

This thesis consists of material all of which I authored or co-authored: see Statement of Contributions included in the thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.

## STATEMENT OF CONTRIBUTIONS

In the School of Environment, Resources and Sustainability, two forms of presentation of the doctoral dissertation are permitted: (1) a standard dissertation monograph, and (2) a manuscript option centred on three or four published or publishable learned journal-type manuscripts on related matters, packaged with introductory and concluding chapters that integrate the purposes/research agenda and findings/implications, with the required result forming a conceptual whole. This thesis used the manuscript option. Specific requirements relating to the manuscript option, which have been met, are as follows:

- The manuscript-based dissertation must reflect a consistent overall conceptual foundation and research agenda and the parts must be integrated to form a coherent package. The whole must be related to the overall purposes of the Environment, Resources and Sustainability (ERS) doctoral program, and the individual components of the dissertation must originate from the doctoral research.
- The manuscripts must be dominated by the intellectual effort of the student. While members of the advisory committee and others involved in the research may, as appropriate, be listed as secondary authors on individual manuscripts, the manuscripts must be written by the student, and the student must be the first author on each manuscript.
- Where multiple authorship occurs, there must be a preface statement in the thesis outlining the roles of the respective authors, and clarifying the extent and nature of the contribution of the student. Co-authors must sign the statement to indicate that they are in agreement with the evaluation of the roles and contributions of the various authors.
- In no case can a co-author serve as an external examiner for the thesis.

Findings from this dissertation research are reported in three co-authored manuscripts (chapters Two, Three and Four). These chapters have been prepared for submission to refereed journals.

**I testify that I am the primary author of the manuscripts in my dissertation, and that the work was dominated by my intellectual efforts.**



---

Natalya Melnychuk (Student)

Co-authorship for R.C. de Loë (Advisor) was determined based on meeting the following criteria:

- Substantial contributions to the conception and design of the work, and to interpretation of data;
- Contributions to editing and revising the work critically for important intellectual content;
- Final approval of the versions of the chapters that will be published as refereed journal article;
- Agreement to be accountable for all aspects of the work in ensuring that questions related to the accuracy or integrity of any part of the work are appropriately investigated and resolved.

**I testify that Natalya Melnychuk is the primary author of the manuscripts in this dissertation, that the work was dominated by her intellectual efforts, and that I have met the four tests outlined above.**



---

Robert C. de Loë (Advisor)

## ABSTRACT

Collaborative water governance (CWG) is a form of decision-making for water that involves multiple actors with diverse interests working together to solve common problems (e.g., pollution, scarcity, flooding). CWG has emerged as an increasingly popular model of governance in Western countries and is promoted as a way to enhance the resilience and effectiveness of decisions and actions for water resources. Vital to CWG is the governance attribute legitimacy, which helps collaborations function and produce results effectively.

Legitimacy is about the justifiability or acceptance of governance systems, organizations, decisions, and mechanisms. Traditionally, in the context of governance, the state's legitimacy, which is largely a product of democratic values, has been the primary focus of legitimacy studies. However, the increased use of collaborative governance that involves non-state actors from various societal sectors (e.g., Indigenous peoples, civil society, industry, agriculture) in decision-making has brought to light questions about the nature of legitimacy within CWG. In particular, there are outstanding questions about what types of legitimacy matter for CWG, how legitimacy evolves as a collaboration develops, and how legitimacy perceptions differ by societal sector.

The purpose of this research is to provide conceptual clarity about the multi-faceted and dynamic nature of CWG legitimacy. This was done through a multi-case study approach analyzing five watershed-based collaborative governance initiatives in British Columbia, Canada. These cases include the Cowichan Watershed Board (CWB), the Lake Windermere Ambassadors (LWA), the Nechako Watershed Council (NWC), the Okanagan Basin Water Board (OBWB), and the Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process (SLIPP)/Shuswap Watershed Council (SWC). The objectives of this research include the following: (1) to synthesise existing legitimacy typologies and build a robust conceptual framework of legitimacy types that can be used for the integrated assessment of legitimacy within CWG; (2) to examine how legitimacy evolves as a collaborative body develops; (3) to determine variations in the composition of legitimacy judgements by societal sector (e.g., government, agriculture, industry, environment) towards CWG bodies; and (4) to provide insight into ways collaborative practitioners can influence legitimacy to enhance the effectiveness and stability of CWG according to various perspectives.

The key findings of this research confirm the hybrid, pluralistic, and dynamic nature of legitimacy as a governance attribute. Legitimacy within CWG is sourced from a combination of practice-, results-, institutional-, social-, and individual-based types that exist across 18 different typologies. No one legitimacy typology encapsulates all legitimacy types. Therefore, the synthesis of typologies in a comparable and mutually reinforcing manner is necessary for an accurate assessment of legitimacy. This is particularly true for multi-sector collaborative governance as findings indicate that empirically the range of actors involved in or impacted by collaborative bodies draw on multiple sources that relate to legitimacy types identified across all 18 typologies. Moreover, these legitimacy types, in different combinations, matter more or less at different stages of a CWG body's development and within the legitimacy judgements of individuals from different societal sectors.

As CWG bodies develop through stages of establishment, growth, maturity, decline and then either dissolution or renewal, legitimacy is also established, extended, maintained, defended, and either lost or re-extended. Findings of this research indicate that the sources that most directly

influence these legitimacy changes vary at each development stage of a collaboration. In each of the five cases, the most dominant legitimacy sources shifted from at first being focused on a sense of need to collaborate, to process management and the production of results, to the development of a sense of permanence, and then to the defence of the relevance and usefulness of a collaboration under the guidance of a leader. In addition to identifying how legitimacy shifts as a CWG body develops organizationally, research findings also categorized what sources and types of legitimacy are more prevalent in the judgements about a collaboration by actors from different societal sectors. Legitimacy judgements of actors connected to the different cases varied according to whether they represented government, First Nations, agriculture, environmental civil society, industry, local property owner associations, or local businesses sectors. For example, government actors commonly viewed a collaboration's legitimacy positively when other government actors either participated in or supported a collaboration. Meanwhile, agriculture representatives positively judged a CWG body when it helped address water issues that impact farmers such as the protection of water allocation licences and agriculture-environmental sustainability.

From these findings, this research makes both a conceptual and practical contribution to knowledge. Conceptually, the research first builds clarity around the meaning and nature of legitimacy in CWG contexts. Conceptual frameworks concerning the relevancy of multiple legitimacy typologies, the stage-based dynamic nature of CWG legitimacy, and the composition of different legitimacy judgements by societal sector may act as assessment tools to more critically and accurately examine legitimacy. Likewise, methodologically, the research also provides insight regarding the importance of cross-disciplinarily for the study of CWG legitimacy. The multiple fields (e.g., political science, sociology, law, psychology) that all study legitimacy through different lenses provide necessary insight to comprehensively understand the topic. Finally, the research also contributes conceptual knowledge about the considerations necessary to influence or strategically manage legitimacy.

Practically, the research also makes a contribution by highlighting ways those engaged in CWG can influence or manage legitimacy. These recommendations include the following: (1) clarify how legitimacy is locally interpreted, (2) strategically assess legitimacy as a collective within a collaborative body, (3) be aware of different discourses and assertions surrounding a CWG body at different times and contexts, (4) pay cautious attention to areas of illegitimacy, (5) patiently deal with challenges of collaboration, and (6) accept that collaborative governance may not be able to establish and maintain legitimacy in all contexts. These recommendations may help build understanding about how to influence legitimacy so that decisions about whether or not and when collaboration should, should not, or should no longer be used, are contextually appropriate.

Legitimacy is needed to ensure multi-sector collaborative governance bodies can effectively address water issues. If collaborative bodies are found to be illegitimate or are continuously being delegitimized then not only may resources be wasted as collaborative processes risk inefficiency or dissolution, but also water resource sustainability may be hindered. Conceptual understanding of the applicable theories, perspectives and the dynamics of legitimacy for collaborative governance can help determine whether or not specific collaborative water governance bodies can foster and maintain the popular support needed for their existence. Although findings specifically address CWG in British Columbia, they are also relevant in other contexts of collaborative governance for water and for the collaborative governance of other environmental resources.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge and thank the following people:

- Dr. Robert de Loë, for his patient guidance, insights, immense knowledge, and support provided to me throughout all stages of this research. I am extremely grateful to have had a supervisor who cared about my work and who did not give up on me. You have made me a more insightful and critically aware person with much improved writing and oral communication skills.
- My committee, Dr. Derek Armitage, Dr. Jennifer Clapp, and Dr. Neil Craik, for their patience working with me and for their hard questions and feedback into this dissertation.
- Dr. Steven Bernstein (University of Toronto) who acted as the external examiner for my oral defence. His constructive criticism, questions and recommendations on this dissertation helped me improve the quality of this work.
- All participants in this study for their inspiring work and the time they gave to participate, including those from or connected to the Cowichan Watershed Board, Lake Windermere Ambassadors, Nechako Watershed Council, Okanagan Basin Water Board, and the Shuswap Watershed Council.
- My peers, mentors, and colleagues, especially those at the Fraser Basin Council and the Rivershed Society of BC for their enthusiasm for water governance, help and guidance, and willingness to share their hearts and minds.
- My family for their patience, forbearance, support, and assumption that I was capable of completing this task.
- I would also like to acknowledge the following funding sources that made this research possible: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) Doctoral Fellowship, SSHRC Research Grant (PI: Dr. Robert de Loë), Ontario Graduate Scholarship, and the Canadian Water Resources Association Scholarship.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Examining Committee Membership .....	ii
Author's Declaration .....	iii
Statement of Contributions .....	iv
Abstract.....	vi
Acknowledgements.....	viii
Table of Contents.....	ix
List of Tables .....	xii
List of Figures.....	xiii
List of Acronyms .....	xiv
Chapter 1 Introduction.....	1
1.1 Research Context .....	1
1.2 Purpose and Objectives.....	3
1.3 Collaborative Water Governance Legitimacy: Conceptual Review .....	4
1.3.1 Governance and Collaboration.....	4
1.3.2 Collaborative Water Governance.....	6
1.3.3 Legitimacy .....	7
1.3.4 Summary .....	13
1.4 Empirical Context .....	14
1.4.1 British Columbia Water Policy and Governance Context .....	14
1.5 Research Design and Methods .....	15
1.5.1 Case Study Method .....	16
1.5.2 Case Descriptions.....	17
1.5.3 Conceptual Framework.....	29
1.5.4 Data Collection .....	31
1.5.5 Data Analysis .....	33
1.6 Organization of Thesis.....	34
Chapter 2 Synthesizing Legitimacy Typologies for Collaborative Water Governance .....	36
2.1 Introduction.....	36
2.2 The Need for a Collaborative Governance Legitimacy Framework.....	37
2.3 A Conceptual Framework for Studying Collaborative Governance Legitimacy ...	39

2.3.1	Legitimacy Types Related to Ideal Practice.....	40
2.3.2	Legitimacy Types Related to the Potential or Actual Achievement of Results .....	42
2.3.3	Legitimacy Types Related to Institutional-setting .....	44
2.3.4	Legitimacy Types Related to Social Acceptance or Consent .....	45
2.3.5	Legitimacy Types Related to Individuals .....	48
2.3.6	Synopsis .....	49
2.4	Methods and Case Descriptions.....	49
2.4.1	Case Selection and Description.....	50
2.4.2	Data Collection and Analysis.....	52
2.5	Results.....	54
2.5.1	Legitimacy Related to Ideal Practice .....	54
2.5.2	Legitimacy from the Potential for or Actual Results .....	58
2.5.3	Legitimacy Types Related to Institutional-Setting .....	60
2.5.4	Legitimacy Types Related to Social Acceptance or Consent .....	62
2.5.5	Legitimacy Types Related to Individuals .....	66
2.6	Discussion .....	68
2.7	Conclusion .....	71
Chapter 3 Legitimacy Assessment Throughout the Life of Collaborative Water Governance .		72
3.1	Introduction.....	72
3.2	Literature Review.....	73
3.2.1	Collaborative Governance Development Stages.....	74
3.2.2	Collaborative Water Governance Legitimacy.....	75
3.3	Setting and Study Design.....	80
3.3.1	Setting .....	80
3.3.2	Study design.....	81
3.4	Results.....	87
3.4.1	Stage 1: Establishment .....	87
3.4.2	Stage 2: Growth .....	89
3.4.3	Stage 3: Maturity.....	91
3.4.4	Stage 4: Decline .....	93
3.4.5	Stage 5: Dissolution or Renewal .....	94
3.5	Discussion.....	96

3.6	Conclusion .....	100
Chapter 4	Collaborative Water Governance: The Composition of Sector-based Legitimacy Judgements.....	101
4.1	Introduction.....	101
4.2	CWG Sectors and Legitimacy.....	102
4.3	Research Method .....	108
4.3.1	Case Descriptions.....	108
4.3.2	Data Collection and Analysis.....	112
4.4	Results.....	113
4.4.1	Government.....	115
4.4.2	Non-government .....	120
4.5	Discussion .....	124
4.6	Conclusion .....	127
Chapter 5	Conclusion .....	128
5.1	Purpose and Objectives.....	128
5.2	Major Findings.....	128
5.3	Contributions.....	131
5.3.1	Academic Contributions .....	131
5.3.2	Recommendations for Practice .....	133
5.4	Study Limitations and Ideas for Future Research.....	136
5.4.1	Methodological Insights.....	136
5.4.2	Conceptual Insights.....	137
5.5	Research Reflections.....	138
5.5.1	Case Reflections.....	138
5.5.2	Transdisciplinary Reflections .....	141
5.5.3	Personal Reflections.....	142
References Cited	.....	144
Appendix 1:	Case Study Characteristics.....	168
Appendix 2:	Semi-Structured Interview Guide .....	175
Appendix 3:	Document Sources .....	176

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1: Outline of Conceptual Frameworks.....	30
Table 1.2: Summary of Interviewee Backgrounds and Case Association .....	31
Table 1.3: Sample Interview Questions .....	32
Table 2.1: Types of Legitimacy and Key Proponents.....	39
Table 2.2: Legitimacy from Ideal Practice.....	41
Table 2.3: Legitimacy from the Potential for or Actual Results .....	43
Table 2.4: Legitimacy from Institutional-setting .....	45
Table 2.5: Legitimacy from Social Acceptance or Consent .....	47
Table 2.6: Legitimacy from Individuals .....	49
Table 2.7: Case Descriptions .....	51
Table 2.8: Interviewee Sectors Per Case.....	54
Table 2.9: CWG Legitimacy Sources Related to Ideal Practice by Case .....	54
Table 2.10: CWG Legitimacy Sources Related to Results by Case .....	58
Table 2.11: CWG Legitimacy Sources Related to Institutional-Setting by Case .....	61
Table 2.12: CWG Legitimacy Sources Related to Social Acceptance by Case.....	63
Table 2.13: CWG Legitimacy Sources Related to Individuals by Case .....	66
Table 3.1: Relevant CWG Legitimacy Types.....	76
Table 3.2: Conceptual Framework.....	78
Table 3.3: Case Description.....	82
Table 3.4: Number of Interviewees by Role and Case.....	86
Table 3.5: Stage 1: Legitimacy Sources, Types and Evidence .....	87
Table 3.6: Stage 2: Legitimacy Sources, Types and Evidence .....	89
Table 3.7: Stage 3: Legitimacy Sources, Types and Evidence .....	91
Table 3.4: Stage 4: Legitimacy Sources, Types and Evidence .....	93
Table 3.9: Stage 5: Legitimacy Factors and Evidence.....	94
Table 4.1: Legitimacy Types .....	105
Table 4.2: Composition of CWG Legitimacy Judgements by Common Sector-based Actors ....	107
Table 4.4: Interviewee Sectors Per Case.....	113
Table 4.5: Actor Group Legitimacy Judgements .....	114

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Case Study Watersheds within British Columbia, Canada.....	15
Figure 1.2: Cowichan Watershed (CWB).....	19
Figure 1.3: Columbia Watershed (LWA) .....	21
Figure 1.4: Nechako Watershed (NWC).....	24
Figure 1.5: Okanagan Watershed (OBWB) .....	27
Figure 1.6: Shuswap Watershed (SWC) .....	29
Figure 2.1: Respective Watersheds of the Five Cases .....	52
Figure 3.1: Five Stages of CWG Development .....	74
Figure 3.2: Case Study Watersheds Within the Province of British Columbia .....	84
Figure 3.3: Development Stage Progress of Each Case.....	85
Figure 3.4: Summary of Findings within each CWG Body Development Stage .....	96
Figure 4.1: Case Study Watershed Locations .....	111

## List of Acronyms

BCUC – British Columbia Utility Commission  
CEG – Collaborative Environmental Governance  
CSR – Corporate Social Responsibility  
CSRD – Columbia Shuswap Regional District  
CVRD – Cowichan Valley Regional District  
CWB – Cowichan Watershed Board  
CWG – Collaborative Water Governance  
DFO – Federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans  
DOI – District of Invermere  
DTR – Documented Terms of Reference  
ENGO – Environmental Non-Government Organization  
FBC – Fraser Basin Council  
LWA – Lake Windermere Ambassadors  
LWMC – Lake Windermere Management Committee  
LWMP – Lake Windermere Management Plan  
LWP – Lake Windermere Project  
MLA – Member of the Legislative Assembly  
MOE – Ministry of Environment  
NEEF – Nechako Environmental Enhancement Fund  
NGO – Non-Government Organization  
NWC – Nechako Watershed Council  
OBWB- Okanagan Basin Water Board  
OCP – Official Community Plan  
ONA – Okanagan Nation Alliance  
OWSC – Okanagan Water Stewardship Council  
RDEK – Regional District of East Kootenay  
RDNO – Regional District of the North Okanagan  
SLIPP – Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process  
SWC – Shuswap Watershed Council  
TAC – Technical Advisory Committee  
TNRD – Thompson Nicola Regional District  
UBC-O – University of British Columbia-Okanagan

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 Research Context

Scholars, practitioners, and policy-makers increasingly recognize that addressing water-related issues at all levels of decision-making requires attention to governance-related concerns. Governance broadly concerns the norms, structures, and organizational practices used to make decisions and take action. One crucial concern for governance is legitimacy. Legitimacy in the context of governance is about both the justification and acceptance of the existence and authority of a governance system, organization, actor, event, or decision (Bernstein 2005). A lack of legitimacy can cause opposition, resistance or a lack of commitment to the processes and results of governance and is therefore a critical concern when considering how to address various water challenges (Pahl-Wostl, *et al.* 2013). For example, if legitimacy is not established or is lost, then the governance process may break down and the decisions and actions of the body could be disregarded or opposed. Understanding the many different facets of legitimacy – such as its various sources and when and why they are used and by whom – can help clarify when strategic changes are needed for the effectiveness of a governance body (Tost, 2011). Given the pressing need for governance for many water issues, ensuring governance bodies have legitimacy so that they can proceed and be effective with their work, is essential for water resource sustainability.

The issue of legitimacy for water governance is also part of a broader political concern in Western countries. Questions of governance legitimacy relate to the changing role of the state due to declining public trust in both liberal democratic practices and the ideals of the welfare state along with increasing demand for participatory approaches to decision-making (Mulgan 2003; Kröger 2007). Traditionally, political authority has rested with governments, whose legitimacy is gained and sustained from constitutions and, in representative democracies, through electoral processes that signal the will of the people (Rosanvallon 2011). However, different models of governance that are based on collaboration, partnerships, and networks among diverse state and non-state actors are being promoted and used in many political systems (Kooiman 2003). As a result, governments increasingly are sharing some of their responsibilities (and sometimes their authority) with a range of non-state actors. For water governance, the sharing of responsibility is particularly common through the use of collaborative governance, which in its most basic form is an approach to governing that involves multiple actors all working towards a common goal (Gunningham, 2009).

This sharing of power between governments and non-state actors has led to changes in legitimacy dynamics and sources, which has raised questions about how legitimacy is achieved in collaborative settings (Bäckstrand *et al.*, 2010a; Baird *et al.*, 2014; Connelly *et al.*, 2006; Hogl *et al.*, 2012; Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012). Within the broader environmental context, researchers (e.g., Wallington, *et al.* 2008; Connelly 2011) have found that collaborative environmental governance (CEG) legitimacy is increasingly variable, hybrid, and dynamic, and is derived from participatory and deliberative processes as well as from their socially-just outputs. For instance, governance attributes such as trust, accountability, and the perceived improvement of social welfare are thought to play a role in the achievement of governance legitimacy in its various forms

(Bäckstrand *et al.*, 2010b; Sabatier, Focht, *et al.*, 2005a). Findings from such studies also suggest that governance legitimacy can be determined in multiple ways based on the type of governance and the context, and is increasingly conditional and susceptible to change (Krell-Laluhová and Scheneider 2004; Connelly 2011). However, there are still outstanding questions, particularly in the context of water governance, regarding the nature of legitimacy. These questions include the following:

- What typologies of legitimacy are relevant to the study of collaborative water governance (CWG)?
- What sources support and hinder the achievement of CWG legitimacy?
- How does CWG legitimacy evolve over time?
- How do legitimacy judgements differ among sectors of society?

The rationale for these questions stems from a cross-examination of different bodies of literature that revealed three knowledge gaps that exist in understanding CWG legitimacy. The first gap concerns the presence of multiple and varying legitimacy typologies in the broader theoretical legitimacy literature. For example, Scharpf (1999) highlights input and output legitimacy types; Beetham (1991) suggests rules, expressed consent, justifiability of rules legitimacy types; and Weber (1964) suggests traditional, rational-legality, and charismatic legitimacy types. These various types suggest that legitimacy may be achieved through a number of different sources. However, in the CWG literature, scholars (e.g., Baird *et al.*, 2014; Edwards, 2016; Orr, 2015; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005; Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012) have predominately only examined legitimacy using one typology. This suggests that potentially relevant typologies exist that have yet to be applied to CWG contexts. The application of these typologies may reveal the importance of little known legitimacy sources.

The second gap concerns the question of whether predominant legitimacy sources and their related types change throughout the development of a CWG organization. Legitimacy is known to be a dynamic attribute that is established, extended, maintained, defended, and lost (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Hybels, 1995; Tilling, 2004). Likewise, collaborative governance bodies, similar to other organizational forms, are known to progress through stages of development as they evolve over time (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Mandell & Keast, 2008). For example, Mandell and Keast (2008) suggest stages of development for interorganizational networks, which include first the building of relationships, second the maintenance of relationships and collaborative process, and third the achievement of collective tasks. However, the collaborative governance literature has not yet examined changes to governance attributes, such as legitimacy, as collaborative bodies develop (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). This is particularly true for CWG, where the dynamic nature of legitimacy has not yet been studied in the context of collaborative organizational development. Knowing which legitimacy source and types are more or less relevant at different points in a collaboration's development can help tailor management approaches to ensure the effectiveness of CWG.

The third gap concerns the composition of legitimacy sources and types within individual legitimacy judgements by sector. In this context, societal sector is defined as the different subdivisions of a community or society based on identifiable socio-economic, political, or cultural boundaries. CWG is a multi-sector endeavor typically made up of people representing various public, private, and non-government societal sectors. Common sectors include

government, First Nations, agriculture, industry, local business associations, and environmental organizations. As a result, the underlying values and interests connected to various sectors may influence the judgements different actors hold toward CWG (Bell & Park, 2006). These judgements form by drawing on various legitimacy sources and are essential to determining the acceptance or support of an entity (Black, 2008). However, individual legitimacy judgements are generally understudied (Black, 2008; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Finch *et al.*, 2014; Tost, 2011). In the context of CWG, the presence of actors from different sectors raises questions not only about how individuals judge legitimacy, but also how individuals from different sectors judge legitimacy. Similar to understanding how predominant legitimacy sources vary over the course of development, understanding how legitimacy sources make-up the legitimacy judgement of different sectors at a given point of time can also help collaborative bodies strategically manage their legitimacy.

Collectively, these are vital gaps because legitimacy ensures governance order, effectiveness, and stability (Beetham, 1991). Uncertainty about the ability of collaborative governance systems to address environmental problems like water and to achieve results that are democratic as well as socially and environmentally sustainable (McClosky 2000; Holley, *et al.* 2012) makes the development of legitimacy knowledge especially important in determining whether CWG is a suitable governance model in certain situations. Addressing these gaps is particularly important for water resource decision-making as the collaborative governance model is increasingly used as a way to include the array of actors concerned with or affected by water issues in the decision-making process (Ryan and Bidwell 2007). Knowledge about CWG legitimacy can help determine whether or not and how CWG can be an effective democratic process capable of delivering social and ecological outcomes. To establish a foundation for this research, this chapter frames the research's problem context and interpretation of key variables using a theoretical and empirical literature review, and outlines the purpose, objectives, overarching methodology and structure of the dissertation.

## 1.2 Purpose and Objectives

Stemming from the aforementioned knowledge gaps, the overarching purpose of this research is to provide conceptual clarity about the multi-faceted and dynamic nature of CWG legitimacy. Four interrelated objectives are pursued to accomplish this purpose:

- 1) To synthesise existing legitimacy typologies and build a robust conceptual framework of legitimacy types that can be used for the integrated assessment of CWG legitimacy;
- 2) To examine how CWG legitimacy evolves as a collaborative body develops;
- 3) To determine variations in the composition of CWG legitimacy judgements by sector; and
- 4) To provide insight into ways collaborative practitioners can influence legitimacy to enhance the effectiveness and stability of CWG according to various perspectives.

These objectives are motivated by two goals: to provide conceptual insight on the empirical sources and types of legitimacy common within judgements towards CWG bodies and to identify how these sources and types change through the development of a collaborative body and based on different societal sector-based perspectives. The research is motivated by both practical and theoretical concerns. Practically, the increasing use of collaborative governance to address water issues in Canada requires critical assessment to ensure these collaborative governance bodies can

achieve their goals. Theoretically, the traditional state-centric and process-based framework of legitimacy is no longer valid in all governance contexts, and thus as one alternative model, a comprehensive understanding of CWG legitimacy is necessary.

The significant and original contribution of this research emerges from (1) integrating understandings and ideas of legitimacy into CWG discussions; (2) empirically testing how and whether legitimacy can be developed and sustained in the context of CWG; and (3) critically challenging the context in which collaborative governance is an appropriate tool for making decisions about water resources. Collaborative governance is analyzed not as an assumed “best” governance model, but as one that can either generate socially and ecologically desirable decisions or lead to stalemate and undermine the policy-making process. Ultimately, this research is predicated on the assumption that legitimacy is required for governance bodies to be influential in addressing water issues but a comprehensive understanding of CWG legitimacy does not fully exist. Based on this assumption, the research tests and challenges insights and ideas of legitimacy in the context of CWG using five watershed-based cases within the province of British Columbia as an empirical setting for analysis.

## **1.3 Collaborative Water Governance Legitimacy: Conceptual Review**

### **1.3.1 Governance and Collaboration**

This research is embedded within the field of governance. Although conceptually governance is used in a variety of ways with a diversity of meanings (Peters & Pierre, 2000; Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1998), in general it is about the process through which decisions are made and actions are taken. Central within many definitions is the idea that governance tries to capture the changing nature of the state (Blatter, 2007; Treib *et al.*, 2007) and is concerned ultimately with creating conditions for ordered rule and collective action (Bell & Park, 2006; Kitthananan, 2006; Stoker, 1998). In creating such conditions, multiple models of governance are being discussed and practiced, many of which, like collaborative governance, focus on including non-state actors in decision-making processes (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). Such inclusion is grounded in the evolved belief of governance academics and practitioners that the participation of private actors in public decision-making will help address complex societal problems more effectively (Innes & Booher, 2000; Koontz *et al.*, 2004).

Collaborative governance is a model of governance that is predicated on the value of non-state actor inclusion using a deliberative form of decision-making. Broadly, it can be defined as “the processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private, and civic spheres to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished” (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015, p. 18). In this sense, collaborative governance is about the co-labour of actors from multiple sectors to make decisions that are of public concern. The emergence of collaborative governance as a desired model of governing is connected in part to the general belief that the state has abdicated some of its responsibilities on the premise of efficiency through devolved or outsourced productivity as well as the belief that the involvement of non-state actors in the policy or decision-making process may be more effective (Borrás & Ejrnæs, 2011). As a result, collaborative governance is used within multiple fields such as planning (e.g., Harris, 2002; Innes & Booher, 2010), business (e.g., Gray, 1985; Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Trist, 1983), public administration (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Bingham *et al.*, 2008; Thomson & Perry, 2006) and

environmental management (e.g., Ali-Khan & Mulvihill, 2008; Koontz, 2006; Margerum, 2008). As a result of its use in these different fields, various theoretical foundations of collaborative governance exist. For example, collaborative planning is largely guided by multiple communication theories related to alternative dispute resolution, deliberative democracy and consensus building (Harris, 2002; Innes, 1995), while cross-sector interorganizational collaboration (stemming from the field of business) is guided by resource dependency and social issue management theories (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011; Selsky & Parker, 2005). Despite these differences, there is conceptual overlap that allows for common characteristics, benefits and challenges of these various forms to be understood together (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Selsky & Parker, 2005).

A number of authors (e.g., Ansell & Gash, 2007; Bryson *et al.*, 2006; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Innes & Booher, 2010; Thomson & Perry, 2006) have offered conceptual reviews of collaborative governance that collectively confirm its main characteristics. Common features include, foremost, the meeting of diverse actors in different formats (e.g., face-to-face, virtually, publicly, and privately) to deliberatively address specific issues (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Also emphasized is the development, through this interaction, of a shared understanding of individual and common interests and an agreed upon procedure by participants. Most often, this interaction is characterized by consensus-oriented dialogue even if consensus is not formally required (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Innes & Booher, 2010). Moreover, developing such shared motivations takes time to develop and requires participant trust, commitment, and belief in the collaboration. This makes collaborative governance a long-term endeavor (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Finally, the pooling of resources (financial, human, information capital) by collaborative participants to address common problems is also generally a central component to collaboration (Fish *et al.*, 2010; Plummer & FitzGibbon, 2004).

Specific to collaborative governance results, authors such as Booher and Innes (2010), Clarke and Fuller (2011), and Cooper *et al.* (2008) have created frameworks that suggest different types of collaborative outcomes. Most notable as outcomes are the potential to create change on the issue that initially lead to collaboration through the achievement of organizational goals (Gray, 2000; Thomson & Perry, 2006) as well as broader change to the system context by adapting services and resources to evolving complex situations (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). However, social change may also be a benefit as participants in the collaborative process develop improved mutual understanding of one another (Cooper *et al.*, 2008; Gray, 2000; Mandarano, 2008) leading to changed attitudes (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Innes & Booher, 2004) and the possibility of greater cooperation and sustained agreements (Cooper *et al.*, 2008; Gray, 2000; Holley *et al.*, 2012a; Thomson & Perry, 2006).

Despite these benefits, only a few analysts (e.g., Innes, 1999; Rogers & Weber, 2010) have challenged the extent to which collaborative outcomes are achieved. Critiques consist of debates about the appropriateness of collaborative governance for all complex problems or situations (Bryson *et al.*, 2006; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Mandell & Steelman, 2003), the ability to ensure suitable representation, secure accountability, and overcome power imbalances among participating actors, as well as the actual benefit of consensus-building (Bingham, 2009; McClosky, 2000; McGuire, 2006). Furthermore, collaborative governance can easily fail without proper antecedents, namely adequate capacity and resources (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Holley *et al.*, 2012a; Wood & Gray, 1991), the willingness of the “right” actors to participate and respect others interests (Holley *et al.*, 2012a; O’Leary & Vij, 2012; Provan & Kenis, 2008) and

appropriate guidance/facilitation (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Likewise, in environmental contexts, spatial and temporal variations between the work of collaborative bodies and actual environmental change may also leave some skeptical of collaborative governance's ability to produce meaningful environmental change (Bäckstrand *et al.*, 2010b; Holley *et al.*, 2012a; Sabatier, Focht, *et al.*, 2005a). The supposed benefits of collaborative governance as a system of governing thus do not guarantee its success in achieving desired goals, and the challenges facing collaborative governance may undermine attempts at developing and maintaining legitimacy.

### **1.3.2 Collaborative Water Governance**

The utilization of collaborative governance in environmental contexts is common given the diversity of actors who use common pool resources and the complex nature of many environmental challenges (Ostrom, 1990). As such, there is a substantial body of literature on CEG (e.g., Ali-Khan & Mulvihill, 2008; Benson *et al.*, 2013; Gunningham, 2009; Taylor & de Loë, 2012), which applies collaborative governance norms and characteristics to environmental contexts. In this application, CEG exists as a subsection of participatory environmental governance arrangements along with, but still distinguishable from other arrangements such as, co-management (e.g., Bown *et al.*, 2013), adaptive co-management (e.g., Plummer, 2009), or general public stakeholder participation (e.g., Reed, 2008). Noting the distinguishing characteristics of different participatory arrangements is important as they represent not only different purposes and use different mechanisms, but also differ in structure, which requires various levels of trust and time for development (Mandell & Steelman, 2003). For example, collaborative governance arrangements tend to differ from co-management approaches in the sense that co-management tends to focus on joint decision making with the state for different natural resources, while collaborative arrangements tend to use consensus-based decision-making with a range of actors that may or may not involve the state (Plummer & FitzGibbon, 2004). Attempts have been made also to distinguish different collaborative arrangements (e.g., Ali-Khan & Mulvihill, 2008; Diaz-Kope & Miller-Stevens, 2015; Margerum, 2008; Moore & Koontz, 2003). For example, collaborations may be government-directed, citizen-directed, or a mixed initiative (Ali-Khan & Mulvihill, 2008; Moore & Koontz, 2003) that may take action developing direct operations, organizational policies and programs, or government legislation, policy and rules (Margerum, 2008). In this dissertation, government-, citizen-, and mixed-directed collaborations that focus on water governance are all studied.

Water is one environmental challenge where these different forms of collaboration are often used. Water's multiple uses and geospatial nature create a political arena that involves a broad collection of actors across local, regional, national, and international levels (Berger *et al.*, 2007). These characteristics make collaborative governance well suited to address water issues. As a result, both integrated and adaptive water management theories of practice are built on collaborative notions such as non-government involvement and dialogue (Sabatier, *et al.* 2005; Van Buuren 2009), and collaborative governance is assumed to be an appropriate way to connect actors from across levels, sectors, and up-stream and downstream from each other. Furthermore, collaborative governance is increasingly used to address complex, often ethically-based, water problems that do not have a right or wrong answer and where solutions develop through emergent and adaptive processes (Watson, 2007). The common pool nature of water also creates an incentive for collaboration by bringing actors together to identify mutual interests and to work

towards common objectives (Ostrom, 1990). As such, collaborative governance is increasingly promoted and used, throughout North America, Australia, Europe and Southeast Asia, to address water-related issues (Koehler & Koontz, 2008).

Although the use of CWG is prevalent at the watershed scale (Lubell, 2004), examples of CWG span all institutional levels and, like environmental governance arrangements, can be led by governments, citizens, or collectively. Examples at the watershed or basin levels include the Fraser Basin Council in BC (citizen-led) and the CALFED Bay-Delta Program in California (jointly managed), along with initiatives (government-led) that affect multiple watersheds such as Alberta's Watershed Planning and Advisory Councils at the provincial level, the Australian National Water Initiative at the national level and the European Union Water Framework Directive (WFD) at the international level. Together these examples represent the different forms CWG may take and through their empirical assessment highlight different challenges that exist in delivering CWG. To illustrate, Dutterer and Margerum (2015) found that fluctuating leadership, informal structure, and flawed formal recognition contributed to the dissolution of CALFED in 2007; Watson and Howe (2006) examined troubled stakeholder engagement in WFD implementation; and Brisbois and de Loë (2016) noted power differentials among actors within Alberta's WPACs. Such governance problems all connect in different ways to the challenge of legitimacy and highlight the need for CWG legitimacy study. Studying CWG legitimacy can help answer how these problems (as well as others) influence the acceptance of or support for a collaborative body, suggest at what point such problems are most pivotal to the effective management and results of a collaboration, and highlight what problems matter more or less to different sectors of society.

### **1.3.3 Legitimacy**

#### **1.3.3.1 Theoretical Foundations**

To study CWG legitimacy, consideration must be given to both the broad theoretical literature on governance legitimacy, as well as the applied empirical literature on legitimacy in CEG and CWG contexts. Like the literature focused on other governance attributes (e.g., power, accountability, capacity), the theoretical knowledge on legitimacy is vast and includes multiple interpretations (Hurrelmann, 2017). To navigate this literature and clarify how legitimacy is interpreted in this dissertation, this section provides conceptual clarification and discussion on the decisive choices made for this study. This includes (a) defining legitimacy (Suddaby *et al.*, 2016), (b) placing this research within the evolution of legitimacy debates, (c) delineating the object of focus for legitimation (Hurrelmann, 2017), (d) making methodological choices about whether the study focus is normative, empirical, or diagnostic (Krell-Laluhová & Scheneider, 2004), and (e) making theoretical choices about the manageability of legitimacy (Sonpar *et al.*, 2009; Tregidga *et al.*, 2007).

Within this dissertation, legitimacy broadly refers to the acceptance of governance. In this sense, legitimacy is about the judgement of appropriate behaviour. This definition is one of two dominant ways legitimacy is commonly interpreted. In the other, legitimacy is about the justification of governance as the normative validation of the exercise of authority. In both of these definitions, legitimacy is a social construct regarding the rightfulness of a certain object. Legitimacy as justification is usually discussed within the context of regulatory governance bodies that have power over a subordinate, while the legitimacy as acceptance is commonly

associated with non-regulatory organizations, and is sociologically- and perception-based (Marquez, 2016). Because the CWG cases used in this study (Section 1.5.2) are non-regulatory and do not yield decision-making power over a subordinate population, this research adheres more directly to legitimacy as a judgement of acceptance. This definition clarifies legitimacy as a specifically different concept compared to vague ideas of support or stability, both of which may be a by-product of legitimacy, but alone may also be conceived from non-normative considerations such as habitual compliance, fear of recrimination, or calculated cost-benefit decisions (Barker, 1990; Hurrelmann, 2017). Defining legitimacy as a judgement also allows other factors such as power, stakeholder interests and other normative values to be included in assessments. This inevitably makes legitimacy a broad concept that risks subsuming other theoretical fields of inquiry. This risk is recognized in this dissertation; nonetheless, the perspective adopted here is that a comprehensive approach to legitimacy is necessary so as to not exclude different influencing factors that may be present in judgements. The main reason for this stance is the proposed hybrid nature of CWG legitimacy along with uncertainty about how legitimacy is determined in alternative governance forms like collaborative governance (Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012; Wallington *et al.*, 2008). Thus, the central conceptual contribution of this dissertation is that a wide variety of perspectives is necessary for a thorough assessment of CWG legitimacy. This approach represents a deviation from common approaches to the study of legitimacy that typically remain within disciplinary and singular interpretations.

Continuing to clarify how legitimacy is considered within this research, the dissertation as a whole must be positioned relative to existing legitimacy scholarship. This research is concerned with helping clarify the nature of legitimacy for a specific form of governance (CWG). This concern is based on a sense of need, argued for by authors such as Connelly (2011) and Deephouse and Suchman (2008) that a gap exists in understanding the sources of legitimacy in different institutional environments. Despite the prominence of legitimacy in the governance literature, it has remained an elusive concept often described only generally to make claims about the quality of governance in different settings (Krell-Laluhová & Scheneider, 2004). Moreover, the existence of multiple governance modes that address different types of governance issues means that legitimacy is increasingly context- and issue-specific, as a function of differing societal norms and values for different circumstances within the same setting. This means that legitimacy is increasingly conditional and requires situated analysis of the components of different governance types not only to assess how legitimacy exists for certain governance bodies, but also to determine the normative aspects of certain governance systems. Important to such analysis, and the focus of this research, are consideration of the specific sources and related legitimacy types that contribute to judgements as a whole, as well as the dynamic nature of governance legitimacy.

In considering the sources and types of legitimacy, authors such as Borrás and Ejrnaes (2011), Connelly (2011) and Wallington *et al.* (2008) have found that legitimacy in its various forms (e.g., legality, justifiability and consent) within different governance contexts emerges from multiple components in a hybrid relationship. Multiple typologies exist that identify this hybrid relationship both in the context of governance and relative to other organizational forms. Perhaps most notable within environmental governance literature is Scharpf's (1997, 1999) input and output typology that is often used to discuss this hybrid relationship. Input components concern procedural logic and consider norms such as the transparency, fairness, inclusiveness and accountability of decision-making. Output components, in contrast, are associated with

consequential logic, problem-solving, and effectiveness and consider whether decision making improves concerns such as welfare and social justice. Others (e.g., Beetham, 1991; Etsy, 2006; Matheson, 1987; Suchman, 1995) provide alternative typologies arguing that legitimacy sources also extend from other legitimacy types beyond input and output. For example, Etsy (2006) suggests democratic, results-based, order-based, systemic, deliberative and procedural legitimacy. In contrast, Suchman (1995) identifies pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy types and Matheson (1987) suggests legitimacy through convention, contract, universal principles, sacredness, expertise, popular approval, personal ties, and personal qualities. These examples suggest that there are multiple sources that comprise legitimacy judgements, and demonstrate that legitimacy cannot be studied as a single entity, but rather should be broken down into its multiple components. However, a framework that covers all of the different sources does not exist and how these sources together determine legitimacy is not well understood (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Johnson *et al.*, 2006).

Perhaps a central reason such a framework does not yet exist relates to the study of legitimacy at different governance scales, as concerns vary at international, national, and sub-national levels. At the international level, questions of legitimacy, particularly for international law and organizations, are often connected to questions of accountability and enforceability of global regulation (e.g., Abbott *et al.*, 2000; Arnull, 2002; Bernstein, 2005; Bodansky, 1999; Buchanan & Keohane, 2006). Meanwhile, at the national level questions of state legitimacy often tie to challenges of representative democracy and who has the right to exercise political authority (e.g., Barker, 1990; Skogstad, 2003; Steen, 2001; Teague & Donaghey, 2009). Finally, at the sub-national level are regional level governance issues such as resource support, the accountability of involved civil society, and regulatory or enforceability challenges (e.g., Chaskin, 2003; Connelly, 2011; Hanberger, 2003; Welch, 2002). In addition to legitimacy studies within a governance context, extensive legitimacy study also exists for private (e.g., Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Auld *et al.*, 2008; Fisher *et al.*, 2016) and non-government organizations (e.g., Brown & Jagadananda, 2007; Jepson, 2005) at any level. Legitimacy typologies are suggested within studies that focus on any of these scales or organizational contexts. Legitimacy types suggested across all are drawn upon for this study to allow the exploration and categorization of CWG legitimacy sources to be as comprehensive as possible.

From a practical standpoint, in addition to identifying all relevant sources, understanding how they work together is also necessary to know what constitutes actual legitimacy judgements towards governance bodies by different actors – i.e., legitimacy for or by whom (Hogl, et al. 2012)? Assessing legitimacy for this purpose involves considering multiple audiences and the composition of individual legitimacy judgements (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Tost, 2011). In this dissertation, it is assumed that legitimacy is judged in a number of different ways, which influences whether legitimacy is established, sustained, and challenged based on whose perspective is being considered. As a result, the goal of this research is not to explicitly measure whether different audiences judge a collaborative body as legitimate or illegitimate. Instead, the goal is to first identify the composition of judgements to catalogue the different sources and related types of legitimacy as a collective regardless of the question of *legitimacy for or by whom* (Chapter Two). Second, the goal is to identify the dynamic nature of these legitimacy sources and types as they change over the course over the development of a collaboration (Chapter Three) and according to perspective from within different sectors of society (Chapter Four).

In relation to legitimacy dynamics, others (e.g., Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Hybels, 1995; Tilling, 2004) have made the claim that legitimacy is a constantly moving target requiring different sources to adapt to various and evolving governance settings. Legitimacy as a social construct continually needs to be maintained and reproduced because it is always susceptible to challenge (Beetham, 1991). In this sense, it requires ongoing management to establish and maintain the status quo, and to address threats, such as changing social legitimacy norms or institutional structures that can lead to legitimacy deficits or decline (Tilling, 2004). Governance models that exist outside of the state may face legitimacy deficits because institutional structures and social norms may not yet be aligned (Schneider *et al.*, 2010). These gaps reflect the shifting governance setting in which multiple forms of governance exist and depend on different governance attributes to develop legitimacy. Moreover, at the organizational level, the development of governance bodies may also lead to changing legitimacy dynamics (Black, 2008; Fisher *et al.*, 2016). Awareness of the dynamics of legitimacy is thus necessary to ensure that assessments either evolve along with governance, or are clearly delineated as a snapshot of legitimacy at a certain time and place.

Following from the need for clarity regarding the conceptual focus of this research, it is important to also identify the object that is actually legitimized. Because legitimacy may be granted to governance systems and institutions, rulers and governance organizations, operating norms, specific laws or policies (Weber, 1968), a decisive choice must be made about what aspect of governance is being studied (i.e., legitimacy of what?). Arguably, since the different aspects relate or are nested within one another to form the governance system, some inferences can be passed from the study of narrower aspects to the nature of legitimacy related to higher-level aspects. However, legitimacy analysis must differentiate between these various aspects. If all components are treated as one unitary object, bias may be introduced based on legitimacy concerns related to one component that is not necessarily applicable to the whole (Hurrelmann, 2017; Suddaby *et al.*, 2016). As a result, a deliberate decision was made in this research to focus the dissertation on *organizational legitimacy* (i.e., collaborative bodies). This means the focus of this research is on empirical accounts of legitimacy *within* specific uses of CWG; however, some insight can be gained around what legitimacy means *for* CWG as a system or model of governance in general. The decision to apply this organizational lens was based on empirical claims calling for the continued assessment of CWG legitimacy (e.g., Edwards, 2016; Orr, 2015), while also recognizing that empirical assessment requires an objective focus. By focusing at the organizational level, the legitimacy object could be explicitly identified (i.e., collaborative boards); this allowed findings to have tangible application to practitioners, while allowing for insight into the systematic nature of CWG.

To empirically assess legitimacy, methodological distinction about how to study legitimacy is also required. Much of the literature on legitimacy differentiates between normative and empirical approaches to the study of legitimacy (Beetham, 1991; Hogl *et al.*, 2012; Schneider & Krell-Laluhová, 2005). Through a normative approach, researchers work to identify exhaustive benchmarks that determine legitimacy as a function of moral rightfulness (Provan *et al.*, 2008; Schneider & Krell-Laluhová, 2005). In Western democracies, these benchmarks are predominantly a function of democratic quality using the state as the main reference point for legitimacy discourse (Beetham, 1991). In contrast, using empirical approaches, researchers observe the actual acceptance of specific political arrangements (Beetham, 1991; Hogl *et al.*, 2012; Krell-Laluhová & Schneider, 2004). In this perspective, the notion of legitimacy is bound

by time and space and focuses on the extent to which a specific arrangement is legitimized by citizens and political actors (Beetham, 1991; Hogl *et al.*, 2012). In addition to these two perspectives, Schneider and Krell-Laluhová (2005) suggest a diagnostic perspective that blends descriptive and normative ideas by drawing on a particular theory of legitimacy to benchmark and empirically evaluate specific political arrangements. Similarly, Scharpf (2007) suggests a functional perspective that speaks to the need to consider normative and empirical approaches based on the utility both can provide to a given situated context. This research adopts the perspective that both perspectives are needed to understand CWG legitimacy empirically. Thus, even though this research is empirical and no diagnostic or normative assessment is conducted, normative interpretations are still present as they often influence or are a part of empirical judgements (Krell-Laluhová & Scheneider, 2004). In the context of CWG, generalized norms identifying how collaborations should or should not function as well as expected benefits of a collaboration (along with its challenges) likely influence how those affected or involved judge a CWG body. For this reason, the sources of legitimacy empirically identified in this dissertation are connected to normative legitimacy types that appear in the literature.

To empirically identify and categorize contextually-based CWG legitimacy sources, this dissertation uses both descriptive sociological and normative typologies. To do so, the dissertation adopts an inductive and deductive cross-disciplinary approach to deconstruct multiple typologies for empirical use. This approach represents a divergence from traditional methods both within the legitimacy and the collaborative governance literatures. Commonly, when legitimacy is empirically studied it is done so in either a descriptive fashion that explores the situated context and compares it to a select typology (e.g., Connelly *et al.*, 2006; Edwards, 2016; Orr, 2015; Sandstrom *et al.*, 2014), describes the legitimacy context in general without making a connection to an existing typology (e.g., Borrás & Ejrnæs, 2011; Luig, 2011; Pinkerton & John, 2008; Ramstad *et al.*, 2009), or studies a select aspect (type) of legitimacy within a given context (often democratic process) (e.g., Hard *et al.*, 2012; Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012). Few studies (e.g., Goldsmith & Pereira, 2014) recognize the need for an integrated typology to study empirical legitimacy. This dissertation embraces the idea that an integrated approach is necessary for the comprehensive assessment of CWG. However, this dissertation also recognizes the inappropriateness of blending normative and sociological legitimacy interpretations (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008), and instead only presents legitimacy types together as a simple form of integration.

Additionally, in applying this empirical approach, this dissertation makes a further distinction between legitimacy and legitimation. According to Barker (2001) legitimacy is an attribute of governance, while legitimation is the process through which legitimacy is either established and affirmed or disputed and withdrawn. In this sense, legitimation is actually the only variable that can be empirically studied; this occurs through the study of others' perspectives via communication (Hurrelmann, 2017). As such, by identifying legitimacy sources, the focus of this research is on identifying the processes that create legitimacy as a desirable governance resource (Suddaby *et al.*, 2016).

Finally, a deliberate decision must also be made about the theoretical position of the study in relationship to the types of recommendations that can be made. Theoretically, two main schools of thought influence conceptualizations of legitimacy as a manageable entity: institutional theory and strategic management (Sonpar *et al.*, 2009; Tregidga *et al.*, 2007). Legitimacy within institutional theory is synonymous with institutionalization in the sense that legitimacy's

existence leads to a stable and ordered society (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Hybels, 1995; Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy as institutionalization is achieved by following a set prescription that aligns with currently accepted societal norms (Sonpar *et al.*, 2009). In contrast, the strategic management literature offers an instrumental approach, claiming legitimacy can be managed through specific planning and manipulation behaviours that generate societal support (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Hybels, 1995; Tregidga *et al.*, 2007). Largely, this literature is associated with sociological analyses of organizational legitimacy (Brinkerhoff, 2005; Cashore, 2002; Scherer *et al.*, 2013; Suchman, 1995). Suggestions for legitimacy management vary usually based on whether attempts are being made to establish, maintain, strengthen, or repair legitimacy (Tilling, 2004). Types of strategies that can be used to influence legitimacy typically fall within one of three categories: conforming to external expectations, manipulating audience perceptions, or engaging in discourse with those who challenge their legitimacy. Example of strategies within these categories could include adapting organizational practices to match accepted community forms, using myths, ceremonies, and symbols to create new community beliefs and values that match with the actions of the organization, or communicating with community members to build common discourse about socially acceptable practices (Baumann-Pauly *et al.*, 2016; Brinkerhoff, 2005; Massey, 2001; Scherer *et al.*, 2013). This dissertation adheres to the belief that CWG legitimacy is manageable and offers suggestions for management when appropriate. The rationale for this position stems first from the still informal nature of collaborative governance in society (Blomgren Amsler, 2016), which suggests that CWG may not yet have engrained institutional norms to which to adhere. Second, the position stems from the inclusionary nature of CWG, which may enhance the tractability of strategic management actions through the representative nature of collaborative participants.

### **1.3.3.2 Collaborative Water Governance Legitimacy**

In the CEG and CWG literature, legitimacy is discussed in one of three ways: as a part of a broader framework of necessary governance attributes (e.g., Armitage *et al.*, 2012; Biermann & Gupta, 2011; Innes & Booher, 2004; Lockwood *et al.*, 2010; Lundqvist, 2004; Moss & Newig, 2010; Pahl-Wostl *et al.*, 2013); within a critique of specific governance systems or bodies (e.g., Kallis *et al.*, 2009; McClosky, 2000); or as an in-depth assessment (e.g., Baird *et al.*, 2014; Edwards, 2016; Gearey & Jeffrey, 2006; Hard *et al.*, 2012; Leino & Peltomaa, 2012; Orr, 2015; Sandstrom *et al.*, 2014; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005; Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012). Together these studies provide insight into the sources, challenges, and situated nature of CWG legitimacy, while also confirming knowledge gaps and justifying this research.

Within the literature where legitimacy is viewed as part of a broader framework, discussion generally revolves around the value of public participation as a legitimating tool (e.g., Innes & Booher, 2004; Koontz & Johnson, 2004), the importance of legitimacy for effective governance (e.g., Fuller, 2009; Innes & Booher, 2004), the general change to the nature of legitimacy in collaborative contexts compared to the traditional benchmark of democratic legitimacy for the state (e.g., Armitage *et al.*, 2012), and possible ways to achieve legitimacy (e.g., Lockwood *et al.*, 2010). In this work, legitimacy is generally discussed either conceptually with the occasional use of empirical examples to support claims or as a part of an empirically assessment. For example, Armitage *et al.* (2012) use the example of gaining non-government actor support for locally based CWG in the Murray-Darling Basin in Australia to support claims about the changed complex nature of collaborative governance legitimacy. Meanwhile, in studies where CWG or CEG

systems or components have been empirically assessed (e.g., Davis, 2008; Koontz & Johnson, 2004; Rickenbach & Reed, 2002), legitimacy is one measure of success. Such assessment also represents instances where legitimacy challenges emerge as a part of an empirical critique. One such study is Kallis *et al.*'s (2009) assessment of the CALFED program, which identified legitimacy challenges stemming from democratic deficits related to representative accountability.

A number of CEG and CWG scholars have also specifically assessed legitimacy (e.g., Bäckstrand, 2006; Baird *et al.*, 2014; Connelly, 2011; Connelly *et al.*, 2006; Edwards, 2016; Gearey & Jeffrey, 2006; Hard *et al.*, 2012; Hogl *et al.*, 2012; Leino & Peltomaa, 2012; Newig & Kvarda, 2012; Orr, 2015; Sandstrom *et al.*, 2014; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005; Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012). In these studies, legitimacy is analyzed using different legitimacy interpretations and typologies to explore its characteristics in CEG and CWG contexts. Most commonly, CWG or CEG legitimacy is diagnostically or empirically approached using one legitimacy typology as a guide. To illustrate, Orr (2015) uses Beetham's (1991, 2013) typology of rules, expressed consent, and justifiability of rules to diagnostically assess CWG legitimacy in Quebec, Canada. In contrast, Baird *et al.* (2014) use Trachtenberg and Focht's (2005) input and substantive legitimacy typology to empirically examine CWG legitimacy in Ontario, Canada, while Edwards (2016) uses Suchman's (1995) pragmatic, cognitive, and moral legitimacy typology to empirically assess CWG in the states of Washington and Nebraska. Collectively, these studies establish CWG and CEG legitimacy as a complex hybrid dynamic that is interrelated with multiple other collaborative attributes such as inclusivity, accountability, transparency, power dynamics, effectiveness, and the surrounding legal structure. However, what these scholars have not done yet is recognize all relevant legitimacy typologies to CWG, examine how legitimacy types change over the development of a collaboration, or assess the composition of legitimacy judgements by sector.

### **1.3.4 Summary**

Collaboration is advocated by policy-makers, practitioners, and academics as a form of governance that produces more ethical and rational outcomes based on its inclusion of multiple interests, thus making its ideal premise more effective and less likely to cause opposition (Innes and Booher 1999; Murray 2005; Gunningham 2009). Legitimacy is particularly important for collaborative governance to function and achieve its goals. However, legitimacy for collaborative governance systems, in comparison to the traditional governance legitimacy of the state, is inherently more complex and multifaceted in nature. Although initial work has been undertaken to understand this complexity and to identify the various dimensions of collaborative governance legitimacy, many crucial outstanding questions remain. Specific questions involve identifying the full range of CWG legitimacy sources, mapping the dynamic nature of these sources, and understanding how they are used in various legitimacy judgements. The urgency and sensitivity of many environmental issues, particularly those concerning water, along with the increased use of collaborative governance to address these issues, makes these questions important areas to address. The governance legitimacy literature provides guidance and tools to help assess and measure legitimacy and the CEG and CWG literatures provide the context in which legitimacy can be studied.

## 1.4 Empirical Context

To empirically study CWG legitimacy, five collaborative bodies were chosen as case studies. The selection of these cases and their specific characteristics are discussed in detail in Section 1.5. Here, the empirical context surrounding these cases is introduced. All cases are located within the socio-political context of the Canadian province of BC (see Figure 1.1) where collaboration is increasingly promoted and used in a diversity of ways to address water challenges in the province's watersheds. This diversity reflects the absence of a provincially-mandated strategy for CWG and the belief by the Province that one CWG model is not appropriate for all of the watersheds in the province (Brandes & Curran, 2009). Given that CWG exists in multiple forms, BC's varying CWG watershed level structures allow this research to study different cases within one socio-political context.

### 1.4.1 British Columbia Water Policy and Governance Context

Geographically, BC is the third largest province in Canada occupying an area of 944,735 km<sup>2</sup> – 95 percent of which is Crown Land and only two percent of which is accessible freshwater (McGillivray, 2005). The province's approach to water management historically over the last century has been driven by economic growth through the development or harvesting of BC's resources. This strategy resulted in decisions such as large water licenses being given for industrial purposes – for example RioTinto AlCan's license for 70% of the Nechako River's average annual flow (Christensen, 1996) – and the construction of large dams, such as the Kenny and Bennet Dams in Northern BC. The adverse impact of these decisions on ecological values such as biodiversity, fish and wildlife habitat, and water supply was recognized by the 1970s and by the 1980s a new strategy began to prioritize concern for social, economic, and ecological sustainability along with public consultation in decision-making (Day *et al.*, 2003; Dorsey, 1991). This resulted in the instigation of collaborative governance initiatives in various forms throughout the 1990s particularly for land use planning (Day *et al.*, 2003; Frame *et al.*, 2004).

From this introduction of CEG in BC, CWG also began to emerge in various formats (Nowlan & Orr, 2010). Notably, CWG that involved non-government actors at the watershed level emerged either as grassroots non-government led forums, such as the Fraser Basin Council or as decision-making with multiple government and non-government actors, such as the Okanagan Basin Water Board (Nowlan & Bakker, 2007). These approaches have had varying success in different watersheds throughout the province and have resulted in many BC watersheds having some form of participatory water governance process that includes multiple actor groups in decision-making. The BC Government recognizes the importance of including all major watershed interests in governance processes (British Columbia Ministry of Environment, 2010b); however, it has not provided an overarching framework that creates a systematic model of CWG across BC watersheds (Brandes & Curran, 2009). The main reason such a framework does not exist is the geographic, resource, and social diversity among BC's watersheds, particularly differences with title and rights claims made by various First Nations within each watershed (Brandes & Curran, 2009). Nevertheless, through the reformation of the Province's main water law – the *Water Act* (R.S.B.C. 1996 c 483) – in 2014 to the *Water Sustainability Act* (S.B.C. 2014, c. 15), objectives have been put in place by the Province to allow for collaborative planning and decision-making, which may in the future include collaborative development of Water Sustainability Plans through watershed-based governance (British Columbia Ministry of

Environment, 2010b). To date, authority or responsibility of local CWG bodies for such plans has not yet been developed.

BC represents a setting where CWG is being practiced by both state and non-state actors. It also represents an area where concerns about the legitimacy of CWG exist (Brandes & Curran, 2009; Nowlan & Bakker, 2007). Notably, questions exist regarding whether the Provincial Government will recognize or give authority or responsibility to watershed-based collaborative bodies and how challenges implementing CWG (e.g., resourcing, maintaining momentum, overcoming local opposition) may be overcome (Fraser Basin Council, 2015a). As such, the watershed-based organizations that practice collaboration specifically including non-government actors form an appropriate empirical context for this research.

**Figure 1.1: Case Study Watersheds within British Columbia, Canada**



## 1.5 Research Design and Methods

Following is an overarching review of the methodology employed for this entire study. The methods relevant to the goals of each specific manuscript are also reiterated in Chapters Two, Three, and Four. Qualitative methods were used to achieve the objectives of this dissertation (Section 1.2) and a constructivist epistemology guides this study's design and analysis (Gray,

2004). Hence, I assume that the meaning of legitimacy is constructed, not discovered. As such, knowledge generation is believed to be relative and based on situated contexts (Creswell 2009). Moreover, within each of these constructed realities, multiple perceptions and meanings may exist (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). In this sense actors construct their own meaning of legitimacy in different ways and multiple contradictory, but equally valid, claims of legitimacy may exist. Thus, throughout the study, interpretations of CWG legitimacy are sought through qualitative data collection within specific social contexts that determine the “truth” of these interpretations. The rationale for using qualitative data collection and analysis is based on the assumption that determining the truth of legitimacy interpretations is a narrative-based exercise to understand the nuances behind the opinions, feelings, and behaviours of people in different social contexts. As such, data on legitimacy are not easily reduced to numbers (Suddaby *et al.*, 2016).

To guide the data collection process, the research methodology draws from both grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) and post-positive (Creswell, 2007) insights. To start the research process, in line with post-positivism, a deductive conceptual framework is used to establish parameters for data collection and analysis. From here, borrowing from grounded theory, this study assumes an iterative inductive and deductive research process is necessary to form knowledge on CWG legitimacy. Thus, theoretical as well as emergent empirical insights guide both the data collection and analysis. While the conceptual framework guided the data collection, actions such as asking open-ended interview questions allowed emergent themes to materialize (Creswell, 2007). Analysis included these themes along with those from the conceptual framework. Specifically, the research used qualitative data analysis to explore and to reflect upon the polycentric nature of legitimacy. Because legitimacy can be judged in many different ways, each judgement may be based on any number of different sources depending on who is judging and the context they are judging within. For example, in one setting a specific audience’s judgement towards a collaboration could matter more than in a different setting. Therefore, the focus of this research is on identifying the range of legitimacy sources and revealing recurrent themes rather than quantifying what matters most within legitimacy judgements.

### **1.5.1 Case Study Method**

In line with post-positivist and grounded theory methodology, a multi-case study approach was used to direct and organize the data collection and analysis methods. Multiple cases were chosen, in comparison to a single case study, on the basis that this approach would allow for a comprehensive inquiry into CWG legitimacy, while also allowing for a degree of generalizability (Yin, 2009). This approach was deemed to be appropriate for the study of CWG legitimacy because case study methods have the ability to explore areas requiring theoretical and in-depth contextual analysis (Gerring, 2007; Stake, 2006). CWG legitimacy knowledge gaps and legitimacy’s interpretive and situated nature (Johnson, *et al.* 2006; Connelly 2011), make case studies a suitable approach to the study of legitimacy.

Case units (Yin, 2009) for this multi-case study design were organizations that practice CWG. The five cases used include the Cowichan Water Board (CWB), the Lake Windermere Ambassadors (LWA), the Nechako Watershed Council (NWC), the Okanagan Basin Water Board (OBWB), and the Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process/Shuswap Watershed Council (SLIPP/SWC). All are within the province of BC. The reason for locating the cases all within one province was to allow for deeper and quicker understanding of the social and political context of each case, and to allow for easier comparisons among the cases. The province of BC was selected

for its diverse geography and the presence of CWG bodies, as well as its prioritization of inclusive governance within the provincial *Water Sustainability Act* (S.B.C. 2014, c. 15) (Brandes & Curran, 2009; Nowlan & Bakker, 2007).

To select each case, four criteria were used. First, the CWG bodies had to be involved in water governance at the watershed or local level. CWG's increasing popularity as a method to make decisions and take action for water at the local or watershed level (Leach, 2006; Lubell, 2004) means that this criterion strengthens the relevance of the research. Second, the body had to self-identify as being a collaborative process involving multiple cross-sector actors that were formally organized as a board or council so their goals, policies, programs, and participants could be clearly identified. Third, geographic diversity among all cases was required to increase generalizability by providing different and more comprehensive understandings of CWG legitimacy across varied contexts. Fourth, diversity in the age of each case was also required to increase generalizability and to facilitate inquiry for Objective Two (to identify how legitimacy evolves as CWG bodies develop). The ability of interviewees to reflect more precisely on more recent variables compared to ones from the distant past was another reason for this criterion. Having current empirical knowledge of bodies at each stage of development, while also being able to make cross-case and longitudinal analysis for some of the development stages, enhanced the validity of findings. To use these four criteria, a list of BC-based CWG bodies was compiled based on personal knowledge and reviews of academic and grey literature on BC CWG. Applying the four criteria to this list led to the five selected cases.

The research findings from using these five cases have applicability beyond the context of each case and BC; however, because of distinguishable characteristics among the cases, not all findings are generalizable (Gerring, 2007). Nevertheless, the use of five case studies, over that of a single case or a larger number of cases, was preferred to allow for an in-depth examination with findings that have a higher degree of reliability and application in other settings (Yin, 2009). The diversity of these cases in terms of their geographic and temporal diversity also helped ensure findings that emerged from studying small BC-based cases were relevant to CWG at a broader system level. Recommendations from the study as a whole were also made independent from situated concerns specific to the individual cases, thereby allowing the reliability of recommendations to also be enforced (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009).

## **1.5.2 Case Descriptions**

Following are descriptions of each case. The water governance characteristics of each case are also summarized in more detail in Appendix 1.

### **1.5.2.1 Cowichan Watershed Board**

#### *Context*

The Cowichan Watershed (Figure 1.2) is 940 square kilometers and is located on the eastern side of Vancouver Island. Principally, water flows west to east in the watershed from the Cowichan Lake, through the 50-kilometer-long Cowichan River, and empties into the Strait of Georgia at the Cowichan and Koksilah Estuary. Significant diversity exists in the amount of precipitation at the headwaters (5000ml+) versus the lower portion of the watershed (>1000ml), with a large majority of the precipitation falling in the winter months (Hunter *et al.*, 2014). This diversity is further aggravated by climate change, which is increasing the frequency of summer droughts and

winter storms. The flora and the fauna of the areas include Douglas fir and Western red cedar; elk, deer, and bear; as well as salmonids (chinook and sockeye) and shellfish in the tidal flats of the estuary (Hunter *et al.*, 2014).

. Currently, the Cowichan Watershed supports a population of approximately 82,000 – 4,600 of which are Cowichan Tribes people (Hunter *et al.*, 2014). The Cowichan Tribes are BC's largest First Nation and have lived in the watershed and depended on its resources since time immemorial. Changes to the basin began with the introduction of Euro-Canadian settlers and include dykes to manage winter floods and large volume extraction of both surface and groundwater for both irrigation and industry purposes. A weir also was built in 1957 to control outflow of the Cowichan Lake for a water license to operate a pulp mill at the town of Crofton; the weir and mill are currently run by Catalyst Paper, the largest employer in the area (Catalyst Paper Corporation, 2012). Agriculture and forestry are the main resource-based industries within the watershed. The watershed is unique in the province as one of the few, where the majority of land (including Cowichan Lake's bottom) is privately owned or managed (Hunter *et al.*, 2014).


Challenges facing the watershed are human and climate change driven. For example, the loss of old growth forests and mono-cropping for forestry has weakened forest soil and its water-absorption capacity; shellfish beds are polluted and cannot be harvested; and the increased frequency of summer droughts have threatened salmon populations to the point that the fish are being caught and trucked upstream to bread because of low river levels (Hunter *et al.*, 2014). Droughts also affect Catalyst Paper and have threatened, but not yet led to, the shutdown of pulp and paper operations. Critical drought in 2003 acted as a policy window to take action on these challenges and led to the development of the Cowichan Valley Regional District's Cowichan Basin Water Management Plan (Westland Resource Group Inc., 2007).

#### *Water Policy and Governance*

Recommended within the plan was the establishment of a collaborative watershed advisory council to help deliver the six goals, 23 objectives, and 89 actions of the plan (Rutherford, 2011). After another drought in 2008, the Cowichan Watershed Board was implemented in 2010 as a co-management partnership between the Cowichan Tribes and Cowichan Valley Regional District (CVRD) (rather than a governance model involving all interest groups) with involvement from the provincial and federal governments and the support of a technical advisory committee (TAC) of relevant technicians and stakeholder groups. The board is comprised of 12 members who are CVRD and Cowichan Tribes elected officials or appointees along with up to four members at large and two provincial or federal government nominated members (Fraser Basin Council, 2015a). The purpose of the CWB is threefold, to implement the watershed plan, to provide leadership in managing the watershed, and to engage communities in water sustainability (Rutherford, 2011). Eight water management targets are used by the CWB as a way to structure activity and make the actions of the plan more tangible. These targets include ensuring water quality meets accepted water quality guidelines, being able to harvest shellfish from the Cowichan Bay by 2020, matching or beating the Town of Ladysmith's per capita water consumption, watershed education for grade four and five students, meeting or exceeding target densities of Steelhead fry in the Cowichan, ensuring the Cowichan River summer flows are seven cm or higher, and protecting 50% of Cowichan Lake's riparian habitat and restoring 10% of impacted riparian habitat by 2021 (Rutherford, 2011). The specificity of these targets is particularly celebrated by the CWB for their measurability. Attention is particularly paid to flow

issues in the Cowichan River and the CWB is an active proponent for localizing and improving flow control via a weir at the mouth of Cowichan Lake (Hunter *et al.*, 2014). Decisions are made by consensus based on advice by the TAC at monthly board meetings that are open to the public. Action on the targets include water quality monitoring and reporting, technical reports and presentations, restoration bodies, public education campaigns and advocacy work on flow and legislation development to senior government. Funding is drawn from both CVRD and First Nations gas taxes as well as grants. Accountability is primarily to the regional district and the Cowichan Tribes as fund contributors. Legal mechanisms of the CWB include registration as a charitable society and formalized terms of reference.

**Figure 1.2: Cowichan Watershed (CWB)**



### 1.5.2.2 Lake Windermere Ambassadors

#### Context

Lake Windermere is located in southeastern BC in the Columbia Valley in the Rocky Mountain Trench and is actually a widening of the Columbia River as it flows north (Figure 1.3). The lake has a surface area of 1610 hectares, a perimeter length of approximately 36 kilometers, and an average depth of 3.4 meters (Neufeid *et al.*, 2010). The lake provides both environmental and human values. Inherent environmental value is provided as fish and wildlife habitat, particularly as the lake acts as the entry point to the Columbia Wetlands, which are recognized internationally under the RAMSAR Convention on Wetlands. Additionally, local communities use the lake for drinking water and recreational activities, which is of significant economic value for seasonal tourism. The lake also provides cultural value to the people of the *Akisqnuq* First Nation and the

Shuswap First Nation Band. Three political jurisdictions surround the lake; the Regional District of East Kootenay (RDEK), the District of Invermere (DOI), and the Columbia Lake Indian Reserve #3 (*Akisqnuq* First Nation).


Both human and natural values of the lake have been impacted in recent years by unprecedented development in the area. Development pressures are connected to Lake Windermere's close proximity to the border of Alberta, where the province's strong economy has led to demands for recreational and investment properties (Regional District of East Kootenay, 2008). Nutrient enrichment of the lake is a primary concern with evidence of the lake becoming more eutrophic with time (Neufeid *et al.*, 2010) creating risk that the lake may exceed its ecological carrying capacity and that drinking water quality may be degraded.

#### *Water policy and governance*

In response to concern for the lake's water quality both civil society and local government have taken stewardship and management action. Together, the RDEK and the DOI have developed the Lake Windermere Management Plan (LWMP) (Regional District of East Kootenay, 2011), and the Lake Windermere Official Community Plan (OCP) (Regional District of East Kootenay, 2008) in recognition that planning, policy, and development regulations related to the shoreline of the lake needed to be updated to match the rate of economic growth and building development in the area. Meanwhile, Wildsight, a local environmental non-government organization (ENGO) developed and delivered the Lake Windermere Project (LWP) from 2005-2009 with the mandate of water quality monitoring and water stewardship education for the public. Following the completion of the LWP, the Lake Windermere Ambassadors (LWA) were established as a volunteer organization to carry on and further the LWP.

The LWA act as a collaborative grassroots stewardship organization comprised of a board of volunteers from different sectors of society. The Ambassadors formed as an inclusive, consensus-based community stewardship group with an open fee-based membership. The general paid membership allows citizens to participate in LWA activities. Following from the LWP, the LWA main objectives continue to be water quality monitoring and water stewardship education for the Lake. However, the LWA have also taken on the additional goals of establishing a watershed governance organization for the entire watershed as well as acting as the Lake Windermere Management Committee (LWMC) to deliver the non-regulatory action of the LWMP. One of the main actions of the LWA as the LWMC is to act as a non-partisan advisor for referral review on development applications to the regional governments assessing impact on the Lake. The LWA have renewed their position as the LWMC until 2021. Work connected with the LWMP provides the LWA with a fee-for-service; this fee along with general membership dues provide base funding for operations, while project-oriented grants are also secured on an annual-basis. The legal basis of the Ambassadors includes recognition in the Lake Windermere OCP Bylaw No. 2061 Section A (10) as the LWMC (Regional District of East Kootenay, 2008), charitable status, and documented terms of reference for both the Ambassadors and the LWMC (Lake Windermere Ambassadors, 2010; Regional District of East Kootenay *et al.*, 2011). Examples of output from the LWA includes annual community water celebrations, ongoing water monitoring and reporting, and foreshore restoration. Meanwhile, the LWA continues to work on securing grant funding, maintaining an identity as a non-partisan group, and building community awareness for watershed governance (Melnichuk *et al.*, 2012).

**Figure 1.3: Columbia Watershed (LWA)**



### 1.5.2.3 Nechako Watershed Council

#### *Context*

The Nechako Watershed (Figure 1.4) covers an area of 52,000 kilometers squared and is comprised mainly of the Nechako Reservoir, Nechako River, and the Stuart River. The Nechako River flows west to east from the Coastal Mountains to the City of Prince George where it meets the Fraser River (Canada’s third largest river by flow volume) as its second biggest tributary (Fraser Basin Council, 2015b). The Nechako River was dammed in 1954, forming the Nechako Reservoir to divert water west to the Town of Kitimat for hydrological power of aluminum smelters and production owned originally by the Canadian company Alcan (merged as RioTinto Alcan in 2007). The Watershed is dominated mainly by coniferous forests, is sparsely populated with approximately 105,000 people, 83,000 of which live in greater Prince George (Fraser Basin Council, 2015b). The fauna of the region includes moose, bears, wolves, and great horned owls,

along with many fish species including chinook and sockeye salmon, rainbow trout and a critically endangered population of white sturgeon (Wood, 2013).

The Nechako Watershed is the unceded territory of the Carrier (*Dakelh*) people, which includes the First Nations communities of *Tl'azt'en*, *Nak'azdli*, *Saik'uz*, *Takla Lake*, *Stellat'en*, *Lheildli T'enneh*, *Cheslatta*, *Nadleh Whut'en*, *Ts'il Kaz Koh*, *Wet'suwet'en*, and *Nee Tahi Buhn* (Fraser Basin Council, 2015b). Traditionally the rivers in the watershed were important for transportation and food of these people (Wood, 2013). The Carrier Sekani Tribal Council represents and advocates for some, but not all of these communities.

Resource development and climate change have had the most environmental and social impact on the Nechako Watershed. The most profound change is a result of hydro-electric development; however, forestry, agriculture, and mining are also factors. The Kemano development project, namely the construction of the Nechako Reservoir including the Kenney Dam and the Skins Lake Spillway caused long-lasting or permanent environmental, social, and cultural impacts (Christensen, 1996; Wood, 2013). Most notable is the altered and significantly reduced flow regime of the Nechako River. The water licence held by Alcan/RioTinto Alcan diverts up to 70% of annual flows from the Nechako River for production. This diversion resulted in raised river temperature and low flow rates, which negatively affect fish habitat and populations as well as the region's food security by limiting agricultural water supply (Wood, 2013). In addition to the fisheries impact as a traditional food sources for First Nations, forceful displacement of the Cheslatta First Nation with the flooding of the reservoir has created long lasting and complex implications for community well-being. Some compensation for the manner in which the Cheslatta were displaced has been achieved; however, there are still many outstanding issues such as the annual flooding of traditional burial grounds that uncovers ancestral remains (Christensen, 1996). The Cheslatta Band is still in the process of trying to shift the release of water from the Skins Lake Spillway to the Kenney Dam so that they may reclaim and put to rest some of their grievances with the Kemano project (Wood, 2013). Despite the negative impacts of Kemano, a range of opinions exist on the benefit of the project due to aspects such as its small carbon impact, the creation of jobs (centralized mainly in Kitimat), and even flood control downstream.

Forestry impacts in the watershed are also an issue particularly due to the Mountain Pine Beetle epidemic in the 2000s. The epidemic, which affected between 41-72% of the timber supply area in the watershed, led to an increase in the annual allowable cut encouraging clear-cutting as well as forest fires and leading as a result to changes in soil moisture, the hydrology of peak flows and flooding, and water quality (Southern Interior Beetle Action Coalition, 2011). Agricultural demand for water and non-point source pollution also have stressed the Nechako system. Likewise, mining operations around the region for copper, gold, molybdenum, and silver (e.g., Huckleberry and Endako Mines) also create a demand for water and increase risk for contamination (Fraser Basin Council, 2015b).


### *Water Policy and Governance*

In the last four decades, governments and civil society groups have worked to improve the overall health of the watershed. The most publicized efforts have been public protests in an effort to stop development work by Alcan in the 1980s and 1990s to expand Kemano (i.e., Kemano II) and increase water diversion. This effort contributed to a provincial review of the development proposal through the BC Utility Commission (BCUC) hearings eventually leading to the

cancellation of the expansion project in 1995. Following the cancellation, Alcan filed a lawsuit against the BC Government for \$500 million of already invested costs. This led to the 1997 Settlement Agreement between both parties and the establishment of the Nechako Environmental Enhancement Fund (NEEF) allocating what was assumed at the time to be \$50 million from each party (due to vague language in the agreement, BC has not yet contributed) (Nechako Environmental Enhancement Fund, 2001).

Also stemming from the BCUC hearing and settlement agreement was the recommendation to form a collaborative multi-actor initiative to identify and problem-solve the multiple issues related to the Nechako River and Reservoir and to reconcile conflict among different stakeholders (including Alcan), First Nations, and governments. The Fraser Basin Council, a sustainability oriented NGO within the province initiated discussions, establishing the Nechako Watershed Council (NWC) in 1996 (formalized in 1998). The formal goal of the NWC was to provide a recommendation to NEEF for best way to spend funds (Nechako Watershed Council, 2009). Some of the main activities of the NWC included the systematic identification of grievances related to water quality and quantity, informal networking and education of participants through field tours throughout the watershed, and the commissioning of scientific work to identify a technical solution to the challenges facing the watershed. Originally, the NWC brought together 18 different organizations from across the watershed; by 2001 the collaboration reached consensus that the best allocation of NEEF funds to solve the most downstream problems was a water release facility at the Kenney Dam. The NWC received funding from NEEF (4Thought Solutions Inc., 2005) and had established terms of reference and legal recognition within Section 4 of the BC/Alcan 1997 Settlement Agreement. After providing the water release facility recommendation to NEEF, the NWC faced challenges of declining participation and stagnant governance process as their recommendation was not followed through and no other significant issues were taken on. Eventually the NWC ended in 2011. Following the closure of the NWC, dialogue began to form a new collaborative initiative (the Nechako Watershed Alliance) in 2015 with the intent of focusing on broader watershed issues and planning (Fraser Basin Council, 2015a).

**Figure 1.4: Nechako Watershed (NWC)**



### 1.5.2.4 Okanagan Basin Water Board

#### Context

The Okanagan Basin (Figure 1.5) is an approximately 200-kilometre-long narrow valley in south-central B.C. Water flows north to south via the Okanagan River, which drains six main lakes before crossing into the US as a Columbia River tributary. It is semi-arid region that annually receives less than 30 centimeters of rain in a precipitation gradient decreasing north to south. The annual precipitation highly varies, ranging from over 1,300 million cubic meters to less than 100 million cubic metres annual inflow into the Okanagan Lake (Summit Environmental Consultants Ltd., 2010). Flora and fauna of the Okanagan Basin include sockeye salmon and 23 species at risk (Jatel, 2013).

The Okanagan Basin is home to the Okanagan (*Syilx*) First Nations people since time immemorial. Their territory extends 69,000 square kilometres across southern BC and Washington State. The *Syilx* people now form eight communities, which are represented by the Okanagan Nation Alliance (ONA). Like most bands in BC, the ONA has not negotiated treaties

with the Province. However, despite unsettled title and rights, the ONA is involved in Okanagan water management – especially regarding fisheries.

The main water challenges for the basin include water scarcity, pollution, and invasive species control – all of which have been ongoing issues since the 1960s. Climate change has aggravated these challenges by increasing weather variability and extremes. Local water scarcity in the basin is natural to the area, but is also worsening due an increasing human population with estimated daily average residential water use of 675 litres per person (Summit Environmental Consultants Ltd., 2010), approximately 270% more than the average daily demand per person in the rest of Canada in 2011 (Okanagan Basin Water Board, 2014). Irrigation is the most intense human water use in the Okanagan – 55% for agriculture, 24% for residential irrigation, 7% for parks and golf courses; while commercial, indoor domestic, industrial, and institutional uses account for the other 14% of water allocations (Summit Environmental Consultants Ltd., 2010). Drought, increasing water demand, and the timing of water availability throughout the year are the main water scarcity issues. The estimated population of the three regional districts in the Okanagan was 354,012 in 2014, which across the valley had increased at rates between 0.9% and 1.8% from the year before (BCStats, 2014). With such population growth, water scarcity will likely become more severe in the future.

Nutrient loading due to point source and non-point source pollution is also an ongoing management challenge causing algal blooms and aquatic plant growth. Managing municipal sewage and fertilizer runoff are particular important management issues as the main valley lakes are sources of drinking water. Invasive species also receive management attention, particularly for Eurasian Watermilfoil (*Myriophyllum spicatum*) control, and the prevention of other species such as zebra and quagga mussels (*Dreissena polymorpha* and *D. bugensis*).


#### *Water policy and governance*

The OBWB is the oldest CWG body in the province (Fraser Basin Council, 2015a). It was formed to address the valley-wide water issues and establish management practices in 1968 and was legislated provincially in 1970 under the Municipalities Enabling and Validating Act (Province of British Columbia, 2015). This Act brought the three Okanagan regional districts together as the OBWB through Supplementary Letters Patent, which also gave the OBWB power of taxation through annual property tax assessments on lands within the basin. This power provides stable base funding for program operations. Following the OBWB’s legislation, the board was designated as the local coordinating authority to implement recommendations from the joint Federal/Provincial Okanagan Basin Study (Canada-British Columbia Consultative Board, 1974).

From the Okanagan Basin Study, the OBWB was recommended to have a broad mandate of valley-wide water leadership; however, the overwhelming extent of watermilfoil invasion and water pollution in the 1970s narrowed the OBWB’s initial focus. As a result, from approximately 1973 to 2006, the aquatic weed control and funding sewage infrastructure were the sole focal points of the OBWB. However, concerns by citizens about population growth, climate change, drought, and forest fires led the OBWB to revitalize its mandate in 2006. The current mandate of the OBWB is now to “provide leadership for sustainable water management to protect and enhance the quality of life and environment in the Okanagan Basin” (Okanagan Basin Water Board, 2010b). With the revitalization of the OBWB’s mandate, the Okanagan Water Stewardship Council (OWSC) was also established as the technical advisory group to the OBWB.

Structurally, the OBWB now brings together appointed politicians from the regional governments (which include 12 municipalities) to provide water leadership. The renewal also led to representation from the ONA, the OWSC, and a member at large on the board (Okanagan Basin Water Board, 2010a). The creation of the OWSC brings together a wide range of water technicians and stakeholder interests to provide consolidated advice to the OBWB. For the 2013-2015 term, two dozen groups were represented on the OWSC—ranging from technicians from all four orders of government to representatives from stakeholder groups such as the BC Fruit Growers Association and the Okanagan Real Estate Board. The actions of the OBWB fall into five categories: delivering basin-wide programs for watermilfoil control, sewage infrastructure funding, and water research and management; advocating and representing Okanagan needs to senior government; providing science-based information to local government and water managers; facilitating communication and coordination among all four levels of government and interest groups for effective water initiatives; and building funding opportunities to strengthen local water management and stewardship capacity. However, while the OBWB takes action and leadership in all these areas, it does not assume all basin water management responsibilities. Federal and provincial agencies, First Nations fisheries, regional districts, municipalities, irrigation districts, research institutes, and non-government stewardship and advocacy organizations all still play vital roles in managing the Okanagan’s water. Likewise, the actions and leadership the OBWB does provide is done without regulatory authority. Examples of work include the establishment of the BC Water Use Reporting Centre, the Okanagan Sustainable Water Strategy, and continuous water modeling and data collection. However, despite the long-standing history and institutionalization of the OBWB, it is not without its own governance challenges; for example, developing meaningful First Nations engagement on the board and dealing with competing human and environmental needs, such as food security, which demand community attention and resources.

**Figure 1.5: Okanagan Watershed (OBWB)**



### 1.5.2.5 Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Program/Shuswap Watershed Council

#### Context

The Shuswap Watershed (Figure 1.6) is located on the interior plateau in south central BC and is the headwaters of the South Thompson River, a major tributary to the Fraser River. The main sections of the watershed include the Shuswap, Little Shuswap, and Mara Lakes, along with Salmon, Shuswap, and Adams Rivers as major tributaries. The Shuswap Watershed is famed for its significant contribution to the genetic diversity of Fraser salmon populations, particularly

sockeye; however, its tributaries also support chinook, coho, and pink salmon (Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process, 2009).

The Shuswap Watershed is the unceded territory of the *Secwepemc* People, which within the watershed today includes the Little Shuswap, Adams Lake, Neskonlith, and Splantsin First Nations Bands. In addition to the *Secwepemc* People, the Shuswap is also home to a population of approximately 50,000 (Cooperman, 2012).

Water quality and foreshore degradation dominate as water-related concerns. Most notable impacts included point and non-point discharge into the lake from agriculture, industry, building development, and houseboat greywater (Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process, 2009). In connection, increased nutrient loading has resulted in two algae blooms (2008 & 2010). As well, 42.8% (174 km) of the shoreline has been highly impacted by human development, such as groynes, docks, and retaining walls (Ecoscape Environmental Consultants, 2009). Safe recreational use of the lake is also a public concern due to a number of boating accidents and casualties (Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process, 2009).


#### *Water policy and governance*

Water quality, recreational, and development concerns for the Shuswap and Mara Lakes were voiced by the provincial and regional governments as well as by civil society, especially in the early 2000s. To address these concerns, the Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process (SLIPP) was formed. It was initially led by the Ministry of Environment (MOE) as a multi-agency initiative to coordinate water management efforts that had been siloed among different agencies (Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process, 2009). The board of SLIPP was comprised of representatives from the three regional districts, a *Secwepemc* representative, a member at large, and provincial agency representatives (Shuswap Watershed Council, 2014).

Collaboration began in 2006 with public consultation working groups leading in 2011 to a three-year pilot program on water quality, foreshore mapping, recreational management planning and ad hoc habitat restoration and derelict dock removal. Management of SLIPP transferred in 2010 from MOE staff to the Fraser Basin Council. Funding of SLIPP was through local government gas tax within the Columbia Shuswap Regional District (CSRD) and the Regional District of the North Okanagan (RDNO), a parcel tax within the Thompson Nicola Regional District (TNRD), and in-kind support from provincial agencies. Meetings under MOE were closed to the public, held quarterly and were run by consensus. Shortly after management responsibilities shifted, meetings were opened to the public and run by a majority voting system. SLIPP's output included a three-year (2011-2013) water quality monitoring data program, a recreational management plan, and foreshore and aquatic habitat mapping, which led to the initiation of restoration projects and the provincial government initiating regulatory action for private foreshore infringements. Analysis from the water quality monitoring program confirmed that Shuswap water quality is gradually deteriorating in some areas of the lake indicating a need for continued monitoring and remediation (Shuswap Watershed Council, 2014). Throughout the existence of SLIPP, programing was contentious due to misconceptions of mandate by the public and provincial bylaw officers using the SLIPP name to take action on foreshore violations (Shuswap Waterfront Owners Association, 2015). In connection to these issues along with the need for continued water quality monitoring work, SLIPP members decided to rebrand at the end of the three-year pilot project and in 2015 became the Shuswap Watershed Council (SWC) (Fraser Basin Council, 2015a).

The SWC maintained a similar governance structure, but established a more permanent funding and legal structure within the CSRD via Bylaw 5705 (Columbia Shuswap Regional District, 2015). Now, the SWC resource structure is through a parcel taxation bylaw by the CSRD, TNRD and the City of Salmon Arm along with continued in-kind support from the BC Ministries of Agriculture and Environment until at least 2021. The SWC also narrowed its focus to only water quality monitoring and safety (Shuswap Watershed Council, 2014).

**Figure 1.6: Shuswap Watershed (SWC)**



### 1.5.3 Conceptual Framework

To guide the research process, individual conceptual frameworks were developed for Chapters Two, Three, and Four. Each of these frameworks integrate insights from literature on governance, collaborative governance, CEG, CWG, and legitimacy. As well, the constructivist approach used

in this research meant that the frameworks also included insight from the empirical contexts and interviewees. As such, initial versions were deductive in nature and then were further developed with inductive insight from empirical fieldwork. Table 1.1, presents a structural outline of the conceptual frameworks.

**Table 1.1: Outline of Conceptual Frameworks**

Chapter	Key Legitimacy Concern	Key Governance Concern	Specific Concern for CWG
2	Types of legitimacy	Governance attributes	What legitimacy types are experienced and relevant to CWG?
3	Legitimacy dynamics	Organizational development stages	How does CWG legitimacy change as a governance body evolves?
4	Composition of legitimacy judgements	Watershed-level sectors of society	What are the CWG sources and associated types of legitimacy that comprise legitimacy judgements by sector

The conceptual framework of Chapter Two is based on the premise that multiple legitimacy types are relevant to both normative and empirical judgements of CWG legitimacy. As such, Chapter Two first provides a comprehensive synthesis of legitimacy types from typologies within the organizational, political, sociological, and legal literatures and identifies possible legitimacy sources suggested within the broad environmental governance and collaborative governance literature. To organize the legitimacy types within this framework, five groupings are used: legitimacy through (a) ideal practice, (b) results, (c) institutional setting, (d) social acceptance or consent, and (e) individuals. The conceptual framework is then applied to the five case studies to explore the possible ways such sources and types may be experienced in CWG.

Building on Chapter Two's conceptual framework, Chapter Three explores when different CWG legitimacy sources and types are more or less important at different stages of a body's development. To achieve this exploration, Chapter Three's conceptual framework uses a generic five stage model of organizational development (stages of establishment, growth, maturity, decline, and either dissolution or renewal) in connection to legitimacy dynamics (establishment, extension, maintenance, defense, and either loss or extension) as an organizational tool to explore when and in what way different legitimacy concerns matter in each of the five cases. Therefore, Chapter Three uses Chapter Two's synthesis of legitimacy types as a supplementary framework to identify relevant CWG legitimacy types and then organizes dominate themes by stage.

Chapter Four also utilizes Chapter Two's synthesis of legitimacy types to identify the composition of legitimacy judgements by actors from different sectors towards the case bodies. As such, Chapter Four's conceptual framework first identifies common CWG sectors that were present and interviewed in all sectors and their common concerns for water. From these concerns, the framework is then used to explore the legitimacy sources that are most prevalent within legitimacy judgements by sector.

#### 1.5.4 Data Collection

Summaries of the data collection methods for the empirical case study research of Chapters Two, Three and Four are outlined here and are reiterated, as appropriate, within each of the mentioned chapters. Semi-structured interviews, documents, and personal observations between November 2013 and February 2015 were used as data for each manuscript. Interviews were the primary source of data as they allowed for direct questioning on different aspects of legitimacy. Documents and personal observations acted as supplemental sources for triangulation to cross-check data sources as well as to provide contextual information to guide interview questioning or provide deeper understanding on topics identified in the interviews.

Across the five cases, 99 interviews were conducted with representatives from a range of sectors both internal or external to each case body. Table 1.2 provides a summary of the background sector and number of interviewees. The sector of interviewees was determined based on their professional role. In cases where interviewees had more than one professional role, clarification was sought about what role they were representing within the interview; 70 of these interviewees were past or current participants or staff of the case studies. In cases where the interviewee spoke about knowledge or experiences across multiple cases, they are represented as having ‘multi-case knowledge’ in Table 1.2. Interviewees were included from relevant sectors for each case and included current CWG body participants, past-participants, and those not involved but familiar with the case(s). Interviewees were sought using either purposeful and snowball techniques and interviews were conducted in-person, by phone, or electronically. Interviews ranged from thirty minutes to over three hours and some interviewees provided written comments in follow-up to the interview.

**Table 1.2: Summary of Interviewee Backgrounds and Case Association**

Case→ Societal actor ↓	CWB	LWA	NWC	OBWB	SLIPP /SWC	Multi-case knowledge
Senior Government (federal and provincial)	3	0	1	3	2	5
Local Government (regional and municipal)	7	4	3	6	9	0
Title and rights holders (First Nations)	3	1	2	1	2	0
Collaborative body staff	1	1	3	2	2	0
Non-government interest groups (e.g., agriculture, industry, environment, residents, funders, youth)	7	11	4	7	5	4
Total Interviewees (n=99)	21	17	13	19	20	9

Interviews were semi-structured, and provided a framework of themes to be explored, while also allowing interviewees to express and emphasize different and new ideas as they saw fit. The interview guide was thus developed to direct interviewees to reflect on their case’s process, results, legal status, social acceptance and the individuals involved (i.e., the five legitimacy type groupings). Table 1.3 provides examples of such questions demonstrating how the conceptual

frameworks of each manuscript helped in the development of the interview guide. The conceptual framework of Chapter Two acted as the primary source for the interview guide and Chapter Three and Four's conceptual framework acted as prompts to guide follow-up questions. For example, when a legitimacy source such as the community's readiness to participate in a collaborative body was being discussed by an interviewee, depending on the case a follow-up question might include why this issue matters specifically to that interviewee and whether they felt that issue mattered more or less at the current time than it did earlier in the body's development. Such questions thus aimed to identify different legitimacy sources and types during a body's development (Chapter Three) and specific legitimacy concerns by sector (Chapter Four). Furthermore, the interview guide was iteratively tailored during the data collection process to reflect identified concerns within each case and to different sectors to gain context-specific insights. The revised and completed interview guide is available in Appendix 2.

**Table 1.3: Sample Interview Questions**

<b>Legitimacy concern identified by conceptual frameworks</b>	<b>Example interview questions to address theme</b>
Legitimacy from ideal practice	How would you characterize the collaborative process? Follow up: Did everyone participate and were they treated equally? Follow up: Were decisions transparent and followed through with? Follow up: Was any sector missing from the collaboration? Follow up: Were decisions deliberated on fairly and consistently? Follow up: Where there any specific problems at different points in time that hindered the process? Follow up: Where there any aspects of the process that helped the collaboration function or achieve its goals?
Legitimacy from results	What kind of influence or impact has resulted from the collaboration? Follow-up: Has this changed over time? Follow-up: Has it been adequate?
Legitimacy from social acceptance	What has been the general community to response to the collaboration? Follow up: Have there been times of notable resistance or support? Follow up: What actions of the collaboration have helped or hindered this response? Follow up: To what extend does the community response affect the collaboration?
Legitimacy evolution	Do the origins have an impact how the collaboration has been perceived? What do you anticipate of the future of the collaboration?

The goals of the research were clearly provided by email or in person to all interviewees in an information letter that was provided to all people sought for an interview. Anonymity was discussed with interviewees and they were asked to sign a consent form. Interviews were either digitally recorded and took place in-person or over the phone, or occurred through written responses by interviewees using email. During the interviews, notes were made regarding the content and personal observations. Interviews not in written format were transcribed verbatim by

myself or by an online transcription service (www.transcribeme.com) with the exception of interviewees that request that portions of their interviews not be recorded or transcribed. The opportunity for member checking of interview transcripts was provided to verify the content and provide clarification if required by the interviewee. These interview procedures were approved by and in accordance with the University of Waterloo Office of Research Ethics.

In addition to interviews, the research analyzed 656 documents identified online or through key informants or interviewees. Types of documents included meeting minutes, newspaper articles, promotional material, technical and policy reports, draft and finalized plans, emails and letters, interpersonal communications, and collaborative group publications, policies, and websites. Appendix 3 outlines the documents and provides a breakdown of the number of each document type. Newspaper articles were searched via keyword (i.e., the name of each body) using Factiva – an internet media database – or local community newspaper databases directly if the newspaper was not available through Factiva. Many of the other documents besides newspaper articles, were retrieved through a collaborative body’s website or from other institutional websites associated with BC or each case’s watershed. The one major exception to this retrieval was for the majority of the documents (of all types) associated with the NWC. Most of NWC’s documentation was stored on hardcopy by the Fraser Basin Council and the University of Northern British Columbia in Prince George. As a result, manual searches were conducted of all archived work and relevant material was scanned and uploaded into the Nvivo software. Generally, documents were utilized to cross check data from interviews and observation or to gain additional information on topics highlighted by interviewees or during observations.

Personal observations were conducted and field notes were recorded within each of the five case studies throughout the data collection period. Observations included attending board meetings of the LWA in December 2013, OBWB in May 2014, and SLIPP in December 2013 and April 2014. Board meetings of the NWC and CWB could not be attended as the NWC had dissolved as an organization by the time of field work and the CWB did not have a Board meeting during the time spent within the Cowichan Watershed. Observations were also conducted during water management-based fieldtrips or social outing with the LWA’s Program Coordinator of Lake Windermere in December 2013, with the OBWB’s Board of Directors to the West Kelowna Water Treatment Plant in May 2014, with the Band Manager of Cheslatta First Nation to the Nechako Reservoir’s Kenney Dam and with the Mayor of Cowichan Lake to the Cowichan Lake Weir. Additionally, two public hearings (February and May 2014) regarding foreshore zoning bylaws in the Shuswap Watershed were also observed to understand the local social context surrounding SLIPP/SWC. *Watersheds 2014*, a BC-wide practitioner-based watershed governance conference in January 2014 was also attended with members from all five cases in attendance; general observations of the broader BC context relative to the case studies were observed. Finally, observations were made during the 99 interviews as well.

### **1.5.5 Data Analysis**

QSR Nvivo 10 software was utilized to organize, code, and analyze the data from all of the interview transcripts, observation notes, and documents for each of the three empirical chapters. For each manuscript, coding stemmed deductively from the theories that formed the conceptual frameworks of each article. The key legitimacy or governance concerns associated with the conceptual framework of each manuscript led to the initial pattern code categories (Saldaña, 2009). Chapter Two pattern codes reflect the range of identified legitimacy types, Chapter Three

pattern codes relate to the stages of development, and Chapter Four pattern codes were common watershed governance actors. Descriptive open coding (Creswell, 2007) was conducted for all of the data related to all three manuscripts to inductively identify legitimacy sources. Axial coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) was then applied to all data types through several iterative rounds to identify the interconnections between the descriptive open codes with the pattern categories. This approach allowed the identified legitimacy sources to connect (a) to the associated legitimacy types (Chapter Two), (b) to the different development stages as they were experienced (Chapter Three), and (c) to the legitimacy judgements of individuals from different sectors (Chapter Four). Using this coding strategy, study findings reflect both existing theory as well as new concepts and ideas – particularly as they relate to identifying CWG-specific legitimacy sources. Triangulation was used to confirm the validity of legitimacy sources and to identify when conceptual saturation occurred within the data (Charmaz, 2006; Yin, 2009). Validity was determined when legitimacy sources were apparent across more than one interview or data form within and across two or more cases. Cross case analysis was conducted on a case-by-case basis comparing the individual cases to each other. Where appropriate, noteworthy differences are shared within the results sections of each empirical chapter. However, for the most part results were relatively similar across all five cases and as a result, findings are presented by themes specific to each chapter rather than by individual case. Evidence is provided primarily through the use of quotations from assessed interviews and documents as well as from written observation reflections. The selection of evidence is based on choosing either typical or especially poignant comments or observations that highlight and illustrate the different coded themes (Sandelowski, 1994). As a result, quotations were selected for both their verbal content as well as their style and tone to ensure that findings are aesthetic, while also being informative. For all interview quotations used within the findings of this research, care was taken to preserve the anonymity of the participant by removing personal identifiers including the case name if necessary.

## 1.6 Organization of Thesis

The remaining chapters of this dissertation include three stand-alone empirically-based manuscripts that each act as their own chapter (Chapters Two, Three, and Four). A subsequent concluding chapter acts as a summary and discussion of the findings and collective contributions of this work (Chapter Five). The three empirical chapters are intended to stand-alone as manuscripts that will be published as co-authored articles with my advisor, Dr. Robert de Loë. Some repetition of the empirical and theoretical context as well as methodology exists in each of these chapters as a result of their stand-alone nature. Despite this nature, the three chapters collectively build on each other to provide a global contribution to the understanding of CWG legitimacy, which is discussed detail in Chapter Five.

Chapter Two is a manuscript entitled *Synthesizing Legitimacy Typologies for Collaborative Water Governance*. This paper synthesizes 18 legitimacy typologies to generate a conceptual framework of legitimacy types that can be used to identify and categorize CWG legitimacy sources. It then empirically demonstrates the applicability of this framework through analysis of legitimacy within the five case study bodies. The work of this paper corresponds to objective one and four of this thesis. The *Natural Resources Journal* will be targeted for publication.

Chapter Three and Four utilize the conceptual synthesis of legitimacy types provided in Chapter Two and provide empirical analysis using the five case study bodies regarding the

dynamic nature of legitimacy and the composition of legitimacy judgements. Chapter Three, *The Legitimacy Lifecycle in Collaborative Water Governance: An Assessment*, explores which legitimacy types are more relevant at different stages of a CWG body's development. This paper thus addresses Objective Two of this dissertation by exploring the evolving nature of CWG legitimacy. This paper will be submitted to *Environmental Policy and Governance*.

Chapter Four, *Collaborative Water Governance: The Composition of Sector-based Legitimacy Judgements* examines the composition of different actor's legitimacy judgements by sector to identify the dominant legitimacy sources and types within each interpretation. Given the multiple social sectors involved in collaborative governance, legitimacy judgements vary towards CWG. This paper will be submitted to the *Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning* and responds to objective three of this dissertation.

Chapter Five provides a summary of the major findings of the three manuscripts and integrates findings together to represent the overall contribution of this research. Theoretical and empirical contributions are offered reflecting on the nature of CWG legitimacy, its strategic management, and the values of using legitimacy to assess collaborative water governance, thereby addressing objective four. Additionally, the chapter addresses the strengths and weaknesses of this research and areas for future study. References and appendices for all chapters are presented at the end of the thesis as per the University of Waterloo's thesis guidelines.

## Chapter 2

# Synthesizing Legitimacy Typologies for Collaborative Water Governance

### 1.1 Introduction

Collaborative water governance (CWG) bodies are organizations that are increasingly utilized in Western contexts to address water concerns that exist cross multiple societal sectors (Pahl-Wostl *et al.*, 2007). These bodies are characterized as the “processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private, and civic spheres to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished” (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015, p. 18). Legitimacy is one aspect of these bodies that lacks clarity because of the inclusion of non-state actors into decision-making and the relative newness of collaboration as a governance model for water (Baird *et al.*, 2014; Edwards, 2016; Orr, 2015; Sabatier, Focht, *et al.*, 2005a).

Legitimacy is about the justifiability or acceptance of governance and is generally acknowledged as a necessary attribute to enhance order, stability, and effectiveness (Beetham, 1991, 2013). Beyond this generalization, legitimacy remains an elusive concept with a range of typologies that describe the various ways it can form. The consequence of this elusiveness is that different legitimacy typologies emphasize different types of legitimacy (Hogl *et al.*, 2012). As a result, when empirically assessing legitimacy and using these typologies for guidance, the typology used influences what legitimacy types and related sources are examined. The result is that the typology chosen may lead to different evaluations and create challenges in assessing what sources actually influence legitimacy empirically. Given that legitimacy is a necessary governance attribute, it is important to know the range of legitimacy sources so that efforts can be made to establish, maintain, and enhance legitimacy for effective governance. Such understanding is particularly vital in CWG contexts given the pressing nature of water governance problems (Rogers & Hall, 2003). To help understand the range of sources for CWG legitimacy, identifying and then drawing on a range of legitimacy typologies can allow for a more robust empirical understanding of the sources of legitimacy for a CWG body.

However, to date in the context of collaborative governance broadly, and CWG more specifically, there have been limited attempts to synthesize relevant legitimacy typologies. Although legitimacy has been assessed in a variety of collaborative governance contexts such as sustainable development (e.g., Bäckstrand, 2006), environmental governance (e.g., Wallington *et al.*, 2008), water management (e.g., Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012), and rural planning (e.g., Connelly, 2011; Connelly *et al.*, 2006), assessments generally only use one typology of legitimacy. For example, Beetham’s (2013) three dimensions of legitimacy – rules, expressed consent, and justifiability of rules – is used by Orr (2015) to assess CWG in Quebec, Canada, while Baird *et al.* (2014) use Trachtenberg and Focht’s (2005) process and substantive legitimacy typology to examine CWG in Ontario, Canada. Given the many theoretical stances on legitimacy that exist, using only one typology can miss other relevant types of legitimacy. For example, Beetham’s (2013) typology dismisses legitimacy as judgement of social acceptance; however, legitimacy through social acceptance is regarded by others (e.g., Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Suchman,

1995; Tost, 2011) as a vital type of legitimacy that determines whether constituents or subordinates to a body actually abide by or support its actions (Johnson *et al.*, 2006). To judge whether collaborative governance is the best form of decision-making for certain issues, comprehensive legitimacy assessment using multiple typologies is necessary.

To address this need, this paper synthesizes legitimacy typologies from across multiple disciplines such as public administration, law, and sociology with the ultimate aim of building a broad synthesized conceptual framework of legitimacy types that are relevant to CWG. Following this synthesis, the framework is then used as a guide to empirically identify legitimacy sources for five local level CWG bodies. By taking this dual approach, the paper makes both a theoretical contribution to the CWG literature by developing a comprehensive framework of relevant legitimacy types, and an empirical contribution by demonstrating how these legitimacy types are experienced across multiple case studies.

## **1.2 The Need for a Collaborative Governance Legitimacy Framework**

Numerous typologies suggest a variety of ways governance bodies can be justified (Hogl *et al.*, 2012). Table 2.1 outlines the main types of legitimacy according to key proponents. Although legitimacy interpretations and the purposes behind these typologies may differ, this paper organizes all of these types into five main groups of legitimacy types: legitimacy related to (1) ideal practice, (2) the potential for or actual results, (3) institutional setting, (4) social acceptance or consent, and (5) individuals. These groups represent an organizational structure that allows the various sources that make up empirical legitimacy judgments toward CWG to be identified. However, there are three notable challenges in presenting and using this framework.

First, this paper represents a synthesis of legitimacy types that are rooted in different interpretations and approaches to the study of legitimacy. Some studies interpret legitimacy as a normative concept, while others treat legitimacy as an empirical entity about social acceptance. Consequently, legitimacy is either about justifying the normativity of authority or the acceptance of the behaviour of an organization with or without authority. These differences make comparative assessment inherently complex (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008) and by extension make the combination of different approaches inappropriate. For this reason, while this paper synthesizes legitimacy types that transcend both normative and empirical interpretations, it does not attempt to blend these approaches. Instead, the argument is made that both approaches simply should be presented together to allow for the comprehensive assessment of legitimacy.

Second, despite the following subsections of this paper distinguishing the boundaries of each grouping of legitimacy types, there are interconnections among all of them. To illustrate, legitimacy sources related to social acceptance may draw on sources of legitimacy from any of the other groupings to form a cognitive judgement towards an organization. For example, participation of non-state actors in collaborative water governance is noted in Trachtenberg and Focht's (2005) typology as a procedural source of legitimacy. However, participation can also be indicative of social acceptance and is identified as its own type of legitimacy in Jachtenfuchs *et al.*'s (1998) typology. Likewise, legitimacy types that have a legal basis could be grouped as legitimacy related to ideal practice when rules are formed internally and related to process. However, such rules can also be identified as being values normatively dictated by the institutional setting surrounding a governance body (Ostrom, 2009). Legitimacy related to individuals also are discussed by some authors (e.g., Bekkers & Edwards, 2007; Suchman, 1995)

within the context of the value they provide to legitimacy related to social consent or ideal practice (as members of an organization). However, there are also others that distinguish legitimacy from individuals as a distinct form of legitimacy (e.g., Easton, 1965; Weber, 1964). As a result of such interrelations, it is plausible that the groupings of legitimacy could be organized in other ways and that the groupings could be further debated. However, the point of this organizational strategy is to provide a way to recognize the many different sources of legitimacy as they connect in different ways to the theoretically identified types.

Third, similar to the interrelatedness of the legitimacy groupings is the relationship of the different typologies to each other. Some typologies draw on others as benchmarks. For example, Suchman (1995) aims to synthesize the literature on organizational legitimacy and highlights the typologies of Weber (1964) and Scott (1995) in the development of his own. Likewise, Bekkers and Edwards (2007) acknowledge and expand upon Scharpf's (1997, 1999) input and output typology by identifying throughput legitimacy (i.e., a judgement on process quality) as separate from input legitimacy. Meanwhile, there are other authors such as Trachtenberg and Focht (2005) who create their own typology without relating their typology to others with similar legitimacy types. As a result of these types of relationships among the typologies, there are duplicate legitimacy types described across multiple typologies that are sometimes expanded on or altered (e.g., a type is given a new name or applied to a different context) from legitimacy types related to other typologies. Despite the interrelations among typologies and groupings as well as the variations in interpretations, the five groupings of legitimacy represent an organizational tool to show the range of legitimacy sources that inform judgements of CWG legitimacy.

In the context of collaborative governance, scholars acknowledge legitimacy as an essential governance attribute, but rarely focus on more than one legitimacy typology or type. This phenomenon is apparent in both overarching frameworks of collaborative governance (e.g., Ansell & Gash, 2007; Bryson *et al.*, 2006; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Innes & Booher, 2003; Thomson & Perry, 2006) as well as empirical collaborative governance legitimacy studies in specific contexts (e.g., Baird *et al.*, 2014; Connelly, 2011; Orr, 2015; Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012). For example, Bryson *et al.* (2006) and Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) focus exclusively on internal legitimacy and Ansell and Gash (2007) focus mainly on procedural legitimacy in their reviews of collaborative governance. As a result, what the collaborative governance literature does not yet do is provide a comprehensive review or assessment tool of the many ways CWG legitimacy may be interpreted or sourced. However, studies on collaborative governance in general and legitimacy specifically along with other research on various collaborative governance attributes such as power (e.g., Brisbois & de Loë, 2015), accountability (e.g., Biermann & Gupta, 2011), outcomes (e.g., Connick & Innes, 2003), and legality (e.g., Bingham, 2009) provide insight into some of the governance dynamics that can act as or influence CWG legitimacy sources in relationship to the different legitimacy types.

Assuming that collaborative governance legitimacy is inherently hybrid in nature (Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012; Wallington *et al.*, 2008), the next section through a literature review synthesizes 22 legitimacy types from 18 legitimacy typologies. Duplicate types with the same name, or that have a different name, but are effectively the same, are only counted once. This judgement was made based on similarities in discussion, on whether different authors were citing and drawing from the other typologies, and whether similar empirical legitimacy sources were identified.

**Table 2.1: Legitimacy Typologies and Key Proponents**

<b>Legitimacy Typologies</b>	<b>Key Proponent</b>
Formal, Social	Arnull (2002)
Rules; Expressed Consent; Justifiability of Rules	Beetham (1991); (2013)
Democratic, Identification, Performance	Beetham and Lord (1998)
Input, Throughput, Output	Bekkers and Edwards (2007)
Principled, Legal, Sociological	Bernstein (2004)
Internal, External	Boulding (1967)
Ideological, Structural, Personal	Easton (1965)
Democratic, Results-based, Order-based, Systemic, Deliberative, Procedural	Etsy (2006)
Legality, Compliance, Problem-solving, Justifiability	Føllesdal (2005)
Input, Output, Social	Horeth (1999)
Participation, Output, Identity	Jachtenfuchs <i>et al.</i> (1998)
Indirect, Parliamentary, Technocratic, Procedural	Lord and Magnette (2004);
Convention, Contract, Universal Principles, Sacredness, Expertise, Popular Approval, Personal Ties, Personal Qualities	Matheson (1987)
Input, Output	Scharpf (1997); (Scharpf, 1999)
Regulative, Normative, Cognitive	Scott (1995)
Pragmatic, Moral, Cognitive	Suchman (1995)
Procedural, Substantive	Trachtenberg and Focht (2005)
Traditional, Rational-legality, Charismatic	Weber (1964)

### **1.3 A Conceptual Framework for Studying Collaborative Governance Legitimacy**

In the following section, the five groupings of legitimacy types are reviewed in terms of their theoretical background and coverage in the collaborative governance literature. The typologies discussed in Table 2.1 are deconstructed and the individual legitimacy types are organized by their fit within each group. These legitimacy types then act as sub-groups to organize the different empirical sources of legitimacy for CWG. Where there are multiple types grouped together a suggested sub-group name has been given for organizational purposes. The groupings are presented in no particular order to reflect that empirical legitimacy judgements also combine sources of legitimacy in ad hoc arrangements. Summary tables of each grouping are provided at the end of each sub-section and collectively act as the conceptual framework to guide the empirical analysis of this paper. The intention of this paper is not to combine normative- and empirical acceptance-based interpretations of legitimacy. Thus, this conceptual framework is not a new legitimacy typology. Instead, it simply is a tool that can be used to identify and organize different legitimacy sources relevant to CWG.

### 1.3.1 Legitimacy Types Related to Ideal Practice

For governance bodies, legitimacy related to ideal practice stems from mechanisms that move the ‘will of the people’ into decisions and action. As a label, ‘ideal practice’ involves two dimensions – a normative value (‘ideal’) and a procedural aspect (‘practice’) that can conceivably adhere to any value foundation. In Westernized contemporary contexts, common ideals relate to both procedural (e.g., accountability, participation, procedural fairness) and substantive (e.g., autonomy, equality, and distributed justice) democratic principles. Principled (Bernstein, 2004), democratic (Beetham & Lord, 1998; Etsy, 2006), deliberative (Etsy, 2006) and justifiability of rules (Beetham, 1991, 2013) legitimacy types adhere to various democratic theories to legitimize modern day rules, policies, and institutions. For example, in contexts favoring representative democracy, the electoral process may be enough to ensure legitimacy, while in deliberative democracy contexts ideal speech conditions and consensus-building may be required (Manin *et al.*, 1987). Alternative legitimacy types related to ideal practice include Matheson’s (1987) convention, universal principle, and sacredness legitimacy; Weber’s (1964) traditional legitimacy; and Easton’s (1965) ideological legitimacy. All of these are based on legitimacy from long-standing societal customs or religious norms.

Connected to ideal types of legitimacy are those more generally focused on process or practice. Examples include input legitimacy (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007; Horeth, 1999; Scharpf, 2007; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005), throughput legitimacy (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007), procedural legitimacy (Etsy, 2006; Lord & Magnette, 2004; Suchman, 1995), systemic legitimacy (Etsy, 2006), and structural legitimacy (Easton, 1965; Suchman, 1995). These types alone do not, *per se*, imply a principled quality. Although, it is common to equate legitimacy from practice with various democratic qualities such as transparency, accountability, and deliberation, it is possible that non-democratic practices such as flexibility and informed decision-making could also be legitimized (Schneider & Krell-Laluhová, 2005). Furthermore, Bekkers and Edwards (2007) also distinguish throughput legitimacy from input legitimacy, which focuses more on the quality of practice. For example, if input legitimacy is gained from a decision-making process having citizen participation, then throughput legitimacy will be gained from the quality of that participation. Structural (Easton, 1965; Suchman, 1995) and systemic (Etsy, 2006) legitimacy types also relate to practice stemming from idealized organizational features or forms.

#### 1.3.1.1 Collaborative Ideal Practice

The practice of collaborating is perhaps the most well studied area of collaborative governance meaning that related legitimacy norms are already well documented. Underpinning the collaborative process are Habermasian ideals of communicative rationality (e.g., inclusive, honest, informed and equitable deliberation) (Healey, 1997; Innes & Booher, 1999), interest-based negotiation (Innes & Booher, 2010), and good governance principles (e.g., accountability, transparency, fairness, social legitimacy, adaptability, integration, inclusiveness) (Lockwood *et al.*, 2010). Norms from these fields of thought are reflected in legitimacy judgements as demonstrated by studies such as Baird *et al.* (2014), Connelly (2011), Hogl *et al.* (2012), Kronsell and Bäckstrand (2010), and Trachtenberg and Focht (2005). For example, Kronsell and Bäckstrand (2010) identify normative standards of representation, fairness, and accountability as key legitimacy traits related to process. Additionally, challenges such as power differentials among participants (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Hegtvædt & Johnson, 2009), accurate representation (Parkinson, 2003), and effective consensus (McClosky, 2000) have been raised in connection to

the legitimacy of collaborative processes. Notably, the inclusion of non-state actors in decision-making through collaboration introduces questions about accountability and legitimacy in terms of who is responsible and who has the right to make decisions (Gunningham, 2009; Holley *et al.*, 2012a). Table 2.2 frames how these collaborative governance norms may relate to the various legitimacy types of this grouping and form part one of five of this paper’s conceptual framework.

**Table 2.2: Legitimacy from Ideal Practice**

Legitimacy Type	How Legitimacy is Created	Examples of Related Collaborative or Environmental Governance Norm	Example CWG Legitimacy Sources
Democratic or non-democratic input: (input, procedural, democratic, principled, normative, justifiability of rules, traditional, convention)	Observance of certain procedures based on moral and ethical systems: most commonly democratic (i.e., the institutional and formal protection of rights and the recognition of people as political authorities)	Participation/inclusion, control/accountability, deliberative quality (Kronsell & Bäckstrand, 2010; Vileyn, 2011); qualities of common pool resource theory (Ostrom, 1990); sustainable development assessment (Gibson, 2006)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Involvement of all relevant actor groups</li> <li>• Due deliberation</li> <li>• Consensus decision-making</li> <li>• Ability for stakeholders to express their voice and influence decision-making</li> <li>• Responsibility and ownership for decisions, decision-making process, and to public</li> <li>• Justness, flexibility, unified, part of a network</li> </ul>
Deliberative	Robust political dialogue that engages multiple perspectives	Deliberative ideal speech conditions (Innes & Booher, 2004); autonomy (Singleton, 2002)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cooperative dialogue, opportunities for debate incorporating a wide range of views</li> <li>• Consensus-based decision-making</li> </ul>
Throughput	Quality of procedures	Perceptions of fairness, procedural justice, equality of participation (Hard <i>et al.</i> , 2012)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Quality of deliberation and equality of access to deliberation by participants</li> <li>• Sincerity of propositions/follow-through on actions</li> <li>• Comprehensibility and clarity of processes and deliberation</li> </ul>

Legitimacy Type	How Legitimacy is Created	Examples of Related Collaborative or Environmental Governance Norm	Example CWG Legitimacy Sources
Structural/ systemic	Evaluation of categories and organisational characteristics	Consideration for scope, diversity and size, formalness, roles and responsibilities of collaboration (Plummer & Armitage, 2007)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Procedural tasks, e.g., agenda setting and reporting, suitability of financial structure</li> <li>• Administrative structures (e.g., communication channels)</li> </ul>
Universal: (ideological, sacredness, universal principles)	Religious or sectoral formula that justifies the possession and sacredness of authority and power	Value of water (Hamlin, 2000; Linton, 2010)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fundamental nature of water</li> </ul>

### 1.3.2 Legitimacy Types Related to the Potential or Actual Achievement of Results

Legitimacy types related to the potential or actual achievement of results are about ‘government for the people’ and stem from the utilitarian view that a governance body should contribute to citizen well-being, usually by addressing a public concern (Benhabib, 1994). Outputs or outcomes of a governance body must actually produce a desired benefit for the people, but the capacity of a body to solve a problem may also be used as a proxy measure (Horeth, 1999). Specific types of legitimacy in this grouping include results-based (Etsy, 2006), problem-solving (Føllesdal, 2005), output (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007; Horeth, 1999; Jachtenfuchs *et al.*, 1998; Scharpf, 1997), substantive (Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005), consequential (Suchman, 1995), performance (Beetham & Lord, 1998), and technocratic (Lord & Magnette, 2004). Together, these types represent a spectrum of ways potential or actual results may provide legitimacy. As a collective, they explicitly tie legitimacy to effectiveness. If a governance body does not have legitimacy it may struggle to be effective; likewise, the ineffectiveness of a body may challenge its legitimacy as well.

Consequential, output, and substantive legitimacy focus on legitimacy attained through the production of actual accomplishments and their outcomes. However, each type has a different focal point claiming legitimacy from different aspects of an accomplishment. Output legitimacy results from the production of tangible goods or services; consequential legitimacy results from the outcomes of that product; and substantive legitimacy concerns both outputs and their outcomes. The distinctions among these legitimacy types, while not entirely clear cut in the literature, indicate the difficulty of measuring impact. Not all results of an action or body are empirically identifiable and some occur over long timeframes or are evident only in retrospect (Suchman, 1995). As such, action-based legitimacy types – performance, technocratic, and problem-solving legitimacy – draw instead from the effort of a body to work towards socially-desirable results. Problem-solving legitimacy relates to a body’s capacity to remedy collective problems, performance legitimacy relates to the quality of results, and technocratic legitimacy focuses on the efficiency and effectiveness of a body’s problem-solving capacity.

### 1.3.2.1 Collaborative Potential for or Actual Results

Collaborative governance results also have been well studied (Clarke & Fuller, 2011; Innes & Booher, 1999) and range from interim to long-term effects such as immediate social and political capital to longer-term changes in attitudes, behaviours and context (Emerson *et al.*, 2012). Legitimacy related to these results depends on the justification of output related to welfare improvements or social or environmental justice (Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005). However, determining the achievement of improvements or justice is difficult as often spatial and temporal differences between collaborative action and actual improvements, particularly for environmental change, can hinder judgements (Bäckstrand *et al.*, 2010b; Holley *et al.*, 2012a; Sabatier, Weible, *et al.*, 2005). As a result, proxy perception-based measures of change are often used as a substitute to outcome evaluations (Leach *et al.*, 2002; Mandarano, 2008). Legitimacy concerns related to this challenge stem from uncertainty around the extent to which collaborations can produce substantive change (Koontz & Thomas, 2006) and are effective and efficient at achieving desirable results (Newig & Fritsch, 2008). Baird *et al.* (2014) and Trachtenberg and Focht (2005) also highlight legitimacy concerns related to trade-offs between social and environmental welfare improvements, and results that benefit some collaborative actors more than others. Table 2.3 frames how these collaborative governance norms may relate to various legitimacy types of this grouping and form part two of five of this paper’s conceptual framework.

**Table 2.3: Legitimacy from the Potential for or Actual Results**

Legitimacy Type	How Legitimacy is Created	Examples of Related Collaborative or Environmental Governance Norm	Example CWG Legitimacy Sources
Problem-solving	Capacity to produce certain solutions that help remedy collective problems	Perceptions of success, (Frame <i>et al.</i> , 2004); social capital developed (Lubell, 2004)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Actor group satisfaction with the quality of results and support for decisions</li> </ul>
Substantive output (output, substantive, consequential, results-based)	Measurable delivery of goals	Policy effectiveness, institutional effectiveness, compliance effectiveness, environmental effectiveness (Kronsell & Bäckstrand, 2010); conflict reduced, agreement reached, information developed (Frame <i>et al.</i> , 2004)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Quantity of actions and results</li> </ul>
Performance	Quality of results	Second order effects, e.g., change in behaviours (Frame <i>et al.</i> , 2004; Innes & Booher, 2010)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extent output of collaborative activities create social or environmental change</li> </ul>
Technocratic	Technical/science-based ability to offer solutions	Use of knowledge and expertise in decision-making (Connelly, 2011)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use of evidence-based knowledge to inform decisions and action</li> </ul>

### **1.3.3 Legitimacy Types Related to Institutional-setting**

The study of legitimacy as it relates to institutional-setting stems predominantly from the fields of political theory and law and reflects the formalized and legal structures that influence both normative and perception-based judgments. Debates centre on the legitimation of power, questioning, for example, how legitimacy is acquired, who is entitled to use it, and its limits (Beetham, 2013). From a legal focus, legitimacy questions focused on the interpretation of law relate to its development, revision, and enforcement (Bernstein, 2004). As such, legitimacy is linked to legality or legal validity, and is about accordance to law, rules, norms, or procedures relevant to a certain issue or context (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007). Adherence to these qualities provides a basic structure of social life and enables the prediction of behaviours and the setting of expectations. Related to this concern is the formalization and institutionalization of these qualities and their ability to establish power and authority over a subordinate through customary, conventional or legal order (Beetham, 2013). In this sense, legitimacy is a contract between a dominant regime and its subordinates. The most traditional contract between an authority and subordinates has commonly been regarded as the adherence of the state to law making legitimacy synonymous with legality (Hanberger, 2003). This legality has been held as a benchmark or institutional goal for many processes and organizations outside of the state for the sense of formalness and permanence it can instil (Blomgren Amsler, 2016).

Types of legitimacy related to this grouping include legal (Bernstein, 2005; Weber, 1964), regulative (Scott, 1995), rules (Beetham, 1991), order (Etsy, 2006), formal (Arnull, 2002), and contract (Matheson, 1987) legitimacy. As a group, these types of legitimacy are bestowed on actors who have some form of sovereignty over organizations or society. Individually, legal, regulative, and rule legitimacy types differ from contract and formal legitimacy because of their attention to the rational establishment of legal doctrines and conventions. In contrast, formal legitimacy is about adhering to established rules and procedures over time (Arnull, 2002) and contract legitimacy stems from the use of binding agreement to establish rights and obligations (Matheson, 1987). Although some of these legitimacy types may be interconnected or associated with legitimacy related to ideal practice (particularly when contracts exist as a part of the governance structure), they can also be interpreted as values that stem from externally prescribed institutional norms.

#### **1.3.3.1 Institutional-setting of Collaborations**

Although collaborative governance scholars have made significant developments in understanding collaborative governance design, challenges, and opportunities, institutional frameworks such as laws, rules, regulations and mandates often are omitted as variables (Blomgren Amsler, 2016). A major reason for this absence is that a large number of collaborations are grassroots, informally initiated outside of statutory decision-making, and rely on voluntary compliance (Stoker, 1998; Tan *et al.*, 2012). Moreover, while legislative, administrative, regulatory, and judicial systems can enable the work of collaborative bodies, they can also constrain them (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Finding ways to constructively embed a collaboration within an enabling legal framework is therefore a normative goal for collaborative bodies, because, as Orr (2015) explains, collaborative water governance legitimacy in the form of legality is tied to its institutional setting. However, in lieu of a legal framework, Connelly (2011) claims that collaborations can maintain legitimacy by developing justifiable rules and procedures. Moreover, scholars in support of collaborative arrangements are arguing for legal infrastructure

that can authorize collaborative governance as a model of decision-making outside of traditional legislative, executive, and judicial systems (Bingham, 2009). Policy processes at every judicial level have begun to catch up and are in various stages of implementing a legal framework to institutionalize various collaborative regimes (Blomgren Amsler, 2016). Table 2.4 frames how these collaborative governance legitimacy norms may relate to various legitimacy types of this grouping and form part three of five of this paper’s conceptual framework.

**Table 2.4: Legitimacy from Institutional-setting**

Legitimacy Type	How Legitimacy is Created	Examples of Related Collaborative or Environmental Governance Norm	Example CWG Legitimacy Sources
Rule (legal, rational-legality, regulative, order, rule, formal)	Rationally established rules and conventions following belief in the legality established over time	Enabling legal framework (Bingham, 2009); institutionalization of collaborative governance (Healey, 2006)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Legislation</li> <li>• Integration within existing structures</li> </ul>
Contract	Contract in which those holding and subjecting to power agree to mutual rights and obligations	Administrative law (Bingham, 2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documented Terms of Reference (DTR), roles and responsibilities, work contracts</li> </ul>

### 1.3.4 Legitimacy Types Related to Social Acceptance or Consent

Legitimacy types related to social acceptance and consent are sociological in nature and stem from the context specific concerns of different actors such as interest groups, the general public, opinion leaders or politicians. When a process aligns cognitively with the cultural knowledge or moral background of such actors, a body may be accepted as appropriate or right (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Legitimacy types associated with this grouping are thus identifiable by their focus on specific expressions or discourses. Commonly in the literature these legitimacy types are confused with the broader legitimacy judgements of actors, which can be distinguished as an empirical decision that uses a variety of different sources (including those related to legitimacy types within this grouping and others). As a legitimacy type, social acceptance or consent is not about what is normatively right, but about what sways a particular society to interpret a governance body as legitimacy (Bernstein, 2004).

The most encompassing legitimacy types in this group include Jachtenfuchs, et al.’s (1998), and Bernstein’s (2004) identity and sociological legitimacy respectively. These types are broadly about the alignment of a body’s values with those of a given community. Other legitimacy types within this grouping are more specifically based on actions that express acceptance or consent. Beetham’s (1991, 2013) legitimacy through express consent focuses on voluntary actions that signify support. Boulding (1967) goes further and distinguishes acceptance or consent from those internal or external to an organization or process (internal/external legitimacy). Internal legitimacy, in addition to Jachtenfuchs, et al.’s (1998) participation legitimacy, stems from the act of involvement and the perceptions of those internal to a body. Meanwhile, external legitimacy,

along with social (Arnall, 2002) and identification (Beetham & Lord, 1998) legitimacy, relates to the acceptance of a body by persons in the surrounding environment. Specific sources of external acceptance are further identified as legitimacy types through popular approval (legitimacy through the vocal will of the people) (Matheson, 1987), parliamentary (legitimacy as an expression of judgement through the election process) (Lord & Magnette, 2004), and compliance legitimacy (legitimacy through adherence to the decisions of a body) (Føllesdal, 2005). These types represent specific ways or actions that can signify social acceptance or consent.

Suchman (1995) also distinguishes between cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy types to clarify the underlying motivations for granting acceptance or consent. Cognitive legitimacy exists as either an active or passive (taken-for-granted) acceptance or need for a body that validates its norms, rules, and practices through alignment with existing cultural structures. Conversely, pragmatic legitimacy relates to the direct value a body may provide an evaluating community. This type of legitimacy differs explicitly from problem-solving legitimacy (within the legitimacy through results grouping) as pragmatic legitimacy is based on the self-serving benefit provided to a certain audience, while problem-solving legitimacy is about the ability of a group to solve an issue they were charged with addressing.

#### **1.3.4.1 Collaborative Acceptance or Consent**

The social acceptance of CWG in Western contexts is still developing despite its steadily increasing use since the 1990s (Lubell & Leach, 2005). This increase, along with the willingness to participate in CWG by the range of actors that have interests in solving water problems, indicates social acceptance of collaboration as a method for public engagement in decision-making (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Legitimacy studies that have examined social acceptance of CWG include Edwards (2016), Leino and Peltomaa (2012) and Sandstrom *et al.* (2014). Findings of these studies stress the situated nature of social acceptance and the variety of ways legitimacy may be attained through acceptance. Notably, the achievement of results (Edwards, 2016), the past-socio political context (Leino & Peltomaa, 2012; Sandstrom *et al.*, 2014) and the involvement of formal government actors in collaborations (Sandstrom *et al.*, 2014) contribute to acceptance. However, skepticism about the performance measurement of collaboration by authors such as Andrews and Entwistle (2010) and Leach (2004) also indicates a challenge to collaborative governance's acceptance. The diversity of actors involved in a collaboration and the degree of conflict present can create varying perspectives on a collaboration's performance and therefore legitimacy (Emerson *et al.*, 2009). Table 2.5 frames how these collaborative governance norms may relate to various legitimacy types of this grouping and form part four of five of this paper's conceptual framework.

**Table 2.5: Legitimacy from Social Acceptance or Consent**

<b>Legitimacy Type</b>	<b>How Legitimacy is Created</b>	<b>Examples of Related Collaborative or Environmental Governance Norm</b>	<b>Example CWG Legitimacy Sources</b>
Cognitive	Cultural and belief system that suggests need and motivation	Belief in the severity of watershed degradation (Lubell & Leach, 2005)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Purpose, goals, activities “make sense” and/or are “taken for granted” according to social constructed reality</li> </ul>
Pragmatic	Benefits provided to the evaluator	Adequate and adequately delivered benefits (Connelly, 2011)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exchange of goods and services that constituents desire for support</li> </ul>
Social identity (identity and sociological legitimacy)	Connection to the audience’s shared belief or culture	Environmental responsibility; belief in collaborative benefits (Ananda & Proctor, 2013)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Socially correct and desirable purpose and actions according to surrounding society</li> </ul>
Internal consent (internal, participation, expressed consent legitimacy)	Voluntary acceptance or normative validation by participants in an organization	Willingness to participate; citizen empowerment (Koontz, 2005); general consent and abidance to governance body (Craik, 2007)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Willingness of affected actors to be involved in the collaboration</li> </ul>
External approval (external, social, identification, popular approval legitimacy)	Acceptance by persons in the surrounding environment	Collective identity (Hardy <i>et al.</i> , 2005); stakeholder acceptance (Paulson, 1998); popularity of collaborative governance (McClosky, 2000);	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Positive normative judgements about outputs, procedures, structures, leaders and personnel by those subject, but not involved with the collaboration</li> <li>• Media recognition</li> </ul>
Parliamentary	Popular sovereignty and elected procedure	Elements of representative democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use of elections</li> </ul>
Compliance	Policies, practices, and authorities in accordance; with constitutional rules and procedures	Obedience to collaborations (Weber, 2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Adherence to collaboration’s rules</li> </ul>

### **1.3.5 Legitimacy Types Related to Individuals**

Legitimacy types in this grouping stem from the performance, qualities, views, actions, or relationships of a person or set of people that provide legitimacy for a whole governance body. The personal qualities (e.g., charisma) of leaders in a governance body act as one such legitimacy type; the personality of those involved can establish beliefs such as trust in a body (Easton, 1965; Matheson, 1987; Weber, 1964). The possession of certain knowledge or expertise by an involved individual or group (i.e. expertise legitimacy) or the personal ties people have with those involved (i.e., personal ties legitimacy) may also infer legitimacy (Matheson, 1987). As well, the already established belief in the legitimacy of participating individuals may be extended to a governance body through indirect legitimacy (Lord & Maignette, 2004). Although this legitimacy type is discussed by Lord and Maignette (2004) in the context of the European Union's legitimacy being an extension of member states' legitimacy, it is also relevant at smaller scales.

Controversy over whether an individual's traits can actually act as legitimacy types is addressed by Scharpf (2009) who distinguishes between sources and types of legitimacy. According to Scharpf (2009) individuals act as legitimacy sources that produce different types of procedural (e.g., productive leadership) or social acceptance (e.g., helping enhance public support), related legitimacy. This paper acknowledges this perspective, but also accepts that there are legitimacy types that specifically relate to individuals where a person's involvement in a governance body or their personal qualities may be inherently valued (Brinkerhoff, 2005).

#### **1.3.5.1 Collaborative Individuals**

In the collaborative governance literature, legitimacy related to individuals is not clearly identified; however, the value of leadership, relationship and trust building, and informed participants is frequently discussed (e.g., Huxham & Vangen, 2005; O'Leary & Vrij, 2012). In general, people are emphasized as a dimension of collaborative governance for the roles they may play including convener, champion, sponsor, facilitator, participants, experts, and public decision maker (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). In these roles, individuals are responsible for helping to convene a body and include others, act neutrally as facilitators, build trust among actors of various perspectives, and establish community support (Frame *et al.*, 2004). Furthermore, criteria deciding who should participate in a body may include assessment of whether individuals have resources such as finances, knowledge, expertise, experience, information, labor ability, or legal authority, to further the agenda of a given collaboration (McGuire, 2006). Likewise, O'Leary and Vrij (2012) emphasize collaborative leader characteristics (e.g., open-mindedness, flexibility, diplomacy, and honesty) and skills (e.g., strong interpersonal communication, interest-based negotiation, conflict resolution, compromise and mediation) as antecedents of collaborative work. This emphasis highlights the importance of people within collaborative governance. Table 2.6 frames how these collaborative governance norms may relate to various legitimacy types of this grouping and form the final part of this paper's conceptual framework

**Table 2.6: Legitimacy from Individuals**

Legitimacy types	Legitimacy type definition	Related collaborative or environmental governance norm	Example CWG legitimacy sources
Personal qualities (personal/ personal qualities/ charismatic legitimacy)	Qualities of person or group involved	Human element (importance of leadership and facilitation) (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Plummer <i>et al.</i> , 2006)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Valued managers and leaders</li> </ul>
Expertise	Through the possession of some type of knowledge	Involvement of local/traditional and scientific experts (Raadgever & Mostert, 2007; van Tol Smit <i>et al.</i> , 2015)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Scientific or traditional knowledge expert input</li> </ul>
Extension (personal ties and indirect legitimacy)	Relationship with those involved	Social network of individuals (Mandarano, 2008)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Informal relationship development</li> </ul>

### 1.3.6 Synopsis

The above section synthesized knowledge on the five groupings of legitimacy types and related collaborative governance norms. Collectively, the summary tables of each of the five groupings (Tables 2.2 – 2.6) act as a conceptual framework for the empirically assessment of CWG legitimacy. This work adopts a broad encompassing interpretation of legitimacy assuming it is comprised of multiple legitimacy types and sources. Although the compatibility of different legitimacy typologies is limited, CWG legitimacy is fundamentally hybrid. By using this framework for empirical CWG assessment, a comprehensive range of legitimacy sources can be identified relevant to the different legitimacy types. The framework can be used to either deductively identify legitimacy sources, or inductively assess the nature of legitimacy sources. Awareness of the full range of legitimacy types applicable to collaborative governance is necessary for accurate assessment.

## 1.4 Methods and Case Descriptions

To identify the empirical sources of legitimacy for CWG using the developed conceptual framework, multi-case fieldwork was undertaken (Yin, 2009). This form of inquiry is appropriate for addressing areas where existing theory is inadequate and where in-depth contextual analysis is necessary (Gerring, 2007; Stake, 2006). Support for this approach stems from the need for exploratory interdisciplinary analysis of legitimacy types as well as the interpretive perception-based nature of legitimacy, which makes legitimacy’s analysis context dependent (Johnson, *et al.* 2006; Connelly 2011). A constructivist paradigm (Creswell, 2009) guided the examination of five cases to identify key concerns and to infer patterns and trends (Stake, 2006). The following describes the cases and data collection and analysis.

### 1.4.1 Case Selection and Description


Five watershed-based CWG bodies were examined to identify different collaborative governance legitimacy sources and their associated legitimacy types. For the purpose of this study, collaborative governance bodies acted as the case-units, focusing the study on the legitimacy of the organization rather than just its actions or policies. The cases were all selected from within the Canadian province of British Columbia (BC) for the purpose of achieving both literal and theoretical replication (Yin, 1994). Using one province as the overall study setting for all cases allowed for an in-depth understanding of the individual cases' broader socio-political contexts. BC was also specifically chosen for its geographic diversity, its prioritization of CWG provincially, and the diversity of collaborative governance models in use (Brandes & Curran, 2009; Nowlan & Bakker, 2007). To select the cases from the province, a short-list was created of BC-based CWG bodies that self-identify as a collaborative body involving multiple cross-sector actors and that operate at the local level. Five cases were collectively selected from this list to ensure geographic diversity across BC and diversity of the age of each case.

The five cases chosen include the Cowichan Water Board (CWB), the Lake Windermere Ambassadors (LWA), the Nechako Watershed Council (NWC), the Okanagan Basin Water Board (OBWB), the Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process/Shuswap Watershed Council (SLIPP/SWC). The CWB represents a collaboration that is co-managed between local government and First Nations and is delivering actions established within a water management strategy laid out by collaborative efforts of the regional government to address both water quality and quantity challenges. The LWA emerged from an environmental non-government organization (ENGO) project and is now a citizen-led inclusive water stewardship group who primarily conduct water quality monitoring and educational activities for Lake Windermere, while also acting as an advisory body to local governments on the ecological water impacts of development proposals. The NWC, while disbanded in 2011, was an inclusive collaboration open to all impacted actors effected by social and ecological effects from water flow diversions for large scale industry; the group's goal was to address conflict among actor groups and make a recommendation about how to allocate funds to remediate water flow impacts. The OBWB represents the longest-standing collaboration in BC and the only CWG body legislated under a provincial act, which provides the power of taxation among three regional governments. The OBWB is accountable to the regional governments of the watershed and is primarily responsible for sewage infrastructure granting and Eurasian Milfoil management; however, they also provide a suite of other water management, education, and stewardship activities. SLIPP was an interagency collaboration among all levels of government (including First Nations) to address water quality, recreational safety, and development impacts on the main lakes of the watershed; after identifying a need for continued water quality monitoring and facing public controversy due to misconceptions about their mandate, SLIPP rebranded as the SWC in 2015. Table 2.7 provides a brief summary of case characteristics and Figure 2.1 indicates the location of the respective watersheds of each case within BC.

**Table 2.7: Case Descriptions**

Case → Characteristic ↓	CWB	LWA	NWC	OBWB	SLIPP/SWC
Date Active	2010-	2009 -	1996-2011	1968-	SLIPP 2006-2014 SWC 2015-
Watershed area	940 km <sup>2</sup>	1,340 km <sup>2</sup>	52,000 km <sup>2</sup>	21,600 km <sup>2</sup>	15,522km <sup>2</sup>
Organizational Structure	12-person board supported by two advisory committees	Volunteer citizen board with general paid membership	Chair supported by two vice chairs with open/inclusive participation for 18-23 impacted organizations	12-person board supported by advice from the ~ 25 person advisory group, the Okanagan Water Stewardship Council	SLIPP: Board supported by two advisory committees SWC: Board
Funding mechanisms	First Nations and regional government gas tax; external grants	Local government fee for service; membership fees; external grants	Nechako Environmental Enhancement Fund; in-kind support from government agencies	Property tax; federal and provincial grants	SLIPP: Local government gas tax; in-kind federal and provincial support SWC: parcel tax; provincial in-kind support

**Figure 2.1: Respective Watersheds of the Five Cases**



#### **1.4.2 Data Collection and Analysis**

Qualitative data collection and analysis methods were deemed necessary to explore the meaning and values behind legitimacy judgments, while also identifying the range of legitimacy sources based on recurrent themes. Data were collected between 2013-2015 from three sources: 99 in-depth semi-structured key informant interviews, 656 documents, and nine in-person observation sessions. Interviews were conducted with staff and politicians from all four orders of government (including First Nations) and appropriate non-government groups all of whom were either internal or external to each case. Of the 99, 70 interviewees were either past or present participants or employees of the different cases. Selection of interviewees was based on ensuring representation of all relevant societal sectors to each case, which were identified both prior to and throughout the interview data collection process. Interviewees were selected using a snowball approach starting with the program managers of each collaboration. Table 2.8 details the breakdown of interviewees by sector within each case as well as those who had multi-case knowledge through experience working with more than one case. Interview recruitment was conducted by email, phone, and in-person during meeting and conference observation. Interviews were recorded using a digital microphone and transcribed verbatim by the first author or by an

internet-based transcription company, TranscribeMe. Transcripts were then member checked to verify the data (Carlson, 2010). Conceptual saturation or when actors from all relevant sectors where interviewed signified the conclusion of interview data collection for each case. Documents include meeting minutes, newspaper articles government reports, letters, promotional material, draft and finalized plans, emails, personal communications, collaborative group publications and websites. Documents were identified through key-informant interviews and internet searches; newspaper articles were located through Factiva using a keyword search of each body's name, as well as through searches of local community newspapers. Observations include board and committee meetings and fieldtrips, public hearings, BC-based water conferences and workshops, as well as observations during interviews and site-visits in each watershed.

NVIVO 10 software was used to analyze data for themes and patterns following an inductive and deductive process using iterative axial coding; triangulation of sources was utilized for validity (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Yin, 2009). Validity was determined based on the existence of the same theme or pattern by more than one data source both within and across cases. The conceptual framework guided the analysis process to suggest how different CWG dynamics (e.g., power) act as sources related to the various legitimacy types. This was achieved by using the different legitimacy types identified in Section 2.3 as parent nodes and coding the data as child nodes to identify legitimacy sources that related to either multiple or single parent nodes. This coding scheme was also duplicated to differentiate positive and negative legitimacy sources related to the same legitimacy types. Positive legitimacy sources that helped establish and maintain legitimacy were coded under one set of parent nodes and negative legitimacy sources that decrease or lead to the loss of legitimacy were coded under the other set. Pattern-matching (Yin, 2009) was then achieved and is presented as findings (Tables 2.9-2.13) that identify how legitimacy sources are positively or negatively experienced and how they relate to various legitimacy types for each case. Cross-case analysis was conducted on a case-by case basis to identify findings linked to individual cases. Some differences were noted among all cases, which are shared below as nuances within the results. However, because the intention was exploratory to identify the range of legitimacy sources across all cases and because mainly the results were relatively similar across cases, findings are presented according to the five legitimacy groupings rather than by case. Key differences are noted where they exist. Evidence of findings is demonstrated using quotations from interviews and documents and vignettes from observation reflections with the intent of illustrating common patterns. Anonymity of interviewees was ensured by providing the sector and case with quotations only if they did not act as individual identifying characteristics.

**Table 2.8: Interviewee Sectors Per Case**

Case→ Sector↓	CWB	LWA	NWC	OBWB	SLIPP /SWC	Multi-case knowledge
Government (federal, provincial, local)	11	4	4	9	11	5
Title and rights holders (First Nations)	3	1	2	1	2	-
Non-government interest groups (e.g., agriculture, industry, environment, residents, collaborative managers, funders, youth)	7	12	7	9	7	4
Total Interviewees (99)	21	17	13	19	20	9

## 1.5 Results

Results show a variation of CWG legitimacy sources related to a range of legitimacy types. The five groupings are used to organize and discuss these sources and their relationship to legitimacy types. Tables 2.9-2.13 present the different legitimacy sources on a case-by-case basis reporting on both legitimizing (+) and non-legitimizing (-) ways the sources were used. In each sub-section, following the presentation of a summary table, selected examples are used to highlight the many types of legitimacy relevant to CWG on a comparative basis among cases.

### 1.5.1 Legitimacy Related to Ideal Practice

Legitimacy types related to ideal practice stem from normative process-based sources. Table 2.9 summarizes the dominant findings related to these legitimacy types.

**Table 2.9: CWG Legitimacy Sources Related to Ideal Practice by Case**

Case → Legitimacy type ↓	CWB	LWA	NWC	OBWB	SLIPP/SWC
Democratic input (principled, input, democratic procedural, normative, justifiability of rules, deliberative, traditional, convention legitimacy)	+ Respectful, deliberative, consensus-based meetings + Meetings open to public + Governance manual outlining procedures	+ Autonomy from parent ENGO (Wildsight) + Impartial decision-making + Meetings open to public + Respectful, deliberative, consensus-based	+ Open and inclusive participation + Respectful, deliberative, consensus-based meetings - Concern about autonomy from Alcan	+ Respectful, deliberative, consensus-based meetings + Meetings open to public + Auditing accountability and transparency + Governance manual	+ Meetings open to public - Exclusion of diverse non-government interests - Exclusion of views through consensus-based and voting-based decision-making

Case → Legitimacy type ↓	CWB	LWA	NWC	OBWB	SLIPP/SWC
		meetings - Accountable representation challenges		outlining procedures	
Non-democratic input (input, procedural, normative, justifiability of rules, traditional, convention legitimacy)	+ Relationships with NGOs	+ Volunteer action + Local government support	+ Science- based decision- making	+ Consistency in meetings + Basin-wide unity + Partnership work with government and NGOs	+ Science-based decision-making
Throughput	+ Involvement of senior federal government staff - Missing representation from Cowichan Lake First Nations + Utilization of action-oriented objectives	- Missing representation Shuswap First Nations	- Declined participant engagement - Withdraw of environmental groups and First Nations	+ Equitable representation of local government - Weak First Nations engagement	- Missing engagement of all First Nations Bands - Transparency issue with in- camera meetings
Structural (structural and systematic legitimacy)	+ Co-managed with First Nations	- Annual grant-based funding	- Static executive - Loss of Fraser Basin Council (FBC) as program manager	+ Expansion of mandate + Development of OWSC + Length of existence + Paid staff	+ Narrowing of mandate - Change of program management from province to FBC - Loss of public advisory committees
Universal (ideological, universal principle, sacredness legitimacy)	+ First Nations cultural and spiritual connection to water + Canadian Heritage status of Cowichan River	+ Recognition of Lake as headwaters to Columbia River and Wetlands + Lake economic and social value	+ Downstream impacts of reservoir on all sectors	+ Importance of surface water to livelihoods in basin	+ Local economic and social importance of lake

In order of most frequently discussed to least, interviewees from across all cases highlighted the following procedural values in their judgments of each case: inclusivity, transparency, public engagement, equitable representation, accountability, respect for different perspectives, honesty and sincerity of interactions, open agenda setting, fairness in terms of benefits and rights of involvement, and deliberation to identify shared-interests. These norms were to a great extent all documented in the terms of reference (LWA, NWC, SLIPP/SWC) or governance manuals (CWB, OBWB) of the cases. However, these values manifested differently in each case, had both positive and negative influence on legitimacy perspectives, and were not always followed. For example, inclusivity was most commonly touted as the most important democratic value: “I think the legitimacy comes from having all those different parties at the table, agreeing on a direction and really acting very responsibly about moving forward” (Interview 38, CWB, regional government). However, inclusivity was also touted as a delegitimizing aspect:

The [OBWB’s] Stewardship Council, there are over 20 members in there now and quite often that is unwieldy when you get that size of group. If I was chair of that kind of group, it would be very difficult to get everybody's opinion. When you have a group that large you tend to have the loudest voice having the largest influence (Interview 83, OBWB, board member).

Such variation in judgements was common across all the democratic values in all cases regardless of the case’s structure. For example, the CWB, the OBWB, and SLIPP demonstrate inclusivity by utilizing technical advisory groups made up of non-state actors to advise boards comprised mainly of elected government officials. This model is in contrast to the LWA and the NWC, which foster inclusivity through a board structure that is open to any and all actors. However, inclusivity challenges were apparent in both models. Notable were challenges to efficient group management (LWA, NWC, OBWB), balancing interests (CWB, LWA, NWC), ensuring accurate representation (NWC, OBWB, SLIPP), efficiently achieving consensus (OBWB, SLIPP), and feelings of exclusion from the process (OBWB, SLIPP). While these challenges were both expressed in interviews and observable, they were not openly documented in meeting minutes or reports. The only exception was the OBWB that, through progress reports attached to their *Okanagan Sustainable Water Strategy* (Okanagan Water Stewardship Council, 2008), regularly assess the challenges facing this strategy and by extension, the organization. As an example, the 2010 progress report (Okanagan Water Stewardship Council, 2010) addressed process challenges such as board structure, involvement of local First Nations, and equitable representation.

Conventional, normative, traditional, and procedural legitimacy not related to democratic input appeared in interviews across all cases highlighting (from most frequently discussed to least) norms of autonomy, ethical justness, financial responsibility, respect for all views, planning flexibility, impartiality, consistent action, political and social connectedness, partnerships, participant unity, government and community leader endorsement, active participation, non-authoritative, future-orientation, evidence-based decision-making using science and traditional knowledge, and First Nations co-management where appropriate. This is illustrated in the following example from a local Cowichan Watershed newspaper article:

We have a great deal of knowledge about our watershed that is held and developed by local groups and First Nations. We can leverage all the scientific data, traditional knowledge and future climate projections to create a “State of the Watershed” report and a Watershed Sustainability Plan that will form part of the presentation for local control (Jefferson, 2016).

Throughput legitimacy was apparent in the evaluation of both democratic and non-democratic legitimacy sources in all of the cases. The most frequently discussed quality judgements across the cases included strategic-foresight and thoroughness of a case's actions and decisions, the quality of participation, and the stability of resourcing. When or how certain legitimacy sources are introduced also mattered for quality judgements. For example, the NWC's inclusive structure meant that the aluminum corporation RioTinto AlCan (formally AlCan), which controls approximately 70% of the Nechako River's annual flow (Wood, 2013), was involved in the NWC with those who felt negatively impacted by this control. The participation of the corporation led a coalition of environmental and First Nations groups to quit the NWC because they believed it could not fairly balance interests: "As long as Alcan maintains its disproportionate influence through representation... we see no means for other stakeholders to exert sufficient leverage to ensure the restoration of the Nechako actually happens" (Sandborn, 1998). In this case, the extent of inclusivity damaged positive beliefs towards the body.

In contrast, organizational characteristics provided structural or systematic legitimacy to all cases. These include contextually-based judgements about the scope, staff and budgetary size, the adequacy of checks and balances, and the body's degree of formality. However, judgements of the same nature could have either a positive or negative influence depending on factors such as who designed the body, the type of problem, the socio-economic and -cultural make-up of the watershed community. To illustrate this variability, SLIPP/SWC's narrowing and the OBWB's expansion of mandate both contributed positively to their reestablishment of legitimacy. Initially, SLIPP had a three-pronged mandate focusing on water quality, safe recreation and development management; public controversy over the extent and regulatory association of the body's mandate particularly related to development management contributed to a narrowing of the mandate as SLIPP rebranded itself into the SWC. The narrower mandate focused principally on water quality monitoring and secondarily on recreational safety as a way to gain consensus on action and calm opposition towards the organization. The following comment demonstrates how the narrower mandate helped calm opposition.

My first impression was that it was too broad of scope with too many components and too difficult to manage... I think that as far as the current direction I am generally not an advocate per say, but they have moved away from agenda creep... I am okay with it if they keep it simple and keep it focused on water quality (Interview 48, SLIPP/SWC, regional government).

In comparison, the OBWB's mandate for approximately the first 30 years focused on Eurasian Water Milfoil management and providing sewage infrastructure improvement grants to local governments. Citizen concern about the growing number of water scarcity and climate change related issues in the watershed in the early 2000s led to support for the OBWB to expand its mandate. As a result, the OBWB took on a broader leadership role taking action on topics such as water use surveying, water supply and demand modeling, groundwater monitoring, water quality monitoring and improvements, and water education, as well as continuing infrastructure grants and invasive species control. The legitimacy value of this structural expansion is exemplified by the following "[The OBWB] used to be a very narrowly focused organization... [and is now] one that is meeting the region's needs and interests much better than it had before (Interview 90, OBWB, board member)." The comparison of the OBWB and SLIPP/SWC demonstrates how finding the right organizational format for a body to operate efficiently can enhance or develop structural and systematic legitimacy. Finally, the focus on water itself fostered ideological

legitimacy: “if you ask people whether water is important and worth working on, you get a universal yes” (Interview 6, CWB, non-government actor). The universal importance of water for life helps justify collaborative action for water sustainability for all of the cases.

### 1.5.2 Legitimacy from the Potential for or Actual Results

Legitimacy types related to the potential for or actual results stem from the actions of governance bodies and subsequent or likely outcomes. Table 2.10 summarizes the findings related to these legitimacy types.

**Table 2.10: CWG Legitimacy Sources Related to Results by Case**

Case → Legitimacy type ↓	CWB	LWA	NWC	OBWB	SLIPP/SWC
Problem-solving	+ Capacity for First Nations-local non-First Nations government relationship building - Questionable capacity to address large issues such as the raising of the weir	+ Capacity for cross-sector work	+ Capacity for cross-sector work + Ability to research	+ Capacity to support other organizations to broaden help + Ability to research and plan	- Questionable ability to change water quality + Capacity to get people working together
Substantive output (output, substantive, consequential, results-based legitimacy)	+ Public water education programing and restoration work	+ Restoration, consistent water quality monitoring, public education	+Delivery of consensus-based decision for a water release facility to address water problems - Failure to diversify results	+ Variety of substantive output (and subsequent outcomes such as improved water quality from sewage improvement grants)	+ Output such as foreshore and habitat inventory mapping and removal of derelict docks (SLIPP)
Performance	+ Tangible objectives for measurable results	N/A	- Lost effectiveness: lack of traction for uptake of decision	+ Efficient delivery of projects and leveraging funds for additional resources (e.g., invasive mussels campaign) - Maintaining momentum to turn water	+ Increased effectiveness and efficiency of water quality monitoring

Case → Legitimacy type ↓	CWB	LWA	NWC	OBWB	SLIPP/SWC
				sustainability plan into deliverable action.	
Technocratic	+ Production and use of science-based knowledge (e.g., bathymetric mapping of Cowichan Lake)	+ Production of science-based knowledge (e.g., water quality monitoring data)	+ Production and use of science-based knowledge on river dynamics, and feasibility of water release facility	+ Production and use of science-based knowledge (e.g., endocrine disruptor study)	+ Production and use of science-based knowledge (e.g., water quality monitoring data)

In each case, the assessment of results commonly justified a body’s existence. Such output was discussed by interviewees and documented regularly as a way to communicate actions to community and resource supporters. For the OBWB and LWA, this documentation exists as annual reporting of activities or results. For the CWB and SLIPP/SWC summaries of activities were documented as projects were completed (e.g., Fraser Basin Council, 2014). For the NWC, this reporting existed as progress reports at different points throughout the body’s existence. Additional to written recognition of output after production, substantive norms were also explicitly valued in documented objectives (CWB) and work strategies (OBWB, LWA, SLIPP). The CWB’s efforts to convey tangible action-oriented norms as objectives/targets of the organization are particularly valued and promoted as evidenced within interviews with board participants as well as documented presentations (e.g., Rutherford, 2011) by the body.

Visual outputs such as restoration work (all but the NWC) and public education workshops (all) were particularly reported in each case as proof of the short-term measurable delivery of substantive output (output, substantive, results-based, and consequential legitimacy). However, output eventually must produce social or environmental change related to a body’s goals to prove utility and maintain legitimacy. Improved relationships, increased public awareness, and greater public policy influence were most commonly highlighted as social outcomes of each case’s work. For example, in a province-wide webinar, the CWB listed its top achievement as “the development of relationships/partnerships with diverse watershed stakeholders” (Polis Project on Ecological Governance, 2012). Environmental change was influenced through activities such as restoration projects (all cases but the NWC), agriculture sustainability programing (CWB, OBWB) and sewage infrastructure grants (OBWB). Quantitative measurement of environmental change was not always directly attributed to each case’s actions; however, this was not expressed in interviews as a detriment to a case’s legitimacy.

Substantive output and performance legitimacy were consistently connected across the cases. The following remark emphasizes the connection of these two types of legitimacy showing that it is not enough for the NWC to achieve its objectives, but that those objectives must be morally desirable and effectively and efficiently achieved.

There's been some habitat tinkering that's gone on. But really, it's just fiddling at the margins. And depending on somebody's interest, they might choose to be involved in that, or aware of it. Other people, like me, decided that other things were more important...it [legitimacy] would therefore be about effectiveness. Does this have a mandate that will actually let it do something to influence the course of events, or is it just tokenism? Is this just harmless, busy work to keep people from annoying the courts (Interview 62, NWC, non-government actor)?

For the NWC, such a statement reflects the challenges the body faced in producing output that would lead to environmental change (one of the reasons the collaboration dissolved). The capacity of each case was also used in legitimacy judgements across all cases (problem-solving legitimacy). The ability for a collaboration to bring various actor groups together, conduct research, manage and plan for water resources, make recommendations, leverage funding to attain additional resources, or provide support to other groups were particularly noted for all cases. To illustrate, SLIPP facilitated coordination across government departments and the NWC case allowed local First Nations who were socially and culturally impacted by water flow controls by industry to sit at the same table with the aluminum corporation, AlCan. In both cases, it was the action of working together that eventually led to improved communication among parties and subsequent output from the collaboration and spin-off initiatives. The following quotation relative to the NWC echoes this sentiment:

The process of sitting down and talking with each other about how we are going to do business for two years was huge; we gained some respect and perspective for each other... One of the greatest accomplishments of the NWC – when we started Cheslatta and AlCan wouldn't even sit in the same corner of the room together and when we ended they were in two different business relationships (Interview 67, NWC, First Nations representative).

Thus, legitimacy from results is a product of capacity along with the actual production of results.

Finally, science-based output from all cases was also noted as a form of technocratic legitimacy. For example, the OBWB supported research on endocrine disruptors (e.g., Steeves & Brett, 2014), which was utilized by municipal governments such as the City of Vernon to inform the city's Liquid Waste Management Plans (Huang, 2014). The production and use of science-based knowledge was present for all the cases producing legitimacy through objective science in connection with the technical nature of water governance. This is evidenced by the number of scientific studies produced by each case, which included water quality monitoring data, annual water flow and temperature studies, bathymetry mapping, and water use trends.

### **1.5.3 Legitimacy Types Related to Institutional-Setting**

Legitimacy types related to institutional-setting stem from the presence of or adherence to contractual or legal sources. Table 2.11 summarizes the findings related to these legitimacy types.

**Table 2.11: CWG Legitimacy Sources Related to Institutional-Setting by Case**

Case → Legitimacy type ↓	CWB	LWA	NWC	OBWB	SLIPP/SWC
Rule (legal, rational-legality, regulative, rule, formal legitimacy)	+ Registered society (Cowichan Watershed Society Bylaw 2014-01) - Lacking stable funding policy	+ Registered society + Recognition in RDEK – Lake Windermere OCP Bylaw No. 2061 Section A (10) as Management Committee (advisory)	+ Establishment recommended in BC Utilities Commission (BCUC) report on the Kemano Completion Project and Section 4 of the BC/Alcan 1997 Settlement Agreement	+ Supplementary letters patent binding the three regional districts and providing tax requisition ability through the BC Municipalities Enabling and Validating Act	+ Shuswap Watershed Council Service Establishment Bylaw No. 5705 (2015) - Non-referendum based development of regional bylaw for parcel tax funding model
Contract	+ Documented meeting minutes, DTR,	+ Documented meeting minutes, DTR, strategic plan	+ Documented meeting minutes, DTR, problem outline	+ Documented meeting minutes, DTR, strategic plan	+ Documented meeting minutes, DTR

Within each case, legitimacy types related to institutional-setting presented as rule or contract legitimacy. First, rule-based legitimacy for each case is still in its infancy. Observed reasons for this infancy include the lack of institutionalization of collaboration as a model of governance through provincial legislature or regulation and the advisory or non-regulatory nature of each case. Of the five cases, the OBWB is the collaborative body that holds the most legal-based and formal legitimacy due to supplementary letters of patent mandated under the Province’s Municipalities Enabling and Validating Act (Province of British Columbia, 2015).

These supplementary letters patent, they give us legitimacy - it is a legislated thing so automatically we are seen as something better - not more credible necessarily - but more entrenched than a volunteer organization (Interview 3, OBWB, board member).

Such sentiment was expressed by both OBWB interviewees and interviewees connected to other cases as well as those with government with multi-case knowledge. However, even though the OBWB has legislated taxation power, they do not hold any regulatory authority.

In the absence of legitimacy through provincial legislation, the other cases utilized different institutional tools that helped develop legitimacy. Examples include, registering as a society or charity (LWA, CWB) and having local government pass bylaws for taxation purposes (SWC) or to mandate a bodies’ advisory role to local government (LWA). Each of these different

legitimizing tools are formally documented as legal contracts or agreements and are shared on the websites of each case (with the exception of the NWC, which did not have an online presence). All of these tools are also referred to within the meeting minutes of each case.

The recent introduction of the provincial *Water Sustainability Act* (Province of British Columbia, 2014), also has led to speculation about the future legal development of CWG bodies. Such action was anticipated by some to help create a sense of institutionalization for CWG:

It will enable local governments and community-based organizations (such as the Lake Windermere Ambassadors) to contribute to decision-making in our Columbia Valley homewaters (Hubrecht, 2015).

Similarly, the use of a taxation bylaw by government to fund a collaboration versus annual funds alone helped institutionalize the SWC by extension of the established legitimacy of local government. SWC's ability to secure a parcel tax funding model through the Columbia Shuswap Regional District (CSRD), guaranteed the SWC another five years of existence allowing it to be seen as more of an initiative embedded within the CSRD: "taxation will create a feeling of permanence and sustainability versus an annualized model where it is, 'are we alive again'" (Interview 59, SLIPP/SWC, government member)? Stability by support through a local bylaw is thus allowing the SWC to focus on broader efforts that are not dictated by annual demands for funds or results.

Administrative formalities (e.g., documented meeting minutes, professionalism of meetings) and the documentation of procedures and roles and responsibilities (e.g. terms of reference, strategic plans) were also observed to provided formal and contract legitimacy for all cases. For example,

The [OBWB] Water Governance Manual – what it did is it spelled in black and white, not only what their relationship was – it was written down and could easily be referred to – but it also spoke to the protocols of the chairs of the respective groups of the Council and the Board and how they would interact and work on different issues. That settled everything down. So, once that governance manual defined some of the operational and working parameters of the Council, much of the concerns of the Board, I felt, disappeared (Interview 91, OBWB).

Contract legitimacy, as such, helps ensure a body is not a threat to the interests of those involved.

#### **1.5.4 Legitimacy Types Related to Social Acceptance or Consent**

Legitimacy types related to social acceptance or consent stem from social or cognitive norms as sources. Table 2.12 summarizes the findings related to these legitimacy types.

**Table 2.12: CWG Legitimacy Sources Related to Social Acceptance by Case**

Case → Legitimacy type ↓	CWB	LWA	NWC	OBWB	SLIPP/SWC
Cognitive	+ Sense of urgency – water quality and quantity concerns	+ Proactive concern for lack of watershed protection	+ Sense of need to address conflict and address industry water impact	+ Sense of need to collaborate across regional districts for basin-wide water quality issues	+ Sense of need for collective effort to address water quality issues
Pragmatic	+ Communication benefit to local industry	+ Local community benefit for the greater good	+ Corporate social responsibility (CSR) benefit to local industry	+ Communication and CSR benefit to local industry	+ Local community benefit for the greater good
Social identity (identity, sociological legitimacy)	+ Aligned perception that co-management is best option	- Concern about ability to provide accountable water governance + Environmental conservation	+ Collective action agreed to be only option to address problem	+ Value of water recognized politically and socially	+ Environmental conservation
Internal consent (internal, participation, expressed consent legitimacy)	+ Willing and consistent participation from all sectors + Resource support from multiple participants	+ Participation from multiple sectors	+ Representation from all sectors initially - Declined participation overtime	+ Long standing participation and resource support from all levels of government + Voluntary participation on OWSC - Limited First Nations engagement	+ Willing participation and resource support from provincial and local government
External approval (external, social, identification, popular approval legitimacy)	- Limited awareness in community	- Limited community awareness + Maintenance of grant funding + Volunteer turnout for programing and membership	+ Popularity in media + Continued external funding through NEEF	- Limited awareness in community + Continuous provision of public funds from mill rate	- Concern for over regulation or sense of infringement on peoples' use of the foreshore + Vocal support from environmental sector

Cognitive legitimacy, conveyed as a sense of need for a body to solve complex water resource problems, was most frequently discussed in newspapers and interviews across all cases as a form of social acceptance. Notably, the urgency of water issues such as degraded water quality or scarcity, departmental silos concerning water management and policy in the federal and provincial government, the complexity of overlapping jurisdictions responsible for water, the changed capacity of provincial and federal government departments to provide action on water issues alone, the fear of environmental deterioration as a result of not taking action, and the popularity and use of collaboration in other watersheds contributed to this sense of need. Crises, such as seasonal drought, in all cases but the LWA, were particularly important in establishing this sense of need, which help justify a collaboration's establishment, maintain its legitimacy, and motivate ongoing participation in and action of a case. For example, with SLIPP/SWC, algae blooms in 2008 and 2010 led to local newspaper headlines such as "Shuswap Lake 'Stewardship Council' Needed Now!" (Nadeau, 2010), which illustrate the popular sense of need for the body. Similar sensationalism was noted for other bodies as well with media stories about salmon needing to be put in pails and trucked up river in the Cowichan Watershed as well as media attention in the Okanagan Watershed about the threat of invasive species (e.g., zebra mussels), which respectively helped reinforce the value of the CWB and OBWB.

Social identity legitimacy types developed when qualities of each case aligned with the beliefs of those judging the different collaborative bodies. Commonly identified beliefs across all cases included the idealization of collaboration as a way to solve common resource problems, provide environmental protection, localize ownership or responsibility for resources, value water, and act cooperatively. However, not all actors in each case prioritized the same values. To illustrate, the project leading up to the LWA was originally established by Wildsight, an ENGO that is commonly known for its strong environmental ethic lobbying for conservation on various issues. The association of LWA with Wildsight led some actors to support the LWA by extension and others to judge it as being too biased towards environmental protection even after Wildsight stepped back from leadership and coordination roles.

The Ambassadors were originally under the wing of Wildsight... which was a good thing. But outside it is perceived as very left-wing and tree hugging by a large part of the community and this has divided the community's opinion [of the LWA]  
(Interview 4, LWA, resident).

For the LWA, the perception of bias had both a legitimating and delegitimizing value, indicating a need for impartiality to gain widespread public acceptance.

Another way a collaboration may be legitimized is through the pragmatic benefit provided to the evaluator. Pragmatic legitimacy from a case's direct value to an actor group was most commonly expressed by industry participants in the CWB, OBWB, and NWC cases. Collaborating helped industries meet their responsibilities to consult, communicate, or work with local community through expectations of corporate social responsibility, or through the protection of water for capital gain purposes. For example, "[The CWB] provides social license because by [sharing] the way that I manage the weir and the river, Catalyst, therefore gains the respect of all other stakeholders which is huge (Interview 9, CWB, industry)." The self-serving value of collaborating can therefore help justify its existence and different sector's participation within a collaboration.

Legitimacy as social acceptance can also be expressed as action. Willing participation in each case was the most dominant action-based way to show consent internally. General community awareness or consent of a case indicated social acceptance in a range of ways (expressed consent, external, social, and popular approval legitimacy). At one end of the spectrum, active support groups were present for all the cases that advocated for the body (expressed consent legitimacy). For example, in the Shuswap Watershed, ENGOs such as the Shuswap Environmental Action Society and the Shuswap Water Action Team were outspoken groups that worked to rally public support for SLIPP and the subsequent creation of the SWC. The act of financing or providing resources for a body can also indicate expressed consent. Both community support and funding may also be tied together, particularly when grant funding requires evidence of community support for an organization. For example, the LWA requires documented community support for Columbia Basin Trust funding. Observed actions by the OBWB, CWB, SLIPP, and the LWA that helped gain such community support included adding the objective of public engagement and education to collaborative goals and a neutral unauthoritative positioning. Even if the primary goal of a body does not require public education it helped build a positive social image. Similarly, when the cases were unbiased and lacked authority they were able to gain social acceptance through the development of positive, non-regulatory relationships with the public. For example, comments such as “as an organization we can support accurate water quality monitoring, but we do not want to see this group get an enforcement and remediation power (Interview 97, SLIPP/SWC, civil society)” were present as concerns for all cases except the NWC. However, this lack of authority along with the absence of formal electoral procedure meant that parliamentary and compliance legitimacy were not found to contribute to the cases’ legitimacy.

At the other end of the spectrum of social acceptance within the community is no action at all, i.e., acceptance through the act of doing nothing or being unaware of the benefit provided by the collaboration. For example, for almost four decades the OBWB provided Eurasian Milfoil management. Some within the OBWB believe that this service is taken for granted by the public and only with the removal of the service, would the public realize the program’s and by extension the OBWB’s value. For example,

Does the layperson know if they go to the beach that it is the OBWB with the milfoil?  
Not really - it is something that has to be done to enhance tourism and keep beaches clean... it is about appealing to the public (Interview 52, OBWB, resident).

This underacknowledged action demonstrates how the OBWB has gained acceptance as an engrained or institutionalized body that is taken for granted in the community. This taken-for-granted sense of value acts as a source of unexpressed action-based external approval, social identity, and cognitive legitimacy.

Additionally, external and popular approval legitimacy were apparent through the action of other watershed bodies mimicking another collaboration’s process or activities (e.g., Columbia Lake Stewardship Society modeled after the LWA (Flynn, 2013)), media recognition (e.g., frequency of publications, positive news stories) and by proxy of the re-election of regional district and municipal government politicians involved within the cases. The ability for each case to effectively communicate their action in lay language was seen as pivotal to gaining these legitimacy types. For example, the OBWB has been particularly successful in gaining public

awareness and support for their work through this approach using media campaigns such as ‘Don’t Move a Mussel’ to stop the spread of zebra and quagga mussels:

I think the OBWB has got on to a really good issue here that has a lot of public support. The public awareness has gone sky-high on it and people are writing letters, and councils that were previously uninformed are writing letters to the senior levels of government (Interview 20, OBWB, regional government).

Such communication effort is documented in the form of media coverage and within the meeting minutes of all the cases. It is also observable as communications or public relations committees within the CWB, LWA and NWC. Effort to promote and build a positive image of the work of the organization can then reinforce the local value of the body.

### 1.5.5 Legitimacy Types Related to Individuals

Legitimacy types related to individuals are sourced from the value different individual people or groups provide a governance body. Table 2.13 summarizes the findings related to these legitimacy types.

**Table 2.13: CWG Legitimacy Sources Related to Individuals by Case**

	<b>CWB</b>	<b>LWA</b>	<b>NWC</b>	<b>OBWB</b>	<b>SLIPP/ SWC</b>
Personal qualities (personal, personal qualities, charismatic legitimacy)	+ Leadership ability of staff and chairs	+ Dedication of program manager	+/-Longstanding commitment of chair	+ Leadership ability of staff and chairs	+ Leadership of program manager
Expertise	+ Skill and network of program manager and technical advisory council	N/A	N/A	+ Skill, education and network of staff and technical advisory council	N/A
Extension (personal ties, indirect legitimacy)	+ Involvement of senior past politicians, First Nations Chiefs	+/- Involvement of ENGO	+/- Involvement of province-wide NGO as manager	+ Involvement of senior past politicians	+/- Involvement of province-wide NGO as manager

The involvement of certain individual people or organizations helped each case gain legitimacy by enhancing popular approval, the willingness to participate by different sectors, and by providing additional resources through individual contributions or access to different funding options (e.g., involvement of First Nations allows for Aboriginal-specific funding). Notably, the involvement of past federal or provincial ministers (CWB, OBWB), wealthy civil society actors (LWA), experts with relevant skill-sets (CWB, OBWB), or organizations with already established

credibility (all case) contributed positively towards judgements of the collaborations. For example, the participation and leadership of the Fraser Basin Council (FBC) in SLIPP/ SWC contributed to both positive and negative judgements of the case: “I am more in favor of the council with the Fraser Basin Council being there because they have some professional expertise... [that] has brought some common sense back to the table” (Interview 70, SLIPP/SWC, local government) and “ I was critical of the FBC... in that they are supposed to be neutral facilitators of the process and I thought they were getting too involved” (Interview 12, SLIPP/SWC, local government). Therefore, the positive or negative judgement towards an individual entity can transfer to a collaboration depending on their involvement (or lack of). In addition, across all of the cases, individual participants helped personalize each collaborative body allowing for a personal connection to be made with each collaboration. For First Nations actors, this relationship was commonly discussed in interviews:

Going to that group of people... having [that] guy... up there. When you see him from fifty feet away you have different thoughts, but then you get talking to him and he just pulls you into the group (Interview 72, First Nations).

However, having unfriendly or disrespectful people or positional organizations involved also subtracted from perceptions of legitimacy by some actors.

It's all about people to make this work. I would say that applies whether you're talking First Nations or not. You will find that some people - and they can be on various sides or various issues - but they just are poison in the group (Interview 5, provincial government).

Individuals who challenged the organization and created disdain for the collaborative process were commented on in 15 of the 99 interviews from all cases but the LWA. Conversely, positive perceptions of the role individual participants and groups play for a collaboration were reported in 50 of the 99 interviews. Such sentiment, while commonly referenced in interviews, did not materialize as strongly within the documents reviewed. Exceptions include a public opinion piece in the media that called for the removal of the public representative on the SWC on the basis that they had an anti-business bias (Cunliffe, 2014) and meeting minutes across all cases that discuss potential participants who should be invited to participate.

Participants' or staffs' educational credentials or scientific or strategic-based intelligence also helped establish expertise legitimacy. Involvement of experts in ways such as participation on a case's technical advisory committee, as exemplified with the OBWB and CWB, made it more difficult for laypeople to disagree with the premise or direction of an organization.

The technical nature [of the OBWB]... a lot of deference is given to that expertise and the fact that our executive director has a PhD - there are credentials that go into it that lend weight in a way that it is harder for Joe Schmo to say... ‘this is wrong’” (Interview 89, OBWB, municipal government).

In sum, who is involved and the abilities they bring to a collaboration can justify or influence legitimacy judgements towards a collaborative body.

## 1.6 Discussion

The following offers observations on the application of the conceptual framework to CWG legitimacy and on the nature of CWG legitimacy. First, the use of the broad conceptual framework demonstrates the value of considering the array of legitimacy types in empirical settings. Five observations concerning the different legitimacy type groupings follow:

- *Sources of legitimacy related to ideal practice are formed from a mixture of norms that are used in different ways within legitimacy judgements.* These norms relate to process, structure, focus, and values that are commonly discussed in the collaborative governance literature as necessary governance qualities (e.g., Ansell & Gash, 2007; Bryson et al., 2006; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Thomson & Perry, 2006). While these norms were frequently discussed in each case, how they were assumed and actually delivered supported, subtracted from, or were not factored into legitimacy judgements. Thus, how these norms are actualized matters when assessing legitimacy empirically. For example, inclusive process both contributed to and subtracted from legitimacy judgements both within and across the cases. It is not adequate to simply state a source of legitimacy, how it is used in legitimacy judgements must be qualified.
- *Output and social improvements are currently used in lieu of demonstrable environmental improvements as legitimacy sources; this could create challenges for collaborations as they age.* Examples of such sources include improved community relationships and the production of projects and programs. The extent to which each case is able to produce environmental welfare or justice improvements remains to be seen. Even though all cases have documented output, some of which includes environmental enhancements (e.g., foreshore restoration), there is limited evidence of the significance of this work on the overall ecological resilience of the area. Moreover, all cases worked to produce scientific data on different aspects of their watersheds (e.g., bathymetry mapping, water quality monitoring, water flow studies). While having this information can be essential for making informed decisions, if it is not utilized for such decision-making in a timely manner it will not contribute to legitimacy. This challenge links to Newig and Fritsch's (2008) concern about collaborative governance effectiveness. Legitimacy contributes to effectiveness and effectiveness contributes to legitimacy. Likewise, the loss of one can also affect the other. In the future, if the output of collaborations does not lead to environmental improvements, output may not contribute to legitimacy. The degree to which collaborations are not faulted for this inability to create environmental change is likely dependent on the future environmental context and on the demands collaborations place on constituents.
- *The institutional-setting of CWG is still in development and so too are related legitimacy sources.* All of the cases were dependent on the situated willingness of the state to help institutionalize CWG and in lieu of a broader legal framework, used formal rules and procedures to develop clarity around the roles and responsibilities of each case and its participants. Findings support claims by Bingham (2009) that an enabling legal framework for CWG legitimacy is still in development. The development of such a framework speaks to the policy and support roles governments can play for CWG bodies. Such support is noted by Lockwood *et al.* (2009) as a way to enhance the effectiveness of collaborative bodies through legitimacy. The legislation supporting the OBWB in combination with the case's longevity and productivity are empirical evidence of this point.

- *A sense of need to address water issues (cognitive legitimacy) dominates as the primary source of legitimacy in the form of gaining public willingness to support CWG development.* In this sense, collaboration is accepted as the best option to address complex problems that cannot be easily solved (O'Leary & Vij, 2012). For all cases, the problem context within the watershed provided initial legitimacy to the collaborations as a solution to local issues. However, the dominance of this acceptance raises important questions about how to maintain legitimacy given longstanding uncertainty about collaborative governance's ability to produce social and environmental welfare and justice (Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005).
- *Individuals supporting and leading CWG bodies generate legitimacy.* Legitimacy sources related to specific individuals and groups are worthy of consideration in future CWG assessments, especially since past assessments (e.g., Baird et al., 2014; Orr, 2015; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005; Van Buuren et al., 2012) have largely ignored this form of legitimacy. Notably, collaborative managers in all cases as well as the participation of certain individuals in the community (particularly those with past or present political status) helped either strengthen the process of the cases by adding expertise as well as time and effort or were able to help generate popular approval for the efforts of the CWG body.

Second, it is important to have a comprehensive understanding of legitimacy sources for empirical assessments for the accurate evaluation of collaborative bodies to help determine ways to improve management and judge whether collaboration is a contextually suitable governance form. The findings offer insights into CWG legitimacy hybridity, circumstances of non-legitimacy, conceptualization, and management. Concerning the hybridity of CWG legitimacy, broadly, each case experienced, albeit to different extents and using different sources, almost all the same types of legitimacy. This was surprising given significant contextual differences across the cases such as the geographic setting, objectives, and the age of each body. This finding not only confirms the hybrid nature of CWG legitimacy (Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012; Wallington *et al.*, 2008), but also emphasizes the relevance of legitimacy types from across a range of legitimacy typologies to assess CWG legitimacy. Thus, unless a specific type of legitimacy is being researched (e.g., democratic legitimacy), empirical assessments should go beyond analysis using one legitimacy typology alone. This has implications for the study of collaborative governance literature, where to date researchers have tended to use only one typology (e.g., Bäckstrand, 2010; Baird *et al.*, 2014; Hogl *et al.*, 2012; Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012). This is problematic because using one typology alone can exclude other sources of legitimacy from empirical analysis. To continue to address this problem, future research, should examine whether and in what contexts different legitimacy types matter more than others. While the intention of this paper was not to examine the interconnections of legitimacy types or typologies, assessments could also benefit from understanding how the groupings and legitimacy types interconnect. Notably, the findings indicated that some legitimacy sources relate to multiple legitimacy types even though the definitions of these types differ. For example, participation may provide both internal consent as legitimacy through social acceptance or may be democratically valued as an input norm. Authors such as Newig and Fritsch (2008) and Mayntz (2010) have begun examining some of these interconnections within individual typologies. Future research should supplement this work by exploring interconnections across typologies and legitimacy groupings. This is important to continue to build clarity around the terminology used to define each legitimacy type used in the literature. Such work may help understand how legitimacy types mutually enforce or contradict each other.

Next, although this paper focused primarily on the positive features of the five groupings of legitimacy types, each legitimacy type also has an opposing negative side (i.e., delegitimization or illegitimacy sources) (O'Kane, 1993). Within each type of legitimacy, different collaborative components could be positively identified in support of legitimacy, not mentioned, discussed as a value that did not provide legitimacy, or discussed because the opposite form was present. For example, inclusivity in collaborative practices often acts as a source of democratic input and normative legitimacy. However, it could also not be considered as pertinent to a body's legitimacy, could be considered harmful to the establishment of legitimacy (i.e., too many actors at the table or implications for accountability), or the failure of a collaboration to be inclusive could be viewed against a collaborative body's legitimacy. These variations emphasize on one hand the dynamic nature of legitimacy because a collaboration must continually establish, enhance, maintain and defend its legitimacy (Tilling, 2004) and on the other hand, the subjectivity and situated nature of the concept (Connelly, 2011). Moreover, the variations suggest that the legitimacy types themselves are neutral analytical constructs that do not infer or detract from legitimacy assessments; it is the discourse surrounding source norms that determines the situated value of each legitimacy type.

How legitimacy is conceptualized in this paper also can be critiqued. Brinkerhoff (2005) and Marquez (2016) caution against the treatment of legitimacy as a concept that is so broad that it subsumes the analytic territory of other governance attributes (e.g., norms such as inclusivity, behavioural change, supportive legislation, trustworthiness, collaborative champions). When this happens, legitimacy as a concept can become complex and vague. This paper, with its comprehensive and in-depth treatment of legitimacy, runs this risk. A collection of legitimacy types from multiple typologies can validate so many social norms that the common discourse on what is and is not legitimacy may be misleading (O'Kane, 1993). Furthermore, a multitude of types can create contradictory understandings of what is necessary to establish, maintain, and lose social or political order (Marquez, 2016). Therefore, it is worthwhile to consider how empirically valuable legitimacy is when broadly interpreted. Marquez (2016) claims that the concept of legitimacy, when broadly interpreted, is not capable of being empirically utilized and thus a narrow interpretation of the concept, such as the justification for subordination to a dominant authority, should be used for empirical assessments. For CWG, this could mean narrowly conceptualizing legitimacy only as the relationships necessary for compliance with a body and its work. However, given the fact that many collaborations (including all the cases) do not have regulatory authority, such a definition could also be deemed irrelevant. Ultimately, the breadth of legitimacy interpretation chosen will depend on the researcher and the study context. To help with this choice, this paper offers a synthesis so that the many types of legitimacy can be collectively recognized. While narrower, more parsimonious decisions about how to interpret legitimacy and which sources and types to focus on for empirical assessments of specific bodies may be more manageable, this synthesis and empirical confirmation of relevant legitimacy types for CWG can help researchers clearly define what type(s) of legitimacy they are investigating and establish more precisely their conceptual parameters.

Finally, this paper's broad conceptual framework has utility as a strategic analytic tool to help develop and manage a collaborative body's organizational capacity. Conceptualizing legitimacy as a strategic tool assumes actors can intentionally influence legitimacy (Suchman, 1995), which involves increasing practitioner understanding of the nuances and methods to enhance, establish, maintain, or defend legitimacy (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). To develop

such understanding, one option includes having open dialogue among collaborative governance participants about legitimacy, its variations, and its meaning from individual perspectives. Stemming from this deliberation would be the development of contextually-based methods to establish, enhance, maintain, or defend legitimacy. Ways legitimacy development can be undertaken, according to Brinkerhoff (2005) include mimicking structures, processes, or systems of the same form that are already legitimate; informing constituents of a body's goals, activities, and outcomes in contextually desirable ways; or working to align values of a body with its community's through celebration and symbols. Knowing which types of legitimacy need development can thus direct and enhance the effectiveness of strategic efforts. For CWG, where the stakes involved in managing water can have significant social and ecological effects, ensuring strategic efforts is vital. However, such management effort should be embedded within a larger strategic process that considers trade-offs between legitimacy types as well as other governance attributes (Sonpar *et al.*, 2009).

## 1.7 Conclusion

One typology of legitimacy alone cannot fully evaluate CWG legitimacy. However, a common approach by researchers (e.g., Baird *et al.*, 2014; Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012) to evaluate CWG legitimacy has been to use legitimacy typologies to evaluate legitimacy that only recognize ideal practice and results-based legitimacy types (e.g., Scharpf's (1997) input and output typology, Trachtenberg and Focht's (2005) procedural and substantive typology, and Bekkers and Edward's (2007) input, throughput, and output typology). Using such typologies or others can miss recognizing other crucial legitimacy sources such as social norms, legal frameworks, or individual people or groups. If CWG legitimacy is to be managed within different contexts, all legitimacy sources must be identifiable. The ultimate aim of this paper as a result was to build a synthesized framework of legitimacy types to assist in the identification of the range of sources and demonstrate its use empirically. This undertaking was inherently complex as not only are multiple typologies grounded in different legitimacy interpretations examined together, but the contextual nuances of the cases also required consideration. This complexity represents a weakness in the framework that should be noted if it is used in other empirical settings without in-depth knowledge of the theoretical dynamics of legitimacy.

Multiple legitimacy typologies from a range of disciplines depict the legitimacy of collaborative bodies as a political, democratic, institutional, utility-based, legal, social, personal, and organizational phenomenon. Empirically, this means that a collaborative body may face opportunities for or challenges to legitimacy in a myriad of ways; for example, through calls for an elected or inclusive representation, through competition for grant monies or resources against other collaborative bodies, or through judgement by higher political authorities as to whether a body is worthy of specific responsibilities, funding, or authority for certain water management tasks. For both practitioners and researchers alike, clear specification is needed about what types of legitimacy are in question. Such consideration, for the better or worse of collaborative governance, could help tailor how legitimacy is managed for the governance of water resources.

## Chapter 3

# Legitimacy Assessment Throughout the Life of Collaborative Water Governance

## 2.1 Introduction

Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) and Mandell and Keast (2008) have proposed that collaborative governance bodies progress through various development stages as they evolve as organizations. At each stage in their lifecycles, collaborations may have a different focus, vary in their approach to governing, and produce different results (Provan *et al.*, 1996). The legitimacy of any governance or organizational body, is also known to change as a body evolves through stages of development (Fisher *et al.*, 2016). However, little is known about the dynamic nature of legitimacy as CWG bodies evolve.

Legitimacy, broadly defined as justifiability or acceptance, is essential for the order, stability, and effectiveness of governance (Beetham, 2013). It forms from multiple sources and associated legitimacy types (Hanberger, 2003) that matter more or less to establish, maintain, enhance and defend an organization's acceptability (Hybels, 1995; Tilling, 2004). Developing knowledge about which sources and types of legitimacy matter throughout the stages of a collaborative body's development is important, given that the ways legitimacy is established and maintained may change as an organization evolves (Fisher *et al.*, 2016). If management of legitimacy does not evolve with an organization, it may risk losing its legitimacy (Suchman, 1995).

Developing understanding of the dynamic nature of legitimacy is particularly valuable in settings where collaborative governance is frequently used. Water governance, a field commonly regarded as one of the most globally important for the sustainability of water (Lautze *et al.*, 2011), is one such setting; collaborative water governance (CWG) is increasingly utilized in Western contexts (Lubell, 2004). However, not only is little known about the dynamic nature of CWG legitimacy, but there is also inconclusive evidence as to whether all CWG legitimacy types and sources are known because existing CWG literature draws on various legitimacy typologies for empirical assessment (e.g., Edwards, 2016; Orr, 2015; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005; Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012). Since legitimacy is such a pivotal governance attribute, it follows that identifying which legitimacy sources and types matter at different development stages of a collaborative body will help practitioners strategically plan for legitimacy changes. Such knowledge will also help CWG practitioners make water governance more efficient and effective.


This paper takes up the question of how legitimacy changes throughout the various stages of CWG. Using a multi-case study approach, it seeks (a) to identify which sources and types of legitimacy are most influential at different points in a CWG body's development and (b) to gain insights into strategic actions practitioners can take to gain, enhance, maintain, or restore legitimacy for collaborative bodies. The paper makes a contribution to the literature at the intersection of legitimacy and CWG by adding an assessment of CWG legitimacy's dynamic nature to existing CWG legitimacy scholarship (e.g., Baird *et al.*, 2014; Orr, 2015; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005; Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012).

## 2.2 Literature Review

Collaborative governance can be defined as “the processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private, and civic spheres to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished” (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015, p. 18). CWG bodies are the organizations that embody these processes and structures for decision-making concerning water. The purported benefits of collaborating (e.g., shared risks, increased likelihood of project success), along with the inability of traditional state institutions and mechanisms to solve the multi-jurisdictional and complex nature of many water problems, have led to its increasing use as a way to address water challenges (Innes & Booher, 2000; Sabatier, Focht, *et al.*, 2005a). While many have studied collaborative governance dynamics, including their antecedents, structure, and performance variables (e.g., Ansell & Gash, 2007; Bryson *et al.*, 2006; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Innes & Booher, 2003; Margerum, 2008; Thomson & Perry, 2006), there is still much that is unknown about how these dynamics evolve over time as a collaboration ages (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).

One analytic framework that can help explore collaborative governance over time is “development stages”. Development stages are constructs that are presented in either a linear or cyclical (i.e., the biological metaphor of a lifecycle) schematic that detail an organization’s development and growth through time using a set number of stages. Although many variations of the model exist, they are similar in nature and thus choosing one is a semantic, rather than substantive, decision (Fisher *et al.*, 2016; Lester *et al.*, 2003). This paper adopts a combination of models based on an inductive-deductive interpretation of the collaborative governance bodies in question. It also draws on insights from organizational (e.g., Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Hybels, 1995; Lester *et al.*, 2003), small group development (e.g., Tuckman, 1965) and network (e.g., Mandell & Keast, 2008; Sydow, 2004) literatures. These literatures provide an important foundation because collaborative governance bodies mimic traits of public organizations (e.g., Edwards, 2016), small groups (e.g., Fraser Basin Council, 2015a), and inter-organizational networks (e.g., Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Presented below and in Figure 3.1 is the five-stage model used in this study. In this model, organizational development is a series of stages that each have identifiable organizational dynamics (e.g., structure, process, performance, output) that change over time. These stages, discussed in more detail below, provide a framework for understanding the different legitimacy challenges and opportunities collaborative governance bodies face as they evolve. Importantly, while the stages are presented linearly for simplicity in this model, the empirical experience may be more complex; for example, some groups may never move from one stage to another, some may skip stages, and others may face multiple crises and points of decline before ever moving to a new developmental stage.

**Figure 3.1: Five Stages of CWG Development**



## **2.2.1 Collaborative Governance Development Stages**

### **2.2.1.1 Stage One: Establishment**

The establishment stage solidifies a body's purpose, roles and responsibilities and organizational boundaries (Lester *et al.*, 2003). For collaborative governance development, this means getting participants involved and working together towards a common goal, deciding on the direction of the body, and building positive organizational culture such as relationships, trust, and commitment (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Mandell & Keast, 2008). As such, the right combination of interpersonal (e.g., recognized interdependence), interorganizational (e.g., need for resource sharing, willingness to take risks) and systematic (e.g., history of collaboration and failed single-sector approaches and a sense of need for collective action) antecedents (Bryson *et al.*, 2006) is needed to motivate people to work together for the establishment of a collaboration.

### **2.2.1.2 Stage Two: Growth**

If acceptance is gained, then bodies enter the second stage – growth – where, in general, there is a formal organizational structure and an established identity with clear roles and responsibilities (Lester *et al.*, 2003). In this stage, the focus is on building organizational sustainability and proving worth by working towards a body's goals to demonstrate impacts (Avina, 1993). For the organizational sustainability of collaborative governance, Keast *et al.* (2004) emphasizes the need for government support and participant commitment in inter-organizational networks. However, many bodies remain at this stage due to resource challenges (Lester *et al.*, 2003), intergroup conflict (Tuckman, 1965), and recognition challenges by external community members (Mandell & Keast, 2008; Sydow, 2004).

### **2.2.1.3 Stage Three: Maturity**

Eventually, when a body becomes self-sufficient with routine cooperation and procedures, focus may shift from expansion to maintenance of procedures and activities and it may be considered engrained or institutionalized within the community (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). For collaborative governance, this maintenance is acknowledged as the preservation of relationships (Vangen & Huxham, 2003) and momentum towards goals (Ansell & Gash, 2007); however, for CWG, consensus does not exist in the literature about whether bodies can or should be maintained in the long-term (Bingham, 2009; Kallis *et al.*, 2009).

### **2.2.1.4 Stage Four: Decline**

At any point, a body may face challenges that can cause organizational decline, leading to reinvention or dissolution (Stage 5) (Lester *et al.*, 2003). In this sense, organizations may decline before they reach maturity. For collaborative governance, sources of decline that hinder a body's ability to function may include the loss of belief in collaboration as an appropriate choice to address a problem (Holley *et al.*, 2012b), inadequate sectoral representation (Parkinson, 2003), poor accountability (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Bingham *et al.*, 2008), power imbalances (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Moody, 2009), and the inability for collaborations to effectively and efficiently achieve their goals (Bevir, 2009; Kallis *et al.*, 2009).

### **2.2.1.5 Stage Five: Dissolution or Renewal**

Finally, when organizational decline becomes contextually too severe, bodies either end or use innovation to reinvent themselves leading to a new growth stage (Lester *et al.*, 2003). This dissolution or renewal proves may happen at any stage within the development of an organization following a period of decline. In the context of collaborative governance, Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) discuss reinvention as adaptation when a collaboration must respond to changes that are a result of its own actions. Although this does not necessarily equate with renewal, it does suggest an iterative reflection and processes modification to fit a new reality.

## **2.2.2 Collaborative Water Governance Legitimacy**

Since CWG exists outside of the traditional decision-making structures (e.g., legislative/parliamentary processes), how its legitimacy is achieved is a question that is being actively explored through both in-depth assessment (e.g., Baird *et al.*, 2014; Edwards, 2016; Gearey & Jeffrey, 2006; Hard *et al.*, 2012; Leino & Peltomaa, 2012; Orr, 2015; Sandstrom *et al.*, 2014; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005; Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012) and general review as one of a number of important attributes for collaborative governance (e.g., Armitage *et al.*, 2012; Biermann & Gupta, 2011; Innes & Booher, 1999; Lockwood *et al.*, 2010; Lundqvist, 2004; Moss & Newig, 2010; Newig, 2012; Pahl-Wostl *et al.*, 2013). Collectively, these studies provide valuable insights into CWG legitimacy's sources, challenges, and situated nature. Also, revealed within many of these in-depth and general reviews are a number of different legitimacy types that categorize legitimacy sources. For example, Orr (2015) uses rules, expressed consent, and justifiability of rules legitimacy types (Beetham's (1991, 2013) typology) to assess CWG in Quebec, Canada. Baird *et al.* (2014), in contrast, used input and substantive legitimacy types (Trachtenberg and Focht's (2005) typology) to examine CWG in the Canadian province of Ontario. However, what this literature collectively does not do is identify all relevant legitimacy types for CWG, which is necessary to understand the composition of legitimacy judgements.

A review of the broader legitimacy literature suggests that there are at least 22 different legitimacy types, not all of which appear in the CWG literature. These legitimacy types are based within different interpretations of legitimacy, where legitimacy is treated as a normative or empirical construct and the focus is on legitimacy as the justification or authority or as the justification of appropriate behaviour by any entity. This paper, acknowledges these differences in interpretations and suggests that a comprehensive approach is needed to consider all different legitimacy types regardless of theoretical background. The main reason for this approach is the documented awareness of the hybridity of both collaborative governance legitimacy (Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012; Wallington *et al.*, 2008) as well as collaborative governance bodies themselves as a structural mix of public and non-governmental organizational norms without authority (Borrás & Ejrnæs, 2011).

Table 3.1. provides a summary of the 22 legitimacy types grouping together similar legitimacy types under a common sub-heading. These groupings are not entirely exclusive of each other as, for example, some forms of rules (identified as a type under institutional-setting) may be internal to a collaboration and dictate process. However, the groups represent a way to synthesize and organize the range of possible CWG legitimacy types. The ideal practice grouping concerns process-based variables, which are often associated with various democratic values. These legitimacy types stem from the ways governance occurs and are often based on normative assessment of how a certain form of governance should be carried out. In contrast, legitimacy related to results stems from the production and quality of output from a governance body. The technical nature of water governance, means that often such results are scientific in nature and focused on improving environmental welfare (Sabatier, Focht, *et al.*, 2005a). Comparatively, legitimacy related to institutional-setting emerges from the existence and use of external formal rules and legal frameworks that provide stability and structure for a collaborative body. Legitimacy types associated with social acceptance represent legitimacy that is based on cognitive reasoning as it aligns with different discourses and values of a society (Bernstein, 2004). Finally, legitimacy types related to individuals stem from the qualities or relationships of specific individuals or groups that generate support. A gap exists in the CWG literature in terms of verifying the applicability of all of these legitimacy types not only in general, but also specific to which types are more or less relevant at different CWG development stages.

**Table 3.1: Relevant CWG Legitimacy Types**

<b>Grouping</b>	<b>Legitimacy Type</b>	<b>Definition</b>
Ideal Practice	Democratic or non-democratic input: input (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007; Horeth, 1999; Scharpf, 1997; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005), procedural (Etsy, 2006; Lord & Magnette, 2004; Suchman, 1995), democratic (Beetham & Lord, 1998; Etsy, 2006), principled (Bernstein, 2004), normative (Scott, 1995), justifiability of rules (Beetham, 2013), traditional (Weber, 1964), convention (Matheson, 1987)	Observance of certain practices based on moral and ethical habits and norms; when democratic norms focus on the institutional and formal protection of rights and recognition of authority
	Deliberative (Etsy, 2006)	Political dialogue engaging multiple perspectives

<b>Grouping</b>	<b>Legitimacy Type</b>	<b>Definition</b>
	Throughput (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007)	Quality of rules and procedures
	Structural: structural (Easton, 1965; Suchman, 1995); systematic (Etsy, 2006)	Evaluation of categories and structural characteristics
	Universal: ideological (Easton, 1965), sacredness (Matheson, 1987), universal principle (Matheson, 1987)	Conformity through values that are generalizable to a large population, e.g., religious or sectoral norms
Results-based	Problem solving (Føllesdal, 2005)	Capacity to produce specific output or outcomes that help solve collective problems
	Substantive output: output (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007; Horeth, 1999; Jachtenfuchs <i>et al.</i> , 1998; Scharpf, 1997), substantive (Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005), consequential (Suchman, 1995), results-based (Etsy, 2006)	Measurable delivery of goals
	Performance (Beetham & Lord, 1998)	Quality of results
	Technocratic (Lord & Magonette, 2004)	The efficient and effective tackling of political challenges on the basis of its general problem-solving capacity
Institutional-setting	Rule: legal (Bernstein, 2004), rational-legality (Weber, 1964), regulative (Scott, 1995), rule (Beetham, 1991, 2013), order-based (Etsy, 2006), formal (Arnull, 2002)	Measured on degree of obligation the rules imposed, the precision of the rules in defining authorized conduct, and the delegation of third parties to implement or interpret rules
	Contract (Matheson, 1987)	Specified by an agreement (not a norm) in which power-holder and power-subject assume mutual rights and obligations
Social Acceptance	Cognitive (Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995)	Cultural systems through values, beliefs, assumptions (fit within larger social system/ alternative will cause chaos)
	Pragmatic (Suchman, 1995)	Whether activity benefits evaluator
	Social identity: identity (Jachtenfuchs <i>et al.</i> , 1998), sociological (Bernstein, 2004)	Cultural connectedness
	Internal consent: internal (Boulding, 1967), participation (Jachtenfuchs <i>et al.</i> , 1998), expressed consent (Beetham, 1991, 2013)	Sense of moral obligation leading to voluntary actions of participants communicating one's commitment or acceptance
	External approval: external (Boulding, 1967), social (Arnull, 2002), identification (Beetham & Lord, 1998); popular approval (Matheson, 1987)	Extent authority generates common public acceptance
	Parliamentary (Lord & Magonette, 2004)	Popular sovereignty through elected process
	Compliance (Føllesdal, 2005)	Adherence to authority
Individual-based	Personal qualities: personal (Easton, 1965; Suchman, 1995), personal qualities (Matheson, 1987), charismatic (Weber, 1964)	Characteristics of authorities

Grouping	Legitimacy Type	Definition
	Expertise (Matheson, 1987)	Justification through the possession expertise and knowledge
	Extension: personal ties (Matheson, 1987), indirect (Lord & Magonette, 2004)	Relationship that provides justification for power exchange or action

To help address this gap, scholars such as Ashforth and Gibbs (1990), Fisher *et al.* (2016), Hybels (1995), Johnson *et al.* (2006), Pinkerton and John (2008), and Tilling (2004) provide frameworks that characterize the evolution of legitimacy over time in contexts other than collaboration. In this work, legitimacy is thought to progress through its own stages of development where it is established, extended, maintained, and defended (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Tilling, 2004). In these stages, legitimacy is established as acceptance within the socially constructed realities of relevant audiences, extended by demonstrating results and gaining local validity, maintained through reputation and routine maintenance that anticipates and prevents or forestalls potential challenges, and defended using various management techniques when an organization faces scrutiny to avoid resource loss. Speaking in more depth to the initial establishment and extension of legitimacy, Johnson *et al.* (2006) also add that legitimacy is forged first through innovation before becoming locally validated, diffused and then generally validated.

Frameworks such as these suggest that legitimacy may develop in a similar manner to organizational bodies themselves. Empirical studies by authors such as Pinkerton and John (2008) and Fisher *et al.* (2016) also confirm the evolutionary nature of legitimacy in different contexts. Pinkerton and John (2008) shows how legitimacy for fisheries in western Canada is based first on scientific and regulatory legitimacy, second on political support, third, on moral validation, and fourth on the creation of new environmental values. Meanwhile, Fisher *et al.* (2016) explain how legitimacy of new technology ventures stems from conception, commercialization, and then growth. Overall, these studies suggest what the dominant legitimacy concerns may be as organizations evolve. Combining insights from these studies with the types of legitimacy relevant to CWG and the development stages in Figure 3.1 produces the conceptual framework shown in Table 3.2. This framework can be used to explore CWG legitimacy over time, and to reveal the types of legitimacy that matter more as collaborative bodies develop (Hanberger, 2003).

**Table 3.2: Conceptual Framework**

Development Stage	Dominant legitimacy concerns evident in literature	Related legitimacy types	Example concerns relevant to collaborative governance legitimacy
Establishment	Establishment: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Liability of newness (body may lack support of traditions and norms); questioning what are they really saying and what will they really do? (Ashforth &amp; Gibbs, 1990)</li> </ul>	Pragmatic, cognitive, moral, problem-solving	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Does the problem context indicate a sense of need for collaboration?</li> <li>Do community members want to collaborate?</li> <li>What conditions acted as antecedents for collaborative action?</li> </ul>

Development Stage	Dominant legitimacy concerns evident in literature	Related legitimacy types	Example concerns relevant to collaborative governance legitimacy
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community understands need for action on certain issues based on evidence (Pinkerton &amp; John, 2008)</li> <li>• Characteristics of resource and community influence the support give to the creation of an entity (Pinkerton &amp; John, 2008)</li> </ul>		
Growth	<p>Extension:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proactive effort to show worth and gain support of constituents (Ashforth &amp; Gibbs, 1990; Tilling, 2004)</li> <li>• Establishing resource stability (Fisher <i>et al.</i>, 2016)</li> <li>• Locally validated (normatively and socially agreeable) process and structure (Johnson <i>et al.</i>, 2006)</li> </ul>	Performance, output/substantive/ results-based, democratic, procedural, normative, input	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Are there adequate resources and government support?</li> <li>• Are roles and responsibilities for participants as well as the collaboration clear/respected?</li> <li>• Is the community generally aware or supportive of the collaboration or of taking action on the issue?</li> <li>• Is the collaborative process based on normative/democratic values?</li> <li>• Is output regularly produced?</li> </ul>
Maturity	<p>Maintenance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ongoing routinized role; requires ongoing assurances of role and anticipation of challenges (Ashforth &amp; Gibbs, 1990; Tilling, 2004)</li> <li>• Valued as a part of community (Pinkerton &amp; John, 2008)</li> <li>• Independence from resource providers (Fisher <i>et al.</i>, 2016)</li> <li>• Adaptation to new audience expectations (Acreman, 2001; Tilling, 2004)</li> </ul>	Cognitive, substantive, internal/external, social, identity, normative, process-based, input, structural, systematic, substantive, consequential, formal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is unity and cohesiveness evident within the collaboration?</li> <li>• Has substantive output/second or third-order results/outcomes been achieved?</li> <li>• Is there a sense of a well-developed network within and with other (i.e., mentorship) watersheds/collaborations?</li> <li>• Is the collaboration self-sustaining?</li> <li>• Does ongoing opposition towards the collaboration exist?</li> </ul>
Decline	<p>Defence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Performance or value</li> </ul>	Internal/ participation, performance, moral,	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is the collaboration able to weather credibility</li> </ul>

<b>Development Stage</b>	<b>Dominant legitimacy concerns evident in literature</b>	<b>Related legitimacy types</b>	<b>Example concerns relevant to collaborative governance legitimacy</b>
	<p>challenges that may impede output and stigmatize organization (Ashforth &amp; Gibbs, 1990)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Scrutinized externally (Tilling, 2004)</li> </ul>	cognitive,	<p>challenges?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can the collaboration take on new or different activities without criticism?</li> <li>• Do political debates challenge effectiveness?</li> <li>• Has the collaboration produced meaningful output?</li> </ul>
Dissolution or Renewal	<p>Loss:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inability to react to challenges (Ashforth &amp; Gibbs, 1990)</li> </ul> <p>Extension:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Flexible reaction to legitimacy challenges (Tilling, 2004)</li> <li>• Exemplification and promotion of new desirable qualities (Ashforth &amp; Gibbs, 1990)</li> </ul>	Internal/participation, external, popular approval, performance, problem-solving	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is the collaboration able to adapt to changing social, political, or environmental challenges?</li> <li>• Have innovative processes been undertaken to extend or change the collaboration's mandate?</li> <li>• Does the collaboration still remain relevant or favoured in the surrounding community?</li> <li>• Are there champions for the collaborative process that ensure the benefit of the collaboration still outweighs transaction costs of participating?</li> </ul>

## 2.3 Setting and Study Design

### 2.3.1 Setting

Since the 1990s, in the province of British Columbia, Canada there has been increasing use of collaborative models for watershed-based and local water decision-making (Brandes & O'Riordan, 2014; Fraser Basin Council, 2015a). Although the Government of BC still maintains constitutional authority to manage the province's water resources, a desire by the Province to share water management responsibilities at the local level through collaborative models is reflected in BC's new Water Sustainability Act (Province of British Columbia, 2014), which supports the use of alternative governance arrangements. Central to the emergence of CWG in Canada and BC are factors such as a public demand for drinking water protection, fish habitat protection, and water quantity and quality challenges, citizen desire to participate in public decision-making, conflict among water users, and limited government resources and silos (Nowlan & Bakker, 2010). In the BC context, these demands have led to the creation of many watershed or local CWG bodies that are all distinct because the province has adopted a one-size-does-not-fit-all approach to watershed scale governance (British Columbia Ministry of Environment, 2010a). The reason for this approach is the significant environmental, cultural, social, and political diversity across the province. In particular, the diversity of First Nations

communities across the province, each with evolving water and watershed resource rights and differing opinions and involvement in the aboriginal treaty process, has made it difficult to prescribe one form of watershed governance (Brandes & O'Riordan, 2014). As a result of the one-size-does-not-fit-all approach, BC's CWG bodies have been established in different ways, at different times, and for different reasons, meaning that each body has faced different legitimacy-related challenges and opportunities (Brandes & Curran, 2009).

## **2.3.2 Study design**

### **2.3.2.1 Method:**

Guided by a constructivist paradigm (Creswell, 2009), a multi-case study design (Yin, 2009) was employed to examine legitimacy over the life of CWG bodies. The ability for case study methods to examine situated knowledge in areas requiring longitudinal assessment (Yin, 2009) and where existing theory is inadequate (Gerring, 2007; Stake, 2006) justifies this approach as CWG legitimacy is context dependent and knowledge is lacking regarding its dynamic nature (Connelly, 2011; Johnson *et al.*, 2006).

### **2.3.2.2 Case Selection and Descriptions:**

Five CWG bodies operating at the watershed scale in the Canadian province of BC were selected as case-units for this study (see Table 3.3 for a summary). BC was an ideal setting for the exploration of CWG legitimacy because a range of collaborative governance models is used throughout the province in watersheds that are geographically diverse and face varying water problems (Brandes & O'Riordan, 2014). To select the cases, BC-based CWG bodies that are locally based and that self-identify as a multi-sector collaborative body were short-listed. From this list, cases were collectively selected to ensure representation geographically from across the province (see Figure 3.2) and to facilitate diversity among the ages and current development stage of the cases. The rationale for this selection process relates to the popularity of CWG at the watershed or grassroots level (Leach, 2006) and variation among collaborative processes. Adhering to these criteria then allows general inferences to be drawn from the findings for locally or watershed-based CWG bodies.

The following five CWG bodies were selected: the Cowichan Water Board (CWB), the Lake Windermere Ambassadors (LWA), the Nechako Watershed Council (NWC), the Okanagan Basin Water Board (OBWB), and the Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process/Shuswap Watershed Council (SLIPP/SWC).

- The CWB is a collaborative partnership between the Cowichan Valley Regional District and the Cowichan Tribes, which is supported by an inclusive stakeholder-based technical advisory committee. It aims to deliver a water management strategy dealing with water quality and quantity concerns and has done so thus far through action such as water quality monitoring, political advocacy and public educational efforts, and restoration initiatives. CWB represents a body still in the growth stage as it is still struggling to secure long-term funding and commitment by the provincial government for participation or action on water quantity issues.
- The LWA is a voluntary citizen-led collaboration that was originally an environmental non-governmental organization (ENGO) project. Their work includes monitoring water quality,

educating the public on water issues, conducting restoration, and advising local governments on the sustainability of development proposals. The LWA also is in the growth stage of its development as it is still depending on annual grants, struggling to maintain consistent participation, and continuing to build an identity separate from its parent ENGO, Wildsight.

- The NWC represents a collaborative body that was open to all impacted actors effected by water flow diversions for an aluminum company (Alcan/RioTinto Alcan). Before the NWC dissolved in 2011, the group worked to address conflict among actor groups and make a recommendation about how to allocate funds to remediate water flow impacts. The body never matured before it started to decline and eventually dissolve due to challenges such as declining participation, stagnant leadership, and the failure of their recommendation for fund allocation to gain support for implementation by the BC Government.
- The OBWB is the oldest collaboration in the province and represents a body that reached maturity, faced decline and was able to renew itself. It is the only CWG body legislated by the Province, which through supplementary letters patent binds together the three regional districts in the watershed to deliver water management responsibilities with taxation power. These responsibilities include sewage infrastructure granting and Eurasian Milfoil management along with a variety of public education, technical research-studies, and advocacy activities. The length of the OBWB (established 1968), the supportive institutional-setting and legal framework, and its general acceptance in the community all indicate the collaboration has matured.
- SLIPP represented an interagency collaboration among governments that formed to coordinate agency responses to issues of water quality, recreational safety, and development impacts. After facing public controversy due to mandate misconception and funding challenges, SLIPP rebranded to the SWC in 2015 to continue addressing water quality and recreational safety concerns. Activities of SLIPP included water quality monitoring coordination among agencies, restoration and derelict dock removal, and public education. This body is now, after a period of decline, in the growth stage again and is continuing to work to prove its utility and calm public controversy.


Together these bodies represent CWG that has formed and been structured in different ways and for various purposes at the local watershed level. Common characteristics among these bodies include their non-regulatory nature, their use of an inclusive structure and deliberation, and their focus on solving local common pool resource problems. Figure 3.3 depicts the development stage and experience of the five cases. Note that in Figure 3.3 the double lines for the OBWB and SLIPPSWC represent the notion that these cases have evolved and been renewed again after a period of decline. Also, because some cases (NWC and SLIPP/SWC) have skipped the maturity stage before entering the decline stage there is a line gap in the figure representing the stages they missed.

**Table 3.3: Case Description**


Trait	CWB	LWA	NWC	OBWB	SLIPP/SWC
Date Active	2010-	2009 -	1998-2011	1968-	2006-

<b>Trait</b>	<b>CWB</b>	<b>LWA</b>	<b>NWC</b>	<b>OBWB</b>	<b>SLIPP/SWC</b>
Origin	Recommended from 2007 Cowichan Basin Water Management Plan (Westland Resource Group Inc., 2007), drought led to initiation	2005 RAMSAR–Wetland International Convention identified gap in lake stewardship impeding Columbia Wetlands protection; ENGO initiated	Collaborative multi-sector partnership stemming from 1997 BC-Alcan settlement agreement due to conflicting water management perspectives; ENGO initiated	Coordination of regional governments to address water quality concerns; in 1974 designated to carry-out Okanagan Basin Study suggestions	Initiated as an inter-agency partnership to coordinate water management and respond to development impacts on lakes and algae blooms
Organizational structure	12-member board	Fluctuating board size; paid general members	Fluctuating board size	12-member board supported by 25-member Okanagan Water Stewardship Council (OWSC)	SLIPP: 21-member board supported by technical and public advisory committees SWC: 12-member board
Legal structure	Registered Society, documented terms of reference (DTR)	Registered society, Lake Windermere OCP Bylaw No. 2061 bylaw establishing Management Committee (LWMC), DTR	Recognition for establishment in BC Utilities Commission (BCUC) report on the Kemano Completion Project, DTR	Mandated under the Municipalities Enabling and Validating Act giving power of taxation via supplementary letters patent, DTR	SLIPP: DTR SWC: Shuswap Watershed Council Service Establishment Bylaw No. 5705 (2015), DTR
Funding mechanism	Annual gas tax funds and external project grants	Local governments service fee, membership fees, external project grants	Nechako Environmental Enhancement Fund and in-kind support from participating agencies	Parcel tax, federal and provincial project grants	SLIPP: Gas tax funds and in-kind contributions SWC: Parcel tax and in-kind provincial support

**Figure 3.2: Case Study Watersheds Within the Province of British Columbia**



**Figure 3.3: Development Stage Progress of Each Case**



### 2.3.2.3 Data Collection:

Data were generated from 99 semi-structured interviews and triangulated with a document review and personal observation from 2013 to 2015. To select interviewees, prior to and during the data collection process, relevant societal sectors were identified for each case and interviewees were sought from across each sector. The broad categories used to organize identified sectors included government (including First Nations government) and non-government interest groups that were either case participants (past or present) or non-participants familiar with the case (including collaborative managers and funders). Table 3.2 outlines the distribution of interviewees from across these sectors relative to each case. Interviewees that work across multiple cases are categorized in the BC-wide column of the table. Interviews were semi-structured, and focused on each case's processes, results, legality, social acceptance, and the individuals involved. Interview questions focused on past, present, and future dynamics to conceptualize the evolution of each case's legitimacy. The conceptual framework guided the design of the interview protocol. For example, regarding legitimacy at the establishment stage of a collaboration, interview questions focused on why and how the collaboration was formed and whether there were any barriers in its initiation. This allowed the antecedents affecting the initial legitimacy judgements towards each case to be identified.

Interview selection was conducted using both purposeful and snowball protocol to include individuals from all relevant CWG sectors who were either knowledgeable about local water management or who were involved in CWG. Interview recruitment and delivery was conducted electronically, by phone, or in person by the first author. Interview data collection concluded when no new topics emerged or when all relevant actors were interviewed. All interviews were

digitally recorded and then transcribed verbatim by either the first author or TranscribeMe, an internet-based transcription service. Member checking of transcripts provided verification of data (Carlson, 2010).

To supplement the interviews, 656 documents were reviewed. These included newspaper articles, meeting minutes, government reports and letters, draft and finalized plans promotional material, emails, collaborative group websites and publications. Document identification occurred by word of mouth and internet searches. Online database or local community newspaper search engines were used to identify news articles that included the name of each collaboration. Finally, nine substantive personal observations took place at board and committee meetings and social events, BC-wide practitioner watershed conferences and public hearings. Observations also occurred during interviews and through watershed site-visits. Data collection concluded when subject saturation was established based on triangulation among interviews, document review, and personal observation (Charmaz, 2006).

**Table 3.4: Number of Interviewees by Role and Case**

Interviewee role	CWB	LWA	NWC	OBWB	SLIPP/ SWC	BC- wide	Total
Past or present participants (government, agriculture, environment, industry, academia, youth, property owners, local business)	18	9	6	15	10		58
Non-participant (same sectors as participants)	3	3	3	1	11	3	24
CWG managers (staff, facilitators, convenors)	1	2	5	2	2		12
Financial resource supporter	1	3	1				5
Total	23	17	15	18	23	3	99

#### **2.3.2.4 Data Analysis:**

All data including reviewed documents, were coded using NVIVO 10. Qualitative analysis was primarily used to understand contextual meanings within the data. Coding was guided by the conceptual framework (Table 3.2) to identify patterns, themes, and relationships among the data both within and across cases. As a result, findings were initially deductive in nature; however, inductive insights from the data were also included to infer trends specifically about the nature of CWG legitimacy. Triangulation of sources and methods was used to validate findings that were discussed in the context of the same development stage within and across cases. Cross-case analysis was conducted on a case-by-case basis with consideration for longitudinal differences. For example, data pertaining to the establishment stage of each collaboration were compared together and contrasted to data pertaining to the other stages. Through this analysis some noteworthy differences were identified across the cases from times when cases were functioning within the same development stage. However, for the most part, legitimacy themes for each stage were relatively similar across the cases that had experienced that particular stage. Given this result, the development stages, instead of the individual cases, are used to present findings, noting

both case and cross-case themes when evident. Themes were identified by either the frequency or depth in which they appear in the data (Saldaña, 2009). Evidence (quotations and observation reflections) were then selected to illustrate the range of dominant themes. With the quotations, anonymity was preserved by withholding interviewee names and only sharing the sector and case with which each interviewee was associated if it would not identify the person.

## 2.4 Results

This paper uses the analytical paradigm of development stages to conceptualize where the establishment, maintenance, strengthening, or weakening of legitimacy takes place (and ultimately matters as an attribute) for CWG. To do so, dominant legitimacy sources and types at each development stage are presented by case (Tables 3.5-3.9) and selected themes are explored in more detail in the accompanying text.

### 2.4.1 Stage 1: Establishment

During Stage One of each case, the dominant legitimacy rhetoric stemmed from the willingness of community members to work together and the belief in CWG as a way to solve water problems. The most relevant audiences forming legitimacy judgements at this stage were often community members both involved with and external to the collaboration, collaborative conveners, and those providing resource support.

**Table 3.5: Stage 1: Legitimacy Sources, Types and Evidence**

Sources of Legitimacy	Relevant legitimacy types	Evidence
Problem-solving discourse: a water crisis creates a local sense of need for collaboration	Cognitive, problem-solving, external approval	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>CWB</i>: critical river flow levels/drought 2008 (Hunter <i>et al.</i>, 2014)</li> <li>• <i>LWA</i>: public call for protection of Columbia River headwaters; perceived changes in aquatic plant growth and water quality (Leschied, 2011)</li> <li>• <i>NWC</i>: public concern about attempts for further industrial diversion of water by Alcan (i.e., Kemano I &amp; II Projects) (Christensen, 1996)</li> <li>• <i>SLIPP</i>: increased sewage discharge proposals, algae blooms, government agency silos, recreational boating accidents (Ecoscape Environmental Consultants, 2009)</li> <li>• <i>OBWB</i>: drought, presence of invasive species, inadequate sewage treatment</li> </ul>
Community readiness: willingness of community to work together; based on the benefit collaboration can provide for the greater good or to specific sectors	Pragmatic, external approval	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>CWB</i>: 2008 North American Indigenous Games create community unity</li> <li>• <i>LWA</i>: participation in LWA from diverse sectors (Lake Windermere Ambassadors, 2010)</li> <li>• <i>NWC</i>: public rally against Alcan expansion and desire for forum to raise concerns</li> </ul>

Sources of Legitimacy	Relevant legitimacy types	Evidence
		(Christensen, 1996) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>SLIPP</i>: divers community participation in SLIPP public committees; media calls for action on development issues</li> <li>• <i>OBWB</i>: joint federal and provincial Okanagan Basin Study (Canada-British Columbia Consultative Board, 1974) calling for collaborative action by regional districts; history of collaboration in basin (e.g., regional library)</li> </ul>

Despite differences in the objectives of and community dynamics surrounding each case (Table 3.4 & 3.5), the perceived willingness of different sectors to work together served as the initial legitimating feature for all cases. Factors stimulating this willingness stemmed from the existence of prior cooperative or participatory work and a sense of need for collaboration. For example, in the Cowichan, drought in 2008 risked the ability of Catalyst Pulp and Paper (one of the region’s largest employers) to operate and detrimentally affected salmon fisheries, which particularly impacted the Cowichan Tribes. This challenge generated a sense of need, which was coupled with a positive experience of cooperation between the Cowichan Tribes and the CVRD to host the 2008 North American Indigenous Games:

In the beginning, the dynamics in this community were set perfectly for it. In 2008, we had what were called the North American Indigenous Games just before the Watershed Board was formed. First Nations from all over North America came to the Cowichan Valley for competitions [and] the whole community participated. Cowichan Tribes were leading it, but there was a huge outpouring of volunteer help. There was a wonderful sense of unity built (Interview 69).

The familiarity of community members with the benefits of multi-sector collaboration helped justify CWG as a viable option to address water problems.

Both the potential for and actual crises played a particular role not just in creating policy windows to stimulate action, but also in emphasizing the sense of need for action to change the status quo. The following newspaper excerpts emphasize this sense of collaborative need for the Shuswap and Lake Windermere: “Once again, we’re facing a large algal bloom that is like the canary in the coal mine... It points to serious problems in the Shuswap and Mara Lakes and the need for a Shuswap Watershed Council as recommended by SLIPP” (Brouwer, 2010 May 14) and “there was consensus (when the Lake Windermere project started) that if we were serious about protecting the health of our water, it needed to be a collaborative approach, not just something done by an environmental group” (Hubrecht, 2014 October 22). Policy windows such as these were seen in all the cases, in the form of environmental crises, concern for government silos, and conflicts among actor groups.

Together this sense of need and the willingness to work together generated momentum at the beginning of each case. One particularly important action noted across all cases to help establish this readiness was the actual invitation and inclusion of relevant actors in initial planning discussions. This action was particularly important for gaining involvement and

legitimacy from First Nations and required upfront open communication and personal connection: “if you want to have First Nations involved, you have to have a conversation from the onset. You can't go halfway through and say, ‘Now, this is what we want to do. How would you like to be involved?’” (Interview 24, CWB convenor)? For the CWB, First Nations engagement as a partner who assisted in structuring the initiative, helped ensure the Cowichan Tribes remained involved later on. Open and meaningful communication from the start is essential to establishing trust and building faith in a body.

## 2.4.2 Stage 2: Growth

Eventually, the initial sources that established a body’s legitimacy are no longer adequate and focus turns to the extension of legitimacy based on what collaborations actually do, how they do it, and the competency of leaders (Table 3.6). Such a focus is present in legitimacy judgements from a variety of audiences, including collaborative conveners, external community members, resource supporters, and participants at this stage.

**Table 3.6: Stage 2: Legitimacy Sources, Types and Evidence**

Sources of Legitimacy	Relevant legitimacy types	Evidence
Structure and process of collaboration: emphasis on thoughtful and clear procedures for collective learning, trust building, selection of participants, administrative practice and hierarchy, roles and responsibilities	Democratic and non-democratic input, structural contract, rule	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Terms of reference or governance manuals of each body, meeting minutes, and observed behavior of board process at meetings</li> </ul>
Strong committed leaders that guide and enhance the credibility of the body	Personal qualities, Extension	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interviewee comments across all cases positively identifying the program managers, staff, and chairs for their contribution to each body</li> </ul>
Established track record necessary to gain social acceptance among collaborative partners and within community; small-wins on non-controversial science-based topics helpful for legitimacy and maintaining member engagement	Substantive output, performance, problem-solving, technocratic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>CWB</i>: eel grass removal, watershed tours</li> <li>• <i>LWA</i>: restoration at Kinsmen Beach</li> <li>• <i>NWC</i>: Science-based recommendation to NEEF to build water release facility at Kenney Dam</li> <li>• <i>OBWB</i>: milfoil management, Don’t Move a Mussel campaign, Water Wise program</li> <li>• <i>SLIPP</i>: derelict dock removal</li> </ul>

Focusing on process, inclusivity and slow deliberate practices that included learning about water issues and collaboration, trust-building, and the development of shared participant values were central to legitimacy judgements in each case. The following comments illustrate these legitimacy sources: “basically legitimacy stems from how we were set up” (Interview 14, CWB

participant); “they [OBWB] spent a lot of time doing that [i.e., educating participants] right upfront...it was kind of a lengthy process at the beginning, but it paid off in the long run” (Interview 85, provincial government employee); “there's a lot of relationship building at the start to get people to trust each other and work together... [then] the really successful ones get things accomplished, people work together well, and they're committed to it” (Interview 5, provincial government employee, referring to CWG in general); and “we decided a long time ago that we need to keep reaching out and be open, transparent because it is also about building legitimacy and building good faith and not giving them [the public] the perception that there is anything threatening” (Interview 3, OWSC participant). Comments such as these speak to the normative development of structural, democratic, and non-democratic input legitimacy types.

Interviewees in all cases often commented on the importance of strong leadership to help guide the collaborative organizations. Leaders most discussed in interviews were the collaborations' chairs or program managers. Their charisma, relevant credentials, strong facilitation ability, or popularity due to their personal background all contributed positively to expanding the premise of a body's legitimacy (i.e., via personal, charismatic, indirect legitimacy). For example, in the context of the OBWB, 11 of the 18 interviewees made comments such as “[He] was a very seasoned politician... he was certainly the person who put the Stewardship Council on the map, he was the person who helped create it and helped get it going” (Interview 51, agriculture representative, OWSC). Similarly, such sentiment was also present in the context of SLIPP/SWC: “with... [their] energy behind it, we were able to initiate public meetings [and] grow some grassroots support for a more collaborative effort among the agencies, including non-government organizations” (Interview 8, provincial government employee). Additionally, “having paid staff is also necessary to really get behind something and put in a comprehensive effort – volunteers can only do so much” (Interview 27, financial supporter, LWA). Paid staff can help get work done making the collaboration more stable and official.

Both participants and observers of each case also expected collaborative bodies to establish a track record through tangible and social output. Small projects such as SLIPP's removal of derelict docks or the LWA's restoration of a local beach were particularly commented on as ways to gain social acceptance and popular approval both with the general public and with supporters (funders) of collaborations.

People will see the project as positive and that is the best bet for legitimacy. Avoid political issues for now. It is too new of a group and doesn't have the resources to take on the big political issues. Focus on what you can accomplish that is highly visible and build... over and over again until you can talk to the common person and they know exactly what you mean when you say "what do the Lake Windermere Ambassadors do?" Once you are at that point you get into the broader bigger discussions and tackle bigger issues (Interview 40, local business representative).

Taking on small manageable projects allowed the case study organizations to prove their capacity to gain additional legitimating resources. For example, the Columbia Basin Trust, which supports the LWA through grants, evaluates grant applications on the ability of a body to produce tangible projects and the degree of community support. In addition, science-based output also acted as a source of legitimacy in each case through the objective credibility (e.g., technocratic legitimacy); examples include technical reports (e.g., 4Thought Solutions Inc., 2005; Canada-British Columbia Consultative Board, 1974) and water quality monitoring reports (e.g., Ecoscape

Environmental Consultants, 2009; Lake Windermere Ambassadors, 2015). Finally, social output such as relationship-building among participants and spin-off partnerships also reinforced legitimacy at this stage. For example,

Networking, that is really what I got out of it... we have come up with research projects... and a lot of work around cattle and water quality working with the ranchers - that has all come through the OBWB. All those connections they are almost intangible, and they were expedited because of actually sitting there [at the OWSC] and hearing the concerns and saying "we impact that, or we can help there" (Interview 44, industry representative, OWSC).

Such social, technical, and project-based outputs were emphasized not only through interviews as a necessity for collaborative body acceptance, but also through regular documentation within meeting minutes, annual progress reports, and media releases.

### 2.4.3 Stage 3: Maturity

OBWB was the only organization to reach the maturity stage, which is demonstrated by the age of the collaboration (established in 1968) and its long track record of consistency in both its process and deliverables. This track record is recorded in four-decades worth of meeting minutes and progress reports, the resulting paper-based products act as evidence of the OBWB's stability and consistency indicating maturity. Likewise, the institutional support of the OBWB through its legislated backing provides further evidence of maturity through the body's sense of permanence that is generated from its long-term financial obligation to provide sewer infrastructure grants. From the OBWB's experience, five key legitimizing features are apparent, which are represented by each row in Table 3.7. Relevant audiences making legitimacy judgements are primarily collaborative participants and their constituents.

**Table 3.7: Stage 3: Legitimacy Sources, Types and Evidence**

Sources of Legitimacy	Relevant legitimacy types	Evidence (OBWB only)
Consistent returns	Substantive output, results-based	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>OBWB milfoil management program and sewage infrastructure grants</li> </ul>
Expected process	Non-democratic input	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Meeting minutes, regular meetings, annual audits and reports</li> </ul>
Meaningful relationships	Non-democratic input, throughput	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Long-term partnerships, partnership programs (e.g., UBC-O research chair position, groundwater monitoring)</li> </ul>
Relevant in changing social and ecological setting	Cognitive, external approval, social identity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Projects in response to relevant/popular issues, e.g., Don't Move a Mussel Campaign, Waterwise program</li> </ul>
Neutrality: lack of regulatory authority helps collaborations build relationships	Non-democratic input, rule	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Supplementary letters patent outlining OBWB responsibilities (Okanagan Basin Water Board, 2010b)</li> </ul>

From the track record of results, the actual consistent delivery of output is one of the foremost ways of maintaining legitimacy for the OBWB:

In considering the work of the water board over the last 45 years, Sears noted it has much to celebrate. Its Sewage Facilities Assistance Grants to local governments in the valley, which began four decades ago, have greatly improved water quality (Kelowna Capital News, 2015).

The ability of the OBWB to demonstrate change over time shows the impact of their work thus showing their effectiveness. Likewise, predictable process also helped build a sense of permanence for the OBWB:

I think just that staying power is probably the thing that will give it the most legitimacy and recognition... We are always there, we are always working forward, we are always developing new initiatives, people know that we are working on things – they don't necessarily understand where it is and how it fits in, what we have done, and where we are going. It is the consistency – we meet month after month – if you miss a few meetings you know it is going to be there on the second Thursday of every month that it is going to be there (Interview 91, OBWB staff).

In this sense, the OBWB has built a sense of permanence through its process. This permanence is also reinforced by observed regularity and transparency of checks and balances such as annual auditing and reporting and meeting minutes. While some of these habits are already present in the cases not in this stage, they were central features instilling stability in the OBWB case.

Next, the presence of meaningful relationships not only among the current individuals involved, but also as historically engrained organizational relationships have helped the OBWB ensure continuity. One way the OBWB does this is by establishing long-term partnerships with organizations like the University of British Columbia in the Okanagan (UBC-O) to continuously support local water research. As well, the ability of the OBWB to develop projects that have a direct impact on issues of popular concern such as invasive species control and water conservation, while also maintaining their other main programming helped keep the body from becoming stagnant. For example, “we all saw how bad the drought was... going forward the [OBWB] wants to ensure it plays a positive role, helping develop proper resources to assist Okanagan communities” (Morning Star Staff Reporter, 2015). Remaining relevant thus plays a role in legitimacy maintenance.

Finally, the OBWB's experience also emphasized the value of acting without regulatory authority to allow for friendly relationship-building across and with different sectors:

I don't see what additional authority would do for us. I feel really strongly that we're a collaborative organization and it's very toxic to have regulatory responsibilities if you're trying to be a collaboration organization. If you're trying to get everybody together to work in the same way and figure out what your joint problems are and how we are all going to spend the money, then have that same board be the one saying, "You broke the rules; we're penalizing you," then you automatically set up internal conflicts within the collaboration. You can't be holding the carrot and the stick at the same time (Interview 90, OBWB staff).

This idea of CWG being non-regulatory was also supported by the majority of collaborative managers and government interviewees in the other four cases asserting that CWG bodies may be able to best achieve their goals through voluntary measures.

#### 2.4.4 Stage 4: Decline

The belief of a body’s legitimacy by any audience may decline at any point during its development. In the data, a collaborative organization’s loss of legitimacy was directly tied to questions of its relevance. Internally, this questioning was linked to declining participation, and a loss of staff. Externally, open resistance within the community, the loss of funding or resources, and questions of stagnancy contributed to decline.

**Table 3.4: Stage 4: Legitimacy Sources, Types and Evidence**

Sources of Legitimacy	Relevant legitimacy types	Evidence (NWC, OBWB, SLIPP)
Relevance	External approval, social identity, cognitive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>NWC</i>: Open opposition (e.g., NWC radio interview, letters of opposition), decline from 20+ participants to six at the final meeting, loss of FBC as program manager</li> <li>• <i>SLIPP</i>: Open opposition in newspapers (e.g., Cunliffe (2014)) and by bodies such as the Shuswap Waterfront Owners Association</li> <li>• <i>OBWB</i>: Stagnant mandate focusing only on sewage infrastructure grants and milfoil management</li> </ul>

For the NWC, SLIPP, and the OBWB, mandate challenges questioning their relevancy manifested in different ways. For the NWC, its singular objective of making a recommendation for the allocation of NEEF money was achieved by 2001 with the recommendation that a water release facility at the Kenney Dam be built to address downstream issues (Nechako Environmental Enhancement Fund, 2001). However, after making this recommendation the NWC did not evolve or refocus its efforts. This led to challenges as described by a local government official:

You have to be able to address the issues that are pertinent at that time... So, when the water release facility was determined as not what they [NEEF] wanted... you want to steer the ship in another direction when you have gone as far as you can with one issue... What happens is that if you go on one issue for too long, the people who initially championed it move on and then you have to get the buy-in of the new generation... the watershed council wasn’t able to do that (Interview 23).

In a similar way, the OBWB’s narrow focus on milfoil management and sewage infrastructure in the early 2000s challenged its relevance in a positive way leading to its renewal. In contrast, SLIPP’s broad mandate initially allowed what some external and internal to the process framed as “agenda creep” or devolution of provincial government mandate leading to open resistance and negative press against the body. This negative perception was particularly held by the economic development sector and lakefront homeowners present within and outside of the collaboration:

“we are already paying for this provincially and federally and now they are asking the local taxpayer to pay on top of it... why are we funding this when it is a provincial and federal jurisdiction already (Interview 12, SLIPP/SWC, local business owner)?” These negative judgements were vocalized in local media resulting in the loss of social legitimacy and popular approval by some local audiences.

Also, connected to the relevance of mandate is the ability for a body to produce results and secure funding to do so. For the NWC, this dynamic created a challenge as the board aged and results were not achieved: “as the council moved forward and years passed and we really didn’t see any difference in the environment and the river never changed, then the awareness began to fade” (Interview 62, environmental sector representative, NWC). Similar concern has also been expressed for the SWC with a narrower mandate focused mainly on water quality monitoring, which may limit the body’s ability to produce tangible results. Both collaborations need to produce results relevant to the current context to be deemed worthy of their management costs.

Decline was also mentioned in interviews as a possible future issue for the LWA and CWB in connection to funding. Both cases rely heavily on external grant funding, which may create stability challenges as grant agencies “are typically hesitant to fund projects by the same body of the same kind over and over again as this may be an indication that the project is not achieving its objectives” (Interview 81, LWA, financial resource supporter). Consequently, if a collaboration lacks funds, process and output may be challenged compromising the body’s legitimacy and its development.

#### 2.4.5 Stage 5: Dissolution or Renewal

Three of the five cases experienced dissolution (NWC) or renewal (OBWB and SLIPP/SWC). Language used in interviews and newspaper articles across these cases that indicated this stage included words such as “demise,” “completion,” “transition,” “revival,” “successor,” or “re-organization.” Dominant audiences included the general public and internal participants depending on the issue.

**Table 3.9: Stage 5: Legitimacy Factors and Evidence**

Sources of Legitimacy	Relevant legitimacy types	Evidence (SLIPP/SWC, OBWB, NWC)
Refocusing or separating from problematic issues and processes	Structural, normative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>NWC</i>: failure to refocus mandate</li> <li>• <i>OBWB</i>: broadened mandate and creation of Okanagan Water Stewardship Council to advise board</li> <li>• <i>SWC</i>: narrowed goals (Shuswap Watershed Council, 2014)</li> </ul>
Communicated continued sense of need	Cognitive, problem-solving, external approval	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>OBWB</i>: focusing event (Okanagan 2003 drought and wildfires) and 2004 workshop <i>Running on Empty</i> calling for expanded OBWB mandate</li> <li>• <i>SWC</i>: Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process (2014) indicating water quality issues and public engagement meetings and</li> </ul>

Sources of Legitimacy	Relevant legitimacy types	Evidence (SLIPP/SWC, OBWB, NWC)
		survey across Shuswap to identify continued water concerns (Shuswap Watershed Council, 2014)
Capacity to take on new roles	Performance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>OBWB</i>: adjustment to supplementary letters patent; expansion of staff and development of the OWSC</li> <li>• <i>SWC</i>: Columbia Shuswap Regional District (2015) providing taxation authority</li> </ul>
Having a champion to lead change	Personal qualities, extension	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>NWC</i>: failure of NWC to change executive board membership</li> <li>• <i>OBWB</i>: new executive</li> <li>• <i>SLIPP/SWC</i>: shift to the FBC as program manager</li> </ul>

For the NWC, there was no consensus in the interviews regarding the single most cause of the body’s disbanding. Common reasons cited included (a) that its purpose of making a recommendation had been achieved, (b) that declined participation made it unrepresentative, (c) that stagnant mandate decreased its relevance, and d) that the unchanging membership of the executive board made it unaccountable. For example, “they felt that their job was done, their mandate had been finished” (Interview 63, resource supporter, NWC), compared to “it became a grinding machine that didn’t have any traction... so it became kind of repetitive” (Interview 87, environmental sector representative, NWC) and “it was no longer broadly based on the community perspective because other communities were fleeing the process...when you see the process go from 20 odd members to six, that is a red flag (Interview 80, collaboration manager, NWC). It is therefore not clear which – a loss of legitimacy or effectiveness – preceded the other.

In contrast, for SLIPP/SWC and OBWB, this stage was about making sweeping changes to the mandate or structure of the bodies. Commonalities across both cases that helped facilitate renewal included (a) having champions lead the change (b) having a contextually appropriate policy window to gain support (i.e., drought and forest fires in the Okanagan, and the end of the SLIPP pilot program), and (c) publicly assessing and communicating the need for change (i.e., public engagement meetings in both cases during transition). However, beyond these commonalities, the OBWB and SLIPP/SWC renewed their focus in different ways. SLIPP’s 2014-2015 manifestation into the SWC, clearly distinguished the SWC as a new entity: “We’re not going there again. We’re moving forward with the program focused on water quality. We’ll develop a new brand, try to keep positive in the media. I’m trying to be optimistic that we can get past it” (Interview 93, collaborative manager). This was done by narrowing SWC’s focus to predominantly water quality monitoring in an attempt to calm concerns about SLIPP acting as a regulatory enforcement body: “they appear to be listening and modifying SLIPP and the Watershed Council... to the point now that it is more palatable and acceptable” (Interview 48, local government official). Thus, the SWC was able to re-establish perceptions of legitimacy (internal/external legitimacy and cognitive through value alignment) by narrowing their mandate and separating from their past. Meanwhile, the OBWB’s renewal in 2006 was about mandate expansion to broader water issues after a period of stagnancy (decline) that was starting to lead to questions about organizational utility:


As time progressed into the '90s, it became apparent that there were more pressing issues with regards to water in the Okanagan than just the board funding improvements to sewage treatment and dealing with milfoil... so they looked for a new director and were also looking at an expanded role in water (Interview 19, local business representative).

Through such efforts, both the OBWB and SLIPP/SWC were able to find renewed mandates. Although this renewal happened in opposite ways for these two cases, both were able to reassert their legitimacy.

## 2.5 Discussion

Findings identify specific CWG legitimacy dynamics and concerns relevant at different stages of a CWG body's development. As CWG bodies develop, legitimacy is established, extended, maintained, defended, and possibly lost or re-extended using a variety of different sources to make legitimacy claims. These main sources are reiterated in Figure 3.4 using the five-stage model of organizational development stages (Figure 3.1) as a guide.

**Figure 3.4: Summary of Findings within each CWG Body Development Stage**



In the establishment stage of a body, community readiness to work together and the desire to solve local water issues dominated legitimacy judgements creating a sense of need for CWG. For example, drought and critical flow levels in the Cowichan River brought people together from across sectors because of their interdependence on the river; likewise, in the Nechako Watershed, the impact of the reservoir and industry flow control on multiple sectors brought a range of people to the NWC to look for a common solution. In this sense, following Johnson *et al.* (2006), the legitimacy of a CWG body at the start is about its innovation as a problem-solving method. Moreover, local validation (Johnson *et al.*, 2006; Pinkerton & John, 2008) for CWG is shown by the willingness of the community to become involved and believe in the body's

premise. Establishing a body using inclusive and democratic norms also helped ensure the initial validation of the cases turned into longer-term acceptance.

Once the case study organizations were established, they were expected to demonstrate their worth predominantly by using valued processes and demonstrating results in the growth stage. Given that collaborative bodies spend most of their existence in this stage (Lester *et al.*, 2003), it is not surprising that findings are input-output oriented and similar to those already present in the CWG literature (e.g., Baird *et al.*, 2014; Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012). Inherent within the findings were democratic values, such as the importance of impartial, open, and transparent dialogue, which supported the deliberative democracy-based underpinnings of collaborative governance legitimacy (Parkinson, 2003). Also inherent was the importance of demonstrated results, even in the form of small projects, which aligns with the socially valued idea of results-based management (Pal, 2010). For the three cases (CWB, LWA, SLIPP/SWC) that were in the growth stage during data collection, deliberation about process and the demonstration of results was common as these bodies were working to prove themselves as normatively valuable collaborative processes that were capable of producing results. Figuring out who these bodies are accountable to and what measures of transparency and documentation are needed are still being learned by these collaborations. Likewise, while all of the cases demonstrated output during their growth stage, the extent bodies were able to see this output materialize into measurable outcomes was indicative of their ability to mature. Water quality improvements due to OBWB sewage treatment improvement program is evidence as a legitimacy source that helped the OBWB prove its worth and mature as an organization. This demonstrates how legitimacy links to effectiveness – when an entity proves its capacity, it furthers its legitimacy (Newig & Kvarda, 2012). Together, these input and substantive output oriented findings demonstrate how legitimacy extension must align with existing and generally accepted cultural beliefs and norms (Walker, 2004). However, what the literature on legitimacy’s evolution does not discuss is legitimacy for a body related to the individuals involved. Findings demonstrated that individuals helped enable each case’s processes and results and added credibility to the body itself through both their presence and charismatic leadership abilities, particularly during the growth and renewal stages. As such, the acknowledgement of leadership in the CWG literature as an important variable for effective management (Pahl-Wostl *et al.*, 2013), needs to be more clearly connected to its influence on legitimacy judgements at different development stages.

Additionally, from the experience of the OBWB, findings also supported the idea of legitimacy maintenance through routinization once a body functions within the maturity stage. Notably, this maintenance was achieved for the OBWB by continuously demonstrating its relevance by producing results, documenting process and outputs, remaining non-authoritative and neutral in political debates, and maintaining relationships through ongoing partnerships. While it is not documented that the OBWB has been explicitly managing their legitimacy, such actions speak to organizational sustainability (Keast *et al.*, 2004). Regardless of whether these efforts were intentionally undertaken to influence legitimacy, their benefit includes the maintenance and reinforcement of legitimacy helping ensure an organization does not become redundant or irrelevant as time passes and the context around issues change (Suchman, 1995). The maintenance of legitimacy by the OBWB through these action, particularly the ongoing production of output, also demonstrates that effectiveness does not just bred legitimacy, but that legitimacy also generates effectiveness. The view that the OBWB is an established and credible

(i.e., legitimate) organization means that resources and partnerships are likely to continue further enhancing the ability of the OBWB to provide sound water governance and management.

If the relevance of a collaboration is challenged, the continuation of its legitimacy stems from a collaboration's ability to re-communicate its worth, while also demonstrating both leadership and capacity. In the stages of decline and dissolution, legitimacy judgements towards the NWC, OBWB, and SLIPP/SWC shifted from a focus on the positive legitimating qualities of each case to those that were de-legitimizing. For example, instead of results being valued as an indication of progress, they are critiqued for their limitations; as an illustration, OBWB's long-standing programming on sewage infrastructure and milfoil management shifted from being an acceptable output to being interpreted as an area of stagnancy where mandate extension could occur. The decision of the OBWB to reinvent itself and renew its focus, in comparison, for example, to the NWC where the mandate did not adapt to changing circumstances, demonstrated how strategic attention to de-legitimizing sources in a stage of decline can presage a collaboration's dissolution or renewal. Thus, de-legitimizing sources indicate areas of change that require attention to ensure the continuation of a body's legitimacy (Tost, 2011). In the decline stage, the experience of SLIPP and the NWC also point to interesting nuances around the relationship of legitimacy and effectiveness. In both cases, as legitimacy was challenged, the cases faced problems of being able to effectively deliver their mandate. For example, public opposition to restoration work by SLIPP halted future projects of a similar nature. However, at the same time for the NWC, the inability to have their recommendation implemented led to the delegitimization of the organization through the loss of participants and eventual dissolution. Given society's contemporary emphasis on results-based management, the relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy not only as a positive relationship for successful governance, but also as a risk indicator for organizations should be particularly noted by collaborative managers.

Together the legitimacy findings at each development stage indicate that multiple legitimacy sources and types matter in empirical assessments and vary in importance at different points as a collaboration evolves. Most importantly, legitimation occurred through alignment of each case's norms and values with socially valued beliefs, the use of normatively appropriate processes, the production of results, and the presence and action of individuals who contributed to each case's credibility.

In addition to the above analysis, five insights can be drawn about CWG legitimacy's temporal nature, which may help individual bodies more strategically manage legitimacy as a resource. First, although legitimacy sources differ as a collaboration develops, decisions and action during a collaboration's initial stages may affect legitimacy later on. For example, effort to include First Nations by the CWB conveners in the structuring and development of the body before it even formed generated a sense of ownership by First Nations over the body later on ensuring their participation even when water was not a political focus. This dynamic speaks to the influence of path dependency (Kay, 2005) on temporal legitimacy judgements; a dynamic Johnston (2011) also identifies as relevant to collaborative governance in the context of how inclusivity and the development of trust determine the value of collaborative decisions. A collaboration's development stages are not disconnected; in particular, decisions made in the establishment and growth stages of a collaboration may influence how a body's legitimacy is subsequently judged.

Second, both CWG and its legitimacy take time to develop. While collaborative governance is often faulted for being a slow process (McClosky, 2000), this slowness can benefit legitimacy development. The time that is required to develop certain collaborative features such as trust and informed consensus-building (Johnston, 2011) can foster legitimacy not only through the inherent value of such features, but also by allowing time to develop more comprehensive projects and reputability within the community. This legitimacy can then be useful as a leveraging device to gain other sources of legitimacy. For example, the OBWB's effort to educate and develop trust among participants allowed for the body's objectives to be more strategically developed as partnerships furthering community support. Gaining such recognition is not a quick task (Pahl-Wostl *et al.*, 2007) and therefore the slow growth of a collaboration can help a body mature and institutionalize.

Third, just because collaborations face different institutional pressures as they develop (Wood & Gray, 1991), does not mean that previously relevant legitimacy sources and types are no longer valid as a collaboration ages. For example, a sense of urgency to address a water crisis may be a dominant legitimating factor in the establishment of a collaboration; however, this does not mean that this source of legitimacy is irrelevant as a collaboration matures. To illustrate, when SLIPP came under scrutiny due to the implications of its associated restoration projects (output), it was able to reassert its relevance by using a sense of need for collaboration to address broader water issues. Thus, legitimacy sources can be stockpiled and in stages where legitimacy may be challenged, past legitimating sources may be utilized to weather difficult times (Fisher *et al.*, 2016). As a result, although for analytical purposes this paper has distinguished between each stage's legitimacy sources and types, in reality these lines are not as clear.

Fourth, CWG legitimacy varies not only within the life of a collaboration, but also over a longer systemic timeframe. Community expectations are not static and any organizational body must be responsive to the surrounding context in which they operate (Deegan *et al.*, 2002). Drivers that influence societal opinion are subject to change based on current socio-political or environmental priorities (Finch *et al.*, 2014). Perhaps if the NWC had adapted to changing circumstances once their recommendation was not implemented they would have been able to renew their membership and focus. The sources of CWG legitimacy at any development stage of a body now may or may not be accepted as legitimate in the future. This is particularly important to consider for CWG, as changing circumstances such as climate change stresses could strain relationships among collaborative participants altering their judgements towards CWG (Pahl-Wostl & Kranz, 2010). The achievement of legitimacy is therefore a moving target that needs continual reassessment by collaborations throughout their life.

Fifth, whose acceptance of a collaboration matters for legitimacy varies at different stages as a body develops. For all cases, in the establishment stage the general community response granting or withholding external approval had a significant influence on legitimacy. To generate a sense of community need, the community has to first be aware of the initiative. For the NWC and SLIPP, public meetings helped generate such awareness and in all cases the media was a key tool for communication. The need for such approval continues into the growth stage with the additional relevance of other interests (e.g., participants, managers, resource supporters). Once community support is gained, collaborations need to focus on validation by those participating in and supporting the body. This was evidenced in all cases through legitimacy judgements focusing on input and output. However, when the body needs to prove its worth to mature and gain stability, to whom the body is most accountable to (e.g., government) has a larger say in judging

legitimacy. For this reason, the OBWB has stability measures in place, such as annual auditing and reporting to the regional governments to ensure accountability is maintained. Moreover, once a body begins to decline, the most relevant audience depends on the issue at hand. For SLIPP, addressing public concerns was essential to a renewed focus, but for the NWC failure to gain government support particularly led to dissolution. This progression roughly follows the legitimacy dynamics proposed by Johnson *et al.* (2006) where legitimacy must first be locally validated (by the community in the establishment stage), diffused (justified by multiple actors) and then generally validated (in the sense that legitimacy is gained through consistency and stability ultimately leading to institutionalization).

Stemming from these five insights, this paper recommends that the strategic management of CWG account for legitimacy and its temporal nature. Specific deliberation about when to best form a body, who to seek acceptance from, how long to spend on a certain activity or process, and when to introduce changes such as a new project or reform, can impact acceptance and improve program outcomes (Ostrom, 1990). Likewise, collaborative participant and manager patience and awareness of strategic windows of opportunity for progress on certain goals can also help build legitimacy rhetoric. Such patience is about strategically deciding when and how to introduce change. For example, collaborations may choose to purposefully introduce a specific issue around the time of a political election in an attempt to gain favour or commitment from government. Similarly, letting time pass and not introducing controversial decisions during times when there is negative popular opinion towards a body, may be a tactic to allow opinions to dissipate or improve as community concerns evolve. Regardless, legitimacy, like a collaborative body's development, takes time. Collaborations need to be diligent and patient in an effort to gain recognition and support from their surrounding community and those that fund and resource operations.

## **2.6 Conclusion**

This paper posits that legitimacy evolves as CWG bodies develop, thus challenging existing CWG legitimacy assessments to re-examine the sources and types of legitimacy that matter at different stages of a collaboration's existence. Legitimacy is not a static concept and should not be assumed that the legitimacy types and sources that helped legitimize a body at one stage will be as useful during other points in a collaboration's existence to enhance, maintain, or defend its legitimacy. To strengthen a CWG body's ability to achieve its goals, anticipating and adapting to changes in legitimacy judgements is vital. This requires awareness of the current development stage of a body and the common legitimacy challenges and opportunities at each stage, as well as collective decision-making and action to determine how to contextually manage CWG legitimacy. To deepen this knowledge, future research should examine what specific activities and processes might hold back or push a collaboration into different development stages further engraining or detracting legitimacy as well as how other governance attributes such as accountability and inclusivity are temporally influenced and related to legitimacy. Also, addressing an inherent weakness of this study, future research should also examine CWG legitimacy's temporal dynamics in other contexts, particularly spaces where CWG is embedded systematically within legislated frameworks or exists at larger national or international scales. Accurate assessment of collaborative governance bodies requires not only consideration of a body's evolving nature, but also differing interpretations of legitimacy.

## Chapter 4

# Collaborative Water Governance: The Composition of Sector-based Legitimacy Judgements

### 3.1 Introduction

Collaborative governance is an increasingly popular way to make decisions and take action for water (Pahl-Wostl *et al.*, 2007). Although different forms of collaborative governance exist (Emerson *et al.*, 2012), one general commonality is the involvement of interdependent actors from across different sectors of society to address problems that could not be solved individually (Ansell & Gash, 2007). This means that collaborative water governance (CWG) bodies – i.e., the organizations that use collaborative governance to make decisions for water – are comprised of multiple state and non-state actors, all having different sector-based interests, e.g. industry, agriculture, and environmental civil society (Bell & Park, 2006). These different interests can have an impact on how different individual actors judge the legitimacy of any organization (Bitektine, 2011; Tost, 2011), including collaborations. Since legitimacy is a crucial attribute of governance organizations as it helps ensure their stability, order and effectiveness (Beetham, 2013), it is vital to know how actors from societal sectors that commonly have a stake in water issues judge a collaborative body's legitimacy. Such identification is important because if a CWG body is found by actors within different sectors to be illegitimate, they may not be willing to comply with collaborative decisions or support or participate in the collaboration and its efforts. Thus, identifying the range of different legitimacy judgements towards CWG bodies may allow its practitioners to influence how it is viewed by different sectors of society. However, legitimacy is generally understudied at the level of individual judgements (Black, 2008; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Finch *et al.*, 2014; Tost, 2011).

Legitimacy in this paper is interpreted as a judgement comprised of multiple sources that determine the empirical acceptance or justification of a certain entity (Borrás & Ejrnæs, 2011). This interpretation differs from common definitions of legitimacy in the context of governance that examine legitimacy as the normative justification of authority (Bodansky, 1999). As a judgement, legitimacy is a discursive product of a social system made up of individual members (Bitektine, 2011; Tost, 2011) whose beliefs, expectations, or interests validate a governance body (Black, 2008). The beliefs, expectations, and interests of individual actors are often connected to various subdivisions of society that relate to different socio-economic, political, or cultural boundaries. Understanding these beliefs, expectations, and interests is important because individuals form a collective that together affect the norms, law, and cognitive ideals of society and ultimately determine what is and is not legitimate (Finch *et al.*, 2014). By applying this view to the study of CWG, it is possible to explore the acceptance of collaborative bodies by people from different sectors who have vested interests in the process, activities, or performance of a collaboration. CWG actors come from different sectors with various public, private, and non-government-based interests in water. Hence, a range of legitimacy judgements about CWG bodies is expected to exist.

This paper's goal is to examine the composition of legitimacy judgements by common societal sectors involved in or directly affected by CWG bodies. This is accomplished using a

multi-case study design to investigate the perceptions of actors in relation to five collaborative bodies in British Columbia, Canada. The paper makes a contribution at the intersection of CWG and legitimacy literatures by empirically identifying the legitimacy sources and types that make up the judgments of actors from different societal sectors towards a CWG body. This contribution will be of value to researchers and practitioners by furthering understanding of the ways different actors judge the legitimacy of CWG bodies, which can be used as insight for strategic legitimacy management.

### **3.2 CWG Sectors and Legitimacy**

Collaborative governance refers to “the processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private, and civic spheres to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished” (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015, p. 18). Bodies that utilize these processes and structures function at all levels. At the local level, they are increasingly utilized to connect actors from grassroots non-state sectors who use water (e.g., farmers, fishers, recreationalists, public utilities) with decision-makers (Lubell, 2004). At this level, collaborations involve these actors in the decision-making process to create tangible action on water issues (e.g., flooding, drought, pollution). Because water issues impact a range of sectors such as health, agriculture, energy, land-use and spatial planning, many believe collaboration is necessary to create effective, long-lasting, and coordinated solutions (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015). Common sectors found in CWG include (but are not limited to) all levels of government (national, provincial, local), title and rights holders (e.g., First Nations), and non-government interest groups such as agriculture, industry, businesses, environmental groups and property owners (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015). Within this study, the sectors focused on include all four orders of government within Canada (federal, provincial, local, and First Nations) along with a mixture of commonly involved non-government actors – agriculture, industry, environmental groups, and local business and property owner associations. Although the interests of individual actors within a societal sector can differ particularly because their knowledge is situated (Connelly *et al.*, 2006), each sector as a whole is commonly identifiable.

Governments are the traditional decision-maker for water resources, and in Canada, federal, provincial, and local (regional districts and municipalities in BC) governments are primarily responsible for water governance. Responsibilities are shared across these governments and include enforcement, information and data gathering, strategic planning, and conflict resolution. The province holds the primary water quality and quantity management responsibilities for water protection, security, provision, and safety (Hurlbert, 2007). The federal government has jurisdiction related to fisheries, navigation, federal lands, and First Nations and international relations (Johns & Rasmussen, 2008). Local governments are primary responsible for drinking water delivery, wastewater management and land use planning; however increasingly are taking on devolved responsibilities from senior governments (Nowlan, 2004).

Government responsibilities in a collaboration may range from actively participating and helping set agendas, framing debates and influencing outcomes; being passively engaged as just one of the many participants; and being a recipient of advice from a collaboration (Koontz & Johnson, 2004). The interest of governments in collaboration stems mainly from their

responsibilities to engage non-state actors in decision-making and from a belief that water management responsibilities may best be accomplished when all views are included within governance and policy processes (Kvarda & Nordbeck, 2012). However, as Milton and Lepage (2010) explain, there is also concern within government, particularly at the local level, about the challenges of financing collaborations, establishing accountability and legal structures, and the enforceability of collaborative work; these challenges can make government hesitant to engage and accept collaborations. From the perspective of the people engaged in collaboration, the same concerns can exist if governments fail to respect the outcomes of collaborative efforts (Roth & de Loë, 2017). The slow development of a legal framework to support CWG, also suggests that the state has been hesitant to fully accept CWG within existing institutional structures (Bingham, 2009). These concerns may reflect in legitimacy judgements towards collaborative bodies.

In addition to traditional government levels, in Canada, First Nations are now recognized as a form of government on a nation-to-nation level. As a government, First Nations have sole or shared responsibility for water management within reserves and often have active fisheries management rights and responsibilities as well (Phare, 2009). The specific rights of First Nations peoples in Canada are continually being defined, clarified, and solidified through a host of Supreme Court decisions such as the 2014 Tsilhqot'in decision that broadened land title of the Tsilhqot'in Nation. Cultural and spiritual understanding about water also make Indigenous peoples critical and unique actors in water decision-making in Canada, and around the world (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015). However, challenges of reconciliation, historical exclusion in public decision-making as a minority, current capacity challenges as a form of government, and implications for title and rights when participating in collaborations with the state have limited how First Nations are choosing to engage in CWG bodies (von der Porten & de Loë, 2013b). For CWG, First Nations participation has come to be recognized as an important variable to gain legitimacy as there is increasing recognition by the state that environmental and resource decision-making requires local First Nation support (von der Porten & de Loë, 2014).

The interests, needs, and perspectives of non-government actors in the water sector vary widely. Moody (2009) suggests that pragmatic reasoning is the primary motivation for their participation in collaborative governance. In this sense, collaboration is justified through the belief that it is the best way for a group to address a problem while ensuring its members get what they want out of a given process or policy. Research such as de Loë *et al.* (2015), de Loë *et al.* (2016), Brisbois (2015), Simpson (2014) and Milton and Lepage (2010) offer insights regarding different reasons non-state actors from agriculture, industry, the environmental sector, and local residents participate in CWG in different Canadian contexts. Motivations for collaborative participation by the agriculture sector are education- advocacy-, and capacity-based. Farmers want to teach other actors about farming practices to dispel negative perceptions about their sector, develop further insight on agriculture and environmental science, ensure the water and land needs of the farming community are protected and included in decision-making, and secure resources to mitigate future risks (de Loë *et al.*, 2015; Simpson *et al.*, 2015). Industry-based actors (e.g., forestry, mining, hydroelectric, oil and gas, companies) are driven largely by corporate social responsibility and social license to operate paradigms. Industry tends to value CWG for the opportunities it provides to inform community members about the work and environmental efforts of a company, to gain understanding of community beliefs, to build or improve relationships with other actor groups, and to assert a company's needs (Brisbois, 2015;

de Loë *et al.*, 2016). Environmentalists, in contrast, come to collaborations with the intention of promoting action that furthers the sustainability of water resources (Milton & Lepage, 2010). Residents, represented by organized associations, join to ensure representation of local values (Brisbois, 2015). The willingness of these non-government actors in general to participate in collaboration is indicative of their acceptance and justification of collaborative governance as a participatory way to make decisions (Gazley, 2008). Actors from some sectors, particularly industry, even view participation in collaboration as a way to enhance their own legitimacy (de Loë *et al.*, 2016).

Together, these actors from government and non-government sectors contribute different knowledge, resources, and perspectives to a collaboration (Plummer *et al.*, 2006). For example, industry is commonly driven by market-based logic, which emphasizes practices of accumulation and ownership and prioritizes efficiency; meanwhile, bureaucratic state actors may be more concerned with the regulation of human activity and emphasize rules and operating procedures (Bryson *et al.*, 2006). These different perspectives can influence a body's behaviour by focusing attention on issues, outcomes, and sources of power related to one perspective rather than another. Perspectives compete "because actions, processes, norms, and structures that are seen as legitimate from one vantage point... may be seen as less legitimate or even illegitimate from the perspective of another" (Bryson *et al.*, 2006, p. 50). This competition can limit the extent collaborations can agree on key organizational factors such as design, function, and goals (Bryson *et al.*, 2006). Lack of agreement on these factors can hinder an organizational body's ability to be validated within a social system (Black, 2008). For CWG, understanding the variety of interests relative to an individual collaborative body can help determine what commonalities and differences exist across legitimacy judgements.

While there is considerable knowledge of the sector-based interests of different actors in water governance processes, there is much less information about how these interests translate into legitimacy judgements towards CWG bodies. Perhaps a contributing factor to this limitation is that legitimacy in the broader context of collaborative governance, water governance, and environmental governance predominantly has been interpreted as a normative attribute rather than as a sociological judgement or legal concept (Bernstein, 2005; Connelly *et al.*, 2006; Høgl *et al.*, 2012). In this sense, studies of collaborative governance legitimacy have focused on determining ideal qualities or diagnostically evaluating how reality complies with these theoretical qualities (Borrás & Ejrnæs, 2011). Commonly, these ideals are variations of democratic norms alone or in combination with substantive claims (Bernstein, 2014). For example, Van Buuren *et al.* (2012) uses Bekkers and Edwards's (2007) input-throughput-output legitimacy typology and discusses accountability, voice, and due deliberation qualities as indicators of water governance legitimacy in the Netherlands. Baird *et al.* (2014) uses Trachtenberg and Focht's (2005) procedural and substantive typology to investigate Canadian CWG legitimacy qualities of representation, welfare improvements, fair consideration, stakeholder rights, genuine consent, and distribution of welfare and costs. Similarly, Bäckstrand (2010) via Scharpf's (1999)'s input-output typology establishes a framework for assessing environmental governance legitimacy broadly, which includes participation, accountability, and deliberative qualities combined with policy, institutional, and environmental effectiveness. Together these legitimacy studies suggest legitimacy sources and types that can provide normative criteria for empirical bodies as well as insight into the composition of legitimacy judgements by different actor groups (Borrás & Ejrnæs, 2011).

Table 4.1 provides a broad synthesis of relevant legitimacy types from 18 different typologies identified in a literature review that are then connected to the different sector-based legitimacy sources in the results section of this paper. In this synthesis, legitimacy types from different typologies are broadly grouped together based on similar descriptions of the ways or sources of legitimacy. While there is some overlap in the groupings (e.g., legitimacy from social acceptance may draw on normative values related other groupings and different forms of rule legitimacy may be interpreted as part of the ideal practice of a governance body), this synthesis acts as a basic structure to help identify empirical CWG legitimacy sources.

**Table 4.1: Legitimacy Types**

<b>Grouping</b>	<b>Legitimacy Types</b>	<b>Way Legitimacy is Created</b>
Ideal Practice	Democratic or non-democratic input: input (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007; Horeth, 1999; Scharpf, 1997; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005), procedural (Etsy, 2006; Lord & Magnette, 2004; Suchman, 1995), democratic (Beetham & Lord, 1998; Etsy, 2006), principled (Bernstein, 2004), normative (Scott, 1995); justifiability of rules (Beetham, 2013). traditional (Weber, 1964); convention (Matheson, 1987)	Presence of specific practices that are morally- and ethically-based habits and norms that guide relationships; democratic - normalized protection of rights and recognition of people as an autonomous political authority
	Deliberative (Etsy, 2006)	Use of interactive multi-person dialogue for decision-making
	Throughput (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007)	Quality of procedures and rules
	Structural: structural (Easton, 1965; Suchman, 1995); systematic (Etsy, 2006)	Use of certain categories and structural characteristics
	Universal: ideological (Easton, 1965); sacredness (Matheson, 1987), universal principles (Matheson, 1987)	Widespread norms that command conformity- e.g., religious or sectoral values
Results-based	Problem solving (Føllesdal, 2005)	Capacity to yield output or outcomes that remedy collective problems
	Substantive output: output (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007; Horeth, 1999; Jachtenfuchs <i>et al.</i> , 1998; Scharpf, 1997); substantive (Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005), consequential (Suchman, 1995), results-based (Etsy, 2006)	Measurable results
	Performance (Beetham & Lord, 1998)	Quality of output
	Technocratic (Lord & Magnette, 2004)	The efficient and effective address of problems using expert problem-solving capacity
Institutional-setting	Rule: legal (Bernstein, 2004), rational-legality (Weber, 1964), regulative (Scott, 1995), and rule (Beetham, 1991, 2013), order-based (Etsy, 2006), formal (Arnull, 2002)	Existence of and extent that regulative rules or law impose obligation
	Contract (Matheson, 1987)	Attained through agreement where power-holder and power-subject assume mutual rights and obligations

Grouping	Legitimacy Types	Way Legitimacy is Created
	Parliamentary (Lord & Magnette, 2004)	Existence of popular sovereignty and elections
	Compliance (Føllesdal, 2005)	Permissive adherence to rules
Social Acceptance	Cognitive (Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995)	Alignment of values, beliefs, assumptions within a larger social system
	Pragmatic (Suchman, 1995)	Benefit to evaluator
	Social identity: identity (Jachtenfuchs <i>et al.</i> , 1998), sociological (Bernstein, 2004)	Connection to local culture
	Internal consent: internal (Boulding, 1967), participation (Jachtenfuchs <i>et al.</i> , 1998), expressed consent (Beetham, 1991, 2013)	Willingness to partake and identify as part of an organization
	External approval: external (Boulding, 1967), social (Arnall, 2002), identification (Beetham & Lord, 1998), popular approval (Matheson, 1987)	Development of general acceptance by surrounding community
	Parliamentary (Lord & Magnette, 2004)	Popular consent through election
	Compliance (Føllesdal, 2005)	Submitting to authority
Individual-based	Personal qualities: personal (Easton, 1965; Suchman, 1995), personal qualities (Matheson, 1987), charismatic (Weber, 1964)	Characteristics of people generate support
	Expertise (Matheson, 1987)	Expertise and knowledge possession generate support
	Extension: personal ties (Matheson, 1987); indirect (Lord & Magnette, 2004)	Relationships generate willingness to comply

In addition to literature that suggests or uses different legitimacy typologies, other environmental or water governance research place legitimacy as one of many desirable governance attributes (e.g., Armitage *et al.*, 2012; Biermann & Gupta, 2011; Innes, 1999; Lockwood *et al.*, 2010; Lundqvist, 2004; Moss & Newig, 2010; Newig & Kvarda, 2012; Pahl-Wostl *et al.*, 2013). These studies reinforce democratic and substantive norms as necessary for governance legitimacy and also discuss the challenges and interrelationships of legitimacy with other governance attributes (e.g., inclusivity, effectiveness and accountability). For example, Newig and Fritsch (2009) and Newig and Kvarda (2012) discuss the relationship between legitimacy and effectiveness of participatory governance (of which they characterize collaborative governance as one type) stressing the democratic dilemma of lost accountability due to the inclusion of multiple non-state actors that are needed to address collective problems. Overall, this research emphasizes legitimacy as one of many normative governance attributes that collectively challenge or support each other in the development of sustained democratic governance that can successfully achieve its goals.

Distinct from this normative legitimacy research, a limited number of CWG studies analyze legitimacy empirically as a discursive attribute. Notable examples include Edwards (2016), Leino and Peltomaa (2012), and Sandstrom *et al.* (2014) who examine legitimacy judgements of the public towards select local water governance organizations in the US, Finland, and Sweden

respectively. Findings from these studies emphasize the situated nature of legitimacy and the inductive and descriptive nature of identifying empirical judgements. While these studies do not identify sector-based perspectives, one study that does is Orr (2015) who distinguishes between local level and policy level actors and adopts a diagnostic approach to assess their legitimacy judgments of CWG in Quebec, Canada using Beetham’s (2013) normative – rules, expressed consent and justifiability of rules – typology. Orr (2015) finds that assessing legitimacy judgements at different levels helps identify key challenges – e.g., the impact of different conceptualizations of inclusion – affecting the ways in which to gain or enhance legitimacy. Orr’s (2015) work suggests that further study into the legitimacy perspectives of other key actors (e.g., industry and First Nations), is necessary. This study supplements these works by analyzing legitimacy as a judgment that is comprised of multiple legitimacy sources and differs according to societal sector. Table 4.2 provides a conceptual framework as a guide to the expected legitimacy sources that comprise the CWG judgements of different sector-based actors.

**Table 4.2: Composition of CWG Legitimacy Judgements by Common Sector-based Actors**

<b>Sector/Actor group</b>	<b>Interests of common water governance sectors</b>	<b>Expected basis of legitimacy judgements</b>
State (local, provincial, national governments)	Establish and reform water decision-making, service delivery, basin management and institutional structures; address public crises and conflict (Hooper, 2003; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015); agenda setting; framing debates, influencing outcomes (Bell & Park, 2006); motivating civil and private sector behavioural change (Brisbois & de Loë, 2016; Holley <i>et al.</i> , 2012a)	Ability of collaborations to provide a normatively appropriate venue to deliver government mandates and improve environmental conditions
First Nations Government	Advocacy of rights, respect for values and practices, equal inclusion in decision-making (Global Water Partnership Technical Advisory Committee, 2009; Memon & Weber, 2010); promotion of self-determination; responsibility of decision-making on traditional homelands (von der Porten & de Loë, 2013b, 2014)	Ability for collaboration to respect, advocate for, and contribute to First Nations rights and values within the collaborative process
Agriculture	Protection of status quo water allocation (Memon & Weber, 2010) and land (de Loë <i>et al.</i> , 2015); correct negative perceptions of sector; provide information and education on farming activities to other sectors (de Loë <i>et al.</i> , 2015; Milton & Lepage, 2010); communicate, learn, and develop agriculture and environmental knowledge (Simpson, 2014); agri-environmental awareness and sharing; assistance adapting and mitigating climate change risks (Roy <i>et al.</i> , 2009); building capacity of farmers to interact with decision-makers; securing resources (de Loë <i>et al.</i> , 2015)	Pragmatically based on ability of collaborative body to support and protect agricultural needs
Environment sector	Sustainability objectives (Brisbois & de Loë, 2016); promotion of watershed integrity (Milton & Lepage, 2010)	Pragmatic and moral benefit of effectively addressing environmental problems
Industry	Further corporate social responsibility and social license to operate by helping develop better informed decisions; reduce conflict and improve relationships with	Pragmatically based on ability of collaborative body to support

Sector/Actor group	Interests of common water governance sectors	Expected basis of legitimacy judgements
	communities; improve environmental conditions (Brisbois, 2015; de Loë <i>et al.</i> , 2016); gain information; protect interests; correct misinformation (Brisbois & de Loë, 2016); represent company's positions and needs; communicate potential impacts of action; provide descriptions and justification of company's water use; ensure others understand financial cost of mitigation; play a role in decision making that affects industry operations (Murray & de Loe, 2012b)	company mandate; concern for practice based on ensuring opportunity to be an engaged player in decision-making
Local Business and Property Owner Associations	Protection of local interests and well-being (Brisbois & de Loë, 2016; Milton & Lepage, 2010)	Cognitive sense of need; pragmatic benefit to community

### 3.3 Research Method

This research aimed to explore the sources of various sector-based legitimacy judgements of select CWG bodies. To do so, a qualitative data collection using a multi-case study approach was used to allow for exploratory analysis across contextually-dependant settings (Gerring, 2007; Yin, 2009). This approach was deemed appropriate as legitimacy is a situated and subjective concept depending on perspective (Connelly, 2011; Johnson *et al.*, 2006) and because legitimacy is in need of further exploratory analysis in the case of CWG (Baird *et al.*, 2014; Orr, 2015). Cases were identified from a shortlist of CWG bodies in the Canadian province of BC that self-identified as being cross-sector collaboratives functioning at the local level. BC was selected as the broader sampling frame because of the existence of many differently structured collaborative governance bodies addressing a variety of water issues within one socio-political context (Brandes & O'Riordan, 2014). The sub-unit of analysis (Yin, 2009) within each case were different sector-based actors that participate or are directly affected by each body. To allow for cross-case analysis, only actors from sectors that were present in multiple cases are reviewed within this paper.

#### 3.3.1 Case Descriptions

Cases included the Cowichan Water Board (CWB), the Lake Windermere Ambassadors (LWA), the Nechako Watershed Council (NWC), the Okanagan Basin Water Board (OBWB), the Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process/Shuswap Watershed Council (SLIPP/SWC).

The CBW is a watershed-wide collaboration that is co-governed by local government and First Nations. The Board was born out of the Cowichan Basin Water Management Plan (Westland Resource Group Inc., 2007), which was a local government led public, private and First Nations endeavor. However, it was not established until 2010 after a drought that created challenges such as having to truck salmon populations upriver to their spawning grounds and the threat of operational shut-down for the main employer of the region (Catalyst Pulp and Paper). After this water scarcity situation, the board was convened and comprised of 12 elected official members from the Cowichan Valley Regional District and the Cowichan Tribe First Nation along with up to four public members and two senior level government members (Fraser Basin Council, 2015a). The board is supported by a technical advisory committee of stakeholders. Funding is on

an annual-basis from both CVRD and First Nations gas taxes as well as grants. Legal mechanisms include registration as a charitable society, and formalized terms of reference. Eight tangible target areas were developed to guide the CWB's work: riparian protection, water supply enhancement, watershed education, water use conservation, summer flow conservation, salmon sustainability, estuary health, and water quality improvements (Rutherford, 2011). A central concern is Cowichan River flows and the CWB is an active proponent for localizing and improving flow control via a weir at the mouth of Cowichan Lake (Hunter *et al.*, 2014). This flow issues connects especially to fisheries, which are particularly important to the Cowichan Tribes as a partner in the collaboration with vested cultural and economic interests in the resource. Major activities include water quality monitoring and reporting, technical reports and presentations, restoration efforts, public education campaigns and advocacy work on flow and legislation development to senior government.

The LWA focuses on Lake Windermere at the Columbia River headwaters. Initially, Wildsight, a local ENGO, initiated the Lake Windermere Project focused on stewardship, education, and water quality monitoring. To continue the work of the project, the LWA formed in 2009 as an inclusive, consensus-based community stewardship group with an open fee-based membership. Since then, the LWA have also taken on an advisory role for local governments by acting as the Lake Windermere Management Committee (LWMC) and providing input on purposed development applications that may have implications for the health of the lake (Regional District of East Kootenay, 2008). Additionally, the LWA is leading efforts to establish a watershed-wide collaborative governance organization to oversee aspects of local water management (Lake Windermere Ambassadors, 2010). The LWA is made up of a board of representatives from different community sectors including First Nations, local business owners, community associations, and environmentalists and also includes a general membership. LWA funding comes from a fee-for-service as the LWMC, external grants, and membership fees. The legal basis of the Ambassadors includes recognition in the Lake Windermere OCP Bylaw No. 2061 Section A (10) as the LWMC (Regional District of East Kootenay, 2008), charitable status, and documented terms of reference (Lake Windermere Ambassadors, 2010; Regional District of East Kootenay *et al.*, 2011). Major activities include ongoing water quality monitoring and reporting, public education, restoration initiatives and recommendations as the LWMC on development applications.

NWC was established in 1996 (formalized in 1998) in response to social and ecological sustainability issues within the watershed. The most notable issue was the diversion of up to 70% of the Nechako River's annual water flow through the construction of the Nechako Reservoir (via the Kenney Dam at the headwaters by Alcan (merged into RioTinto Alcan in 2007) in 1954 (Wood, 2013). This development permanently altered the hydrology and ecology of the region leading to public controversy, which was exacerbated when Alcan proposed additional diversions in the 1980s and 90s. This controversy helped initiate the 1995 BC Utility Commission hearings and the 1997 BC-Alcan Settlement Agreement (Province of British Columbia, 1997). From these processes, the NWC was formed to address tensions and watershed problems. From the 1997 Settlement Agreement, \$50-\$100 million was allocated for the Nechako Environmental Enhancement Fund (NEEF) to address downstream issues (Nechako Environmental Enhancement Fund, 2001), and the NWC took on building a consensus recommendation for how this fund could be best spent. Initially, the NWC brought together over 20 stakeholder groups and First Nations from across the watershed (Nechako Watershed Council, 2009) and by 2001 made the

recommendation that a water release facility at the Kenney Dam should be built (Nechako Watershed Council, 1998). The NWC received funding from NEEF for operations (4Thought Solutions Inc., 2005) and had established terms of reference and legal recognition within Section 4 of the BC/Alcan 1997 Settlement Agreement. After providing recommendation to NEEF, the NWC faced challenges of declining participation and stagnant governance process as their recommendation was not followed through and no other significant issues were focused on. Eventually, the NWC dissolved in 2011.


The OBWB was established in the 1970s as a partnership among the three regional governments that cover the watershed boundaries (Canada-British Columbia Consultative Board, 1974). For the first 30 years of the OBWB, its primary deliverables were the provision of sewer improvements and Eurasian Milfoil control. However, local drought and wildfires in 2003 brought the communities of the Basin together to renew the OBWB's mandate to be more encompassing of different water issues such as invasive species control and water scarcity concerns from increasing water demand (especially population growth and agriculture) (Jatel, 2013). The mandate renewal included the creation of the Okanagan Water Stewardship Council (OWSC) as a technical advisory group to the board comprised of 30 plus stakeholders and First Nations (Okanagan Basin Water Board, 2010b). The renewal also led the Okanagan Nation Alliance, the OWSC chair, and a member at large to be included on the board along with appointed politicians from the regional governments (Okanagan Basin Water Board, 2010a). The funding and legal structure for the OBWB are established through BC's Municipalities Enabling and Validating Act (Province of British Columbia, 2015) with letters patent creating a mill rate parcel tax across the three regional districts. Major activities of the OBWB include watermilfoil management, a grant program for sewage improvement (Okanagan Basin Water Board, 2012), public education campaigns, advocacy work to senior government on various water issues (Okanagan Basin Water Board, 2014), the Okanagan Water Sustainability Plan (Okanagan Water Stewardship Council, 2008), watershed modeling and data collection (Okanagan Hydrometric Network Working Group, 2008), water conservation and quality improvement grant programs, the creation of the BC Water Use improvement Centre (Okanagan Basin Water Board, 2014), establishment of a local university water research chair, and local government bylaw guide books (Okanagan Basin Water Board, 2011). The OBWB is the oldest and one of the most recognized CWG bodies in BC.

SLIPP began as a Provincial Ministry of Environment (MOE) led multi-agency initiative to coordinate effort to address silos among water management agencies due to increased residential and marina development proposals, which included applications for treated sewage discharge into the watershed (Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process, 2009). Collaboration began in 2006 with public consultation working groups, leading in 2011 to a three-year pilot program on water quality, foreshore mapping, recreational management planning and ad hoc restoration and derelict dock removal. Management of SLIPP transferred in 2010 from MOE to a NGO (Fraser Basin Council). Funding of SLIPP was through local government gas tax within the Columbia Shuswap Regional District (CSRD) and the Regional District of the North Okanagan (RDNO), a parcel tax within the Thompson Nicola Regional District (TNRD), and in-kind support from provincial agencies. The board of SLIPP was comprised of representatives from the three regional districts, a First Nations representative, a member at large, and provincial agency representatives (Shuswap Watershed Council, 2014). Programing of SLIPP was contentious due to misconceptions of mandate by the public and provincial bylaw officers using the SLIPP name to take action on

foreshore violations (Shuswap Waterfront Owners Association, 2015). In connection to these issues, SLIPP members decided to rebrand at the end of the three-year pilot project (Fraser Basin Council, 2015a). Consequently, SLIPP became the SWC in 2015 and continued working on water quality and safety issues (Shuswap Watershed Council, 2014). In particular, remediation of non-point source pollution from agriculture has been identified as a necessary focus for the Council. The SWC maintained a similar governance structure, but established a more permanent funding and legal structure within the CSRD via Bylaw 5705 (Columbia Shuswap Regional District, 2015). Major activities of SLIPP and the SWC include coordinated water quality monitoring and reporting (Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process, 2014), removal of derelict docks (Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process, 2014), foreshore inventory and mapping (Ecoscape Environmental Consultants, 2009), and a recreational management plan (Peak Planning Associates, 2013).

Figure 4.1 outlines the watershed of each case within BC. Collectively, these cases represent CWG bodies that aim to include a range of sectors impacted by water resource issues in local watershed level decision-making and action using a deliberative format. These specific cases were chosen to ensure diversity across the cases in terms of geographic distribution in BC and in terms of each body’s age.

**Figure 4.1: Case Study Watershed Locations**



### 3.3.2 Data Collection and Analysis

Data were collected from 2013 to 2015 in the form of 99 semi-structured interviews, document review, and personal observation. Interviews were conducted with representatives from available societal sectors both internal (70 interviewees) or external (29 interviewees) to each case. Table 4.4 provides a matrix of sectors present in the cases and the corresponding number of interviews with actors from each. Prior to and throughout the data collection process, relevant sectors to each case study were identified and effort was made to include interviewees from all of these sectors who were participants, past-participants, or not involved but were familiar a case(s). However, not all cases included the same sectors. Sectors reported on in this paper each included five or more interviewees across all cases with the exception of interviewees from the Federal Government; federal interviewees connected to the CWB spoke both specifically to the CWB and to CWG throughout the province. In Table 4.4, the 'other' category of interviewees included sectors where inadequate data were available; however, insight from these interviewees toward the sectors reviewed were included when relevant. Also, several interviewees represented multiple sectors. In these interviews, the interviewees' primary role as a professional was identified (according to the interviewee) and then focused on in the interview. For example, if an interviewee was a politician and a member of a local property owner association, clarification was sought to confirm the capacity in which they would be interviewing and then interview questions were tailored to inquire about that specific perspective. However, for government staff working with specific sectors (e.g., Ministry of Agriculture employees), interviewees were treated as government representatives. Interviews discussed each case's process, results, legal status, social acceptance and its personal dynamics, specially asking follow-up questions to tease out sector-based perspectives using prompts stemming from the conceptual framework (Table 4.2). Purposeful and snowball interview selection was used in an attempt to have diverse representation from all societal sectors. Interviews were held in-person, by phone, or electronically and were electronically recorded. The first author or an internet-based service (TranscribeMe Inc.) transcribed the interviews verbatim. Member checking of transcripts verified the data (Carlson, 2010). Interview anonymity was protected throughout the research process as well as in the writing of this paper by only conveying the associated case or sector with interviewee quotations when it would not disclose identity.

Data were also collected from a review of 656 documents including meeting minutes, newspaper articles, reports and letters, promotional material, plans, interpersonal communications, emails, collaborative body publications and websites. These documents were identified via internet searches or word of mouth. Newspaper articles were identified via keyword searches for the name of each case using Factiva or local community newspaper databases. Observations of board and committee meetings and fieldtrips, public hearings, local practitioner conferences, watershed site-visits and interviews were also utilized. Notably, these two data sources act as secondary support in this paper as the interview data provided in-depth narratives of sector-based perspectives that are not always apparent in documents or observable as an external researcher.

Interviews and observation notes were transcribed and all data including reviewed documents and observation notes were coded using NVIVO 10 software. Qualitative analysis was used to explore and understand the depth and context of sector-based judgements. Open and axial coding identified patterns, themes and relationships (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) of common sector-based legitimacy perspectives across each case. While, no sector had unified water governance

concerns, the concerns each sector faced were common across the cases. For this reason, while case-by-case analysis was conducted to compare sectors common across the cases, the results are presented by sector, only making cross-case comparisons when there are notable differences. Triangulation of data sources from across two or more cases confirmed the credibility of the themes. Both data collection and analysis were deductive and inductive in nature continuing until conceptual saturation was reached across cases and common sectors. Evidence was selected for reporting based on its ability to clearly illustrate and highlight the themes present within each sector. Care was taken to ensure anonymity when using interview quotations as evidence by withholding the case if it was an identifying characteristic.

**Table 4.4: Interviewee Sectors Per Case**

Case→ Societal Sector ↓	CWB	LWA	NWC	OBWB	SLIPP/ SWC	Total by sector
Federal	3	-	-	-	-	3
Provincial	2	-	2	5	3	12
Local (regional districts & municipalities)	7	4	3	6	9	29
First Nations	3	1	2	1	2	9
Agriculture	-	1	-	3	1	5
Industry	2	-	2	1	-	5
Environment	2	2	2	-	2	8
Local business and property owner associations	1	4	1	2	4	12
Other (watershed managers, funders, academics, youth)	3	5	3	3	2	16
Total Interviewees	23	17	15	21	23	=99

### 3.4 Results

The different sources of legitimacy that are primarily discussed by actors representing different sectors of society are presented as the findings of this research. Table 4.5 synthesizes these findings by sector.

**Table 4.5: Actor Group Legitimacy Judgements**

<b>Actor Group</b>	<b>Empirically Identified Sources of Legitimacy</b>	<b>Type of Legitimacy (See Table 4.1)</b>
State (local, provincial, national government)	Community readiness to work together	External approval
	Involvement of other levels of government	Extension, external approval
	Alignment of body's goals with government mandate	Social identity
	Track record of results	Substantive output
	Governance stability; inclusive, unbiased process	Structural, throughput
	Value of water to community well-being (local)	Pragmatic
	Supported institutional framework (local)	Rule
	Politician/senior level bureaucrat interest (province)	Extension, personal qualities
First Nations Government	First Nations involvement (national)	Extension
	Recognition and respect for capacity limitations	Non-democratic input
	Prioritization of interests	Democratic input, pragmatic
	Aligned political representation on collaboration/respect for title and rights	Structural
	Treatment as equal partner throughout process	Democratic input
Agriculture	Sense of representation on board	Democratic input
	Protection of agricultural water allocation	Pragmatic
	Address of water issues that affect agriculture (e.g., drought, flood preparedness)	Pragmatic
Environment sector	Alignment of agriculture sector with environmental protection	Pragmatic
	Ability to address environmental issues	Cognitive, pragmatic, substantive output, problem solving
Industry	Benefit to public communications mandate, fulfillment of water management responsibilities, protection of water licence, strengthening of social licence to operate through environmental protection	Pragmatic
	Requirement for impartial and forthcoming process	Democratic input, structural
Local business and property owner associations	Respect for community well-being	Pragmatic, cognitive

## 4.4.1 Government

### 3.4.1.1 The State

Across all levels of government, community readiness, support of other government agencies, alignment of goals and results, a proven track record, and democratic processes acted as legitimacy sources. These sources influenced not only the various governments' judgements of a collaboration, but also their willingness to participate, partner or contribute resources.

A community's readiness to work together across sectors and the prioritization of inclusivity within each case indicated to government actors well rounded local support that increased the likelihood that a collaboration would achieve its goals. This sentiment is illustrated by the views of a retired senior-level provincial employee familiar with all five cases:

There is nothing more powerful to government decision-makers than a group of citizens with First Nations and industry onside saying "we want a change and this is what we want and we all agree." All government is going to say is "great, how do we make this work" (Interview 32).

For each of the cases, the initial participation of any level of government, even those that acted as convenors of the collaboration, required the willingness of a range of sectors to be involved.

Additionally, the support or participation of other government agencies (i.e., different jurisdictional levels, geographically neighbouring jurisdictions, or different departments within the same government) acted as an indication for four of the five cases (excluding the LWA) that a body was a credible organization. In this sense, each government looks at the interaction others have with a collaborative body as a legitimacy source. As an example, for the NWC, provincial and federal government participation was contingent on each other participating. The following comment in the *Prince George Citizen* demonstrates this point: "the B.C. government agreed to participate in the board's initiative, provided there was also participation by the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans (Citizen Staff, 1996). Similar sentiment was also iterated by Fisheries and Oceans in a private letter to NWC staff. Recognition of each other's management roles in the Nechako Watershed meant that one agency did not want to participate if the other was not willing.

Government agencies at all levels, also look at how a body's goals and results align with their own department's mandate. Collaborations must provide value via a service provided that aligns with the priorities of the government in power, the budget year, and long-term ministry plans. A provincial employee familiar with all five cases expressed this sense of need as a balancing of resources with the extent a collaboration benefits the government's pragmatic interests: "the more that they are trying to advance something that is where government has decided they want to go, the more likely we are to get more directly involved in there" (Interview 8). Thus, the extent a collaboration's goals align with government mandate can dictate the amount of support or involvement from a government. In the context of the CWB, the close alignment of the body's goals with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO)'s mandate led to partnerships projects (e.g., bathymetric mapping of Cowichan Lake) and was observed to influence DFO's prioritization of senior-level employee representation at meetings, the transfer of representation from the retiring employee to their successors without change in prioritization, and willingness to represent the CWB at public events. "[The CWB] has to have a clear linkage to the mandate of protecting fish and fish habitat, which is what we do... [this justifies] the time and

expense of participating (Interview 84, federal employee).” Thus, in some circumstance it can make sense for government to initially take a leadership role (e.g., SLIPP was initially led by provincial staff). If government can help shape the scope of a collaboration, then the body’s mandate may naturally align with the priorities of a ministry or department.

A track record of measurable output was also required to gain government support or participation in a collaboration. This sentiment was expressed by a federal employee speaking about collaborations in general as legitimacy being “a board doing things and in a measurable way... all the boards do stuff, but it's to really have a focused place that they're going to that we value” (Interview 2, federal employee). Measurable results can indicate stability of the governance process fostering perceptions of trust that a collaboration is a low-risk option in which to invest time and resources. As result of this view, every case produced at least annual reports that highlight and summarize the main activities and their impacts.

Collaborative governance process norms also factored into perspectives at each government level; the most commonly valued norms were impartiality and long-term accountability to constituents. Impartiality was identified as particularly important for elected local officials across all cases in connection to their responsibilities to act in their constituents’ best interests, justify tax fund allocations, and provide equal benefit across the community. Concern for impartiality was particularly observed during SLIPP/SWC and OBWB meetings regarding projects like SLIPP’s derelict dock removal program and the OBWB’s community grant program, where board members went into detail to deliberate and ensure project benefits were geographically distributed before offering support. Next to impartiality, governments were also concerned about ensuring the cases were representative and accountable as a long-term governance form. A provincial employee reflecting on concerns of all government levels commented on this connection:

A group needs to have the ongoing responsibility for their decision... You have to look at that and say, “are they going to be around for a while once they make a decision? Why would this group be wanting this right now? Can they be seen as impartial or are they trying to achieve a very specific outcome that may not be supported by the broader community?” ... They’ve got to participate as a partner with some accountability to community (Interview 85).

In this sense, accountability is a key source that normatively justifies a collaboration. Issues of accountability were observed and expressed in interviews towards SLIPP, LWA, CWB. For SLIPP it was not clear who would be responsible for implementing the collaboration’s recommended actions or plans. For the LWA, the voluntary nature of the body raised questions about sustained involvement. Meanwhile, for the CWB, accountability was debated at the provincial level with regards to whether the CWB’s desire to structurally alter the weir at the mouth of the Cowichan River and locally control river flows could be enforced legally. A clear accountability path was thus particularly necessary for government actors to view collaborations as more than a voluntary organization.

Specific legitimacy sources were also noted for each government level. For local governments across all cases, a key legitimacy source was the alignment of the body’s mandate with community well-being. For example, a municipal public servant reflecting on the LWA explained:

This Council... has always indicated that this Lake is very important to the community... damage to it and not understanding the science behind it could lose our advantage in all sorts of different things, be it in the community, loss of jobs, all those types of things. Consequently, we have tried to support them [LWA] both in kind, in free space, and a \$10,000 fee for service (Interview 11).

Even though the LWA is not government led, there is recognition of its contribution to the vitality of the community. Also, noted in local government judgements towards CWB, LWA and SLIPP was the positive judgement of a legal and financial structure similar to the OBWB's letters patent through provincial legislation. For example, "the nice thing about the Okanagan Board's model is that they are legislated with a set mandate and their territory is defined and they have some power associated with it. That is what we are missing as a council" (Interview 59, local government politician, SWC). This sentiment reflects the desire for a sense of stability and the resource support that is provided through a supportive institutional-setting; a norm that has not yet been fully developed at the senior government level for the other cases.

At the province level, the opinion of ministry senior staff or politicians influenced agency support for a body through personal or indirect legitimacy. For example, for SLIPP, personal political endorsement influenced provincial support: "one of the keys to this is MLA George Abbott. If he continues to support SLIPP, future funding from the province will be committed" (Brouwer, 2010). Although the MLA's continued perspective is unknown, it is interesting to note that as public controversy for SLIPP began to emerge, the withdraw of provincial staff leadership also changed leading to the transfer of management for the organization.

Finally, only at the federal level did particular concern emerge for First Nations engagement in a collaboration as a legitimacy source. "I would be very hesitant as a federal representative to participate in any table that didn't have First Nations participation...because you're just going to run into conflict the minute you leave that table" (Interview 14, federal employee, CWB). Other federal interviewees expressed similar sentiment, emphasizing an awareness of the need to consider First Nations in resource management decisions.

### **3.4.1.2 First Nations Government**

First Nations participated in each of the case studies through representation at the tribal council (NWC), nation (OBWB & SLIPP/SWC), or band (LWA, CWB) level. The type of representatives from these levels differed in each case as either band or tribal council chiefs (CWB, NWC), band or nation-level staff (LWA, OBWB), or volunteer nation representatives (SLIPP/SWC). In all cases, except the NWC, only one representative was present to represent First Nations interests even if multiple Bands existed within the watershed. In the OBWB and CWB, technical representation on sub-committees also existed. First Nations interests in each case included a range of topics such as bringing cultural and spiritual values, traditional knowledge, water, fisheries, and land rights and current projects to the collaborative table. However, First Nations representation differed in terms of the depth of engagement and the frequency of interaction in each case (e.g., from the CWB being co-managed and regularly led by a member of the Cowichan Tribes' Chief and Council to the limited attendance of the Okanagan Nation Alliance (ONA) at OBWB board meetings (according to board meeting minutes from 2013-2015). Despite these differences, five main legitimacy sources were identified in First Nations' CWG judgements.

First, two interconnected sources of legitimacy that influence First Nations judgements include recognition and respect for limited First Nations capacity and the prioritization of their interests. Within the CWB case, Cowichan Tribes has a role as a leader of the organization and has thus been able to help shape the body to align with the priorities of the Tribe so that their capacity can be extended by the work of the CWB. “They [CWB] recognize a lack of capacity. They come and they help us. They talk to us. They don't demand, but they want us there. And every time they do anything, First Nations are always recognized” (Interview 28, Cowichan Tribes staff). As a result, with the CWB, Cowichan Tribes’ concerns around fisheries and water quality are prioritised within the case, enhancing their desire to be involved. “They're well recognized, they're well supported... and as a result of this they become willing to be a part of the process with NGO and industry people – even though they don't have to go there” (Interview 86, provincial employee, BC-wide). This example is in contrast to sentiment within the OBWB where the ONA added to the board as a seat when the collaboration renewed its focus after over forty years in existence:

A lot of the things that we work on are really quite mundane. So, if you're a chief and you have a choice of either be working on some very serious land rights negotiation or coming down and talking about communications. What would you choose to work on? (Interview 90).

If a collaboration is not relevant to a First Nation, then their capacity limits will likely influence their judgement towards a collaboration in a negative way. In the OBWB, this limitation was observed as occasional ONA staff participation rather than Chief and Council at board meetings and ONA interns as representatives on the OWSC. As a result, OBWB First Nations engagement was limited to technical, rather than political discussion based on the involved individuals’ portfolios. This recognition and respect of capacity limitations also connects to the prioritization of interests. If First Nations participation does not provide tangible value back to the Band or Nation, questions also arise about whether a collaboration is worthy of their time. For SLIPP/SWC and the OBWB, because First Nations do not contribute to the tax base that funds both bodies, they are not eligible to vote on financial decisions, and in the case of the OBWB, the ONA is not eligible to receive OBWB grants. This led to a sense of disadvantage for example, “we would be involved, but it takes a little bit out of you when you go to meetings and you are the only one not contributing funding or making decisions” (Interview 72, First Nations representative, SLIPP/SWC).

Third, political tension between the Canadian state and First Nations also influences how First Nations judge a collaboration to determine whether or not they would participate. The risk of impact on title and rights claims and whether interaction with First Nations was technician-to-technician or politician-to-politician influenced how a body was perceived. “Generally, stakeholder groups including government are a no-no because everything becomes on the record in conversation... as [we] do not want to be seen in negotiation” (Interview 33, First Nations representative, OBWB). If First Nations are seen to be collaborating it may jeopardize their autonomy claims.

Similarly, as a fourth source of legitimacy, collaborations are judged for who is involved and whether they are technical or political personnel.

We would look at a board...as being a collection of the stakeholders; they are not sitting at the table as a representative of the province... [they are] only bringing the

technical expertise of the province to the table. They are not there to make adjudications for the province, but when a chief is sitting at the table he has that responsibility (Interview 74, First Nations representative, SLIPP/SWC).

Because of the requirement to build Nation-to-Nation relationships in Canada, First Nations must be met with equal commitment and participation of political leaders to gain their support. For example, with the NWC “they [Carrier Sekani Tribal Council] didn’t feel properly identified as a nation to take part in a group of small governments and chambers of commerce and environmental groups... they wanted to speak government to government” (Interview 54, First Nations representative). This sentiment was also reflected by First Nations in all of the other cases. If First Nations elected officials are going to put aside title and rights issues to work at a collaborative table then they want to be met as elected officials by elected officials. The equal partnership between elected First Nations and regional district officials in the CWB is evidence of how this relationship can work and generate acceptance for the body.

Finally, positive legitimacy judgement, particularly in the form of dedicated political involvement, required the time to build meaningful relationships. For the CWG, building meaningful relationships meant treating the Cowichan Tribes as a nation and equal government partner at a collaboration’s establishment and throughout its existence. Strategic decision by the CWB’s initial convenors to not involve Cowichan Tribes as just a member, but as a leader in a First Nations government-to-regional government relationship is cited as the first step in gaining the Cowichan Tribes support.

[Cowichan Tribes] have a very strong, legitimate stake as a government in the watershed. If this was going to be a local initiative from the very beginning... then how could you not have a partnership between the two local [government] bodies that depend upon this watershed and that have legitimate authority (Interview 69, CWB).

This sentiment has also been continued as the CWB has developed. Cowichan Tribes contribute financially to the CWB and the CWB continuously makes an effort to engage with the Cowichan people: “the Watershed Board has been the most inclusive group for First Nations that I’ve ever seen. They always talk about including First Nations in everything and they’re always saying, ‘I wish we had more First Nations [involvement]’” (Interview 28, First Nations representative). Also, important to this relationship is the building of trust among participants “We really want to trust the people we’re sitting down with. We want to know those people; who they are and that they’re not just, ‘okay, here is somebody just showing up and they are going to be replaced by somebody else down the road’” (Interview 82, First Nations representative). Personal relationships can thus lead to positive legitimacy judgements.

Important to note in consideration of these five sources of legitimacy is the influence of context in terms of how First Nations use these sources in judgements. Particular contextual factors included band-to-band and band-to-tribal council relationships as well as differing political agendas among First Nations leaders. In each case, bands were excluded from the collaboration because the participating First Nations entity in each collaboration did not represent them. The Little Shuswap Indian Band was not part of SLIPP because they are not a part of the Shuswap Nation Tribal Council (SNTC) that participated in the collaboration. The Shuswap Band is not but the Akisqnuq Band is represented in the LWA. The Splotsin First Nations are not represented in the OBWB as they are not a part of the ONA. The Cowichan Lake Band is not part

of the Cowichan Tribes and is not part of the CWB as a result and in the context of the NWC, multiple First Nation Bands were not included depending primarily on their relationship with the Carrier-Sekani Tribal Council. This exclusion has raised concerns about the quality of CWG First Nations representation; for example, “they [the Cowichan Lake Band] may still feel somewhat slighted about the fact that tribes downstream have a more pivotal decision-making role on the board” (Interview 35, financial resource contributor, CWB). Similarly, “if we were honestly represented by SNTC that could be a seat, but if we deem we are not, do they offer us a seat?... I think every individual band should have the opportunity to sit at that table... [at least then they would] be entitled to receiving minutes” (Interview 74, First Nations representative). For First Nations, one voice does not represent every Band. Voice may also differ across the mindset of the First Nations government in question. For example, personal mindset may play a role: “do you have a forward-thinking person at the table or do you have someone who is entrenched in past traditions more? That makes a big difference about who you are speaking with and how you will get things to happen” (Interview 47, SLIPP, First Nations). The personal beliefs of First Nation government leaders in power can influence how their government engages with and judges a collaboration.

### **3.4.2 Non-government**

#### **3.4.2.1 Agriculture**

Pragmatic legitimacy judgements were common across the agriculture sector, regardless of farming type (e.g., arable, pastoral, mixed) in all cases. These include judgements about the effect of a case’s work on water allocation licenses and the benefit collaboration can provide to farming, such as protection from encroaching development and climate change (e.g., more extreme or frequent drought and flooding). These concerns were particularly emphasized in the Okanagan where there is a large agriculture demand for water and drought is a major concern: “I think the real purpose of the OBWB for me – is drought – when times of drought come we want to be able to have a system which is already set up where allocations can be reduced” (Interview 51, farmer). Likewise, “it is a big issue for farming; we don't want to see our allocation dropped to allow for more people to come in [i.e., move to the Okanagan region] - that is major... the whole board might be against me on that - but I just think that is the way it is” (Interview 25, farmer). These comments emphasize the value of considering agricultural needs to gain support from the sector.

Nutrient loading from agricultural run-off was identified in the Okanagan, Cowichan, and Shuswap as focal issues for each case, leading some agricultural representatives to express feeling a sense of opposition separating them from other collaborative participants.

They [OBWB] have made some mistakes in the past about doing certain things and agriculture moving ahead and stuff - I think it was actually a water rates study or something and they didn't consult with the farmers - they got lambasted for that. We actually told them "how could you do this?" And it was "oh ya we can do that." They learned very quickly that you need everybody on side before you go down this path (Interview 78, agricultural representative, provincial employee).

In the Cowichan, a Ministry of Agriculture representative expressed similar concern:

I think the Cowichan Watershed Board has got significant priorities identified that need work and I think agriculture has got to develop some goodwill at the board table. There's concern obviously about this water quality issue. As a result of that, the goodwill that agriculture has is limited at the board table. That's going to be a challenge to overcome I believe (Interview 86).

This sense of opposition towards agriculture by collaborative bodies risks animosity towards a collaboration from farmers, and impedes positive legitimacy judgements. However, this is not the case for all within the sector.

The majority of agricultural people are the best stewards of the land, not only because they care, but because that is their livelihood - and that is why it is not so difficult to get the majority of them on side with things like water quality (Interview 34, SWC, farmer).

For SLIPP/SWC, the decision to include agricultural representatives on the board was intentional to try and displace animosity, rather than provoke it. For SWC working to build better relationships with the agriculture community is particularly important since water quality monitoring during SLIPP has indicated that non-point source pollution stemming from areas of the watershed that have high agricultural activity have significant nutrient loading issues. Such relationship building was noted as an important aspect for how the CWB and the OBWB approach water quality issues as well. Similarly, cases that were able to frame environmental protection as a benefit to the agriculture sector because of their dependence on the land, were able to garner more support for the body. This was evident in projects of the OBWB, CWB, and SWC that work with farmers (e.g., CWB's agriculture conservation workshops for water purveyors and farmers (Hunter *et al.*, 2014)). For all these cases, the goal has been to find ways not to blame the agriculture sector for water challenges, but instead to help enable the sector to strengthen its relationship with the environment in ways that produce both livelihood and ecological benefits. In sum, collaborations may be positively judged for the extent that they are able to protect agriculture water needs while also sensitively helping the sector embrace environment responsibility.

### **3.4.2.2 Environment**

Water conservation or stewardship groups are present in the watersheds of each case, although their relationships to a collaboration varies. Their relationships ranged from being a participant within the collaborative bodies (e.g., Salmon River Watershed Roundtable in the SWC), a supportive partner and advocate for the collaboration (e.g., Cowichan Stewardship Roundtable), a parallel organization with a limit relationship (e.g., Nechako Environmental Enhancement Society), or a non-participating interest group that opposes a collaboration's work (e.g., Nechako River Alliance). Environmental protection is the primary concern for these groups:

As long as the watershed board stays focused on environmental protection and sustainability – so we're here for the fish, we're here for the people that depend on the fish and the ecosystems that they support and that support them, then I'm all in (Interview 16, CWB, civil society).

Similar sentiment was apparent across all cases emphasizing the moral and pragmatic basis of legitimacy judgements from this sector. This sentiment also emphasizes the strong discourse

surrounding these collaborations as entities focused on environmental conservation. For this reason, the pragmatic interests of actors working in this sector to address or represent environmental needs factors into judgments toward a collaboration. Those representing environmental needs want to be assured that a collaboration benefits the environment, typically through the production of output that leads to environmental change. Challenges to the belief that a collaboration is not capable of producing environmental output is exemplified in the context of the NWC, as the Nechako River Alliance (representing eight environmental groups and First Nations Bands) withdrew support and participation from the NWC in 1998 (Citizen Staff, 1998). The Alliance felt that power imbalance between industry and the others involved would result in minimal environmental change in the watershed and did not want to compromise their values through consensus. In this sense, the inclusive and consensus-based nature of collaboration negatively influenced the legitimacy judgements from within the environmental sector.

### **3.4.2.3 Industry**

Three of the five cases included participation from large shareholder-based natural resource industry. These industries include Catalyst Pulp and Paper and Timberwest Forestry in the Cowichan Watershed, Alcan (now RioTinto Alcan) in the Nechako Watershed, and Gorman Bros. Lumber in the Okanagan. The involvement of industry related predominantly to the pragmatic benefit participation provides to a company, which included improving community relations and social license to operate, meeting public communications and water management responsibilities, and protecting water licenses (where appropriate). To illustrate are two comments from industry personnel in the Nechako and Okanagan.

All of this [NWC participation] was intended to protect our water license ultimately, and we believe we have to be active in leading the way in terms of sustainability to be able to do that (Interview 61, NWC, Alcan representative).

Most of my role at the Stewardship Council was to make them aware of what management forestry does in the watershed... a lot of my role there was to download and educate the other members around the table and to stay current on what policies were coming up (Interview 44, OBWB, forestry representative).

These quotations emphasize why industry participates in collaborations, which is also publicly exemplified in corporate promotional material (e.g., Alcan, 2006) and shareholder reports (e.g., Catalyst Paper Corporation, 2012). However, there were limits to the extent industry engaged in each of the three cases. Comments such as “a lot of the agricultural stuff I didn't spend a lot of time on” (Interview 44, OBWB, forestry representative) and “Catalyst isn't actively engaged in the many aspects of the Cowichan Watershed Board that are not linked directly to the mill operations” (Interview 9, industry representative) demonstrate this limit and the importance of direct relevance as a condition of industry's involvement. These expressions were expressed consistently across all three cases with industry representatives emphasizing the need for collaborations to appeal to industry's sense of corporate social and environmental responsibility so far as it is germane to their work and their shareholders.

Additionally, expressed in the judgement of a collaboration's legitimacy and as a factor for industry participation was the assurance of a collaboration being impartial and forthcoming:

If it is a group of honest, interested stakeholders who meet in good faith, TimberWest will reciprocate, and attend, and participate... Legitimacy is having the full - or the broadest possible - spectrum of interested stakeholders at the forum. If that's the case, pertinent agencies, relevant neighbors, stakeholder groups, and an unbiased and a full appreciation of science, in any device, then it is legitimate to us (Interview 18, CWB, industry representative).

In the context of TimberWest, this emphasis on process connects to past community opposition towards historic local forestry management, which often included clear-cutting that was visible to communities. For TimberWest, overcoming historically-based perceptions as the company has sought to embed social and ecological sustainability in their practices requires public spaces where representatives are not treated as the enemy. Collaborations can assist in providing this space so long as there is a neutral table and the sector is treated fairly and equally.

#### **3.4.2.4 Local Business and Property Owner Associations**

Local business and property owner associations acted as case participants (LWA, NWC) or represented the public through media and at public and board meetings. In general, their support exists as awareness of the collaboration and as judgement that the cases respect local interests.

General awareness of the collaborative bodies was interpreted by interviewees across all cases as an indication of community support. Public awareness was conveyed through newspaper articles, letters of support for a case, public turnout at a collaboration's meetings or events, and the number of views on a webpage or social media platform. As a result, each case worked to develop media and communications strategies to publicly connect. For example, the LWA program manager has a standing column in the local newspaper, the Valley Echo, the OBWB's executive director has a social media presence, and the NWC produced media releases after council meetings. In this sense, the media was viewed as a way to gain and maintain public awareness about the bodies. This awareness then allowed the cases to demonstrate their goals and show their role within the community. Nevertheless, across all cases there was concern about limited public knowledge of each body. For example, "[the LWA] needs public support...people will lose interest if they don't understand it" (Interview 40, local business representative). Additionally, similar to local government judgements, whether a collaboration respects local citizen interests was also important for public support. For local business owners with vested interests in local economic well-being, judgment stemmed from whether the case provided pragmatic economic benefit: "this lake is the centre economic piece of our valley and somebody is actually paying attention to it – that I can support" (Interview 58, LWA, local business representative). However, local business may view a collaboration negatively if it limits economic opportunities by promoting environmental conservation. This concern was present for the OBWB, LWA, and SLIPP/SWC; to illustrate:

Sometimes the perceptions around SLIPP are that it's environmental-type people that just want to shut things down.... that's a good and a bad thing. They can certainly get lots of people active... but sometimes they're perceived as having special interests (Interview 13, local business).

Property owners across the cases also expressed similar concern. Sentiment towards the LWA acts as illustration: "the greatest challenge is to not undermine economic viability of the Lake. If it gets to the point where they are limiting activity on the Lake that will be viewed

negatively and publicly people will turn on them” (Interview 60, property owner association representative). For the LWA, SLIPP, and NWC, perceptions that the collaborations would prioritize environmental conservation over socio-economic needs was a main factor in how those with vested economic interests in the respective watersheds would judge a collaboration. Social acceptance for local business and property owner associations thus requires respect for livelihoods.

### 3.5 Discussion

Based on the sector-based judgements within the watersheds of each case, basic observations can be made about some of the prominent sector-based legitimacy perspectives towards each collaboration. Notably, for the CWB gaining provincial government support for the organization remains key for the body to move forward with some of its goals (especially concerning water quantity/flow control). Establishing clear pathways of accountability, impartiality, and demonstrating effectiveness will be particularly important for gaining such support. In contrast, for the LWA, local government as well as local business and community owner associations perspectives are paramount. The LWA needs to be perceived as neutral to provide unbiased advice to local government and demonstrate to the community that water governance for the entire watershed will provide both socio-ecological as well as socio-economic benefits. For the NWC, even though the body disbanded, legitimacy was strongly tied in the end to the provincial government’s failure to allocate funds for the NWC’s recommendation, which then created a sense of failure that disengaged participants. Meanwhile, for the OBWB, while a strong institutional-setting has allowed government actors to positively perceive the organization’s legitimacy, perspectives of legitimacy by First Nations still need to be improved – particularly by finding ways to make the organization relevant to the ONA. Finally, for SWC, past public controversy, particularly by local business and property owner associations, raised concerns about the community benefit of SLIPP as well as the utility of the organization leading to questions by government actors as well. The institutionalization of the SWC within a local government bylaw and the achievement of environmental improvements will continue to enhance the SWC’s legitimacy.

In reflection of these perspectives, this study’s results indicated that while a variety of legitimacy sources influence judgements toward CWG bodies, a strong emphasis on pragmatically-based judgements existed across all sectors in all cases. Although CWG brings a diverse group of sectors together attempting to find common values towards water, the interests of the different sectors are often forefront in legitimacy judgements (Moody, 2009). As a result, the interests and motivations different sector-based actors have towards collaborations can be indicative of their legitimacy judgements. Consequently, research by other authors (e.g., Brisbois, 2015; de Loë *et al.*, 2015; de Loë *et al.*, 2016; von der Porten & de Loë, 2013a) that has looked in-depth at select sector-based beliefs toward CWG align with the findings of this paper. For example, this paper identified agricultural judgements to be based on the ability for CWG bodies to help protect agricultural water allocation licenses, address water issues that affect farmers and improve agricultural-environmental sustainability. de Loë *et al.* (2015), Murray and de Loe (2012a) and Simpson *et al.* (2015) studying the perspectives of farmers towards CWG identify these same variables (e.g., addressing flood and drought issues that affect farming) along with others as CWG benefits to the agriculture sector. Similarly, some of the motives for industry

participation in CWG (e.g., strengthening of social license) identified by (de Loë *et al.*, 2016) and Brisbois (2015) are also included within the legitimacy judgements identified within this paper.

This study also furthers Moody's (2009) observation of the primarily pragmatic nature of non-government actor judgements towards a collaboration by also including government actors. For example, the state's concern for community readiness and governance stability may be driven by a desire to limit resource expenditures, a known concern for many Western governments (Lockwood *et al.*, 2009). Likewise, government concern for the involvement of other agencies in a collaboration may tie to concerns about overstepping or maintaining jurisdictional divisions of power (de Loë & Kreutzwiser, 2007). For First Nations governments, the pragmatic interests of ensuring their right to self-determination and being recognized as a nation-based government partner (von der Porten *et al.*, 2015) particularly acted as themes within their legitimacy judgements. Importantly, the First Nations legitimacy judgements were perhaps the most cynical of CWG compared to the others and their pragmatic interests should be noted as an area to address when looking for ways to enhance CWG legitimacy. von der Porten *et al.* (2015), through research on the BC CWG context (including the OBWB specifically), confirm this negative view, claiming that within BC CWG there is poor understanding and treatment of First Nations as a self-determining, politically autonomous nation. von der Porten *et al.* (2015) also make practical recommendations to address this inadequacy suggesting action such as correcting resource and capacity differences between First Nations and other collaborative actors and ensuring processes and goals are developed with First Nations involvement. This action, in turn, could also improve legitimacy judgements.

Discussion of the sector-based pragmatic interests of actors involved in a collaboration is not surprising as collaborative governance aims to incorporate diverse interests (Emerson *et al.*, 2009) using interest-based negotiation (O'Leary & Bingham, 2009) and consensus building (Ansell & Gash, 2007). However, even as mutual benefits and interests are identified, the pragmatic interests of a sector still present as the primary sources of a legitimacy judgement. Recognition and occasional reassessment of these interests may thus help a collaboration better establish, maintain, or defend its legitimacy to various sectors. At the core of such an examination of the different interests is the question: *whose legitimacy matters?* Ultimately, an answer to this question is context specific depending on the issue being considered and the role different sectors play in contributing to and solving the problem at hand. To illustrate, consider SWC and the science-based confirmation that non-point source agriculture run-off is a water quality issue that needs to be addressed. In considering how to approach remediation, it can be worthwhile to consider how the SWC is viewed by the agriculture sector, as well as possibly government (i.e., Ministry of Agriculture) if they are needed to provide support or regulatory enforcement. Knowing and respecting the pragmatic interests of the agriculture sector can help build support for the approaches taken to address the pollution issues; in turn, this may also strengthen legitimacy judgements towards a collaboration. Also, relevant in the assessment of different legitimacy judgements, is considering how these perspectives evolve over time. It can be expected that as actors become more familiar with the norms of collaboration and as a collaboration becomes further institutionalized within society, that their interests may be influenced with the values of the collaborative process itself (Box, 2002). Such consideration may already be evident within government sector legitimacy judgements that were influenced by a community willingness to work together and the involvement of other government agencies.

Findings from this study also revealed that all legitimacy judgements drew from each grouping of legitimacy types presented in Table 4.1. However, no one typology alone adequately covered an entire sector's judgements, let alone the entire social system. This inadequacy of typologies is supported by Black (2008) who asserts that different judgments of legitimacy may not even be based on the same evaluations. Legitimacy research that diagnostically uses one typology for analysis (e.g., Baird *et al.*, 2014; Hogl *et al.*, 2012; Newig & Kvarda, 2012; Orr, 2015; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005) is therefore at risk of missing crucial sources of legitimacy that matter empirically. When the intention is to draw on or apply legitimacy theory to empirical settings, utilizing a variety of legitimacy typologies, as in Table 4.1, can produce a more robust understanding of legitimacy sources.

How different legitimacy judgements relate across sectors was also discernible from the findings. There are both overlapping and adversarial legitimacy judgements. For example, local business and property owners' associations and local government both factor impact on local community well-being into their judgements. Conversely, for example, the environmental sector's judgements concern the ability of a collaboration to produce environmental outcomes regardless of inclusivity compared to the state's concerns for inclusivity or procedural justice, which may hinder environmental output by slowing decision-making. Although collaborative governance is known for bringing multiple interests together (Ansell & Gash, 2007), conflicting interests may require a collaboration to prioritize the legitimacy concerns of one over another, ultimately decreasing legitimacy judgements by the non-prioritized group (Tregidga *et al.*, 2007). The findings show how this challenge manifests in all of the cases; for example, for the NWC, involvement of (RioTinto) Alcan in the collaboration, while increasing support of the NWC by industry led to environmental civil society withdrawing support. Awareness of, justification for, balance between, and management of these trade-offs may help garner support from a broader range of society. Likewise, observing where there is overlap of sector judgements (i.e., sources and types of legitimacy of similar nature used across multiple legitimacy judgments) may indicate focus areas where attention could strengthen support and counteract challenges in other areas.

The findings also emphasized the differences in considering legitimacy as a social judgment versus a normative attribute. Pragmatic legitimacy concerns rarely show up in normative legitimacy interpretations (Black, 2008); however, there is a relationship between the two. Pragmatic judgements provide a foundation that socially justify the function of CWG bodies within their social system. Normative legitimacy theories identify ideals and act as assessment frameworks to evaluate empirical settings. Moreover, parts of normative theories (i.e., legitimacy types) appear within social judgments of legitimacy. Understanding what legitimacy types are valued within different settings and by different sectors can indicate the practicality of different normative theories to collaboration. In the context of CWG, particularly at the local watershed level, the premise of a body is often to create practical change on a given issue; thus, having normative theories that are not lofty unachievable goals empirically can help provide accurate assessment of different bodies.

Together these observations make a case for collaborations to strategically manage legitimacy by openly monitoring their environment (Patel *et al.*) and considering both collectively and individually the legitimacy judgments of all actors regardless of sector (Black, 2008). To help with this process, researchers, practitioners and policy makers when assessing CWG legitimacy should ensure conceptual clarity about the form of legitimacy (judgement, normative or process based) in question and when considering judgement-based legitimacy make clear whose

perspective is of concern. From a practical standpoint, not providing clarity risks excluding perspectives and not gaining legitimacy from select social sectors. Strategic management of a body's legitimacy can benefit from a polycentric framework to provide awareness of all different perspectives and to efficiently manage resources when attempting to gain support from different groups. By identifying each sector's interests and legitimacy judgments, collaborations can become more relatable to a diversity of sectors.

### 3.6 Conclusion

CWG bodies are an important part of efforts to address various water issues. The legitimacy of these bodies is pivotal to their ability to function and produce results. Knowing the common legitimacy sources different sector-based actors use to empirically judge CWG bodies should be a part of efforts to strategically manage legitimacy. This requires a pluralistic understanding of legitimacy judgements. There are a variety of different sector-based actors in CWG with varying interests and motivations pertaining to CWG, which can influence what sources are drawn on to make legitimacy judgments. The pragmatically-oriented nature of legitimacy judgements (Moody, 2009) means that knowledge of the different sector-based interests and motivations of CWG actors can help in understanding the composition of their legitimacy judgements. While some research on the interests of different sectors exist (e.g., Brisbois, 2015; de Loë *et al.*, 2015; de Loë *et al.*, 2016; Milton & Lepage, 2010), this work is not connected to legitimacy perspectives. This paper represents an effort to empirically make these connections through an understanding of the composition of common legitimacy judgements.

By working to further knowledge on the composition of sector-based legitimacy judgements, management efforts can then be tailored to not only recruit and retain participants from different sectors, but can also gain their resource support and willing compliance to collaborative decisions. Caution of management efforts is necessary though; while some judgements may complement each other, others may be in conflict with each other. Addressing concerns of one sector, may negatively influence the judgements stemming from another. Identifying the perspectives and openly discussing ways to mitigate differences can help collaborations effectively manage their legitimacy.

To help with these management efforts, future research studying the interests and motivations of various sectors should connect to discussion on legitimacy judgements. Furthermore, future study of how different actor groups' judgements evolve, how different perspectives interrelate and are impacted by management decisions, what the interests and connected judgements are of other sectors (e.g., youth, financial institutions, women), and how the normative nature of collaboration itself can modify interests will compliment this study's initial assessment. For any of these efforts, CWG legitimacy researchers must also clearly acknowledge that their interpretation of legitimacy as a social judgement (in contrast to it being a normative value or process (Suddaby *et al.*, 2016)). This can help to build conceptual clarity for legitimacy both by researchers and practitioners. By identifying legitimacy as a sector-based judgement, collaborations can better understand how to gain support and credibility for its operations as legitimacy means different things to different people.

# Chapter 5

## Conclusion

Collaborative governance has become a favoured approach to make decisions and take action for different resources, particularly water. Legitimacy is essential to ensure this approach can produce order, stability and effectiveness. This dissertation has addressed knowledge gaps concerning specific nuances of legitimacy in the context of collaborative water governance (CWG). The following reviews these efforts offering summary observations on CWG legitimacy. This is accomplished by synthesising the principle findings and identifying their significant and original contribution to knowledge. To do so, the research's purposes and objectives, major findings, academic and practical contributions, limitations, and areas deserving of further study are discussed. Finally, a personal reflection on the research process concludes this work.

### 4.1 Purpose and Objectives

The purpose of this research was to provide conceptual clarity about the multi-faceted and dynamic nature of CWG legitimacy. This was accomplished by drawing on collaborative governance and legitimacy literatures from across multiple disciplines and empirically assessing the legitimacy of five CWG bodies in accordance with the following objectives:

- 1) To synthesise existing legitimacy typologies and build a robust conceptual framework of legitimacy types that can be used for the integrated assessment of CWG legitimacy;
- 2) To examine how CWG legitimacy evolves as a collaborative body develops;
- 3) To determine variations in the composition of CWG legitimacy judgements by sector; and
- 4) To provide insight into ways collaborative practitioners can influence legitimacy to enhance the effectiveness and stability of CWG according to various perspectives.

### 4.2 Major Findings

To achieve these objectives, the research was presented as three interrelated manuscripts that individually addressed objectives one, two and three and collectively addressed objective four. Chapter Two presented a synthesized framework of legitimacy types relevant to CWG and demonstrated the framework's empirical relevance. Chapters Three and Four used Chapter Two's synthesised framework to examine temporal changes to legitimacy and variations in sector-based legitimacy perspectives. Each chapter's findings were drawn from the empirical study of five watershed- or local-level CWG bodies. Following is a synthesis of the chapters' major findings.

Chapter Two findings were a product of reviewing CWG legitimacy using a conceptual framework of legitimacy types from 18 different typologies. Typologies that were used to form the conceptual framework stem from different interpretations that exist across multiple disciplines such as political science (e.g., Arnall, 2002; Beetham, 2013; Bekkers & Edwards, 2007; Easton, 1965; Føllesdal, 2005; Scharpf, 1997), organisational sociology (e.g., Matheson, 1987; Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995), international affairs (e.g., Bernstein, 2004; Etsy, 2006), and environmental governance (e.g., Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005). The goal of this work was to identify relevant CWG legitimacy types and their empirical sources. Such work was deemed

important because legitimacy is essential to effective collaborative governance (Baird *et al.*, 2014; Connelly *et al.*, 2006; Orr, 2015), but multiple legitimacy typologies create uncertainty about how it is attained and maintained. From these typologies, legitimacy stems from the normative appropriateness of processes (e.g., Buchanan & Keohane, 2006; Levi *et al.*, 2009), the achievement or appropriateness of results (e.g., Rothstein, 2009), legality or legal correctness (e.g., Craik, 2007), institutionalism (e.g., Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Johnson *et al.*, 2006), a social belief or interaction signifying compliancy or desirable action (e.g., Walker, 2004), or those involved (e.g., De Cremer, 2002; Matheson, 1987). As such, legitimacy types relate to practice, results, institutional-setting, social acceptance, and individuals.

Findings from the application of the 18 typologies to CWG revealed 22 legitimacy types relevant to the study of CWG. This led to the claim that empirical legitimacy of CWG bodies cannot be fully assessed using only one legitimacy typology. For example, using one legitimacy typology such as Scharph's (1999) input-output framework may miss other sources that validate a collaboration related to the legal, social, or people-based types of legitimacy. Thus, a synthesis of legitimacy types is needed to understand the many different interpretations of legitimacy and the contextually-based sources of legitimacy related to each type. Accepting such a synthesised understanding of legitimacy is significant for the study of CWG as it furthers claims that legitimacy is a hybrid governance attribute. Authors that acknowledge the hybrid nature of collaborative governance legitimacy (e.g., Hogl *et al.*, 2012; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005; Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012; Wallington *et al.*, 2008) have done so only by recognising the different basis of legitimacy types within one typology. This study goes further by recognising that a wide range of legitimacy types from multiple typologies are relevant to CWG and that the range of interpretations of legitimacy guiding these typologies is also relevant to the study of CWG legitimacy.

Nevertheless, having a comprehensive understanding of legitimacy in terms of awareness of different interpretations and related legitimacy sources and types can enhance the strategic management of CWG legitimacy. Chapter Two thus establishes a conceptual guide to empirically identify the different legitimacy sources and types according to theory. This effort reflects calls to know more about the components of collaborative governance (e.g., Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; O'Leary & Bingham, 2009). By knowing more about the many different sources and types of CWG legitimacy, an effort can be made to strategically manage collaborative bodies' legitimacy to help stabilize and build the effectiveness of individual groups. Thus, while many collaborative scholars (e.g., Gunningham, 2009; Koontz & Thomas, 2006; McClosky, 2000) have questioned the ability of collaborative governance to actually produce environmental change, this dissertation instead focuses on strategic legitimacy management as a way to help build the success of collaborations. Utilising Chapter Two's synthesis of legitimacy types, Chapter Three and Four explore the temporal and perception-based differences of CWG legitimacy types.

Chapter Three empirically assessed the temporal nature of CWG legitimacy with the goal of understanding how legitimacy evolves as CWG bodies develop. This work acts as a response to a call by Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) to know more about how collaborative governance elements evolve over time. Findings indicated that as CWG develops organizationally through stages of establishment, growth, maturity, decline and either renewal or dissolution, dominant legitimacy concerns evolve as well. At each stage, the most prevalent legitimacy concerns shift from initially being focused on a sense of need for the body, to the management of process and production of results, to developing a sense of permanence and then to defending the relevance

and utility of the body with the guidance of a champion. In this sense, during the evolution of a collaborative body, legitimacy priorities shift from being about its establishment, to its enhancement, maintenance and defence.

Where Chapter Three's findings focused on how legitimacy differs over the course of a CWG body's organisational development, Chapter Four shifted the focus to examining variations in legitimacy judgements based on the range of common societal sectors involved in or impacted by CWG. As such, Chapter Four's goal involved identifying the dominant sources and types of legitimacy influencing the judgements of different sector-based actor groups towards the five empirical case studies.

Key findings from Chapter Four show that because CWG brings a diversity of sectors into the governance process, judgements about a collaborative body's legitimacy are inevitably as diverse as well. Government, First Nations, agriculture, environmental civil society, industry, and local property owner associations and businesses all use differing norms and values, many of which pragmatically align with the agenda and concerns of each individual sector, to inform actor's judgements towards CWG bodies. For example, government actors commonly look for the involvement of other government actors as an indication of legitimacy, while industry representatives commonly look at the CWG body's ability to further the corporate social responsibility mandate of their company as a positive legitimacy value. This finding adds depth to interpretations of CWG legitimacy by other scholars (e.g., Baird *et al.*, 2014; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005; Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012) who consider societal judgements only as a collective rather than in a sectoral or individual manner.

The analysis in Chapter Four also makes a case for an empirical polycentric lens to study legitimacy given its intersubjective and context-specific nature (Connelly *et al.*, 2006). Normative (e.g., Beetham, 2013; Føllesdal, 2005; Jachtenfuchs *et al.*, 1998) and power or rule-based (e.g., Hegtvædt & Johnson, 2009; Weber, 1964) interpretations of legitimacy only provide one view on legitimacy that may not actually matter in individual empirical judgements. Given that CWG body decisions can have a direct impact on water resource sustainability, considering the actual perceptions of legitimacy in given contexts regardless of normative or rule-based ideals may be more important to ensuring CWG bodies can successfully achieve their goals related to local water sustainability.

Finally, acknowledging the variation of different actor's legitimacy judgements by sector means that considering how to strategically manage legitimacy requires a tailored approach not just through the temporal development stages of a collaboration, but also based on whose perspective is being valued. Such a finding directly responds to objective four by further suggesting how to strategically manage legitimacy for CWG bodies. Variation in legitimacy judgements by sector means that action establishing, enhancing, maintaining, and defending legitimacy must respond to the different interests and values held by actors within these sectors. This requires finding ways to manage the trade-offs between contradicting legitimacy values – e.g., producing quick environmental change versus satisfying time-intensive process requirements like inclusivity.

## 4.3 Contributions

### 4.3.1 Academic Contributions

This research was guided by insights from two broad literary fields: collaborative governance and legitimacy. The literature on collaborative governance (e.g., Bingham, 2010; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; O'Leary & Bingham, 2009; Thomson & Perry, 2006), collaborative environmental governance (e.g., Holley *et al.*, 2012b; Innes & Booher, 2003; Koontz, 2006; Margerum, 2008; Newig & Kvarda, 2012), and collaborative water governance (e.g., Leach, 2006; Lubell, 2004; Memon & Weber, 2010; Sabatier, Focht, *et al.*, 2005a) provided insight on the mode of governance being studied. Literature on political legitimacy (e.g., Beetham, 2013; Bekkers & Edwards, 2007; Etsy, 2006; Føllesdal, 2005; Lord & Magnette, 2004; Scharpf, 1997; Weber, 1964), organizational and institutional legitimacy (e.g., Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Easton, 1965; Johnson *et al.*, 2006; Matheson, 1987; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011); collaborative environmental governance legitimacy (e.g., Bäckstrand, 2010; Connelly, 2011; Hogl *et al.*, 2012; Newig & Kvarda, 2012; Wallington *et al.*, 2008), and collaborative water governance legitimacy (e.g., Edwards, 2016; Orr, 2015; Sandstrom *et al.*, 2014; Trachtenberg & Focht, 2005; Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012) provided insight on legitimacy's many interpretations and differing dynamics. Findings from this research are most directly applicable to literature on collaborative water governance and its legitimacy; however, scholars of the other aforementioned fields may also draw insights from the findings.

Broadly, this research contributes to existing scholarship that is addressing a knowledge gap surrounding legitimacy dynamics of alternative governance models that exist outside of traditional state-based decision-making structures (e.g., Bäckstrand, 2006; Baird *et al.*, 2014; Connelly, 2011; Edwards, 2016; Hogl *et al.*, 2012; Orr, 2015; Sabatier, Focht, *et al.*, 2005a; Sandstrom *et al.*, 2014). The four objectives of this study directly contribute a theoretical synthesis of legitimacy typologies relevant to empirical assessments of legitimacy in the context of CWG as a specific type of alternative governance. By doing so, this study also contributes to discussions criticizing the complexities and challenges of collaborative governance in terms of process management (e.g., Kallis *et al.*, 2009; Margerum & Robinson, 2015; McClosky, 2000) and in the context of environment and water governance, its ability to produce expected ecological outcomes (e.g., Koontz & Thomas, 2006; Newig & Kvarda, 2012). Furthering CWG legitimacy knowledge and arguing for CWG legitimacy's strategic management provides additional information about CWG challenges and, rather than provide further criticism, suggests techniques to help make collaborations more effective despite legitimacy complexities. As a result, the research findings make four main contributions to the academic. These contributions concern (a) the conceptual nature of legitimacy for CWG, (b) methodological insights for studying CWG legitimacy, (c) the value of legitimacy analysis for collaborative governance, and (d) strategic legitimacy management for CWG.

First, the nature of legitimacy as a hybrid, pluralistic, and dynamic governance attribute was confirmed and expanded through the collective findings of Chapters Two, Three, and Four. Although, scholars of collaborative governance commonly acknowledge that legitimacy is a hybrid attribute (Bäckstrand, 2010; Baird *et al.*, 2014; Hogl *et al.*, 2012; Van Buuren *et al.*, 2012; Wallington *et al.*, 2008), this research extends this claim by both theoretically and empirically outlining the myriad of relevant legitimacy types and their empirical relevance for CWG bodies. Theoretically, legitimacy types are practice-, results-, institutional setting-, social-, and

individually-based, yet no one typology of legitimacy alone provides a comprehensive framework. This dissertation empirically demonstrates that CWG legitimacy is constituted from a range of sources related to these different legitimacy types. Understanding the differences of these legitimacy sources and types – such as when and why they are used and by whom – can help understand how legitimacy sources lead to different claims about a body’s legitimacy or illegitimacy (Tost, 2011). As a result, Chapters Three and Four sought to explain how legitimacy sources manifest over time and how they are used by common sector-based groups to judge CWG. The temporal analysis of Chapter Three showed that CWG legitimacy manifests differently over the evolution of a collaborative body and its management challenges change from establishment, to extension, to maintenance, and to defence. This finding extends claims made by others (e.g., Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Fisher *et al.*, 2016; Sonpar *et al.*, 2009; Suchman, 1995) concerned with other organisational contexts about how legitimacy changes over time to CWG and show the prioritization of unique legitimacy sources and types at different development stages for CWG. Legitimacy management approaches can thus be adopted to prioritise these different sources as a collaboration develops. Furthering Chapter Two and Three's findings, Chapter Four highlighted the need to consider society’s judgements on a sectoral basis, particularly as collaborative bodies seek to bring a diversity of cross-sector actors to the table. Exploring legitimacy judgements on an individual level by sector exemplified the pluralistic nature of CWG legitimacy. Individuals judgements towards a collaboration are made up of multiple legitimacy types and sources, some of which are more prominent than others based on sector. Individual sector-based behaviours are one of the key variables influencing collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Therefore, gaining insight into their values and perspectives can be useful to strategically help make decisions to gain support from different sectors and to know when CWG is a suitable form of governance for a given situation.

Second, in addition to making a conceptual contribution about the characterization of CWG legitimacy, this dissertation provides methodological insight into the empirical study of CWG legitimacy. Findings demonstrate the hybrid nature of CWG legitimacy, which was a direct result of identifying a range of legitimacy typologies from across academic disciplines. This hybridity creates a rationale for a cross-disciplinary approach to studying CWG legitimacy. The primary reasoning for this need is that unlike governance bodies that exist within or through the direction of the state, CWG at the watershed level tends to exist as a public interest entity whereby both organisational and political theory have application. As a result, theories, typologies, and interpretations of legitimacy stemming from research on governmental (e.g., Beetham, 2013; Bekkers *et al.*, 2007; Bernstein, 2004; Etsy, 2006) and organisational (e.g., Johnson *et al.*, 2006; Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995) bodies are relevant. CWG legitimacy analysts must clearly distinguish and defend the type of legitimacy (and its disciplinary background) or analyse CWG legitimacy from a holistic framework such as the one presented in Table 2.2. In addition, this dissertation as a whole makes a contribution to the way legitimacy is studied. This is done by demonstrating the value of adopting a cross-disciplinary empirical method that transcends normative and positive interpretations of legitimacy to assess the ideal practice, results, institutional-setting, social acceptance, and individual bases of CWG legitimacy. Consideration of all these bases is useful for longitudinal and perspective-based studies.

Third, complementing this contribution, a case is also made to incorporate legitimacy more directly into collaborative governance literature about the management of collaborative processes. While legitimacy is commonly recognized as a core governance attribute, many general reviews

of collaborative governance (e.g., Ansell & Gash, 2007; Bryson *et al.*, 2006; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Innes & Booher, 2010; O'Leary & Bingham, 2009; Thomson & Perry, 2006) give limited consideration to the many dimensions of CWG legitimacy. While this paper acknowledges that legitimacy is not the only attribute that matters for the management and output of collaborative governance, findings show the range of perspectives on legitimacy as well as the challenges and opportunities these perspectives can present for effective decision-making. Giving well-rounded consideration to legitimacy can enhance the robustness of collaborative governance analysis.

Finally, this research has also provided explicit consideration about the strategic management of CWG legitimacy. The premise that legitimacy can be strategically managed stems from the organisational sociology literature (e.g., Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Brinkerhoff, 2005; Sonpar *et al.*, 2009; Suchman, 1995), which posits that organisational bodies can instrumentally control how they are socially perceived. Suggestions from this research, which are described in the next section, broadly concern forming a localised common understanding of CWG legitimacy, identifying and addressing different legitimacy perceptions held within different sectors of society while also managing trade-off effects on other sector's beliefs, and adopting management approaches over time as collaborative bodies evolve. By making these practical recommendations, this work contributes knowledge about how to make collaborative bodies function more effectively to achieve their goals. Given debates in the literature about the manageability and utility of collaborative governance as a way to effectively achieve environmental outcomes in particular (Koontz & Thomas, 2006), this knowledge can then be used to argue that the possibility of managing legitimacy challenges can improve CWG's ability to be a suitable model of governance for water resources. A fuller understanding of CWG legitimacy's hybrid, dynamic, and polycentric nature may help both academics and practitioners alike better understand how to manage legitimacy so that judgements for whether or not and when collaboration should, should not, or should no longer be used as a model of water governance can be contextually determined.

CWG is not the only, or necessarily the best approach, to sustainably manage water resources in all cases. CWG qualities such as participant diversity and inclusion, accountability and transparency, effective leadership, and popular approval are all desired; however, attaining these values is not easy (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). This challenge is what can create legitimacy deficits regardless of legitimacy's interpretation for any CWG body. Nevertheless, if collaboration is being used then working to improve its design and management should be a priority. Actions to help improve collaborative design and management may include conducting situation assessments to decide if the antecedents of collaboration exist in a given location, building participant and manager understanding of collaboration dynamics and a shared theory of change (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015), cultivating leadership and effectively valuating productivity and performance (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; O'Leary & Vij, 2012).

#### **4.3.2 Recommendations for Practice**

Scholars seek to understand collaborative governance, while practitioners work to improve their collaborative efforts. Practical contributions from the empirical findings of this dissertation are geared towards those managing, convening, facilitating, leading, or participating in collaborative water governance bodies. In particular, local and regionally based CWG bodies in BC and in other parts of the world can benefit from considering these contributions. Examples of such

bodies in BC (in addition to the case studies) include the Shawnigan Watershed Roundtable, the Coquitlam River Watershed Roundtable, the Nechako Watershed Alliance and the Nicola Watershed Community Roundtable. Elsewhere in Canada, such bodies may include Alberta's Water Protection Advisory Councils and Saskatchewan's different watershed associations. Internationally, examples include the San Francisco Estuary Partnership and Skagit Watershed Council in the United States, the United Kingdom's Regional Water Authorities in Europe and the Murry Darling Basin Authority in Australia. Additionally, those contemplating convening a CWG body in any context may also find value in considering the following recommendations as a part of an effort to build acceptance for the body. The following six considerations represent processes or discussions that should occur when determining what the best management approaches for legitimacy are in a specific context.

1) *When thinking about and assessing legitimacy, clarify how legitimacy is defined*

Legitimacy is a concept that is commonly discussed by practitioners and scholars at a general level as an essential attribute, but there is limited critical discussion of the many types or interpretations of legitimacy (Hogl *et al.*, 2012). Having a clear understanding of what types of legitimacy are relevant in a given context and establishing a clear consensual understanding of legitimacy's meaning among collaborative actors may help collaborative bodies strategically manage their own form of legitimacy. To help guide these discussions, the conceptual framework developed in Chapter Two (Table 2.2) provides a starting point from which to consider the multiple ways legitimacy may be conceptualised and sourced for a collaborative body. Awareness of the range of legitimacy types and the contextually-based sources is thus the first step in more clearly defining the meaning and significance of legitimacy for CWG. Statements describing legitimacy of a CWG body should then detail the type(s) of legitimacy being assessed with an accompanying rationale.

2) *Deliberate about and assess legitimacy strategically and openly as a collaborative body*

In determining what types of legitimacy matter to a specific collaborative body, collaborative managers should utilize the inclusive and deliberative nature of CWG to collectively discuss different perceptions about a collaborative body's legitimacy and how to strategically manage different legitimacy sources. A starting point may include identifying what legitimacy means to different collaborative actors, analysing media and public perceptions towards a collaborative body to identify what legitimacy types are used by varying actors to support or challenge a collaboration, and collectively making a context specific assessment framework of the actions that may support or limit a group's legitimacy. Such deliberative action may help groups identify a common vision of legitimacy and identify potential challenge areas for specific CWG bodies. However, care should be given not to inflate legitimacy as the only necessary governance attribute; effective governance relies on multiple values such as the presence of resources and capacity as well (O'Kane, 1993).

3) *Be aware of different audience discourses and underlying assertions towards a CWG body at different times and contexts*

Part of strategically and openly discussing legitimacy as a collaborative body involves recognizing the different views of actors involved in or impacted by a collaborative body (the polycentrism of legitimacy) as well as how perceptions change over time (the dynamic nature of legitimacy). Determining which legitimacy sources are relevant to impacted actors and how the related types of legitimacy can be achieved (Edwards, 2016) therefore can help build effective decision-making. In the context of CWG, the involvement of different sectors of society means that there is no single way to achieve legitimacy. Regardless of whether multiple sectors classify a collaborative body as legitimate or illegitimate, the underlying attitude of what constitutes legitimacy may differ. Chapter Four provides insight into the different legitimacy sources and related types used within the perceptions of different sector-based actors. A multipronged approach that carefully considers these different attitudes and how legitimating actions for one audience may be interpreted by others is necessary to appropriately manage trade-offs and to balance perceptions, particularly if CWG is to be an impartial governance body that is of interest to multiple sectors. Moreover, identification and management of different legitimacy sources must be reassessed as a CWG body evolves. As Chapter Three highlights, different types of legitimacy are more or less relevant at different stages of a collaboration's development. This means that even though different actors may base their legitimacy judgements on different water interests, different features of a collaboration may be focused on within these judgements as a collaboration evolves. Reassessment of legitimacy perceptions as collaborations develop and as environmental and social contexts change are thus necessary for ongoing legitimacy management.

4) *Pay attention to areas of illegitimacy and proceed cautiously*

Areas of illegitimacy represent places that can be worked on to improve legitimacy (Tost, 2011). Following this logic, identifying delegitimizing sources are equally as important for strategic management as legitimizing sources. Common sources of illegitimacy discussed in the empirical cases of this dissertation included feelings that the process was unrepresentative, unaccountable, or not capable of producing meaningful outcomes. Addressing such challenges through inclusion processes, transparency actions, or changed output may help build the legitimacy of collaborations. Literature geared towards the management of collaborations (e.g., Bingham *et al.*, 2008; O'Leary & Bingham Blomgren, 2007; O'Leary & Bingham, 2009) can provide guidance to help deal with common collaborative problems. However, action to strategically manage legitimacy must be cautiously adopted (Sonpar *et al.*, 2009) to ensure management action in one area does not negatively impact other governance attributes or the support given from other interest groups (O'Kane, 1993).

5) *Be patient and deal with challenges if a collaborative body is to successfully achieve its goals*

No governance system is without challenges. Findings in all of the five case studies highlighted different legitimacy challenges CWG bodies face, including disfavour or poor management of the collaborative process, a lack of output or outcomes, weak formal institutional or legal status, poor community support, and unsupportive participants. However, findings also illustrated that the

cases that endured through these challenges continued to evolve. For example, SLIPP faced challenges overcoming vocal opposition from a select civil society groups; however, renewal through modification to its process and focus over time has helped calm these concerns. This renewal required time and effort. Collaborative managers and participants should not expect that the process and achievement of environmental and social outcomes will be easy (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Along with building collaborative participant understanding of the challenges facing CWG, awareness of the long-term nature of collaboration (Nkhata *et al.*, 2008) and of the longer timespan needed for environmental improvements (Biddle & Koontz, 2014; Kenney, 2005) can help generate community patience and willingness to commit to collaborating.

- 6) *Accept that collaboration may not be able to establish or maintain legitimacy in all contexts; the dissolution of a collaborative body does not mean collaboration will never work*

Although this dissertation prioritizes strategic management strategies for legitimacy, there may be situations where collaboration is not the best governance model to effectively address certain issues despite management attempts. Essentially, not all communities may be ready to collaborate even if effort is made to establish a collaborative body (Innes & Booher, 2010). Moreover, changing circumstances or problematic actions of a collaboration may lead to insurmountable legitimacy challenges. This may include situations where quick action is needed (Nkhata *et al.*, 2008), where there is an unwillingness to work together (Watson, 2007), where output does not lead to intended outcomes (Newig & Fritsch, 2008), or where decision-making creates a disproportionate impact on a given sector (Moody, 2009). Collaborative governance is only one of multiple governance models that may help address various water resource challenges. Legitimacy challenges that cannot be strategically managed may just indicate that collaboration is not an appropriate tool at a given time. However, if collaboration is desired but not legitimised locally, work must first be done to build the antecedent conditions for collaboration before reassessing the possibility for acceptance and the suitability of collaboration at a later time.

## **4.4 Study Limitations and Ideas for Future Research**

### **4.4.1 Methodological Insights**

The conceptual and analytical parameters set around this study mean that other important areas of inquiry for CWG legitimacy as well as other interpretations of legitimacy were excluded from analysis. Notably, from an epistemological-methodological standpoint, this study examined CWG legitimacy using mainly a descriptive approach (compared to normative or diagnostic) that examines how legitimacy was granted through the environment and actions of relevant actors in the real-world (Hogl *et al.*, 2012; Krell-Laluhová & Scheneider, 2004; Suchman, 1995). In this sense, this study reviewed how CWG legitimacy was constructed empirically for the real-world case studies. In contrast, normative and diagnostic approaches respectively determine ideal legitimacy qualities from an objective and prescriptive perspective or evaluate the normative acceptability of empirical cases (Hogl *et al.*, 2012; Krell-Laluhová & Scheneider, 2004). Examination of legitimacy using these other epistemological-methodological standpoints may provide further insight into CWG legitimacy's nature such as quantifying what models of CWG are more or less legitimate according to normative legitimacy values.

From an ontological perspective, this paper broadly interpreted legitimacy as the acceptability of governance (Bodansky, 1999; Hogl *et al.*, 2012), which means that other interpretations of legitimacy were either embodied within or excluded from this analysis. For example, interpretations that treat legitimacy solely as the extent authoritative power is justifiable (e.g., Weber, 1964), or as the conformity to rules or laws (e.g., Abbott *et al.*, 2000) will likely yield different insights. Likewise, this study also focused on CWG bodies as case-units, meaning that specific aspects of CWG such as certain processes and decisions, as well as CWG systematically as a model of governing, were not directly examined. Re-examining CWG legitimacy from different interpretations and with different focus points may reveal additional insights not uncovered in this dissertation.

Data collection and analysis considerations also set further parameters around this study. Notably, the decision to use semi-structured key informant interviews potentially created bias when conceptualising legitimacy in each case. In particular, the identification of relevant legitimacy types as empirical findings for Chapter Two, Three, and Four was limited by the extent interviewees were able to speak to their respective case's dynamics. Other data collection methods such as surveys or focus groups may have highlighted different dynamics in more or less depth or frequency. Likewise, this study inherently favoured the perspectives of those who were currently involved in the cases or residing in the respective watersheds during the data collection period. Since legitimacy is an empirically evolving concept (Suchman, 1995), perspectives of participants who have left the collaborative process may have provided additional insight, particularly around temporal changes to each case's legitimacy. Although an attempt was made to include past perspectives in each case, difficulty locating as well as receiving a response to interview requests was much more frequent compared to current participants and residents. Future studies systematically comparing and contrasting perspectives of past and present CWG actors may help identify temporal shifts in legitimacy perceptions, which can help identify the institutionalisation of collaboration as a model of governing. Furthering the validity of findings, the objectives of this dissertation could also be explored through quantitative means – similar to CWG legitimacy enquiries by Sabatier, Focht, *et al.* (2005b) and Edwards (2016) – to examine the extent different legitimacy types matter at different points in a collaborative's development and according to different perspectives. Finally, the study could also be replicated in different contexts outside of BC, at different governance levels (e.g., as national or international bodies), and for different forms of collaborative governance, e.g., action versus organizational versus policy collaboratives (Margerum, 2008). This would facilitate comparing and contrasting the generalizability of findings for CWG at a systematic level and suggest in what contexts CWG may be most effective as a governance tool.

#### **4.4.2 Conceptual Insights**

Four main areas of inquiry were made apparent during the study process that extended beyond the scope of this dissertation. First, while this dissertation focused on CWG legitimacy, it is also worthwhile to consider CWG illegitimacy as a focal point for research. Illegitimacy is a driver for pursuing organisational change (Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). Studying the challenging beliefs, convictions, or practices that stand in the way of efforts to effectively make decisions and take action for the sustainability of water resources is essential to determining ways to help address CWG issues. Sources of delegitimization commonly were noted in key informant interviews as a critique of CWG bodies. These sources were either the opposites of legitimating sources (e.g., the

process was inclusive or not inclusive) or a direct source of illegitimacy (e.g., inclusivity was viewed as either contributing to either the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the process). Considering what legitimacy sources and types are viewed negatively and the reasons for illegitimacy may indicate where and what type of change can be made to either enhance CWG legitimacy or suggest that another model of governance may be more suited for a given situation. Likewise, exploring what strategic legitimacy management tools are most effective – such as working to alter perceptions to align with the current body or altering qualities of the body to align with commonly held perceptions (Brinkerhoff, 2005) – can also provide useful insights for CWG legitimacy management.

Second, the ability for governance policy to help formalise CWG also frequently arose in interviews across all cases as an important variable that helps establish, maintain, or enhance multiple legitimacy types. Calls notably for a provincial policy that provides more coordination, government support, and unity to CWG initiatives at the watershed level across BC were expressed. Exploring different policy frameworks that can help formalise or legislate CWG, the implications of embedding CWG jurisdictionally (i.e., impacts on other legitimacy sources) and barriers to such establishment should be further explored.

Third, consideration for legitimacy in the context of the political ecology of specific CWG bodies is also an interesting area deserving further consideration. Since legitimacy is a situated social construct (Connelly *et al.*, 2006), it follows that how the ecology of the watersheds are experienced by actors involved in or impacted by a collaboration could influence how the legitimacy of a collaborative body is judged. Although the intention of this dissertation was not to directly explore the political ecology of CWG legitimacy, adopting a social-ecological systems view (e.g., Berkes *et al.*, 2003) to more descriptively explore local environmental narratives on CWG legitimacy could help further understand the nuances of legitimacy for CWG bodies in specific contexts. Such understanding of legitimacy has been sought for other environmental contexts such as wildlife conservation (e.g., Bixler, 2013) and ecotourism (e.g., Lawrence & Wickins, 1997) and could provide insight for water governance given the changing nature of water due both to climate change (e.g., water quantity and quality changes) and the natural fluidity of the resource. Particularly interesting questions include how the biophysical nature of water as well as historical social processes and interactions with water in specific contexts shape the judgements of actors towards CWG.

Finally, this dissertation examined CWG on the assumption that collaboration is a desirable entity and its legitimacy should be strategically managed. Future research may choose to look comparatively at CWG compared to state-run initiatives with varying degrees of non-government sector participation to explore what governance models may be the most socially accepted in different contexts based on legitimacy assessments. Such insight may particularly contribute to ongoing work that seeks to evaluate collaborative governance for its effectiveness (e.g., Koontz & Johnson, 2004; McClosky, 2000; Newig & Kvarda, 2012).

## **4.5 Research Reflections**

### **4.5.1 Case Reflections**

Given that legitimacy has been interpreted in this dissertation as a perspective-based construct that varies according to whose view is prioritized, it is impossible to make substantive claims

about whether a collaborative body is or is not legitimate unless a specific audience is prioritized (Baird *et al.*, 2014). Therefore, the intention of this research was not to identify whether the cases studied were or were not legitimate. Nevertheless, it is possible to reflect on common nuances learned about the cases from the research process. Major themes from each case are reflected on and three main legitimacy nuances identified from across the cases are shared.

#### *Cowichan Watershed Board*

The most commonly recognized legitimacy sources of the CWB included the prioritization of co-governance between the regional district and Cowichan Tribes, the use of action-based objectives/targets, the involvement of Federal agencies, a well networked and knowledgeable collaborative manager, and the inclusive nature of the technical advisory committee. However, as much as these sources were viewed by the researcher to legitimize the CWB, delegitimizing sources were apparent as well. Notable concerns included ensuring that First Nations interests do not supersede all other water interests, securing stable funding, and making headway on the objectives of the organization. Continuing to make headway towards the achievement of the CWB objectives through tangible output and securing stable funding will be key in determining whether the CWB can mature as an organization.

#### *Lake Windermere Ambassadors*

The LWA represents an ENGO project that gained broad-based community support to carry on as a citizen-led collaboration focused on water stewardship that also acts as an advisory body (LWMC) to judge the ecological impact of development proposals for the local governments. The most noted legitimacy opportunities and challenges for the LWA from across varying perspectives stem from its origin story and its citizen-led nature. As a body that spawned from a ENGO (Wildsight) that is known for its conservation rhetoric and opposition to multiple development proposals, the LWA began with both a basis of outspoken support and opposition from those who either agree with or are against Wildsight. This origin created an opportunity for legitimacy as it allowed for supporters of Wildsight to automatically see the LWA as legitimate by extension of Wildsight's initial involvement. It also provided ideal process legitimacy as Wildsight provided resources as well as guidance to help develop both structure and process. However, the involvement of Wildsight along with the citizen-led nature of the LWA also has created skepticism in the community about the neutrality of the LWA's agenda and missing accountability measures should the LWA take on more of a governance role. To overcome these challenges, particularly if the LWA is to take on more of a governance role, strategic consideration should be given towards process-based accountability measures along with the continued promotion of the LWA as an organization separate from Wildsight.

#### *Nechako Watershed Council*

The NWC was formed in the midst of ongoing conflict about the control of water flows by a large industry (Alcan). The collaboration was established to bring together the different sectors to deal with opposing opinions and come up with a strategy to mediate the impacts of water diversions. Although the NWC was able to bring together a diversity of sectors and build relationships that led to a consensus-based proposal for a cold-water release facility to address impacts, both political circumstances and organizational dynamics delegitimized the collaboration. Questions about the feasibility of the proposal, the lack of senior government support to follow through on implementing the release facility, and then the failure of the NWC to evolve and adapt to

changing circumstances after the proposal was rejected were main contributors to the collaboration losing participants and eventually disbanding. Continuing to work on their recommendation, while also broadening their focus to remain current and changing leadership within the body may have helped the NWC regain their legitimacy.

#### *Okanagan Basin Water Board*

The OBWB is the most mature and institutionally established CWG body not only among the cases but also within the province. The legitimacy of the OBWB is closely tied to its institutional history, its organizational structure established through provincial legislation that binds all three regional districts in the watershed together under letters patent and providing tax authority, its staff, and its output track record. However, it also faces challenges in gaining meaningful First Nations participation, managing a large inclusivity-based technical advisory committee, and ensuring that the organization does not become stagnant in delivering its management plans. Questioning the type of engagement from the ONA required, TAC power and group dynamics, and how to make progress on existing plans are points of consideration for further legitimacy maintenance.

#### *Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process/ Shuswap Watershed Council*

SLIPP was initiated to address government silos that most directly were connected to growing concerns for water quality issues in the Shuswap Watershed. However, miscommunication and the association of SLIPP with regulatory enforcement for foreshore rehabilitation and a dock and buoy bylaw by the regional district initially created outspoken public disapproval of collaborative efforts. This association forged strong illegitimacy arguments for SLIPP creating additional challenges in terms of managing group process and the achievement of results. However, public relations efforts to overcome misconceptions, the ongoing sense of need to address water quality challenges, the leadership of the chairs and collaborative managers, and the eventual establishment of the SWC through a regional district bylaw helped justify the body's continuation. The achievement of results that impact water quality will likely be the biggest legitimacy challenge for the SWC in the future.

#### *Case Comparison*

Cross case reflection of the experiences of these cases also show three nuances about CWG legitimacy specific to the cases and provincial context.

- 1) *How a collaboration is established can have lasting legitimacy affects.* Wildsight's initiation of the LWA, the co-management framework of the CWB, public miscommunication of SLIPP at the beginning all had a lasting influence on the challenges or opportunities facing legitimacy. Strategic legitimacy management is necessary from the initial planning stages of an organization and throughout its existence.
- 2) *Sources of illegitimacy are normal and can be overcome.* Legitimacy was not considered to be perfect in any of the cases. All faced challenges as noted above; however, these challenges are not static. For example, SLIPP calmed negative public opinion by refocusing their mandate and the LWA is continuing to distance itself from Wildsight. Time and strategic management of legitimacy can help shift negative legitimacy perspectives.
- 3) *To advance CWG in BC, a supportive institutional setting is necessary.* Other than the OBWB, all cases in their evolution faced resource challenges and questions of stability, accountability, and purpose. Having provincial support, for example through partnership, resourcing, or legislation can enhance the effectiveness of collaborations. While a unitary insti-

tutional framework for all CWG bodies may not be appropriate for BC given regional differences, this is not an excuse to forgo partnerships and support for CWG bodies.

#### 4.5.2 Transdisciplinary Reflections

The transdisciplinary underpinnings of this research include the study of a real-world problem, the consideration of multiple disciplinary and practical knowledge forms, and the aim of producing a useful significant and original academic and practical contribution to knowledge (Bergmann *et al.*, 2005). Interrelated transdisciplinary challenges of (a) defining transdisciplinary research, (b) balancing practical and theoretical knowledge contributions and (c) integrating multiple forms of knowledge (Tress *et al.*, 2009), all had an impact on this research process.

First, as a result of transdisciplinary definition differences, I have questioned whether this research can actually be defined in this way. A notable definition difference that has caused confusion concerns whether transdisciplinary research requires an academic and practitioner partnership for development (Bergmann *et al.*, 2005; Hirsch Hadorn *et al.*, 2006; Lang *et al.*, 2012). This research did not form from a partnership, but rather from many informal conversations and observations about collaborative governance challenges with practitioners. Consequently, I have questioned how the research process might have differed if a partnership had been formed with select collaborative bodies to collaboratively develop the research goals. This debate led me to realize the importance of having a clear definition of not only concepts in research, but of the research process itself. Tress *et al.* (2009) even explain that such uncertainty can create operational challenges for transdisciplinary research such as ensuring research is valued both practically and academically.

Second, in my own research, questions arose such as who the main audiences should be for research dissemination, what constitutes a contribution to knowledge, and what forms of knowledge should be prioritised. In particular, identifying ways to operationalize legitimacy knowledge into useable practitioner-based knowledge was difficult given its theoretical nature. If a narrower definition of transdisciplinarity had been stipulated and a partnership with select collaborative bodies had been used, such questions and issues may have been more directly tailored to the needs of the partner groups. In the case of water governance, the benefits of having research be directly useful to practitioners is especially relevant, given that deeper understanding of effective governance may help address the social and ecological effects of water issues (Renner *et al.*, 2013).

Finally, I began my graduate studies thinking about the challenges of popular acceptance and the validity of SLIPP, which exists in my hometown. This beginning was grounded in a desire to help make a practical contribution to water sustainability by understanding strategic ways to help body's like SLIPP achieve their goals. However, throughout the research process, I was continually confronted with broader questions about whether collaborative governance was even an appropriate form of governing in certain circumstances. Such questioning required conceptual thinking about how CWG is understood. Thus, while my focus on legitimacy as a research topic was motivated by wanting to help certain bodies with strategic management decisions, the transdisciplinary influence of the program also led me to see how such a contribution can be furthered by critical analytic work as well. Practitioners have to decide whether collaboration is a worthwhile mode of governance for water resources in their own setting. Knowledge on the legitimacy challenges and dynamics of collaborative governance may help indicate whether or not and when to start a collaboration, how to work to overcome or

manage opposition or deficits for any given body, or when to end a collaboration. In this sense, distinguishing what is a practical contribution versus an academic contribution to CWG legitimacy blurs. Making a practical contribution of this nature is not possible without theoretical reflection. Likewise, making an academic contribution to knowledge has little value in the field of environmental studies if it is not useable.

### **4.5.3 Personal Reflections**

Next to learning about transdisciplinary research, I have also learned about my own development as a researcher. The importance of (a) learning by doing, (b) having a community of support, and (c) clearly defining project boundaries for proper time management were main takeaways I gained about the research process.

Through this research, the value of experiential learning was personally reinforced as a way to acquire skills and knowledge. Not only gaining an understanding of the social, cultural and personal aspects or conducting research, but also observing, experiencing, and actively engaging with practitioners together have allowed me to learn how to research and produce knowledge in the field of environment and resource studies. Both empirical exploration and literary insight are necessary to ensure research is evidence-based and empirically appropriate. The experience of researching CWG legitimacy showed me the unique challenges of producing such research – critically analysing and interpreting theoretical and practical knowledge, flexibly working within different contexts (i.e., within academic and practical spaces), professional adapting interpersonal skills (e.g., respectfulness, humility, friendliness) all matter to the research process. Knowledge development, particularly from empirical work, requires personal skills that extend beyond basic analytic thinking.

Also crucial is having a community or network of support. Throughout this PhD, the support of others was vital in helping me learn to develop and carry out the project, think about the conceptual and methodological challenges facing the research process, and maintain my mental health as I faced challenging life circumstances. This community exists as a network of academics, practitioners, and personal relations, which taught me that the PhD research process is more than just an academic undertaking. Throughout the research process, developing, nurturing, and giving back to my network helped me further conceptual thinking on CWG legitimacy as well as my capacity to do the work. For future research endeavours continuing to strengthen my network, especially through actions such as participating in professional associations, attending conferences, networking, and building relationships with peers will help further the reach of my research contributions.

However, in conjunction with developing this network, I have also realised in hindsight the importance of putting conceptual boundaries around what is and is not part of the research process to better manage the time frame and prioritisation of producing a dissertation. In developing my network and community of support, I often chose to participate in tangential research and practitioner-based opportunities to contribute to different projects or processes in both an academic and practical capacity. I often justified these activities, based on their ability to further my knowledge and experience working within the field of sustainability or water management. However, in reflection of the extended period of time completing this PhD has taken, a large lesson learned for me is about the value of distinguishing frugally between opportunities that will add value directly to a research project versus distractions that may aid

personal development but limit the time available to focus on PhD tasks. Budgeting time for any given project should be realistic and prioritised. This is especially important moving forward to ensure that time is not a negative influence on the output of any endeavour – particularly those that may influence social and environmental sustainability.

## References Cited

- 4Thought Solutions Inc. (2005). *Nechako Watershed Council Report: Assessment of Potential Flow Regimes for the Nechako Watershed*. Vancouver, BC: 4Thought Solutions, Inc.
- Abbott, K., Keohane, R. O., Moravek, M., Slaughter, A., & Snidal, D. (2000). The concept of legalization. *International Organization*, 54(3), 401-419.
- Acreman, M. (2001). Ethical aspects of water and ecosystems. *Water Policy*, 3(3), 257-265.
- Alcan. (2006). *Working with Water: Management of Nechako Reservoir and Nechako River*. Montreal: Alcan.
- Ali-Khan, F., & Mulvihill, P. R. (2008). Exploring collaborative environmental governance: perspectives on bridging and actor agency. *Geography Compass*, 2(6), 1974-1994.
- Ananda, J., & Proctor, W. (2013). Collaborative approaches to water management and planning: an institutional perspective. *Ecological Economics*, 86, 97-106.
- Andrews, R., & Entwistle, T. (2010). Does cross-sectoral partnership deliver? An empirical exploration of public service effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 20(3), 679-701.
- Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2007). Collaborative governance in theory and practice. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 18(4), 543-571.
- Armitage, D., de Loë, R., & Plummer, R. (2012). Environmental governance and its implications for conservation practice. *Conservation Letters*, 5(4), 245-255.
- Arnall, A. (2002). Introduction: the European Union's Accountability and Legitimacy Deficit. In A. Arnall & D. Wincott (Eds.), *Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union* (pp. 1-10). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ashforth, B., & Gibbs, B. (1990). The double edge of organizational legitimation. *Organizational Science*, 1(2), 177-194.
- Auld, G., Bernstein, S., & Cashore, B. (2008). The new corporate social responsibility. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, 33, 413-435.
- Avina, J. (1993). The evolutionary life cycles of non-governmental development organizations. *Public Administration and Development*, 13(5), 453-474.
- Bäckstrand, K. (2006). Multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development: rethinking legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness. *European Environment*, 16(5), 290-306.
- Bäckstrand, K. (2010). The legitimacy of global public-private partnerships on climate and sustainable development. In K. Bäckstrand, H. Khan, A. Kronsell, & E. Lövbrand (Eds.), *Environmental Politics and Deliberative Democracy: Examining the Promise of New Modes of Governance* (pp. 85-104). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

- Bäckstrand, K., Khan, H., Kronsell, A., & Lövbrand, E. (Eds.). (2010a). *Environmental Politics and Deliberative Democracy: Examining the Promise of New Modes of Governance*. Cheltenham, Glos, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Bäckstrand, K., Khan, J., Kronsell, A., & Lövbrand, E. (2010b). The promise of new modes of environmental governance. In K. Bäckstrand, J. Khan, A. Kronsell, & E. Lövbrand (Eds.), *Environmental Politics and Deliberative Democracy: Examining the Promise of New Modes of Governance* (pp. 3-27). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
- Baird, J., Velaniškis, J., Plummer, R., & FitzGibbon, J. (2014). Political legitimacy and collaborative water governance: an exploratory case study. *International Journal of Water Governance*, 2(1).
- Barker, R. (1990). *Political Legitimacy and the State*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Barker, R. (2001). *Legitimizing Identities: The Self-presentations of Rulers and Subjects*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Baumann-Pauly, D., Scherer, A. G., & Palazzo, G. (2016). Managing institutional complexity: a longitudinal study of legitimacy strategies at a sportswear brand company. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 137(1), 31-51.
- BCStats. (2014). *2014 Sub-Provincial Population Estimates*. Victoria, BC: Province of British Columbia.
- Beetham, D. (1991). *The legitimation of power issues in political theory*. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Beetham, D. (2013). *The Legitimation of Power* (2nd ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Beetham, D., & Lord, C. (1998). Legitimacy and European Union. In A. Weale & M. Nentwich (Eds.), *Political Theory and the European Union: Legitimacy, Constitutional Choice and Citizenship* (pp. 15). London: Longman.
- Bekkers, V., Dijkstra, G., Edwards, A., & Fenger, M. (2007). Governance and the democratic deficit: an evaluation. In V. Bekkers, G. Dijkstra, A. Edwards, & M. Fenger (Eds.), *Governance and the Democratic Deficit: Assessing the Democratic Legitimacy of Governance Practices* (pp. 296-312). Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- Bekkers, V., & Edwards, A. (2007). Legitimacy and democracy: a conceptual framework for assessing governance practices. In V. Bekkers, G. Dijkstra, A. Edwards, & M. Fenger (Eds.), *Governance and the Democratic Deficit: Assessing the Democratic Legitimacy of Governance Practices* (pp. 35-60). Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate.
- Bell, S., & Park, A. (2006). The problematic metagovernance of networks: water reform in New South Wales. *Journal of Public Policy*, 26(1), 63-83.
- Benhabib, S. (1994). Deliberative rationality and models of democratic legitimacy. *Constellations*, 1(1), 26-52.

- Benson, D., Jordan, A., Cook, H., & Smith, L. (2013). Collaborative environmental governance: are watershed partnerships swimming or are they sinking? *Land Use Policy*, 30(1), 748-757.
- Berger, T., Birner, R., Diaz, J., McCarthy, N., & Wittmer, H. (2007). Capturing the complexity of water uses and water users within a multi-agent framework. *Water Resources Management*, 21, 129-148.
- Bergmann, M., Brohmann, B., Hoffmann, E., Loibl, C., Rehaag, R., Schramm, E., & Vob, J. (2005). *Quality Criteria of Transdisciplinary Research: A Guide for the Formative Evaluation of Reserch Projects*. Frankfurt, Germany: Institute for Social-Ecological Research.
- Berkes, F., Colding, J., & Folke, C. (2003). Introduction. In F. Berkes, J. Colding, & C. Folke (Eds.), *Navigating Social-Ecological Systems: Building Resilience for Complexity and Change* (pp. 1-31). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. (Reprinted from: Not in File).
- Bernstein, S. (2004). *The Elusive Basis of Legitimacy in Global Governance: Three Conceptions*. Hamilton: Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition, McMaster University.
- Bernstein, S. (2005). Legitimacy and global environmental governance. *Journal of International Law and International Relations*, 1(2), 139-166.
- Bernstein, S. (2014). Legitimacy in intergovernmental and non-state global governance. *Review of International Political Economy*, 18(1), 17-51.
- Bevir, M. (2009). *Key Concepts in Governance*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Biddle, J. C., & Koontz, T. M. (2014). Goal specificity: a proxy measure for improvements in environmental outcomes in collaborative governance. *Journal of Environmental Management*, 124, 268-276.
- Biermann, F., & Gupta, A. (2011). Accountability and legitimacy in earth system governanc: a research framework. *Ecological Economics*, 70(11), 1856-1864.
- Bingham, L. (2009). Collaborative governance: emerging practices and the incomplete legal framework for citizen stakeholder voice. *Journal of Dispute Resolution*, 2009(2), 270-323.
- Bingham, L. B. (2010). The next generation of administrative law: building the legal infrastructure for collaborative governance. *Wisconsin Law Review*, 2, 297-356.
- Bingham, L. B., O'Leary, R., & Carlson, C. (2008). Frameshifting: lateral thinking for collaborative public management. In L. B. Bingham, R. O'Leary, & C. Carlson (Eds.), *Big Ideas in Collaborative Public Management* (pp. 3-16). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Bitektine, A. (2011). Toward a theory of social judgements of organizations: the case of legitimacy, reputation, and status. *Academy of Management Journal*, 36(1), 151-179.

- Bixler, R. P. (2013). The political ecology of local environmental narratives: power, knowledge, and mountain caribou conservation. *Journal of Political Ecology*, 20, 273-285.
- Black, J. (2008). Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory regimes. *Regulation & Governance*, 2(2), 137-164.
- Blatter, J. (2007). Legitimacy. In M. Bevir (Ed.), *The Sage Encyclopedia on Governance* (pp. 518-519). London, UK: Sage.
- Blomgren Amsler, L. (2016). Collaborative governance: integrating management, politics, and law. *Public Administration Review*, 76(5), 700-711.
- Bodansky, D. M. (1999). The legitimacy of international governance: a coming challenge for international environmental law. *American Journal of International Law*, 93(3), 596-624.
- Booher, D., & Innes, J. E. (2010). Governance for resilience: CALFED as a complex adaptive network for resource management. *Ecology and Society*, 15(3), Online.
- Borrás, S., & Ejrnaes, A. (2011). The legitimacy of new modes of governance in the EU: Studying national stakeholders' support. *European Union Politics*, 12(1), 107-126.
- Boulding, K. E. (1967). The legitimacy of economics. *Economic Inquiry*, 5(4), 299-307.
- Bown, N. K., Gray, T. S., & Stead, S. M. (2013). Co-management and adaptive co-management: two modes of governance in a Honduran marine protected area. *Marine Policy*, 39, 128-134.
- Box, R. C. (2002). Pragmatic discourse and administrative legitimacy. *American Review of Public Administration*, 32(1), 20-39.
- Brandes, O. M., & Curran, D. (2009). *Setting a New Course in British Columbia - Water Governance Reform Options and Opportunities*. Victoria, BC: The Polis Project.
- Brandes, O. M., & O'Riordan, J. (2014). *Decision-Maker's Brief: A Blueprint for Watershed Governance in British Columbia*. Victoria, BC: POLIS Project on Ecological Governance, University of Victoria.
- Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2005, 9/29/2005). *Organizational legitimacy, capacity, and capacity development*. Paper presented at the Public Management Research Association 8th Research Conference, Los Angeles, California.
- Brisbois, M. C. (2015). *Natural Resource Industries and the State in Collaborative Approaches to Water Governance: A Power-Based Analysis*. (Doctor of Philosophy), University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON. Available from Ref
- Brisbois, M. C., & de Loë, R. (2016). State roles and motivations in collaborative approaches to water governance: A power theory-based analysis. *Geoforum*, 74, 202-212.
- Brisbois, M. C., & de Loë, R. C. (2015). Power in collaborative approaches to governance for water: a systematic review. *Society and Natural Resources*, online, 1-16.

- British Columbia Ministry of Environment. (2010a). *British Columbia's Water Act Modernization Discussion Paper*. Victoria, Canada: BC Ministry of Environment.
- British Columbia Ministry of Environment. (2010b). *Policy Proposal on British Columbia's new Water Sustainability Act*. Victoria: Province of British Columbia.
- Brouwer, B. (2010). Planning process hinges on funds. *Shuswap Market News*, pp. A1-A2.
- Brouwer, B. (2010 May 14). Suspected algal bloom blights Mara Lake. *Shuswap Market News*, p. A3.
- Brown, L. D., & Jagadananda, K. (2007). *Civil Society Legitimacy and Accountability: Issues and Challenges*. Cambridge, MA: The Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
- Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Stone, M. (2006). The design and implementation of cross-sector collaborations: propositions from the literature. *Public Administration Review*, 66(s1), 44-55.
- Buchanan, A., & Keohane, R. O. (2006). The legitimacy of global governance institutions. *Ethics and International Affairs*, 20(4), 405-437.
- Canada-British Columbia Consultative Board. (1974). *Canada-British Columbia Okanagan Basin Agreement*. Victoria, BC, Canada: Canada-British Columbia Consultative Board.
- Carlson, J. A. (2010). Avoiding traps in member checking. *The Qualitative Report*, 15(5), 1102-1113.
- Cashore, B. (2002). Legitimacy and the privatization of environmental governance: how non-state market-driven (NSMD) governance systems gain rule-making authority. *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions*, 15(4), 503-529.
- Catalyst Paper Corporation. (2012). *Our Tomorrow: Catalyst Paper 2012 Sustainability Report*. Richmond, BC: Catalyst Paper Corporation.
- Charmaz, K. (2006). *Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Chaskin, R. J. (2003). Fostering neighborhood democracy: legitimacy and accountability within loosely coupled systems. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 32(2), 161-189.
- Christensen, B. (1996). *Too Good To be True: Alcan's Kemano Completion Project*. Vancouver, BC: Talon Books.
- Citizen Staff. (1996). Plan sought for Nechako Watershed. *Prince George Citizen*.
- Citizen Staff. (1998). Watershed Council gets Cold Shoulder. *Prince George Citizen*, p. 1&3.
- Clarke, A., & Fuller, M. (2011). Collaborative strategic management: strategy formulation and implementation by multi-organizational cross-sector social partnerships. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 94(supplement 1), 85-101.

- Columbia Shuswap Regional District. (2015). *Bylaw 5705 - A bylaw to establish the Shuswap Watershed Council Service*. Salmon Arm, BC: Columbia Shuswap Regional District.
- Connelly, S. (2011). Constructing legitimacy in the new community governance. *Urban Studies*, 48(5), 929-946.
- Connelly, S., Richardson, T., & Miles, T. (2006). Situated legitimacy: deliberative arenas and the new rural governance. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 22(3), 267-277.
- Connick, S., & Innes, J. E. (2003). Outcomes of collaborative water policy making: applying complexity thinking to evaluation. *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management*, 46(2), 177-197.
- Cooper, T. A., Bryer, T. A., & Meek, J. W. (2008). Outcomes achieved through citizen-centered collaborative public management. In L. B. Bingham & R. O'Leary (Eds.), *Big Ideas in Collaborative Public Management* (pp. 211-229). Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe.
- Cooperman, J. (2012). What is behind the census numbers? *Shuswap Passion*.
- Craik, N. (2007). Deliberation and legitimacy in transnational governance: the case of environmental impact assessment. *Victoria University of Wellington Law Review*, 38(2), 381-401.
- Creswell, J. W. (2007). *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Creswell, J. W. (2009). *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Cunliffe, D. (2014). Chamber News. *The North Shuswap Kicker*.
- Davis, N. A. (2008). Evaluating collaborative fisheries management planning: A Canadian case study. *Marine Policy*, 32(6), 867-876.
- Day, J., Gunton, T., & Frame, T. (2003). Toward environmental sustainability in British Columbia: the role of collaborative planning. *Environments*, 31(1), 21-38.
- De Cremer, D. (2002). Charismatic leadership and cooperation in social dilemmas: a matter of transforming motives??. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 32(5), 997-1016.
- de Loë, R., Murray, D., & Simpson, H. (2015). Farmer perspectives on collaborative approaches to governance for water. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 42, 191-205.
- de Loë, R. C., & Kreutzwiser, R. D. (2007). Challenging the status quo: the evolution of water governance in Canada. In K. Bakker (Ed.), *Eau Canada: The Future of Canada's Water* (pp. 85-103). Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- de Loë, R. C., Murray, D., & Brisbois, M. C. (2016). Perspectives of natural resource sector firms on collaborative approaches to governance for water. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 135, 1117-1128.

- Deegan, C., Rankin, M., & Tobin, J. (2002). An examination of the corporate social and environmental disclosures of BHP from 1983-1997: A test of legitimacy theory. *Accountability, Auditing & Accountability Journal*, 15(3), 312-343.
- Deephouse, D. L., & Suchman, M. (2008). Legitimacy in organizational institutionalism. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), *The Sage Handbook of organizational institutionalism* (pp. 49-77). London, UK: Sage.
- Diaz-Kope, L., & Miller-Stevens, K. (2015). Rethinking a typology of watershed partnerships: a governance perspective. *Public Works Management & Policy*, 20(1), 29-48.
- Dorcey, A. H. J. (1991). *Perspectives on Sustainable Development in Water Management: Towards Agreement in the Fraser River Basin* (1 ed.). Vancouver, B.C.: University of British Columbia, Westwater Research Centre.
- Dowling, J., & Pfeffer, J. (1975). Organizational legitimacy: social values and organizational behavior. *The Pacific Sociological Review*, 18(1), 122-136.
- Dutterer, A. D., & Margerum, R. D. (2015). The limitations of policy-level collaboration: a meta-analysis of CALFED. *Society and Natural Resources*, 28, 21-37.
- Easton, D. (1965). *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: Wiley.
- Ecoscope Environmental Consultants. (2009). *Shuswap Watershed Mapping Project: Foreshore Inventory and Mapping*. Kelowna, BC: Ecoscope Environmental Consultants.
- Edwards, M. L. (2016). Public perceptions of the legitimacy of water governance organizations in Nebraska and Washington. *Society and Natural Resources*, 29, 265-283.
- Emerson, K., & Nabatchi, T. (2015). *Collaborative Governance Regimes*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- Emerson, K., Nabatchi, T., & Balogh, S. (2012). An integrative framework for collaborative governance. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 22(1), 1-29.
- Emerson, K., Orr, P. J., Keyes, D. L., & McKnight, K. M. (2009). Environmental conflict resolution: evaluating performance outcomes and contributing factors. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, 27(1), 27-64.
- Etsy, D. (2006). Good governance at the supranational scale: globalizing administrative law. *Yale Law Journal*, 115(7), 1493-1562.
- Finch, D., D., D., & Varella, P. (2014). Examining an individual's legitimacy judgement using the value-attitude system: the role of environmental and economic values and source credibility. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 127(2), 265-281.
- Fish, R. D., Ioris, A. A. R., & Watson, N. M. (2010). Integrating water and agricultural management: collaborative governance for a complex policy problem. *Science of the Total Environment*, 408(23), 5623-5630.

- Fisher, G., Kotha, S., & Lahri, A. (2016). Changing with the times: An integrated view of identity, legitimacy, and new venture life cycles. *Academy of Management Review*, 41(3), 383-409.
- Flynn, T. (2013). *Columbia Lake Stewardship Society: New group with an important mandate*. Kaslo, BC: Columbia Basin Watershed Network.
- Føllesdal, A. (2005). *The seven habits of highly legitimate new modes of governance*. Paper presented at the NEWGOV Consortium Conference, Florence.
- Frame, T. M., Gunton, T., & Day, J. C. (2004). The role of collaboration in environmental management: an evaluation of land and resource planning in British Columbia. *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management*, 47(1), 59-82.
- Fraser Basin Council. (2014). Summary: 2011-2013 Water Quality Monitoring Results for Shuswap and Mara Lakes. Vancouver, BC: Fraser Basin Council.
- Fraser Basin Council. (2015a). *Collaborative Watershed Governance - Keys to Success and Current Examples in BC*. Vancouver, BC: Fraser Basin Council.
- Fraser Basin Council. (2015b). *Nechako Watershed Health Report*. Vancouver, BC: Fraser Basin Council.
- Fuller, B. W. (2009). Surprising cooperation despite apparently irreconcilable differences: agricultural water use efficiency and CALFED. *Environmental Science and Policy*, 12, 663-673.
- Gazley, B. (2008). Intersectoral collaboration and the motivation to collaborate: toward an integrated theory. In L. B. Bingham & R. O'Leary (Eds.), *Big ideas in Collaborative Public Management* (pp. 36-54). Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
- Gearey, M., & Jeffrey, P. (2006). Concepts of legitimacy within the context of adaptive water management strategies. *Ecological Economics*, 60(1), 129-137.
- Gerring, J. (2007). *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gibson, R. (2006). Sustainability assessment: basic components of a practical approach. *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal*, 24(3), 170-182.
- Global Water Partnership Technical Advisory Committee. (2009). *Lessons from Integrated Water Resources Management in Practice*. Stockholm, Sweden: Global Water Partnership.
- Goldsmith, P., & Pereira, F. (2014). Outlining a strategic legitimacy assessment method: the case of the Illinois livestock industry. *Agricultural and Human Values*, 31(2), 215-230.
- Gray, B. (1985). Conditions facilitating interorganizational collaboration. *Human Relations*, 38(10), 911-936.

- Gray, B. (2000). Assessing inter-organizational collaboration: multiple conceptions and multiple methods. In D. Faulkner & M. de Rond (Eds.), *Cooperative Strategy: Economic, Business, and Organizational Issues* (pp. 243-260). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gray, D. E. (2004). *Doing Research in the Real World*. London: Sage.
- Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2005). Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions, and emerging confluences. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research* (2nd ed., pp. 191-216). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Gunningham, N. (2009). The new collaborative environmental governance: the localization of regulation. *Journal of Law and Society*, 36(1), 145-166.
- Hamlin, C. (2000). 'Waters' or 'Water'? master narratives in water history and their implications for contemporary water policy. *Water Policy*, 2(4-5), 313-325.
- Hanberger, A. (2003). Public policy and legitimacy: A historical policy analysis of the interplay of public policy and legitimacy. *Policy Sciences*, 36(3), 257-278.
- Hard, C. H., Hoelting, K. R., & Christie, P. (2012). Collaboration, legitimacy and awareness in Puget Sound MPAs. *Coastal Management*, 40(3), 312-326.
- Hardy, C., Lawrence, T. B., & Grant, D. (2005). Discourse and collaboration: the role of conversations and collective identity. *Academy of Management Review*, 30(1), 58-77.
- Harris, N. (2002). Collaborative planning from theoretical foundations to practice forms. In P. Allmendinger & M. Tewdwr-Jones (Eds.), *Planning Futures: New Directions for Planning Theory* (pp. 21-43). London, U.K.: Routledge.
- Healey, P. (1997). *Collaborative Planning*. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Healey, P. (2006). Transforming governance: challenges of institutional adaptation and a new politics of space. *European Planning Studies*, 14(3), 299-320.
- Hegtvedt, K. A., & Johnson, C. (2009). Power and justice: toward an understanding of legitimacy. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 53(3), 376-399.
- Hirsch Hadorn, G., Bradley, D., Pohl, C., Rist, S., & Wiesmann, U. (2006). Implications of transdisciplinarity for sustainability research. *Ecological Economics*, 60, 119-128.
- Hogl, K., Kvarda, E., Nordbeck, R., & Pregernig, M. (2012). Legitimacy and effectiveness of environmental governance - concepts and perspectives. In K. Hogl, E. Kvarda, & R. Nordbeck (Eds.), *Environmental Governance: The Challenge of Legitimacy and Effectiveness* (pp. 1-27). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Holley, C., Gunningham, N., & Shearing, C. (2012a). Introduction *The New Environmental Governance* (pp. 1-14). New York: Earthscan.
- Holley, C., Gunningham, N., & Shearing, C. (2012b). *The New Environmental Governance*. New York: Earthscan.

- Hooper, B. P. (2003). Integrated water resources management and river basin governance. *Water Resources Update*(126), 12-20.
- Horeth, M. (1999). No way out for the beast? The unsolved legitimacy problem of European governance. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6(2), 249-268.
- Huang, D. L., E. (2014). *City of Vernon Liquid Waste Management Plan Stage 2/3 Report to Council*. Kelowna, BC: Urban Systems.
- Hubrecht, S. (2014 October 22). Lake activist spreads local knowledge. *Invermere Valley Echo*.
- Hubrecht, S. (2015). Public comments invited on Water Sustainability Act. *Inververmere Valley Echo*.
- Hunter, R., Brandes, O. M., Moore, M., & Brandes, L. (2014). *The Cowichan Watershed Board: An Evolution of Collaborative Watershed Governance*. Victoria, BC: Polis Project on Ecological Governance.
- Hurlbert, M. (2007). *Canadian Water Law*. Ottawa, ON: National Council of Women of Canada.
- Hurrelmann, A. (2017). Empirical legitimation analysis in International Relations: how to learn from the insights – and avoid the mistakes – of research in EU studies. *Contemporary Politics*, 23(1), 63-80.
- Huxham, C., & Vangen, S. E. (2005). *Managing to Collaborate: The Theory and Practice of Collaborative Advantage*. New York: Routledge.
- Hybels, R. C. (1995). On legitimacy, legitimation, and organizations: a critical review and integrative theoretical model. *Best Papers Proceedings Academy of Mananagement*, 55, 241-245.
- Innes, J. (1995). Planning theory's emerging paradigm: communicative action and interactive practice. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 14(3), 128-135.
- Innes, J., & Booher, D. (2004). Reframing public participation: strategies for the 21st century. *Planning Theory & Practice*, 5(4), 419-436.
- Innes, J. E. (1999). Evaluating consensus building. In L. Susskind, S. Mckearnen, & J. Thomas-Lamar (Eds.), *The Consensus Building Handbook: A Comprehensive Guide to Reaching Agreement*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc. (Reprinted from: Not in File).
- Innes, J. E., & Booher, D. E. (1999). Consensus building and complex adaptive systems: a framework for evaluating collaborative planning. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 65(4), 412-422.
- Innes, J. E., & Booher, D. E. (2000). *Collaborative Dialogue as a Policy Making Strategy* (2000-05 ed.). Berkeley, CA: Institute of Urban & Regional Development, University of California, Berkeley.

- Innes, J. E., & Booher, D. E. (2003). Collaborative policymaking: governance through dialogue. In M. Hajer & H. Wagenaar (Eds.), *Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society* (pp. 51-77). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Innes, J. E., & Booher, D. E. (2010). *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*. New York: Routledge.
- Jachtenfuchs, M., Diez, T., & Jung, S. (1998). Which Europe? Conflicting models of a legitimate European political order. *European Journal of International Relations*, 4(4), 409-445.
- Jatel, N. (2013). *Using social network analysis to make invisible human actor water governance networks visible: the case of the Okanagan Valley*. (Master of Arts.), University of British Columbia, Kelowna, B.C. Available from docs
- Jefferson, P. (2016). Local governance over watershed is worth the potential price. *Lake Cowichan Gazette*, p. 6.
- Jepson, P. (2005). Governance and accountability of environmental NGOs. *Environmental Science and Policy*, 8(5), 515-524.
- Johns, C., & Rasmussen, K. (2008). Institutions for water resource management in Canada. In M. Sproule-Jones, C. Johns, & T. Heinmiller (Eds.), *Canadian Water Politics* (pp. 59-89). Montreal, Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Johnson, C., Dowd, T. J., & Ridgeway, C. L. (2006). Legitimacy as a social process. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 32, 53-78.
- Johnston, E. W. (2011). Managing the inclusion process in collaborative governance. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 21(4), 699-721.
- Kallis, G., Kipping, M., & Norgaard, R. (2009). Collaborative governance and adaptive management: lessons from California's CALFED water program. *Environmental Science and Policy*, 12(6), 631-643.
- Kay, A. (2005). A critique of the use of path dependency in policy studies. *Public Administration*, 83(3), 553-571.
- Keast, R., Mandell, M. P., & Brown, K. (2004). Network structures: working differently and changing expectations. *Public Administration Review*, 64(3), 363-371.
- Kelowna Capital News. (2015). Facing future water supply challenges. *Kelowna Capital News*.
- Kenney, D. S. (2005). *In search of sustainable water management: international lessons for the American West and beyond*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Kitthananan, A. (2006). Conceptualizing governance: a review. *Journal of Societal and Social Policy*, 5(3), 1-19.
- Koehler, B., & Koontz, T. M. (2008). Citizen participation in collaborative watershed partnerships. *Environmental Management*, 41, 143-154.

- Koontz, T. M. (2005). We finished the plan, so now what? Impacts of collaborative stakeholder participation on land use policy. *Policy Studies Journal*, 33(3), 459-481.
- Koontz, T. M. (2006). Collaboration for sustainability?: A framework for analyzing government impacts in collaborative-environmental management. *Sustainability: Science, Practice and Policy*, 2(1), 15-24.
- Koontz, T. M., & Johnson, E. M. (2004). One size does not fit all: matching breadth of stakeholder participation to watershed group accomplishments. *Policy Sciences*, 37, 185-204.
- Koontz, T. M., Steelman, T., Carmin, J., Korfmacher, K. S., Moseley, C., & Thomas, C. W. (2004). *Collaborative Environmental Management: What Roles for Government?* Washington D.C.: Resources for the Future Press.
- Koontz, T. M., & Thomas, C. W. (2006). What do we know and need to know about the environmental outcomes of collaborative management? *Public Administration Review*, 66(Supplement 1), 111-120.
- Krell-Laluhová, Z., & Scheneider, S. (2004). *Legitimacy and the democratic quality of the political order in Britain, Germany, and Switzerland: a discourse analytical perspective*. Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Uppsala, Sweden.
- Kronsell, A., & Bäckstrand, K. (2010). Rationalities and forms of governance: a framework for analysing the legitimacy of new modes of governance. In K. Bäckstrand, J. Khan, A. Kronsell, & E. Lövbrand (Eds.), *Environmental Politics and Deliberative Democracy: Examining the Promise of New Modes of Governance* (pp. 28-46). Northampton: Edward Elgar.
- Kvarda, E., & Nordbeck, R. (2012). Legitimacy and policy effectiveness of national strategies for sustainability in Austria. In K. Hogl, E. Kvarda, R. Nordbeck, & M. Pregernig (Eds.), *Environmental Governance. The Challenge of Legitimacy and Effectiveness* (pp. 69-88). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Lake Windermere Ambassadors. (2010). *Terms of Refrence*. Invermere, BC: Lake Windermere Ambassadors.
- Lake Windermere Ambassadors. (2015). *Lake Windermere 2015 Water Quality Monitoring Results*. Invermere, BC: Lake Windermere Ambassadors.
- Lang, D. J., Wiek, A., Bergmann, M., Stauffacher, M., Martens, P., Moll, P., . . . Thomas, C. J. (2012). Transdisciplinary research in sustainability science: practice, principles, and challenges. *Sustainability Science*, 7(S1), 25-43.
- Lautze, J., de Silva, S., Giordano, M., & Sanford, L. (2011). Putting the cart before the horse: water governance and IWRM. *Natural Resources Forum*, 35, 1-8.
- Lawrence, T. B., & Wickins, D. (1997). Managing legitimacy in ecotourism. *Tourism Management*, 18(5), 307-316.

- Leach, W. D. (2004). *Is Devolution Democratic? Assessing Collaborative Environmental Management*. Sacramento, California: Centre for Collaborative Policy.
- Leach, W. D. (2006). Collaborative public management and democracy: evidence from western watershed partnerships. *Public Administration Review*(special issue), 100-110.
- Leach, W. D., Pelkey, N. W., & Sabatier, P. A. (2002). Stakeholder partnerships as collaborative policymaking: evaluation criteria applied to watershed management in California and Washington. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 21(4), 645-670.
- Leino, H., & Peltomaa, J. (2012). Situated knowledge-situated legitimacy: consequences of citizen participation in local environmental governance. *Policy and Society*, 31(2), 159-168.
- Lemos, M. C., & Agrawal, A. (2006). Environmental governance. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, 31, 297-325.
- Leschied, H. (2011). *Lake Windermere Project Final Report*. Invermere, BC: Wildsight.
- Lester, D. L., Parnell, J. A., & Carraher, S. (2003). Organizational life cycle: A five-stage empirical scale. *International Journal of Organizational Analysis*, 11(4), 339-354.
- Levi, M., Sacks, A., & Tyler, T. (2009). Conceptualizing legitimacy, measuring legitimacy beliefs. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 53(3), 354-375.
- Linton, J. (2010). *What Is Water? The History of a Modern Abstraction*. The University of British Columbia Press: Vancouver, BC.
- Lockwood, M., Davidson, J., Curtis, A., Stratford, E., & Griffith, R. (2009). Multi-level environmental governance: lessons from Australian natural resource management. *Australian Geographer*, 40(2), 169-186.
- Lockwood, M., Davidson, J., Curtis, A., Stratford, E., & Griffith, R. (2010). Governance principles for natural resource management. *Society and Natural Resources*, 23, 986-1001.
- Lord, C., & Magnette, P. (2004). E pluribus unum? Creative disagreement about legitimacy in the EU. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 42(1), 183-202.
- Lubell, M. (2004). Collaborative watershed management: a view from the grassroots. *Policy Studies Journal*, 32(3), 341-361.
- Lubell, M., & Leach, W. D. (2005, Feb 3-4, 2005). *Watershed partnerships: evaluating a collaborative form of public participation*. Paper presented at the National Research Council's Panel on Public Participation in Environmental Assessment and Decision Making, Washington D.C.
- Luig, T. (2011). Legitimacy on stage: Discourse and knowledge in environmental review processes in Northern Canada. *Anthropological Notebooks*, 17(2), 75-89.

- Lundqvist, J. (2004). Integrating Swedish water resource management: a multi-level governance trilemma. *Local Environment*, 9(5), 413-424.
- Mandarano, L. A. (2008). Evaluating collaborative environmental planning outputs and outcomes: restoring and protecting habitat and the New York-New Jersey Harbor Estuary Program. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 27(4), 456-468.
- Mandell, M. P., & Keast, R. (2008). Evaluating the effectiveness of interorganizational relations through networks: developing a framework for revised performance measures. *Public Administration Review*, 10(6), 715-731.
- Mandell, M. P., & Steelman, T. (2003). Understanding what can be accomplished through interorganizational innovations: the importance of typologies, context and management strategies. *Public Management Review*, 5(2), 197-224.
- Manin, B., Stein, E., & Mansbridge, J. (1987). On legitimacy and political deliberation. *Political Theory*, 15(3), 338-368.
- Margerum, R. D. (2008). A typology of collaboration efforts in environmental management. *Environmental Management*, 41, 487-500.
- Margerum, R. D., & Robinson, C. J. (2015). Collaborative partnerships and the challenges for sustainable water management. *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability*, 12, 53-58.
- Marquez, X. (2016). The irrelevance of legitimacy. *Political Studies*, 64(1S), 19-34.
- Massey, J. E. (2001). Managing organizational legitimacy: communication strategies for organizations in crisis. *International Journal of Business Communication*, 38(2), 153-183.
- Matheson, C. (1987). Weber and the classification of forms of legitimacy. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 38(2), 199-215.
- Mayntz, R. (2010). *Legitimacy and compliance in transnational governance*. Cologne, Germany: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
- McClosky, M. (2000). Problems with using collaboration to shape environmental public policy. *Valparaiso University Law Review*, 34, 423-434.
- McGillivray, B. (2005). *Geography of British Columbia: People and Landscapes in Transition* (2nd ed. ed.). Vancouver: UBC Press.
- McGuire, M. (2006). Collaborative public management: assessing what we know and how we know it. *Public Administration Review*, 66(s1), 33-43.
- Melnichuk, N., Murray, D., & de Loë, R. C. (2012). *Water Governance Challenges and Opportunities: Lake Windermere, British Columbia*. Waterloo: Water Policy and Governance Group.

- Memon, A., & Weber, E. P. (2010). Overcoming obstacles to collaborative water governance: moving toward sustainability in New Zealand. *Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research*, 2(2), 102-116.
- Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and ceremony. *American Journal of Sociology*, 83(2), 340-363.
- Milton, N., & Lepage, L. (2010). From a Participative Framework to Communities' Realities: The Challenges of Implementing Stakeholder Involvement in Quebec Watershed Management, Canada. In K. A. Berry & E. Mollard (Eds.), *Social Participation in Water Governance and Management: Critical and Global Perspectives* (pp. 137-160). London: Earthscan.
- Moody, M. (2009). *"Everyone will get better together": How Those Responsible for California's Bay-Delta Water System Understand Collaboration*. Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California, School of Policy, Planning and Development.
- Moore, E. A., & Koontz, T. M. (2003). Research note: a typology of collaborative watershed groups: citizen-based, agency-based, and mixed partnerships. *Society and Natural Resources*, 16(5), 451-460.
- Morning Star Staff Reporter. (2015). Water fund flows for 10 years. *The Morning Star*.
- Moss, T., & Newig, J. (2010). Multilevel water governance and problems of scale: setting the stage for a broader debate. *Environmental Management*, 46, 1-6.
- Murray, D., & de Loe, R. C. (2012a). *Farmers' Perspectives on Collaborative Approaches to Water Governance*. Waterloo, ON: Water Policy and Governance Group.
- Murray, D., & de Loe, R. C. (2012b). *Understanding the Current and Potential role of the Natural Resources Sector in Collaborative Approaches to Water Governance. Summary of Survey Findings*. Waterloo, ON: Water Policy and Governance Group.
- Nadeau, R. (2010). Shuswap Lake "Stewardship Council" Needed Now! *North Shuswap Kicker*, p. 60.
- Nechako Environmental Enhancement Fund. (2001). Report of the Nechako Environment Enhancement Fund Management Committee. Prince George, BC.: Nechako Environmental Enhancement Fund.
- Nechako Watershed Council. (1998). *Terms of Reference*. Vanderhoof, BC: Nechako Watershed Council.
- Nechako Watershed Council. (2009). *Nechako Watershed Council Communications Pamphlet*. Vanderhoof, B.C.: M. R. Concepts.
- Neufeld, A., Swain, L., & Rieberger, K. (2010). *Water Quality assessment and Objectives for Windermere Lake*. Victoria, BC: BC Ministry of Environment
- Newig, J. (2012). More effective natural resource management through participatory governance? Taking stock of conceptual and empirical literature - and moving forward. In K. Høgl, E.

- Kvarda, R. Nordbeck, & M. Pregernig (Eds.), *Environmental Governance: The Challenges of Legitimacy and Effectiveness* (pp. 46-68). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
- Newig, J., & Fritsch, O. (2008). More input - better output: does citizen involvement improve environmental governance. In I. Bluhdorn (Ed.), *In Search of Legitimacy. Policy-making in Europe and the Challenge of Complexity* (pp. 205-224). Opladen, Germany: Farmington Hills.
- Newig, J., & Fritsch, O. (2009). Environmental governance: participatory, multi-level -- and effective? *Environmental Policy and Governance*, 19(3), 197-214.
- Newig, J., & Kvarda, E. (2012). Participation in environmental governance: legitimate and effective? In K. Hogl, E. Kvarda, R. Nordbeck, & M. Pregernig (Eds.), *Environmental Governance: The Challenge of Legitimacy and Effectiveness* (pp. 29-45). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
- Nkhata, A. B., Breen, C. M., & Freimund, W. A. (2008). Resilient social relationships and collaboration in the management of social-ecological systems. *Ecology and Society*, 13(1), Online.
- Nowlan, L. (2004). *Customary Water Laws and Practices in Canada*. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.
- Nowlan, L., & Bakker, K. (2007). *Delegating Water Governance: Issues and Challenges in the BC Context*. British Columbia: UBC Program on Water Governance.
- Nowlan, L., & Bakker, K. (2010). *Practising Shared Water Governance in Canada: A Primer*. Vancouver, BC: UBC Program on Water Governance.
- Nowlan, L., & Orr, C. (2010). *Brief on BC Water Act Reform*. Vancouver: Watershed Watch Salmon Society.
- O'Kane, R. H. T. (1993). Against legitimacy. *Political Studies*, 41(3), 471-487.
- O'Leary, R., & Bingham Blomgren, L. (2007). *A Manager's Guide to Resolving Conflicts in Collaborative Networks*. Washington, D.C.: IBM Center for the Business of Government.
- O'Leary, R., & Bingham, L. B. (2009). *The Collaborative Public Manager: New Ideas for the Twenty-First Century*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- O'Leary, R., & Vij, N. (2012). Collaborative public management: where have we been and where are we going? *The American Review of Public Administration*, 42(5), 507-522.
- Okanagan Basin Water Board. (2010a). *2010 Annual Report*. British Columbia: Okanagan Basin Water Board.
- Okanagan Basin Water Board. (2010b). *Okanagan Basin Water Board Governance Manual*. Kelowna, BC, Canada: Okanagan Basin Water Board.

- Okanagan Basin Water Board. (2011). *Local Government User Guide: Okanagan Water Supply and Demand Project*. Kelowna, B.C.: Okanagan Basin Water Board.
- Okanagan Basin Water Board. (2012). *Sewage Facilities Grant Program*. Kelowna, BC: Okanagan Basin Water Board.
- Okanagan Basin Water Board. (2014). *Okanagan Basin Water Board Water Management Program Review 2014*. Kelowna, BC, Canada: Okanagan Basin Water Board.
- Okanagan Hydrometric Network Working Group. (2008). *Hydrometric Network Requirements for the Okanagan Basin*. Victoria BC: BC Ministry of Environment.
- Okanagan Water Stewardship Council. (2008). *Okanagan Sustainable Water Strategy: Action Plan 1.0*. Kelowna, BC, Canada: Okanagan Basin Water Board.
- Okanagan Water Stewardship Council. (2010). *Sustainable Water Strategy Action Plan 1.0: 2010 Progress Report*. Kelowna, BC, Canada: Okanagan Basin Water Board.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2015). *Stakeholder Engagement for Inclusive Water Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing.
- Orr, C. (2015). A multi-level perspective on the legitimacy of collaborative water governance in Québec. *Canadian Water Resources Journal*, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07011784.2015.1110502>.
- Ostrom, E. (1990). *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ostrom, E. (2009). *Understanding institutional diversity*: Princeton university press.
- Pahl-Wostl, C., Conca, K., Kramer, A., Maestu, J., & Schmidt, F. (2013). Missing links in global water governance: a process-oriented analysis. *Ecology and Society*, 18(2), 33 online.
- Pahl-Wostl, C., Craps, M., Dewulf, A., Mostert, E., & Taillieu, T. (2007). Social learning and water resources management. *Ecology and Society*, 12(2), Online.
- Pahl-Wostl, C., & Kranz, N. (2010). Water governance in times of change. *Environmental Science and Policy*, 13(7), 567-570.
- Pal, L. (2010). *Beyond Policy Analysis: Public Issue Management in Turbulent Times* (4 ed.). Toronto, ON: Nelson Education.
- Parkinson, J. (2003). Legitimacy problems in deliberative democracy. *Political Studies*, 51(1), 180-196.
- Parmigiani, A., & Rivera-Santos, M. (2011). Clearing a path through the forest: a meta-review of interorganizational relationships. *Journal of Management*, 37(4), 1108-1136.
- Patel, A. M., Xavier, R. J., & Broom, G. *Toward a model of organisational legitimacy in public relations theory and practice*. Paper presented at the International Communication Association Conference, New York, NY.

- Paulson, D. D. (1998). Collaborative management of public rangeland in Wyoming: lessons in co-management. *Professional Geographer*, 50, 301-315.
- Peak Planning Associates. (2013). *Draft Recreation Management Plan for Shuswap, Little Shuswap, Mara and Adams Lakes*. Kamloops BC: Peak Planning Associates.
- Peters, B. G., & Pierre, J. (2000). Citizens versus the new public manager: the problem of mutual empowerment. *Administration and Society*, 32(1), 9-28.
- Phare, M. A. (2009). *Denying the Source: The Crisis of First Nations Water Rights*. Surrey, BC: Rocky Mountain Books.
- Pinkerton, E., & John, L. (2008). Creating local management legitimacy: building a local system of clam management in a northwest coast community. *Marine Policy*, 32, 680-691.
- Plummer, R. (2009). The adaptive co-management process: an initial synthesis of representative models and influential variables. *Ecology and Society*, 14(2), online.
- Plummer, R., & Armitage, D. (2007). A resilience-based framework for evaluating adaptive co-management: Linking ecology, economics and society in a complex world. *Ecological Economics*, 61(1), 62-74.
- Plummer, R., & FitzGibbon, J. (2004). Some observations on the terminology in co-operative environmental management. *Journal of Environmental Management*, 70, 63-72.
- Plummer, R., Kulczycki, C., & Stacey, C. (2006). How are we working together?: A framework to assess collaborative arrangements in nature-based tourism. *Current Issues in Tourism*, 9(6), 499-515.
- Polis Project on Ecological Governance. (2012). Summary: Watershed Governance Institutional Mentorship Webinar With the Cowichan Watershed Board and Lake Windermere Ambassadors. Victoria, BC: University of Victoria.
- Provan, K. G., & Kenis, P. (2008). Modes of network governance: structure, management, and effectiveness. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 18(2), 229-252.
- Provan, K. G., Kenis, P., & Human, S. E. (2008). Legitimacy building in organizational networks. In L. B. Bingham & R. O'Leary (Eds.), *Big Ideas in Collaborative Public Management* (pp. 121-137). Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
- Provan, K. G., Sebastian, J. G., & Milward, H. B. (1996). Interorganizational cooperation in community mental health: a resource-based explanation of referrals and case coordination. *Medical Care Research and Review*, 51(1), 94-119.
- Province of British Columbia. (1997). *BC/ALCAN 1997 Agreement*. Victoria, BC: Executive Council Chambers.
- Province of British Columbia. (2014). *Water Sustainability Act*. Victoria, BC: Queen's Press.
- Province of British Columbia. (2015). *Municipalities Enabling and Validating Act RSBC 1960*. Victoria: Queen's Press.

- Raadgever, G. T., & Mostert, E. (2007, 2007). *The role of expert knowledge in collaborative water management*. Paper presented at the International Conference on Adaptive and Integrated Water Management: Coping with Complexity and Uncertainty, Switzerland.
- Ramstad, K. M., Paine, G., Dunning, D. L., Geary, A. F., Keall, S. N., & Nelson, N. J. (2009). Effective partnerships between universities and indigenous communities: a case study in Tuatara conservation in Aotearoa. *Journal of the Royal Society of New Zealand*, 39(4), 229-231.
- Reed, M. S. (2008). Stakeholder participation for environmental management: a literature review. *Biological Conservation*, 141(10), 2417-2431.
- Regional District of East Kootenay. (2008). Lake Windermere Official Community Plan Bylaw No. 2061. Cranbrook, BC: Regional District of East Kootenay.
- Regional District of East Kootenay. (2011). *Lake Windermere Management Plan*. Invermere, BC: Regional District of the East Kootenay.
- Regional District of East Kootenay, Lake Windermere Ambassadors, & District of Invermere. (2011). *Lake Management Committee Terms of Reference Invermere*, BC: Lake Windermere Ambassadors.
- Renner, R., Schneider, F., Hohenwallner, D., Kopeinig, C., Kruse, S., Lienert, J., . . . Muhar, S. (2013). Meeting the challenges of transdisciplinary knowledge production for sustainable water governance. *Mountain Research and Development*, 33(3), 234-247.
- Rhodes, R. A. W. (1997). The new governance: governing without government *Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability* (1st edition ed., pp. 45-60). Buckingham, United Kingdom: Open University Press. (Reprinted from: Not in File).
- Rickenbach, M. G., & Reed, A. S. (2002). Cross-boundary cooperation in a watershed context: the sentiments of private forest landowners. *Environmental Management*, 30(4), 584-594.
- Rogers, E., & Weber, E. P. (2010). Thinking harder about outcomes for collaborative governance arrangements. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 40(5), 546-567.
- Rogers, P., & Hall, A. W. (2003). *Effective Water Governance* (TEC Background Papers No. 7 ed.). Stockholm, Sweden: Global Water Partnership.
- Roth, A. P., & de Loë, R. C. (2017). Incorporating outcomes from collaborative processes into government decision making: a case study from Low Water Response Planning in Ontario, Canada. *Ecological Economics*, 132, 169-178.
- Rothstein, B. (2009). Creating political legitimacy electoral democracy versus quality of government. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 53(3), 311-330.
- Roy, D., Osborne, B., & Venema, H. D. (2009). *Integrated Water Resources Management in Canada: Recommendations for Agricultural Sector Participation*. Winnipeg, Manitoba: International Institute for Sustainable Development.

- Rutherford, T. (2011). *Cowichan Watershed Board - Targets Presentation*. Duncan, BC: Cowichan Watershed Board.
- Sabatier, P., Focht, W., Lubell, M., Trachtenberg, Z., Vedlitz, A., & Matlock, M. (2005a). Collaborative approaches to watershed management. In P. Sabatier, W. Focht, M. Lubell, Z. Trachtenberg, A. Vedlitz, & M. Matlock (Eds.), *Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches to Watershed Management* (pp. 3-22). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Sabatier, P., Focht, W., Lubell, M., Trachtenberg, Z., Vedlitz, A., & Matlock, M. (Eds.). (2005b). *Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches to Watershed Management*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Sabatier, P., Weible, C., & Ficker, J. (2005). Eras of watershed management in the United States: implications of collaborative watershed approaches. In P. Sabatier, W. Focht, M. Lubell, Z. Trachtenberg, A. Vedlitz, & M. Matlock (Eds.), *Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches to Watershed Management* (pp. 23-52). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Saldaña, J. (2009). *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
- Sandborn, P. (1998). *Private Letter to Fraser Basin Council*. Allied Rivers. Prince George, BC.
- Sandelowski, M. (1994). Focus on qualitative methods. The use of quotes in qualitative research. *Research in Nursing and Health*, 17(6), 479-482.
- Sandstrom, A., Crona, B., & Bodin, O. (2014). Legitimacy in co-management: the impact of preexisting structures, social networks and governance strategies. *Environmental Policy and Governance*, 24(1), 60-76.
- Scharpf, F. W. (1997). Introduction: the problem-solving capacity of multi-level governance. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 4(4), 520-538.
- Scharpf, F. W. (1999). *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?* New York: Oxford University Press.
- Scharpf, F. W. (2007). *Reflections on Multilevel Legitimacy*. Cologne, Germany: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
- Scharpf, F. W. (2009). *Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity*. Cologne, Germany: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
- Scherer, A. G., Palazzo, G., & Seidl, D. (2013). Managing legitimacy in complex and heterogeneous environments: sustainable development in a globalized world. *Journal of Management Studies*, 50(2), 259-284.
- Schneider, S., Hurrelmann, A., Krell-Laluhová, Z., Nullmeier, F., & Wiesner, A. (2010). *Democracy's Deep Roots : Why the Nation State Remains Legitimate*. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Schneider, S., & Krell-Laluhová, Z. (2005). *Examining the Democratic Quality and Legitimacy of the Nation State: A Discourse Analytical Perspective*. Bremen, Germany: TranState Working Papers.

- Scott, R. W. (1995). *Institutions and Organizations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Selsky, J. W., & Parker, B. (2005). Cross-sector partnerships to address social issues: challenges to theory and practice. *Journal of Management*, 31(6), 849-873.
- Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process. (2009). *Strategic Plan for Shuswap and Mara Lake*. Vancouver, BC: Fraser Basin Council.
- Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process. (2014). *Final Report*. Vancouver, BC: Fraser Basin Council.
- Shuswap Waterfront Owners Association. (2015). *SWOA Position Statement*. Scotch Creek, BC: Shuswap Waterfront Owners Association.
- Shuswap Watershed Council. (2014). *Shuswap Watershed Water Quality Program Terms of References v.5*. Vancouver, BC: Fraser Basin Council.
- Simpson, H., de Loë, R., & Andrey, J. (2015). Vernacular knowledge and water management – towards the integration of expert science and local knowledge in Ontario, Canada. *Water Alternatives*, 8(3), 77-97.
- Simpson, H. C. (2014). *The Agricultural Community and its Contribution to Collaborative Environmental Problem-Solving*. (Doctor of Philosophy), Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON. Available from Docs
- Singleton, S. (2002). Collaborative environmental planning in the west: the good, the bad and the ugly. *Environmental Politics*, 11(3), 54-75.
- Skogstad, G. (2003). Who governs? who should govern? political authority and legitimacy in Canada in the Twenty-First Century. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 36(5), 955-973.
- Sonpar, K., Pazzaglia, F., & Kornijenko, J. (2009). The paradox and constraints of legitimacy. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 95(1), 1-21.
- Southern Interior Beetle Action Coalition. (2011). *The Mountain Pine Beetle Epidemic: A Critical Issue for BC*. Kamloops, BC: SIBAC.
- Stake, R. E. (2006). *Multiple Case Study Analysis*. New York: The Guilford Press.
- Steen, A. (2001). The question of legitimacy: elites and political support for Russia. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 53(5), 697-718.
- Steeves, J., & Brett, T. (2014). *Endocrine-Distrupting Compounds (ERCs) in water in the Okanagan*. Kelowna, BC: Okanagan Basin Water Board.
- Stoker, G. (1998). Governance as theory: five propositions. *International Social Science Journal*, 50(155), 17-28.
- Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

- Suchman, M. (1995). Managing legitimacy: strategic and institutional approaches. *Academy of Management Review*, 20(3), 571-610.
- Suddaby, R., Bitektine, A., & Haack, P. (2016). Legitimacy. *Academy of Management Annals*, 11(1), 1-77.
- Summit Environmental Consultants Ltd. (2010). *Okanagan Water Supply and Demand Project: Phase 2 Summary Report*. Vernon, BC, Canada: Okanagan Basin Water Board.
- Sydow, J. (2004). Network development by means of network evaluation? Explorative insights from a case in the financial services. *Human Relations*, 57(2), 201-220.
- Tan, P. L., Bowmer, K. H., & Baldwin, C. (2012). Continued challenges in the policy and legal framework for collaborative water planning. *Journal of Hydrology*, 474, 84-91.
- Taylor, B., & de Loë, R. (2012). Conceptualizations of local knowledge in collaborative environmental governance. *Geoforum*, 43, 1207-1217.
- Teague, P., & Donaghey, J. (2009). Social partnership and democratic legitimacy in Ireland. *New Political Economy*, 14(1), 49-69.
- Thomson, A. M., & Perry, J. L. (2006). Collaboration processes: inside the black box. *Public Administration Review*, 66(1), 20-32.
- Tilling, M. V. (2004). *Refinements to legitimacy theory in social and environmental accounting*. Paper presented at the Finders University Commerce Research Paper Series, South Australia.
- Tost, L. P. (2011). An integrative model of legitimacy judgements. *Academy of Management Journal*, 36(4), 686-710.
- Trachtenberg, Z., & Focht, W. (2005). Legitimacy and watershed collaborations: the role of public participation. In P. Sabatier, W. Focht, M. Lubell, Z. Trachtenberg, A. Vedlitz, & M. Matlock (Eds.), *Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches to Watershed Management* (pp. 53-82). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Reprinted from: Not in File).
- Tregidga, H., Mine, M., & Kearins, K. (2007). *Organizational legitimacy and social and environmental reporting research: the potential of discourse analysis*. Paper presented at the Asia-Pacific Interdisciplinary Research in Accounting (APIRA) Conference,, Auckland, N.Z.
- Treib, O., Bähr, H., & Falkner, G. (2007). Modes of governance: towards a conceptual clarification. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 14(1), 1-20.
- Tress, B., Tress, G., & Fry, G. (2009). Integrative research on environmental and landscape change: PhD students' motivations and challenges. *Journal of Environmental Management*, 90(1), 2921-2929.
- Trist, E. (1983). Referent organizations and the development of inter-organizational domains. *Human Relations*, 36(3), 269-284.

- Tuckman, B. W. (1965). Developmental sequence in small groups. *American Psychological Association*, 63(6), 384-399.
- Van Buuren, A., Klijn, E. H., & Edelenbos, J. (2012). Democratic legitimacy of new forms of water management in the Netherlands. *Journal of Water Resources Development*, 28(4), 629-645.
- van Tol Smit, E., de Loe, R., & Plummer, R. (2015). How knowledge is used in collaborative environmental governance: water classification in New Brunswick, Canada. *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management*, 58(3), 423-444.
- Vangen, S., & Huxham, C. (2003). Nurturing collaborative relations: building trust in interorganizational collaboration. *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 39(5), 5-31.
- Vileyn, M. (2011). *Democratic legitimacy in multi-level political systems: what can they learn from federal theory?* Paper presented at the EUSA Twelfth Biennial International Conference, Boston, MA.
- von der Porten, S., de Loë, R., & Plummer, R. (2015). Collaborative environmental governance and indigenous peoples: recommendations for practice. *Environmental Practice*, 17, 134-144.
- von der Porten, S., & de Loë, R. C. (2013a). Collaborative approaches to governance for water and Indigenous peoples: a case study from British Columbia, Canada. *Geoforum*, 50, 149-160.
- von der Porten, S., & de Loë, R. C. (2013b). Water governance and Indigenous governance: towards a synthesis. *Indigenous Policy Journal*, XXIII(4), Online.
- von der Porten, S., & de Loë, R. C. (2014). How collaborative approaches to environmental problem solving view Indigenous peoples: a systematic review. *Society and Natural Resources*, 27(10), 1040-1056.
- Walker, H. A. (2004). Beyond Power and Domination: Legitimacy and Formal Organizations. In C. Johnson (Ed.), *Legitimacy Processes in Organizationa* (Vol. 22). Bingley, UK: Emerald.
- Wallington, T., Lawrence, G., & Loechel, B. (2008). Reflections on the legitimacy of regional environmental governance: lessons from Australia's experiment in natural resource management. *Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning*, 10(1), 1-30.
- Watson, N. (2007). Collaborative capital: a key to the successful practice of integrated water resources management. In J. Warner (Ed.), *Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management* (pp. 31-48). Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- Watson, N., & Howe, J. (2006). Implementing the EU water framework directive: Experiences of participatory planning in the Ribble Basin, north west England. *Water International*, 31(4), 472-487.
- Weber, E. P. (2009). Explaining institutional change in tough cases of collaboration: "ideas" in the Blackfoot Watershed. *Public Administration Review*, 69(2), 314-327.

- Weber, M. (1964). *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. New York: Free Press.
- Weber, M. (1968). *Economy and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Welch, R. (2002). Legitimacy of rural local government in the new governance environment. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 18(4), 443-459.
- Westland Resource Group Inc. (2007). *Cowichan Basin Water Management Plan*.
- Wood, D. J., & Gray, B. (1991). Toward a comprehensive theory of collaboration. *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 27(2), 139-162.
- Wood, J. (2013). *Home to the Nechako: The River and the Land*. Victoria, BC: Heritage House Publishing
- Yin, R. K. (1994). Discovering the future of the case study method in evaluation research. *Evaluation Practice*, 15(3), 283-290.
- Yin, R. K. (2009). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (4th edition ed. Vol. 5). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

## Appendix 1: Case Study Characteristics

Case→ Trait ↓	SLIPP/ SWC	NWC	LWA	OBWB	CWB
Date Active	SLIPP 2006- 2014 SWC 2015-	Initiated in 1996 (formalized 1998)-2011	LWP 2005-2009 LWA 2009 -	Formed in 1968 (legislated in 1970)-	2010-
Origin	Initiated as an inter-agency partnership by the BC Ministry of Environment for improved coordination of existing water manage-ment programing among all orders of government	Collaborative partnership recommendation connected to 1997 BC-Alcan settlement agreement because of conflicting water management perspectives; Fraser Basin Council initiated discussions	2005 RAMSAR– Wetland International Convention held locally to discuss Columbia Wetlands – delegates + public identify gap in stewardship of upstream lake; Wildsight (local E-NGO) initiates Lake Windermere Project leading to formation of LWA	Effort to coordinate three regional districts to address public concerns for basin; 1974 was designated local coordinating authority to address recommendatio ns from the joint Federal/ Provincial Okanagan Basin Study	Recommended from 2007 Cowichan Basin Water Management Plan
Boundary/ Drainage area	SLIPP: Shuswap, Little Shuswap and Mara Lakes SWC: Shuswap Watershed: 15,522km <sup>2</sup>	Nechako Watershed including water/area diverted to Kitimat/Rio- Tinto Alcan: 52,000 km <sup>2</sup>	Lake Windermere: 1,340 km <sup>2</sup>	Okanagan Watershed: 21,600 km <sup>2</sup>	Cowichan Watershed: 940 km <sup>2</sup>
Mission / Mandate	SLIPP: “Working together to sustain the health and prosperity of the Shuswap and Mara Lakes”.  SWC: “Enhanced water quality that supports human and ecosystem health and the local economy	“Enhance the long-term health and viability of the Nechako Watershed with consideration for all interests and to provide a forum to address water management and related issues in the Watershed and to work toward cooperative resolution of these issues.”	“Through collaboration of representatives of key community sectors, the Lake Windermere Ambassadors will serve as a resource for future projects benefiting the health of Lake Windermere.”	“Provide leadership for sustainable water management to protect and enhance the quality of life and environment in the Okanagan Basin”	“Provide leadership for sustainable water management to protect and enhance environmental quality and the quality of life in the Cowichan watershed and adjoining areas.”

Case→ Trait ↓	SLIPP/ SWC	NWC	LWA	OBWB	CWB
	in the Shuswap watershed.”				
Main goals	<p>SLIPP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• water quality; recreation safety; development management</li> </ul> <p>SWC:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• water quality; recreation safety</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify solutions for flow issues connected to the Kenney Dam and the Nechako Reservoir</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Water quality monitoring; stewardship; education; restoration; referral review (advisory) for DOI and RDEK for development applications; establishment of water governance board for watershed</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sewage infrastructure improvement grants; Eurasian Water Milfoil management; water use surveying; water supply and demand modeling; ground-water monitoring; water quality monitoring and improvements; water education</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Water quality, estuary health; water conservation; education; fish management; flow management; riparian habitat protection</li> </ul>
Organizational Structure	<p>SLIPP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Board supported by technical &amp; public advisory committees</li> </ul> <p>SWC:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Board</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Chair supported by two vice chairs with open/inclusive participation for impacted organizations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Board + general paid membership</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 12-person board supported by advice from the ~ 25 interest group Okanagan Water Stewardship Council (formally the technical advisory group)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 12-person board supported by communications and technical advisory committees</li> </ul>
Board Members	<p>Initial SLIPP members:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BC Ministry of Agriculture</li> <li>• BC Ministry of Environment, including BC Parks and Conservation Officer Service</li> </ul>	<p>Initially 18 member organizations (increased and then slowly declined)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Alcan/Rio-Tinto Alcan</li> <li>• BC Trappers Association</li> <li>• City of Terrace</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Variable participation from any of the following sectors:</li> <li>• Businesses</li> <li>• First Nations</li> <li>• Governments</li> <li>• Non-government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• North Okanagan Regional District</li> <li>• Central Okanagan Regional District</li> <li>• Okanagan-Simikameen Regional</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cowichan Valley Regional District</li> <li>• Cowichan Tribes</li> <li>• Fisheries and Oceans Canada</li> <li>• BC Ministry of</li> </ul>

Case→ Trait ↓	SLIPP/ SWC	NWC	LWA	OBWB	CWB
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BC Ministry of Forests, Lands, and Natural Resource Operations</li> <li>• Columbia Shuswap Regional District</li> <li>• City of Salmon Arm</li> <li>• District of Sicamous</li> <li>• Fisheries and Oceans Canada</li> <li>• Fraser Basin Council</li> <li>• Interior Health Authority</li> <li>• North Okanagan Regional District</li> <li>• Royal Canadian Mounted Police</li> <li>• Shuswap Nation Tribal Council</li> <li>• Thompson-Nicola Regional District</li> <li>• Transport Canada</li> <li>• Civil Society</li> </ul> <p>SWC members:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Columbia Shuswap Regional District</li> <li>• Thompson-Nicola Regional District</li> <li>• City of Salmon Arm</li> <li>• District of</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• City of Prince George</li> <li>• Community Futures Development</li> <li>• Corporation of Stuart Nechako</li> <li>• District of Fort St. James</li> <li>• District of Kitimat</li> <li>• District of Vanderhoof</li> <li>• Kemano Community Association</li> <li>• Kitimat Chamber of Commerce</li> <li>• Lheidil T'enneh First Nations</li> <li>• Nechako Valley Regional Cattlemen's Association</li> <li>• Northwest Communities Coalition</li> <li>• BC Ministry of Energy and Mines</li> <li>• BC Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks</li> <li>• Regional District of Bulkley Nechako Area D, E, F</li> <li>• Southside Economic Development Association</li> <li>• Terrace and</li> </ul>	<p>Organizations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Local Residents</li> <li>• Recreation</li> <li>• Resorts</li> <li>• Second Homeowners</li> <li>• Youth</li> <li>•</li> </ul>	<p>District</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Okanagan Nation Alliance</li> <li>• Water Supply Association of BC</li> <li>• Okanagan Water Stewardship Council</li> </ul>	<p>Environment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community members-at-large</li> </ul>

Case→ Trait ↓	SLIPP/ SWC	NWC	LWA	OBWB	CWB
	Sicamous, <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Secwepemc Nation</li> <li>• BC Ministry of Environment</li> <li>• BC Ministry of Agriculture</li> <li>• Regional District of North Okanagan</li> <li>• Civil Society</li> </ul>	District Chamber of Commerce <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tweedsmuir Recreation Commission</li> <li>• University of Northern BC</li> <li>• Vanderhoof and District Chamber of Commerce</li> <li>• Vanderhoof Fish and Game Club</li> </ul>			
Decision-making Structure	SLIPP: By consensus; financial matters are voted on by members who have made a financial contribution  SWC: By vote; financial matters are voted on by members who have made a financial contribution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consensus among all members for all issues</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consensus among all board members for all issues</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consensus among all members; financial matters are voted on by regional government board members only</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consensus among all members for all issues</li> </ul>
Funding mechanisms	SLIPP: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Direct monies from local and regional partners (gas tax) + in-kind staff and resource contributions from federal and provincial</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nechako Environmental Enhancement Fund + in-kind support from participating agencies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fee for service from municipal and regional district direct funds; membership fees; external project grants (e.g., Columbia Basin Trust)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Property tax of up to \$0.036/\$1000 of assessed property value from land within the three regional districts; federal and provincial project grants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Direct monies from Cowichan Tribes and CVRD (gas tax); external project grants (e.g., Living Rivers funding)</li> </ul>

Case→ Trait ↓	SLIPP/ SWC	NWC	LWA	OBWB	CWB
	<p>agencies</p> <p>SWC:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Parcel Tax through service bylaws with the TNRD, CSRD, and City of Salmon Arm + in-kind MOE support for water monitoring</li> </ul>				
Legal basis	<p>SLIPP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Documented Terms of Reference (ToFR)</li> </ul> <p>SWC:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Shuswap Watershed Council Service Establishment Bylaw No. 5705 (2015)</li> <li>Documented Terms of Reference (ToFR)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Recognition for establishment in BC Utilities Commission (BCUC) report on the Kemano Completion Project</li> <li>Documented ToFR</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Charitable status</li> <li>Recognition in RDEK – Lake Windermere OCP Bylaw No. 2061 Section A (10) as Management Committee (advisory)</li> <li>Documented ToFR</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mandated under the Municipalities Enabling and Validating Act</li> <li>Power of taxation through Supplementary Letters Patent to the three Okanagan regional districts</li> <li>Documented ToFR</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Registered Society (Cowichan Watershed Society Bylaw 2014-01)</li> <li>Documented ToFR</li> </ul>
Major outputs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water quality monitoring and reporting</li> <li>Removal of derelict docks</li> <li>Foreshore and upland area sensitivity mapping</li> <li>Recreational Management Plan</li> <li>Raised general awareness and improved relationships among participating organ-</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Numerous technical reports regarding a release facility at the Kenney Dam</li> <li>Issue report identifying 23 areas of concern for the sustainability of the Nechako River</li> <li>Advocacy work to promote Kenney Dam water release facili-</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ongoing public education initiatives (i.e., watershed tours, workshops, education campaigns, water celebrations)</li> <li>Water quality monitoring and reporting</li> <li>Restoration initiatives</li> <li>Recommendations to RDEK and DOI for development applications</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Watermilfoil management</li> <li>Grant program for sewage infrastructure improvement</li> <li>Ongoing public education initiatives (i.e., workshops, education campaigns)</li> <li>Advocacy work on various water management and govern-</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water quality monitoring and reporting</li> <li>Development of Cowichan Watershed Sustainability Targets</li> <li>Advocacy work on various water management and governance issues to senior government</li> </ul>

Case→ Trait ↓	SLIPP/ SWC	NWC	LWA	OBWB	CWB
	izations	ty to NEEF committee <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Raised general awareness and improved relationships among participating organizations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Raised general awareness and improved relationships among participating organizations</li> </ul>	<p>ance issues to senior government (e.g., Water Act Modernization, invasive species)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development of Okanagan Sustainable Water Strategy</li> <li>• Watershed modeling and data collection (e.g., Okanagan Land Use Inventory and Water Demand Model, Okanagan Water Supply and Demand Project, Okanagan Groundwater Monitoring Project, re-installing Water Survey of Canada hydrometric stations)</li> <li>• Water Conservation and Quality Improvement Grant program - providing seed small project funds to local organizations</li> <li>• Creation of the BC Water Use Reporting Centre</li> <li>• UBC-O Water Research Chair establishment</li> </ul>	<p>(e.g., Water Act Modernization, Cowichan River flows)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Numerous technical reports and presentations on water management/ governance / stewardship / education</li> <li>• Restoration initiatives</li> <li>• Ongoing public education initiatives (i.e., watershed tours, workshops, education campaigns)</li> <li>• Raised general awareness and improved relationships among participating organizations</li> </ul>

Case→ Trait ↓	SLIPP/ SWC	NWC	LWA	OBWB	CWB
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Local government by-law guide books for water protection</li> <li>• Raised general awareness and improved relationships among participating organizations</li> </ul>	

## **APPENDIX 2: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE**

Can you describe the current and past interaction you personally and the group, organization, or interest you represent have had with the collaboration?

Follow up: Does this differ from other participating groups? How?

Follow up: Why did you or your organization decide to participate?

What role have you or your organization provided to the collaboration? How would you characterize the collaborative process?

Follow up: Did everyone participate and were they treated equally?

Follow up: Were decisions transparent and followed through with?

Follow up: Was any sector missing from the collaboration?

Follow up: Were decisions deliberated on fairly and consistently?

Follow up: Where there any specific problems at different points in time that hindered the process?

Follow up: Where there any aspects of the process that helped the collaboration function or achieve its goals?

What role do you see the collaboration playing locally?

Follow up: What are their strengths and weaknesses in this role?

Follow up: Do they need/ should they have authority to carry out this role?

What role does the provincial government or legislation or policy play for the collaboration?

Follow up: How does this role affect the collaboration?

What has been the general community response to the collaboration?

Follow up: Have there been times of notable resistance or support?

Follow up: What actions of the collaboration have helped or hindered this response?

Follow up: To what extent does the community response affect the collaboration?

What actions or process have been most important for the organization?

What kind of influence or impact has resulted from the collaboration?

Follow-up: Has this changed over time?

Follow-up: Has it been adequate?

Do the origins have an impact how the collaboration has been perceived?

What do you anticipate of the future of the collaboration?

Do you think your opinions of the collaboration differ from other organizations? In what ways?

What does the concept of legitimacy in the context of the collaboration mean to you?

Given the study objectives, is there anything I haven't asked that you think I should know?

In light of the study objectives, can you identify other individuals I should interview?

### Appendix 3: Document Sources

Document Number	Document Type	Source	Name	Year
<b>Cowichan Watershed Board</b>				
1	Website	CWB	CWB Website	-
2	Policy	Westland Resource Group Inc.	Cowichan Basin Water Management Plan	2007
3	Policy	CWB	Cowichan Watershed Board Governance Manual	2010
4		CWB	Technical Advisory Committee – Terms of Reference	2010
5	Policy	Cowichan Valley Regional District	Constitution and Bylaws for the Cowichan Watershed Society	2013
6-52	Meeting Minutes	CWB	Various	2011-2015
53	Report	Hunter, R., Brandes, O. M., Moore, M. L., Brandes, L.	The Cowichan Watershed Board: An Evolution of Collaborative Watershed Governance	2014
54-58	Newspaper	Cowichan News Leader Pictorial	Various	2009, 2014
59-64	Newspaper	Lake Cowichan Gazette	Various	2014-2015
65	Newspaper	Parksville Qualicum Beach News	Society wants to provide input to regional water governance plans	2015
66	Newspaper	Ladysmith Chronicle	Water restrictions eased	2015
67-68	Newspaper	Postmedia Breaking News	Various	2015
69-71	Newspaper	Victoria Times Colonist	Various	2014-2015
72-73	Newspaper	Globe and Mail	Various	2014, 2015
74	Report	Hunter, R.	Collaborative Watershed Governance Workshop	2011
75	Report	Rutherford, T.	Cowichan Watershed Board Targets	2011
76	Report	Hutchins, R.	The Cowichan Watershed Board Story	2012
77	Letter	CWB	Water Sustainability Act – Comments of the CWB	2013
<b>Lake Windermere Ambassadors</b>				
78	Website	LWA	LWA Website	-

<b>Document Number</b>	<b>Document Type</b>	<b>Source</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Year</b>
79	Policy	LWA	Terms of Reference	2010
80	Policy	LWA	Lake Management Committee Terms of Reference	2011
81	Policy	RDEK & DOI	Lake Windermere Management Plan	2011
82	Policy	RDEK	Lake Windermere Official Community Plan Bylaw No. 2061	2008
83	Report	RDEK & DoI	Lake Windermere Management Plan: Implementation	2011
84-102	Meeting Minutes	LWA	Various	2011-2014
103	Report	LWA	Lake Windermere 2011 Water Quality Monitoring Results	2011
104	Report	LWA	Lake Windermere 2012 Water Quality Monitoring Results	2012
105	Promotional Material	LWA	Lake Windermere Ambassadors Brochure	N/A
106-129	Newspaper	Columbia Valley Pioneer	Various	2011-2015
130-140	Newspaper	Invermere Valley Echo	Various	2011-2015
141	Newspaper	Free Press	Celebrating water and a local water hero	2015
142-143	Newspaper	East Kootenay News Online Weekly	Various	2011-2012
144	Report	POLIS	Summary: Watershed Governance Institutional Mentorship Webinar	2012
145	Report	Harma, K., Gardener, J., Knight, D. & Melnychuk, N.	Working for the Watershed: Establishing an Upper Columbia Watershed Governance Body at the Headwaters of the Columbia River, British Columbia	2013
146	Report	LWA	Water Governance at the Headwaters of the Columbia River	2013
147	Letter	LWA	"This is Our Watershed" ~ A Community Conversation	
148	Policy	Elk River Alliance	Elk River Watershed Council: Terms of Reference	2012
149	Report	LWA	Kinsmen Breach Restoration Project: Final Summary Report	2012
150	Policy	LWA	"This is Our Watershed ~ A Community Conversation: Summary Notes	2013

Document Number	Document Type	Source	Name	Year
<b>Okanagan Basin Water Board</b>				
151	Website	OBWB	OBWB Website	-
152	Policy	Province of BC	OBWB Supplementary Letters Patent	1964
153-159	Report	OBWB	OBWB Annual Report	2009-2015
160	Report	OBWB	Governance Manual	2010
161	Policy	OBWB	Terms of Reference for the OWSC	2006
162-219	Meeting Minutes	OBWB	Meeting Minutes	2009- 2015
220-260	Meeting Minutes	OBWB	Meeting Minute Summaries	1968-2008
261	Plan	OBWB	OBWB Strategic Plan 2014-2019	2014
262	Briefing Note	OBWB	Letter to Honourable Steve Thomson Re: Improving water management in British Columbia: Proposal for a new water commission	2014
263	Report	Jacqueline Belzile	Water Use Reporting Case Studies	2014
264-277	Newspaper	Vernon Morning Star	Various	2014-2015
278-294	Newspaper	Kelowna Capital News	Various	2014-2015
295-299	Newspaper	Penticton Western News	Various	2014-2015
300	Newspaper	Keremeos Review	Don't be a drain on the water supply	2015
301-303	Newspaper	Summerland Review	Various	2014-2015
304-306	Newspaper	Lake Country Calendar	Various	2015
307-309	Newspaper	Canadian Press	Various	2001, 2009, 2015
310-311	Newspaper	Topnews.in	Various	2013, 2015
312-314	Newspaper	Postmedia News	Various	2010-2011
315	Newspaper	Salmon Arm Observer	Region asked about water funds	2015
316	Newspaper	Invermere Valley Echo	Beneath the Surface: Mussels on the Move	2015
317-319	Newspaper	Vancouver Sun	Various	2012-2013
320	Newspaper	Edmonton Journal	Controversy brewing in B.C. water deal	2011
321-323	Newspaper	M2 Press wire	Various	2006, 2008, 2010
324	Newspaper	Canadian Business News Network	B.C. provides \$150,000 for	2008

Document Number	Document Type	Source	Name	Year
		(eSource)	Okanagan water study	
325	Newspaper	Canada Newswire	Okanagan Basin Water Study: One of Nine Community Projects to Receive Over \$1.9 Million in Federal Gas Tax Funding	2007
<b>Nechako Watershed Council</b>				
326	Policy	NWC	Terms of Reference	1998
327	Policy	NWC	Role and Responsibilities: Coordinating Committee	1999
328	Policy	Government of British Columbia	BC-Alcan 1997 Agreement	1997
329-386	Meeting Minutes	NWC	Various	1997-2010
387-455	Newspaper	Prince George Citizen	Various	1995-2012
388-462	Newspaper	The Prince George Free Press	Various	1995-1998
463-469	Newspaper	Prince George This Week	Various	1995-1996
470-478	Newspaper	The Vancouver Sun	Various	1996-1997
479-480	Newspaper	Globe and Mail	Various	1996, 2011
481-484	Newspaper	Omineca Express	Various	1997-2000
485	Newspaper	Associated Press Newswires	Water release plan for B.C. salmon launched	2002
486-487	Newspaper	The Canadian Press	Various	2001, 2002
488	Newspaper	M2 Presswire	BC Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks: Nechako River water licence applications to be reviewed	1999
489	Newspaper	Industrial Energy Bulletin	Alcan strikes deal with BC Government ending litigation over Kemano Project	1997
490-491	Newspaper	Eco-log Week	Various	1997
492	Newspaper	Canada NewsWire	B.C.-Alcan Agreement Sets Stage For Job Creation, Environmental Enhancement In Province's North	1997
493	Briefing Note	NWC	Future Roles for the Nechako Watershed Council	2004
494-499	New Release	NWC	Various	
500	News Release	Fraser Basin Council	Fraser Basin Contributes to Improving Status of Three of BC's Ten Most Endangered Rivers	1998
501	News Release	NEEF	NEEF Newsletter Three	2000

Document Number	Document Type	Source	Name	Year
501	Promotional Material	NWC	Nechako Watershed Council	1
502	Promotional Material	Alcan	Working with water	1996
503-505	Radio Transcript	CKNW-AM	"The Raif Mair Show"	1996-1998
506	Magazine Article	Human Organization	Promoting aboriginal territoriality through interethnic alliances: The case of the Cheslatta T'en in northern British Colum	2003
507	Report	NWC	A Progress Report	1999
508	Report	NWC	Issue identification and Optional Solutions Scoping Matrix	2000
509	Report	Cornerstone Planning Group	Summary Workshop on Issues	1999
510	Report	NEEF	NEEF Multi-Interest Involvement Process Workshop Report	1999
511	Report	NWC	Training in Consensus Decision Making for the NWC session Notes	1999
512	Report	Fraser Basin Management Program (FBMP)	Nechako Watershed Management Initiative June 15, 1996 Exploratory Workshop: Background Paper, Proposal, Results Paper	1996
513	Report	NEEF	NEEF Summary Report	2001
514	Report	NEEF	Nechako River Summary of Existing Data	1999
515	Report	NWC	How we got to here from there: A Chronology of Events Leading to the Proposed Nechako Watershed Council	1997
516	Report	FBC	Water Management Planning Process for the Nechako: A Proposal	1998
517	Letter	FBC	Letter to Chief Thomas of Saik'uz First Nation Re: Workshop	1998
518	Letter	FBC	Letters to FBC Operations Committee Re: NWC resignation	1998
519	Letter	Rivers Defence Coalition	Letters to FBC resigning from NWC	1998
520	Letter	FBC	Letter in response to resignation of River Defence Coalition	1998
521	Letter	Northwest Communities Coalition	Letter in response to resignation of River Defence Coalition	1998
522	Letter	Kitimat Chamber of	Letter in response to resignation	1998

Document Number	Document Type	Source	Name	Year
		Commerce	of River Defence Coalition	
523	Letter	FBC	Letter to Alcan Re: Nechako River Issues	1997
524	Letter	Alcan	Letter Response Re: Nechako River Issues	1998
525	Letter	BC Minister of Education: Paul Ramsey	Letter response Re: Participation in NWC	1998
526	Letter	FBMB	Letter of invitation to Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to Nechako Watershed Workshop	1996
527	Letter	Minister of Fisheries and Oceans	Response to Letter of Invitation	1996
<b>Shuswap Watershed Council/Shuswap Lake Integrated Planning Process</b>				
528	Website	Fraser Basin Council	Shuswap Watershed Council Website	-
529	Policy	Fraser Basin Council	Terms of Reference for Water Quality Program	2014
530	Policy	Columbia Shuswap Regional District	Bylaw 5705 - A bylaw to establish the Shuswap Watershed Council Service	2015
531-532	Meeting Minutes	Fraser Basin Council	Summary of SWC Meeting	2014
533-535	Meeting Minutes	SLIPP	Summary of SLIPP minutes	2012-2013
536	Plan	SLIPP	Strategic Plan for Shuswap and Mara Lakes	2008
537	Plan	Fraser Basin Council	Water Quality Monitoring Plan 2011-2014	2011
538	Report	Fraser Basin Council	Shuswap Watershed Water Quality Program (SWWQP) Summary of Results Public Engagement: Phase 1	2014
539	Report	Fraser Basin Council	Summary: 2011-2012 Water Quality Monitoring Results for Shuswap and Mara Lakes	2013
540	Report	Leftside Partners Inc.	SWWQP Feasibility Study	2014
541	Report	Northwest Hydraulic Consultants	Integrated Water Quality Monitoring Plan for the Shuswap Lakes, BC	2010
542	Promotional material	SWC	Come to a Community Open House	2014
543	Promotional Material	Fraser Basin Council	SLIPP: Working together to sustain our watershed	N/A
544-578	Newspaper	North Shuswap	Various	2010-2014

<b>Document Number</b>	<b>Document Type</b>	<b>Source</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Year</b>
		Kicker		
579- 611	Newspaper	Shuswap Market	Various	2005-2014
612-616	Newspaper	Lakeshore News	Lake safety not assured	2014
617-638	Newspaper	Salmon Arm Observer	Various	2010-2015
639	Newspaper	Eagle Valley News	Various	2015
640-646	Newspaper	Vernon Morning Star	Various	2015
647-649	Newspaper	Vancouver Sun	Various	2008, 2010
650-652	Newspaper	Canadian Press	Massive algae blooms on Shuswap Lake spur action by area municipalities	2010
653	Newspaper	Canwest News Service	Mara Lake development moratorium sought	2010
654	Newspaper	M2Presswire	Awards Honour Interior Public Service Employees	2010
655	Letter	Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resources	SLIPP agency interest in private property	2011
656	Letter	Northwest Hydraulic Consultants	Memorandum/Transmittal Re: Site visit trip report – SLIPP Foreshore Restoration Project	2011