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Author’s Declaration

This thesis consists of material all of which I authored or co-authored: see Statement of Contributions included in the thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
Statement of Contributions

Chapter 5 is a published journal article that was equally co-authored with Sophia Murphy, PhD Candidate, Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability, University of British Columbia.

Some material in the dissertation has drawn on previous work, including material from a report in which I was the sole author as a consultant with the Quaker United Nations Office, and work for PO 692, an independent seminar course during my PhD, led by Dr. Derek Hall. These materials appear in Chapter 2 in the overview of the international agricultural trade regime.
Abstract

The fair trade and food sovereignty movements adopt very different strategies for challenging the existing international agricultural trade regime. Food sovereignty contests and resists the existing system, employing contentious politics and an “outside strategy” motivated by the view that the regime cannot be reformed. Meanwhile, fair trade largely focuses on existing opportunities within the system, taking up a collaborative, “inside strategy” in an effort to progress towards an equitable and just trade system. These movements have notable differences in their views on how to change how trade is governed. This research seeks to explain and understand why these two different movements take up different strategies in pursuit of a common goal.

To understand and explain these two strategies, I analyze their strategies and activities, and the factors that explain these, through an interdisciplinary analytical framework that bridges the theory and practice of governance and change. My findings and analysis demonstrate that when we analyze these movements through such a lens, we see more clearly the complexities of governing international trade and challenging neoliberal hegemony, and how the seemingly divergent strategies of these movements are complementary to achieving economic justice.

The fair trade movement’s inside, collaborative strategy has leveraged available opportunities to shape policy, raise awareness on injustices in trade and global supply chains, and to change the norms and discourses on international trade. These activities are complemented by political advocacy that is rarely acknowledged in the academic analysis of the movement. Those in the movement who work with fair trade markets do not treat markets as a sufficient mechanism to address injustices in the international trade system. Rather, they see markets as a short-term option for poor producers, and as a mechanism to contribute to facilitating new opportunities to make long-term changes in the system. However, the movement responds to existing conditions, and does not seek to push for new opportunities where none exist.

Food sovereignty, meanwhile, has forged space for peasant voices and democratic legitimacy in global governance of food and agriculture through its contentious politics, and has been part of the movement that has raised significant awareness and distrust around free trade agreements. But the movement appears to be guided by more principles than a strategy that has identified the processes for achieving its goals for fairer trade. It also does not fully appreciate how its strategy affects export commodity farmers. While it seeks to dismantle, rather than reform, the WTO, it does not have a concrete vision for an alternative without the WTO. With a vision that no opportunities can emerge from its contentious politics, its strategy does not align with what we know about this type of strategy’s contributions to change.

I conclude that both movements’ strategies are necessary to changing the international agricultural trade regime, and neither alone is sufficient. I question and problematize a tendency to analyze movements that treat their strategies and activities in isolation of broader contributions to common problems. This is matters for academic analysis of these and other movements moving forward. Rather than evaluating movements in isolation, might we consider instead what contributions they bring, and be careful to consider these contributions as part of a broader collection of movements and activities?
Acknowledgements

This project is the result of nine years, a time in which I’ve relied on the support of many people I have been most fortunate to have in my life. Having the opportunity to acknowledge the role their love and support has meant to my completion of this project may be my favourite outcome of this endeavor. Strap yourselves in; this will take a while.

First, and foremost, to Dr. Jennifer Clapp: Without your gracious patience and unwavering support through these years, I would never have gotten here. I’ll forever remember the day I asked Mat Paterson where I should do my MA, and he said “University of Waterloo, with Jennifer Clapp”. Without hesitation, and to his visible surprise, I replied “tell me somewhere else!”. Rest assured it wasn’t you – I wanted to live in a more vibrant city. But I came out to meet you, and was instantly sold by your genuine enthusiasm for and dedication to economic justice and to students, and your personal warmth. I was right to suspend my reservations for the city, and I’m forever grateful for everything you’ve done as I’ve struggled to balance devastating loss, financial needs, and the common struggles that come with completing a PhD. I have been infinitely lucky to have you in my corner, and for your mentorship, both professionally and personally. Thank you so very much for everything.

To Dr. Derek Hall and Dr. Steffanie Scott, my committee members, your patience and willingness to see me through these years is deeply appreciated. I am most grateful for your guidance on the dissertation, for incredible, and timely, feedback all along the way. My success has been contingent on your dedication and generosity, and I thank you.

Dr. Bruce Frayne and Dr. Adam Sneyd, thank you for giving your time to read through my work and to participate in my defence.

This doctorate was possible through the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Council Joseph-Armand Bombardier CGS Doctoral Scholarship #767-2008-1014, President Scholarship from the University of Waterloo, a Doctoral Completion Award from the Faculty of Environment, and Balsillie Fellowships through the Centre for International Governance Innovation in Waterloo, Ontario.

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Thank you to Gawain Kripke, for bringing me to Oxfam America and for some of my favourite debates about trade and political economy. You’ve convinced me more than once – at least partially. And deepest thanks to Stephanie Burgos for giving me the fullest experience in policy
advocacy and American politics that has left an indelible mark on me and this work. You could have relegated me to administrative work, but you brought me into and mentored me through the thick of everything. And I loved it!

And my deepest gratitude to the many others near and far who have played such an important part of my life and in getting me here – Carolyn Tilley for our monthly dates, and for taking in every Hunger Games, Amy Poehler, and Tina Fey movie with me. Ry & Liz - man I love and am endlessly motivated by you both and your friendship. Rachelle and Isabelle (and Mat and Fred) – I love our friendships and how they continue to last the test of time. Mat Paterson for inspiring me into environmental justice, food issues, and academia, and leading me to Jennifer. Larry Cebulski for your generosity and constant encouragement, not to mention your understanding and perspective. Joan Dosso, for being the first to believe in me and show me that I can achieve academically. Rich Fratello, you are such a dear friend and support; thanks for always being here. Kelly Hauser for keeping things fun and adventurous. Janice and Sarah for the yoga that gave more to my soul than my body. Cyn Dupont – merci for the years of friendship, insights; je t’aime, toune. Brooke Klein (love Moo!), Michelle Vachon, John Weatherhead, the girls - Tracie, Erin, Ines, and Christine – you are an inspiration in your friendship and dedication to one another; Jade, Lucas, Cara, Jules, Warren, Keelan, Ryan, and Aly – I love you all and feel a little closer to Mikey when I’m with you; Julie Prince, Jamie Reardon, Viv & Cricket, Paula and Doyle, Aunt Ruth, Uncle Brian, Julie, Laura, Ange, Jamie, Ruby, Georgia, Sylvee, Liam and Ben; Jen and Jordan, Meag, Dan and Ethan, Di, and my sister Andrea. Last but not least, the Waterloo crew for in situ friendship and inspiration: Linda Swanston, Ricardo Tranjan, Sarah Martin, Taarini Chopra, Ariane Goetz, Betsy Aziz, Ola Tjornbo, Jennifer Blake, Vic Li, Michele-Lee Moore, Jonathan Crossen and Kata Bohus, and Stefano Pagliari. 

Dar Williams – thanks foremost for the songs that inspire, and for listening to the voice telling you to hold a songwriting retreat, and for bringing together some of the most wonderful people in the world year after year, building a community like no other. And to “all the little Dars” (copyright Jim Terry) from these retreats over the years – thankfully your hours of gold and emerald light aren’t billable, or I’d be broke. I love you all so very dearly.

Joe Wray – you are a cut above. Your exceptional musicianship is paralleled only by your generosity of heart. Your friendship means oh so very much to me.

Rene, Sarah, and Daniellie Wassill, you are forever part of the core fabric of my heart. I would never be where I am today if you hadn’t taken me in like family. I love you all so very much. And Julien (Bubbs!) - thank you my little sunshine monkey for burning away the stormy clouds over the last two years.

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my heart. And Vaalea – Vaalester, my little whalester – my sunshine bunny on stormy days. Awooo!

Adam Lerner – my fellow 36 with a 9 wing™. You have been there for me through everything over the last 4 years, and I can’t even begin to express how grateful I am for your friendship. You truly are a brother. And Karen (K-z!), thank you for the best hugs and conversations, Lemon laughs, and the occasional excuse to cheer on the Red Sox again. You, Viv, Maya and Lily elevate tenfold my great fortune of having Adam as a friend.

Melissa Talhelm and Paul LaCava – you motivated me on at this endeavor so I could one day become an inspiring teacher like yourselves. Thanks for the texts, whether demanding word counts and endless ludicrous reasons for laughter. Paul - you’re a ray of ceaselessly supportive songwriting sunshine that brings so much joy to my world. One day we WILL write a song about tics together, and it will be a hit! And Melissa – you poetic, noble land mermaid – a friend that will always rank (far!) above waffles. Thanks for sharing the best music (others’ too, but especially yours), the best laughs, the best poutine, the worst kale, three of the greatest kids out there (JT, Graham Nugget and Ivy), a few tears, and so much more. You’ve got enough good karma to get you real far, kid.

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Betty-Ann Wassill – you have played such an important role in my life. Just being who you are has mentored me towards being a person of generosity, empathy, strength, courage, and humility. I’m sorry you’re always the first person I call, but if you weren’t so damned awesome, maybe I wouldn’t.

To quote Dar, just one more time:

*But they’re waiting just the same*

*With their flashlights and their semaphores*

*And I’ll act like I have faith and like that faith never ends*

*But I really just have friends*
Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated foremost to Michael Jacob Wassill - my honeybunch - a boy who grew to be a gentle and loving young man that I am infinitely lucky to have had in my life for 20 too short years. Michael selflessly, heroically, and without hesitation put himself between a friend and the person who sought to harm her, and passed away in May of 2013 from this courageous act of true friendship and love. Michael’s loss devastated me and very nearly derailed my completion of this dissertation.

Michael carried a fierce sense of justice and a deep compassion for those excluded from and oppressed by local and global economic systems. I once suggested he should quit smoking because buying cigarettes supported the egregious behavior of tobacco companies, to which he replied “that’s seriously the most convincing argument anyone has given me to quit”. This is just one of many examples of how harm to others spoke more loudly to Michael than any harm to himself.

A large part of what has motivated me on with this dissertation amidst the grief of losing Michael has been a sense of duty to fight twice as hard to contribute to the better, more equitable, and more just world that we both have sought in our lives, but he is no longer here to pursue. I have tried to focus on how I can keep and honour Michael in this world by keeping up the fight for the justice Michael so fiercely defended. I hope this dissertation makes some small contribution to a better world. If it does, it is owed as much to the inspiration from Michael as it is to my efforts. I love, miss, and keep you with me every day, my honeybunch.

This dissertation is also dedicated to Claire (Munch, Lovenut, Heart #2) and Kathryn (Beans, Scootchie, Heart #3). You make me want to help yield a kinder, just, and more sustainable world all the more, for you, and children like you all over the world, to grow up in. I love you up to the stars and across to the sky, all the time. You are my brightest shining stars on this journey, and the place my heart calls home.

Whatever kingdoms come, the pulse that leads my heart is yours, my loves.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AoA</td>
<td>Agreement on Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS</td>
<td>Aggregate Measure of Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATO</td>
<td>Alternative Trade Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>C.A.F.E.</td>
<td>Coffee and Farmer Equity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Framework for Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFS</td>
<td>Committee on World Food Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSM</td>
<td>Civil Society Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Western African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIAN</td>
<td>Foodfirst Information and Action Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLO</td>
<td>Fairtrade International</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTAO</td>
<td>Fair Trade Advocacy Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTN</td>
<td>Fair Trade Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSM</td>
<td>Food Sovereignty Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAFSP</td>
<td>Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATS</td>
<td>General Agreement on Trade and Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVC</td>
<td>Global Value Chains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLCWFS</td>
<td>High Level Conference on World Food Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLTF</td>
<td>High Level Task Force for World Food Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IATP</td>
<td>Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPC</td>
<td>International Planning Committee on Food Sovereignty</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPE</td>
<td>International Political Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least Developed Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIFDC</td>
<td>Low-Income Food Deficit Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVC</td>
<td>La Via Campesina</td>
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<tr>
<td>MST</td>
<td>Brazil’s Landless Workers Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTAE</td>
<td>Non-Traditional Agricultural Export</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROPPA</td>
<td>Agricultural Producers' Organisations of West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAPs</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Policies</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPS</td>
<td>Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td>Special Rapporteur</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAN</td>
<td>Transnational Activist Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNC</td>
<td>Transnational Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRIMs</td>
<td>Trade-Related Investment Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRIPs</td>
<td>Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UR</td>
<td>Uruguay Round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFTO</td>
<td>World Fair Trade Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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</table>
We are pilgrims in the land between religions
   We are following our children
   And we paint in different colors every day
   And if we're true to our hearts they will grow up and want to stay
   We will work beside them as they build modest houses and
      On a misty April morning
      We'll rest the shovels on the fence
      And die and become a summer day
Summerday, Dar Williams (2008)
Chapter 1: Introduction

This dissertation sets out to query how we analyze these different, and for some, competing strategies to challenge the existing international agricultural trade regime. It sets out to answer the following questions:

How do we explain, and understand, the two distinct strategies that promote alternative food markets and systems – food sovereignty and fair trade – in resistance to the same international agricultural trade regime?

To do this, I consider the strategies adopted by the fair trade and food sovereignty movements to challenge the international agricultural trade regime for its negative impacts on small-scale producers in developing countries. Both movements emerged to contest the international agricultural trade regime, but presently take two very different approaches to changing this regime. Fair trade, while a politically active movement at its emergence in the 1950s, has evolved to be associated primarily with alternative markets that connect producers in the South with consumers in the North, and guarantees producers higher prices for their products than producers might otherwise receive. Food sovereignty, in contrast, has become associated with a vision for radical transformation of food and agriculture markets, because of its goal to dismantle the existing international agricultural trade regime, and its adoption of confrontational political activities at the national and international level. At its inception, the fair trade movement was similarly focused on an alternative trade regime at the international political level. Fair trade’s contemporary approach is very different from its early decades. As neoliberal policies and mandates have risen and become embedded at the national and international policy levels, space to implement policies to protect and promote agricultural sectors in developing countries has become limited. This has increased the vulnerability of small-scale agricultural producers on global markets. In the wake of neoliberalism’s rise, the fair trade movement shifted to a market focus while the food sovereignty movement emerged to engage confrontational politics (Fridell, 2007; Moburg and Lyon, 2010).

Broadly, this research seeks to improve our understanding of the respective roles different social movement strategies can play in global governance and change, through an examination of two case studies: the fair trade movement and the food sovereignty movement. I am concerned with the fair trade and food sovereignty movements because they are often treated very differently in the radical left\(^1\) leaning academic literature that examines these movements, despite that both movements share a common objective to transform the rules and practices of trade in the pursuit of economic justice.

The contemporary fair trade movement is frequently criticized by scholars for inadequately confronting the root causes of the social and economic injustices of trade (Schmeizer, 2013; Lyon and Moburg, 2010; Holt-Gimenez, 2010; Fridell, 2009; Fridell, 2007; Shreck, 2005). In these critiques, fault is found with fair trade because, at best, it is insufficient in confronting

\(^1\) The use of “radical left” in this dissertation implies an analytical approach that pursues more totalizing change and disputes, or at least questions, the benefits of more reform-oriented strategies of change.
neoliberal governance of trade, and at worst it reinforces neoliberalism. The food sovereignty movement, meanwhile, is often lauded for its principles and commitment to resistance to these structures, even though the outstanding question is whether the movement’s goals can realistically be achieved (McMichael, 2014; Wittman et al., 2010; Ayres and Bosia, 2011; Holt-Gimenez, 2009; Desmarais, 2007). While these studies make important empirical and analytical contributions to our understanding of both movements, they often rely on an analytical approach that starts with how the world is ordered (defined here as a neoliberal world order that structures politics, power, and many social relations), and evaluates the activities and principles of these movements based on whether they are aligned with or in contestation of this order. Rarely do these analyses consider the practical processes through which a shift from the current order to the authors’ desired world order might take place.

My research, by contrast, provides a comparative analysis of both movements through a framework built on theories of change, through which I analyze each movement’s strategy. The analytical framework draws on a body of interdisciplinary literature to establish the relevance of state and non-state actors, as well as ideas, norms and knowledge, and their complex interactions in contributing to how complex issues are governed, and how that governance takes shape. The analytical framework accepts that there is a neoliberal hegemonic world order, but questions theories that necessitate abrupt and transformative changes to hegemony. The framework adopted here treats hegemonic change as dynamic and fluid, giving significance to smaller changes through various governance outcomes as part of the process to transformative change. It treats both inside, collaborative and outside, confrontational approaches to change as equally necessary and complementary to transformative change. It does not assume compromise is cooptation, recognizing instead that compromise is part of progressive change. It also challenges assumptions that hegemony is immutable, demonstrating that hegemony is not static, and encourages identifying discontinuities with neoliberalism, and not just continuities. By adopting a blend of theory and practice, this framework contributes to understanding the different ways various actors, activities and governance mechanisms can interact and overlap to bring about progressive change, and even radical change. This analytical framework gives a more nuanced understanding of change, both in theory and in practice, that reflects the complex processes that take place between the binary categories of the current and a new world order. By adopting this framework, my analysis helps us understand the contributions and limits of different strategies in changing the international agricultural trade regime. Its comparative application provides insights that are absent from the literature, which helps us understand that different activities play different, and I argue complementary, roles in bringing about change.

Summary of Findings

My research provides several explanations for why each movement adopts their respective strategy, relying heavily on interviews with those in the movement, as well as other primary data.

---

2 Change, it is acknowledged, is a broad term. I discuss this more in chapter 3. But to qualify it as “political” or “social” has proven to be too narrow for how I use it here, as the theory set out in Chapter 3 highlights that change is a dynamic, complex process of normative shifts, increased awareness, new knowledge and ideas, as well as binding policies and laws. As such, change here is a reflection of the dynamic processes of global governance that are part of the shift from the current world order to a new one.
Examined through the theoretical lens set out in Chapter 3, I determine that each movement takes a different, but complementary, approach to contesting and transforming the existing international agricultural trade regime into a more equitable trade system. These strategies are different in part because of different views of how change should take place, and in part by the different production and market motivations of the producers they represent.

The contemporary fair trade movement has relied on a collaborative, “inside” strategy, focused on harnessing existing social and political opportunities to integrate increased economic justice into the international agricultural trade regime. The movement has also prioritized increasing consumer and citizen awareness of unfair trade practices, as well as pursuing procurement contracts for Fairtrade products and other commitments from local government representatives. This strategy, and the markets for Fairtrade certified products that are the hallmark of the contemporary fair trade movement, are not intended to produce immediate, transformative outcomes. Nor do those in the movement view markets as sufficient for transforming the international agricultural trade regime. Rather, these activities are all viewed as part of a process, and part of a larger collection of social movement and civil society activities, contributing to more transformative change across time and space. The movement, however, has held a narrow view of opportunities - primarily focused on European politics (where they see opportunity to be most present), and bypassing opportunities at the global level to achieve some of their goals. I query whether contentious politics might be required to push forward the movement’s agenda given its acknowledgement that there are very limited opportunities at the political level to change international trade rules and practices.

I present several explanations for this strategic approach. First, those in the fair trade movement tend to believe there are currently very few opportunities to fundamentally change the rules governing trade and supply chains. As a result, the spaces that are open to push a fairer trade agenda in policy spaces – predominantly in Europe, are the focus of the movement. Second, priority is given first to markets because this is the mandate given to those in the network from producers, and limited resources preclude extensive political engagement. Nonetheless, those involved in fair trade markets make a conscious effort to leverage the successful expansion of fair trade markets - to increase awareness and citizen engagement, to help push a fairer trade policy agenda, and as part of a long-term strategy to change the norms on how trade should be conducted. Within this explanation is a larger issue of the production and market interests of Fairtrade producers, which are not uniform, but do provide insight into how the fair trade movement prioritizes its activities and strategies. Third, the strategy adopted by the fair trade movement is one that sees change as part of a dynamic and iterative process through which a web of activities can generate new platforms from which bigger change can take place. Fourth, in line with all of this, no one I spoke with in the fair trade movement believes that markets are a sufficient or best way to address the international agricultural trade regime and its injustices. Rather, they see markets as a limited opportunity to provide immediate supports to producers in developing countries, and as a tool to leverage meeting some of the strategic goals above, such as normative shifts and increased awareness of trade injustices. At the same time, the movement tends to keep a limited focus on local and European politics, and far less attention on the global governance arena, even though the latter has significant consequences for export commodity farmers.
The food sovereignty movement (FSM), by contrast, adopts an “outside” strategy of contentious politics, seeking to break down the institutions they perceive to be reinforcing the international agricultural trade regime, most prominently the World Trade Organization (WTO), but other international institutions including the G8 and G20 group of finance ministers as well. A body of literature examining how civil society and social movements impact change in practice supports the necessity of contentious politics when opportunities are absent to shape change (Gaventa and McGee, 2010; Green, 2008; Green 2012). I find that the FSM’s contentious politics has contributed to opening new opportunities to shape trade rules along food sovereignty lines, specifically within the WTO. While the movement has shown flexibility on some non-trade related issues, I argue that the movement has adopted an all-or-nothing approach to changing the international agricultural trade regime, where it refuses to engage opportunities to pursue policies that align with some of the principles of the movement, but do not generate transformational change. Indeed, the movement believes that the current international agricultural trade regime cannot be reformed, and must be dismantled.

I identify three main explanations for the food sovereignty movement’s strategy. First, the movement emerged in response to the liberalization and privatization of agricultural sectors, and the emergence of the WTO. As such, the movement’s response to the WTO has been one of contention. In this emergence, the movement decided democratically to act in resistance to the WTO, a position that has not changed in almost 25 years. This is partially explained by the early membership of the movement, and the interests of the producers that it reflected. A second, related explanation for this outside, contentious strategy is the food sovereignty movement’s perception that the current international agricultural trade regime – particularly the World Trade Organization – cannot be reformed and must be dismantled. Third, the movement does not have a clear vision for what place trade can have and what role small-scale exporters can occupy in a food sovereign system. The absence of a clear vision for an alternate system that considers small-scale exporters allows it to continue with a narrow focus on resistance.

I suggest that different strategies taken up by each of these movements is partially explained by the different producer interests that motivate each movement’s activities. The fair trade movement is focused on the impacts of the current international agricultural trade regime on smallholder agricultural commodity exporters and labourers. For those producers, improved conditions on trade and export markets have great significance to their livelihoods. Fairtrade producers do not necessarily seek radical, confrontational activities that are “resistant” to existing market systems; some do, as I will show, but many seek more immediate opportunities for increased income and power in existing markets. Fairtrade helps meet those needs. The food sovereignty movement (FSM), meanwhile, is focused on small-scale production for local markets and not on those who produce for traditional and on-traditional export markets. Food sovereignty is more associated with peasant production: subsistence and small-scale production for local markets. The concerns of producers looking to food sovereignty are different than that of those looking to fair trade.

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3 Green (2008) references an “outside strategy” here, rather than “contentious politics”, but I invoke them as similar enough to be equivalent for my work.
Understanding Each Movement’s Strategy for Change

To better understand each movement’s strategy, and how each movement contributes to change, I analyze them through an analytical framework set out in Chapter 3 that identifies how progressive and transformational change relate, and ways in which civil society and social movements can contribute to change. I argue that both movements adopt strategies that are consistent with theories on how change happens, but that each of these strategies alone represents only a partial strategy for change. Fair trade, for its part, identifies some opportunities, where present, to shape policy and society towards an international trade system that is fairer not just for those involved in fair trade markets, but for all. Yet, the movement also acknowledges that opportunities are very limited. Interviewees working in fair trade acknowledged to me that political advocacy is constrained by a lack of political will to change current rules governing trade and supply chains (Walker, 2012; Corbalán, 2013). In this context, contentious politics as a mechanism to forge opportunities where none exist would be identified as an appropriate strategy (Tarrow, 2011). Overall, the fair trade movement leans towards more amicable relations with policy makers, seeming not to want to “rock the boat”, and does not engage in the confrontational approach of contentious politics. What’s more, I find that, while the movement does seize some opportunities for change, it also misses important opportunities as well, especially at the global level. I argue that the fair trade movement has a narrow focus on what constitutes an opportunity for change, and has thus neglected some available opportunities at the international level that might benefit its wider objectives and the producers it represents.

By contrast, the FSM does not believe existing international political spaces that currently govern trade are amenable to changing the international agricultural trade regime, and responds to this perception of absent opportunity by engaging in contentious politics. The FSM contests all global agricultural free trade agendas, including the WTO and the many bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements, though my analysis of the strategy is restricted to the WTO (discussed in the methodology section below). The FSM strategy on the WTO is focused on delivering a single desired end - the dissolution of the WTO’s oversight on agricultural production and trade, with no clear component to their strategy on how trade would look without the WTO. The movement, however, has remained very closed to collaborative opportunities that have emerged in response to their contentious politics at the WTO. The literature on contentious politics identifies the strategy as necessary to forge opportunities where none exist (Kolb, 2012; Tarrow, 2011; Gaventa and McGee, 2010). I provide evidence that the FSM’s contentious politics has forged multiple opportunities to support WTO negotiations that would push future agreements towards alignment with some key food sovereignty principles – notably to allow governments increased policy space on food and livelihood security concerns.

I am reluctant to suggest that the limits of each movement I have identified should be taken as a critique of each movement’s respective strategy. It is questionable that each of these movements is responsible for tackling every facet of change; that is, to engage both “inside” and “outside” strategies. Indeed, it is probably unreasonable to expect movements to address all issues in the same manner. For one, each movement is constrained by limited resources. For another, it might be more appropriate that different actors take up different roles, some using more confrontational politics and others adopting more collaborative methods. Those who develop collaborative relationships with policy makers might find those relationships eroded if they become too
confrontational, making it preferable for others to confront policy makers, so as to forge new opportunities that more collaborative actors can then seize. Meanwhile, those who adopt confrontational strategies might lose some of their power to forge opportunities through contentious activities if they shift towards collaborative politics. By maintaining some autonomy, those who confront may be able to more forcefully hold policy makers accountable as opportunities open and others step in to seize these, and change begins to take place.

**Methods and Scope**

**Methodology**

The methodological approach adopted in this dissertation is based primarily on comparative and case study methodologies that rely on analytical frameworks to provide insights on empirical research. My research of the two selected social movements is aligned with a methodological approach that Lijphart characterized as an “interpretative” case study, where cases are selected based on interest, and are applied to an existing theoretical lens with the purpose of “throwing light on the case rather than of improving the generalization in any way” (Lijphart, 1971, p.692). My dissertation also relies on a type of comparative analysis that Collier terms a “contrast of contexts”. Collier describes this analysis as “an examination of two or more cases in order to highlight how different they are, thus establishing a framework for interpreting how parallel processes of change are played out in different ways within each context” (Collier, 1993, p. 108).

Drawing on several global governance and international political economy thinkers, I develop an analytical framework, which I use to analyze and explain the strategies of my selected case studies. This analytical framework is applied to enhance the comparative analysis of two selected social movements, filtering the explanations of each movement’s strategies and how we can understand them. The case studies compared here are not used to test or develop the theoretical framework, but rather draw on that framework for explanatory purposes. As Lijphart notes, this interpretive methodology contrasts with other approaches that use case studies to build or support theory, but maintains this approach is a form of “applied science” (Lijphart, 1971).

I employ two primary research methods to collect the data I interpret through this analytical lens: qualitative content analysis (QCA) and semi-structured interviews. QCA can be referred to as “a research method for subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns…it is ‘a method for systematically describing the meaning of qualitative material’” (Cho and Lee, 2014, p. 3 quoting Schreier, 2012, p. 1).

Semi-structured interviews are a type of formal interview where questions are set out at the start of the interview, but are often open-ended and reflexive to allow the interviewer to target her research to answers provided by the interviewee. Semi-structured interviews are particularly helpful for answering explanatory “why” questions that are not tied to quantitative measures and indicators (Fylan, 2005). The interviews were used in conjunction with primary literature to explain the motivations of each movement in pursuing the strategies they do. They do not represent the majority of the research, but are instrumental to the final analysis.
The use of interpretative and comparative case studies provides a strong analytical basis for addressing the research objective to compare and explain the different strategies of the fair trade and food sovereignty movements. I selected these two movements because of an interest in both movements based on their shared objective to address the various social and economic impacts of the international agricultural trade regime and because of how the existing literature evaluates their strategies for doing so. Regarding the latter, I was concerned that much of the radical left academic literature evaluating these two movements was analyzed through frameworks that sought to determine if each movement’s efforts and/or goals are conducive to transformational change, but did not reflect the practicalities of actually achieving change.

My concern with connecting theory and practice aligns with others who are concerned with the persistent disjuncture between theory and practice, in the academic field of global governance and beyond (Hurrell, 2011); as argued in a report by the Overseas Development Institute, “often it seems that researchers, practitioners and policymakers live in parallel universes” (ODI, 2004). As I discuss in Chapters 2 and 3, conclusions drawn on whether or not the activities and principles of each movement reflect the current hegemonic world order (usually neoliberalism) result from the absence of an understanding of the processes that shape change in practice. In contrast to these generalized conclusions, I examine the objectives and the strategies of each movement and compare them systematically through the analytical framework, rather than based on principled objectives.

My hypothesis entering this study was that the different strategies of these movements offered different but important contributions to changing the international agricultural trade regime, and that the strategies of the two movements are more complementary than competing because both are important to bringing about their shared desire to transform the international agricultural trade regime. I further hypothesized that the different strategies of each movement were explained by different ideas of how to achieve change, and the interests of different producers, which were responsible for how they strategize achieving change.

I relied on the empirical data gathered through my primary and secondary literature reviews and interviews to explain the two different strategies. This data provided the rationale underpinning each movement’s strategy, and the activities they adopt to implement their strategies. Analyzing this data and the strategies and activities of these movements through my analytical lens was shaped by some of the literature on policy and social change in practice provided a strong measure against which to test this hypothesis. As noted, it is not my objective to verify or adjust the theoretical lens through which I conduct my examination. Rather, it is to expand our understanding of these two movements, and to provide a more systematic analysis of how they each contribute to global governance in different, sometimes complementary ways. It is hoped that this will catalyze an increased interest in a more nuanced approach to understanding the role of social movement and civil society activities in global governance.

**Research Methods Overview**

**The Research Problem**

My master’s research, my doctoral coursework and an internship with Oxfam America all motivated my interest in this topic. My research during my master’s introduced me to the food
sovereignty and fair trade movements, and their divergent approaches to challenging the international agricultural trade regime. My doctoral coursework built on this introduction, with a focus on the role of agricultural exports in addressing poverty. My 8-month internship with Oxfam America, where I worked with the Economic Justice Policy Manager (then focused on agriculture and trade) in policy advocacy on trade preference reforms developed my deep interest in the practicalities of policy change. At Oxfam I engaged with US government representatives and agencies in pursuit of progressive policy reform. This exposed me to the deeper complexities of policy making than was apparent in the literature, and it was this experience that inspired me to focus on the practicalities of policy change and how social movements engaged effectively in these processes.

Application of Research Methods

The qualitative methodology I have applied required several research methods and activities to collect the necessary data and develop the necessary concepts to answer the dissertation’s central question, with each activity complementing the other. The initial stage of my research was a review of the primary and secondary literature of each movement (although this has been an ongoing endeavour throughout my work on the dissertation) and drawing on the academic and activist literature to construct an analytical framework. During this stage, I collected data on each movement’s trade-related strategies and activities, and on how these strategies were analyzed in the existing academic literature. This literature review was necessary to gain insights into each movement’s position on trade, why each movement feels the international agricultural trade regime is unjust, and the activities they have taken up to challenge this regime. This laid the foundation for explaining the movement’s strategy for challenging the international agricultural trade regime, in addition to providing a general review of the literature. This literature review supplied data to help explain and understand each movement’s strategy, and served to identify what remained unexplained, which I used to help shape my interview questions.

I relied heavily on primary literature through organizational reports and website communications. For fair trade I consulted reports and website content from key fair trade organizations connected to fair trade markets, notably Fairtrade International, Fairtrade Foundation (now Fairtrade UK), and the Fair Trade Advocacy Office, as well as Divine Chocolate and Kuapa Kokoo.4 I also reviewed the secondary literature on fair trade, primarily peer reviewed academic journal articles and books, both to determine the different interpretations of fair trade’s strategies and activities, and to collect additional data on the strategies taken by those involved in the movement, including producers. However, this research did not consult directly with producers.

For the food sovereignty movement, I consulted primarily the websites for La Via Campesina and the International Planning Committee on Food Sovereignty (IPC), the two major umbrella organizations that make up the movement, as well as some literature by organizations and individuals who are members of the food sovereignty movement. As with fair trade, I also consulted the academic literature on food sovereignty to supplement the primary research,

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4 These are all identified later in the dissertation.
seeking out supplementary background information as well as the range of ways the movement’s activities and strategies are analyzed.

I relied on a secondary literature as well to review academic analysis of each movement. This had already partially taken place prior to my PhD, when I began to consider that the movements’ strategies were being evaluated based on principled objectives related to whether activities reflected or resisted the hegemonic world order, rather than on how change happens in practice. I undertook a systematic review of the literature to better situate my own research in the existing body of literature.

Upon completion of the initial literature review (I continued to review literature that appeared relevant on an ongoing basis), I turned to the interview phase, drafting questions to fill in gaps on explaining each movement’s strategy. I sought to interview those who were currently or formerly involved in each movement to gain first-hand accounts of the reasons and motivations for each movement’s strategy, as a means to explain what motivated each movement’s strategy. With food sovereignty, for example, I used interviews to clarify the movement’s position on trade, as this seemed to be ambiguous and poorly understood in the literature. I also sought to better identify what motivated the decision to dismantle rather than reform the WTO, and the movement’s response to what I perceived to be opportunities within the WTO to align international trade rules with some of the principles of food sovereignty. With fair trade, for example, I sought to acquire first-hand accounts from those involved in Fairtrade markets on what role these markets occupied, in their view, in challenging the international agricultural trade regime, and why fair trade was no longer as active in policy advocacy. In this latter case, a wide body of literature has supposed that the shift to markets has been premised on the belief that market-led governance is superior to government regulation, but I had yet to see first-hand accounts that this was the case. I wanted to survey those involved in markets to get a first-hand account. I also queried several interviewees on whether they felt political engagement was necessary, and why they did or did not pursue political activities (depending on the interviewee). I also attended several conferences and events (detailed below) as an observer to collect data and to make contacts for additional interviews.

I conducted 10 semi-structured interviews with key members of the fair trade and food sovereignty movement between 2012 and 2013. Most interviews were conducted over Skype, and all interviews were recorded with permission from interviewees. Interviews were then transcribed in full or in part (depending on relevance of answers), and relevant data from the interviews were applied to the organizational system in Scrivener. Interviews lasted approximately one hour. These semi-structured interviews allowed me to target questions to the activities and strategies of those involved in the social movements studied, and to redirect questions towards understanding why those strategies and activities were adopted and prioritized. It also allowed me to explore some answers in-depth, and to redirect questions that proved less applicable to the interviewee, sometimes a situation only identified during the interview. In alignment with my ethics conditions, after drafting the dissertation, I contacted all interviewees, providing them with excerpts of the citations as I have used them in the dissertation. Interviewees confirmed the use to assure its accuracy, and I received permission from all interviewees to publish the content and their names. I deliberately omitted applying “[sic]”
references in interview quotes as many of my interviewees spoke limited English, and I do not believe it is appropriate to pinpoint those errors.

I conducted three interviews with key members of the food sovereignty movement, each of whom have been a part of the leadership of La Via Campesina. It proved challenging to secure interviews with members of the movement, as some members were reluctant to be interviewed. Some members spoke with me informally, but declined to be formally interviewed. I have not used the content of those informal conversations in this dissertation. I experienced greater openness to being interviewed by those in the fair trade movement. In all I interviewed seven members (current and former) of the fair trade movement, including those involved with policy advocacy for organizations in the movement, an executive with the producer-led and owned Fairtrade chocolate company Divine Chocolate, those who had engaged in Oxfam’s Make Trade Fair campaign, and a former Board Chair for Fairtrade International. These interviews served to help verify and interpret my primary and secondary research sources.

I also participated as an observer at some relevant conferences and activities to better understand the position and approaches of the movements being evaluated, and the processes of policy and global governance. In 2009 I attended as an observer at the People’s Food Sovereignty Forum, which took place in Rome, Italy. The forum was a parallel meeting that considered together 450 organizations that represented peasants, agricultural workers and international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) focused on food issues, to debate the governance of global food and agriculture. The forum ran parallel to the United Nations’ World Summit on Food Security, also taking place in Rome at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and participants of the People’s Food Sovereignty Forum presented a statement at the end of the summit based on the participation at the forum (Burnett, Rompré, and Swanson, 2009). In 2010 I attended the Fair Trade Futures Conference as an observer. The conference took place in Boston, and was a gathering of members of the fair trade movement to collectively brainstorm the future of fair trade. In October 2012, I participated as an observer at the Civil Society Mechanism (CSM) meetings in Rome, where civil society organizations from around the world focused on the governance of global food and agriculture gather in preparation for their role as a participatory member in the meetings and negotiations of the Committee on World Food Security. Members of the food sovereignty movement were particularly active in this event, even taking a leadership role. I also participated as an observer the same year in the meetings and negotiations of the 39th Session of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), which followed the CSM.

Alongside my data collection I consulted academic and other literature to develop the conceptual and analytical framework from which I would analyze the data I was collecting. I integrated theories I had already been familiar with and supplemented them with some additional research to develop the analytical framework that was rigorous and thoughtful on the processes and practices of change. I also consulted literature that looked at social movement and civil society strategies in practice to classify each movement’s strategy. This was essential to understanding each movement’s strategy, allowing me to filter what place various activities, perspectives, perceptions and general views have in both the theory and practice of change, and whether these strategies are at odds, or in fact complementary. For my analytical framework, I relied on the global governance literature to set my broad framework on how the world is organized, and to
identify the relevant actors and activities that shape global governance and policy. I also relied on literature from various disciplines to include the role of social movements and civil society actors in shaping policy and governance, and to understand how different strategies can shape and change policy and governance.

I organized much of the data collected through Scrivener, a computer application that helps to organize research and to integrate it into the writing process. Using this program, I developed a system analogous to coding, whereby I created an outline template that categorized the questions underpinning my research and some of the initial findings. I input the relevant data from interviews and literature review into the appropriate categories, and then consulted these categories when writing my first draft. For example, in the literature review I categorized and sub-categorized how different academics analyzed each movement, how this analysis related to ideological umbrellas (loosely termed – “neoliberal”, “capitalist”, “socially embedded”, “counter-hegemonic”). With each movement, I would categorize definitions and concepts, history, evolution (to detect flexibility and strategy change), their ideas of how the world is ordered/political change happens, engagement with trade and global governance issues, and their engagement with policy spaces.

**Dissertation Structure**

This dissertation evolved from initially being a single manuscript format to being a multiple manuscript format, with the introduction of the latter option to the Global Governance PhD Program. Because of this, analysis took place in intervals, appearing first in two academic, peer reviewed journal articles reflecting my research, both of which were published in the early part of writing my dissertation prior to my intention to make them part of the current dissertation format.

The responses of the fair trade and food sovereignty movements to political opportunities was analyzed first, on a preliminary scale, for an article published in the journal *Geopolitics*, titled “Trouble in the Fields”. The chapter identifies some of the activities of both movements through primary and secondary literature review, but excludes interviews (which took place after the article was submitted for review). This article also does not adopt the theoretical lens as an analytical framework; the framework was not yet fully developed at the time the article was written. The application of the analytical framework appears primarily in Chapter 7, and to a small degree in Chapters 5 and 6. The article is also not focused exclusively on trade, analyzing each movement’s response to opportunities in global governance following the global food crisis.

Similarly, Chapter 5, a piece equally co-authored with Sophia Murphy titled “What Place for International Trade in Food Sovereignty ”, was published in *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, also prior to the final analysis and independent of the theoretical framework. This is the second manuscript in my multiple manuscript dissertation format. While some of the interviews with members of the food sovereignty movement had taken place at that time, only one was referenced, with permission from the interviewee. There are brief elements of my theoretical framework included in this article, but it is not used to systematically analyze the food sovereignty movement. Overall, this article incorporated some of the key points for my research,
but required supplementary research and information, which I integrated in the later chapters of the dissertation. Chapter 5 is the second manuscript for the multiple manuscript format.

I have written a third article, included here as Chapter 6, on fair trade. This was written after the decision to pursue the multiple manuscripts format had been made, and after the completion of my interviews and research. However, it similarly draws only briefly on the theoretical framework. This article is not yet published, but I intend to submit it for publication as a stand-alone article. Because of this intention, space would not accommodate both the objective of the article – to identify the fair trade movement as more politically engaged than is often accredited in the literature – and the presentation and systematic application of the theoretical framework. As such, I left analyses through the theoretical framework for Chapter 7. This is the third manuscript for the multiple manuscript format.

Because of the limited space allotted to journal articles, and the time at which the first two articles were written, I use Chapter 7 to interpret the data that appears in Chapters 4-6 through the analytical framework that is set out in Chapter 3. By doing this, I identified how each movement reflected what we know about change, I labelled each movement’s strategy based on its activities as well as explicit views on how change was expected to take place. Following this, I used the analysis of each movement to draw conclusions on how the movements are complementary to one another. This is not a manuscript intended for publication, but is a substantive additional chapter to the dissertation that is instrumental in both explaining and understanding the different strategies of each movement.

It should be noted that because this is a multiple manuscripts approach, there is some repetition. Because the journal articles are stand-alone publications, they require some context that is drawn from other parts of the broader dissertation. This is intentional duplication and not an oversight in the writing. I have attempted to limit this as much as possible, but felt in certain circumstances that context was important earlier in the dissertation, but also to the stand-alone articles for publication.

Scope

What Do I Mean by ‘Fair Trade’ and ‘Food Sovereignty’ Movements?

Tarrow defines social movements as “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities” (2011, p. 9; italics in original). Social movements often emerge in response to injustices at the national, and, with the acceleration and expansion of globalization, the global level. There is no singular model of social movements; their formality and organizational structures can vary from hierarchical and highly centralized networks of organizations with strong leadership to the free-flowing, decentralized and minimally managed (Tarrow, 2011, pp. 119-139).

Both the food sovereignty and fair trade movements are social movements made up of different organizations that carry different characteristics and views from each other that collectively challenge the unfair outcomes of trade for producers globally, and particularly in the Global
South. As with social movements generally (Tarrow, 2011), both are heterogeneous, though the food sovereignty movement is not as disparate as, and is more centralized than, the fair trade movement (at this point). Fair trade has branched off into several organizations around the world which have different, and sometimes competing, visions for how to challenge the international agricultural trade regime. Food sovereignty, meanwhile, is primarily made up of two major umbrella groups: *La Via Campesina* (LVC) and the *International Planning Committee on Food Sovereignty* (IPC).

I overview the fair trade and food sovereignty movements in Chapters 2, 4, 5, and 6 (with some repetition as Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are stand-alone journal articles). While their membership overlaps, not all organizations are members of both the IPC and LVC. Where possible, I identify the specific organization of the movement that is subject to the point being made, rather than generalizing the movement broadly, but in its general use, my reference to the FSM embodies these two organizations. This may in fact lend to some unintended generalizations that do not reflect some of the differences between these organizations, and possibly others who identify with the movement but are not members of these organizations. As such, a caveat is given here that there are diverse perspectives within the movement, and the views that are ascribed to the movement are not intended to necessarily apply to all that fall under its umbrella.

The same caution should also be applied to fair trade. Fridell sub-categorized the contemporary fair trade markets as the “fair trade network” (FTN), part of, but distinct from the fair trade “movement” more broadly:

The ‘fair trade network’ is used to refer to a formal network of NGOs that connects peasants, workers and craftspeople in the South with partners in the North through a system of fair trade rules and principles – what authors typically refer to when they speak of fair trade commodities or handicrafts. In contrast, the ‘fair trade movement’ refers to a broader movement, which has had significant influence in international development circles since the end of the Second World War. This movement has no official existence, but rather is a term used to encapsulate a variety of initiatives headed by southern governments, international organizations, and NGOs with the purpose of radically altering the international trade and development regime in the interest of poor nations in the South (Fridell, 2007, p. 23).

Because fair trade markets are the most prominent manifestation of fair trade today, and are often seen as synonymous with fair trade, Fridell’s distinction between the *movement* and the *network* has merit. However, there are problems with Fridell’s compartmentalization of the FTN, which I discuss in chapter 5. While Fridell situates the network as part of the movement, he also distinguishes it from the movement, essentially categorizing the movement as political and the network as neoliberal and market-driven, which I expressly refute later in the dissertation. In this dissertation, I use both the terms fair trade movement and fair trade network. I invoke the use of FTN when using a narrower focus on those who are involved in markets, which represents the most publicly prominent members of the fair trade movement today. I focus predominantly on the work of those who fall under the Fairtrade International umbrella. Fair trade markets more broadly embody other certification organizations - notably the World Fair Trade Organization.
(WFTO), which has a stricter set of standards for certification than Fairtrade International (FLO) – and Fairtrade USA, which has a looser set of standards. Most of the academic literature generalizing fair trade, however, appears to reference FLO’s activities and policies, rather than the totality of organizations or other fair trade organizations such as the WFTO, and since its withdrawal from FLO, Fairtrade USA. Additionally, most of my empirical evidence links to organizations that fall under the FLO umbrella (though not exclusively – for example, Fair Trade Advocacy Office is a joint effort of FLO and WFTO). To be clear, I do not include the companies certified by Fairtrade as part of the movement, nor the network. Companies, except for Divine Chocolate (which is majority producer owned, as I discuss below) are a locus for change that those in the movement and network are focused on, and organizations like FLO and FTAO operate independently of corporate actors.

Because of this common usage of “fair trade”, the “Fair Trade Network” label allows me to be more precise when I am referencing fair trade actors that are tied to Fairtrade markets. However, I do not dichotomize the network from the movement, nor qualify the term ‘network’ as apolitical and distinct from movement. Rather, I consider the network as an integral part of the broader fair trade movement. There are many times in the dissertation where I also use the term movement, which, as already noted, can never be generalized to represent all members, but is tied to activities or positions of fair trade movement members that likely includes the network, but is not limited to it.

The term ‘Fairtrade’ as one word, meanwhile, is used to denote fair trade products and activities that fall under FLO’s umbrella. This is a categorization adopted by FLO to distinguish its own fair trade brand. I use this only when I feel confident that it is an accurate classification. In instances where it is unclear, I default to the broader “fair trade” classification. In instances where it is not exclusively Fairtrade, notably the work of the FTAO [Fair Trade Advocacy Organization], because of its inclusion of WFTO, I also default to the broader “fair trade” denomination.

Lastly, in 2011 FairTrade USA withdrew from Fairtrade International. This is a complex issue that took place part way through my research. My analysis of fair trade here explicitly excludes discussion of the now independent FairTrade USA, which may in fact be more aligned with neoliberal values, co-opted and lacking solidarity. While FairTrade USA is technically categorized as part of the fair trade network, it has become a contentious and divisive one. Including Fair Trade USA in my analysis would have require targeted research that falls outside the scope of this research. My dissertation is in large part a response to the academic literature that emphasizes FLO, and Fairtrade USA no longer fits under this umbrella, and indeed, has intentionally withdrawn itself from the category because of its unwillingness to adhere to its standards.

Classification of Small-Scale Producers

A number of terms are invoked to describe agricultural producers in developing countries: peasants, small-scale producers, smallholder farmers, subsistence farmers, etc. It is challenging

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5For example, the World Fair Trade Organization requires 100% commitment to fair trade in order to be certified. This means companies like Nestlé and Cadbury cannot be certified.
to pinpoint a single definition for these overlapping classifications of producers. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) statistics glossary, small-scale producers are “producers operating at a small scale, used to distinguish from industrialized producers.” Smallholder farmers, defined by the FAO as those who manage up to 10 hectares of land, manage 80% of the land in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (FAO, 2012). But as the OECD glossary goes on to make clear, “the line separating small- and large-scale producers is arbitrary. What is considered small-scale in one country or region may be considered large-scale in another”. Murphy (2010) similarly points to the complexity of pinpointing a definition to small-scale and smallholder producers. The term ‘smallholder farmer’ speaks more directly to land holding size (and implies ownership), while small-scale production is tied more to production volume; though, again, this can vary immensely. I use the term small-scale producers in this dissertation because it most closely aligns with the producers represented by the Fair Trade and Food Sovereignty movements (though fair trade also includes labourers on plantations). I believe it would be problematic to attribute a specific land or production volume size to this classification; to do so would exclude producers that likely should be considered. However, the term here is used to reflect those agricultural producers that are not engaged in industrialized, large-scale commercial production, instead managing relatively small plots of land, generally (but with some exceptions) no more than 10 ha, and that may employ modern, industrial technologies, but minimally.

*Focus on the WTO*

While the international agricultural trade regime is made up of numerous multilateral trade agreements, including the World Trade Organization (WTO), bilateral free trade agreements, regional trade areas, and other agreements with varying degrees of economic integration, I focus here on the World Trade Organization. It would be impossible to provide a more in-depth examination of social movement engagement with all the various free trade areas. The WTO, by contrast, has been a central area of focus that has mobilized the FSM in particular because of its shared impact across farmers around the world. The WTO also replaced antecedent efforts to create a system of international trade governance that the fair trade movement had been involved in up until the 1970s. There is ample information available on the FSM’s engagement with the WTO over the years, with the origins of the movement tied to the emergence of the WTO. This is in no way to dismiss the significance of other free trade areas, or to assume that the findings here apply equally to other free trade areas. That is for future research to determine.

*Terminology*

Developing Countries

In general, I adopt the conventional terminology of “developing” and “developed” countries. The only real standardized classification of developing countries is the OECD-DAC list that classifies low- and middle-income countries as “developing”. The low- and middle-income designation is tied to World Bank gross national income data. I do not cross reference the use of “developing”

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against the OECD-DAC data, but this tends to be a more generous classification, including industrializing countries such as Brazil and China as “developing”. This categorization classifies least developed countries as developing countries, the former a category set out by the United Nations. There are instances where I cite data from other authors that use different categorizations, such as “rich” or “industrialized” countries rather than “developed” countries. In such instances, I maintain the original categorization, under the assumption that this maintains greater integrity towards the data collection methods. It would be beyond the scope of this project to cross reference data collection methods from secondary literature to my classifications.

“Change”

Change is, admittedly, a vague term. I use “change” here to mean the range of governance outcomes from the fair trade and food sovereignty movement strategies and activities that contribute towards a new and much more economically and socially just international agricultural trade regime. This involves changes that contribute to a shift away from the neoliberal principles and unequal power relations that have shaped and continue to uphold the current regime, which are presented in Chapter 2. This is the goal of both movements. This means a movement away from neoliberal priorities of agricultural liberalization, privatization, and government withdrawal from market oversight, and towards agricultural trade rules that are targeted, democratically decided, and considerate of any negative implications and benefits for trading populations, particularly vulnerable populations. The shorthand for this is often trade rules that allow for “policy space”: a way of designating that international trade rules are not premised on goals of wholesale “liberalization”, but allow countries, particularly developing countries, the sovereignty to prioritize other goals even if it means disrupting trade. This can include goals such as food security, agricultural and rural development, smallholder livelihoods, etc. This also extends beyond pursuit of aggregate country-level benefits of trade to benefits that have positive distributional impacts. These are the general features sought by both the food sovereignty and fair trade movements; that is, fairer trade, though they may differ on how, and by which precise rules, this might be achieved. The establishment of a new international agricultural trade regime that prioritizes fairer trade rules is a normative goal that I refer to here as “transformational” change: it is a goal to achieve fairer trade that is characterized by social, political and economic equalities, in contrast to the current inequalities.

However, I do not adopt the view that successful outcomes of these strategies and activities, potential or realized, are measured by whether they are themselves transformational. Indeed, I eschew such analytical approaches in favour of fluid and dynamic approaches to achieving transformational change, which I detail in Chapter 3. I reject approaches to analyzing strategies, activities, and their potential outcomes based on whether they are radical disassociations from the current regime, neoliberalism, and the underscoring hegemonic order. Rather, “change” is used here to depict the potential and realized outcomes of the strategies and activities of each movement that can contribute to transformational change, but are not necessarily transformational change in of themselves. That is, those outcomes that may not be an end, but are a start.

I detail what these outcomes might be, based on the Global Governance literature, presented in Chapter 3. This can include easily discernable outcomes, such as policy and regulatory changes
that address unfair trade rules (as akin to the rigged rules and double standards of the international trade regime presented in Chapter 3), or that seek to remedy unequal power and benefits currently embedded within international supply chains. But change can also include other, non-policy outcomes that challenge key features of the international agricultural trade regime, such as establishing norms and ideas that are at odds with those that underpin the international agricultural trade regime and neoliberalism.

Governance is shaped by a range of complex factors that cannot be pinpointed to a single outcome. This is later characterized as a “crazy quilt”, one that defies a clear roadmap or blueprint to achieving a specific end, including transformational change. For example, a policy outcome may not fundamentally address the rules of trade, or power relations, but still be a part of normative and ideational change, which is part of a long, winding path to implementing regulations and policies that directly target unfair trade. This is argued to be the case with fair trade procurement policies in Chapter 7, whereby procurement policies are not a trade policy, but are arguably part of establishing government commitments to fairer trade, commitments that implicitly acknowledge that the international agricultural trade regime is not, in fact, fair. I argue that such outcomes can be leveraged for future changes, all part of the process of transformational change. In sum, the potential and realized normative, ideational, regulatory, policy and knowledge outcomes, potential and realized, that can be conceived from the strategies and activities of each movement, are considered here to be “change”. These outcomes may not, in of themselves, result in a new international agricultural trade regime, but they have valid potential to contribute to such a transformation.

“Neoliberalism”

Neoliberalism as a concept is generally a doctrine of minimal state involvement in market and social sectors. This neoliberal doctrine that became widespread in the 1980s has served to promote (at least discursively) free markets and smaller roles for government in national economies and international rules governing trade (Scholte, 2005, pp. 38-39). This includes the promotion of the free movement of goods and financial flows (although less clearly labour), letting “markets” rule, privatization of state run industries, and deregulation of markets and market actors. Because neoliberalism has become a dominant social organizing principle, it may not be intentional in practice. Market-led governance such as private certification, for example, may not be intended to promote and reinforce less state governance, even if it might serve that end. Under neoliberalism, the state still has some role, but it is relegated to promoting individual liberties and freedoms, for example through property rights and promoting innovation (Bacon 2010).

However, neoliberalism in practice is different than it is in concept. In the section on “rigged rules and double standards” found in Chapter 2, neoliberalism is demonstrated to be, effectively, a selective application of neoliberal principles that privilege the interests of powerful actors. Indeed, neoliberalism is, in practice, involves “many powerful state and corporate actors [that] have qualified or refused a ‘free market’ approach when its adoption would disadvantage them” (Scholte, 2005, p.39). When analyzing how each movement’s strategy contests neoliberalism, I am speaking to the principles of neoliberalism as a concept, detailed in the preceding paragraph. However, when discussing neoliberalism in practice, there are contradictions with the principles
of neoliberalism as a concept, a reflection of the interests of powerful political and market actors within the international agricultural trade regime.

Breakdown of Chapters

This dissertation is divided into 8 chapters, including the introduction and conclusion. In Chapter 2, I provide a detailed overview of the literature on both the international agricultural trade regime and the nexus between agricultural trade, development and small-scale agricultural production. This establishes the significance of agricultural trade to developing country economies, to their potential economic development and to the livelihoods of small-scale producers. This overview considers both the ways in which agricultural trade can benefit developing countries and the livelihoods of small-scale producers, and the ways in which it can harm them. It also outlines how the international agricultural trade regime is structured to disproportionately disadvantage small-scale producers in developing countries, through both the current rules of the World Trade Organization and power within global supply and value chains. The chapter then goes on to provide a review of how the literature perceives the contributions of both movements in changing the international agricultural trade regimes.

In Chapter 3, I present a theoretical framework through which I later analyze the strategies of both movements. I adopt and integrate various theoretical approaches that embrace complexity over binaries, involve nuanced theories of change, and rely more on evidence of change in practice rather than solely on change in theory. My theoretical framework contends that governance must be thought of as dynamic processes, rather than as a static approach to world order whereby change can only occur if it is absolute and transformative. In my approach, hegemony is ever-changing, neoliberalism is not as immutable as we are often led to believe, and singular activities can be thought of as part of this dynamic process rather than in isolation. This analytical framework gives permission for, and validity to, both “inside” and “outside” strategies to shaping governance. I argue neither alone is sufficient for bringing about change.

Chapter 4 is the first journal article of the multiple manuscripts’ three journal articles. This article provides an important indication of how both movements respond to governance opportunities and insights into their respective strategies, which helps explain their responses to the international agricultural trade regime. The article, titled “Trouble in the Fields”, identifies how each of these movements responded to governance opportunities at the international level after the food crisis, providing an initial empirical inquiry into how each movement responds to political opportunities to shape governance. The article focuses on the period after the 2007-2008 food crisis a time that was uniquely open to new thinking on agricultural policy, including trade policy, with opportunities to shift away from neoliberal policies, and identifies various opportunities at the global level emergent in response to the global food crisis. From there, I overview the movements and how they have responded to these opportunities after the food crisis. From this analysis I argue that the fair trade movement at the time did not demonstrate efforts to engage these opportunities, even though these opportunities addressed some of the agricultural issues the movement expressed concerns about at the time, such as prioritizing smallholders in agricultural aid, increased support for agriculture, and trade policy. The fair trade movement instead seemed to prioritize the achievements of the Fairtrade markets in supporting producers through the crisis. By contrast, the FSM did respond to these emergent opportunities to
shape governance, which has helped it establish itself as a leader in the governance of food and agriculture after the food crisis. It bears noting that this paper is not focused exclusively on trade; while the FSM demonstrated a willingness to engage more collaboratively with the CFS, trade is not a part of the CFS mandate. Furthermore, as I show in later chapters, the movement lacks the same openness to collaboration within the international trade governance fora.

Chapter 5 is an article published in *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, and was co-authored, with equal authorship, by Sophia Murphy. The article takes an in-depth examination of the position of the food sovereignty movement on trade in food and agriculture. It identifies the ambiguities of the FSM’s position, identifies how it responds to governance of agricultural trade, and evaluates the movement’s approach to trade. The article provides a deeper empirical investigation of the FSM’s position on trade and its strategies and activities around trade. The article finds that while trade has been a central focus of the movement since its inception, the movement’s position on trade is ambiguous, in part because there is not yet a clear and direct statement of the movement’s position on trade, and in part because many proponents who are not necessarily members of the movement are more opposed to trade. In the article we conclude: “It would be [most] accurate to say that the movement’s concern is with structures of agricultural production and trade, that is, structures governed by policies promoting liberalization and privatization and entrenching transnational corporate power, which the FSM, with reason, sees as harmful to hundreds of millions of small-scale producers. This analysis motivates the FSM’s demand that governments have greater autonomy in their domestic policy-making” (Burnett and Murphy, 2014, p. 1069).

Chapter 6 is a proposed journal article that takes a deeper look at the fair trade movement, its activities, its objectives, and its strategy. The article outlines the fair trade movement’s position on trade, and the strategy of the contemporary fair trade movement, primarily through mechanisms under the Fairtrade market. The article argues that the contemporary fair trade movement is frequently and unfairly characterized in the academic literature as neoliberal, co-opted, and lacking solidarity. These characterizations are based on empirical and analytical assumptions that the movement sees markets as the means to address economic injustice, that the fair trade market is a private form of governance that prioritizes individualism and voluntary governance, and that the movement does not engage in political activities. By contrast, I outline several political activities taken up by the movement, provide evidence that those in the fair trade network do not see the market as sufficient for addressing unequal trade regimes, and argue that that the movement’s strategy and activities provide important contributions to challenging the current international agricultural trade regime, and neoliberalism more broadly.

In Chapter 7, I examine both movements comprehensively through the analytical framework laid out in Chapter 3. In this chapter I bring together the empirical content from chapters 4-7, alongside supplemental primary and secondary research not found in earlier chapters, and analyze this data to explain and understands each movement’s strategy. Starting with food sovereignty, I provide three main but interconnected explanations for the movement’s strategy on challenging the international agricultural trade regime. First, the movement’s origins are tied to resistance to the WTO, and democratic decisions that reject it can be reformed. Second, the movement’s origins are as a peasant movement, which has led to a prioritization of local markets over trade. In doing so, the movement has not developed a clear place for trade in food
sovereignty. Third, in tandem with this, the movement has developed a collective identity tied to peasantry, subsistent farming and production for local markets that has, although I suggest in no way intentionally, suppressed conflicting identities. This has denied the reality of different market and production interests among small-scale commodity exporters, which in turn contributes to the movement’s position on trade governance and its views on export production. Following this, I analyze the food sovereignty movement through the analytical framework set out in Chapter 3 to identify the contributions of movement’s contentious strategy to change, and its limits, finding cause for both.

I then move to explain and understand the fair trade movement’s strategy for change. I put forward two prominent explanations for the fair trade movement’s strategy. First is the movement’s decision to limit its political activities to the opportunities it perceives to be available, but also targets its activities to areas that can contribute to opportunities in the long term. Unlike with the food sovereignty movement, contentious politics is not the approach taken to generate opportunities. Instead, the fair trade movement seeks to increase awareness around the unfair practices of the international agricultural trade regime, and to change the norms underpinning the goals of trade. Second, those working within the network have to manage with limited financial and human resources. Under a mandate to producers, this means that the first priority for those in the network is to expand markets. This is not, contrary to common supposition, because those in the network view markets and market-led governance as a means to overcome the injustices within the international agricultural trade regime. It is simply seen as a mechanism for providing relief for some of the world’s poor by improving their immediate situation. Those in the network expressed intentions to leverage the successes related to expanding fair trade markets as a means to contribute to fairer trade for all, and the transformation of the international agricultural trade regime in the long-term. Next, as with the food sovereignty movement, I analyze the fair trade strategy by drawing on the analytical framework from Chapter 3. In the final section of the chapter, I discuss how the strategies of both movements are complementary from the perspective of the framework set out in Chapter 3. That is to say, both movements adopt a strategy that is necessary, but not sufficient, for generating change. The food sovereignty movement adopts a strategy – of contentious politics – that is necessary to create opportunities where none are present. But it refuses to engage in those opportunities, perceiving that there is no room for reform of trade governance, and that radical transformation is necessary. Fair trade, meanwhile, is willing to be collaborative and flexible, but less engaged in contentious politics. According to the literature on change put forward in Chapter 3, both of these activities are necessary for achieving change, making them complementary.

In Chapter 8 I review the main take-away points from the dissertation, what direction future research could take to complement that which is presented here, and how future work might strengthen the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3.

**Conclusion**

This dissertation is about identifying how fair trade and food sovereignty pursue common goals, and finds that they have less that divides them than is often thought. It uncovers how these two movements both contribute in different, but complementary, ways to some of the same goals. There has been, in my mind, a growing tension among those on the political left where good is
challenged for being an enemy of better, and for being insufficient as a stand-alone effort rather than important to collective efforts. This appears to be breeding an increased divisiveness in addressing very challenging problems. I believe that we will be far more successful in addressing problems if we are less divisive, and instead work in closer alignment from our shared goals.

I have sought here to provide a better understanding of how we challenge monumental problems in a practical way, and in doing so have discovered that indeed, those on the left that seem at odds do in fact have more in common than what divides them. In the case of the fair trade and food sovereignty movements, the common goal to challenge the negative impacts of the international agricultural trade regime has in fact yielded complementary strategies for change. These strategies, on the surface, seem diametrically opposed. However, when we look more closely through a lens that understands how change happens, we find that they are in fact much more aligned than most might believe. Together, these strategies may have the potential to make strong advances towards building a more just and equitable international agricultural trade system, one that is beneficial to a range of small-scale agricultural producers in developing countries: those producing both for local markets, and those producing for export.
Chapter 2: Fair Trade and Food Sovereignty Movement Responses to the International Agricultural Trade Regime

This chapter provides the foundations from which much of the analysis in this dissertation takes place, and demonstrates the originality and relevance of my dissertation within the wider body of academic literature analyzing both movements examined here. It begins by detailing the deeply embedded international agricultural trade regime that both these movements are responding to, albeit in different ways. It then provides an overview of how each movement is treated in the literature for their response to this regime. My own research will respond to this literature in later chapters, where I challenge some of the assertions made about the fair trade and food sovereignty movements through new empirical research and the application of my theoretical framework to each movement’s strategies and activities.

The first section provides an overview of the relationship between agriculture, trade, development, and small-scale agricultural producers. This section outlines the importance of agricultural production to many developing countries at the macro-economic level, as well as the livelihoods of the billions of people relying on the sector for their livelihoods. It also details the significance of trade, including export agricultural production, to the national economies of many developing countries, to many small-scale producers, and to food security.

The chapter then shifts to detail ways in which the international agricultural trade regime negatively impacts small-scale producers in developing countries, focusing on two main issues. The first issue is the rules that govern international trade, where I outline several ways these rules limit the capacities of developing countries to support agricultural sectors while simultaneously requiring increased market access to foreign exports, creating unfair competition on global food and agriculture markets that advantage developed countries and disadvantage developing countries. While on the surface the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) provides exemptions for developing countries to level the playing field, a closer examination of these exemptions shows the rules in fact privilege agricultural products from developed countries and disadvantage developing country products, particularly products in which developing countries should have a comparative advantage on domestic and international markets. Liberalization under the WTO came after market liberalization policies by many developing countries, implemented as conditions that came with development loans in the 1980s. This agricultural liberalization culminated in many negative market and livelihood impacts for developing country agricultural sectors. The second issue covered is the global supply chains characterized by unequal power relations that situate small-scale farmers at the bottom of the chain with the least power, and thus generate unfavourable market conditions for most small-scale producers. I focus on these two issues specifically because they are a common focus for both movements in their response to the unfair agricultural trade conditions impacting small-scale producers.

In the final section of this chapter I review the literature analyzing both movements and how academics interpret their efforts to achieve economic justice for small-scale producers. I argue that most analyses of food sovereignty treat the movement favourably, based on the principled objectives of the movement, including: i) its resistance to the current international agricultural
trade regime, ii) its resistance to neoliberal, capitalist and industrial agricultural production more broadly, and iii) its pursuit for sustainable agricultural production by small-scale producers and peasants, which includes prioritizing local markets. Acknowledging the contributions of this analysis, I argue that it excludes consideration of the complex and practical processes underpinning change in practice. I do demonstrate that academics have begun to ask an increasing number of difficult questions about the food sovereignty movement in recent years, reviewing a body of academic literature engaging in critical analysis of the movement. This includes questions around the extent to which the movement represents small-scale producers and peasants, which highlight the differences among these complex and disparate populations.

The fair trade movement has similarly been evaluated frequently against principled objectives, but as a benchmark for the movement’s shortcomings rather than its strengths. I review a body of academic literature that is critical of the fair trade movement for embodying and/or reinforcing neoliberalism. Specific criticism levied against the contemporary fair trade movement, at least the market members of the movement, include its general support of agricultural production for export markets, its certification of transnational corporations, and its governance through private certification and other forms of private governance. In these interpretations, the contemporary fair trade movement is largely characterized as seeking to overcome economic injustices from trade through markets rather than through regulation.

The final section of the chapter reviews a more nuanced body of academic literature that evaluates the fair trade movement through a Polanyian framework of an analysis, a lens tied to whether the activities of the movement serve to subjugate markets to society, or vice versa (following Karl Polanyi’s political economic and social theorizing, discussed in detail in Chapter 3). Through this analytical framework, academics acknowledge the contributions of fair trade markets that can be considered transformative (in this instance to achieve the subjugation of markets to society), while arguing that fair trade simultaneously reinforces the international agricultural trade regime. These authors give different weight to the contributions of fair trade in changing the existing international agricultural trade regime, but all acknowledge contributions, rather than wholly dismissing the movement and markets. It is from this body of literature analyzing these movements that my own research makes new and unique empirical and analytical contributions.

**Agriculture, trade, development and small-scale agricultural producers**

Agriculture plays an important role in the economies of many developing countries and their populations. Approximately 2.5 billion people in poor countries rely on food and agriculture for their livelihoods (FAO, 2012). Agriculture employs about 45 percent of the total labour force (this includes formal and informal, as well as family labour) and represents about 10 percent of GDP in low- and middle-income countries (FAO, 2015; Clapp, 2016, p. 8). When we disaggregate this data, we see that for many countries, agriculture is much more important (Clapp, 2016). In Central African Republic, agriculture\(^1\) is just shy of 60% of GDP, and has

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\(^1\) The World Bank classifies this as “agriculture, value added”, which “corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources”. World Bank Data [http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS](http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS)
taken a growing share of GDP over the last twenty years (World Bank Data).\(^2\) It is also more than 50% of GDP for Chad and Sierra Leone, more than 30% of GDP for more than a dozen other countries, and more than 20% of GDP for more than a dozen more (World Bank Data). Most of these countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.

Smallholder farmers, small-scale producers and labourers are nestled prominently in these statistics. Of the 2.5 billion people who rely on agriculture and food production in poor countries, about 1.5 billion live in smallholder households (FAO, 2012). It is difficult to calculate the number of people engaged in agricultural production for wage, and survey data has often underreported wage-labour participation in agriculture (World Bank, 2007, p. 205). However, the World Bank reports that “agriculture is a large and growing employer of wage labor” and that most regions are seeing an increase in the number of wage labourers in agriculture (World Bank, 2007, p. 205-206).

Agriculture is important to many development goals, but is central to three in particular: reducing poverty and hunger, fostering gender equality, and achieving environmental sustainability (Byerlee et al., 2009, p. 17). Agriculture is widely acknowledged to be one of the most important sectors for developing country economic growth and development (World Bank, 2007; Watkins, 2008). About 70 percent of the world’s poor, as well as most of the world’s hungry, live in rural areas and are dependent on agricultural production for their livelihoods, whether as market producers, wage labourers, or growing food for self-sufficiency (or some combination therein) (WFP, 2013). In 1996, the International Labour Organization reported that half of the 1.1 billion workers who engaged in agricultural production at that time did so for wage-labour, and that they were situated on “the bottom rung of the rural poverty ladder and even below the minimum subsistence level” (ILO, 1996). In concrete numbers, as of 2015, at least 795 million people were counted as suffering from hunger, and nearly one billion people were living in extreme poverty (FAO, 2015). However, this number on hunger is probably too low. It is premised on a definition of hunger redrafted in 2012 by the FAO, which changed the methodology for collecting data on who is considered hungry, shifting from the basis of calories necessary to live an active lifestyle to the calories necessary to maintain a sedentary lifestyle, and to hunger that is persistent for more than one year. This assumes a lifestyle most poor and hungry do not maintain, and overlooks hunger from crises, especially in a time of food price and climate volatility (Lappé et al., 2013).

**Agricultural Trade Matters**

While most of the food we consume is produced locally, the volume of trade in food and agricultural products has been increasing, even though its share as a traded good has declined dramatically over the last 100 years from about 50 percent to below 10 percent (WTO, 2014; Clapp, 2012). In 2013, the value of food exports was 1.45 trillion dollars, compared with 316 billion in 1990, and rose from 6.7 percent of world merchandise exports in 2005 to 8 percent in 2013 (WTO, 2014, p. 66). Food trade increased an average of 13 percent a year between 2000 and 2008, and agricultural trade rose 4 percent per year between 1990 and 2002, both increasing faster than production (Clapp, 2012, p.9). In 2013, agricultural products made up 9.5 percent of world trade in merchandise and 30.4 percent of trade in primary products (WTO, 2014).

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But global statistics only frame a much bigger picture. In many places, trade in food and agricultural products plays a much more dramatic role. For the European Community and the United States – the world’s major food exporters – food trade only accounts for a small percentage of their exports. By contrast, many developing countries (and some developed) rely very heavily on food and agricultural trade as a percentage of their exports. In Ethiopia, one of the countries hardest hit with cyclical drought and famine, and categorized by the United Nations (UN) as a Low-Income Food Deficit Country (LIFDCs), food represents 77.1 percent of its exports (WTO, 2014). At the same time, Ethiopia has the capacity to be food self-sufficient (see Table 6.20, McCorriston et al., 2013, p. 48). In Nicaragua and Malawi, food accounts for 75.6 and 75.8 percent of exports (respectively). They are also both LIFDCs; Malawi also has the potential to be food self-sufficient (see Table 6.20, McCorriston et al., 2013, p. 48). These are extreme examples, but for many countries, and many LIFDCs, food exports represent more than 30 percent of their exports (WTO, 2014).

Meanwhile, many countries depend on food imports to feed their populations. LIFDCs are low-income countries that are categorically net importers of food, which means their gross food imports are greater than their gross food exports, based on persistent food import dependence. The vast majority of LIFDCs are from African countries. African countries only account for 3.5 percent of world food exports, but their agricultural primary exports were 13.5 percent of all exports and 46.5 percent of imports (WTO, 2014). This situation is a dramatic shift from the 1970s, when the continent was a net exporter of food. It is the result of a decline in the value of many of its key agricultural export products, and an increase in the import of cereals and livestock (FAO, 2009). As we will see further on, this import in cereals is tightly linked to the broader international agricultural trade regime, and powerful interests, which has had challenging impacts on domestic food and agricultural production and markets.

Trade is more than just about macroeconomic data. It is about livelihoods. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 5, highlighting how tens of millions, if not more, producers and workers depend on agricultural exports for their livelihoods. This includes traditional agricultural export commodities, such as coffee, cocoa, bananas, tea, cotton, etc. But it also includes non-traditional agricultural exports (NTAEs), notably fresh fruit and vegetables and fresh cut flowers, an increasingly important part of agricultural economies in developing countries (World Bank, 2007, Watkins 2008). The World Bank reported in 2007 that NTAEs represent 47 percent of developing country exports, in contrast to traditional exports, which account for 21 percent of developing country exports (World Bank, 2007, 60). Horticulture has seen particularly strong growth, and in 2004 developing countries represented “43 percent of world trade in fruit and vegetables, excluding bananas and citrus”.3

While agricultural trade matters, and trade can support livelihoods, it can also undermine them. Trade is a contentious issue because of the colonial legacies and contemporary power in supply chains that have historically and continue to shape these livelihoods (Friedmann, 1994; Rosset, 2004). These exports come primarily from Brazil, Chile, China and Mexico, although the share of exports from Sub-Saharan Africa continue to grow (World Bank 2007, 60). The World Bank reports this as “world trade” but it is under the heading of “diversifying through export markets”. As such, it is assumed here this is not trade solely within developing countries.

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3 These exports come primarily from Brazil, Chile, China and Mexico, although the share of exports from Sub-Saharan Africa continue to grow (World Bank 2007, 60). The World Bank reports this as “world trade” but it is under the heading of “diversifying through export markets”. As such, it is assumed here this is not trade solely within developing countries.
2006, Borras, 2007). These supply chains have been shown to subject producers to unfavourable trading conditions because of contemporary power in supply chains that shape producer livelihoods (discussed in detail further down). At the same time, producers continue to engage in trade, and many wish to continue doing so, despite the legacies and enduring challenges (Murphy, 2010; Masakure and Hanson, 2005; Bernstein and Byers, 2001).

What is it exactly about agricultural trade that the food sovereignty and fair trade movements contest? It is rooted in what Jennifer Clapp refers to as “the world food economy” (Clapp, 2012) and its dynamics. Clapp characterizes the world food economy as “an increasingly global market for food, with more and more food travelling through global production, trade, and processing supply chains, influenced by a myriad of international economic and political forces” (Clapp, 2012, p. 5). Included among the most influential actors and forces shaping this global food economy are:

- state-led global expansion of both the industrial agricultural model and the transnational trade in food, agricultural trade liberalization, the rise of transnational corporate actors in all aspects of the food and agricultural sector, and the intensification of the financialization of food, such that food commodities have become increasingly like any other financial product bought and sold by investors (Clapp, 2012, p. 11).

This global food economy has emerged out of radical transformations in the post-war period, themselves an outcome of changes in agricultural production, trade and governance, with significant impacts on small-scale producers in developing countries around the world. Grant, Josling, and Coleman associate the global food economy with the integration of agriculture under the umbrella of political, economic and cultural globalization, whereby they contend that agriculture became “one sector contributing to growth”, reflecting a shift away from the view that self-sufficiency was the “backbone to nationhood” (2004, p. 4). With this shift, agriculture came to be governed through transnational policy space, which included state governments, international organizations, international NGOs, transnational social movements and transnational corporations (Grant, Josling, and Coleman, 2004).

While all these issues effect small-scale farmers and their choices, I focus on two issues in this thesis: i) the current international agricultural trade regime applied to food and agriculture (with a narrowed focus on the WTO) and ii) the rise of transnational corporate actors that pervade “all aspects of the food and agricultural sector” (ibid), as demonstrated in contemporary issues related to power in the food and agricultural supply chains. The relevance of these two issues to this project is their position as the shared focus of the food sovereignty and fair trade movements. I look at these two key issues in the following sections, and in this dissertation, I simplify them as the current “international agricultural trade regime”. Though I iterate again, I only examine a narrow representation of international trade in food and agricultural products – for example, I focus on the WTO and not the full gamut of international trade agreements, and on supply chains more relevant to fair trade, to the exclusion of other aspects of the corporate food regime, such as the grain trade and the biotechnology industry, which all have relevance, but to give all aspects full consideration of these is beyond the scope of this work.
The Rigged Rules of Agricultural Trade

The first feature of the international agricultural trade regime - the multilateral trade and investment rules that govern the current international agricultural trade regime - have played a significant role in the poverty and food insecurity facing small-scale farmers in developing countries. These rules have “locked in an imbalanced set of rules and practices that have contributed to vulnerability in the world’s poorest countries” (Clapp and Burnett, 2014, p. 79). These rules and standards are institutionalized in trade agreements, globally through the World Trade Organization (WTO), and through bilateral and multilateral free trade and investment agreements (FTAs).

In 2002, Oxfam’s Make Trade Fair campaign characterized the multilateral rules governing trade, in a book by the same title, as “rigged rules and double standards” (Watkins and Fowler, 2002). This characterization was speaking to the multilateral trade and investment rules that had been established through the World Trade Organization in 1995. The WTO was created as a result of the Uruguay Round (UR) multilateral trade negotiations that were part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO regulates international trade and investment, enforcing its trade agreements signed by member states through an adjudication body. Complaints are mediated through its dispute settlement mechanism, which adjudicates trade grievances between members, and prescribes compensatory measures to recover trade losses when complaints are found valid, such as through retaliatory trade protections or through financial compensation. The rules are embedded in several agreements targeting specific sectors and issues that were negotiated during the Uruguay Round.4

While the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) is the overarching agreement governing trade and investment in food and agricultural sectors, these sectors fall under several other agreements as well. For example, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is applied to patented seeds, and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) are applied to safety and quality standards and labeling.

The WTO rules specific to agriculture, as applied to trade and investment regulations, was new. Not only were agricultural liberalization policies absent from previous trade agreements (notably the GATT), developed countries intentionally excluded agriculture as a sector from trade agreements up until the WTO’s founding in the 1990s (Wilkinson, 2006). Integrating food and agricultural products into trade agreements was a result in part of the high costs of agricultural supports and protections in some developed countries; OECD countries were motivated to reduce their high support levels (Clapp, 2006). The AoA reduced agricultural market protections and converted them all to tariffs in an effort to increase market access, and reduced and removed domestic supports considered trade-distorting. It also sought to end export subsidies. These rules have ultimately failed to reduce OECD country supports, as agricultural supports rest at similar levels to those at the formation of the WTO (Clapp, 2006, Arsenault, 2015). Indeed, several authors have noted that the current liberalization regime, particularly of agriculture, has removed many of the protections that were imperative to many countries’ economic development and industrialization (Chang, 2003; Rodrik, 2007; Stiglitz, 2007).

4 https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/final_e.htm
Special Allowances for Developing Countries

On the surface, the WTO took into consideration the needs of developing countries, especially with regards to agriculture, and applied special and differential treatment to developing countries through special allowances, higher spending exemptions and lower reduction commitments. But when the rules are examined more closely, it is obvious that they in fact privilege developed countries, and the special exemptions for developing countries are at best tenuous, and at worst devious.

Domestic supports permitted under the WTO AoA are categorized in “green” and “blue” boxes. Those that are considered trade distorting are subject to constraints, and are categorized in what is called the “amber box”. This includes “all domestic supports except those in the blue and green boxes…[including] measures to support prices, or subsidies directly related to production quantities” (WTO, n.d.).

The de minimis rule provides another exemption that supposes to benefit developing countries more than developed. Developing country reduction commitments are exempt from being applied to their Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) under the de minimis allowance when the supports are not greater than 10% of the supported product’s aggregate value in a given year, or when supports that are not product-specific are less than 10% of total agricultural support. Developed countries are also eligible for the same de minimis allowance, but it is capped at 5% rather than 10%.

Lastly, subsidy exemptions through the WTO Development Measure allow countries to implement agricultural and rural development supports, direct and indirect, if they are an “integral part of the development programmes of developing countries” (Elamin, 2000 n.p.). These measures can include investment subsidies, agricultural input subsidies to low-income and resource-poor producers, and supports to producers encouraging diversification away from illegal narcotic production.

Development Exemptions in Practice

These exemptions are not as beneficial as they appear at first glance. In practice, the WTO rules governing agriculture removed many of the protections that supported several developed countries as they industrialized. Simultaneously, it regulated domestic support allowances in ways that are uniquely advantageous to richer industrialized countries while far less attainable for many developing countries.

Supports implemented by many developing countries are already permitted within the “green box”. The policies that developing countries have proposed to have classified as “green box” exemptions are, meanwhile, excluded. These include farmer settlement policies, land reform, infrastructural services, land rehabilitation and soil conservation, resource and drought management, flood control, rural employment, nutrition and food security, etc. (De Schutter, 2000).

5 If a country spends more than the de minimis allowance, however, then the total spending is applied towards AMS (that is, the first 10/5% is not exempt).
6 Article 6.2 of the WTO AoA.
If developing countries implement these policies, they will be applied to their *de minimis* allowance. As developing country investment in agricultural sectors grows and becomes costlier, it could push these supports past the *de minimis* allowance.

Meanwhile, investments in agricultural development that are permitted under the green box often require administrative capacities that developing countries lack (De Schutter, 2011). Income insurance for producers is such an example; to be eligible for insurance, producers must demonstrate a 30% net income loss based on three year averages. When farmers make up 1 to 5 percent of the population and tend to be large, industrialized farms, providing such information is plausible. However, in developing countries, many farmers lack the arithmetic and literacy skills to document such losses, and their incomes tend to be diversified through on and off farm work. Even if farmers could provide the documentation of income loss, governments would be unlikely to have the administrative capacity to manage the volume of paperwork associated with such a large segment of the population, nor the resources to compensate so many farmers (De Schutter, 2011).

The green box thus privileges policies accessible to support domestic farmers in developed countries, and disallows those accessible and important to developing country farmers. As much as 40-50 percent of agricultural exports from the United States (US), the European Union (EU) and Canada depend on green box subsidies (UNCTAD India, 2007, cited in TWN 2007). Domestic subsidies in OECD countries\(^8\) meanwhile increased following the AoA. Between 1998-2000, OECD subsidies rose to USD 330.6 billion, from USD 271.8 billion in 1986-88 (Clapp, 2006, p. 565). As of 2015, subsidies by these countries totaled $250 billion annually (Arsenault, 2015).

The market access pillar of the AoA holds similar imbalanced advantages, despite the supposed special privileges extended to developing countries. Because tariff cut requirements are averaged, countries are able to maintain high tariffs on select products while making larger cuts to other products. As a result, “rich countries tended to maintain high levels of tariffs on products typically exported by developing countries, such as groundnut, sugar and meats. Tariffs on these products are as high as 500%. Industrialized countries also continue to apply lower tariffs to unprocessed goods and higher tariffs to processed goods” (Clapp and Burnett, 2014, p. 82).

The development measure is ambiguous on what constitutes a “low income or resource poor farmer”. Application of this allowance by some developing countries has been questioned by other WTO members at the Committee on Agriculture at the WTO (Elamin, 2000). If found to be ineligible for this exemption, these supports would fall under amber box spending and applied to reduction commitments (De Schutter, 2011). Without a clear definition of “low income” and “resource poor”, WTO arbitration could place a chilling effect on developing countries implementing this exemption.

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7 This varies per country. For example, the United States is less than 2%, Canada approximately 2%, and the EU approximately 5%.
8 OECD countries are those countries that are members of the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation, which generally tend to be higher income countries, but should not be conflated with “developed” countries as set out by the United Nations as it is independent membership criteria.
Lastly, WTO Member Countries are required to reduce amber supports in accordance with the reduction commitment schedule set out when each country joined the WTO. Reduction commitments are tied to a country’s “Aggregate Measure of Support” (AMS), which is the total product and non-product support agricultural spending. The commitment is to reduce spending by 20 per cent over 6 years (developed country Members) or 13 per cent over 10 years (developing country Members), compared to spending during the 1986-1988 base period.

AMS reduction commitments only apply to the thirty-four member countries that committed to reducing their trade-distorting domestic supports when they joined the WTO. These countries are effectively permitted to apply trade-distorting supports for agriculture, which are capped at their reduction commitment. Countries that did not have supports in place prior to joining the WTO have a default support cap of zero dollars. Furthermore, these reduction commitments are tied to a period when agricultural spending was very high in developed countries, and very low, or even non-existent, in developing countries. This allows developed countries to maintain a high level of supports (Galtier, 2013). The United States’ reduction commitments, for example, are capped at $19 billion a year (Schnepf, 2014).

Currency adjustments and high inflation rates can further minimize the nominal supports permitted for developing countries:

> With inflation as high as 10-15 percent per annum, ‘current’ administered prices rise by several folds above the fixed base period external prices, thereby magnifying Current AMS levels, which easily exceed committed maximum levels (Elamin, 2000).

The AoA has a provision for inflation, but it is unclear; for example, “an excessive rate of inflation” is not quantified (Elamin, 2000).

It is no accident that the trade rules applied to agriculture in the WTO benefits developed countries and their farmers. These loopholes and provisions were designed by the United States and the EU to protect their own interests, often tied to corporate interests, reflecting a long history of how trade has been negotiated by these actors (Clapp and Burnett, 2014, p. 82). They mirror the broader WTO agreements that promote the economic interests of wealthier countries that set rules to benefit their sectors, while blocking poorer countries from implementing the very policies that facilitated industrialization in their own countries (Weiss, 2005; Wade, 2003). Wade labels this the “shrinking of development space” that is “kicking away the ladder” to development (Wade, 2003, p. 633). Chapters 5 and 7 give further explanation of the power and interests that underscore these asymmetrical outcomes. While the WTO negotiations require consensus for agreement, there are various exogenous factors at play including both the relative power and economic interests of Member countries, and that of their domestic industries, as well

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9 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, EU, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland-Liechtenstein, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Tunisia, United States, Venezuela.

https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs bkgrnd13_boxes_e.htm
as exogenous factors such as institutional design and negotiating processes (Wolfe, 2004; Grant, Josling, and Coleman, 2004).

Currently, the agricultural trade rules under the WTO represent a contorted liberalization agenda that is recognized by both movements to be unfair and designed to serve specific interests. For most in the fair trade movement today, there are few – if any – opportunities to change this international trade rule system, so opportunities for fairer trade are pursued primarily through fair trade markets, increased awareness, citizen engagement and domestic policies. For most in the food sovereignty movement, the international trade rule system set out in the WTO (and several other bilateral and multilateral trade agreements) cannot be reformed and must be overturned. Each movement responds to the imbalanced international trade rules set out in the WTO agreements in different ways, which I discuss below.

**Deepening Inequalities: Liberalization atop Liberalization atop Liberalization**

Not only are the rules set to advantage developed countries, but many of the world’s developing countries agricultural sectors were liberalized prior to the establishment of the WTO in 1995, making their liberalization commitments under the WTO steeper than they were for developed countries. The structural adjustment policies (SAPs), attached to loans from international financial institutions in the 1980s, required many developing country governments to liberalize their agricultural markets by withdrawing state supports and investments, removing market access and import barriers such as tariffs, quotas and export taxes, and eliminating marketing boards and supply management policies (Bello, 2008; Clapp, 2006; Puplampu and Tettey, 2000). While developing countries undertook these market liberalizations, most OECD countries maintained market protections and heavy farm subsidies totalling more than 300 billion dollars a year, making the majority of developing country agricultural products uncompetitive both on international and domestic markets.

As a result, while the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) emerged from the Uruguay Round negotiations, ostensibly to “level the playing field”, in practice it only served to further embed many of the unequal market conditions established through SAPs (Clapp, 2006). Rhetorically, the AoA was supposed to generate greater market access and reduce supports from all member countries, both developed and developing (Clapp, 2006). In practice, the loopholes and structuring of trade rules outlined above allowed OECD countries to maintain farm subsidies and market access barriers, as developing countries liberalized their markets, exacerbating the vulnerability of agricultural sectors on both global and domestic markets (Clapp, 2006).

Agricultural trade negotiations today seem to further embed these inequalities. At the end of 2001 the Doha Development Round of WTO trade negotiations were launched to revise agreements under the WTO. These negotiations have persisted for over 15 years, but have largely been stalled because of the uncompromising demands of developing countries on the multilateral trade rules governing agriculture. Today, the original agreements remain the outstanding agreements that set the rules governing trade and investment under the WTO, with some temporary agreements made to address immediate issues.
While WTO negotiations barely budge, an increasing number of bilateral, regional and multilateral free trade agreements have been negotiated outside of the WTO. Most of these agreements prohibit restrictions on imports and exports of agriculture, increasing the vulnerability of developing country agricultural sectors on global markets (Grain, 2008). Some evidence finds these agreements can counter agricultural interests in OECD countries with other industry interests, which may in fact open agricultural markets further (Mulgan, 2008). However, this may depend on the negotiating parties. Some developing countries have had to accept uneven terms in such agreements in exchange for promises of “aid, investment, and technical cooperation” (Mulgan, 2008, p. 165). While the North American Free Trade Agreement did not put any restrictions on subsidies, it did require increased market access, with Mexico estimated to have experienced more than $12 billion dollars in losses across eight agricultural goods over a nine-year period. These losses are associated with U.S. dumping of subsidized products (Wise, 2009).

**Rigged Rules, Ravaged Markets**

These rigged rules and double standards have had negative impacts on the agricultural sectors and the livelihoods of small-scale producers in developing countries. The combination of early market access liberalization under SAPs, further market access liberalization under the WTO, and effectively uncurtailed agricultural subsidies by developed countries, have made it very difficult for most small-scale producers in developing countries to compete on both global and domestic markets. Because developing countries have opened borders while rich countries have exported highly subsidized products, domestic markets have been overtaken by artificially low priced imported food. These open markets coupled with a surplus of goods on global markets that are priced low because of subsidies is resulting in rising import surges in developing countries (FAO, 2006a; FAO, 2006b; FAO, 2006c; Khor, 2005). An import surge is a substantial increase in the quantity of a country’s imports of a good relative to the average import of the same good over a period of time (Kwa, 2008). The FAO quantifies a surge as a 30 percent “positive deviation from a three-year moving average of import data” (FAO, 2006a; FAO, 2006b; FAO, 2006c; Khor, 2005; quote from 2006c, n.p.). Import surges are most frequently those products that receive the highest subsidies in the US and the EU. This is perhaps one of the most critical structural concerns, as studies have shown that import surges can reduce farmers’ incomes and threaten their livelihoods, causing serious and widespread problems to small producers (Khor, 2005, 8). For example, in 2003 the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) determined that subsidized agricultural products in the United States were sold on international markets below the cost of production. The price difference was as much as 43 percent for wheat, 35 percent for rice, 25 percent for soybeans, 13 percent for corn, and 61 percent for cotton (IATP, 2003). This has resulted in many import surges in developing countries (FAO, 2006a; FAO, 2006b; FAO, 2006c; Khor, 2005).

These import surges and unequal trading conditions price domestic producers out of markets, undermining livelihoods (Watkins, 2008; Murphy, 2006; Khor, 2006; Raman, 2006). Export products from many of these countries are also unable to compete on global markets. Many countries have experienced negative food trade balances as a result. Most African countries went from being net exporters of food in the 1970s to being net importers of food post-liberalization (Rakotoarisoa, 2011; FAO, 2015). While the WTO has rules to safeguard against import surges, and countries could technically bring forward a complaint to the institution’s Dispute Settlement
Mechanism, most poor countries lack the resources to confront more powerful countries, and even if they won, the outcome would be an allowance for retaliatory protections that would not likely bring any practical changes.

Meanwhile, developing country economies and agricultural sectors have suffered under unequal market access. Between 1985 and 1995, OECD protections carried USD 11.6 billion in welfare costs for developing countries and resulted in a steady decline in agricultural exports from developing countries (Binswanger and Lutz, 2003, pp. 153-155). Daviron and Gibbon (2002, p. 259) argue that the dissolution of state regulatory systems to support prices has undermined production of agricultural exports in some African countries. The unequal liberalization of global agricultural markets has rendered small farmers in developing countries vulnerable on global markets, constraining their capacity to benefit from agricultural exports as well as their ability to produce for domestic markets. Adding further salt to the wound, around the same time that market liberalization was imposed, traditional export prices collapsed following the collapse of commodity agreements (Daviron and Gibbon, 2002). Market losses further impoverished farmers around the world and forced many to exit agricultural production (Bryceson, 2002). The forced withdrawal of the state has also been widely criticized for resulting in the deterioration of market infrastructure, essential to well-functioning markets, further disadvantaging developing country agricultural sectors and small farmers, also discussed above (Bezemer and Heady, 2008; Khor, 2006; Timmer et al., 1991).

As countries have become more dependent on imports for their food, an increased vulnerability to food insecurity has come with it. Countries that are dependent on imports from the global market are highly vulnerable to food price shocks and volatility (Clapp, 2009; Clapp and Cohen, 2009). This was the case with the price spikes and volatility that began in 2007 and continued on-and-off through 2011. Between 2006 and 2008, food prices rose by nearly 60%, with global grain prices doubling (FAO, 2011). At their peak, prices hit their highest level in 30 years (FAO, 2011). In 2010, food prices spiked again, reaching new record highs above 2008 levels (BBC, 2011). This was devastating for poor populations in developing countries. With between 60-80 percent of their expenditures going to food, many households had insufficient access to food (WFP, n.d.). Food import bills soared for many developing counties, draining foreign exchange reserves. Food prices today remain volatile, and reprieves from high prices have been largely circumstantial, and not a result of fundamental changes to the underlying causes of the 2007-2008 food crisis (Blas, 2011). Clapp and Cohen’s edited volume discusses in detail the relationship between vulnerability and import dependence, highlighting how countries that are more dependent on food imports are more vulnerable to price and supply volatility on global markets, which have become more volatile as they have become less regulated (Clapp and Cohen, 2009).

The rise and volatility of food prices during the 2007-2008 food crisis was the result of several factors, including the depreciating US dollar, commodity speculation, and relatedly, oil prices (which factor into production prices because of oil-rich inputs and transportation prices) and biofuel production. While other production and supply-side factors (increasing populations, changing diets, especially meat consumption in emerging economies, and environmental factors influencing production) are also relevant, they explain less the spike in global prices and more
the longer-term trend in a rise of prices (Clapp, 2009; Clapp and Cohen, 2009; Wise and Murphy, 2012).

What is more relevant here is the vulnerability of the world’s poor on global food and agricultural markets, and the relationship of this vulnerability to both liberalized markets and the relationship to the erosion of small-scale producers. Most of world’s poorest countries impacted by the food crisis were “agricultural-based and import-dependent” (Clapp, 2009, p. 1189). The current rules of the international agricultural trade regime have hindered small-scale producers’ competitiveness on domestic markets and hindered investment in poor countries’ agricultural sectors. These rules have not significantly benefited many developing country agricultural products on global markets. So long as these rigged rules and double standards continue, sustainable food and livelihood security will remain at bay.

Supply chains

Along with these “rigged” trade rules, supply chains are a second feature of the global food economy and its intersection with the international agricultural trade regime that creates food and livelihood security challenges for small-scale producers producing for exports. Corporate concentration has increased dramatically in the global food and agricultural supply chain, changing who wields power over global food and agriculture. Academics and civil society organizations argue that this power shapes what is produced, where it is produced, who it is produced for and by whom it is produced (Murphy, 2005; McMichael, 2005; Clapp and Fuchs, 2009; ETC Group, 2013). Alongside this concentration has been an increase in vertical and horizontal integration as well as major mergers and acquisitions between and among these companies (ETC Group, 2005; Murphy, 2006; Murphy et al., 2013). This concentration and consolidation goes against basic neoclassical principles of sound economics, which eschews concentration at such high levels.

Retailers - supermarkets and hypermarkets – have emerged to be one of the major wielders of market power in global food and agricultural supply chains (Clapp and Burnett, 2014; Murphy, 2006; ETC Group, 2005). The concentration of supermarkets is summarized in Clapp and Burnett:

Food retail has become increasingly concentrated over the last twenty years, both within countries and globally, raising concerns that oligopolies are forming and compromising market competition, with global impacts. In the UK, four retailers hold about 75 percent of the market share and in Australia, just two retailers hold 70-80 percent of the country’s supermarket market share (in gross dollars). In the US, the situation is a little different, with market share somewhat more evenly spread across traditional supermarkets, but with Walmart holding an estimate of 33 percent of the market share in food retail. Transnational supermarket chains are establishing a stronger presence in developing and emerging economies as well. Globally, in 2004, the top 10 supermarkets in the world accounted for almost one quarter of the global food retail market share, with Walmart accounting for the highest market share. After Walmart, supermarkets make up the top retailers in the world: beginning with France’s Carrefour, then the UK’s Tesco, and finally
Germany’s Metro, attributable in significant part to their expansion into emerging markets (2014, p. 84).

Intermediaries such as manufacturers, processors and distributors were once considered the dominant market power in agricultural commodity chains. The increased consolidation of the retail sector has led many to argue that a significant portion of this power is shifting to retailers (Watkins, 2008; Reardon and Timmer, 2008; Murphy, 2006; Burch and Lawrence, 2005).¹⁰

Supermarkets can provide important opportunities to agricultural producers in the South, because of their increased demand for high-value non-traditional agricultural exports, including fruit and vegetables. This demand can generate new market opportunities for developing country producers. Supermarkets are also credited with some of the increased integration of more socially and environmentally sustainable products such as organic and fair trade (Watkins, 2008; Murphy, 2006). Supermarkets can also allow consumers to exercise their power through advocacy for more equitable and sustainable market conditions, including fairer trade, to the benefit of small-scale producer livelihoods (Murphy, 2006, 36).

At the same time, the extreme concentration of retailers and their subsequent rise to market power has put pressures down the commodity chain as each link in the chain tries to maintain profits in an increasingly competitive market (Burch and Lawrence, 2005, 4). Producers are situated at the bottom of the supply chain, possess the least market power, and often feel the brunt of these pressures. The rising market power of supermarkets has shaped at least two developments that have generated significant challenges to small farmers in the South. One is an increase in privately set and monitored quality and safety standards; another is an increase in contract farming.

The consolidation of the retail sector and its rise in market power has resulted in a shift to setting of private (rather than public) standards around food quality and safety. To be sure, food production should adhere to standards that will ensure the safety of consumers. However, there are concerns that the setting of standards sits disproportionately in the hands of retailers, and is used as a tool for companies to pre-empt state regulation, allowing companies to set the terms by which they are bound (Fulponi, 2008; Reardon et al., 2001, 19). Private safety and quality standards are further argued to provide additional advantage within the highly competitive retail sector, as supermarket brands race to be differentiated based on quality, social and environmental standards (Murphy, 2006; Daviron and Gibbon, 2002; Reardon et al., 2001). Finally, retailers use private standards as a means to reduce competition in their own sector. Standards carry high transaction costs, and thus require tight and efficient coordination and management to keep costs low (McCluskey, 2007; Reardon et al., 2001). Private standards tend to favour more centralized retailers, who have an advantage because they have the resources to develop highly refined coordination and management systems. These systems then tend to privilege more centralized

¹⁰The extent to which the retail industry is concentrated varies by geographic region. Europe holds the most consolidated food retail sector, home to four of the top five global food retailers (in 2004, France’s Carrefour, Germany’s Metro AG, Ahold from the Netherlands and the UK’s Tesco were the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th largest retailers measured by market, respectively) (ETC Group 2005) While the US is less consolidated, Walmart is by far the largest global food retailer, with almost three times the global market share as Carrefour (Murphy 2006, 11).
processors, distributors or manufacturers because they carry lower transaction costs (Reardon and Timmer, 2008, 191; Daviron and Gibbon, 2002, 142).

While quality and safety standards provide benefits to consumers and supermarket brands, the conditions created by private standards are at times a disadvantage to smaller and poorer farmers and smaller firms, favouring larger farmers instead (Reardon et al., 2001). It is argued in the literature that these standards are transforming the global agri-food system into a “more capital, technology and management skill dependent” system (Fulponi, 2008, 7-8), a system that requires investments in resources that small farmers often cannot afford, such as storage and refrigeration facilities (Reardon et al., 2001; Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002, 504). Even though standards might produce higher profits for both producers and retailers, it is producers who tend to absorb the higher costs associated with this system of production (Fulponi, 2008, 12), which can outweigh the profitability of participation (Takane, 2006; Singh, 2002; Fuchs and Kalfagianni, 2010).

The increased consolidation of supermarket chains and the related shift towards private standards has created an increased push for contract farming (Reardon et al., 2001, p. 428; Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002). Contract farming centralizes relations between producers and procurers (whether manufacturers, processors, distributors or supermarket chains). This centralization facilitates the tight coordination and management needed for retailers to remain competitive, helps facilitate traceability to ensure safety, reduces transaction costs, helps to provide a stable supply of bulk quantities with uniform quality, it helps avoid direct labour relations, and it overcomes constraints on land ownership (Swinnen et al., 2007; Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002, pp. 511-515; Singh, 2002, p. 1624; White, 1999). Arguments are made that contract farming provides opportunities for farmers: contractors might provide credit to enable farmers to access the technologies, information and inputs needed to meet the emergent quality and safety standards. Contractors might also provide guaranteed prices, markets, and incomes for farmers on often unstable markets (Murphy, 2006; Singh, 2002; Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; White, 1999).

However, the gains from contract farming are not clear-cut; once again there is evidence that this system, while offering potential opportunities for some farmers, often disadvantages small-scale farmers. Contract farming tends to benefit larger farmers who are more centralized and require fewer transaction costs than smaller farmers (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002, p. 519; Singh, 2002). While contracts might provide farmers with the access to technologies and inputs to produce for changing markets, they are acquired through loans carrying interest and administrative fees, which may result in the cost of production calculating higher than the income earned, effectively generating debt rather than livelihood (Masakure and Henson, 2005; Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; Singh, 2002; White, 1999).

Contract farming is characterized by highly unequal relations of power, which leaves producers, who are many, at a structural disadvantage against buyers, who are few (Murphy, 2006). Producers lack the bargaining power to set the terms of the contract, so that those with more power in the chain (retailers, manufacturers, distributors and processors) have the ability to set the terms of prices and value-added on products. Some contractors have downloaded transaction costs (storage, transportation, delivery, costs to administer contracts) and market risks (crop failure due to weather and disease, price volatility and poor quality produce) onto farmers,
engaging in practices that could even be argued to exploit producers, such as underpaying farmers, turning away products without explanation, setting prices below market prices, delaying payments for products and providing poor extension services (Murphy, 2006; Singh, 2002; White, 1999). These conditions can mean that by the time everything is repaid, new loans will be necessary to overcome declining productivity (White, 1999). Contract farming is also linked to environmental degradation, social alienation and differentiation, the disruption of traditional community arrangements and social institutions, and the generation of adverse gender and labour relations (Korovkin, 2005; Singh, 2002; White, 1999). Finally, contract farming has shown that some firms extract the profits related to production, so that they do not get reinvested in local communities, defeating a significant point of their purpose (Singh, 2002).

The challenges associated with contract farming vary with each individual context – different companies impose different contract conditions and different crops might favour different sized farm-holders (see Takane, 2006, pp. 36-38). However, the above findings reflect trends that have been identified across a wide body of literature. “Most of the studies”, argues Singh, “find contracts inequitable, short-term, and ambiguous. However, it is not the contract per se however which is harmful, but how it is implemented in a given context” (Singh, 2002, p. 1626). Despite these trends and the negative outcomes for farmers, there is evidence that farmers wish to continue with contract farming in order to maintain access to markets and inputs (Singh, 2002, p. 1624; Masakure and Henson, 2005, p. 1729). In their case study, Masakure and Henson (2005, p. 1729; see also Murphy, 2010) show farmers wished to retain the status of prestige associated with export agriculture.

Local Development Matters Too

The international agricultural trade regime plays out in ways that are detrimental to small-scale agricultural producers, and it has contributed to hunger and poverty among populations who depend on food and agriculture for their livelihoods. But trade is not the only problem here. There are numerous factors that contribute to this widespread concentration of poverty and hunger in rural developing countries, ranging from domestic and cultural issues to the character of a globalized food and agricultural system that increasingly undermines the ability of producers to obtain a sustainable livelihood from their production. Local conditions can play a role, and these are often part of a complex problem that “is a consequence as much as a cause of development” (Barrett, 2008, p. 300). Land reform is widely thought to be among the most essential preconditions for sustainable agricultural development, both for subsistence and export farmers (Hall, 2008; Borras, 2007; Lahiff et al., 2007; Rossett, 2006; White 1999). Meanwhile, factors such as “access to productive technologies and adequate private and public goods in order to produce a marketable surplus” (Barret, 2008; p. 300)11, as well as “the institutional and physical infrastructure necessary to ensure broad-based, low-cost access to competitive, well-functioning markets” require economic investment that depends on development, but also are essential to acquiring the economic resources for investment (Barret, 2008; p. 300). Yet, while development can bring the important infrastructure for smallholders to engage successfully in markets, domestic or international, infrastructure is often necessary to increase development.

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11Also put as “investment in private assets, improved technologies, and public goods”
Local infrastructure is needed to facilitate a range of necessities for successful agricultural production, whether for greater self-sufficiency on local markets or for international trade. Some of this is very basic infrastructural development that relates to creating marketable surpluses, whether for domestic markets or international ones, notably transport infrastructure (Barret, 2008). But it also includes a range of other important tools, what Jouanjean terms ‘soft’ infrastructure, which includes elements such as transport competition, extension services, institutions to implement sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, and most notably storage, the absence of which creates a pivotal hindrance to food security (Jouanjean, 2013). A lack of storage generates significant food losses, and requires many farmers to sell their produce on markets after harvest, when there is a glut on markets, which means that prices are driven down. These same farmers that sell their products after harvest are later forced to purchase on a market with few sellers when their limited stores run out, when prices are higher, resulting in food insecurity as an accessibility issue, not just an availability one related to food losses (Godfray et al., 2010, p.416; Barrett, 2008, p. 238). While trade plays a strong role in both supporting and undermining food and livelihood security around the world, it alone does not bear the responsibility for these issues and it is not the intention of this thesis to propose that it does.

Changing the International Agricultural Trade Regime

It is the international agricultural trade regime that is marked by rigged rules and double standards, the shrinking of development space, and the suffocation of producer livelihoods and empowerment that both the fair trade and food sovereignty movements respond to, and today seek to change. Yet, each movement has taken a different approach to changing the international agricultural trade regime, and largely target separate parts of it. I overview in the next few sections the different ways each movement is perceived in the literature to be changing the international agricultural trade regime.

The food sovereignty movement has engaged in a politics of resistance, confronting and protesting major institutions they perceive to be supporting the rigged trade rules and corporate concentration in the global agricultural supply chains, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Group of Eight/Seven (G8/G7), the Bretton Woods Institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)). The food sovereignty movement also targets supply chains, but overall does not engage much in activities to change market conditions for export producers, focusing instead on changing conditions for those seeking to produce for more local markets.

The fair trade movement made a shift in the 1980s to prioritizing the issues related to supply chains, using alternative markets as a means to help provide better market conditions for those producing for international markets, ensuring increased income for producers living in poverty, and building awareness of the impacts of the international agricultural trade regime by increasing consumer and citizen awareness of supply chains on small commodity producers. The movement, as will be discussed later in greater detail, was more focused on trade policy in the past, and continues to do so to a lesser extent today. With a focus on export commodity producers, fair trade has shifted in recent decades towards prioritizing the empowerment of

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12 The accessibility/access relationship to food losses is my own analysis.
producers and changing practices within supply chains, as well as increased government oversight in this latter area.

This project seeks to understand how these different, and for some (Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck, 2012; Nicholson, 2013) competing, approaches to changing the international agricultural trade regime are analyzed. This is motivated in part from a discontent with analytical approaches adopted in a wide body of literature that tends to evaluate these movements more on principle of how the world is ordered and how the world should be ordered, and less on a framework of change in practice.

**Food Sovereignty and Change**

A sizable representation of the academic literature has promoted the movement and concept of food sovereignty as a necessary radical alternative to the current global food and agricultural system, one that promotes sustainability and the voice and interests of peasants and small- and medium-sized food and agricultural producers. Many of these studies focus on the principles of food sovereignty in addressing poverty, hunger, and ecological issues, and in confronting the corporate food regime. I provide an overview of this literature below. This overview does not focus exclusively on food sovereignty and trade. I employ it to gain a sense of how food sovereignty is evaluated in the academic literature.

Food sovereignty is presented as a vision of radical, transformative change from “the current, and linked, food, economic and environmental crises” that are the “direct result of decades of destructive economic policies based on the globalization of a neoliberal, industrial, capital-intensive and corporate-led model of agriculture” (Wittman et al. 2010, p. 2, referencing La Via Campesina). According to Wittman et al.:

> The theory and practice of food sovereignty has the potential to foster dramatic and widespread change in agricultural, political and social systems related to food by posing a radical challenge to the agro-industry model of food production. The transformation envisioned entails a changing relationship to food resulting from an integrated, democratized, localized food production model. It also entails a fundamental shift in values expressed in changed social and political relations (2010, p. 4).

The authors present this as not just a change in relations of production and consumption, but as a revolution in social relations, citizenship, and democracy (Wittman et al., 2010, p. 4-5). Rosset argues, in response to the 2007-2008 food crisis, “the time seems to have truly arrived for food sovereignty and La Via Campesina”, and that “there is no other real solution to feeding the world, and it is up to each and every one of us to help force the changes in national and international public policy that are so urgently needed” (Rosset, 2008, p. 463).

Also supporting food sovereignty as the solution after the food crisis, Holt-Gimenez elevates it against the responses of major institutions including the World Bank, WTO and FAO, comparing the ecological and smallholder benefits of food sovereignty (and agroecology) with the expansion of corporate-led biotechnology and industrial agriculture systems promoted by these institutions (Holt-Gimenez, 2009). Fairbairn (2010), pitting food sovereignty against
contemporary uses of the concepts of food security and the right to food, which she argues have become neoliberal, identifies the laudability of food sovereignty in its resistance to the corporate food regime. She acknowledges this may not be a harbinger of immediate success, but argues it at least has the “potential to destabilize the corporate food regime” (p. 31). Ayres and Bosia (2011, p. 60) suggest that food sovereignty, through two examples playing out on the ground, can be an act of resistance and a “counterweight to global agribusiness”. Its laudability here is its resistance and its targeting of the root of the problem in the global food system (Fairbairn, 2010). Windfuhr and Jonsén (2005, p.39) similarly argue the developing platform of “food sovereignty is not a luxury or a utopian dream, but a necessity”.

Several principles of food sovereignty underpin the view that it is the necessary and only approach to addressing rural poverty, inequality, food insecurity and ecological sustainability. The democratic principles and integrity upon which food sovereignty is founded and which it demands is one of these principles. Food sovereignty requires that decisions are formed through consensus and not through top-down politics (Desmarais, 2007; Borras, 2008; Winfuhr and Jonsén, 2005). In light of this, food sovereignty is celebrated for giving voice to peasants and producers who for so long had been represented through NGOs (Martínez-Torres and Rosset, 2010, p. 158).

Food sovereignty is also celebrated for promoting a food system that prioritizes, protects and enables small-scale, subsistence, traditional and peasant production (Rosset, 2011). Its ties to agroecology accredit it as a system of production that separates it from the industrial agricultural system that requires capital intensive, input-intensive production, making food sovereignty more suitable to localized market systems (Altieri and Toledo, 2011). Food sovereignty’s agroecological foundation also promotes a sustainable food system that addresses major global ecological crises today, namely, biodiversity loss and climate change (Altieri et al., 2012; Rosset, 2011; Altieri, 2009). van der Ploeg (2014, p.2) argues that “food sovereignty is coming to be seen as a far better guiding principle for the production, processing, distribution and consumption of food than the market… Despite its ‘infancy’, FS shows the potential for becoming an overarching concept that is capable of strongly mobilizing people around the world… Food sovereignty offers food producers around the world the prospect of regaining their dignity and improving their livelihoods”.

This literature has praised the food sovereignty movement broadly (beyond just trade) largely on its principles, and commitment to resistance, and not on rigorous evaluation of its efficacy, realized or potential. This is not to dismiss or question these findings. Hospes (2014, p. 119) argues that this academic front promoting food sovereignty has formed an epistemic community “to define and defend food sovereignty”. The principles of food sovereignty do indeed uphold democratic integrity and legitimacy, the essential value of small-scale agricultural producers in addressing poverty and food insecurity sustainability, and the value of sustaining a global ecosystem. But these principles are desired ends, and require a strategy on how to arrive at them. It is arguably necessary, but it is ultimately insufficient, to promote food sovereignty in the academic literature on the basis of its principles alone. Understanding how these principles can be achieved as the desired impacts of equitable and sustainable agricultural production and the empowerment of producers is also necessary, but less present in this literature.
A body of academic literature examining food sovereignty through a less partial lens also exists, and has expanded exponentially in recent years. This literature identifies contradictions and ambiguities within the movement, identifying a range of concerns including social justice issues (McMichael, 2014; Bernstein, 2014), class issues (Borras, 2008), gender issues and persistence of patriarchy in traditional and local food systems (Bernstein, 2014; Agarwal, 2014), consumer vs. producer rights (Edelman, 2014), and farmer representations (small, large, export, domestic/local, etc.) (Patel, 2009; Boyer, 2010; Agarwal, 2014; Burnett and Murphy, 2014). These contradictions are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7.

Some of these studies have focused on peasant representation within the movement. Borras (2008) has thoughtfully praised the movement’s efforts while simultaneously pointing to a necessity to question representation in social movements, food sovereignty notwithstanding. Patel, also a supporter of the broader concept and movement, similarly questioned “big tent politics” and the challenges of representation and the exclusion in the food sovereignty movement, where there is a commitment to choice but also a very clearly defined set of principles to which members must adhere (Patel, 2009). Borras and Franco in 2010 argued that the “complex, messy real world exposes multiple dilemmas and challenges…with regard to the land dimension of food sovereignty”, where land distribution, unquestionably essential, does not necessarily lend to “food sovereignty-based development” (Borras and Franco, 2010, pp. 106-107). Boyer (2010), providing one of the few case studies of food sovereignty on the ground, identifies a disjuncture between the opposition to food security in food sovereignty and the importance of food security to peasants on the ground.13

The launch of the Yale conference “Food Sovereignty: A Critical Dialogue”, which took place in New Haven, Connecticut in September 2013, was perhaps the first real forage into questioning the movement’s activities and goals. Many of the papers presented at the conference were published in a special 2015 double issue of Journal of Peasant Studies. The conference brought together researchers, academics, and members of the movement to have a thoughtful discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of the movement. A special edition of Globalizations published in 2015 also tackled some of the complicated questions related to food sovereignty, including “food sovereignty for whom, and how” (Schiavoni, 2015, p. 467) as well as the occurrences of multiple sovereignties and the importance for the movement to move beyond binaries (including trade and local) in order to truly take flight (Iles and deWit, 2015; Shattuck et al., 2015).

Akram-Lodhi argues that the food sovereignty movement has been essential in mobilizing producers and peasants to resist the corporate food regime and to “propel change”, as well as in engaging in policy negotiations in select fora, both among national governments and in, primarily, the UN system (2015, p. 568). But he also acknowledges that “it might be argued that the inability to define a wider range of specific changes that they favour reduces the ability of transformational food sovereignty movements to reshape the perspective of the progressive and reformist strands of global food movements, because it reflects an inability to identify the possible pathways by which societies can move into a more just future” (Akram-Lodhi, 2015, p. 567-8).

13 Rosset et al. (2011) provide a case study, but it is a “self-study”.

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Akram-Lodhi’s last point leads to the subject of my analysis of the movement: how food sovereignty conceptualizes changing the international agricultural trade regime. Some of the radical left scholars have celebrated food sovereignty for its principled objectives in resisting and presenting an alternative to the existing structures of agricultural production and trade. Some have elevated food sovereignty for its radical and principled positions of resistance, compared against other efforts including fair trade (Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck, 2011) and the right to food and food security (Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck, 2011; Fairbairn, 2010; Claeyss, 2015). But in all this, there is little discussion on the practicalities of such radical transformations. While radical resistance might be a strong stance in opposition to the existing regime, does it actually generate change? The literature above does not query the movement’s strategy for change, or the assumptions that a push for radical change will deliver radical change. Rather, it remains primarily focused on the principled features of food sovereignty as a concept and as a movement.

My research attempts to identify both the movement’s strategy for, and its contributions to, changing the international agricultural trade regime, premised on the application of my analytical framework of how change takes place, set out in Chapter 3. The movement’s ideals have shaped its firm and often uncompromising approach to trade, which has resulted in its engagement in contentious politics. As I will show, this contentious politics has created many opportunities to give small-scale producers a voice in shaping trade rules. I argue these are very important accomplishments by the movement in contributing to change. But I also argue that principled objectives are not only insufficient, when too firmly entrenched, they can work against achieving overall goals. Hospes (2014) argues that the radical fixation maintained by the food sovereignty epistemic community might be responsible for the limited take-up of food sovereignty in policy and institutional settings. My own research identifies limits to the food sovereignty movement’s strategy by showing how the radical position of the movement has led it to both refuse to engage in political opportunities and to marginalize many vulnerable producers who may fit under the “big tent” it proposes to have pitched.

**Fair Trade and Change**

A number of academics have also evaluated the fair trade movement against ideals rather than grounded in theories of change, but use this as a benchmark for the movement’s shortcomings. Much of this literature is critical of fair trade for being “neoliberal” and part of the existing international agricultural trade regime and capitalist structures of agricultural production and trade.

For many, the issue is that fair trade seeks to address the problems in the trade system through markets, and specifically individual consumption, which are argued to be characteristic of neoliberalism both in their individualism and in their eschewing of government regulation (Maniates, 2002; Low and Davenport, 2009, p. 87; Lyon and Moburg, 2010, p. 4; Guthman, 2007, p. 456; Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck, 2011, p. 115). Others criticize fair trade markets for upholding institutions they see at odds with economic justice and producer empowerment (Shreck, 2005; Clark and Hussey, 2015; Schmeizer, 2013, p.235). In these views and others, the assumption is that fair trade abandoned political goals in a shift to market-led governance (Vanderhoff Boersma, 2009). A detailed discussion of this takes place later in the dissertation.
The contemporary movement is thus, in this view, at best a reflection of the neoliberal times, and thus an impotent movement. It is at worst, however, supporting and reinforcing the neoliberal system it claims to challenge. These analyses parallel the either/or approach that characterizes efforts based on whether they are challenging or reinforcing neoliberalism. Many of these views have either assumed positions held by those in the fair trade movement about the role of markets in addressing trade injustice, or about private governance. I challenge these assumptions in Chapters 4 and 6, where I present broader characteristics and activities of the movement that dispute these assumptions.

There are others who are not so black and white. These academics identify some neoliberal characteristics within fair trade activities. But they also identify challenges to the neoliberal classification of fair trade. Many of these more nuanced authors are often examining fair trade through a lens attributed to Karl Polanyi (discussed in depth in Chapter 3). Christopher Bacon makes precisely the point that fair trade “is neither purely neoliberal nor social movement led”, and that it is ultimately a “deeply contested, socially embedded process, subject to an array of political economic constraints, personal convictions and path-dependent contingencies” (Bacon, 2010, p. 112). Fair trade, he argues, needs to be fairer, and is not as fair as it used to be. He argues for greater participation of Southern Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), grassroots development stakeholders, and consumer interest groups. He also argues for organizational reforms within Fairtrade to increase transparency and flexibility. Similarly, Jaffee (2012) argues that fair trade as a social movement has “succeeded partially in re-embedding market exchanges within social and moral relations” (Jaffee, 2012, p. 95), but at the same time it has been co-opted by corporate interests by weakening and diluting standards, ultimately disembedding markets from society at the same time (Jaffee, 2012, p. 97).

Bacon (2015) also finds nuance in an examination of the relationship between fair trade and food sovereignty on the ground. Bacon’s case study of a Nicaraguan farmer cooperative engaged with fair trade markets and food sovereignty finds that “cooperative staff and farmers have started to integrate ideas from fair trade, food sovereignty and food security to achieve their organizational and livelihood goals” (Bacon, 2015, p. 482). Bacon argues that “the juxtaposition of fair trade, food security and food sovereignty as competing terms is more perplexing than helpful to policy dialogue on questions of farmer empowerment, hunger alleviation and agricultural sustainability in the global food system” (Bacon, 2015, 470). He argues further that fair trade producer organizations, producer organization Coordinator of Fairtrade Latin America and the Caribbean (CLAC) in particular, may find synergies with food sovereignty principles and objectives because of their own willingness to pursue food sovereignty principles and engage in resistance alongside participating in fair trade and mobilize the two together (Bacon, 2015, p. 483). He finds as well that fair trade producers are not immune to some of the more radical politics of resistance that are the trademark of food sovereignty, even while they also celebrate the same principles that are more anathema to it. For example, CLAC celebrated that Nestlé chose to certify under FLO’s umbrella instead of the less stringent FairTrade USA label after the latter split away from FLO. Overall, Bacon’s study provides context to the complex producer interests and motivations that underpin both of these movements, and how these contribute, as I discuss later, to the different strategies and activities undertaken by each movement.

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14 Though he adds a caveat that these synergies may be limited.
Watson challenges the notion that the individual action, criticized in the more radical literature for being characteristically “neoliberal”, is necessarily anathema to a double movement. He argues instead it can be the start of the double movement:

The incorporation of individuals into a system of market trade might therefore be seen as one aspect of the first stage of the double movement. As such, if we are to understand the heightened significance of fair trade as the manifestation of the second stage of a contemporary double movement, then we should expect fair trade to challenge the primacy of market relations. Yet it is far from clear that this is actually the case. The act of ethical consumption may well challenge assumptions about the amoral status of the content of most market relations. However, fair trade networks have developed within the existing structure of market relations, and their increased prominence has resulted from the decisions of market agents. A Polanyian perspective on fair trade must therefore be rather more nuanced than has thus far been the case (Watson, 2006, p. 436).

In this view, Watson sees the consumer as, on one hand, prioritizing the social over the economic, per Polanyi. On the other hand, he sees this as still located within a market-system. The market system, he argues, is problematic from a Polanyian perspective because it is an “economic fallacy” that the market is the only way for economic relationships to be carried out (Watson, 2006).

That said, Watson problematizes still the distanced relationship in fair trade. He argues that fair trade relationships are “market institutions … constructed on the ostensibly impersonal laws of supply, demand and price determination” such that

the very context within which the rendering less anonymous of the trading relationship takes place is itself based upon the reification of impersonal laws. It is difficult to see, when adopting a Polanyian perspective, exactly how far the re-personalisation of the trading relationship can go under current conditions of fair trade. As Gregory Baum notes, Polanyi believed it to be impossible to construct a truly ethical existence so long as the dominant form of economic life reflects the manifestation of impersonal laws (Watson, 2006, p. 440).

Lyon, in work preceding her edited volume with Moburg (2010), asserts similar cautions on the persistence of distanced relationships in fair trade. She argues that “[o]verstating the exceptional nature of fair trade consumption may weaken the market’s transformative potential” (Lyon, 2006, p. 452). She validates existing claims in the literature, including that fair trade is motivated by “political choices and conscious reflexivity of Northern consumers” (Lyon, 2006, p. 452), and that coffee is defetishized by fair trade’s revelation of the social and environmental impacts of marketing the commodity, and fair trade markets are more equitable and participatory (Lyon, 2006, p. 452). However her major findings are that producers in certified cooperatives have a weak knowledge about and engagement with Fair Trade and that it in fact reinforces producer-consumer differences, findings discussed in Chapter 6 on producer knowledge.

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15 Polanyi’s double movement is discussed in greater detail in chapter 3, but essentially involves the emergence of a movement to resist when the priority of markets takes precedent over the priorities of society more broadly.
Interestingly, Doherty, Davies and Tranchell (the latter is associated with fair trade markets through her work as an executive with Divine Chocolate) highlight that consumers are not necessarily engaged and knowledgeable. Instead, they argue that there is an increased consumer passivity in fair trade as supermarket brands are forcing choice on consumers, and the “balance of influence is shifting further away from radicals and pragmatists to passive consumers who continue to buy KitKat, Starbucks’, Tate & Lyle and Dairy Milk because it is habitual rather than as an active decision to consume fair trade” (Doherty et al., 2013, p. 178). It remains questionable though, to my mind, whether knowledge is necessary for reembedding markets into social relationships. If markets were embedded through regulations requiring fairer trade, as so many suggest is necessary for truly progressive fair trade, it is fairly unlikely that most consumers and producers would possess any greater awareness of the laws guiding markets than in passively purchasing fair trade markets through private governance.

Raynolds is perhaps the most optimistic about fair trade’s contributions as a Polanyian double movement. She argues that fair trade is ‘socially regulated’, and is thus Polanyian for its “engagement of diverse social actors in shaping activity in an economy which is both an arena of institutional coordination and social contestation” (Raynolds, 2012, 278). She builds this conclusion on a nuanced view of the complexity of social regulation and the evolutions of governance in the age of globalization:

In market arenas, movement groups, mission-driven enterprises, and ethically minded consumers uphold Fair Trade’s social foundations, forestalled processes of corporate mainstreaming [sic]. In production arenas, certification standards increasingly outweigh movement commitments in governing Fair Trade practices and while the power of peasant politics is being eroded new openings are being created for engaging labor politics. As I conclude, Fair Trade helps illuminate the complex and contested nature of social regulation in global food market [sic] as movement efforts move beyond critique to socioeconomic construction. […] Although Polanyi focuses on the rise of national state regulatory institutions, policies, and laws, contemporary authors extend this argument to explain the emergence of transnational initiatives for social protection and non-governmental approaches to market regulation (Raynolds, 2012, p. 277, 278).

Raynolds concludes that fair trade “remains both a ‘movement and a market’” (2012, p. 298, citing Raynolds, 2000).

Few of these analyses and evaluations of the fair trade and food sovereignty movements are tied to a theory of change. They are more connected to principled ideas of how food and agricultural systems should be, and whether each movement’s activities are aligned or in opposition to the current status quo (often, but not exclusively neoliberalism). As my theoretical approach will demonstrate, while principled ideas of how things should be, and understanding of the structures that underpin the international agricultural trade regime (and hegemony broadly) are important, these cannot be used to evaluate processes of change. Evaluating within a theory of how the world is ordered tends to look at change as either transformative or submissive. I challenge that this is a sort of grand theorizing that is a privilege of academia and does not adequately reflect the complex processes of change in practice, and the realities faced by those who are living in poverty and hunger on the ground.
Conclusion

This chapter has set the stage for the chapters that follow. It provides an overview of the international agricultural trade regime that both movements acknowledge causes great harm to small-scale agricultural producers in the developing world (and developed). It looked specifically at the international trade rules that were drafted by powerful actors in the global economy to their own advantage, and to the disadvantage of most developing country economies broadly, and their agricultural sectors specifically. It has also given an overview of the power inequalities in global food and agriculture supply chains, identifying how small-scale producers are vulnerable and wield little power against the increasingly concentrated transnational food and agriculture corporations. It is these features of the international agricultural trade regime that highlight not only the common concerns of the food sovereignty and fair trade movements, but the need for significant transformations to the regime. Such change is essential to address the poverty and inequalities that are disproportionally high among rural and agricultural producing populations in developing countries.

The chapter then considers how each movement’s efforts to address these issues are analyzed in the academic literature. It demonstrates an approach in the literature that benchmarks the strengths and weaknesses of each movement based on whether their strategies and activities are in alignment with or in opposition to the current regime. This analytical approach, I argue, is not built on credible theories of change, but rather on principled premises on the need for radical change. While I do not question in this dissertation the need for radical change, I do question how we analyze actors and activities seeking such radical, transformative change. In the next chapter, I look at theories of change, including some political economic theories that theorize radical, transformative change of hegemonic world orders, and those that are more built on theory and practice, to present my analytical framework grounded in practical processes that contribute to change. This is not a blueprint for change, nor does it answer every question about how change happens. It does however provide critical insights into how we analyze efforts at effecting change. Building on the existing literature analyzing these movements, and the theoretical chapter that comes next, the rest of this dissertation lays out the strategies and activities of both the fair trade and food sovereignty movements, concluding with analysis of how these strategies and activities correspond to the analytical framework set out in the next chapter.
Chapter 3: Not an End, Just a Start: A Theoretical Framework of Change

“The key to the future of the world is finding the optimistic stories and letting them be known”.
(Pete Seeger cited in Pareles, 2014)

Welcome to the golden age of speed with grace
Waiting for the angry gods to smite our race
I logged on to Africa in just one day
I opened a door and that’s OK
It’s not an end, it’s just a start
It’s not an end, it’s just a start


The question set out at the beginning of this project is how do we explain, and understand, the two distinct strategies for alternative food markets and systems – food sovereignty and fair trade – in resistance to the same international agricultural trade regime? How we understand these strategies and how we evaluate them is not mutually exclusive. Indeed, how we understand these strategies shapes how we evaluate their effectiveness.

The chapter is organized as follows: it begins with an overview of global governance, discussing which actors and mechanisms count towards shaping governance. From there I discuss Neo-Gramscian and Polanyian theories - two critical theories from the field of international political economy – and what they say (or don’t say) about processes of change. These do not represent the range of radical theories of change, but are examples that reflect the binary grand theorizing I address in this dissertation, where expectations are that change is transformational, without a clear identification of the processes that achieve transformational change. From here I review the literature that results in the analytical framework that appears in the final section. This includes Peter Andrée’s “integrated theoretical approach” that speaks to Gramsci’s theorizing on change and Ilene Grabel’s Hirschmanian approach, both of which treat hegemonic change as dynamic and nuanced rather than abrupt and monumental. After this I explore some of the literature theorizing change in practice, which identifies the different strategies that contribute to change, and their unique but complementary roles. This literature validates both collaborative, inside strategies and confrontational, outside strategies as necessary for shaping governance, but insufficient along in bringing about change. I conclude by bringing these later theories together to develop my own analytical framework.

This chapter contributes to answering these questions by putting forward a theoretical framework of change through which I will later parse the activities and objectives of the food sovereignty and fair trade movements, to help understand their strategies. By overviewing some of the central tenets of the field of Global Governance, I establish the range of assumptions of what actors and activities matter in the effort to make trade equitable and just. I accept that states do not have a monopoly on power in international (and national) politics, recognizing markets, civil society, international organizations and various national and transnational actors and interests as shaping
global governance. I also accept norms, ideas, discourses and knowledge as important factors in shaping global governance, moving beyond the assumptions that rational- and self-interests alone are what motivate decisions.

The theoretical framework also goes beyond the traditional global governance literature to consider beyond just *how the world is ordered* to query the *processes* through which governance comes into place and change happens. I delve into broader literature on development in practice and the roles civil society and social movement actors have in this process and juxtapose this literature with global governance and global political economy theories. I integrate both theories of understanding the world and theories that are more rooted in practice and practicality.

This approach directly challenges the social science academia that adopts grand theories of change through a binary analytical lens that assumes activities are either in opposition to the existing order or is in conformation of it. In contemporary political economy literature, this binary is often manifest as identifying whether something can be categorized as neoliberal or not (Grabel, 2015). This analytical framework contests binary analyses that simplify change to whether it fits outside hegemony, pursuing instead a more nuanced approach to change, one that considers the dynamic and iterative processes that contribute to transformational change.

I am in no way proposing a blueprint for change, nor a comprehensive account of how change happens. Change is complex. This lens is, however, one way in which academics can be more insightful and nuanced in their analysis of social movement and civil society efforts to achieve hard-won tasks. In the case of fair trade and food sovereignty especially, both movements seek what is, today, among the most improbable changes of all—thoughtful and equitable agricultural trade policy. If assessments of the efforts of these movements are oversimplified, they risk missing important developments and opportunities emergent from each movement’s efforts, and contribute less to our understanding of how change can and does in fact take place.

**Global Governance and Change**

Global Governance is a theoretical field that emerged out of International Relations and International Political Economy to convey, among other things, how the world is ordered. International Relations traditionally holds the view that states maintain sovereignty despite the rise of new politically powerful actors, such as civil society and transnational corporations, interdependence that has come with the increased movement of people, goods and financial flows, and related social and economic issues (Krasner, 2001). Global Governance, by contrast, holds the view that the political world has and continues to change, and in the process, states have lost their monopoly on authority (assuming they ever had it). James Rosenau (in Ba and Hoffman, 2005, 145) has famously proposed that global governance is characterized by a “crazy quilt” of multiple spheres of authority, which displaces the state as the only location of authority, or even the primary sphere of authority.

Many have elaborated in detail the patchwork of authority that make up this crazy quilt. When neoliberalism took root in the 1980s, markets, market actors and market interests featured most prominently. Susan Strange has argued that the state has retreated and that market authority has risen, although she suggests that how this authority is distributed depends on the issue, proposing a continuum ranging from market authority that is reinforcing state authority to market authority...
that is undermining state authority, and should be measured on each issue (Strange, 1996, 91-92). Fuchs has empirically shown the power of business actors and the ways they shape policies in states and international institutions (Fuchs, 2005). Fuchs does this by highlighting the structural, instrumental and discursive power of business actors, which has given them a great deal of agenda-setting and rule-setting power as well as a great deal of influence on policies and the norms underlying policies in their interests (Fuchs, 2005). Murphy argues that industry interest groups have a great deal of power in shaping international law (Murphy, 2000). Cutler argues private authority has been obscured in international relations and that TNCs have the power to establish rules, shape norms and discourse. She also argues that International Relations has obscured power asymmetries, as liberals tend to view all actors as equal, assuming a level playing field between civil society and economic spheres, a neutral market (Cutler, 1999). In their edited volume, Clapp and Fuchs demonstrate the ways corporate power is particularly involved in shaping the governance of global food and agriculture (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009). The power of food and agricultural corporations is discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. The rise of private governance is considered a hallmark of the rise of market authority and the decline of the state.

But it is not just market actors that are getting increased validation; civil society is identified as a major actor shaping governance and bringing it democratic legitimacy (Scholte, 2002). While the role of non-state civil society actors in world politics is not a new consideration, it has proliferated in recent decades (Iriye, 2004). Civil society can play an important role in constituting world politics and exercising power and authority in numerous ways within global governance. International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) have played an important role in shaping world culture and social organization, and thus in shaping the environment in which states, corporations and IGOs operate (Boli and Thomas, 1999). INGOs also “provide meaning of action, models for global organizing, forms of discourse and communication, and avenues for influencing states and other actors” (Boli and Thomas, 1999, 320). Looking at environmental issues, human rights and women’s rights campaigns, Keck and Sikkink have demonstrated how Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) use information, ideas and strategies to influence the information and values that shape policies. TANs use socialization techniques through generating symbols and framing, leverage (pressure and persuasion) and accountability politics to create a “strategic portrayal” of an issue to generate substantial normative change” (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, quote p. 8). Fuchs argues that despite the power of business in shaping norms, civil society has an important role in countering business power, by shaping awareness, campaigning and demanding accountability (Fuchs, 2006). McKeon gives an account of how civil society can have a meaningful impact on global governance in food and agriculture when provided space for participation (McKeon, 2009). In addition to the role of state, markets and civil society, international organizations may possess authority independent of the member states or state interests that often oversee them (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). Betsill and Bulkley (2006) argue that authority is also being divested to the subnational level in their assessment of the Cities for Climate Planning initiative.

Actors have more than rational, instrumental power in shaping global governance; norms, ideas, discourses and knowledge also play a part. Early constructivists have argued that state interests and identities were shaped by intersubjective norms and ideas, which generated what it means to behave rationally and be a modern and bureaucratic state (Ruggie, 1998; Wendt, 1992). Haas’s
theory on epistemic communities suggests that professional and expert knowledge can inform states in complex times around issues that generate uncertainty and thus constrain cooperation (Haas, 1997). Others argue that non-state actors such as global civil society can be the authors of norms, information, ideas and even world culture, which can inform states, international organizations, regimes and other institutions (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1999; Keck and Sikkink, 1999; Keohane and Nye, 1972; Young, 2005; Boli and Thomas, 1999; and Meyer et al., 1997, p. 147, the latter who specifically make the argument about world culture). Barnett and Duval offer a reminder, however, that it is necessary to conceive of the complex ways in which power can underlie the making of rules in GG. The authors specifically caution that constructivists have a tendency to overlook the way power is infused within normative structures, as well as how norms can be an expression of power (2005, 41).

The global governance literature provides important insights on the variables involved in shaping global governance, and gives credence to the range of actors, interests and activities that contribute to how global governance is shaped. This literature also identifies a range of mechanisms through which governance takes place. Building from this literature, I treat civil society and social movements as legitimate and important actors in shaping global governance – the entire crazy quilt, from rules and regulations to norms and ideas. The analytical framework on processes of change identified below is founded on this premise. My work is focused on the activities of civil society and social movements, and how they contribute to these processes. This is certainly not a linear or comprehensive account of the broader processes of change. To be clear, my work does not come near to being a comprehensive account of the interests and roles of competing actors and power that shape the opportunities and possibilities for civil society and social movements to achieve their goals. I also give credit to a wide range of outcomes that can be constituted as “change” here, from the easily discernable – such as a shift in policy – to the less obvious and concrete – a change in knowledge or shifting norms. Anything that is influenced within this “crazy quilt” is considered part of the process of change. But it does not mean that this will generate a linear outcome. Nor, importantly, does it lay out how various power politics will play out in the process. But the intention here is to understand how these activities and strategies align with what we know about change; it is not to evaluate their effectiveness in achieving their end goals.

**Critical Political Economy and Governance**

I now turn to two prominent theoretical approaches in the international political economy (IPE) literature – Robert W. Cox’s neo-Gramscian theory of change and Polanyi’s theory of a Double Movement - to help explain a tendency to adopt binaries in social movement analysis. These two theoretical frameworks exemplify engagement of binaries along transformative versus reform lines, though I am not suggesting they are exclusive in doing so. Indeed, they are just two examples that reflect a wider tendency within the radical left literature to adopt a binary approach to thinking about change. They are also theories referenced in the theories I draw on below and in some of the analysis of the movements I reviewed in Chapter 2.

In the Coxian neo-Gramscian approach to radical change, hegemonic structures must be confronted through a counter-hegemonic affront in order to achieve desired change. Gramsci’s hegemony is defined by Cox as “a condition in which the governed accepted or acquiesced in authority without the need for the application of force” (Cox, 2004, p. 311). Hegemony is
manifest in state and civil society forces, and is bound together through material conditions (classified as social relations and physical means of production), and ideas. Material conditions and ideas are not autonomous, but mutually constituting (Cox, 1983, p. 168). This hegemony makes up what is considered a “historic bloc”, whereby these “interacting elements create a larger unity” (Cox, 1983, p. 167). Counter-revolutionary forces constitute a new “historic bloc” (ibid, p. 168).

The current hegemonic order today is understood as neoliberal globalization, which privileges capitalism, particularly unregulated (or selectively regulated) capitalism, transnational capitalist interests and (subjectively) unfettered markets. Hegemonic order is reproduced through not just coercion, but also consent, such that its norms and ideas are embedded in a way that the hegemonic order goes unquestioned by society, making it a dominant principle organizing society (what is often coined as a state of “world order”). States, international institutions, and even global civil society operate within this hegemonic order, reinforcing and reproducing it (Cox, 1983; Cutler, 1999; Andrée, 2007). When attempts at affecting political change do not resist and challenge these structures, they are dismissed as reinforcing and/or reproducing world order (Andrée, 2007; Ford 2005).

Neo-Gramscians have some broad principles that underscore what is necessary to undermine the existing hegemonic bloc. First, “organic intellectuals” are crucial agents who, according to Cox, raise consciousness that serves “to clarify the political thinking of social groups, lead the members of these groups to understand their existing situation in society and how in combination with other social groups they can struggle towards a higher form of society” (Cox, 1999, p.16). Second is a war of position, whereby “a strategy for the long-term construction of self-conscious social groups into a concerted emancipatory bloc within society, must take place. It is only when the war of position has built up a combination of organized social forces strong enough to challenge the dominant power in society that political authority in the state can be effectively challenged and replaced” (ibid). The alternative, a “war of maneuver”, that is, a revolutionary take-over of a state to achieve institutionalize a new hegemonic order, is considered a “fragile victory”, inferior to the war of position, which is more sustainable by virtue that it establishes “a civil society animated through popular participation [as] an indispensable basis for durable new political authority” (ibid).

Cox includes a cautionary note against “passive revolution”, one that does not meet the standards of his theory of hegemonic change, categorizing it as a coopted war of position:

Passive revolution can also take the form of a stalled war of position strategy which is strong enough to provoke opposition but not strong enough to overcome it. Furthermore, a strategy on the part of the dominant power gradually to coopt elements of the opposition forces—a strategy known in Italian politics as trasformismo—is another form of passive revolution. Yet another form would be emancipatory strategies divorced from the material conditions of the social groups involved, inevitably incurring the illusions of utopianism and idealism (Cox, 1999, p. 16).

This passive revolution could be compared to a reform-oriented strategy of change; an approach that cannot be identified as independent of hegemony.
A second and more prominent IPE theory informing radical change is Karl Polanyi’s theory of double movement (Polanyi, 1944). Polanyi argued that the industrial revolution and the subsequent rise of the 19th Century market system embedded society in markets, what he terms the “market society”. While markets had always existed, for the first time society was subordinate to the market and its logics, rather than the inverse. Polanyi argued that change could bring social dislocation, but governments were integral to mitigating and slowing these social dislocations. With the changes that came with the 19th Century, government intervention was eschewed in favour of “blind faith in spontaneous progress” (Polanyi, 1944, p. 79).

Polanyi argued that this resulted in what he termed a “double movement” - the expansion of the liberal market economy and the accompanied resistance by society for self-protection. Common Englanders resisted the market system through social demands, such as labour unions, factory laws, and the like. However, social resistance was “incompatible with the self-regulation of the market” (Polanyi, 1944, p. 136). This generated a “clash of organizing principles”: between economic liberalism and social protection which resulted in deep institutional strains and which generated class conflicts, generating a shift from “crisis” to “catastrophe” (Polanyi, 1944, p. 140). Most notable was the rise of nationalism and fascism, the eventual decline of the international economic coordination, and the emergence of World War II.

From a Polanyian perspective, markets need to be de-naturalized, with a moral imperative to ensure that markets are subordinate to society and society is not subordinate to markets. Polanyi’s dichotomy arguably has more space for nuance than Gramsci’s, whereby one can see a governance mechanism or process as prioritizing social objectives, even if it is not generating a totalized transformation of the entire market system (as with a “hegemonic bloc”). That said, he does make some precise statements on re-embedding markets in society, notably the tie to state regulation of markets to control them, and the absence of “false commodities”, that is, the commodification of land, labour and money.

Such binary theories of change are adopted in the literature critical of contemporary agricultural production and trade, even though the theories themselves are not always explicitly referenced. The neo-Gramcian framework is only rarely explicitly referenced (Guthman, 2007; Shreck, 2005). Yet, the neo-Gramscian approach to hegemonic change is closely mirrored in analytical framings of an activity or movement labeled as “neoliberal” or not neoliberal, radical or reform, resisting or reinforcing, etc., even if not directly referenced. Moore, Gibbon and Slack, while they only use the term “hegemony” once, highlight tensions between the mainstreaming of fair trade and a genuine confrontation of this paradigm, and question whether a “dominant social paradigm” can be confronted from within, or must be confronted from without (Moore, Gibbon, and Slack, 2007). Overall, the literature review on each movement in Chapter 2 demonstrates a tendency among many academics who analyze these movements to adopt binary lenses, seeking to determine if a radical transformation of the existing international agricultural trade system will result from the studied movement’s activities and principles. Polanyi, in contrast to Gramsci/neo-Gramscianism, is more frequently referenced directly, found in studies seeking to classify whether a movement or activity is a “double movement”. We see this especially in fair trade (Watson, 2006; Guthman, 2007; Bacon, 2010; Jaffée, 2007; Jaffée, , 2012; Raynolds, 2012).
These theories provide important conceptual contributions to understanding how the socio-political and economic world is ordered, particularly on dominant organizing principles and hegemony. But their contributions to our understanding of processes of change are called into question here. I lump these approaches, and those that mirror them, into the “grand theorizing” category that have questionable practical application for explaining change. Polanyi’s theory of a double movement has more credibility in light of its empirical support, but not for its universality. Meanwhile, I have yet to come across an empirical substantiation of Cox’s application of Gramsci’s theory of counter-hegemonic change. As a result, when these theories, or theories that adopt similar binary approaches to change, are used for evaluating food sovereignty or fair trade, there is a tendency to evaluate the movement by drawing a dichotomy between whether it is reflective of the existing world order, or counter to it. This can lend to analytical conclusions that the activities and strategies of each movement are reinforcing neoliberalism or countering it based on the principles of their actions, but not on the effectiveness of these actions. As Gaventa and McGee note, “the vast literature on social movements and collective action focuses on explaining the whos and whys of these movements themselves, but not necessarily the policy changes to which they contribute” (Gaventa and McGee, 2010, p. 10). Such binary approaches can also homogenize movement efforts without identifying the nuance of some activities against others.

As a result of this tendency towards binaries that abstract from process, I look to a broader literature to understand better what processes result in change, and the various impacts different activities have on global governance. This framework relies quite heavily on a theoretical framework established by Peter Andrée in his book, Genetically Modified Diplomacy (2010), which evaluates the political negotiations of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, but also draws on nuanced critical theory and some of the theorizing of development in practice.

**Not an End, Just a Start**

The importance of understanding processes of change cannot be understated. As Jan Aart Scholte put succinctly, “it is relatively easy to compile wish lists. It is something else to get wishes fulfilled” (Scholte, 2005, p. 417). One of my interviewees, who has been involved with in-depth United States policy advocacy for decades, first with Friends of the Earth, and today as Director of Policy and Research Oxfam America, goes further to point out the challenges of achieving wishes that are at odds with the status quo:

> It’s easier to make critiques than to be propositional, and in being propositional, to be very practical about what can be done. Saying another world is possible is great, but getting from here to there is pretty monumental, and not nearly as easy as you might imagine, because on the way from here to there are a lot of interests that get hurt to get there (Kripke, 2012)

This is not meant to justify acquiescence to adversity, but it does justify a thoughtful consideration of processes of change, beyond just how things “should be” and on achieving “ultimate goals”. It justifies an acknowledgement that change requires a sophisticated strategy that has some grounding in reality and processes of transition.
Challenging dichotomies in favour of nuance is not new; E.H. Carr, often considered one of the founders of International Relations, argued that political thought must be based on a balance of utopia and realism. Utopianism unchecked, he argued, is naivety, and realism unchecked breeds sterility. Instead, he argued that utopianism is also purposive and realism provides objectivity through observation and analysis. If these two positives are brought to the table, we find what he characterizes as “mature thought” (Carr, 1964, p. 10). More recently, Patomaki argued blueprints and ideas of radical transformations have ‘closed ends’ and thus might both preclude reality, and not take into account specific contexts, present and historical. He advocates instead for “critical realism”, which tends “to work for enhancing the self-transformative capability of contexts by criticizing untrue naturalizations, reifications and fetishations of social being and related mystifications of knowledge; by making arguments for peaceful transformation; and by creating mechanisms of reflective learning” (2003, p. 367).

Mature thought and critical realism are exemplified in Scholte’s (2005) theorizing of globalization, in which he straddles the reality that globalization will not recede with the need for a more equitable and sustainable globalization. He frames globalization as a governance issue rather than an inherent problem, arguing convincingly that globalization both negatively and positively affects human security, social equality, and democracy. The balance between positive and negative globalization, he argues, is shaped by policies, and he indicted the neoliberal policy order underpinning globalization rather than globalization itself as the cause for negative outcomes. He thus advocates what he terms a critical middle ground approach, what he characterizes as a “blend of ambitious reformism and cautious transformism”. A critical middle ground includes balancing between constructivist ideals and materialist powers, finding a common ground between globalist and skeptics, re-empowering states and recognizing new sites of authority, and recognizing globalization as being both shaper and shaped by society.

Scholte’s argument for reformism “does not stop at social safety nets, environmental impact statements and corporate citizenship, but in addition undertakes far-reaching public regulation and progressive redistribution of resources” (Scholte, 2005, p. 392). He also argues for a form of transformism that imagines beyond the status quo. He envisions this critical middle ground approach as a form of “post-capitalist solidarity economics with alternative models of work and consumption” and argues that it “merit[s] a serious hearing and concerted efforts at elaboration and implementation” (Scholte 2005, p. 394). In making this argument, he examines the situations he believes would enable and inhibit his ideas (see Scholte, 2005, p. 417-421) in order to avoid claims of utopianism, but caveats that he is only laying the groundwork on how to think about the future.

My analytical framework builds off these nuanced approaches, departing from a sole consideration of how the world is ordered and goals for binary, transformative change, to thinking about the complex, dynamic processes of change. My framework considers how we might engage “mature thought”, how such a critical “middle” ground approach might be implemented through a balancing of reality and utopianism, and how can we conceive of strategies that do not rely on a “blueprint” for change. I do this in the following sections, drawing on a handful of academics who present theoretical frameworks of change that explicitly denounce binary theories of change in favour of more nuanced ideas.
Peter Andrée’s Integrated Theoretical Approach

The foundation for my analytical framework is Peter Andrée’s (2010) evaluation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB) and its role in governing genetically modified organisms. Andrée builds on a neo-Gramscian premise of a present hegemonic world order. However, he also confronts the neo-Gramscian tendency to dichotomize policy and governance mechanisms as either hegemonic or counter-hegemonic. He instead attempts to build a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which the various components of global governance can contribute to change.

Andrée labels this an “integrated theoretical approach” identified as the interaction of norms, ideas, discourses, interests and knowledges that shape governance (Andrée 2007, p. 27-36). This theoretical approach grafts together a neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony with Michel Foucault’s theory of discourse. Like many others, Andrée (2007) identifies the existing global hegemonic bloc as neoliberal globalization, established through coercion and consent, and links it to OECD countries and the transnational capitalist class. However, he also draws on Foucault’s discourse theory, which suggests that, “because of their status as truth claims, discourses have a kind of agency, or normalizing power, in politics” (ibid, p. 23), which both set the boundaries on what makes sense and marginalizes those voices that do not, or cannot, fit within the dominant discourse, thus constraining opposition to the status quo (Andrée, 2007). Effectively, both these theories jointly identify the myriad of active forces that are forming and constraining resistance to hegemony.

What is relevant to this project is the way in which Andrée develops a theoretical framework that imagines changing hegemonic structure. Andrée argues that Gramsci’s theory of hegemony failed to conceptualize change, which he identifies as a ‘hole’ in his work (2007, p. 190). This hole has led those adopting a neo-Gramscian approach to overly dichotomize hegemonic and counter-hegemonic approaches to governance. “This counter-hegemonic approach suggests that political conflict takes place between static, dichotomous poles, a situation we don’t see in most fields of politics” (2007, p. 190). Instead, he promotes a more ‘fluid’ approach to analysis, where political struggle is understood to be continuously occurring within a hegemonic bloc, such that discursive and hegemonic politics, and power dynamics, are unpredictable and constantly evolving (ibid, p. 291).

Andrée’s (2007) analysis draws on this ‘fluid’ lens to evaluate this political struggle. He finds that both those seeking to resist and those seeking to reinforce hegemony not only shape governance (specifically through the CPB negotiations) but he argues that they also evolve, conforming to one another in doing so. More specifically, he demonstrates that, while at the end of the day the governance of biotechnology conformed to the hegemonic world order, the hegemonic structure did not come out of the negotiation process as those who were supporting it would have liked. Rather, the emergent hegemonic bloc had to accommodate some of the discourses, norms and interests of the resistance camp. Thus he concludes that the politics of biotechnology both conforms to and counters hegemony, which disputes common understandings of hegemony as immutable outside of counter-hegemonic structural change.

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1 Lucy Ford draws some very similar conclusions in her analysis of the love canal environmental crisis, although she draws on a less rigorous theoretical framework than Andrée, I will draw on her work to complement Andrée’s.
Finally, Andrée argues that the ongoing political struggle around biotechnology maintains a space for the discourses, norms and ideas of resistance to shape related policies.

**Grabel’s Hirschmanian Approach**

Ilene Grabel, complementing Andrée, also provides insightful and compelling ideas on processes of change amidst neoliberal hegemony that challenges the binary grand theorizing of transformational hegemonic change (Grabel, 2015). She employs a “Hirschmanian” analytical framework and, drawing on her empirical analysis of global financial architecture after the global financial crisis, argues:

> Change can and does happen in many ways. The romanticized view on the left and the right holds that institutional Armageddon followed by wall-to-wall, coordinated transformation is the only way to effect meaningful change. I argue not only that this view fails to capture the diverse ways in which change occurs, but also that it glorifies a form of change that is decidedly not ideal (Grabel, 2015, p. 389).

This “Hirschmanian” approach is rooted in the thinking of its namesake, development economist Albert O. Hirschman, who also challenged grand theories and grand utopian ideas of transformation over more dynamic processes of change (Grabel, 2015). Such grand theories allowed for “reductionist causal relationships, quick fixes and simple-minded solutions to complex challenges” (Grabel, 2015, p. 394). Grabel invokes instead Hirschman’s concept of “possibilism” – the idea that small-scale, messy, disparate innovations revealed what could be; what reforms might be available. Central to his view is an emphasis on uncertainty – on imperfect, deficient knowledge of what is and what might be. Hirschman counterpoised possibilism to the predominant ‘futilism’ in the social sciences (and especially in development economics) – “the view that any initiatives that were not entirely consistent with the precepts of received theory were bound to fail” (Grabel, 2015, p. 394).

Grabel’s Hirschmanian approach eschews single solutions to complex problems, akin to the critique against single “recipes” put forward by contemporary economist Dani Rodrik (Grabel, 2015, Rodrik, 2007). In Grabel’s view, “Hirschman was deeply suspicious of ‘coherence’, which is predicated on the notion of the social world as a simple social system, where everything fits, and which dictates ex-ante what can and cannot work. His view was that it is imperative to learn from multiple examples rather than to seek truth in blackboard economics” (Grabel, 2015, p. 396). In applying this idea, Grabel convincingly argues we need to identify when governance is marked by discontinuity with neoliberalism, and not just when it demonstrates continuity. In doing so herself, her research finds that there are far more fractures in the neoliberal order than acknowledged in the post-crisis literature on global financial architecture. This leads her to argue we are in a post-neoliberal era.

Grabel’s Hirschmanian approach also points to several principles that target the “lamentable evaluation criteria” that reinforce the grand theorizing approach to change:

1. Institutional coherence and adherence to a strict model is not a legitimate objective. Diversity of development paradigms that are complementary and perhaps overlapping are more likely to address the complexity of development challenges on the ground.
2. Viability across time and space is not a priority. Rather, we might assume that innovative governance will adjust in the face of challenges.
3. A single response need not be sufficient, or address every element of a problem.
4. Scalability and universality is not a harbinger of success, pointing again to the necessity of diversity.
5. Fundamental change is not a mark of success. Minor changes have relevance. Fundamental change is largely a utopian, unattainable ideal (Grabel, 2015 p. 397).

Grabel (2015) labels this approach “productive incoherence”. It is a form of decentralization - not necessarily from the state - as a form of overarching institutional governance. Coherence itself, she reminds us, is a principle of neoliberalism. It centralizes power and authority in governance, and gives less opportunity for democratic voice and representation, as exemplified in institutions such as the IMF. By contrast, decentralization and incoherence open space for diverse policies that are tied more closely to democratic voice, and give more opportunity for exit (Grabel, 2015). This Hirschmanian approach embraces the diverse governance mechanisms that provide opportunity, without the expectation of sufficiency, scalability, viability, and, most importantly here, fundamental, overarching change.²

Theorizing Development in Practice

Gaventa and McGee offer a practical approach to development and change, adopting a very similar view on change in practice (Gaventa and McGee, 2010). The authors demonstrate that policy change relies on intersecting approaches from civil society and social movements that embody both compromise and radical practices, and that each approach plays a complementary but necessary role in change. This practical approach does not treat compromise as co-optation, as Cox’s neo-Gramscian view might, but rather sees it as part of the necessary process of change, more akin to Andrée, who identifies how compromise is adopted by both those within and those at odds with hegemony. Gaventa and McGee, like Grabel, also challenge how we perceive the “success” of a movement, to align with the range of approaches that seek and achieve different goals, at least in the short-term, but still contribute to change.

Gaventa and McGee consider when political opportunities are present for change and when they must be forged: “opportunities open the way for political action but movements make opportunities” (Gaventa and McGee, 2010, p14, quoting Gamson and Meyer, 1996). As such, they find space both for those civil society actors that seek to work with existing policy space to bring about change, and those engaging contentious politics to create opportunity where it is not to be found. For those working with existing opportunities, change requires “commonality and collaborations” through “broad coalitions of deeply embedded social actors, who also link to and build alliances with reformers in the state”, which requires broader engagement with not just political actors, but media, the public, national, sub-national and international organizations (Gaventa and McGee, 2010, p. 35-37).

² Most of this comes from Grabel, 2015. However, some parts are also from a talk she gave on her forthcoming work for the University of Ottawa International Political Economy Network lunch on April 7, 2016. The talk was titled “The Global Crisis and the Architecture of Development Finance”. http://www.cepi-cips.ca/event/the-global-crisis-and-the-architecture-of-development-finance/
However, when opportunities for desired change are not present, then a different strategy is necessary—one that mobilizes contentious politics that is often more confrontational than it is compromising, involving:

a greater focus on collective action and popular mobilization, as well as skillful use of high-profile media. [Such strategies] also often involved conflict and antagonism, rather than more comfortable partnerships with government. This [requires] strong, relatively independent civil society actors who [can] challenge and hold their own against powerful interests (2010, p. 28).

The concept of contentious politics builds off some earlier literature on social movements and change, closely tied to the work of Sidney Tarrow. In his work on power in social movements, Tarrow argues that “contentious politics is triggered when changing political opportunities and constraints create incentives to take action…”, such that “ordinary people – often in alliance with more influential citizens and with changes in public mood – join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities and opponents” (2011, p 8). Tarrow notes further that in contentious action, “organizers exploit political opportunities, respond to threats, create collective identities and bring people together to mobilize them against more powerful opponents” (2011, p. 8).

Oxfam’s Duncan Green, who has spent a great deal of time researching and writing on how change happens, posits similarly to Gaventa and McGee that change happens neither unilaterally through contentious politics, nor through political engagement involving compromise (Green, 2008; 2012). Instead, change often requires simultaneous “inside” and “outside” advocacy strategies. In similar vein to “contentious” politics, those on the “outside” seek to forge opportunities and are situated from a position of resistance. By contrast, those that operate “inside” work with existing opportunities, comparable to Gaventa and McGee’s (2010) engagement through “commonality and collaboration”. Green makes clear that those on the “inside” require those on the “outside” to generate opportunities for such collaboration and commonality. But those on the “outside” do not often directly shape what goes on the “inside”:

One regular source of tension [within civil society] is over whether to pursue the tactics of ‘outside’ confrontation, for example mass street protests, or less visible ‘insider’ engagement, such as lobbying. An outsider strategy based on mass mobilisation often needs stark, unchanging messages, but these can alienate officials and political leaders, and limit the insiders’ access to decision-makers. Conversely, an insider strategy muddies the waters with compromises, undermining mobilisation and raising fears of betrayal and co-optation. Yet both are necessary and a joint ‘insider-outside’ strategy can be highly effective. Conflict and co-operation are often both required to change policies, mindsets and intransigent leaders (Green, 2012 p. 52).

These authors present change as dynamic rather than transformative, necessitating at times flexibility and constant reflexivity, thus making it necessary for civil society strategies to understand the political context they wish to shape. The processes through which opportunities open and close are often long – spanning years – and are “historic, dynamic and iterative”
(Gaventa and McGee, 2010, 15) with opportunities present largely as a result of previous mobilizations, but liable to change at any time. As opportunities emerge, new forms of resistance will also be present. Effectively, opportunities are ever shifting, and thus civil society must be reflexive to their presence and absence.

Change on fundamental issues requires contention and contestation – both inherent in how they are framed as well as in how they are fought. But at other times it requires commonality and collaboration among a broad range of stakeholders who will not always agree. This view challenges approaches to participation and civic engagement which reduce such processes to technical approaches, or the notions of and processes of national ownership’ achieved through non-contentious consultation and dialogue but which veil vast chasms of differences in power and interests. On the other hand, this view also challenges those who argue that change must always come from below and from outside through confrontation. The trick is to combine these, and know when to use which to achieve change (Gaventa and McGee, 2010, p. 36).

These theoretical approaches validate a critical perspective that is less dichotomizing in its assessment of policy and governance mechanisms and their contributions to transformational change. It demonstrates that change is more fluid, dynamic and iterative, rather than radical and transformative, as posited in the critical IPE literature reviewed above. These approaches recognize that different processes and different strategies play different roles in reaching the same end. They identify “radical” and “reform” as more complementary than competing. They also challenge how we understand hegemony, making it less immutable, less static, and perhaps less powerful, than is often thought, and provide a more sophisticated understanding of the processes that underlie hegemonic change.

**An analytical framework of change for moving forward**

I opened this chapter with two quotes. The first is from the late American folk musician and activist Pete Seeger encouraging us that “the key to the future of the world is finding the optimistic stories and letting them be known”. Seeger, a tireless advocate for socioeconomic, racial, and environmental justice, known as much for his peaceful protests as for picking up trash as he walked up a street, saw his fair share of reasons to lose optimism. Seeger lived more than 90 years, through several wars, and was a target during the McCarthy era which saw him convicted (and later acquitted) of contempt of Congress and banned from performing as a musician throughout the country. The second is from the contemporary American folk musician and activist Dar Williams’ song *The World is Not Falling Apart*. In the song, as I interpret it, Williams grapples with the challenges of feeling limited in the small actions we take to change the world’s many challenging problems. I reference it because I believe she is on to something when she presents in the song the notion that each action, however limited, “is not an end, it’s just a start”.

I chose these quotes as an anchor to the theoretical framework adopted in this dissertation, which adopts a dynamic and fluid view of change, in contrast to the dichotomous grand theorizing on change. This framework eschews a sole focus on the shortcomings of the actions and strategies for change that are not fully transformational, and identifies positive contributions
of these actions and how they can be considered a part of the process towards transformational change. In short, it helps find the optimistic stories, and situates them as not an end, but just a start. I set forward in the next pages, drawing on the theoretical discussion above, this framework, through which I will analyze the food sovereignty and fair trade movements to explain and understand their strategies for changing the international agricultural trade regime.

To begin, the global governance literature provides important insights on the variables involved in shaping governance, and gives credence to the range of actors, interests and activities that contribute to how global governance is shaped. This literature also identifies several mechanisms through which governance takes place. Building from this literature, I treat civil society and social movements as legitimate and important actors in shaping global governance – the entire crazy quilt, from policies and regulations to norms, discourses and ideas. My analytical framework is founded on this premise

My analytical framework draws from the theories above that question grand theories of totalizing change, while giving credibility to smaller outcomes as part of transformational change. I adopt here an analytical framework that builds off these nuanced approaches, departing from a focus on how the world is ordered and static views of change to thinking about processes of change. I argue this framework reflects the “mature thought” where utopian naivety and realist sterility are tempered, and represents a critical “middle” ground approach that balances the opportunities of reality and the possibilism towards the ideals that are sought. This framework adopts Grabel’s “productive incoherence” that gives legitimacy to the decentralized collection of diverse policies, regulations and governance mechanisms that are all part of the crazy quilt, even when they are not sufficient, scalable, viable, and representative of fundamental, overarching change. It also assumes Grabel’s lens of Hirschmanian possibilism where small-scale and disparate governance mechanisms are all integral to change. Finally, it is also careful to consider how activities and outcomes reflect discontinuities with hegemony, rather than just continuities.

The framework treats these governance mechanisms as the products of both inside and outside strategies, strategies that, when used correctly, are complementary and not competitive. Outside strategies, used here as equivalent to Tarrow’s “contentious politics”, play an important role in creating opportunities for change where none exist. This does not mean that resultant opportunities will be the final desired outcome, but rather opportunities can often only represent movement towards desired outcomes. The absence of opportunity necessitates “conflict and antagonism, rather than more comfortable partnerships with government (Gaventa and McGee, 2010, p. 28). Inside strategies, in turn, take advantage of perceived opportunities to influence governments by finding commonality and adopting collaboration. Similarly, these opportunities are not necessarily pointed towards the desired final outcomes, but are moving in that direction. In following Andrée’s “integrated theoretical approach”, and Grabel’s points on discontinuity with hegemony, these inside strategies can contribute to transformational, as “counter-hegemonic”, change, even if they don’t immediately result in it.

Following Andrée (2007), Gaventa and McGee (2010), and Green (2012; 2008), compromise is treated as part of the process of change, and not necessarily anathema to transformation. This does not mean that all compromise contributes to change, but neither does it mean that all compromise is a reinforcement of hegemony. Compromise by both those pursuing progress and
by those seeking to uphold and expand hegemony is part of the dynamic process of change. Both inside and outside strategies necessarily involve compromise in the process of change. Outside strategies use contentious politics to create new opportunities, but that does not mean these opportunities are a direct path to desired ends; they are part of a dynamic, continuously changing landscape of governance. Inside strategies, by their very nature of being collaborative, often require diplomatic finesse to ensure maintaining strong relationships. Inside strategies tend not to rock the boat, and are less aggressive than outside strategies. Inside strategies are more focused on working towards a goal based on the opportunities that are perceived to be present before civil society and social movements. These two strategies work in tandem, and neither can succeed without the other. They are part of what Gaventa and McGee identified above as a long process to bring about change.

This framework is used to explain and understand the strategies of each movement seeking to change the international agricultural trade regime. In developing this framework, I share the assumption of a neoliberal hegemonic world order, and where society is subject to the interests of markets and not vice versa. I do not question the need for transformational change of the international agricultural trade regime, as characterized in Chapter 2. But my dissertation is limited to analyzing the activities and strategies of civil society and social movements, and how they contribute to these processes. Also noted in Chapter 2, my work does not come near to being a comprehensive account of the interests and roles of competing actors and power that shape the opportunities and possibilities for civil society and social movements to achieve their goals. My work is not an evaluation of the outcomes of these activities and strategies, as that would require an entirely different framework of analysis. It is rather an analysis that helps determine the validity of these activities and strategies to address trade governance, based on what we know about how change happens.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented the analytical framework though which the data presented in subsequent chapters, in support of the explanations and understandings of both movements, will be analyzed. It is premised on a theorizing of how governance, and change, happens, in somewhat general terms, but much greater specificity than is found in most of the literature analyzing these movements. A radical act of resistance may not transform the world, but it may open a door towards doing so, or close a door that thwarts change. At the same time, one small normative change can set the path for broader policy change. Building awareness on an issue can set the path for broader policy change. Taken in isolation, these might seem too small to be significant. But the field of Global Governance and theories on the processes underpinning change in practice situate small changes as part of a much bigger whole. An alternative market such as fair trade may not reach everyone or fix everything, but it may provide an opportunity for vulnerable populations while also generating increased awareness and different norms on trade. The contributions of each small change are not ends, but new starting points, part of a dynamic process of creating and seizing opportunities, on which future change can be built. This is perhaps suitably analogous to rock climbing, where the climber has to locate spaces to place their feet and hands to bring themselves higher up. This is neither an instantaneous process, nor is it always linear. There are times when the climber has to descent or go sideways in search of a place to grab hold in order to eventually meet their goal. But each step matters; the same is true with the process of change.
This analytical framework is put forward cautiously. It is not to build a false optimism nor allow for complacency. Pete Seeger, less famously, also said “the real revolution will come when people realise the danger we're in...I'm not as optimistic as people think I am. I think we have a 50-50 chance of there being a human race in 100 years” (Helmore, 2007). The point here is to endorse a balance of optimism with realism. I call this “critical optimism”. It is a cautious optimism for contesting injustice that still draws on Robert W. Cox’s “critical theory” to acknowledge and challenge institutional and social power relations. But it does not take the perspective that if you do not confront the entire system that you are ignoring its sway or being absorbed by it, as Cox supposes in the concomitant, and problematized, “problem solving” theory. This framework recognizes the significance of targeting the root and structural causes of the problems social movements seek to change. But more moderate efforts at change and contestation must not be dismissed nor overgeneralized as part of hegemony. That is, discontinuity with, and not just counter-, hegemony matters to hegemonic change. This framework does not situate change on one of two poles. Nor does it situate change along a continuum. Change happens on a messy map that is perhaps most analogous to a constellation, that does not fit neatly on a simple straight line, but in the mess of dynamic, interacting social and political activities that are characteristic of humanity and our day to day lives.
Chapter 4: Trouble in the Fields: Fair Trade and Food Sovereignty Responses to Governance Opportunities After the Food Crisis

Baby I know that we got trouble in the fields
And the bankers swarm like locusts out there, turning away our yields
And the trains roll by our silo, silver in the rain
Leave our pockets full of nothing but these dreams of the golden grain

(Nanci Griffiths, Trouble in the Fields)

Introduction

In 2008, the global economic and food crises gave a dramatic demonstration of the vulnerability of the world’s poorest people to rising food prices. The combined crises bluntly exposed the failings of existing governance of global food and agriculture to prevent food price volatility and to address the immediate and structural causes of the vulnerability of the world’s poorest to this volatility (Clapp, 2009; Clapp and Cohen, 2009). In fact, key elements of existing governance were responsible for heightened vulnerability. In response to the crisis, new political spaces opened up as national and international initiatives sought to better govern agriculture and food sectors. These political spaces and policy efforts have provided opportunities for a substantial reshaping of global food and agriculture, and with these opportunities, renewed struggles over whose interests will be served and at whose expense.

In his work on the efficacy of social movements, Sidney Tarrow argues that “contentious politics is triggered when changing political opportunities and constraints create incentives to take action…” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 6). While recent literature on food governance has demonstrated the changing political opportunities and constraints that emerged from the food crisis (see Clapp, 2009b; McKeon, 2011; Murphy and Wise, 2012), little specific attention has been given to how these opportunities have been acted upon. In this paper, I provide an initial enquiry into the responses of two social movements – the fair trade and food sovereignty movements – to the recent food crisis and some of the more prominent multilateral global governance initiatives emergent from it. I find that while participation in Fairtrade markets may have provided crucial practical benefits, helping farmers mitigate some of the impacts of the food crisis, the movement does not appear to have responded to the governance opportunities emergent in the wake of the crisis. As a result, the movement has missed valuable opportunities to return to its historic roots of engaging with and shaping governance initiatives through advocacy and participation in governance institutions – opportunities that can be important to effecting the changes it seeks in structures of global agriculture and trade. By contrast, the food sovereignty movement has engaged extensively with the global governance mechanisms emergent in the wake of the crisis,

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1 This is a published article (Burnett 2013), with slight modifications to reflect feedback from my dissertation committee members.
2 The use of Fairtrade (as a singular) word denotes the Fairtrade certification market specifically, under Fairtrade International (FLO). Fair trade (two words) reflects non-market elements of the fair trade movement. Two words are used for the broader movement as well, which includes the Fairtrade market.
establishing itself as a civil society leader in the governance of food and agriculture at the international level.

The paper begins with a sketch of the 2007-2008 food crisis and a brief overview of multilateral global governance mechanisms that emerged in its immediate aftermath, focusing on the reform of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations’ (FAO) Committee on World Food Security (CFS), the High Level Task Force for World Food Security (HLTF), and the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP). While foremost just an overview, I reflect on how these spaces incorporate public participation, as characteristics of legitimate governance. I then turn to an examination of the efforts of the fair trade and food sovereignty movements following the food crisis. I focus on these two movements because both are responding to the same global structures of agricultural production and trade that are argued to be a central cause of the vulnerability of small farmers and the world’s poor to global food price volatility. I analyze how each movement has responded to the global food crisis and the global governance mechanisms that are in place, and how this relates to their goals to challenge existing structures of global agricultural production and trade. Billions of the world’s poorest people remain vulnerable to continued food price volatility. Engagement by social movements in shaping new governance spaces is imperative to ensuring the representation of the interests of those vulnerable to food insecurity and poverty from volatile prices.

Good research comes with a caveat or two. First, this study focuses on direct responses by the movements to the post-food crisis opportunities examined here. I am neither suggesting this is the only work of the movements, nor that direct interaction is a sole, or prime, form of effective governance. For example, in 2011 the food sovereignty movement was working to negotiate a Declaration, and eventually a Convention, securing Peasants’ Rights within the UN (Edelman and James, 2011; the declaration was not yet enacted as of May 2016). The fair trade movement has made efforts in political advocacy at the European level and the national level, particularly in the United Kingdom. Indirect work of the movements can also have important impacts on governance, most notably by creating new norms to eventually shape policies. Establishing Peasants’ Rights, even informally, can have important future impacts on governance of global food and agriculture (Edelman and James, 2011). Fair trade, meanwhile, has arguably raised considerable awareness of the inequitable nature of commodity trade, effectively countering the once frequently touted claims that “free trade is fair trade”. While in no way to diminish these accomplishments, direct engagements with emerging spaces is examined here because these spaces are seen to be unique opportunities for shaping governance, and are specifically in response to the food crisis. Second, the research conducted here examined communications, publicly available documents and reports released by prominent groups in each respective movement during and after the time of the food crisis. Further research involving conversations with the broader range of groups and individuals involved in each of these umbrella movements

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3 See for example the work of the Fair Trade Advocacy Office and the UK’s Fairtrade UK.
4 A 2010 debate that took place within The Economist reflects one example of fair trade rising to greater credibility over free trade. The magazine asked readers to vote on whether trade should be fairer or freer, showcasing two contrasting positions seeking to answer the questions. The magazine explicitly promotes economic liberalism that would cause one to anticipate its readers would vote for free trade, but ultimately readers voted for fairer trade. At the time of writing the debate was available online here: http://www.economist.com/debate/overview/172
is essential to better understand the complexities of each movement’s approach and response to governance opportunities following the food crisis.

The Global Food Crisis

Food Price Volatility and Impacts: An Overview

The 2007-2008 global food crisis pushed the number of hungry people in the world past one billion for the first time in recorded history, revealing serious problems with the structures and governance of global food and agriculture. Between 2006 and 2008, food prices rose by nearly 60%, with global grain prices doubling (FAO, 2011). At their peak, prices hit their highest level in 30 years (FAO, 2011). This was devastating for poor populations in developing countries. With between 60-80 percent of their expenditures going to food, many poor households in developing countries had insufficient access to food (WFP, n.d.). Food import bills soared for many developing counties, draining foreign exchange reserves. Food price volatility persists today, and fundamental changes to the underlying causes of the 2007-2008 food crisis have not been addressed in a systematic way so as to achieve greater price stability (Blas, 2011). A repeat of the 2008 global food crisis remains all too possible without such structural changes, as vulnerability persists and “the higher prices and higher levels of food price volatility in international markets are not short lived” (HLPE, 2011). Even amidst temporary reprieves in global food price increases, many developing countries continued to struggle with higher domestic food prices (HLPE, 2011).

Explanations for the Food Crisis

The 2007-2008 global food crisis was the result of a confluence of short-to-medium term and root, structural factors (see Clapp and Cohen, 2009; Mittal, 2009; De Schutter, 2009; and Constantin, 2008 for details), though vulnerability to and impacts of high food prices played out differently for different populations, in accordance with domestic and national agro-ecological situations (HLPE, 2011). The crisis was in part the result of immediate shocks to the market that were occurring at the time. The relative depreciation of the US dollar and the rising price of oil (used for agricultural inputs, transportation and market factors) generated a rise in food prices. Supply-side factors also influenced both the short-term rise in food prices as well as a steady rise in food prices in the years leading up to the crisis. These include declining production due to weather events, ecological degradation, rising consumption of food generally and of more grain-intensive meat, depleted grain stocks, and the diversion of food crops to biofuel production (Conceição and Mendoza, 2009). Though contentious, a link between speculation on commodity financial markets and price spikes is strongly supported (see HLPE, 2011; Clapp, 2009b; IATP, 2008). However, while these explanations explain the general rise in the price of food and the

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5 Increased food consumption and biofuels as two contributing factors remains controversial; a recent report of the High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security (HLPE) argued that meat and grain consumption in emerging economies were questionably significant, while biofuels were a much more important contributor. See HLPE 2011. See also Ghosh 2011.
localized spike in 2007-2008, they fall short of pointing to the structural contexts underlying the vulnerability of populations to this spike.

Consideration of the root, structural causes underlying the food crisis and vulnerability to it, many of which are interconnected, must also be targeted (Clapp and Cohen, 2009; Clapp, 2009a; Mittal, 2009). Already detailed elsewhere, these are briefly listed here (McKeon, 2011; Clapp and Cohen, 2009; Clapp, 2009; Mittal, 2009; Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck, 2011). Three significant contributors to vulnerability include a radical decline of investment in developing country agriculture over the last 30 years, corporate concentration and power in global food and agriculture, and the liberalization of and government withdrawal from supporting agricultural sectors in developing countries. Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) of the World Bank and IMF in the 1980s and 1990s and commitments made with the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Agriculture were significant in establishing these contributing factors (McKeon, 2011; Clapp and Cohen, 2009). Other factors such as land tenure and agroecological conditions also contribute to vulnerability (HLPE, 2011). These conditions have escalated vulnerability by compromising developing country productive and competitive capabilities of small farmers, and thus their livelihoods, while leaving many countries unsustainably dependent on costly imports to feed their populations (FAO, 2011b). Addressing the food crisis requires that the governance of the global agro-food system considers not just the immediate causes of price volatility and domestic contexts, though this is essential, but also the fundamental structural contexts that render billions of the world’s poor vulnerable to this volatility. The emergence of governance initiatives following the food crisis, in principle, creates opportunities for such structural change to take shape.

**Governance After the Food Crisis**

Governance today is best described as “crazy quilt” of complex interactions among multiple spheres of authority, well beyond the sole jurisdictions of states and regulation (Roseneau, 2005). It includes the principles, norms, knowledges and values that guide the direction taken by policy makers and other actors shaping and implementing regulations, policies, programs and initiatives that seek to establish order (Ba and Hoffman, 2005; O’Brien, 2005; Scholte, 2005; Scholte, 2002; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Keohane and Nye, 1972; Meyer et al., 1997; Haas, 1997). Enacted in and by a variety of state, sub-state and supra-state fora and actors (including international organizations, civil society, transnational activist movements, market actors, and private foundations, as well as various networks and partnerships therein) (Betsil and Bulkley, 2006; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Slaughter, 2005; Hall and Biersteker, 2002; Cutler, 1999; Strange, 1996; Keck and Sikkink, 1998), governance in various public, private and hybrid forms emerges through power struggles and contention between competing interests, discourses, ideas

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6 While Mittal’s broad points are followed, it is supplemented by literature from before and after the food crisis, giving greater legitimacy to the arguments.

7 Clapp and Cohen 2009 are a particularly valuable resource for this, as the vulnerability and volatility framework is found in their volume and examines in detail various structural issues. On Corporate power in global food and agriculture, see Clapp and Fuchs 2009.

8 Governance here draws on the global governance literature. Global governance, and governance generally, are widely contested terms. It is not my intention to engage in debate here. Instead, I lay out the concept for clarity and purpose in the paper.
and knowledges (Barnett and Duvall, 2005; Fuchs, 2005; Scholte, 2002; Murphy, 2000; Clapp, 1998). Principles of public participation and public accountability through the inclusion of spaces for democratic consultation and open debate are integral to achieving legitimate governance (Scholte, 2005; 2002, p. 281). Although technocratic criteria have been given greater consideration over the years, it is democratic criteria like public participation and accountability that are crucial to allowing social movements to seize new political opportunities and shape governance, and for leading to further principles of governance, notably monitoring and evaluation (Scholte, 2002).

In the decades leading up to the 2007-2008 food crisis, global food and agriculture was governed by policies and principles prioritizing selectively free market and agricultural trade liberalization premises (characterized by rigged rules and double standards as stipulated in Chapter 2), urban bias in development policies, and loosened regulations of commodity financial markets. This system neglected the needs of small farmers and rural area populations and made for highly volatile global food markets, keeping hundreds of millions of the world’s poorest from accessing one of life’s most basic necessities. It instead served the interests of powerful transnational corporations (TNCs) in agricultural sectors, through the influence of institutions like the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO (Higgins and Lawrence, 2005, p.1). This despite evidence from many experts that liberalization and privatization were a disconcerting, ahistorical approach to governing agricultural sectors in developing countries and that it served neither small farmers in developing countries nor development generally (see for example Timmer, 1991; Chang, 2003; and Chang 2009).

Since the crisis, governments and international institutions have stepped up their focus on food and agriculture exponentially. At the domestic level, countries trying to mitigate increasing food insecurity have implemented various trade and domestic policies to increase food supplies and reduce domestic food prices. These include reducing tariffs and fees on food imports, implementing export restrictions and/or bans to retain national food supplies (Mulat, Pangrazio, and Maetz, 2009), providing consumer subsidies, releasing public food stocks, reducing value-added and other taxes, as well as using price controls or other private trade restrictions. Lower income food import dependent countries have also made pleas for food aid, often in conjunction with the release of grain stocks or consumer subsidies (Demeke et al., 2009).

These policies have had mixed impacts and sometimes come at significant costs. More importantly, they are insufficient in addressing the fundamental problems underlying the global food crisis. They are unsustainable. For low income, food import dependent developing countries whose populations are most vulnerable to rising food prices, increased spending at a time when governments are battling balance of payment deficits and domestic crises will create new problems while mitigating others. Furthermore, these policies do not address the underlying causes of the food crisis and vulnerability to food price volatility, which reflect a more fundamental crisis of governance.
To this end, several multilateral governance mechanisms have emerged in response to the global food crisis. Some of these initiatives are outlined below.⁹ The initiatives discussed below are not intended to be comprehensive, but were chosen for analytical and practical reasons. They are prominent global governance initiatives responding explicitly to the global food crisis, engaging governments and/or civil society, along with other primary actors in global governance. They speak to some of the structural causes for the food crisis outlined above, albeit dubiously, which contextualizes them as relevant responses to the food crisis. While they may not all have the same governing “teeth” as institutions like the World Trade Organization, which have legal authority and enforcement capabilities, they hold enormous potential in shaping the policies, norms and general practices for governing global food and agriculture in the wake of the food crisis. On a more practical level, their prominence also makes information and analysis on the initiatives accessible.

Reformed World Committee on Food Security

Among the most significant governance initiatives in response to the 2007-2008 global food crisis is the reformed CFS. The CFS is an intergovernmental committee of the FAO committed to ending hunger and effectively ensuring the right to food. Established in 1974, the CFS was largely an ineffectual body unable to perform its prescribed functions (McKeon, 2011, p. 8). In response to the global food crisis, it was proposed that the CFS be reformed, with the broader goals of redefining its vision and role so that it would become the central UN policy platform for addressing food security and nutrition (FAO, 2009). As such, it could become a leading authority on best practices on governing global food and agriculture. The reformed CFS is committed to being inclusive, to being grounded in reality by staying connected to local activities, and to remaining flexible and reflexive to changing contexts and needs. Such reflexivity can be an important commitment to ongoing public participation and public accountability, by virtue of continually checking and rechecking the experienced impacts of programs and adapting to successes and failures.

A crucial element of the CFS’s reform is the endeavour to democratize the governance of global food and agriculture by ensuring “that the voices of all relevant stakeholders are heard in the policy debate on food and agriculture”. In addition to country members, the reformed committee has extended participation rights to non-state actors, both as members of the CFS advisory board, through annual plenary sessions, and the High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE).¹⁰ The CFS advisory board is composed of representatives from UN membership agencies, selected

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⁹ To be clear, the primary intention here is not to evaluate these initiatives nor to suggest they are aligned with the objectives of the movements. Rather, they are treated as sites of political opportunity to shape governance – either through engagement or resistance.  
¹⁰ The HLPE is comprised of a steering committee of international experts from various fields related to food security and nutrition, alongside project teams who work on project-specific issues under the selection and management of the Steering committee. (http://www.fao.org/cfs/cfs-home/cfs-about/en/ accessed March 2011) The HLPE’s role is “to keep [the] CFS up to date with world wide knowledge and abreast of emerging trends in food security. The HLPE should lead to more informed policy debates and improve the quality and effectiveness of decisions regarding food security and nutrition policies from local to international levels”. (Source: http://www.fao.org/cfs/cfs-hlpe/en/ accessed March 2011.)
representatives of civil society organizations and NGOs, international agricultural research bodies, and the private sector and philanthropic organizations.\footnote{http://www.fao.org/cfs/cfs-hlpe/en/}

The significance of these proposed reforms to strengthen and democratize the CFS cannot be understated. At the same time, granting the CFS, and the FAO more broadly, governance authority around food and agriculture is an effort mired in deep political contestations. Social movements seeking structural changes to global food and agriculture favour the FAO and the CFS because of their more inclusive and democratic nature. However, donor countries are resistant to the FAO taking a lead role in the governance of global food and agriculture, preferring instead more exclusive institutions such as the G8/20 and the World Bank, where their power can be exercised and public participation and accountability constrained (Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck, 2011, p. 127; Murphy, 2011; Jarosz, 2009). Not that the FAO is without power struggles. Jarosz argues that the institution is constrained because it is occupied with navigating the interests of more powerful and often grain-exporting countries (US, Canada, Western Europe and Australia), who prefer technocratic, aid-driven solutions, while attending to the needs of poorer, and often grain importing countries in Africa, South America and South Asia, who remain marginalized in their fight for the right to food and greater food self-sufficiency (Jarosz, 2009, p. 40). These battles take a toll on the efficacy of the FAO. For decades, the attempts by the FAO to address what are labeled in this paper as structural issues have been subordinated to the more technocratic fixes promoted by powerful countries, which effectively reinforce the current structures that need to change (Jarosz, 2009, p. 40). However, such power struggles do not preclude the FAO from actively representing the interests of poorer countries. As Margulis demonstrates, the FAO actively challenged the market-force governance approach dominating WTO negotiations of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), showing the institution does balance against powerful interests, despite struggles (Margulis, 2011).

The work of the committee is still very much underway, and only time can tell how the CFS reforms and efforts will be received and, if at all, enacted, especially as powerful actors vie to locate governance authority where they can execute their own interests. Nonetheless, the reform of the CFS as committed to democratically informing policy spaces embodies a sort of ideal governance design and is a unique opportunity to create a governance space truly engaged with local needs and structural contestations.

**High Level Task Force on Global Food Security**

Like the reformed CFS, the HLTF was created in response to the global food crisis. Under the leadership of the United Nations Secretary General, the task force brings together several UN agencies and programs along with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the OECD and the WTO. The goal of the task force is to create a “comprehensive and unified response to the challenge of achieving global food security” (United Nations, 2011). This includes facilitating a prioritized plan of action and coordinating its implementation.

The HLTF developed the Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA), with civil society member consultation, to serve as a joint position of all HLTF members, with the goal of
providing governments, international and regional organizations and civil society groups with “a menu of policies and actions from which to draw appropriate responses” (United Nations, 2011). The framework contains a twin-track approach to addressing food security, including immediate investments in food assistance and safety nets, programs to address long-term structural causes of insecurity, including agricultural investment, and connecting producers with access to essential agricultural resources. It also focuses on smallholder needs, ensuring a right to food, increased income, and adequate nutrition (United Nations, 2011).

Some analysis is more critical of the CFA, seeing it as an approach that will reinforce the structures underlying the causes of the food crisis (Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck, 2011). Such critiques target its lack of specificity in areas such as how to achieve the right to food, contradictions between support for smallholders alongside integration into structurally unequal global commodity chains, and the lack of discretionary power afforded to the CFA, as the funds to implement change have been relegated to the World Bank’s oversight of the GAFSP (discussed below) (Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck, 2011). By contrast, Clapp argues that the CFA went further in addressing some of the structural contexts underlying the food crisis, compared to other responses from institutions like the G8, the OECD, and even the final declaration of the FAO 2008 High Level Conference on World Food Security (HLCWFS) (Clapp 2009c, p. 299). Though the CFA supports a conclusion to the Doha Round, such support is on the condition that the conclusion addresses structural inequalities in the agreement; it is wary of trade liberalization and cautious on what role trade can play in development (Clapp 2009c, p. 299). The CFA has gone further than other governance mechanisms in its calls for an international consensus on biofuels and for a reassessment of biofuel subsidies. The CFA is also more cautious on biotechnology, and makes recommendations for regulating commodity markets (Clapp, 2009c). Ultimately, the final analysis of the CFA, much like the CFS, requires the evidence of time; it contains noble proclamations, but whether they are transparently, reflexively and accountably implemented remains to be seen, especially given the battle over the location for governing global food and agriculture.

World Bank Global Agriculture and Food Security Program

In 2009, G8 leaders convened for a Summit in L’Aquila, Italy, where they committed 22 billion dollars over three years to invest in agriculture for food security (G8, 2009). Leaders also agreed to advancing food security through increased and sustained commitments for financial and technical assistance. This would be implemented through more comprehensive and better-coordinated strategies among donor countries working with vulnerable countries, by supporting country-owned food security strategies and processes, and through the use of multilateral institutions when appropriate (G8, 2009). The declaration from the L’Aquila summit initially supported the HLTF and the CFA, but at the G20 meeting in Pittsburgh a few months later, leaders called on the World Bank and multilateral development banks to develop a multilateral trust fund through which they could work with interested donors and organizations to “scale-up

12 The authors here frame many of these structures as neoliberalism and the “corporatist food regime”, but include – global commodity chains, trade liberalization, etc.
agricultural assistance to low-income countries”. The GAFSP was formed as a result in September 2009.

The GAFSP is perhaps the most controversial multilateral governance mechanism emergent in response to the food crisis. It is a multi-donor trust fund established to address the underfunding of agricultural sectors in developing countries and regions as well as to assist with strategic food security investment plans being developed by countries in consultation with donors and stakeholders. Part of its mandate is to assist in implementing the pledges from the G8 Summit in L’Aquila. Although the World Bank serves as the trustee for and coordinator of the GAFSP, the trust also works with other partners in implementing its projects, including other regional and international organizations, civil society organizations, regional development banks and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (GAFSP, 2011; Reuters, 2011). As of April 2011, GAFSP was active in eight countries, and the trust fund had acquired only (US) $900 million in pledges from 5 countries and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

While contributions as of 2012 represented a minute fraction of the US $22 billion pledged to the L’Aquila Global Food Security Initiative, raising concerns whether the pledged money will actually be translated into tangible funds, it is the location of the fund within the World Bank that is perhaps most contentious. The World Bank is an institution criticized for having a long history of failing to help poor countries fight poverty and hunger. This is tied to decades of imposing economic, social and development policies on poor countries based on misguided and questionable development models that have at times done more harm than good. SAPs are an example of this (Babb, 2009; Stiglitz, 2007, p. 301; Peterson, 2003). In the context of agriculture, the Bank is criticized specifically for reinforcing the structures that underlie the food crisis with its emphasis on technocratic agricultural investments, export-oriented agriculture and increased trade liberalization (McKeon, 2011). Related to this, critics charge that the institution itself is an extension of the arm of its major donors, notably the United States, where their money can buy them a great “voice”, as opposed to being a representation of public participation and accountability (Babb, 2009; Murphy, 2011, p. 1). The fear, thus, is that the GAFSP will represent the interests of the powerful and reinforce the existing structural contexts underlying the global food crisis.

How the governance of global food and agriculture takes shape and plays out within these fora remains to be seen. The fragmentation of the governance of global food and agriculture itself has been argued to be a key problematic condition, as various bodies have taken on different roles, with sometimes competing visions on what is good for development and what is detrimental (Clapp and Cohen, 2009). On one hand, perhaps fragmentation allows for expanded democratic space where debate can take place and dissenting voices heard. When the WTO emerged as a central site of governance of global food security with the negotiations of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), it sought to govern using market forces, although negotiations ultimately resulted in allowing many continued supports and protections for developed countries that are veiled as non-trade distorting supports. In response, the UN system, traditionally the location of international governance over hunger and food issues, launched a counter-movement within the negotiations to defend developing countries from sweeping liberalization policies (Margulis,

14 These countries are Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Haiti, Mongolia, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
On the other, such fragmentation questions the efficient use of resources. The efforts amid UN bodies to counterbalance WTO efforts were uncoordinated, conceivably involving greater use of resources than a more coordinated effort would have required (Margulis, 2011). More importantly, competing governance agendas and initiatives can represent power struggles among fragmented fora, and obstruct policy cohesion (Margulis, 2011). As evidenced in the post-crisis governance initiatives, different parties vie to locate authority within different bodies to suit their own objectives and interests, with less democratic and more powerful institutions (notably the World Bank) shaping governance outcomes, rather than democratic voices. We see this especially in the post-crisis institutions outlined above. Civil society and developing country interests seek to locate authority within the more democratic and autonomous UN system. Meanwhile rich countries, especially the United States, seek to secure their interests by locating authority in the institutions where they have greatest influence – namely the World Bank and G8/G20 fora (McKeon, 2011; Murphy, 2011).

Sophia Murphy (2011) argues that these power politics in governance of global food and agriculture after the crisis reflect multilateralism in crisis. At the very least, these politics demonstrate how multilateralism can be challenged by the tensions between principled democratically accountable governance and power politics where strong actors attempt to protect their interests. If social movement potential to generate change is predicated on seizing opportunities, as suggested in the literature (Tarrow, 2011; Gaventa and McGee, 2010), this is a pivotally opportune time for the fair trade and food sovereignty movements to engage in governance. The best interests of their stakeholders depend on the outcomes emergent from governance, and by extension, of these battles within a fragmented governance context. It is a time when these movements can both work to shape the future governance of global food and agriculture in the interests of its most vulnerable stakeholders, and a time when they can work to resist, confront and delegitimize those perilous governance schemes that may very well render the poor even more vulnerable. In the remainder of the paper, I examine both how these movements desire new governance over global food and agriculture, and have responded to these emergent opportunities for shaping and contesting future governance.

**Social Movement Responses to Governance Opportunities**

**Fair Trade**

Fair trade originated as a movement that critiqued existing inequalities in international trade and desired to provide an alternative trading system that would be more equitable for poorer countries engaged primarily in commodity production. The movement dates back to the post-war efforts of development NGOs, and grew in the 1960s and 1970s, drawing on research linking commodity production for international markets with declining terms of trade. The movement suggested that trade policies privileged rich countries while not supporting (and even undermining) poor people in poor countries. At the time, the movement engaged with national and international policy spaces to regulate markets and generate alternative structures of trade, working with developing country governments and with forums like the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to advance these goals (Fridell, 2007). However, in the 1980s, the advent of neoliberalism and the withdrawal of the state from market
regulation and interventions led to a stagnation of the movement, and undermined its achievements on regulating markets up to that point (Fridell 2007). The movement’s focus thus shifted from prioritizing a change in political spaces to pursuing market opportunities (Fridell, 2007).

Today, fair trade continues to criticize existing trade structures as inequitable, arguing that conventional trade fails to “deliver sustainable livelihood and development opportunities to people in the poorest countries of the world” (WFTO, 2011). However, fair trade is currently most active as a market mechanism, defined as a “trading partnership” (FTAO, 2011, p. 6)\(^\text{15}\), that is designed to provide producers and labourers in developing countries with more equitable and sustainable production conditions by linking them with ethically minded consumers in rich countries. This is done through the marketing of certified products, overseen by organizations like Fairtrade International (FLO) and the World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO). This work is not negligible. Fairtrade supports 746 producer organizations in 58 countries, representing between one and two million marginalized producers around the world (FLO, 2009). Global sales in Fairtrade products have seen remarkable continuous growth, seeing 40 percent growth every year in the five years leading up to 2009 (Avril, 2010).

While the movement is allied on the need for new trading structures, organizations within the movement disagree over what is constituted as “better” trade and on how an improved trading partnership should play out. The certification of large transnational corporate manufacturers and retailers, such as Nestle, Cadbury’s, Starbucks, and Walmart, are a particularly strong point of contention. Because these companies have only shifted a small portion of their products to Fairtrade, some in the movement challenge the certification of these companies, and whether these retailers should be permitted to sell certified products (Jaffee, 2007; Bacon, 2010). The WFTO for example requires 100% commitment to fair trade, denying organizations like the UK’s Fairtrade UK and Fairtrade Canada membership to its organization. Despite cleavages, different organizations within the movement continue to try to hash through their differences and work together to advance shared advocacy goals (Raynolds et al., 2007, p. 231).\(^\text{16}\) As Jaffee (2007) argues, the fair trade movement will need to commit to addressing these differences as it continues to grow.

The Fairtrade market approach has also led to criticisms of the movement (Blackman and Rivera, 2011; Lyon and Moberg, 2010; Bacon et. al., 2008) and tensions exist between those promoting the mainstreaming of Fairtrade and those who wish to see fair trade relegated to truly alternative markets that resist the dominant economic system (Holt-Giminez and Shattuck, 2011; Lyon and Moburg, 2010; Fridell, 2007). The movement is often given a blanket characterization as a neoliberal market-oriented movement, and many charge that, as a result, the movement reinforces existing structures of inequity rather than confronting them (Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck, 2011; Moburg and Lyon, 2010). Yet, while the priority is indisputably market-focused,

\(^{15}\) This definition emerged in 2000 through an agreement between Fairtrade International (FLO), the now World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO, formerly IFAT), the European Fair Trade Association and others.

\(^{16}\) I also attended the Fair Trade Futures conference held in Boston, Massachusetts September 10-12 2010, where the divisions within the movement around issues such as corporate participation was a primary point of discussion. Participants representing Fair Trade organizations, advocates, producers, academics and others showed a commitment to reconcile differences, especially try and reconcile the pros and cons of participation by transnational corporations.
“awareness raising and ... campaigning for changes in the rules and practice of conventional international trade” remains part of the definition of Fairtrade (FTAO, 2010). Neither is policy advocacy absent from the movement’s work. The movement has an advocacy arm in the Fair Trade Advocacy Office (FTAO), a joint initiative of FLO, WFTO and the European Fair Trade Association. The FTAO engages governments by submitting position papers and advocating small farmer positions to the European Commission, international fora and other governing bodies on policies and consultations on trade and development policies, taking some of these issues further in political spaces. Organizations like the Fairtrade UK have also engaged in advocacy at the national and regional level. Further research should make a point of investigating the extent to which the fair trade movement is committed to advocacy rather than to give a blatant dismissal of the movement’s work. That said, markets certainly garner the lion’s share of the movement’s focus, and this disproportionate focus on markets, I argue, appears to have led the movement to miss opportunities presented by the governance initiatives produced by the global food crisis.

Fair Trade and the Food Crisis

The fair trade movement’s response to the food crisis is largely one that reflects its current prioritization of private governance through its market mechanisms and, it seems to a far less extent, one that focuses on political opportunities presented after the crisis. The highest profile public responses of the movement to the food crisis appear to be found in two reports issued through FLO and the UKs Fairtrade UK (it should be noted both are affiliated with the more ‘mainstream’ camp of the fair trade movement) (FTF, 2009; FLO, 2008). These reports emphasized the vulnerability of Fairtrade producers to food price volatility, and how producing for Fairtrade markets had mitigated the impacts of food price volatility on producer households. Fairtrade producers were as much vulnerable to the food crisis as were farmers in developing countries generally (FLO, 2008). Some Fairtrade producers are net buyers of food and struggled to ensure household food security as food prices soared. Additionally, the increased prices for inputs, in part because of the concomitant increased price of oil at the time, increased the cost of production for farmers (FLO, 2008). However, the Fairtrade social premium, according to the documents, played a crucial role in helping farmers to mitigate the impacts of the 2007-2008 spike in global food prices. Fairtrade guarantees a fixed price for commodities as well as a social premium. If the global market price for a commodity rises above the fixed Fairtrade price, the producers get the higher price, plus the premium. The premium is “a sum of money paid on top of the agreed Fairtrade price for investment in social, environmental or economic development projects, decided upon democratically by producers within the farmers’ organisation or by

17 The work of the Fair Trade Advocacy Office can be found on its Position Papers page which includes support for policy activities by other organizations, such as Oxfam’s GROW campaign, and recommendations for policy spaces such as the EU CAP http://www.Fairtrade-advocacy.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=82&Itemid=161

The trouble here is this appears to be a relatively small element of the fair trade movement, and it is unclear that in the years following the food crisis it has modified its efforts much. In short, intentions to move further towards political engagement in the wake of the food crisis are not apparent.

18 This dissertation indeed takes up this endeavour; this article was written prior to the completion and thus reflects, at that time, the need for further research.

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workers on a plantation” (FTF, 2011). By contrast, under conventional market conditions, price increases may not be transferred to producers, but rather go to middlemen such as traders, or to speculators (FLO, 2008). Specifically, the reports argue that gains from assured prices and the social premium were essential to some farmers engaged in Fairtrade to mitigate the food crisis. The premium provided access to credit to cover increased agricultural input costs and was used to invest in subsistence production, diversification that provided a buffer food supply amidst rising food prices (FTF, 2009; FLO, 2008). In short, participation in Fairtrade markets appears to have practical implications for small producers in mitigating the impacts of the food crisis.

Yet, while the primary focus of the reports after the crisis has been the Fairtrade market, they also acknowledge the importance of more fundamental structural changes in global food and agriculture to supporting smallholder farmers. In addition to celebrating the Fairtrade market for mitigating the impacts of the crisis, the Fairtrade UK’s report signals that broader fundamental changes are also required above the market mechanisms (FTF, 2009). In its conclusions and recommendations, the report suggests that Northern governments should prioritize smallholder needs in agricultural aid, increased supports for agriculture, and rethink trade liberalization, providing instead special treatment for developing countries. It suggests that Southern governments refocus on smallholders through greater supports, access to key resources such as credit and basic inputs, and honour commitments to agricultural sectors. The report also targets, among other things, fairer practices by corporations in commodity chains and greater public support for fairer trade and Fairtrade products (FTF, 2009).

Overall, despite reflecting on and engaging in critical responses to the food crisis, and its continued political advocacy, the shift made by the Fairtrade movement from prioritizing regulation to prioritizing markets persists today. The FTAO, despite its good work, is still only staffed by two individuals, which certainly puts major constraints on its scope and capacities. Meanwhile, despite the promotion of policy changes in the Fairtrade UK report, there is no mention of these governance initiatives. Similarly, despite the advocacy mandate of the FTAO, there is no visible demonstration of engagement with the emergent political opportunities discussed above. This includes engagement with the multilateral fora to shape post-crisis governance and opposing proposals harmful to equitable conditions for small producers in developing countries. While this might, at least in part, reflect an issue of capacity, it is nevertheless argued here that neglecting these opportunities has been a grave oversight by the movement. Participants in the fair trade movement, particularly some of its top bodies such as FLO and WFTO, should reevaluate their strategies and priorities. In short, market-based private governance may offer important benefits to producers, but it is insufficient in addressing the broader structural causes of vulnerability on global markets. Meanwhile, some of the policy spaces that have emerged in response to the food crisis embody the very conditions that the Fairtrade UK argued in its report needs to be addressed, and that the movement originally sought to address. This includes agricultural investment, trade liberalization and better targeted aid. It is argued here that the movement should reevaluate its priorities and strategies for helping small farmers vulnerable within global markets. Specifically, it should be re-evaluating its political strategies (and lack thereof), in an effort not only to shape global governance rules in the interests of its stakeholders, but also to ensure that the end outcomes are not to their detriment.

19 This is based on an examination by the author of the publically available information on the websites of the WFTO, FTF and FLO, as well as FTAO, as of April 2011.
Food Sovereignty

Since its inception 15 years ago, the food sovereignty movement has emerged on the global political scene as a powerful and important player in the struggle over global food and agricultural governance. The movement and concept emerged through La Vía Campesina, a grassroots international peasant organization that is a global alliance of organizations representing family farmers, peasants, landless workers, indigenous people, and rural youth and women (herein peasants) (Rosset, 2009, p. 115). La Vía Campesina introduced the concept of food sovereignty in 1996 in resistance to the expansion of capitalist agricultural production and neoliberal globalization, which it holds responsible for widespread poverty, hunger and landlessness (Wittman et al., 2010; Rosset, 2009; Desmarais, 2007). Initially, La Vía Campesina defined food sovereignty as “the right of each nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to produce its basic foods, respecting cultural and productive diversity” and “the right to produce our own food in our own territory” (La Vía Campesina, 1996, cited in Desmarais, 2007, p. 34). In the year 2000, the organization expanded its definition to include “the right of people to define their agricultural and food policy” (Desmarais, 2007, p. 34 citing La Vía Campesina, 2000). The movement actively confronts and resists corporate concentration and the commodification of global agricultural production as well as international trade in agricultural products, and is demanding greater food self-sufficiency and political sovereignty around food and agricultural policies. Today, La Vía Campesina continues to lead the food sovereignty movement, representing marginalized rural people from over 150 social movements and 79 countries (Holt-Gimenez, 2010).

In 2002, food sovereignty expanded with the creation of the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC), founded to represent rural populations at the 2002 World Food Summit (IPC, 2009). The IPC is “an international network that brings together several organizations representing farmers, fisher folks and small and medium scale farmers, agricultural workers and indigenous peoples, as well as NGOs, providing a common room for mobilization that holds together local struggles and global debate” (IPC, 2009). It contends it is the only global body working to network hundreds of millions of peasants so that they can actively participate, with a voice, in governance fora (IPC, 2009).

The movement and the concept became more formalized in 2007 at the Forum for Food Sovereignty (Nyéléni) in Mali. Here, over 500 invited delegates from more than 80 countries, representing producers, indigenous people, landless people, rural labourers, indigenous movements, consumer groups and other groups, met to discuss and clarify the principles of food sovereignty and their implications. Out of Nyéléni came what is now the most recognized definition of food sovereignty: “the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems” (Nyéléni, 2007). Key themes raised in the Nyéléni documents include a focus on land and agrarian reform, greater allowance for market protections such as tariffs on imports and farm subsidies, more sustainable and agro-ecological agricultural

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20 For simplicity I herein use peasants, a generalization embodied in the movement’s self-identification as a ‘peasant’ movement.
production, greater control for small farmers over seeds and resources, and the rights and protection of women (Nyéléni, 2007; Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck, 2011).

The movement has actively engaged in policy-making processes at the national and international levels. While there have been some examples of national legislation integrating the concept of food sovereignty and more precisely of promoting local markets, this still falls far from any concrete and structural commitment to actually achieving genuine food sovereignty (Wittman et al., 2010). The movement’s activities however have focused intensely on the international level. This includes opposing and protesting neoliberal governance institutions, particularly the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO (Wittman et al., 2010). It also involves actively trying to empower and influence the United Nations, as a democratic global institution, as the location for governing global food and agriculture (Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck, 2011).

**Food Sovereignty and the Food Crisis**

The rallying cry of the food sovereignty movement in the wake of the food crisis has been “the time for food sovereignty is now” (LVC, 2009; IPC, 2008; FAO, 2008). Where the fair trade movement seems to be largely absent from the policy space opportunities emergent from the food crisis, the food sovereignty movement has been deeply engaged. One area of focus has been on securing the participation of all types of producers in the governance of global food and agriculture, to ensure their interests are represented and protected. For the movement, the food crisis is an unsurprising manifestation of the existing structures of agricultural production and trade that are destructive to smallholder farmers, making another primary focus the continued advocacy for fundamental transformation of these structures.

The movement has actively responded to post-crisis governance initiatives as they have unfolded, harnessing political opportunities to advance the movement’s goals. In June 2008 the IPC for Food Sovereignty offered an official statement in response to the UN’s initial response to the food crisis through the High Level Conference on World Food Security (HLCWFS), held in Madrid, Spain. In the statement, the movement charged that the food crisis was “being used by political and corporate elites as opportunities to entrench corporate control of world agriculture and the ecological commons” and that such actions at the HLCWFS constituted an “assault on small scale producers” (IPC, 2008). It voiced concerns that the conference excluded “the main stakeholders” affected by the food crisis while privileging profit-seeking private actors. The statement countered that the appropriate response to the food crisis is to ensure the right to food, the promotion of more sustainable models of small farming including agro-ecological approaches, and support for agrarian reform. It also challenged that such measures could be supported through the establishment of a commission on food sovereignty within the UN, “constituted by representatives of governments and organizations of fisherfolk, peasant and small

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21 While some of their criticisms overlap with the structural contestations above, Via Campesina and leaders of the Food Sovereignty movement would be more apt to contest broader structures of globalization and capitalism as well, which are not discussed here.

22 While the HLCWFS and the FAO World Summit on Food Security were important events, and have undoubtedly shaped the governance initiatives discussed above, it fell beyond the scope of this paper to discuss them as governance initiatives. They are discussed here because they reinforce the active engagement of the food sovereignty movement in response to opportunities presented by the global food crisis.
scale farmers, pastoralists and Indigenous Peoples, to identify, document and advance collective strategies for solving the food and climate crises” (IPC, 2008, p. 2). La Via Campesina launched a similar critique focusing on deficits in representation, arguing the HLCWFS was being dominated by the World Bank, IMF and the WTO, alongside transnational corporations, privileging corporate, industrial agricultural production and consumption structures, while those who produce 80% of the world’s food – small scale farmers - were allocated only a few minutes at the end to speak (IPC, 2008; LVC, 2009). La Via Campesina advocated instead for “one single space inside the UN to deal with the food crisis with the full participation of social movements and small holder food producers” (LVC, 2009).

In 2009, when the FAO organized a second summit gathering world leaders to address the food crisis, the food sovereignty movement again engaged in response. Alongside the FAO summit, civil society organizations convened a parallel forum, entitled “People’s Food Sovereignty Now!”, where the IPC and La Via Campesina played central roles. The forum hosted more than 400 delegates from 70 countries representing small producers, farmer organizations, fisherfolk, indigenous people, those employed in food, as well as international NGOs. The primary goal of the forum was for participants to reach agreement on what key actions were imperative to addressing the global food crisis. The forum concluded with a final declaration, which was presented at the FAO summit, read by a farmer and food sovereignty advocate from Orissa, India (Clapp, 2009d). A key outcome of the parallel summit was that participants put their weight behind the reformation and strengthening of the CFS as a means by which civil society, including the food sovereignty movement, could participate in the governance of global food and agriculture on an ongoing basis (Burnett, Rompré, and Swanston, 2009).

Not only does the CFS reflect the food sovereignty movement’s values, but the movement also has an active voice in the committee. The Network of Farmers' and Agricultural Producers' Organisations of West Africa (ROPPA) and the IPC represent two of the four CSO/NGO representatives on the reformed committee’s advisory board, representing millions from around the world who are part of the food sovereignty movement. The CFS also reaffirms and seeks continued commitment to a universal right to food. However, there are disjunctures between the outcome of the CFS and the movement’s objectives. While the CFS is located in the FAO, the advisory board of the CFS includes the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, as well as the World Bank alongside the CSO/NGO representatives. For the movement, this means engaging in dialogue with members of institutions they actively confront and resist. At the People’s Forum it was said that there were efforts to exclude the World Bank and private foundations on the advisory board. While the movement lost this battle, it decided to retain its presence on the advisory board, with the pledge that it would never compromise on or modify their demands, accepting that they may win or they may lose.

In contrast to the movement’s celebration of the CFS, La Via Campesina has vocally opposed the GAFSP for commodifying food, land, and agriculture, and for pushing capital-intensive agricultural production, notably genetically modified organisms, on small farmers (LVC, 2010).

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25 This is the account of Nora McKeon at the People’s Forum in Rome, November 16, 2009. The author attended the event as an observer.
Participants and delegates at the forum were displeased that the GAFSP had become the location of the trust fund to manage the L’Aquila and other donor pledges (Burnett, Rompré, and Swanson, 2009). It was felt that the CFS’s inclusive and democratic nature made it the appropriate location of such funding. The GAFSP, by contrast, was characterized as “undemocratic, untransparent, and destined to lead to a replication of past mistakes” (People’s Forum, 2009). Notably, the privileged role granted to the GAFSP after the reform of the CFS raised concerns about the prospects for the CFS. Generally these related to the fact that while the G8 and G20 supported the GAFSP to operate with the World Bank as the location of implementing the fund, the CFS continued to lack any financial commitments for its operations, leaving participants concerned that the CFS has only been granted rhetorical legitimacy while the World Bank and donor countries continue to operate with business as usual (Burnett, Rompré, and Swanston, 2009). In general, participants at the forum continued to advocate participation, support and enthusiasm for the CFS, but did so cautiously, and promised to remain vigilant in the coming years as the CFS reforms unfold (Burnett, Rompré, and Swanston, 2009).

According to Holt-Gimenez, La Via Campesina has been “among the most vocal critics of institutional responses to the global food crisis” (Holt-Gimenez, 2010, p. 204). La Via Campesina independently tends to be more radical than the broader movement under the IPC for Food Sovereignty umbrella. Yet, while La Via Campesina might be vocally critical of and resistant to these governance structures, it is the IPC that has become an integral voice in the governance of global food and agriculture as a member of the advisory body of the CFS. So while La Via Campesina has perhaps been the most vocal critic, the IPC has arguably been more successful as an agent of the food sovereignty movement with the potential to shape governance.

It is an exciting time for food sovereignty supporters, seeing the movement gaining traction as a central player and prominent voice in the governance of global food and agriculture. Unfortunately, to what extent the movement’s work within the CFS and in other policy spaces will have practical implications remains precarious in the continued broader power struggles in shaping governance. Only time can tell whether these spaces will move beyond having only ‘rhetorical legitimacy’ while other initiatives maintaining the status quo, like the GAFSP, dominate governance of global food and agriculture.

**Conclusion**

Two years after the spike in prices that led to the 2007-2008 global food crisis, progress on reducing the volatility of food prices and the vulnerability of farmers through the international governance of global food and agriculture remain precarious at best. Change will almost certainly be protracted, but can only come about if advocacy networks such as the fair trade and food sovereignty movements think critically about how to affect such change and act on the opportunities that emerge as volatility and vulnerability persist. This paper has attempted to give an introductory evaluation of how the fair trade and food sovereignty movements have responded to the new governance opportunities that have emerged in response to the 2007-2008 global food crisis. As an introductory evaluation, it invites further research on this topic. This would include an evaluation of the way the movements shape governance at different scales – local, national, regional, etc. – and how this shapes governance at the national level.
I argue for a nuanced understanding of the fair trade movement’s response to the food crisis and its involvement in governing after the food crisis. While it is common for the movement, at least the market-oriented element therein, to be categorized dismissively as neoliberal because of its market focus, it is suggested here that this is a reductionist analytical approach that overlooks the complexities of governance and its shaping. The movement has been active at the local and national levels to institute greater Fairtrade markets, which are arguably generating increased normative challenges to the notion that free trade is fair. And while a more just system is important, the Fairtrade market is clearly not seen to be a sole solution to the problems afflicting farmers. It is however perhaps an important assistance to farmers who struggle to live, often well below the poverty line. However, the analysis here suggests that the movement has missed important opportunities to engage the new governance I – particularly those in the UN system the movement used to work more closely with – and to more actively contest the trade system it exists to resist. This is particularly unfortunate since these could be the opportunities to achieve the very changes the movement expressed were necessary after the food crisis – supporting small holders, investing in agriculture, addressing inequitable agricultural trade rules, better targeted aid, and broader market issues. Indeed, as the above analysis shows, the battle over these issues is a battle of interests – the status quo interests of powerful countries and their stakeholders against those of developing country and smallholder producers. This should raise alarms for the movement. I argue that the movement should evaluate its priorities and how it balances between its market-oriented work and its policy advocacy. The former, as a private governance mechanism, may indeed have an important contribution as change unfolds and given the realities of a globalized world, but the vulnerability of Fairtrade farmers to the food crisis shows it insufficient. It is the policy advocacy targeting the root causes of the volatility and vulnerability underlying the food crisis that is fundamental to seeing a shift towards a more just and equitable reality. At the very least, the fair trade movement should re-evaluate its strategy during this time of opportunity and return to its political roots of the 1960s and 1970s to mobilize for such changes.

The food sovereignty movement, by contrast, has worked with great determination and made impressive advances in ensuring that the voices of key stakeholders in global food and agriculture are heard in this governance transition, positioning itself as a central voice in key governance institutions including the advisory board of the CFS and the 2008 and 2009 FAO summits. As noted, these accomplishments should not be exaggerated, as the effects of these efforts and the reach of the movement’s vision remain to be seen. Nevertheless, for a relatively incipient transnational advocacy movement, food sovereignty has been remarkable in responding to governance opportunities after the food crisis.

Food price volatility and rising food prices, as well as vulnerability among the world’s poorest to this volatility, promise to persist. As these new governance initiatives continue to unfold, both the fair trade and food sovereignty movements can play an important role in reshaping governance of global food and agriculture, to shape policies in the interests of the poor and smallholder farmers, as well as to challenge and contest initiatives and directions that are contrary to their interests.
Chapter 5: What Place for International Trade in Food Sovereignty?¹
Kim Burnett and Sophia Murphy

Introduction

The Food Sovereignty Movement (FSM) emerged in part in resistance to the model of globalization that was institutionalized in the Uruguay Round of trade agreements (UR) and the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Since its inception, the FSM has contested the WTO’s legitimacy as an institution for the governance of food and agriculture. The connection between the FSM’s origins and its rejection of the WTO has created the impression that the movement is opposed to international trade. This is inaccurate; the movement has objected to the privileged place given to trade in food and agriculture policy and law, and has objected to the multilateral rules that govern trade, but the FSM is not opposed to trade per se. Nonetheless, it is our view that there is confusion about what kind of trade would be “all right” in a food sovereignty model and an insufficient consideration on the part of the FSM of what lies beneath the label “international trade” in particular (namely, numerous and varied markets operating in complex inter-relationships) as well as insufficient consideration of how best to regulate those markets.

We argue the FSM should strive for a clearer and more considered stance on international trade. That stance should take account of the diverse needs and interests of hundreds of millions of smallholder farmers and farm workers around the world. These livelihoods are dependent on export markets and despite many inherent challenges, those involved do not necessarily want to exit international markets. We see three changes to the context of agricultural trade that support a re-examination of the costs and opportunities of engaging in advocacy on multilateral trade. First, who trades which commodities with whom, and how, has changed markedly in the past 15 years. Second, the WTO appears to be adapting to some extent to this new context, which also includes changes in the balance of global geo-political power and changes in how the institution relates to civil society. Third, the FSM itself has begun to say more about trade and the conditions under which it should take place. The moment seems propitious for a fresh look at the FSM’s strategy on trade.

The FSM has argued international agricultural trade should be regulated at the UN, not the WTO. The authors agree the WTO has many limitations in its structure, founding principles and in its negotiating culture. Nonetheless, we see opportunities at the WTO to contribute to a broader food sovereignty-based trade campaign. We suggest the FSM consider the potential for changes in the existing rules and the difference such changes could make to the lives of smallholders, farm workers and their communities.

Our intention is to raise questions that are important to the FSM but not yet sufficiently discussed by the movement. To that end, the paper begins with an examination of the FSM and its history.

¹ This is a published article (Burnett and Murphy 2015), with slight modifications based on feedback from committee members.
with regard to trade. We then consider some ways in which the movement’s ambiguous position on trade excludes the needs and interests of smallholder farmers and farm workers whose livelihoods depend on trade. We look at changes in trade and at the WTO and assess the movement’s stated preference for the UN to house trade negotiations and agreements. Finally, we explore the possibilities for a more engaged FSM strategy on trade.

Food Sovereignty: A Movement and a Concept

Food sovereignty as a movement is a relatively new transnational social movement and advocacy network of peasants, farmers, fisher folk, and other peoples dependent on agricultural production for their livelihoods. The movement originated in the Americas and Europe and expanded quickly to Asia, and later to Africa and other parts of the world (Holt-Gimenez, 2010, 204). FSM emerged as a political movement when La Via Campesina (LVC) used the term to assert itself as an international voice for peasant organizations at the World Food Summit in Rome in 1996. In just fifteen years, the movement has become a leading transnational agrarian movement of peasant\(^2\) organizations, led in large part by LVC. As of 2010, the FSM represented primarily marginalized rural people from over 150 social movements and 79 countries, including 12 African countries and several countries in South and East Asia (Holt-Gimenez, 2010). The movement has become a pivotal force in working to safeguard the rights, dignity and livelihoods of millions of the most vulnerable persons and communities across the world.

LVC introduced the concept of food sovereignty as an alternative to the expansion of capitalist agricultural production and neoliberal globalization of agricultural markets. The emergence of LVC coincided with the birth of the WTO and the coming into force of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). Under the banner of food sovereignty, LVC members articulated their rejection of the WTO and all it stood for with the slogan: “WTO out of agriculture”. They were not just rejecting the AoA, but all the agreements that affected agriculture, understanding that just taking agriculture out of the WTO (i.e. removing the AoA) would not keep agriculture free from WTO rules (Wiebe 2012). The slogan was an assertion that agriculture was their space, as producers, and they should have a voice in how the space should be managed. LVC was not just articulating a critique of the AoA’s rules and asserting that globalization should not dictate domestic agricultural policies. The organization’s wider point was to assert the primacy of agriculture, to allow governments space to support agricultural sectors rather than liberalize them, to insist on the importance of including producers’ voices in governance mechanisms and to reject the corporate control of commodity markets. From early on, LVC refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the WTO. The organization chose instead to devote what scarce resources it had to multilateral advocacy to the UN system.\(^3\)

\(^2\) La Via Campesina in fact defines themselves as an international movement of “peasants, small- and medium-sized producers, landless, rural women, indigenous people, rural youth and agricultural workers” (Via Campesina, 2007). For simplicity, the term ‘peasants’ is used in this paper to include all of these groups.

\(^3\) This is based on first-hand observation of LVC statements made in trade and agriculture strategy meetings among civil society organizations, including the series of meetings co-hosted by CSOs at the World Council of Churches in Geneva over a number of years starting in 1998, in which Sophia Murphy was an organizer, facilitator and participant as an advisor on trade and agriculture for the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, an NGO based in Minneapolis, USA.
LVC defined food sovereignty at its inception as “the right of each nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to produce its basic foods, respecting cultural and productive diversity” and, “the right to produce our own food in our own territory” (in Desmarais, 2007, p. 34). The organization later added, “the right of people to define their agricultural and food policy” to the definition (in Desmarais, 2007, p. 34). The movement and the concept became more formalized at the 2007 Forum for Food Sovereignty (Nyéléni) in Mali. The Nyéléni Declaration contains the most commonly recognized definition of food sovereignty today:

Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems (Nyéléni, 2007).

The forum also established the movement’s central focal areas, including land and agrarian reform, market protections for peasants, sustainable and agro-ecological agricultural production, greater control for peasants over seeds and resources, and women’s rights (Nyéléni, 2007, Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck, 2011).

Trade and Food Sovereignty

From the inception of the FSM through Nyéléni to today, international trade has been a central focus of the movement’s political work, which is critical of the structures of trade, and of the rules institutionalized in international trade agreements. The movement is not, however, hostile to trade. Indeed, a number of the farmers’ organizations associated with the FSM have members whose crops are sold in international markets—ROPPA in West Africa, for example, and the National Family Farm Coalition in the United States. As the FSM has evolved, it has taken a clearer position that it accepts trade under certain circumstances.

Trade Under Certain Circumstances

Broadly, the FSM allows for trade where domestic production cannot meet needs, and where agriculture gives priority to providing food for domestic populations with the surplus available for export (LVC 2010b). Windfuhr and Jonsén (2005, 32) observe, “(the) food sovereignty framework is a counter proposal to the neo-liberal macroeconomic policy framework. It is not directed against trade per se, but is based on the reality that current international trade practices and trade rules are not working in favour of smallholder farmers...” Similarly, the third pillar in the Declaration of Nyéléni rejects trade and its institutions when qualified as harmful: “governance structures, agreements and practices that depend on and promote unsustainable and inequitable international trade and give power to remote and unaccountable corporations” (IPC, 2009). The movement calls for trade rules that permit the protection and support of small-scale producers, as well as mechanisms such as supply management, commodity agreements, quotas, etc. in support of food security and sustainable livelihoods (Pimbert 2009). These requests in fact mirror many agricultural policies adopted historically by most of what are today industrialized countries (see Chang, 2005; Stiglitz, 2007).
Some in the FSM also promote “fairer trade”. At the Nyéléni forum, the declaration states: “Fair trade initiatives and other arrangements should be supported” (Nyéléni, 2007). At the same conference, transparent trade was promoted, where trade, “guarantees just incomes to all peoples as well as the rights of consumers to control their food and nutrition”. More recently, the Nyéléni newsletter included a promotion of socially just trade:

Food sovereignty emphasizes ecologically appropriate production, distribution and consumption, social-economic justice and local food systems as ways to tackle hunger and poverty and guarantee sustainable food security for all peoples. It advocates trade and investment that serve the collective aspirations of society (Nyéléni, 2013).

Notably, LVC, in its 2013 Jakarta Call, cites “fair trade between countries” as one of the principles of food sovereignty moving forward (LVC, 2013e). Yet these are all passing references. The FSM remains vague on what “fairer” trade should look like.

A report published in association with the Réseau des organisations paysannes et de producteurs de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (ROPPA, which in English translates as the Network of Farmers’ and Agricultural Producers’ Organisations of West Africa) gives a more comprehensive position on trade in traditional commodities and food sovereignty (Koning and Jongeneel, 2006). ROPPA is an association of West African peasant associations, and participates in the FSM (though it is not a member of LVC, it was a member of IPC during Nyéléni). The report considers how cotton and cocoa production can be integrated into food sovereignty principles through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in particular to increase farm-gate prices of these commodities. The authors propose three foundational pillars for autonomy and empowerment in export markets: a) end dependence on importing markets; b) involve farmer organizations; and c) include production controls. Because the United States dominates a large share of the cotton market (roughly 20 percent), international supply management is considered impossible to coordinate, and a shift to processing and selling cotton for the ECOWAS market is deemed necessary (Koning and Jongeneel, 2006). The authors do not demonstrate that the domestic demand necessary for this approach to be feasible exists.

For cocoa, the report recommends an international supply control arrangement, which the authors argue is possible because developed countries do not produce cocoa, and there are no close substitutes, giving producers more market power. Recognizing challenges (for example, free riders), the authors argue these can be overcome with the right incentives (Koning and Jongeneel, 2006). While the report does not demonstrate a commitment across countries, and is largely conceptual, it does think through how export commodity production can be compatible with the principles of food sovereignty.

Overall, there is little evidence that the FSM works with small-scale farmers whose products are exported and no clear agenda is presented for them. This leaves the conditions where trade is integral to food security unaccounted for. It also leaves ambiguous the precise circumstances in which trade is acceptable to the movement, and makes possible to identify contradictions in what

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4 It is unclear how the report is connected to ROOPPA, and how connected it is to the Food Sovereignty movement. However the report does bear the ROOPPA logo and ROOPPA is a prominent member of the movement.
is said under a food sovereignty banner. This in turn leaves uncertain what place there is within food sovereignty as a concept and as a movement for small-scale producers whose production is exported. It is probably fair to say the movement does not yet have a position on international trade itself, but that it has taken a position against certain norms and practices around trade.

**Prioritizing Local Markets First**

The FSM clearly prioritizes local market exchange over global trade, in part as a direct response to neoliberal globalization and the tenets of agricultural liberalization that have accompanied it (Wittman et al., 2010; Rosset, 2006; Nyéléni, 2007). The original definition of food sovereignty put out by *La Via Campesina* in 1996 focused on the rights of nations to develop their capacities to produce their own food. Assertion of the right to develop these capacities has been consistent through to Nyéléni, however, the discourse itself by then had shifted from one of the rights of nations to the rights of peoples (McMichael, 2014b, footnote 9). The forum furthermore included “localizes food systems” as the third of six pillars of food sovereignty. The pillar promotes a bridging of the distance between producers and consumers and a re-localisation of decision-making (IPC, 2009). Elsewhere at Nyéléni, it was established that policies should prioritize production for local consumption, and imports should not displace this (Nyéléni, 2007).

The movement’s prioritization of local markets, promotion of greater self-sufficiency and condemnation of the WTO could lead to the perception that the movement is against trade per se. In fact, it would be more accurate to say that the movement’s concern is with structures of agricultural production and trade; that is, structures governed by policies promoting liberalization and privatization and entrenching transnational corporate power, which the FSM, with reason, sees as harmful to hundreds of millions of small-scale producers. This analysis motivates the FSM’s demand that governments have greater autonomy in their domestic policy-making.

The perception of the movement as against international trade is exacerbated by strongly critical views of trade expressed by proponents of food sovereignty. The Oakland Institute’s materials about food sovereignty link production of coffee, cocoa, and other “colonial legacy” products to hunger and poverty (Oakland Institute, ND). Peter Rosset documents how export-oriented trade supports the interests of large, wealthy and expanding farms at the expense of small-scale farmers and peasants, who are displaced by the expansion of export trade onto marginal lands with poor soil quality and difficult growing conditions (Rosset, 2006, p. 5). Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck (2011) criticize what they label “mainstream” fair trade and classify it as part of the corporate food regime. The authors acknowledge that some within an “Alternative Fair Trade” movement take, “progressive and often radical positions on the issues of food and justice”, but the distinction only seems to further underline that most of the fair trade movement fails to take a progressive stance.

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5 McMichael suggests that the intention was always the rights of peoples. While this may or may not be the case, the discourse itself did change.
6 Which they qualify as “corporate expansion and individual ‘consumption-as-politics’, divorced from political organizing” (Holt Gimenez and Shattuck, 2011, p.115).
Views such as these contribute to the impression—a vague but definite sense—that the FSM rejects trade, and risks oversimplifying the motives and interests of small-scale farmers producing for export markets (which we elaborate on below). In our view, the FSM would benefit from more debate and some clarification on how the movement views trade, the needs and political objectives of small-scale producers engaged in export, and the place of these producers under food sovereignty.

**Opposition to the WTO**

If the FSM has been ambivalent about trade, its rejection of the WTO as a legitimate institution for governing agricultural trade is crystal clear (LVC, 2013d; Rosset, 2006; Holt-Gimenez, 2010; Wittman et al., 2010). Forged in part in reaction to the WTO and the Uruguay Round Agreements, FSM sees the WTO as an illegitimate, undemocratic institution embedding the neoliberal governance of agricultural production and trade, at the expense of peasant and small-scale producers. This deep resistance to the WTO is evident in analysis such as this from Peter Rosset:

> The WTO and other trade liberalization agreements are by nature designed from the ground up to favor the removal of barriers to trade, rather than its regulation in the public interest, and the non-transparent, anti-democratic, superpower-dominated mechanisms they use are unlikely to make anything else possible (Rosset, 2006, p. 77).

Rosset and Martínez invoke “collective defiance” as a characterization of social movements, citing LVC’s defiant attitude to the WTO and World Bank (Rosset and Martínez, 2005, p. 5). In the preparations for the WTO’s Ministerial Conference in Bali in December 2013, LVC members are still clearly articulating their strong rejection of the WTO and the underlying interests it is seen to represent (LVC, 2013d). LVC emerged with a strong critique that the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations7 were deeply undemocratic and marginalized developing countries and, within countries, the voices of social movements, especially farmers and peasants. LVC’s critique targeted the WTO agreements most immediately, but also the structural adjustment policies of the World Bank and the IMF, which they saw as emerging from the same economic logic. Overall, the existing and expanding structures of global agricultural production and trade were decried as economically, culturally, socially and politically harmful to peasants, small-scale farmers, indigenous peoples and other food producers and to be root causes of poverty, hunger and landlessness around the world (Wittman et al., 2010; Rosset, 2009; Desmarais, 2007). In this analysis, international trade is an instrument of oppression, part of a larger economic structure that disadvantages the South against the North, the peasant against the transnational grain trader, and local cultural preferences against global consumer culture, embodied by McDonald’s, Walmart and Carrefour.

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7 GATT (or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) was the forum in which multilateral trade negotiations took place until the WTO was established in 1995, at which time the GATT became one of the agreements administered by the WTO.
Yet Trade Matters

Tens of millions of small-scale producers and farm workers earn their living from crops raised for export, and from a food sovereignty perspective, this makes trade important. The FSM has not explained how such producers might make the transition to a new livelihood, nor whether it is a transition that the producers involved actually want to make. The food sovereignty principle that agriculture is for feeding local communities before trade raises questions about where export commodities fit, particularly commodities that are not staple foods such as cocoa and coffee. Five million small-scale farmers grow almost 90 percent of the world’s cocoa while 25 million people produce 80 percent of the world’s coffee (Fairtrade UK, 2013). While primarily grown on plantations using labourers, commodities such as tea, sugar and bananas are also grown by millions of small-scale farmers (ibid). These livelihoods leave much to be desired, but are too important to people’s survival to dismiss or ignore.

Meanwhile, evidence shows that many producers selling in export markets express interest in improving conditions, and especially their economic bargaining power, in the markets they already know (Wolford, 2010; Murphy, 2010; Vorley et al., 2012). A recent IIED/Hivos study of smallholder agency in globalized markets makes the point that both farmers’ organizations and, especially, NGOs, sometimes pursue an ideological agenda that neglects the stated economic preferences of the smallholders concerned (Vorley et al., 2012).

Indeed, many studies, rooted in critical analysis, demonstrate that the interests of small-scale farmers vary (Murphy, 2010; Borras, 2008; Wolford, 2010; Hivos/IIED, 2012). Many small-scale farmers may prefer producing within the existing global structures, even seeing production for exports as prestigious (Singh, 2002). Concern for the nature of markets today does not necessarily translate into a desire to confront the global system, but instead leads to demands for space to equitably integrate into the global system:

Many small-scale farmers themselves are less preoccupied with critiques of global power and more interested in their rights as economic actors. That is, they want to improve their bargaining position in the markets they buy from and sell to, they want laws that accommodate their needs…they want programmes and support structures to help them better meet the demands of the most promising markets…They also want some protection from loan sharks, from unscrupulous middlemen, from dumped agricultural imports, and from landowners who flout the law, or bend it to suit their interests. (Murphy, 2010, p. 27)

Wolford’s (2010) examination of Brazil’s Landless Workers Movement (MST in Portuguese, and a member of the FSM) and the differences among members in the North and south of the country found that sugarcane producers in the north, who joined the movement in the late 1990s, preferred to return to sugarcane production over switching to agricultural self-sufficiency. This was in contrast to the small-scale producers from the South, who had joined MST earlier in the movement’s history. Ultimately, Wolford concludes that while the MST wanted to move farmers out of sugarcane production on the grounds it is an ‘exploitative crop’, settlers in the North knew the crop, how to grow it, and how to access its markets. This is contextualized what she terms ‘common sense’, which is conditioned by social and institutional contexts, is the unconscious,
taken-for-granted and often unthinking elements that motivate people’s decisions, in this case the sugarcane producers (2010, pp. 22-23). They were more comfortable with the risks in the sugarcane sector than with those of home gardens. Knowing the associated risks and power relations in sugarcane, when prices were right, growing sugarcane and acquiring reliable wages was their preference, over domestic production oriented towards greater self-sufficiency (Wolford, 2010).

Another example can be found in West Africa, where Kuapa Kokoo, a Ghanaian cocoa cooperative, represents over 40,000 farmers across 1300 Ghanaian villages (Kuapa Kokoo, N.D.) and produces 10 percent of Ghana’s cocoa supply. It is the country’s only cooperative licensed to export cocoa. The cooperative became Fairtrade® certified through Fairtrade International (FLO) two years after its creation. Shortly after, it became a majority shareholder of what is today Divine Chocolate, an independent 100 percent certified Fairtrade chocolate company. The chocolate is produced in Germany, operations are based in London, but the profits return to the cooperative in Ghana. In many ways, Divine embodies the sort of fair trade promoted by the FSM.

But Divine Chocolate goes further: the cooperative has publically celebrated the Fairtrade certification of major transnational companies including Nestlé and Cadbury (Divine Chocolate, 2011), despite these companies’ limited commitment to fair trade and the fact that they are competitors in the same market. But ninety-eight percent of Kuapa Kokoo’s production is for conventional markets, and their support for the mainstream adoption of fair trade language appears to demonstrate a broader objective to also improve the market conditions under which it operates. Producers in developing countries demonstrate a range of motivations for producing for fair trade markets, some social and community driven, but they are motivated by other factors as well, including acquiring higher prices, greater financial access, and a more reliable market (Raynolds et al., 2007).

True certified fair trade products represent a niche market and their potential to be scaled-up and replicated are limited by structural constraints. But fair trade products and the efforts of the market can be considered an important part of the process of change, even part of a broader fair trade movement (Raynolds et al., 2007). In many ways the market mechanism creates new normative and discursive framings that challenge claims of the benefits of free trade and current commodity chain relations. As Bacon points out, while imperfect, fair trade does embody elements of a Polanyian Double Movement, that is, a social movement that emerges in confrontation of existing economic structures that embed society in markets, engendering harmful socioeconomic impacts, with an effort to re-embed markets in society (Bacon, 2010). Fair trade markets also provide important opportunities for farmers, most of whom have too few market alternatives, and are evidence that not all small-scale producers are pursuing the same model of governance. These examples demonstrate smallholder farmers resisting radical and ideal change and instead looking for practical opportunities. This raises questions about representation in the FSM, and how the diversity of production practices the movement promotes can all find their place.

8 Fairtrade (one word) is used to denote the FLO certification program. Fair trade two words is used for the concept of fair trade and the broader movement.
Food sovereignty holds that people should define their policies in a democratic system, the specifics of which should be determined by context. Diverse outcomes are expected and welcomed (Patel, 2009, p. 663; Nyéléni, 2013). The model clearly includes space to produce for export markets. But at the same time, food sovereignty is committed to a number of core tenets, which include prioritization of production for domestic food consumption and a strict resistance to transnational corporations. The requirement to respect these principles presumably constrains the choices people have in shaping their food production and consumption choices. In other words, there are uncertainties around the boundaries food sovereignty sets on ‘allowed’ choices. The boundaries are not firm on many issues, but on trade there are some clear parameters, linked, as we saw above, to the unambiguous rejection of the WTO, and the critiques of mainstream fair trade markets but without a clear idea of what exactly ‘true’ fair trade would look like.

Principles of representation are complex. LVC emerged as an alternative peasant voice, challenging those who claimed at the time to represent the voices of peasants: IFAP (the International Federation of Agricultural Producers) and certain NGOs, who often spoke in the name of the smallholder producers they worked with in the global South. The FSM saw IFAP as representing the often large-scale farmers who benefited from the neoliberal, capitalist structures of agricultural production and trade (Borras, 2008; Borras, 2010; Pimbert, 2010; Holt-Gimenez, 2010; Desmarais, 2007). Meanwhile, though NGOs are recognized to have been useful when peasant organizations were unable to participate in governance forums, there were tensions around what role NGOs should play as peasant voices came forward to speak for themselves (Desmarais, 2007, p. 23). Today, the FSM works selectively and on carefully defined terms with a small number of NGOs, such as Foodfirst Information and Action Network (FIAN), the Land Research Action Network, and the Inter-Church Organisation for Development Cooperation, and (until recently), Oxfam-Novib (Borras et al., 2008).

To claim representation, however, by the account of many, including supporters, is to engage in the exclusionary (Borras, 2008; Wolford, 2010; Boyer, 2010). Borras (2008, p. 268) makes the critique that the movement is relatively absent in national and local settings, and that, despite its intentions to the contrary, it fails to represent peasants across class, political and ideological divides, as well as in many geographical areas. Others have found that the movement’s efforts at the international level were not aligned with the understandings of peasants at the ground level (Boyer, 2010; Windfurch and Jonsén, 2005). Boyer’s study in Honduras specifically argues that members at the local level felt that the movement’s objectives in international spaces did not reflect their understandings and needs, causing tensions (Boyer, 2010). In her case study on the MST in Brazil, Wolford’s (2010) main finding is that the appearance of representation necessitates contradictions and exclusion of interests within a movement. She does not see this as necessarily problematic; but more a natural tendency for tension, and a disjuncture between a public façade and actual engagement, which for Wolford is a normal part of activism. She also recognizes, however, that an oversimplified ideal of representation is not without consequence.

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9 Representation is a big issue. Here we only discuss smallholders, but issues related to consumers would also be an important element as well, one affected by trade. It is simply beyond the scope of the paper to include this here.

10 IFAP has since been dissolved. A new organization with a broadly similar constituency has emerged in its place: the World Farmers Organization.
In the case of the Brazilian MST trying to integrate sugar cane producers in the North, the challenge proved to be the assumption on the part of organizers that once joining the MST, sugarcane growers would come to share the movement’s ideals. This proved not to be the case and sugarcane farmers eventually withdrew from the movement.

Given the limits of representation, though recognizing its importance for political movements, the question arises of how to regulate an international trade system that serves the broader interests of smallholders, within and outside of the FSM. The movement advocates for the establishment of an equitable system that empowers smallholders as economic actors in markets, while allowing for diverse ways of engaging in agricultural production. The question is not just one of how to construct a system of trade that is true to FSM’s vision, but also how such a trade system might emerge from current structures of international trade. The governance of international trade has undergone significant change since LVC emerged. Resilient food systems – and their producers and consumers – need many markets; the global trade rules dictate a single market. Can this change?

**Agricultural Trade in International Markets**

Free trade theory argues that a division of labour and specialization will encourage systems of production and exchange based on comparative advantage, maximizing efficiency and reducing costs. The claim of free trade is that the removal of government interventions such as tariffs, subsidies and market protections will allow consumers and producers to follow their economically rational self-interest, which in turn will create a ‘first best’ single market in which welfare is maximized. While obviously important, this theory of trade is ultimately unpersuasive on a number of counts, from the empirically measurable irrationality of many market actors when assessed against economists’ expectations (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009) to the challenges of unequal distribution that mar so many supposedly “free” markets (Stiglitz, 2007). Agricultural trade is in fact characterized by large political and economic power asymmetries (Koning and Pinfstrup-Andersen, 2007; Morrison and Sarris, 2007) and is dominated by modes of production that pose huge ecological challenges (see UNCSD, 2011; UNCTAD, 2013).

Despite these limitations in theory and practice, international trade remains important in agriculture; indeed, it has been vital to communities, countries and empires for thousands of years in many parts of the world. Trade can form part of an important safety net, guarding against local crop failures. If one region does not get the harvest it needs, then another can provide some of its surplus. Trade can also make it possible for human settlements to exist in places where the food available locally would not be sufficient for a large population. Trade has allowed people to enjoy different foods and different tastes, enriching diets. People trade food for other goods, too, thereby diversifying their economies. Trade can create ecological efficiencies, allowing a more intelligent distribution of stresses on natural resources such as land and water than do the political boundaries of nation states (see for example the discussion of Caroline Saunders and others of the energy use and emissions of New Zealand’s agriculture (Saunders et. al., 2006)). Trade in some form is a given—the challenge lies in how to align trade rules with food sovereignty’s broad principles.
The rules that govern international trade were first negotiated at the end of the Second World War, and signed in 1947 as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). GATT did not exclude agriculture but first the United States and then the European Community successfully secured an exemption from GATT rules for their agriculture sectors (Wilkinson, 2006). This exemption lasted until the UR, which concluded in 1994 with a revised version of GATT and a stand-alone Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) as well as a number of other agreements that have determined the evolution of agricultural trade and investment over the past 13 years, including Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), and the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS). Before the UR, international agricultural markets were largely dominated by governments and state-trading boards, though a handful of private grain traders were also present and important (Morgan, 1979). Much of the trade in international markets was residual. This meant agricultural commodity markets were relatively thin (supplies were limited) but the major exporters held large stocks, which stabilized international prices (Galtier, 2013).

The Changing Face of International Trade

International trade has evolved significantly since 1994. It is less about an exchange of goods between two firms from clearly identified countries and increasingly about what are called global value chains (GVCs), in which one or more firms organize the production of a good—say green beans—by engaging directly with producers (or their cooperatives of local buyers) and overseeing all stages of processing through to the point of final sale (usually a supermarket shelf). John Humphrey and his colleagues were among the first to describe this phenomenon in the post-UR world, looking at the role of supermarkets in shaping production and demand (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001).

The emergence of vertically integrated GVCs in international trade, including agricultural commodity trade, has a complex history, linked to innovations in communication, storage and transportation as well as policy changes within countries and at the multilateral level. It was not just the AoA that proved a catalyst for these changes but also GATS, TRIMs and TRIPs, as well as food safety issues regulated by the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS). Change came from outside the WTO trade agreements, too, from bilateral and regional trade agreements and national policies to shift power from the state to the private sector. Technological change in communications, transportation and storage was also crucial.

As these changes have taken effect, the U.S. and E.U. no longer dominate as exporters and importers in international agricultural commodity markets (Bureau and Jean, 2013). Brazil, Argentina, Thailand, India, the Ukraine, Russia and China are among the countries that have emerged as big producers, buyers and sellers of agricultural commodities (Daviron and Douillet forthcoming). An estimated 69 percent of Least Developed Country (LDC) food imports in 2006-2007 came from other developing countries (cited in Mold and Prizzon, 2011).

While the source of food exports has shifted, private traders have consolidated their power. Four companies control an estimated 75-90 percent of all cereal trade in international markets

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1 The term value chain was first coined by Porter, 1985.
(Murphy et al., 2012). The privatization of the Canadian and Australian wheat boards, an outcome aggressively sought by the private grain firms through domestic and multilateral lobbying efforts, has led to take-overs by the already dominant commodity traders, further reducing competition for farmers and consumers alike. New companies are emerging, as Hopewell (2013) discusses in relation to Brazil and as Schneider (2011) and Peine (2013) describe in relation to China. These firms will no doubt change the landscape over time, but for now they appear to be copying the global model set by existing agribusiness.

Demand for food continues to grow, reflecting dietary shifts in middle-income countries as they increase both meat consumption (creating demand for feed), and the consolidation of biofuels markets, powered by mandates and subsidies in the U.S. and E.U. This demand is shaping what is grown, what is traded, who to and at what price. Meanwhile, as demand grows, so does waste. In one widely cited report, as much as half of all food produced is estimated to be thrown away—nearly two billion tonnes per year globally (IME, 2013). According to a recent United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) report, “If current population and consumption trends continue, humanity will need the equivalent of two Earths to support it by 2030.” (Moomaw et al., 2012). This demand (and much of the waste) comes from relatively affluent consumers who are less sensitive to price increases. As the global food price crisis (discussed below) illustrated, it is the poor who have absorbed price shocks and uncertain demand (Dawe and Timmer, 2012; McCreary, 2012). All of this fuels instable politics and mounting pressure for change, evident in local fights over resources, food riots, and the dramatic spike in foreign investment in land, too often accurately characterized as land grabs.

The Food Price Crisis

In 2007-2008, food commodity prices doubled, hitting their highest levels in 30 years or more (Wise and Murphy, 2012). Governments began to question the idea that international markets were a sound basis for food security. Their doubts were fuelled by a stream of analysis on the failings of international commodity markets, including a report prepared by eight inter-governmental agencies for the Group of 20 richest economies on price volatility (IAWG, 2011); the CFS High Level Panel of Experts report on the same topic (HLPE, 2011); and public statements such as the 2009 G20 L’Aquila Declaration, which many more governments and agencies than the G20 membership also signed (Wise and Murphy, 2012). National policies started to change: food importers such as Saudi Arabia significantly increased their food reserves, while other countries, such as Uganda and Senegal, invested in stockholding infrastructure to support improved marketing and distribution of domestic production (ActionAid, 2012).

Changes at The WTO

Meanwhile, the WTO itself has undergone some changes. Although the epitome of globalization in some circles, the WTO has proved in some ways a surprisingly flexible institution. Today, the

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12 These are Archer Daniel Midland, Bungee, Cargill and Louis Dreyfuss.
13 The Canadian Wheat Board has lost its monopoly but will remain a voluntary public firm until 2016.
dominant economic powers at the WTO are the United States, the European Union, Brazil, India, and China. The so-called Quad of negotiators that dominated talks in the 1980s and 1990s (the United States, Europe, Canada and Japan) is no longer relevant (Hopewell, 2013). Economically less powerful states have begun to concert their efforts against the more powerful. For example, the Group of 33 (G33) countries, a group of developing countries, large and small, led informally by the Philippines, Indonesia and to some extent India, has emerged as a decisive voice on agriculture. Some of the G33’s demands, articulated around the objective of protecting national food security and providing support to “resource-poor, low-income farmers”, are aligned with the principles of food sovereignty. The G33 fought for the right to raise tariffs, at least temporarily, and to protect certain agricultural commodities from import liberalization (Khor, 2008b). These positions were one of the reasons the WTO negotiations broke down in July 2008. Contestation of U.S. cotton subsidies, led by Brazil but involving African cotton producers, also contributed to the negotiation stalemate (Khor, 2008).

There is also a G20 in the context of the agriculture negotiations, separate and not entirely aligned with the G33, which is led by agricultural exporters such as Brazil and Argentina. G20 proposals target industrialized countries for further tariff concessions while also remaining committed to opening markets in the South for their exports. Among this group, Brazil in particular has emerged as a trading powerhouse with a strong presence in the WTO negotiations. Brazil has led two successful challenges, one against the United States (on cotton) and the other against the European Union (on export subsidies for the sugar industry) using the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Brazil is not a typical developing country in the context of agriculture, yet the fact that a developing country could force a trading powerhouse to change its laws (or, as the U.S. chose to do, pay a fine) is an indication the institution does not only represent the interests of industrialized countries’ agri-businesses.

In addition to changes in the political balance of power within the WTO, there have been changes in relation to civil society engagement. In 1998, Scholte et al. argued CSOs could carve out stronger democratic space if they focused on sustained and substantial advocacy with the organization (Scholte et. al., 1998). In the decade after the WTO was founded, procedural changes supported this view. The WTO General Council agreed to dramatically improve public access to documents and to create some space for civil society, including accreditation procedures to give CSOs more consistent access to the organization. It seems reasonable to suppose that this change was in part the result of the pressure created by NGOs that would post negotiating texts and other documents on their websites, sometimes giving even governments access to the texts before the WTO secretariat could. These changes were in some ways small, and many of them were informal. They were made possible by the relationships some NGOs developed with government delegates and with the WTO secretariat staff. They did not change the fundamental disagreements on what trade policies would be best but they made it possible to have an open debate on some issues.

14 Evaluations of Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP)’s trade work include quotations from government negotiators acknowledging their gratitude for the documents and analysis of what they might imply.
15 This observation is based on Sophia Murphy’s first-hand involvement in WTO negotiations as a senior policy advisor with IATP, between 1997 and 2008 as well as on her consulting work with civil society organizations, government and the UN.
The work of the Special Rapporteur (SR) on the Right to Food, Olivier de Schutter, illustrates the possibilities for engagement. In 2011, the SR engaged directly and publicly with the WTO, setting out some challenges to the trade rules from a right to food perspective and making proposals on where the rules should be reformed to better support national food security strategies (de Schutter, 2011). Among the SR’s recommendations was a call for the rules to allow the establishment of public food reserves – a call that was then reflected in the G33 proposal on public food stocks in 2012. This is not in itself evidence of a direct causal relationship, but given the SR’s close engagement with the FSM, it is interesting both that he chose to engage in an uncompromised but constructive way with the WTO, and that at least some number of governments heard what he had to say.

Before the food crisis broke, many countries were already unhappy with the Doha proposals for agriculture, as evidenced in the G33 and G20 proposals. The crisis then showed the vulnerability of poor countries that depended on international markets for food security. It also shone a light on the one-sidedness of rules that gave exporters significant policy space and importers so much less (Sharma, 2011). The differences among negotiators grew irreconcilable in the wake of the crisis and agriculture was central to the collapse of the Doha negotiations in 2008.

It is still an open question whether the Doha negotiations will ever be completed. Whether or not they are completed, the shifts in political focus and balance of power observed in the last five or so years suggest the WTO offers room for manoeuvre that the FSM might want to consider. There are some specific advantages to the multilateral trade system, as well as costs to ignoring the system, despite its significant challenges.

For the FSM, What Role for the WTO?

Food sovereignty, too, has evolved and taken root in the last 15 years. A number of governments have integrated food sovereignty into their constitutions or laws, including Ecuador, Venezuela, Mali, Bolivia, Nepal and Senegal (Wittman et al., 2010, p. 8). A growing number of constituencies are choosing food sovereignty as a way to express their dissatisfaction with the food systems they must interact with. National and sub-national food sovereignty movements have emerged, adding depth and complexity to a project that began as an international exchange among peasant organizations. Can this evolving and changing FSM see opportunity in international trade regulation to advance its agenda?

While rejecting the WTO as a forum, the FSM accepts the need for multilateral discussion of trade and proposes the UN, especially the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), as the appropriate forum in which governments should determine the rules by which to govern global food and agriculture. The FSM judges the UN to be more democratic than the WTO, more accessible to civil society and thus more likely to represent the interests of diverse stakeholders. LVC in particular has invested significant time and political energy into a successful bid to create a voice for small-scale producers at both FAO and the IFAD, two of the three Rome-based food agencies. This work has been led by the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC) and most recently culminated with an important role for civil society, and

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16 The third is the World Food Programme.
within that for producers, as part of the renewal of the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS) in 2009 (Brem-Wilson, 2010).

The appeal of the FSM emphasis on the UN as the forum that should govern all aspects of agriculture, including trade, has appeal. The UN has a better basis from which to integrate trade into a broader vision of agriculture and food as having political and cultural, as well as material, importance.

FAO has changed in the years since LVC started building their multilateral presence, responding to heavy criticism by reforming and amending its work to renew its place as an important institution for the governance of food and agriculture. Food security has moved to the top of the global policy agenda, and definitions of food security have also evolved importantly in the years since the 1996 World Food Summit. Not least, the right to food has now a prominent place in the international debate, as evidenced by the range and depth of the issue-based reports coming from the office of Olivier de Schutter, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food. The reformed CFS is tackling some of the biggest challenges to global food security at its annual meetings, with governments, civil society, and the private sector all at the negotiating table.

Nonetheless, the proposal that FAO become the forum for international trade negotiations is not persuasive. FAO has no mandate to govern agricultural trade. And while isolating agricultural trade policy from broader agricultural policy is highly problematic, so, too, is the proposal that agricultural trade rules can somehow be isolated from other trade discussions. This is especially so now that trade encompasses so many aspects of the economy, from the rules that govern the movement of labour, to intellectual property rights, to investment. Somehow the trade rules for agriculture, while having to respect agriculture and its specificities, are going to have to come to terms with other sectors and economic priorities as well. Agriculture’s future is intimately bound to the future of other sectors of the economy. FAO is simply not equipped to allow an integrated discussion of this kind.

The WTO does have a mandate to govern trade, and not just in the eyes of the dominant economic powers. Other countries seek to participate actively at the WTO, whether as part of formal groups such as the Least Developed Countries or the African Union, or in more fluid groups built around negotiating positions, such as the G20 and G33.

While the struggle to renew and re-empower the UN remains of obvious importance to the FSM objectives, a shorter-term objective could also be to support those countries that want to change the WTO from within. The risk of not engaging is to lose an opportunity to strengthen small-scale producer voices in negotiations that shape the rules determining producers’ livelihoods. Many of those small-scale producers live in some of the now more dominant countries: Brazil, India and China especially. While China presents enormous challenges for civil society organizing, both India and Brazil have well-developed and articulate civil society organizations that are active in influencing national policy, including trade policy. If the FSM ignores this avenue, it both loses an opportunity and allows others, especially agri-business, to dominate that chance to influence policy.
This position has echoes of the debate between “insider” and “outsider” strategies that were prominent around the time of the Seattle Ministerial in 1999. Our view echoes those of Green (2012) and others who argue that an engagement within policy spaces and confrontation from outside of them are necessary. The significant changes in the balance of power within the WTO over the last decade suggest the costs and opportunities of engagement by NGOs as ‘insiders’ need to be revisited. As a consensus-based organization, moving slowly closer to universal membership (though not yet there), the WTO’s authority is not trivial. The organization is led less by the secretariat than most UN agencies and is in that sense more accountable to the members, who are ultimately the spokespeople of (mostly) elected governments. While continuing to advocate for changes at the UN that would curb and direct trade policy (especially through the CFS), why not simultaneously push for change that could lead to new multilateral trade rules at the WTO?

The dissolution of the WTO meanwhile could create a void in international trade governance that would risk strengthening plurilateral agreements among the richest economies. The trend towards more fragmentation in international systems is highly detrimental to the realization of food security. In such contexts, weaker states lack the space in which to cooperate and build alliances with one another, leaving them more vulnerable to the whims of the more powerful countries. The outcomes of too many bilateral and regional free trade agreements attest to this (for example, the Central America Free Trade Agreement).

Many will question the extent to which the WTO can be made more democratic. Changes in accreditation, access to negotiating documents and meeting summaries, and the creation of a public forum for open debate give some ground for hope. In addition to the evolving and improved channels for civil society engagement, developing countries have emerged as stronger and more able negotiators. Meanwhile the political context has changed markedly to a more critical examination of modern globalized agricultural systems. The situation is far from perfect but so are the alternatives.

One question is the extent to which the WTO as an institution for the negotiation of trade agreements can be separated from the pursuit of a specific agenda, often called ‘corporate globalization’ (Hopewell, 2013). It is possible to imagine multilateral trade rules that encourage and support a plurality of markets and that empower governments to negotiate policy spaces for these markets in the interests of their citizens, in the interests of food security and sustainable poverty reduction. In some small way, the space the G33 has sought to carve out with its proposal to exempt expenditures on public grain reserves from limits under WTO spending controls is a step in this direction. We think it is possible to imagine the WTO as a place that counterbalances the power of those countries (and companies) that have set the rules to their benefit and to the detriment of small-scale producers and farm workers. Such a WTO would move away from a mandate of increased liberalization to increased consideration of the needs of specific markets and support special and differential treatment, special products, commodity agreements, and other measures as seems useful to protect the public interest, broadly speaking, and the rights and interests of producers and farm workers more specifically.

Conclusion
This paper begins a process of considering why trade should be integrated into a vision for food sovereignty. The FSM’s ambiguous, unclear and sometimes contradictory position on trade lends to misunderstandings about the movement’s vision for trade and how it might be realized, which in turn may close political doors and result in fractures within the movement. As the movement evolves and takes on an increasingly important (and more broadly based) political role, rethinking where, with whom, and with which institutions to engage also takes on some urgency. Engagement with trade offers not only new ways to realize food sovereignty as it has been defined, but also ways to round out and further develop the concept of food sovereignty itself. Dialogue with small-scale export producers will be an important part of this, to understand their interests and their motivations, and to use this understanding to broaden the scope of food sovereignty. Whether producing for fair trade markets, or traditional or non-traditional agricultural commodity chains, some fieldwork evidence suggests that these producers are motivated to continue their engagement in export markets. Millions of farmworkers, too, are working to improve their working conditions, but are also protective of their jobs. They perceive international trade to be important for their livelihoods.

We suggest that the movement reconsider its dismissal of the WTO. The literature on social movements and political change argues that contentious issues require contentious politics, which are essential for opening doors where opportunities for engagement are absent. Yet the literature simultaneously argues that movements should be open to opportunities for structural changes when such opportunities arise (Gaventa and McGee, 2010; Tarrow, 2011). There appear to be cracks in the edifice of the WTO today: opportunities that were not evident 20 years ago. These could present important opportunities to transform not only the rules of trade but the way in which those rules are determined, with some potential for the principles of food sovereignty to be integrated.

We remain cautious in making these arguments. Our hope is to contribute some perspective, grounded in theory and analysis, that may be of use to the FSM as it continues to act against the dominant structures of agricultural production and trade that have been harmful to small-scale producers and farm workers everywhere. We hope work will continue on forging a stronger strategy, one that includes a place for trade.
Chapter 6: Identifying Fairtrade’s Challenges to Neoliberalism

Introduction

Fair trade is best known as an alternative market where consumers purchase products that adhere to a set of social and market standards, as guaranteed through a third-party labeling certification system. Much of the time this assurance is given through the Fairtrade International (FLO) label. Fair trade, however, has a history of pursuing equitable social and economic systems through political activities. For many, fair trade’s evolution from political advocacy to the fair trade markets we know today has been at the expense of its early commitments to establish international trade rules and governance that was to facilitate equitable trade for all, as well as stronger social relations connecting producers and consumers across the globe. In this view, the rise of today’s market-oriented fair trade system embodies the neoliberal characteristics it claims to contest (see for example Fridell, 2007; Lyon and Moburg, 2010). This paper examines and challenges claims that fair trade is neoliberal, that it has become co-opted, and that it has abandoned its principles of solidarity economy, all in favour of market-based governance.

I begin with a brief introduction on fair trade, and an overview of the claims above. From there I compare these claims against existing academic analysis and new empirical evidence on fair trade activities that support a nuanced assessment of the movement. I begin by questioning many of the present assumptions that underpin the claims that fair trade embodies a neoliberal logic, whereby unregulated markets and private governance are prioritized over government regulation. I do this by presenting a body of evidence that identifies many political activities and priorities taken up by the fair trade movement, including engagement with several European political offices. I also draw on interviews with and statements from affiliates of fair trade organizations that make explicit the view that markets are not sufficient in overcoming the social and economic injustices of the current international agricultural trade regime. Additionally, I challenge the notion that private governance is necessarily neoliberal, and argue that fair trade embodies a more progressive form of private governance that is not at odds with regulatory oversight, and may even help facilitate it.

Following this, I examine the claims that fair trade has been “co-opted”. While acknowledging that market power has played some role in shaping the boundaries within which fair trade standards are set, and that some companies that certify fair trade do not demonstrate a strong commitment to fair trade, I find little evidence to show direct corporate interference in fair trade standards. Furthermore, although these companies mostly lack a full commitment to fair trade, the decision to engage transnational corporations and supermarkets in fair trade is not objectively anathema to the interests of producers. The “mainstreaming” of fair trade is instead welcome by some producers because of the market growth and normative shifts it is believed to generate. As a result, I argue that the perspective that fair trade has been “co-opted” overlooks the complex range of motivations that underpin these developments, and merits a more cautious analysis.

Finally, and building on the previous sections, I challenge the assertion that fair trade is no longer a solidarity economy. As Christopher Bacon points out, there are today many types of fair trade. He categorizes three – (i) the “corporate”, which operates through Northern-based
certification organizations like FLOW and Fair Trade USA, (ii) social economies that have a more direct relationships and full commitment to fair trade than the corporate fair trade, and (iii) a hybrid of these two (2015, p. 473). I argue that with these different fair trades come different producer interests and motivations, just as there are different producer interests and motivations outside fair trade. I question whether solidarity, as it is positioned based on the initial conceptualization of fair trade, should be the only version of what can be considered “solidarity”. In others words, I question whether we might conceive of multiple forms of solidarity that meet these different producer motivations, or even whether solidarity might evolve with inclusion of more producers. This suggestion is somewhat of a conundrum given some of the democratic deficiencies in FLO (discussed below). But the desire for a stricter form of fair trade that does, ultimately, limit the market’s reach and the market’s size, does not seem to represent the interests and motivations of all producers.

Ultimately, I argue in favour of increased nuance in analysis of fair trade markets. Some of the more critical arguments labeling fair trade as neoliberal rely on omissions of broader activities taken up by fair trade organizations, as well as false assumptions about the fair trade network’s strategies and decisions. A nuanced approach, by contrast, offers an understanding of the precise and diverse contexts and factors that shape the strengths and weaknesses of fair trade and, if we are so inclined, better help the movement to determine how it can strengthen its own governance and activities.

A Note on Terminology

Before beginning the background and analysis of the arguments, it is necessary to provide a note on fair trade terminology. Gavin Fridell distinguishes those in the movement who are more narrowly focused on fair trade markets from the broader fair trade movement. He classifies the contemporary fair trade markets as the fair trade “network” (FTN), as distinct from the fair trade “movement” more broadly. He begins his classification of the FTN by stating:

The ‘fair trade network’ is used to refer to a formal network of NGOs that connects peasants, workers and craftspeople in the South with partners in the North through a system of fair trade rules and principles – what authors typically refer to when they speak of fair trade commodities or handicrafts. In contrast, the ‘fair trade movement’ refers to a broader movement, which has had significant influence in international development circles since the end of the Second World War. This movement has no official existence, but rather is a term used to encapsulate a variety of initiatives headed by southern governments, international organizations, and NGOs with the purpose of radically altering the international trade and development regime in the interest of poor nations in the South (Fridell, 2007, p. 23).

Fair trade markets are the most prominent manifestation of fair trade today, and are often seen as synonymous with fair trade, despite that there is more to the movement than just markets; for example, labeling organizations engage in political activities and other efforts to improve producer empowerment. From this standpoint, Fridell’s distinction between the movement and the network has merit. Fair trade is represented by a vast number of activities, actors, organizations and networks.
However, Fridell’s use of the FTN has some contradictions with its classification as part of the movement. He identifies the FTN as *one* initiative among many others in the broader fair trade *movement*. Yet the so-called network is itself a vast number of actors, organizations and activities, and not accurately summed as *one* initiative. For example, Fairtrade USA famously split from Fairtrade International’s umbrella over, among other things, the former’s desire to certify coffee plantations. Fridell also introduces the network as part of the movement, but goes on to treat it analytically as distinct from the movement; he argues that the movement has declined with the advent of neoliberalism, but that the network grew and expanded because of growing fair trade markets (Fridell, 2007; Fridell, 2009). This implicitly alienates the network as separate from the movement, rather than a part of it. Fridell similarly distinguishes the movement as at odds with neoliberalism, while claiming the network not only “adjusted its strategy in the 1980s, placing a new emphasis on market-driven development and volantariist reforms to the existing international economic order” (Fridell, 2007, p. 39), but having also “abandoned the statist emphasis of these theories while maintaining their neo-Smithian understanding of the capitalist market” (Fridell, 2007, p. 24). Reed similarly dichotomizes the market arm of fair trade from the broader social movement, arguing that “in talking about fair trade, it is important to distinguish between broad social movements, which are aimed at the reform of the international trading system, and the more specific initiatives that seek to link more directly small producers in the South to northern consumers” (Reed, 2009, p. 4).

What follows will reinforce my objection to the trend to dichotomize the movement from the FTN. Nevertheless, I do use the frame of “Fair Trade Network” to classify when I am focusing more narrowly on the contemporary fair trade movement, which includes, and is even predominantly represented by, those who are involved in markets. I specifically focus on the work of those who fall under the Fairtrade International umbrella. Fair trade markets more broadly embody other certification organizations – notably the World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO), which has a stricter set of standards for certification than Fairtrade International (FLO) – and Fairtrade USA, which has a looser set of standards. Today, most of the literature, however, is referencing FLO’s activities and policies. Additionally, most of my empirical evidence links to organizations that fall under the FLO umbrella (though not exclusively – for example, Fair Trade Advocacy Office is a joint effort of FLO and WFTO). Because much of the contemporary literature on fair trade is discussing FLO markets, the “Fair Trade Network” label seemed an appropriate distinction in my discussion. But, as my research will show, this network is very much engaged beyond the confines of market activities, bears some of the trademarks of the movement, as defined by Fridell, and is not at all “neoliberal” in the ways that many academics, including Fridell, suggest.

**Fair Trade Overview: Emergence and Evolution**

Fair trade markets emerged in the decades after World War II when churches sought to connect organizations in the North with handicraft producers in developing countries. This was an attempt to address poverty through market opportunities (Bacon, 2010; Raynolds et al., 2007; Lyon, 2006). Fair trade markets were motivated by a focus on shifting towards increased trade

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1 For example, WFTO requires 100% commitment to fair trade in order to be certified. This means companies like Nestlé and Cadbury cannot be certified.
opportunities in place of a focus on aid as the foundation for development (Wilkinson, 2007). By the 1960s and 1970s, fair trade markets expanded through alternative trade organizations (ATOs) that established more direct sales networks between producers and retailers (Raynolds et al., 2007, p. 16). This was the early advent of alternative markets connecting producers in the South with consumers in the North.

The 1970s brought an increased awareness of injustices born from trade through the efforts of campaigners, students, trade unions and activists focused on social and economic justice concerns. The fair trade movement was focused on more than markets, seeking regulatory and multilateral approaches to securing fair trade. The movement looked to international commodity agreements, working with UN efforts concerned with establishing equitable economic agreements, including the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the Lomé Convention on trade and aid. The movement also worked with developing country governments pursuing more state-led economies (Fridell, 2007). Some of the demands being made by the movement in these decades included increased liberalization of rich country markets and fairer commodity markets, more equal terms of trade that would make developing countries less dependent on raw commodities, and increased aid and financing from developed countries to compensate for market fluctuations. Fridell (2007, p. 34) classifies this time as the “pinnacle of the [fair trade] movement”.

With the 1980s came an acceleration of globalization and the spread of neoliberal policies and practices, which stymied efforts by those in the movement to shape trade rules and set forward commodity agreements to make trade fairer for all. Around the same time, the International Coffee Agreement collapsed, international traders and roasters consolidated, and agricultural sectors in developing countries were liberalized. Liberalization came first under the IMF and the World Bank’s structural adjustment policies (SAPs), and later under the WTO. Liberalization removed government policy space to support and protect markets, creating a context ripe for unfair trading practices (Clapp and Burnett, 2014; Bacon, 2010; Lyon, 2006, p. 453; Clapp, 2006). This was also a time where concentration of corporate power in agricultural supply chains increased, which generated many downward pressures on agricultural producers and workers in developing countries. This corporate concentration has continued, and dictates terms of trade, often unfavourably for small-scale export commodity producers (Murphy et al., 2012; Clapp and Fuchs, 2009; Murphy 2006).

Some in the movement responded to these changing circumstances and lost political opportunities by pursuing a certification and labeling system to advance fairer trade opportunities. The certification and labeling of products originated in the 1980s with Max Havelaar, the first fair trade certification initiative (Jaffee, 2012; Bacon, 2010; Vanderhoeoff Boersma, 2009; Fridell, 2007). Max Havelaar was coordinated through a partnership between the Dutch development organization Solidaridad and the Union of Indigenous Communities of the Region of Isthmus (UCIRI), a peasant organization from Oaxaca, Mexico that was formed to address challenges to getting fair prices for their coffee production. Max Havelaar extended from Holland to other European countries and eventually evolved into the establishment of the Fairtrade Labeling Organization (now known as Fairtrade International), the umbrella
organization certifying most contemporary fair trade products today, which are referred to as *Fairtrade* (one word)\(^2\) products (Jaffée, 2012; Vanderhoeff Boersma, 2009).

This process of certifying goods as Fairtrade, to communicate their more ethical origins to consumers, has catalyzed fair trade markets to where they are situated today. Global Fairtrade sales in terms of dollar value and volume have risen steadily over the last decades.\(^3\) The number of products certified Fairtrade increased from 150 in 2003 to over 1,000 at the end of 2005. In 2008, sales of fair trade products reached 700M pounds (retail value) in the UK – a major Fairtrade market. This represented a 46% increase from 2007, and a huge increase from the 16 million pounds sold in 1999 (Doherty, 2011). Global sales in Fairtrade products have seen remarkable continuous growth, at 40 percent every year in the five years leading up to 2009 (Avril, 2010). Sales of Fairtrade certified products were more than $5.6B in 2010, with an additional $1 billion in sales from world shop and unlabeled fair trade products worldwide (Doherty et al., 2013, p. 162). Globally, sales in 2014 increased ten percent to reach €5.9 billion (FLO, 2015). Many national markets saw growth, with Canada, Hong Kong, Sweden and Germany leading the increase in sales. However, though sales still reached a significant number at £1.67BN, in 2014 the UK saw a decline in sales for the first time in 20 years, with sales dropping by almost 3.7 percent (Butler, 2015; FLO, 2015). In 2014, many products from cotton to cocoa to dried fruit saw a rise in global sales (FLO, 2015).

Fair trade as a concept is today encoded in the definition set out by major fair trade organizations that fall under FINE, a collective of major fair trade organizations, several years ago\(^4\):

> Fair Trade is a trading partnership based on dialogue, transparency and respect, that seeks greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable development by offering better trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalized producers and workers – especially in the South. Fair Trade organizations (backed by consumers) are engaged actively in supporting producers, awareness raising and in campaigning for changes in the rules and practice of conventional international trade.\(^5\)

The definition was designed to embody two elements: to create a working model for just trade, and a more radical component challenging existing business practices as a tool to encourage changing existing structures of trade (Moore et al., 2007).

Despite these market successes, the FTN and the prioritization of fair trade markets have been subject to many critiques. Specifically, concerns are raised that the shift towards markets has been one that represents an abandonment of fair trade’s roots as a solidarity, alternative, political

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\(^2\) When the term Fairtrade is used as one word, this represents FLO’s market products, a delineation of the term set forward by FLO itself.

\(^3\) Sales data on the fair trade market appears to be primarily products certified through FLO.

\(^4\) At its inception the association represented four major organizations: FTI (then Fairtrade Labeling Organization, or FLO), WFTO (then International Federation of Alternative Trade or IFAT), the European Fair Trade Association (EFTA), and the Network of European World Shops (NEWS!, which has since merged into the WTFO, leaving three organizations today.) FINE at the time was the acronym of the four organizations’ names.

\(^5\) [http://wfto.com/fair-trade/definition-fair-trade](http://wfto.com/fair-trade/definition-fair-trade)
movement, and a shift towards a market-led development that embodies the values of the economic system it was born to contest.

**Fair Trade as Neoliberal**

Many academics argue that the FTN\(^6\) seeks to address injustices in the trade system through markets, and specifically individual consumption, characteristics associated with neoliberalism both in their individualism and in their eschewing of government regulation (Maniates, 2002).

Low and Davenport characterize certified fair trade markets as an “globalize to change consumers “one cup at a time”, via individualism that relies on “shopping for a better world” (Low and Davenport, 2009, p. 87). Lyon and Moburg claim that the FTN sees markets as the means to economic justice. They argue that the retreat of the state and statist development theory from the 1980s resulted in fair trade being given “a rebirth in a nonstatist incarnation as an international movement that seeks economic justice and environmental sustainability through markets themselves” (Lyon and Moburg, 2010, p. 4). They go on further to suggest that the FTN embraces a non-state approach to governing:

> in place of legal and policy remedies by states on behalf of the farmers and workers who reside within their borders, fair trade seeks social justice by embracing the deregulated markets that are themselves often responsible for deepening poverty in rural communities (Lyon and Moburg, 2010, p. 7).

Lyon and Moburg conclude that by the 1980s “the fair trade movement as originally conceived, that is, a statist program challenging free trade, appeared to be as moribund as the Keynesian policies on which it was based” (Lyon and Moburg, 2010, p.3). Guthman contends that “these labels concede the market to the locus of regulation, in keeping with neoliberalism’s fetish of market mechanisms” (Guthman, 2007, p. 456). Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck argue that the FTN is part of the “hegemony of the neoliberal trend” as the “corporate expansion and individual ‘consumption-as-politics’, divorced from political organizing, undergirds the ‘mainstreaming’ wing of the international Fair Trade movement” (Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck, 2011, p. 115).

Schmeizer argues fair trade is palatable to the institutions that promote neoliberal governance, listing the World Bank and the European Union, because it is a form of private governance (Schmeizer, 2013, p. 235). And Vanderhoff Boersma goes a step further, suggesting that it is because fair trade organizations feel constrained to engage in the radical that they settle for the neoliberal:

> Policy makers in the national fair trade organizations, however, are afraid to speak out politically and to make alliances – whether economic, cultural, or political – with others who are looking for the viable alternatives that are needed to counter the neo-liberal trade regime (Vanderhoff Boersma, 2009, p. 58).

Others target the fair trade network for representing broader political and economic institutions that are odds with their view of more progressive social economy. Shreck problematizes the network’s participation in capitalism and export markets more broadly, arguing fair trade

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\(^6\) These authors don’t necessarily identify this as the fair trade network, but it tends to be a focus on fair trade as manifest predominantly as fair trade markets.
reinforces developing country producers’ dependency on export markets, and the assumption that development is desirable and necessary (Shreck 2005). Clark and Hussey (2015, p. 3) argue that the “growth and mainstreaming of [FLO] certification has made certification and traceability an end in itself, a process of ‘governance through bureaucratization’ dominated by a ‘technical procedural logic’”. For these authors, fair trade markets have come to embody the neoliberal (or sometimes capitalist) logic that must be contested in order to truly make trade fair. In such views, the FTN is at best a reflection of the neoliberal times, and thus an impotent movement. At its worst, Fairtrade supports neoliberalism, reinforcing the system it claims to contest.

**Fair Trade as Co-opted**

Others take issue not necessarily with fair trade markets themselves, but with the decisions underscoring the mainstreaming of fair trade. A highly controversial issue with the mainstreaming of fair trade markets has been the certification of transnational corporations like Nestlé and Cadbury, and the licensing of major supermarket and hypermarket chains. There are a range of relationships within mainstreamed Fairtrade, and degrees of engagement therein. Corporate retailers can facilitate the sale of products licensed through ATOs, such as Max Havelaar coffee. Other retailers have acquired licensing rights, bypassing ATOs. Some companies have a 100 percent commitment to fair trade, such as Divine Chocolate Company, while others certify some of their products, such as Cadbury’s Fairtrade certified Dairy Milk and Nestlé’s four finger KitKat bars; with these latter bars are only certified in select, participating countries. Products from plantations that generally do not compete with products from smallholders can also be certified (Reed, 2009; Jaffee, 2012). Products from companies like Divine Chocolate, which are 100 percent Fairtrade, can be sold through major retailers who do not fully commit to Fairtrade or its values.

Mainstreaming, though controversial, has been responsible for the exponential growth in Fairtrade markets over the last 20 years (Wilkinson, 2007; Jaffee, 2012). For many this growth has come at too great a cost to the integrity and principles of fair trade, with mainstreaming argued to have generated the cooptation of fair trade markets and the dilution of fair trade standards (Jaffee, 2012; Archer and Fitch, 2010; Reed, 2009; Fridell, 2007). Several changes in the standards and enforcement of fair trade over the decades have been identified. For example, a decline in the real prices paid for coffee to Fairtrade producers is frequently discussed. There had been a 41 percent decline in real prices by 2008, which was potentially below the costs of production (Renard and Loconto, 2012; Jaffee, 2012, p. 108; Bacon, 2010 p. 130). FLO prices were increased in 2011 after controversy grew, though they remain lower in real terms compared with 1988 prices (Bacon, 2010; Jaffee, 2012).

Fairtrade requires importers to both pre-finance producer cooperatives and to develop long-term relationships with producers. But these requirements to ensure stable markets for producers are also identified as standards that have become diluted over time (Clark and Hussey, 2015; Reed, 2015).7

7 At this time, Dairy Milk is certified in the UK and in Canada, Kit Kat is certified in the UK.

8 The authors also include Fairtrade USA’s certification of coffee plantations, but this was only achieved after the split from FLO, and is excluded from my analysis. Jaffee 2012 states that coffee prices were at times below cost of production, but Bacon (2010) argues that there is an absence of systematic studies on the costs of production.
Pre-financing and the requirement for traceability “in a number of commodity areas” were officially suspended in 2008 by FLO (Doherty et al., 2013, p. 167). The certification of plantations is also alleged to be a softening of principles. According to Jaffee, it was retailers who pressured for the certification of labourers and plantations (Jaffee, 2012). FLO, however, has sought to protect smallholder producers by not certifying certain commodities often produced through smallholder cooperatives (for e.g. coffee, cocoa, honey and cotton). Products produced on plantations that are Fairtrade certified include bananas, tea and flowers. The intention for plantation certification was to protect the frequently marginalized labourers who are employed by large plantations. Thus, in order to be certified, plantations must adhere to a number of labour standards. Doherty et al. argued in 2013 that the Fairtrade standards protecting labourers were weak, specifically around their rights to organize and to democratically determine how the social premium would be used (Doherty et al., 2013). FLO appears to have since made efforts to strengthen labour standards, revising them in 2014 to include the requirements that workers be allowed to organize and engage in collective bargaining, Fairtrade labourers receive a living wage where “salaries must be equal or higher than the regional average or than the minimum wage in effect”. Fairtrade workers are also guaranteed health and safety standards, and other standards to ensure conditions are equitable for all workers. However, smallholder farmers, including CLAC, have reportedly made efforts to exclude labourers from participating in governance of Fairtrade International, arguing instead that labourers should rely on unions rather than FLO (Fiorito, 2012).

Whether Fairtrade has been coopted directly by corporations is debatable. Evidence ultimately fails to demonstrate a direct relationship between corporate intervention in the setting of fair trade standards. There are some who link the systemic and market power of corporations to standard dilution. While Renard and Loconto (2012, p. 57) argue it was “corporate pressure” that kept prices low, they provide no additional details. Bacon, by contrast, suggests that hesitance to increase prices has been motivated by a fear that corporations would withdraw from Fairtrade markets if prices were raised (Bacon, 2010, p. 134). Renard and Loconto also argue that the link is systemic, that “standard systems are not neutral, but rather the outcomes of the interests of those who participate in their creation” (Renard and Loconto 2012, p. 55). They argue that inclusion and exclusion in setting standards is determined by financial and economic powers, with participation in standard setting constrained for those from southern countries, notably producers (Renard and Loconto, 2012, p. 55).

Reed argues that allowing retailers to license products runs the risk that they “may become less willing over time to merely engage ATOs on the basis of arms-length market relations and will seek to take a more active approach to governing the fair trade commodity chain” (Reed, 2009, p. 11). Licensing allows companies and retailers to demand higher quality standards, and to achieve greater cost efficiencies, which can make them more competitive against Alternative Trade Organizations (ATOs) (Reed, 2009).

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11 They cite Bacon 2006, a report in Spanish which I cannot read to verify.
Ultimately, the proof that Fairtrade has been coopted by corporate interests is limited and the arguments are often more cautionary, relying on theories of cooptation and potential risk than on evidence of actual corporate interference. On whether direct cooptation has ever taken place, Barbara Fiorito, former Chair of the Board with FLO from 2006 to 2008, denied witnessing direct corporate influence on Fairtrade standards during her tenure (Fiorito, 2012). While many academics and activists voice a strong concern that mainstreaming undermines ATOs and more direct, solidarity approaches to fair trade, Bacon states that ATOs have maintained growth rates from coffee sales amidst fair trade mainstreaming (Bacon, 2010). FLO, for its part, has improved its democratic legitimacy over the years since mainstreaming. Today, the Fairtrade board consists of four members nominated by the three producer networks, four members nominated by FTOs, and three independent board members, although this is not a proportional representation of small-scale producers (Bacon, 2015).12 FLO has also made smallholders “50% owners of their global regulatory system” (Bacon, 2015, p. 474). In 2014 FLO elected its first producer representative as chair of their board. Marike de Peña, Chair of the Board, is director and co-founder of a banana cooperative in the Dominican Republic, and is also the Chair of the CLAC.13

Fair Trade or Fairwashing?

Not everyone is concerned with the direct influence of corporations; some are more concerned with corporations coopting the legitimacy that comes with a Fairtrade label when these corporations only certify a small fraction of their products, making no demonstrable commitment to fair trade broadly. This is termed “fairwashing”, and is argued to be an effort to “cash in on a niche market” through the “commodification of social justice” (Archer and Fitch, 2010, p. 110). Fairwashing, it is argued, can allow companies to “oversell their commitment to fair trade well beyond the reality” (Doherty et al., 2013, p. 174; see also Renard and Loconto, 2012), which can in turn create competition for those companies that are 100 percent committed to fair trade but are not distinguished for this commitment (Fridell, 2009). Some ATOs that are committed to 100% fair trade have withdrawn from FLO in response to the certification of those without the same commitment (Schmeizer, 2013, p. 235). While attending the 2010 Fair Trade Futures conference in Boston, I observed and participated in a discussion on developing a label to differentiate full and partial commitment, but no such label has surfaced in the years since.14

Fairwashing raises concerns that certifying companies that do not commit fully to fair trade will legitimize and uphold their practices that are anathema to fair trade:

This ‘clean-washing’ or ‘fairwashing’ helps mainstream corporations to justify and perpetuate their exploitative trading practices – they thus capitalize on the efforts of ATOs and activists, who over years have created the ‘social brand’ that gives value to the fair trade label. By selling a small percentage of their products under fair trade certification, mainstream companies can use the strategy of ‘parallel

12 Bacon’s article lists three seats, Fairtrade International lists four.
13 [http://www.Fairtrade.net/about-Fairtrade/who-we-are/board-members-general-assembly.html](http://www.Fairtrade.net/about-Fairtrade/who-we-are/board-members-general-assembly.html); Clark and Hussey do identify outstanding representational shortcomings in the organization. However, FLO does appear to be very responsive to critiques, and to producer representation.
14 I attended the conference as an observer for my research; the conference was held September 10-12, 2010 in Boston, Massachusetts.
production’ to improve their image as socially conscious without fundamentally changing their sourcing practices (Schmeizer, 2013, p. 235).

Many of these companies do lack a demonstrable commitment to the principles of fair trade. Companies like Nestlé and Cadbury only certify a small percentage of their products as Fairtrade. In its 2015 corporate social responsibility report, Nestlé cites that 30 percent of its cocoa is part of its “Nestlé Cocoa Plan” for sustainable sourcing (Nestlé, 2015). However, this sourcing is shared across several initiatives. While the report states that “a high proportion of this cocoa was sourced from farms and plantations that meet the UTZ certification code of conduct for cocoa standards…and the Fairtrade certification standard”, it is unclear how much is Fairtrade (Nestlé, 2015, p. 122). In 2013, Nestlé listed an estimate of 5300 tonnes of cocoa sourced for its KitKat, which is about 8.5 percent of the 62,299 tonnes of cocoa purchased for their Nestle Cocoa Plan that year (Nestlé, 2013). Ten percent of one third is still only 3 percent of the company’s cocoa. Cadbury only certifies its Dairy Milk bars and buttons in select countries, while Mars only certifies its Mars bars in the UK and Ireland (FTF, 2015).

Many companies use certification labels with lower standards, such as Rainforest Alliance, UTZ certified, or Starbucks’ own “Coffee and Farmer Equity” (C.A.F.E.) program, in addition to their Fairtrade certified products (Newman and O’Connell, 2011; Bacon, 2010; Smith, 2010). Clark and Hussey argue convincingly that Fairtrade International could improve their efforts to obtain stronger commitments, particularly by enforcing the standard requiring minimum volume commitments, which they do not currently enforce (2015, p. 13). Indeed, at the 2010 Fair Trade Futures conference two panelists argued that FLO struggles to realize and leverage its power in supply chains.17

**Fair Trade as Re-Embedding Markets**

While many treat fair trade as strictly neoliberal, others question whether it is purely, or even primarily, neoliberal. Some scholars, often those adopting a Polanyian analytical framework, argue that the verdict on Fairtrade as neoliberal is nuanced, and that while in some ways neoliberal, contemporary fair trade markets also embody characteristics of a Polanyian double movement that contributes to the embedding of markets in society. Both Bacon and Jaffee, who provided evidence of diluted standards, and argue that Fairtrade is not as fair as it should be, do maintain that Fairtrade simultaneously serves to re-embed markets in societies, at least partially, in a Polanyian sense (Jaffee, 2012; Bacon, 2010). Bacon argues that fair trade “is neither purely neoliberal nor social movement led”, and that it is ultimately a “deeply contested, socially embedded process, subject to an array of political economic constraints, personal convictions and path-dependent contingencies” (Bacon, 2010, p. 112). Jaffee (2012, p. 95) argues that fair trade as a social movement has “succeeded partially in re-embedding market exchanges within social and moral relations”. Watson, while problematizing the market-system and distanced relationships of Fairtrade, also argues that the consumer is prioritizing the social over the economic, which is characteristic of a Polanyian double movement, and not simply “neoliberal”

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15 Unfortunately, the report for 2015 does not disaggregate its data so it is not possible to definitively conclude that the ratio of Fairtrade in 2015 is the same as 2013. So a caution is made that it could be a higher ratio.


17 This was brought forward by Sophie Tranchell and Daniel Jaffee in a panel.
Lyon, while more directly critical of contemporary Fairtrade in later work (Lyon and Moburg, 2010, see above), argued that Fairtrade has permitted “political choices and conscious reflexivity of Northern consumers” (Lyon, 2006, p. 452), and that coffee is defetishized by fair trade’s revelation of the social and environmental impacts of marketing the commodity, all of which align with Polanyi’s thesis on double movement (Lyon, 2006, p. 452).

Raynolds argues that fair trade is ‘socially regulated’, and is thus Polanyian for its “engagement of diverse social actors in shaping activity in an economy which is both an arena of institutional coordination and social contestation” (Raynolds, 2012, p. 278). She builds this conclusion on a nuanced view of the complexity of social regulation and the evolutions of governance in the age of globalization:

In market arenas, movement groups, mission-driven enterprises, and ethically minded consumers uphold Fair Trade’s social foundations, forestalled processes of corporate mainstreaming [sic]. In production arenas, certification standards increasingly outweigh movement commitments in governing Fair Trade practices and while the power of peasant politics is being eroded new openings are being created for engaging labor politics…Fair Trade helps illuminate the complex and contested nature of social regulation in global food markets as movement efforts move beyond critique to socioeconomic construction. Although Polanyi focuses on the rise of national state regulatory institutions, policies, and laws, contemporary authors extend this argument to explain the emergence of transnational initiatives for social protection and non-governmental approaches to market regulation” (Raynolds, 2012, p. 277, 278).

Raynolds concludes that fair trade “remains both a ‘movement and a market’” (2012, p. 298, citing Raynolds, 2000).

Adding to this literature validating the contributions of Fairtrade markets to contesting neoliberalism/the primacy of market over social values, I next provide empirical support to challenge the claims that the FTN sees markets as sufficient in addressing injustices of the international agricultural trade regime. To do this, I reference explicit denial from those involved in Fairtrade to a view of markets, and identify the increasing political activities of those associated with Fairtrade organizations.

**Markets as Insufficient**

As discussed above, some scholars claim that those in the network favour markets over state regulation for overcoming economic injustice. I argue this is conjecture at best; those that make such assertions inadequately demonstrate evidence that such a view is held. In contrast, the literature, along with those I interviewed, gives evidence that those in the FTN see markets as neither ideal, nor preferable, for dealing with the social and economic injustices resulting from international trade. Rather, markets are seen to serve as an interim support to provide opportunity and empowerment to poor producers while the current trade regime persists.

Paul Chandler, former chief executive at Traidcraft, a prominent UK fair trade organization, made explicit in 2006 that fair trade markets could not be seen as sufficient in addressing
economic injustice, with a direct challenge to those asserting that fair trade sees market as the answer:

It is important first of all to be clear that fair trade does not offer a full and complete answer to all economic justice issues. Often criticisms of the fair trade concept assume that it is seeking to offer a complete alternative model to replace capitalism and establish a new world order: making it an easier concept to de-bunk. Sometimes this can be encouraged by the over-enthusiastic advocacy of campaigners, and the confusion of fair trade with wider trade justice campaigning for ‘fairer trade’ – campaigning which most fair trade advocates fully support, but which addresses a much wider range of issues. Fair trade can only be seen as part of a wider response to justice issues, and should be assessed in that light (Chandler, 2006, p. 256).

The 2014 annual report of the Fair Trade Advocacy Office (FTAO, discussed further below) lists the office’s planned activities targeting supply chain power for 2015. The first item on that list is a plan to confront the notion that markets are sufficient. The report states their plan is to “continue to advocate before the EU institutions to show the repercussions of current enforcement systems on non-EU producers. [FTAO] will put pressure on the [European Commission] by bringing further evidence that voluntary systems alone do not work” (FTAO, 2015, p. 10, emphasis added).

Meanwhile, I asked those working with fair trade organizations promoting markets if their organizations thought Fairtrade markets were sufficient in addressing economic injustice, and none directly queried on this point supported the notion that Fairtrade seeks to address economic injustices through markets. Sergi Corbalán, Executive Director of the Fair Trade Advocacy Office, was emphatic when asked if Fairtrade markets are sufficient:

No! It’s certainly not. And basically I think that the fair trade movement was based on the conviction that it is important to make all trade fair, rather than only a part of it. However, in the interim, which unfortunately is certainly going to last longer than what we initially wanted, let’s say, it is of course interesting to have an alternative to conventional trade that consumers can choose. However, the ultimate goal would be that all trade is fair and therefore labels or certification schemes for fair trade would not be necessary (Corbalán, 2013).

Aurelie Walker, Trade Policy Advisor with the Fairtrade UK at the time of our interview, was also emphatic with an initial “no” in response to the same question, and reinforced the point with a caveat that market activities alone are insufficient:

Even within the market, I think we always position ourself as one solution to the problem. We know that we won’t solve the issue. We don’t say that we have all the solutions. We are part of the solution to this really huge problem (Walker, 2012).
Erin Gorman, CEO of Divine Chocolate USA at the time of our interview, identified numerous requirements necessary to overcome the injustices embedded in the current global economy, which include policy change, cultural change and addressing power relations. When I asked about the sufficiency of the market, she responded there is no single “market” as a complete entity, and to assume so:

Objectifies a thing that isn’t singular and makes it seem like it has the power in of itself…“the [chocolate] market”, in our case as Divine, is made up of a lot of people and a lot of institutions with varying degrees of money who yield varying degrees of influence. [Some] of them wield influence disproportionately to others in ways which are unjust, and in some cases their ability to have power, influence and money is a result of the deliberate, structural, systematic discrimination…Divine’s whole reason for existing is to basically say “actually, you need to change who owns what, who has a say, who has a seat at the table, who gets to wield power, who has power, and to what end?” So some of that requires cultural change, some of it requires policy change, some of it requires changing how people think about money, finance, [and] equity; it’s quite interwoven” (Gorman, 2012).

There is no question that fair trade markets are today a top priority for those in the fair trade network. There has been a demonstrable shift away from the broader international political activities that were present in the early decades of the fair trade movement, and a reoriented focus that prioritizes markets. But this shift is not supported by a view that markets are superior or sufficient for addressing injustices in the international agricultural trade regime, as is claimed in some of the literature. Rather, this shift is motivated by a mandate to producers, limited resources, and the perceptions of the relative opportunities present to work through markets in contrast to political spaces.

**Fair Trade Political Activities**

In addition to misjudging the significance attributed to markets by those in FTN, the campaign and advocacy work of the fair trade network also tends to be given little, if any, consideration by those who are often quick to challenge that the movement is focused solely on markets and is characteristically “neoliberal”. By contrast, those involved with fair trade markets have indeed engaged in advocacy for fairer trade rules and supply chain practices at the political level, primarily in European political I.

The most prominent location of political activity has been through the Fair Trade Advocacy Office (FTAO), a joint initiative of FLO, WFTO and the European Fair Trade Association. Though the FTAO was formally made an organization in 2010, its work dates back to the early 2000s as an informal organization. With its formalization, the FTAO has increased its scope and activities, which has coincided with an increased staff and resources. In 2011 the office had two staff members (excluding interns, who have maintained a role in the operations since formalization): the Executive Director, Sergi Corbalán (who continues to hold that role to date (mid-2017)), and one Policy Officer. The staff listed in the 2014 annual report includes three project coordinators in addition to the Executive Director (FTAO, 2015).
The FTAO engages in campaigns and advocacy both for public procurement and government policy regarding trade, development, and equitable supply chains. The advocacy strategy of the FTAO for achieving trade justice focuses on two key priorities: enabling policy environments for fair trade and addressing power in supply chains (FTAO, 2015; Corbalán, 2014). The FTAO has engaged governments by submitting position papers and advocating small farmer positions to the European Commission, as well as providing input for policy development and consultations on trade and development, taking up some of these issues further in various political spaces.  

Advocacy Work

The FTAO’s strategy for enabling policy environments for fair trade, which is focused on European policy, targets a range of European intergovernmental organizations, including the European Commission, the European Union, the European Parliament and its members, to promote fairer trade policy. FTAO’s 2011 annual report (FTAO, 2011), the first for the organization following its formalization, highlights its engagement in a substantive number of political activities. FTAO has participated in five European Commission advisory groups, providing submissions to public consultations on Trade and Development, the EU External Action Budget, the EU Single Market and the EU Common Agricultural Policy, and has engaged the EU Development Commissioner (FTAO, 2011). Many of these activities have continued and been ramped up by the organization in subsequent years, outlined throughout their annual reports published in recent years (see for example FTAO, 2015; FTAO, 2014; FTAO, 2012; FTAO, 2011).

While the FTAO is mandated with pursuing advocacy objectives on behalf of the major fair trade organizations, it is not alone in engaging at the political level; several individual organizations do so as well. Traidcraft is listed as part of EPA [Economic Partnership Agreement] Watch, an organization that monitors and campaigns on economic justice concerns related to agreements between the EU and African, the Caribbean and Pacific countries.  

In 2004, Traidcraft also led a campaign against EPAs at the World Social Forum in London (Dine & Shields, 2008). Fairtrade UK, a trade organization under FLO, also engages in policy advocacy where it can. In 2010 Fairtrade UK partnered with the Bond Institute for its “Great Cotton Stitch-Up” campaign. The campaign targeted trade injustices related to Africa’s “Cotton-4”, African countries that are most reliant on cotton and should have the strongest competitive advantage on global markets, but do not because of exponential subsidies by major trading powers, including the United States, the EU, China and India (FTF 2010). The recommendations from the report on cotton target EU and UK governments to remove trade distorting cotton subsidies, pressuring the US to do the same, and to negotiate fairer trade rules through the WTO as well as reforming the WTO overall to ensure all developing country interests are negotiated, and to deliver on development (FTF, 2010, p. 33).

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18 The work of the Fair Trade Advocacy Office can be found on its Position Papers page which includes support for policy activities by other organizations, such as Oxfam’s GROW campaign, and recommendations for policy spaces such as the EU CAP. http://www.Fairtrade-advocacy.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=82&Itemid=161

19 http://epawatch.eu/introduction/; the organization was active in 2009-2010 and does not appear to be active over the past five years.
FTF also encourages citizen (as opposed to consumer) engagement in its campaigns:

If we have a campaign on, we can ask the local campaign people to write to their MPs as well, to lobby them and get them to host events and debates and get them to invite their members of parliament as well – during Parliamentary elections we encourage our supporters to go along to ask if the candidate will support fair trade or if they value it (Walker, 2012).

Fairtrade UK also works to mobilize local level engagement in fair trade. Part of that strategy is to get the support of elected officials by having them ask questions in Parliament for the organization and to sign on to a debate or motion going through the House of Parliament (Walker, 2012).

Those more involved in the market-side of the movement have been ramping up their political activities and engagement in more recent years, but these activities are not new, showing that fair trade never “abandoned” its political prioritization. In 2004 members of the movement submitted a declaration for UNCTAD XI, whereby it laid out three “demands” to the organization and its member government. These included creation of a multilateral regulatory mechanism for world commodity markets, national rights to food sovereignty, promotion of South-South cooperation, CSO and producer organization participation in establishing and implementing such mechanisms, research on the impacts of trade policy and corporate activity, fair trade, and regional and bilateral agreements on small producers and marginalized groups in the South, increased participation and capacity building of small and medium sized enterprises in policy making, connecting small producers to credit and business support systems, as well as supporting Fairtrade markets and recognition of the fair trade definition (IATP, 2004).

Focusing on Supply Chains

FTAO is also actively targeting supply chain governance as part of its strategy for fair trade. This stream of the organization’s strategy is premised on the assumption that there are too many domestic and international constraints for trade to truly become fair. In the interim, FTAO sees “several government-led initiatives about working conditions in global supply chains, at Members State and EU level, both focusing on specific value chains like textiles and also cross-cutting initiatives” as one window of opportunity to make trade fairer (FTAO, 2015, p. 8). The FTAO sees these as an opportunity to address the main causes of unsustainable supply chains. The FTAO has set a priority to advocate for standards that ensure all members within the supply chain are guaranteed a living income – in the case of farmers – or wage – in the case of artisans and workers (FTAO, 2015, p. 8).

FTAO ran a “Power in Supply Chains” campaign for 2014-2016, to tackle the unequal buyer power in supply chains that they describe as “one of the root causes of unfair trade...that eventually leads to situations where producers and workers at the beginning of the supply chains have to pay the price with even worse working conditions and lower remunerations” (FTAO, 2015, p. 9). The strategy focuses on building a coalition among fair trade actors, including CSOs, trade and farmer unions and other organizations targeting the imbalances of power in supply chains (FTAO, 2015, p. 9). In 2014, FTAO activities included meeting with EU representatives, commenting on EU activities and commissioning and launching in the European Parliament a
report titled “Who’s got the power? Tackling imbalances in agricultural supply chains” (FTAO, 2015). FTAO’s plan for moving forward from these outcomes include, as noted above, to push governments beyond voluntary approaches, with a specific focus on EU competition law to include “producer welfare, the environment and future generations” (FTAO, 2015, p. 10). FTAO also committed to pushing Member States to have mechanisms in place for complaints from non-EU producers, to build capacities for EU fair trade actors to lobby governments, to build public awareness, specifically with a Make Fruit Fair II campaign, to build coalitions, and to follow-up on a report on power imbalances within a specific commodity chain, identifying the externality costs of “seemingly cheap products” (FTAO, 2015, p. 10).

In 2015, FTAO partnered in the Make Fruit Fair campaign, described as “a global consortium of 19 partners from the European Union, Cameroon, Colombia, Ecuador and the Windward Islands – coordinated by Oxfam Germany” (FTAO, 2015b). Among the campaign’s efforts was a petition engaging citizens to push EU policy, to propose legislation to address unfair trade practices in fruit commodity chains (targeting bananas and pineapples specifically). The petition received over 50,000 signatures (FTAO, 2015b). The promised report, focused on bananas, was released in December 2015 (FTAO, 2015). The report highlights “the human costs of cheap bananas”, highlighting the health impacts of those exposed to harmful agrochemicals, oppression and fear experienced by workers, unsustainable livelihoods, and the role played by European supermarkets, and their increased concentration, in contributing to these unfair trading practices (FTAO, 2015b). FTAO co-published the report along with Banana Link.

FTAO’s strategy is targeting the structural power that puts Fairtrade between a rock and a hard place; one of furthering the market interests of producers while changing the overall trade system. As expressed to me by Corbalán:

the way that operators deal with each other, particularly how powerful operators treat their suppliers, how they abuse their buyer power, and what are the conditions they impose on them – how they unilaterally change contracts, how they cancel contracts, how they charge promotions to the supplier rather than taking them up, how short-term contracts they get, how unexpectedly they change conditions, etc. There are a lot of unfair trading practices that in reality are a private matter anyway, because they are between two operators. But it is linked to the imbalances in power in supply chains, so in a way we are working on this issue very much at the EU level because there is a discussion at the EU level on whether you should regulate fair trading practices and put in a place – a robust system – to phase them out. But also we are thinking of launching a campaign in the future calling on the EU to improve in a much more stronger way its competition powers, to break away these blockages and these bottlenecks in supply chains where four or five actors dominate a certain stage in the supply chain and therefore have so much power and therefore they impose unfair trading practices on the other. Bottom line: this is for us a priority because we believe that this is also trade justice, even if it is not trade policy in the stricter sense (Corbalán, 2013).

In addition to their independent advocacy and campaign work, fair trade organizations also participate in various coalitions and partnerships to push for more equitable trade. Coalitions are
instrumental, and perhaps even necessary, to achieve policy change (Sabatier, 1988). The FTAO is a member of various coalitions and alliances as part of its strategy. It is as a member of Cooperative European and the Alternative Trade Mandate (ATA). ATA is an alliance for advocacy and consultation on EU trade policy and international development policy. FTAO also works to encourage EU policies and practices that support fairer supply chains (FTAO, 2011). The report self-identifies the FTAO as “one of the leading NGOs on EU public procurement policy”, where EU spending is valued at 20% of GDP, and highlights its work alongside other NGOs to promote more ethical and sustainable procurement in the EU (FTAO, 2011, p. 10).

The ATA is another important example of the FTAO’s political activities. The mandate of the ATA is not focused on fair trade markets or procurement, but is instead a “new vision for trade” that pursues “democratically controlled trade and investment policies” through substantive change to trade agreements and trade structures (Alternative Trade Alliance, n.d). This mandate covers several core principles: to ensure protection of a range of rights and social protections, government sovereignty to implement policies on trade and regulating markets (including financial markets), EU policies that respect development objectives of other countries, holding corporations accountable to their social and environmental impacts, respecting food sovereignty, binding environmental regulations, transparent and fair income distribution within global value chains (while ensuring income stability for producers and workers alongside affordable prices for consumers), prioritizing open access systems, particularly for seeds and medicines, excluding public goods from trade agreements, common but differential treatment for developing countries, and respect for the precautionary principle (Alternative Trade Alliance, n.d.).

Underlying all these policy principles is the understanding that democratic deficiencies in decision making is a key problem that needs to change. These deficiencies include secrecy in trade negotiations, control over trade policy by unelected officials (the European Community (EC), exclusion of European Parliament from trade negotiations, the absence of any meaningful consultation with civil society by the EC, the disproportionate consideration given to corporate interests and lobbies, and the irreversibility of trade agreements (Alternative Trade Alliance, n.d., p. 6). Some of the alliance’s proposals include prompt publication of negotiation positions and proposed policies to assure transparency and openness, strengthening of parliament, meaningful civil society participation and “needs tests” at the national level prior to and during trade negotiations to ensure they are representative of national interests, and independent assessments of trade agreements once negotiations are completed, to assure human right considerations, capabilities to propose amendments, thorough assessments of the agreements after they have been implemented, and finally, prevention of corporate capture throughout policy formation and negotiations (Alternative Trade Alliance, n.d.). As a member of the ATA, the FTAO and others in the broad fair trade movement are actively pushing for an alternative trade mandate.

Fairtrade UK, meanwhile, is a member of various coalition networks that engage in advocacy, and the foundation signs on to advocacy letters addressed to political representatives. Fairtrade UK also engages in deeper partnerships with likeminded NGOs and producer organizations doing similar work and engaging in more substantive advocacy, such as producing joint materials, lobbying together, and campaigning, where the partner organizations might be working on complementary approaches such as contract law, business practices, and supporting smallholder farmers (Walker, 2012).
The FTN is indeed engaged in a great deal more than just market activities, with the FTAO especially actively engaging in advocacy activities with governments and in coalitions. In fact, FTAO has in recent years made a commitment to channel 50 percent of its activities into policy advocacy on fairer trade rules, reflecting an increase in its focus on policy (Corbalán, 2013).

**Limits on Political Engagement**

Without question, Fairtrade markets remain a priority for many of these organizations, as it remains a mechanism through which these organizations can have some impact, and because it remains important to many of the producers engaging in fair trade markets. While those in the FTN maintain that fair trade encompasses much more than markets, certification markets do remain their primary mandate (Walker, 2012). When I asked Erin Gorman with Divine Chocolate about political engagement, she replied that they are fundamentally a chocolate company, and for that reason do not engage in a lot of advocacy. This stance is despite that they are a producer-run company, and are 100 percent Fairtrade. However, they have engaged on policy issues when asked, and engaged to push for better regulations when investment company Armajoro sought to corner the cocoa market in 2010, because those decisions had direct impacts on the company (Gorman, 2012).

The sense that political opportunities to engage in trade are absent is also a challenge for those engaged in Fairtrade and motivates the focus on markets (Kripke 2012, Walker 2012). For Fairtrade UK, policy advocacy would require clear policy asks, and the organization does not feel they have clear asks to bring forward. They have done some work on asks for the WTO Ministerial, and around the cotton campaign, but ultimately hold the perspective that there is little opportunity to create regulatory changes. As a result, FTF’s approach has been building awareness and changing businesses practice, drawing on the market’s success to engage in political activities and advocacy, but at a limited level (Walker, 2012).

It can be especially difficult for organizations to justify assigning quite limited resources when the political opportunities are perceived to be limited. (Corbalán, 2013; Kripke, 2012; Walker, 2012). Even larger organizations like Oxfam America, which have a long history of advocating for fairer trade, most notably with the Make Trade Fair campaign in the early 2000s, have had to acknowledge these limits. As Gawain Kripke, Director of Policy, explained it to me:

> We have limited resources...We have to make strategies and making strategies is about making choices. And as a matter of our own responsibility and about making impact, you have to focus on where you can have impact. If I kept going to Geneva and lobbying on the Doha Round, I’d be wasting my time (Kripke, 2012).

This type of challenge is not unique to the fair trade network. There are structural factors that limit organizational capabilities to pursue the hard-fought wins, as funding and institutional

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20 For information on the Armajoro dealings to take delivery of a significant portion of available cocoa on world markets, see Farchy and Blais (2010).
reputation are increasingly contingent on more immediate and measurable results and do not accommodate long-term goals (Cooley and Ron, 2002). Most of these organizations directly acknowledge the necessity of policy change, and the desire to engage more in political activities, or to see others do so. But they simply lack the faith that resources channeled in that direction will bear fruit. Nonetheless, they continue to channel resources where they see opportunity, such as in shaping policy in European parliaments, getting fair trade on the agenda for government procurement, and in reaching out to youth and consumers to build increased awareness of trade injustices.

**Solidarity Economy**

Producer interests also motivate a prioritization of markets. This motivation, and the activities of the fair trade network outlined above, leads to a final point about the critiques targeting fair trade for its shift towards prioritizing markets, and the integration of transnational corporations into these alternative markets. Many scholars object to the fair trade movement’s evolution in the last 30 years away from a “solidarity” economy towards being another market economy that is considered characteristically capitalist and, as discussed above, neoliberal (Jaffee, 2012; Bacon, 2010; Fridell, 2009; Reed, 2009; Jaffee, 2007; Fridell, 2007). This section does not question assertions that fair trade markets have shifted from more direct relations between producers and alternative trade organizations towards more mainstreamed and distanced markets. However, it challenges the assumptions that this outcome is necessarily void of solidarity. Rather, it queries what it means when we promote a solidarity economy, and specifically, *solidarity for whom*?

Fridell’s book on fair trade coffee (2007) appears to be a seminal critique of the shift away from the solidarity economy character of fair trade that many identify as the foundation of fair trade. Fridell’s research focuses on the decline of Alternative Trade Organizations (ATOs) amidst the mainstreaming of fair trade markets. ATOs are considered to embody solidarity because of their direct relationships with producers, because they alone embody centrally the characteristics of “equality and liberty”, and because they bypass the “structural hierarchies” of capitalist markets (Fridell, 2007; p. 286). Reed similarly argues that mainstreaming is also eroding solidarity, generating what he classifies as “tensions between…movement and market actors” in which

> [T]he movement actors typically feel that the FLOs do not adequately consult with them and are deviating from the original values and purpose of fair trade. The FLOs, they charge, have become inordinately concerned with increasing sales and, as a result, are overly subject to corporate influence. For their part, the market actors argue that if they do not grow the markets, then they cannot help small producers, and corporate actors will join rival certifying schemes with much weaker standards (Reed, 2009; p. 7).21

There are a number of concerns by those promoting ATOs and solidarity that are linked to preserving fair trade values and ensuring that fair trade is committed foremost to benefiting producers and not excluding them (Fridell, 2007; Reed, 2009). At the same time, there is also a strong emphasis on fairness for ATOs and their inability to compete against major retailers amidst the growing network of actors. It is, in essence, a concern of whether Northern ATOs can

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21These competing schemes are discussed in an earlier section.
survive in mainstream markets. Reed acknowledges that this does, in some ways, pit much needed markets for small producers against normative ideas of what fair trade should look like (Reed, 2009).

It is this question of ideas that leads me to question whether we can stipulate that fair trade is no longer solidarity because it is not in solidarity with the ideas that originated from ATOs and some producers. First, as clarification, this goes beyond the notion that fair trade sees markets as sufficient and regulation as unimportant, as established above. Fridell, for example, assumes that this is one of the distinguishing factors between his ideal of solidarity (as “moral economy”) and what he implies is the fair trade “network” today:

What is needed is to formulate new projects that promote greater democratization and the further empowerment of people through the state, not to abandon state-led development in favour of less democratic, and significantly less successful, pro-market models endorsed and imposed by neoliberal institutions” (Fridell, 2007, p. 286).

As I’ve already established in detail, there is no non-state agenda on the part of those promoting Fairtrade markets; quite the opposite. Nor is the mainstreaming of fair trade today, and some of the ways it has evolved, devoid of representation concerns from a wide range of producer and labour interests. As noted, studies demonstrate that fair trade under FLO has taken directions and made decisions that are contested by some producers (Clark and Hussey, 2015; Bacon, 2010; Reed, 2009). The institution too has long been beleaguered by charges of democratic deficiencies in its representation of producers, which has prompted some changes to address this, but which still requires changes for stronger representation of producers and producer voices (Clark and Hussey, 2015; Bacon, 2010).

At the same time, there are fair trade producers who celebrate the mainstreaming of fair trade for expanding market possibilities—which raises the question of whom solidarity is for, and who decides what solidarity looks like. A range of motivations underpins the market decisions of fair trade producers in developing countries. Some of these are social and community driven, but they can be shaped by other factors as well, including securing higher prices for their products and more reliable markets (Raynolds et al., 2007; this is also given consideration in Burnett and Murphy 2014). The broader literature has made clear that producers across the Global South carry a vast range of production and market motivations. These motivations are not always political, or seeking to create an alternative market (Murphy, 2010; Wolford, 2010; Borras, 2008; Rigg, 2006; Masakure and Hanson, 2005). Sometimes producers wish only for sufficient income to provide for their families and educate their children so they can exit agriculture (Rigg, 2006, p. 194).

One group of producers that has celebrated some of the mainstreaming of Fairtrade markets is Kuapa Kokoo, a farmer cooperative in Ghana that today represents more than 40,000 farmers across 1300 villages. It was established in partnership with the UK’s TWIN Limited in 1993, following the country’s liberalization of the cocoa sector a year earlier, and became certified
Fairtrade shortly after. Kuapa Kokoo is the only farmer organization licensed to export cocoa in Ghana, and became Fairtrade certified two years after its creation.

In 1997, the cooperative, in partnership with Twin Trading (in the UK) and with support from the Body Shop, Christian Aid, and Comic Relief, started the Day Chocolate Company (now Divine Chocolate) in the UK, a manufacturer of Fairtrade chocolate. Production takes place in Germany alongside “more familiar chocolate brands”, and “not at a super premium price” (Sophie Tranchell, quoted in The Economist, 2007). Kuapa Kokoo owns 44% of the company, while the above donors make up the other major shareholders, giving the cooperative a share of the profits from the sale of Divine chocolate bars. The cooperative also has two seats on the board, and one of the four annual board meetings is held in Ghana.

As Sophia Murphy and I discuss in Chapter 5, Kuapa Kokoo has publicly celebrated the partial participation of transnational companies in Fairtrade markets despite these companies’ limited commitment to fair trade and the fact that their products compete with Divine’s (Burnett and Murphy, 2014, p. 8). Bacon notes that CLAC also celebrated when Nestlé signed with FLO instead of Fairtrade USA after the latter split from the former (Bacon, 2015, p. 482). Divine attributes the decision by these companies to certify their own products Fairtrade to the company’s own successful brand, calling Divine Chocolate “a catalyst for change”, and sees it as part of the process for more substantive change in the chocolate industry. Erin Gorman, CEO of Divine Chocolate, put this in perspective in our interview:

One of the reasons we have decided to celebrate it is because we felt they are overtly acknowledging that there was a reason for them to do it in the first place. When Divine set itself up, it set itself up with an internal, if not an external, objective to change the way the chocolate industry works. We consider the fact that, in the British market where we have operated for 16 years now, all of those major brands now have Fairtrade, is a condition of our success, of getting our competitors to recognize that they should have done it, and that it’s the minimum that you need to do…We’re under no illusion that that means the companies themselves have changed…That’s something that we can still move to push on – to get the companies to fundamentally change the way they do business, but paying more in your supply chains is necessary but not sufficient to have created that change (Gorman, 2012).

Ninety-eight percent of Kuapa Kokoo’s production is for conventional markets. Their support for the mainstream adoption of Fairtrade appears to demonstrate a broader objective to change the broader market conditions under which it operates. At the same time, mainstreaming also serves a basic and immediate need: when celebrating the certification of these companies, a statement

22 http://www.kuapakokoo.com/about/us
23 The Divine Chocolate website lists Kuapa Kokoo share of ownership at 44% http://www.divinechocolate.com/uk/about-us/frequently-asked-questions
24 http://www.divinechocolate.com/about/story.aspx
25 Though one of the leaders noted concern about unfair competition through certified TNCs.
26 http://www.divinechocolate.com/uk/about-us/research-resources/divine-story
from Kuapa Kokoo implied the importance of the certification, whereby “Kuapa Kokoo started benefiting from the Fairtrade premium on cocoa” from these products.  

This is one example that gives a different perspective on what producers are looking for. It is not the only one. The central theme at the 2010 Fairtrade Futures conference in Boston, Mass, was “unity and division”, and certification of transnational companies and retailers was a central point of conversation.  

27 I attended the conference as an observer, which informs my citation (in contrast to direct interviews, which I did not conduct at that time). One of the first sessions, “Values vs. Volume: Different Theories of Change in Fair Trade” tackled the issue directly. Bob Chase, President of ATO SERRV International, questioned “whose values” we count in such a “values vs. volumes” debate, and whether effectiveness in real terms might mean a decline in profits.  

28 Michael Conroy, then with Transfair International, raised the point that, while certifying supermarkets might grant them legitimacy, there is no evidence to say that this undermines fair trade values. He went on to question the legitimacy of the “values vs. volume” debate itself, asking “whose values?” and “which values”... “no one is questioning values, just other values”.  

29 Over the course of several sessions and discussions, a range of participants brought up that producers want major transnational companies to buy and sell fair trade products, because they want increased markets for their products.  

When we ask “whose values” and “which values”, and query whose interests are motivating the values and the directions taken by the fair trade movement, then we get a more complex vision of what solidarity means. This is undoubtedly one of the greatest struggles of representation in social movements. When a movement begins, it is formed by a group who share a vision and want to see that vision come to be. But if the nature of the movement is to institute widespread changes that effect the larger population, and seeks to represent that larger population, as fair trade does in its efforts to change the terms of commodity trade, then representation gets murky. Either representation is limited in its reflection of the like-minded, or the ideas underpinning the movement become flexible as it takes on wider representation; indeed, as movements grow in members, and start achieving limited successes towards their goals, there tends to be growing divisions between those pursuing more fiercely original objectives and those willing to compromise (Tarrow, 2011). If we want an economy to truly be a reflection of “solidarity”, then we have to come to terms with how we represent different stakeholders.  

The question of whose interests are represented in fair trade becomes even trickier because consideration is given to representation of two different groups: Northern ATOs and producers in the South. Commodity producers in the South are far from a homogenous group; they have a range of motivations and interests. While the foundations of fair trade are, at least partially, tied to solidarity between ATOs and producers who share their vision, fair trade today is made of a wider collection of producers, which may change what constitutes “solidarity”. Moreover, in some ways, solidarity can be argued to include the mainstreaming of markets. Not as an end, but as part of the process towards achieving fairer trade. With a lack of systematic studies outlining

27 http://www.divinechocolate.com/uk/about-us/research-resources/divine-story  

28 I attended the FTF as primarily an observer, though was invited to participate in group discussions.  

29 Bob Chase, President of SERRV International, was a panelist in the discussion.  

30 Michael Conway, (then) Transfair International, Fair Trade Futures Conference, Session 1 “Values vs. Volume: Different Theories of Change in Fair Trade”. Saturday, September 11, 2010, Boston, MASS.
producer motivations and interests, it is perhaps inappropriate for anyone to suggest what is “solidarity” vis-à-vis “fair trade”. I certainly do not propose to be doing so here. Rather, I have simply attempted to identify that solidarity is not necessarily lacking in the mainstreaming of markets. Just as there is evidence of producer dissent over mainstreaming, there is also evidence of producer support. Solidarity today may not be consistent with what it was fifty-plus years ago.

Conclusion

This article has shown a wider perspective to portray the work of the fair trade network today than is often taken in the academic literature analyzing fair trade. I dispute some of the claims that fair trade embodies a neoliberal logic, that it has been “co-opted”, and that it has abandoned solidarity in its market pursuits. It’s not disputed here that fair trade markets do not meet the interests or objectives of all the producers it represents. The mainstream markets today have evolved from the principles of solidarity in the original objectives of fair trade set out several decades ago. But fair trade has also expanded to include millions of producers, more producer organizations, and has connected these producers with more markets. With expansion comes increased diversity of motivations and interests. I have provided some evidence that there is a greater diversity of producer interests than is typically included in the literature. I contend that one of the greatest gaps in the literature on fair trade is more systematic and rigorous research to determine the range of interests and motivations of producer participation in fair trade. Such research would include random samples of not just participating organizations, but participating producers as well. I do not intend to discredit the findings that suggest fair trade is not aligned with the interests of producers who have been studied. Rather, I question whether these samples are representative of all fair trade producers.

This paper has also brought forward a more nuanced assessment of the fair trade network’s activities and motivations. It has identified the network’s strong commitment to political activities, even though these activities are limited. In chapter 4 I was critical of the fair trade network’s failure to engage several relevant opportunities to shape governance of food and agricultural livelihood security after the global food price crisis. Here I have identified some of the reasons for these limits in political engagement, which are in no way tied to neoliberal ideals, but instead to producer mandates, limited resources, and perceptions of opportunities. Furthermore, I have provided further evidence of the network’s engagement in citizen advocacy and political engagement – notably European political – engagement. While it could be argued that the network could, and should, do more, it can also be argued that the network is not a singular superhero that needs to pursue transformative change, but rather should be considered part of a global effort to bring about desired changes.

An approach that considers global efforts in analyzing the activities and initiatives of social movements and civil society is supported by some of the literature on processes of change. For those theorizing change, there is a growing consensus that there is no single approach to change, and that change is often born of a combination of both contentious activities, such as protest and resistance, and collaborative activities, such as policy advocacy and mobilizing awareness (Grabel, 2015; Green, 2012; Tarrow, 2011; Gaventa and McGee, 2010). These are often referred to as “outside” and “inside” strategies (respectively). As Oxfam’s Duncan Green writes:
One regular source of tension [within civil society] is over whether to pursue the tactics of ‘outside’ confrontation, for example mass street protests, or less visible ‘insider’ engagement, such as lobbying. An outsider strategy based on mass globalization often needs stark, unchanging messages, but these can alienate officials and political leaders, and limit the insiders’ access to decision-makers. Conversely, an insider strategy muddies the waters with compromises, undermining globalization and raising fears of betrayal and co-optation. Yet both are necessary and a joint ‘insider-outsider’ strategy can be highly effective. Conflict and cooperation are often both required to change policies, mindsets and intransigent leaders (Green, 2012, p. 52).

Ilene Grabel (2015) presents an inspiring Hirschmanian theory of change that eschews grand theories of change in favour of what she calls “productive incoherence”. She premises this on the view that a diversity of development paradigms that are complementary and perhaps overlapping are more likely to address the complexity of development challenges on the ground:

Change can and does happen in many ways. The romanticized view on the left and the right holds that institutional Armageddon followed by wall-to-wall, coordinated transformation is the only way to effect meaningful change. I argue not only that this view fails to capture the diverse ways in which change occurs, but also that it glorifies a form of change that is decidedly not ideal (Grabel, 2015, p. 389).

Grabel presents “productive incoherence” as a form of decentralization that is not necessarily focused on decentralization from the state, emphasizing decentralization as a form of overarching institutional governance. Coherence itself is, she reminds us, a principle of neoliberalism. It centralizes power and authority in governance, and gives less opportunity for democratic voice and representation. Decentralization and incoherence meanwhile open space for diverse policies that are tied more closely to democratic voice, and give more opportunity for exit. This Hirschmanian approach embraces the diverse governance mechanisms that provide opportunity, without the expectation that each embody sufficiency, scalability, viability, and fundamental, overarching change.31 In this theorizing, Grabel also encourages analysis to determine not only the ways in which activities are marked by continuities with neoliberalism, but also to determine how they are marked by discontinuities. I have laid out here several ways in which fair trade reflects such discontinuities with neoliberalization.

I argue that the various inside activities of the fair trade movement and their wider objectives for normative change and raising awareness bear the hallmarks of a productive incoherence that makes positive contributions to governance. I have demonstrated that those involved in the fair trade network seek more than just an alternative market, and in no way intend for markets to be a sufficient, or even ideal, mechanism for addressing the social and economic injustices resulting from trade. With a more nuanced framework of analysis, we might ask: what role does the fair trade network intend to play in changing the international agricultural trade regime? In what

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31 Most of this comes from Grabel, 2015. However, some parts are also from a talk she gave on her forthcoming work for the University of Ottawa International Political Economy Network lunch on April 7, 2016. The talk was titled “The Global Crisis and the Architecture of Development Finance”. [http://www.cepi-cips.ca/event/the-global-crisis-and-the-architecture-of-development-finance/](http://www.cepi-cips.ca/event/the-global-crisis-and-the-architecture-of-development-finance/)
ways is it successful? In what ways is it limited? Does the network, in a demonstrable way, undermine broader efforts seeking the same change? Or does it complement them? These inquiries might bring forth more substantive understandings of how the fair trade network contributes to fair trade for all, and where it falls short.
Chapter 7: Wandering the Land Between Religions: Analysis and Comparison of the Fair Trade and Food Sovereignty Movements

Introduction

This chapter brings together the three manuscripts presented in chapters four through six, provides additional primary and secondary research to complement the research in earlier chapters, and analyzes the strategies and activities of both movements through the analytical framework set out in Chapter 3. I begin the chapter with an explanation of the food sovereignty movement’s strategy to address the injustices emergent of the international trade regime. The contentious, outside strategy opposing the structures of agricultural production and trade that service neoliberalism, free markets, and transnational corporations is built on the framing of protecting and prospering peasant agricultural production. This has mobilized small- and medium-scale producers around the world to support the movement, built awareness, and created opportunities for peasant voices to have a place at the table in governance of global food and agriculture. At the same time, I argue that the movement’s contentious politics approach is premised on a static view of change in a dynamic political context, and because of this static approach, the movement has rejected opportunities to impact the governance of agricultural trade.

I next present my analysis of the fair trade movement, adopting a similar format to overview the movement. I find the fair trade movement takes a more “inside” strategy than an outside strategy to challenge the international agricultural trade regime. In adopting this inside strategy, the movement responds to what it perceives as available opportunities through markets and political engagement. Members of the movement view this inside strategy as a means to forge new opportunities as well, by generating normative change and awareness building. But the movement takes up a minimal “outside“ strategy, as it does not currently engage where it sees no real political opportunity.

I argue that this fair trade strategy is, similarly to the food sovereignty strategy, a valid but limited strategy for confronting the international agricultural trade regime. The fair trade movement has achieved a strong legitimacy as a voice in many policy and governance. However, the movement has limited its potential impacts by restricting its political focus to where they perceive opportunities to be present, rather than taking a leadership role in shaping governance. The movement has also neglected some opportunities to have influence and represent smallholder exporters at the global level, notably those present at organizations such as the WTO, the CFS and the FAO, and the GAFSP, as I discuss in Chapter 4. Given the impacts of the international agricultural trade regime on the producers the movement represents, the movement could develop a strategy that is more aligned with its relative social and political power.

Ultimately, I argue that the individual potential for each movement’s strategy is insufficient for transforming the international agricultural trade regime, based on the theory of change presented
in Chapter 3, but that both strategies are important and necessary for transforming the international agricultural trade regime that currently disadvantages small-scale producers.

Explaining and Understanding the Food Sovereignty Movement’s Strategy

According to *La Via Campesina*, founders and prominent members of the food sovereignty movement (FSM), “it is only possible to end the global food crisis and hunger through food sovereignty and agro-ecological production” (LVC, 2013a). Some of the foundational principles that underpin food sovereignty – sustainability, equity, agrarian reform, protecting smallholders and overcoming food import dependence - are essential to the advancement of a less crisis-prone global food system. At the same time, food sovereignty is messy, and what food sovereignty means in practice is often unclear and not always convincing. In the words of Marc Edelman (2014, p. 2), food sovereignty is “at once a slogan, a paradigm, a mix of practical policies, a movement and a utopian aspiration”. While food sovereignty is all of these things, it is often unclear what food sovereignty is amidst all of these things.

In this section, I build on the research from previous chapters to explain and understand the food sovereignty movement’s strategy for changing the international agricultural trade regime. I argue that the FSM’s strategy for changing the international agricultural trade regime appears to be guided more by principled views on how agricultural production and markets should be, and their views on the intractable nature of the current international trade regime, and is guided less by objectives based on pragmatic processes of change. The movement adopts a perspective that change must be transformative, and does not identify a fluidity to the processes of change. The movement rejects the approach that smaller changes which are insufficient for reaching desired goals can be part of a wider, dynamic process of change that contributes to desired goals. This does not mean the movement does not make important contributions to transforming the regime, but it does cap the potential for the movement’s strategy.

The activities taken up by the FSM to challenge the international agricultural trade regime are characteristic of contentious politics. This is clear by the movement’s goal to remove the WTO from agriculture through actions of protest and to disrupt WTO negotiations, alongside its refusal to negotiate or pursue reform of the WTO. This is manifest in the activities of *La Via Campesina*, which is more involved on issues related to trade and food sovereignty than is the IPC. (The IPC arm of the movement is less contentious, and engages primarily with the FAO and UN system on issues largely unrelated to trade.) This resistance extends to all rural liberalization regimes, from bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements to proposals for “more enhanced neoliberal structural adjustment in the guise of [Heavily Indebted Poor Countries programs]” (Nyéléni 2002); that is, essentially any promotion and institutionalization of agricultural trade liberalization. The movement views this neoliberal, capitalist system as initiated and dominated by, and empowering of, private sector and corporate actors (Patel, 2009), compromising and undermining sovereignty (McMichael, 2014), which in turn undermines the relationship between peasants and the state (Desmarais, 2007, p. 74). Wittman et al. argue that such a neoliberal, capitalist system with these characteristics is unsustainable, inequitable, and establishes a “loss of control over markets” (Wittman et al., 2010, 2). The movement wants to protect small farmers from international markets, represented primarily by large-scale industrialized agriculture coming from key exporting countries with heavy agricultural subsidies that depress global prices and create unfair competition for domestic producers.
These acts of resistance and contentious politics are an important element for achieving change. But the movement’s strategy to challenge the international agricultural trade regime does not demonstrate a view that the purpose of contentious politics is to generate opportunities for change. The movement is not seeking just to have a voice in the current system; it wants to shape the next system. As Desmarais writes, “although the Via Campesina emerged out of exclusion, this does not mean that it is struggling simply to be included in the existing structures – structures that sought to exclude peasants and small farmers in the first place. Instead, the Via Campesina insists on defining the spaces, the terms, and processes of participation, and in so doing fundamentally change the structures that affect agriculture, both locally and globally” (Desmarais, 2007, p. 199). The food sovereignty strategy is instead one that treats the role of contentious politics as producing transformative change, in this case by terminating the WTO’s role in governing agricultural trade. Or perhaps rather more appropriately put, I argue, based on what we know about change, the food sovereignty movement does not demonstrate a clear strategy of “change” so much as it does one of contention.

Explaining Food Sovereignty’s Strategy

I present next interconnected explanations for the FSM’s strategy to challenge the international agricultural trade regime. I draw on my review of the primary and secondary literature on the movement, and my interviews with members of the movement, to provide the empirical explanations for choosing these strategies. These explanations integrate both content from previous chapters and additional content not appearing above. I do not submit that these are the only explanations for the movement’s strategies; there may be other explanations from future research that provide further insights.

I put forward three empirical explanations to explain the FSM’s strategy. First, the food sovereignty movement’s origins are a response to changing politics – the advent of neoliberal policies and their widespread application to agricultural sectors, including the emergence of the WTO and the negotiation of the Agreement on Agriculture. Second, the movement made the democratic decision from the outset that the WTO could not be reformed, and that it must be overturned. This position on the WTO has not changed in the decades since, and the movement maintains a view that the WTO is illegitimate and undemocratic, and the movement refuses any efforts to negotiate new trade rules, even if they are aligned with the principles of food sovereignty. Third, the movement has yet to develop a clear place for trade within the concept and vision for food sovereignty, one that adequately considers the market interests and motivations of small-scale commodity exporters. As such, the movement has a more dogmatic and principled approach to trade than a practical one. I suggest that this is the result of the movement’s origins, whereby a collective identity around peasantry was developed, which has brought forward both the problematic representation and “big tent politics” identified by Patel (2009), Borras (2008) and others, and a prioritization of local markets. While in no way to suggest intentionally, this collective identity and its related priorities has suppressed alternative identities, namely those of small-scale producers who do not share their market motivations. This includes most clearly small-scale commodity exporters.
Rejection of the WTO and the need for Transformational Change

Tarrow writes that social movements engaging in contentious politics often emerge and act in response to changing politics (2011, p. 8). The FSM emerged in 1993, roughly a decade into a rise in the application of austerity measures to agricultural sectors at the national and international level around the world, and amidst the WTO negotiations within the Uruguay Round, which expanded agricultural liberalization in many countries. This emergence was in response to the global advancement of neoliberal globalization, which was ultimately institutionalized in the agreements established under the World Trade Organization.\(^1\) This amounts to the changing politics – the rise of the international agricultural trade regime – that sparked the movement’s contentious politics on trade. I argue that the origins of the movement as a response to the WTO and agricultural liberalization, are an important aspect of what explains the movement’s strategy on trade, particularly its strong stance against the WTO and its views on the restricted place trade can have within food sovereignty.

The movement’s rejection of the WTO is introduced in Chapter 5. The decision to reject rather than reform the WTO originated with a democratic process that shaped this decision. This process reflects the general process by which LVC makes decisions, where synthesis is built\(^2\) through debate and finding consensus, relying on horizontal processes rather than top-down leadership (Desmarais, 2007; Nicholson, 2013). In the process of deciding on the WTO, there were two different positions on how to address the organization. The first position was what Paul Nicholson, one of the original leaders of La Via Campesina, categorized as the “Asian” camp, which wanted, literally, to “burn the WTO”, represented by a “very hard position from India [and] Korea” (Nicholson, 2013). Another position, from the North American and European members of the movement, was to reform the WTO: “Let’s try to improve it, make it better, less worse, more or less following the [Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy] line” (ibid).

Navigating these differing positions and coming to consensus was a huge debate involving contentious discussions within the LVC (Nicholson, 2013; Wiebe, 2012). The consensus reached to take the WTO out of agriculture altogether came through agreement that taking agriculture out of the WTO was not enough. If agriculture was removed from the WTO (that is, no longer regulated under the AoA), other agreements could still apply to agricultural production and trade, and members agreed that the organization should have no reach over agriculture (Nicholson, 2013; Wiebe, 2012).\(^3\)

This rejection is underscored by the view that the organization is illegitimate for being undemocratic and unrepresentative because of the priority given to the interests of powerful countries and corporate actors during negotiations, to the exclusion of many less powerful

\(^1\) While the FSM’s contentious politics extend beyond the WTO, I focus on the organizations as a global institution applicable to the fields of global governance and global political economy, because of the relatively substantive amount of information available on the movement’s activities around the WTO, and because of the limits of scope in any research endeavour, including my own. Investigating the numerous national policies and bilateral and multilateral free trade and investment agreements, and the movement’s response to these, would be impossible.

\(^2\) “Synthesis” is the word used by Paul Nicholson in our interview. The implied meaning here is akin to finding common ground, which is not the general use of the term, but is a valid one.

\(^3\) It should be noted that both interviewees independently made this point about consensus being found; I did not prompt on this. Mr. Nicholson did not mention what position, if any, was taken by other regions.
governments and civil society (Desmarais, 2007; p. 108). The organization is also perceived to strip countries of their national sovereignty, to supersede other international agreements (McMichael, 2014; Wiebe, 2012; Desmarais, 2007), and to be an extension of the World Bank and IMF, whose policies of conditional loans preceded the WTO’s in developing countries:

[The WTO] is not approved by parliament, it is not representing the parliaments…There is no democratic control there. And obviously, as the agreements must be consensual, that’s our opportunity of generating contradictions in WTO. And the fact that when we mobilize against the WTO our objective is to go in and disrupt work (Nicholson, 2013).

This firm position is also part of the FSM’s objection to the broader neoliberal structures of international trade for destroying producer livelihoods. As La Via Campesina pointed out early in 2000:

The imposition of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and regional trade agreements is destroying our livelihoods, our cultures and the natural environment. We cannot, and we will not, tolerate the injustice and destruction these policies are causing. Our struggle is historic, dynamic and uncompromising (LVC, 2000).

This is the view shared by the broader movement, which, through the IPC, argues that “globalization and liberalization” policies since 1996 are compromising livelihoods and “intensifying the structural causes of hunger and malnutrition” (Nyéléni, 2002).

WTO Cannot be Reformed

The movement not only rejects the WTO, but it rejects any possibility that the institution can be reformed (Wittman et al., 2010, Appendix 2; People’s Coalition for Food Sovereignty, 2013). One reason for this is the perception that to try to reform or work with the WTO is to ascribe it legitimacy (Desmarais, 2007, p. 109). Another is the assumption that the organization simply will not change in a way that it a) redistributes power so as to achieve democratic legitimacy; b) shifts away from neoliberal trade policies, and c) prioritizes food security above trade. As a result of this, the movement refuses to engage with the WTO other than to facilitate its demise. This is true even when opportunities are present to see food sovereignty principles integrated into future agreements. I expand next on this initial point, as presented in Chapter 5, next.

Paul Nicholson, former leader of LVC and still a prominent member of the movement, imparted to me food sovereignty’s rejection of any opportunity for reforming the WTO, giving accounts of when the movement has directly refused opportunities to have a voice in the WTO (Nicholson 2013). Nicholson (2013) recounted to me the time LVC joined with other social movements following the suicide of a Korean protestor [Lee Kyung Hae] atop a barricade outside the 2003 WTO Ministerial Meeting in Cancun, Mexico. Lee’s suicide catalyzed coalescence among protestors, including the Koreans, the indigenous movements, women movements, the black block4, and La Via Campesina. The protesters joined ranks to pull down the barricade around the WTO negotiations in Cancun. In Nicholson’s account, when the walls came down the protestors

4 The black block was a group of protestors who were more inclined towards violent dissent.
physically turned their backs on the army guarding the negotiations, on the conference, and on the WTO, and gave their speeches. This action, according to Nicholson, gave the movement legitimacy to those inside the WTO, as a voice to be reckoned with. Yet, though they established this legitimacy, they still refused to negotiate:

That time the accumulation of all our strengths, trying to build a common action, a common strategy, gave us a huge legitimacy. And at the end legitimacy is very important. At the end, the president of the council of ministers of the EU asked to have a meeting with us on the last day, because the victory was ours. We had a big discussion. Where Lee had died, we had an altar, … and we said you have to come to the tent, where we had the alter for Lee. He came with all his security and we said you have to take off your shoes here. He took off his shoes, and he didn’t have his socks on, and he came in, and he discussed, on our conditions. He came to us and talked on our conditions. What I mean by that is our strategy with WTO is confrontational, totally. We don’t accept any negotiation with WTO (Nicholson, 2013).

Nicholson told me there have been other, similar opportunities, for dialogue with those in the WTO, but still the movement refuses to negotiate:

the Secretary General Director [of the] WTO…two or three times he’s asked us to have a conversation with him…We’re not interested. We are not interested in the proposal of ‘let’s make a progressive WTO’. We are against the free trade agenda…and [getting a] marginal compensations for swallowing the whole agenda. … Our strategy has been confrontation. … We don’t believe in the free trade agenda. We’re not against trade per se, but trade must be done on another basis, and not based on trade opportunities (Nicholson, 2013).

Nicholson reaffirmed that the foundation for this position is a perception that the WTO can never change. When I asked him whether there could ever be an opportunity to transform the WTO “with a lot of effort and time”, his response was definitive: “impossible… the interests are so engrained, of the free trade agenda, that there are no cracks. That’s my way of thinking. There is no way” (ibid).

The movement’s resistance to the WTO and rejection of any possibility of its reform is further demonstrated in LVC’s split from its previous ally, the Our World is Not For Sale (OWINFS) network. OWINFS, known for its engagement in contentious politics at the WTO as well, is a broad network of organizations contesting the corporate globalization that characterizes the global trading system, and LVC had been a long-standing member of the network. The FSM joined OWINFS, through LVC, as part of its “Shrink or Sink” campaign, after a slow process to ensure the network’s final draft allied with the movement’s vision (Desmarais, 2007, p. 124). The movement worked with OWINFS to contest the Doha Round of negotiations, adopting a three pronged strategy that included: 1) general public and national government education; 2) a major CSO forum in Beirut to network and strengthen their positions, and 3) to act as a counterpoint to the WTO ministerial.
However, in 2011 OWINFS issued a statement on desired policy outcomes from the WTO negotiations in Geneva, which upheld the post-crisis push for increased policy space to prioritize, among other things, food security and sovereignty (OWINFS, 2011). This effort to shape WTO negotiations rather than to contest them prompted LVC to publicly withdraw its membership from the network. LVC issued a response outlining their position against any sort of negotiations with the WTO. For LVC, it was not enough that there were opportunities to achieve some of their objectives at the WTO (such as policy space). In their statement on OWINFS, they write:

[OWINFS’s] statement espouses admirable language against corporate-led globalization but then goes on to make several demands of the WTO, sounding more like a negotiating partner rather than a critical civil society that should be pushing the envelope on its demands. Our demands are bigger than getting policy space and preferential treatment in the WTO. The statement’s demands not only fall short, but they also serve to legitimize the WTO. We are not negotiators and we should not be limited to what we can or cannot demand within the context of the negotiations. We are social movements, we are working to change the world and we will never achieve change unless we continue to raise the pressure on our governments and demand it. We must never be afraid to imagine a much better world, one without the WTO, one that is based on Economic Justice, that has Food Sovereignty at its heart and one that relates to Mother Nature in a respectful and sustainable manner (LVC, 2013b).

The WTO is perceived to be unchangeable because of the interests pursuing “free trade” that underscores the organization. This argument seems to conflate the WTO as necessarily and unwaveringly with free trade, even though, technically, it is but a regulator of world trade. While its function is, in part, to ensure that “trade flows...as freely as possible”\(^5\), the practice of negotiations by so many countries representing so many interests makes for a set of rules that are, in fact, much less than free trade. The rigged rules set out in Chapter 2 demonstrate this. The rules of the WTO are not in fact “free trade”; they are carefully crafted rules that allow supports and protections to the advantage of some interests and the disadvantage of others. The efforts of the G33 and other groups, which Murphy and I outline in Chapter 5, and the pursuit by OWINFS to negotiate new rules, demonstrate the practicalities of negotiations involved in trade rules, and that trade rules, though ostensibly about “free trade”, are also a set of compromises by all negotiating parties. In this instance, it is a pursuit of policy space for developing country agriculture, a pursuit that is a conceivable and plausible within the WTO, and that has had enough traction to stall all negotiations within the institution.

The alignment between the G33 proposals and food sovereignty principles discussed in Chapter 5, and the opportunities brought forward to the movement through its acts of resistance, demonstrate that even though the movement has forged and been presented with new opportunities to transform the WTO negotiations along food sovereignty lines, the movement refuses to engage in these opportunities, and sees the only option forward as one that is all or nothing when it comes to governing trade. The FSM admits that policy space is part of their demand, but it is not their entire demand. And indeed, one could argue that the movement has chosen to continue pursuing only contentious politics even in the presence of opportunity

\(^5\) [https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm)
because the opportunity is not the one it seeks. The movement is clear it will not seek opportunity within the WTO, it seeks opportunity outside the WTO, and in the absence of the WTO. It has also stated its desire is to see trade governed at the United Nations. Yet the UN has no such current mandate to regulate trade, and the likelihood of such a shift is profoundly unlikely. Evidence from the reformed CFS already demonstrates concerted efforts to block discussion on the relationship between trade and food insecurity (Clapp and Murphy, 2013; McKeon, 2015, p. 102). At the same time, aside from their brief allusion to governing trade at the UN, the movement has no explicit vision for how trade should be governed.

Meanwhile, the absence of the WTO could indeed work very strongly against the principles of food sovereignty even more than its current existence undermines them. With no clear vision for agricultural trade governance and an ambiguous position on a role for trade in food sovereignty, the movement does not have a strategy for governing trade beyond just contesting how it is currently governed. As such, it is argued this is not, at least solely, an issue of these emergent opportunities not being the opportunities the movement seeks. Rather, it includes the issue that the movement, at this time, does not seek opportunities, but rather just contests what exists at present. I suggest, in conjunction with the third explanation on framing below, that this is a result of the movement’s origins, and their response to changing politics, rather than a strategy built on the practicalities of change. It is more a strategy of contention than it is a strategy of change.

**Ambiguous Place for Trade in Food Sovereignty**

A second explanation for the food sovereignty movement’s strategy to address the international agricultural trade regime is its weak conceptualization of what place trade has in food sovereignty. In Chapter 5, Murphy and I argue there is general confusion around what role agricultural trade might have within the concept of food sovereignty. At its emergence, the movement defined food sovereignty as the rights of nations to develop the capacities to produce their own food. This catalyzed an early perception of the movement as being autarkic protectionists on agricultural trade issues. In Chapter 5 we demonstrated how the FSM’s position on trade has evolved, or at least been clarified, over time. In more recent years, the movement has been more careful to articulate a place for trade. The concept of food sovereignty later evolved to promoting the rights of all people, rather than nations; ostensibly an attempt by the movement to get away from the perceptions that food sovereignty promotes autarky (McMichael 2014). The movement does, however, maintain the view that production for local markets should come first, and trade should only occur after this. The movement promotes “fairer trade”, though it does not put forward what “fairer” trade means. Its position on trade is today one that largely gives allowances for trade outside of certain practices, and which conform to normative objectives set by the movement, but still neglects to establish a credible and sophisticated framework for what trade should look like.

I queried all three interviewees on whether and to what extent trade has a place in food sovereignty. All interviewees, who were tied with leadership early on in LVC, suggested to me that food sovereignty has never been against trade:

> It was never the view of LVC that trade should be stopped. That’s a kind of extreme position that was often attributed to us, but that was never, never our
position. We were always aware that in terms of food stuff trade has gone on from as far back as there are any records and certainly in this time there’s no position against trade per se (Wiebe, 2012).

Paul Nicholson agreed, that the movement is not, and has never, been against trade per se, but that it is opposed to the agro-export model:

We have always defended that trade must exist but must be based on food sovereignty regulations, and always to prioritize the needs of the people before the opportunities of trade. We base this on the model of agro-export, that is trade oriented, and our position is totally against that. But we are not against trade, but we believe in trade along food sovereignty principles (Nicholson, 2013).

Andrea Ferrante, a former leader and active member with La Via Campesina, also challenged the idea that the movement is against trade and in promotion of an autarkic food system. He argues that their views flow from their foundational perspective of a rights based approach to trade that allows producers and consumers sovereignty:

With food sovereignty it is not only relocalization of the market. It’s not an autarkic system. It is a rights based approach that is not an individual but a part of a community so each community comes back to its right to decide its own policy in agriculture what they want to eat how they want to farm what will be the landscape and the community. There are people who want closed society and sometimes they use and they abuse the term food sovereignty, and they think [that] you need to eat only local food and that this is food sovereignty, and it is not [food sovereignty] at all. So it’s not a problem that I can trade cheese, but with who, and with which rules, and how those rules are affecting my daily life. That’s the problem. (Ferrante, 2012)

This approach to allowing individual and community policy autonomy – essentially the ability to choose – is central to the movement, and to the “sovereignty” in “food sovereignty”. However, the narrow allowances for trade, the ambiguous position overall on trade, and the movement’s deep resistance to the WTO discussed in further detail below, also suggest that the movement’s positions reflect the interests of particular producers, to the exclusion of others. To be more specific, it reflects the interests of mainly subsistence producers and those producing for local markets, and not by agricultural commodity exporters. What remains unknown is whether this is the result of producer representation or the norms and ideologies of the leaders and main participants of the movement.

I attempted to clarify in interviews what place smallholder exporters might have in food sovereignty. In doing so, I encountered additional information that helped bring clarity, but was still left with a vague position overall. All interviewees voiced a number of concerns around power in the supply chain and in setting the rules and practices governing trade, the two issues of the international agricultural trade regime I have highlighted here, and around the ecological consequences of trade-oriented production:
The conflict is not with the product, it’s with the model of production, the social context of the product. But one first comment: if, and it’s very well recorded, if we look at the coffee plantation living conditions, or the tea pickers working conditions over the last 200 years, there has been no variation at all in labour conditions; they have not improved over the last 200 years…In the context of trade based on food sovereignty of course oranges or tea, the specific export-oriented products, depending on the model of production, are perfect. But for us then the monoculture, plantation model is a destructive one – of our rights and our ability to be peasants, and a destructive one too of nature (Nicholson, 2013).

Another interviewee also emphasized the current “distribution model” as the problem with trade, as opposed to trade in of itself. He argues that the current distribution model is not compatible with the principles of food sovereignty, such as agroecology, a rights-based approach, and connecting consumers with producers. He also voiced contempt for existing trade rules because they constraint the possibilities for farmers to earn a livelihood and to practice farming, with their extensions into seed property rights, genetic modification issues, access to water, and access to resources in general, arguing that an acceptable distribution model would have to be “controlled by smallholders” (Ferrante, 2012).

Ferrante, an active farmer, exports agricultural products himself. He states that producing for export is not the problem, but rather that producing solely for exports is:

The problem is [if] I am organized totally for export, then I am totally depending on somebody else. Whether it is a good guy or a not good guy, you are not in a position of equal understanding. So this is also the weakness sometimes of those things (Ferrante, 2012).

He went on to express that the problem with being organized only for export was not just the supply chain and power inequalities therein; it is also the fact that one cannot have a strong local market if farmers are producing for export, and according to the Ferrante (2012), “without a strong local market, you can’t do anything.” Supporting the movement’s overarching position, trade can only come after the local market is secured: “if you want to build something that is also built on international trade you need to have to assure first that the walls are strong of the local market, and on that build so that export” (Ferrante, 2012).

Nettie Wiebe, who was the International Coordinating Committee member of the North American/Mexican region in LVC from 1996-2001, acknowledged that some cocoa and coffee producers (as an example) might consider these commodities their own crop; that is, what they know. But similar to other proponents of food sovereignty (discussed in chapter 5), Wiebe followed this with questions about why this is what they know, alluding to the colonial legacies, rather than sovereignties, that have structured production:

But let’s go back to basics and ask “well, why are these cocoa plantations here and how do people – is the land of pineapple, cocoa, tea, etc. actually land that was used for food production and taken out of the hands of people?” … Or wheat in Western Canada, or canola, it’s all for export, or 80% of it, and agriculture is
cultural, and what we know and how we live and how we have structured our economy but that’s one of the things that’s being challenged. The restructuring, the rapid restructuring of our societies, our communities, our economies, and our methodologies, the way in which we produce food, is shaking people out of that place where they were comfortably producing sugar for a known market in a trade arrangement that had some stability. A lot of that is being undermined anyway. So the questions around ‘we’ve been growing wheat here for the international market for three generations, why would we stop now?’ – in some ways those questions are being changed because the trade is changing so rapidly (Wiebe, 2012).

Nicholson, meanwhile, revealed an assumption that all small farmers producing for export would rather not be exporting: “who exports at the end of the day? It isn’t the small farmer who exports. The small farmer never aspires to sell rhubarb in Frankfurt or ginger in Frankfurt, no” (Nicholson, 2013). The challenge with these assumptions and views – that it is all structured and not desired by small-scale producers – fails to stand up to scrutiny, as discussed in the section of chapter 5 that outlines the different production and market motivations of small-scale producers. Many producers do in fact want to produce for export. There is a strong body of literature to show that a range of motivations shapes the production and market decisions made by agricultural producers, and in those motivations, a number prefer to produce for export and global supply chains (Michelson, 2012; Hall, 2011; Murphy, 2010; Wolford, 2010; Borras, 2008; Singh, 2002; Bernstein and Byers, 2001). While Wiebe points to the sugar farmer as an example to problematize production of export commodities, Wolford (2010) shows that, in fact, those sugar farmers chose to return to sugar production amidst unfair and unstable production relations, after having tried home gardens and finding that production less desirable. The interests of smallholders and rural populations vary, and they do not always reflect the FSM’s vision. And as Nishizaki (2014, p. 25) is quick to warn, we should not assume this is some form of false consciousness: “peasants possess sufficient autonomy to evaluate critically what they hear and see in their lives and to espouse any view they find most convincing or plausible”. The take-away from this is that the FSM does not seem to understand the full scope of varied interests of small-scale producers around the world, and yet they propose a model of agricultural markets that presumes the interests of small-scale commodity exporters align with their own, when research shows they do not.

The food sovereignty movement is made up of more than 150 producer organizations, and it is well beyond the scope of this research to identify what sort of production members are engaged in. I asked those in the movement if they worked with exporters, but the answer was not completely clear. I was told “yes”, but then the example shifted to references to working with the UN International Labour Organization, the agricultural labourers on banana plantations and migrant workers (Nicholson, 2013).

Framing Begets Strategy: Peasant Identity and Suppression of Exporters

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6 In hindsight, it would have been beneficial to ask this question during interviews. But I was focused more on the role for exporter farmers.
That the food sovereignty movement has not thought through what place trade might occupy within a food sovereignty model offers some explanation of the movement’s strategy. But one might ask what explains its ambiguous position on trade. In other words, why has the movement not thought through what place trade might have in a food sovereignty model? I argue that the movement’s origins as a peasant movement, in alliance with indigenous movements, which has motivated a focus on the interests of those producing for local markets and self-sufficiency, and a framing of food sovereignty as a struggle by those producers against the WTO, has led the movement to focus on a confrontational strategy against the rules of trade. In our interview, Paul Nicholson stated as much when he discussed the movement’s activities at the WTO’s 2003 Cancun Ministerial Meeting in Mexico:

When we went to Hong Kong we were 3,000 LVC activists. We were the ones that nearly blocked the conference. When we went to Cancun it was the mobilization of indigenous and LVC alliance which made it possible to block Cancun. Because at the end of the day you have to mobilize, to mobilize people. And to mobilize people you have to have a narrative, a story, a logical story that mobilizes hope and struggle, which can accumulate and incorporate movements. And of course when you have a confrontation directly with the army and the police, you have to have a very well thought out strategy of how to do that because things get tough; you can’t take a struggle to nowhere. You have to have strategic perception of where you’re going, how to do it, and how to influence (Nicholson, 2013).

The essential elements of contentious politics by social movements are framing, constructing identity, and shaping emotions (Tarrow, 2011; p. 142-143). In doing this, movements “define, crystallize and construct collective identities” and “reflect, capture and shape emotions to mobilize followers” (ibid, p. 143). An intrinsic part of contentious politics involves embellishing, and taking to extremes, collective action frames. In the process, movements will often try to suppress identities that conflict with their goals – to create increased homogeneity as a means to solidarity (ibid, pp. 147-151).

These elements of contentious politics by social movements are evident in the food sovereignty movement’s contentious approach to trade that currently excludes the interests of many smallholder exporters. The movement has developed a collective identity of peasantry, with *Via Campesina* literally translating as “the peasant’s way”. This collective identity includes a prioritization of local markets, small-scale production and resistance to global markets and the powers that have structured and continue to dominate them. In constructing this collective identity, there is evidence of a suppression of the various market and production motivations of producers, specifically those who wish to produce for export (detailed in Chapter 5 and recapped above). The movement’s collective identity reflects the interests of those of producers that prioritize local and regional markets, those who desire to shift production in that direction, and those whose interests are undermined on local markets by globalization and trade liberalization. The movement is clear that trade should occupy a place only after strong local markets are in place. This position does consider the livelihoods of export producers, and there is no evidence that they have had a significant say in what place trade should have in food sovereignty.
Murphy and I argue that part of the reason for the FSM’s ambiguous position on trade is that the movement has not thought through the interests of small exporter producers broadly. While some of the organizations under the food sovereignty umbrella include groups that include export producers (such as the West African Farmer Organization ROPPA – Réseau des organisations paysannes et de producteurs de l’Afrique de l’Ouest), there is not a dedicated representation of, nor obvious evidence of consultation with, exporters. ROPPA, a prominent West African producer organization that is widely engaged in producer representation within global governance, is not a member of La Via Campesina, falling under the IPC in its engagement with food sovereignty.

The movement’s position on trade broadly, as only having a place after strong local markets, suggests that these objectives suit the interests of those producers and consumers who would benefit from stronger local markets, and others who support local markets for whatever vested normative, or ideological reasons. We can deduce this primarily from the movement’s prioritization of local markets first, its lack of a clear view on how smallholder export commodity producers and labourers might have a place in food sovereignty, and the objective to exempt agriculture from the rules of the WTO and other liberalization policies that have a history of undermining these markets. Simply put, the movement does not discuss the sovereignty of export producers. There is, to date, little evidence that the movement’s position is born from discussion with and representation of export producers; the movement is born of and strongly reflects the interests of small-scale peasant producers who rely more on local markets and seek agricultural supports and protections for more subsistence farming. This is in no way to question the importance of this mandate. However, a better consideration of the varied interests of small-scale exporter producers may strengthen the movement’s position on trade, given its strong commitment to democracy and consensus, and its currently ambiguous position on trade. Such an endeavor might in turn adjust the movement’s strategy on addressing the international agricultural trade regime, possibly making it more practical, as its current strategy does not reflect a strong understanding of the various production and market motivations of all small-scale producers.

This is not to suggest an intentional exclusion of exporter interests. By contrast, the evidence above suggests a misunderstanding of those interests, rather than an intentional exclusion; interviewees with strong ties to the movement’s leadership support the notion that exporters or commodity labourers are “stuck” producing sugar, cocoa, or coffee because of their colonial history, and that no farmer would choose to export to Frankfurt. We have demonstrated in Chapter 5, citing numerous studies, that this is simply not the case. However, the movement has focused its strategy on building an alternative agricultural production and market model that prioritizes local markets above exports with no clear place for small-scale producers, and labourers, involved in export markets and wishing to remain so. I argue here that the role of framing in social movement helps explain this outcome; the food sovereignty movement emerged as a peasant movement in response to the WTO. This was led with the framing of a collective identity of peasants whose way of life was disrupted by neoliberal globalization and corporate agriculture, and with resistance and dismantling of the WTO as essential to preserving that way of life. Small-scale commodity exporters are perceived to be pursuing these markets not by choice, but through colonial legacies and other political economic forms of oppression.
Food Sovereignty Strategy beyond Trade

The analysis of the food sovereignty movement’s strategy above is one that is focused solely on its activities and strategies for agricultural trade. The movement’s inflexibility in its contentious approach to trade governance is distinct from its strategic approach on governance in other areas. The movement does seize opportunities and demonstrate flexibility in other areas, through engagement with the United Nations. Various factors have influenced the movement’s willingness to engage with and even promote the UN as a location of governance over food and agriculture. One reason for this is the perception from those in the movement that the UN (and the FAO) is more democratic than other institutions like the WTO, as a “one country, one voice” system that is more attentive to providing civil society with a voice (LVC, 2009). The reform of the CFS in 2009 and the integration of Civil Society as a voice, albeit a non-voting one, has reinforced the more democratic nature of the FAO (for the FSM).

Democratic accountability alone does not explain the movement’s interest in locating governance at the UN. The movement sees participation in the UN as essential to its priorities, namely food security above trade:

We are in Rome and at the CFS, and not at the WTO in Geneva, because it is in Rome that food security is the objective, that the right to food is the referent, which lead to fundamentally different trade rules. This allows for a cultural shift (Ferrante, 2012).

The movement, despite its promotion of the UN system, has reservations about its role in the UN, and maintains vigilance over its participation with UN organization. It has not shied away from confrontational activities there, too, especially prior to the reform of the CFS. Chapter 4 outlines several of the movement’s engagement with the UN, including its response critical of cooptation at the High Level Conference on World Food Security (HLCWFS) and its commitment to advocate and participate in the CFS, but to do so cautiously. The movement also engages other organizations that are designed to hold the UN accountable, and challenge some of the decisions/approaches taken by the UN. While the movement upholds the UN as the desired governance location, it does so reflexively, with an eye to a particular form of governance aligned with the food sovereignty model. Desmarais makes one of the few statements on how trade might be governed under the UN, stating that new trade rules would need to be drafted to coincide with a more democratically run and more transparent system (Desmarais, 2007, p. 109).

The movement’s engagement with the UN demonstrates a willingness to balance contentious politics with seizing emergent opportunities, and a willingness to be collaborative on contentious issues. This example of engagement with the CFS also demonstrates a flexibility within the movement to participate despite the inclusion of private sector actors. Part of what explains this willingness is the belief that engagement with the FAO can lead to cultural shifts; the movement is ultimately motivated by a long-term goal to see a shift in the balance of power, away from the WTO, World Bank and IMF towards the FAO/UN. Desmarais writes that this “could potentially help to shift (ever so slightly) the power dynamics between the FAO and other major agencies” (Desmarais, 2007, p. 109).
A similar strategy is simply not evident on trade, and I argue that the explanation for the movement’s strategy above offers some potential insights into why this is. That is, the movement has not thought through a place for trade beyond its negative impacts on peasants, and that its collective identity as a peasantry has given much greater priority to protecting and promoting local markets, rather than to the interests of small-scale commodity exporters. If the movement was more attuned to the latter’s interests, it may find reasons to be more flexible on trade governance. That said, the UN, particularly the CFS, is indeed a more transparent and inclusive forum than the WTO, and provides clearer and more systematic opportunities for the voices of all stakeholders. This undoubtedly plays a significant, and understandable, role in the movement’s decision to invoke flexibility at the UN.

Understanding the Food Sovereignty Movement’s Strategy

In this section I analyse how the FSM’s strategy aligns with what we know about change, drawing on the theoretical framework set out in Chapter 3. As already stated throughout the dissertation, at its foundation, the FSM’s strategy for responding to the international agricultural trade regime is one of contentious politics. The movement adopts an “outside strategy” of confrontation against the WTO, with an expressed unwillingness to transition to an “inside strategy”. In our interview, Paul Nicholson characterized their “inside” strategy for the WTO as one that seeks to disrupt the institution from the inside:

I’ve been inside...Trying to know what’s happening, trying to shape actions inside. Trying to disrupt inside. We’ve done some very interesting actions inside, right? Trying to give support to the NGOs who have got a more critical position. Trying to support NGOs having a more critical position inside (Nicholson, 2012).

This is not an “inside strategy” by definition; it is an outside strategy that takes place inside. This strategy is neither collaborative, nor willing to compromise. However, without demonstrating any indication that the contentious politics should generate opportunities, other than the destruction of the WTO, I argue this is more a strategy of contention than a strategy of change. The movement engages quite successfully in contentious politics up to a point; but its aversion to compromise and flexibility when it comes to trade governance, and the current absence of a clear place for trade in food sovereignty, puts the strategy at odds with the purpose of contentious politics in shaping governance. The movement’s goals for trade governance are for totalizing, transformative change where trade governance shifts from the WTO to the United Nations.

Mobilizing Producers on the Global Stage

In Chapter 3, it was established that contentious politics was necessary when opportunities are not present. Contentious politics, or an “outside strategy”, is a means to forge opportunities, and has historically been essential to political change. Gaventa and McGee (2010) note the essentiality of mobilization in contentious politics, not just of members, but also of media and other social organizations that can support the movement’s activities. This is also discussed in
the section above, with Tarrow’s (2011) emphasis on developing collective identity to mobilize membership.

The FSM’s strategy of contentious politics has made significant contributions to mobilizing peasants around a collective identity and against powerful opponents, including those setting and implementing the agricultural trade liberalization agenda. The FSM has been incredibly successful in transnationally mobilizing small farmers and peasants to demand their voices be heard at the international level (Desmarais, 2007) and is credited with inspiring collective action around the world (Shattuck, Schiavoni, and Vangelder, 2015). This has been one of the strongest achievements of the food sovereignty movement, and is still one of the greatest strengths of the movement moving forward. Among the movement’s explicit objectives upon its emergence was to give voice to peasants, as distinct from peasant voices being represented through NGOs and organizations like IFAP/WFO, which had dominated as the voice of farmers before. As noted above, though they have rejected these opportunities, the WTO has responded to the FSM’s mobilization activities outside negotiations by seeking to consult the movement. The FAO also forged a partnership with La Via Campesina in 2013, labeling it as the “largest movement of small-scale food producers in the world” (FAO, 2013). Some academics have even argued that La Via Campesina is not only a leading transnational agrarian movement, but also the most powerful social movement in the world (Rosset, 2009; Borras, 2008).

This mobilization has extended to bring members of the food sovereignty movement together with academics and other organizations around the world as well. While the movement has pushed against NGOs representing the voices of peasants and small farmers, it has also allied with NGOs and other CSOs such as Friends of the Earth and FIAN-International (as examples). The term food sovereignty has proliferated exponentially. This mobilization has put food sovereignty on the agenda, generating important discursive and normative power to peasants:

The Via Campesina efforts have led to important shifts in the debate around food and agriculture. The Via Campesina’s concept of ‘food sovereignty’ (a radical extension of the ideas surrounding food security) has spread widely and is now embraced by local, national and international movements around the world. The concept is also being explored by global institutions such as the FAO, and recent reports to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights advocate for food sovereignty as a means of ensuring the human right to food and food security. The concept of peasant rights re-entered the international arena...[and] after having all but disappeared from national government and international plans over the past twenty-five years, agrarian reform is now back on the agenda, and the World Bank’s ‘market assisted land reform program’ is now in question (Desmarais, 2007, p.8).

Akram-Lodhi has noted the extent to which “food sovereignty has come to occupy a central place in the discourse of food activists around the world” (Akram-Lodhi, 2015, p.563). A google search of the term (in quotations) has more than 1.8 million hits as of January 2017.8

7 http://www.foodsovereignty.org/about-us/
8 This is an updated account for a statistic presented in Akram-Lodhi, 2015, p. 563)
The FSM has had remarkable success in bringing small farmers and peasants to the table in global governance of food and agriculture, primarily by drawing on contentious politics that have mobilized and carved out opportunities for those voices to be heard. These impacts cannot be understated. Gaventa and McGee identify such accomplishments (drawing on the work of Leslie Fox) as “transformational” for empowering citizens to challenge the status quo and accessing a sense of their own power, as well as “developmental” for having strengthened civil society (Gaventa and McGee, 2010, p. 30).

The FSM’s contentious activities confronting the WTO includes its participation in the broader protests of WTO ministerial meetings. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to isolate and identify the impact of the FSM specifically at these protests, and on agricultural policy therein. Indeed, measuring the impact of such protests, and of social movements generally, remains quite difficult (Kolb, 2007). Nevertheless, academics have argued that these protests broadly, particularly at the WTO ministerial in Seattle, but also those in Hong Kong, Cancun and elsewhere, have had some impact on the course of governing global trade, and the FSM should be ascribed some responsibility for contributing to these successes. Scholte highlights Seattle among the radical activities that have given civil society broadly a more prominent place in Global Governance (Scholte, 2002). Gill argues these protests have been part of identifying, expanding and putting into practice new forms of political identity and agency, which in turn can “challenge some of the myths of and the disciplines of modernist practices, and specifically resisting those that seek to consolidate the project of globalization under the rule of capital” (Gill, 2000, p. 138). The “Battle of Seattle”, as the 1999 protests against WTO meetings in the city are colloquially known, achieved this beyond just identity politics, however, getting to issues of gender, race, class, ecology and social concerns. These protests can also be argued to represent a new understanding of shared struggles and problems between movements worldwide, mobilizing agreements that are not just in the interests of dominant powers (capital, countries, etc.) (Gill, 2000, p. 139). These protests are credited with having expanded awareness of globalization and related discontents and with mobilizing and inspiring further movements engaging on these and other global issues (Wood, 2012; Gill, 2012).

Forging and Rejecting Opportunities: A Limited Contentious Strategy

The food sovereignty movement’s contentious politics strategy makes important contributions to challenging the international agricultural trade regime. However, these challenges face some notable limits that risk undermining both the movement’s objectives and the generation of a more equitable trade regime. The movement’s assumptions that the WTO cannot be reformed to have increased democratic legitimacy, to move away from neoliberal policies and to prioritize food security objectives over trade objectives are challenged in chapter 5. I investigate further these assumptions in the next section, and discuss how these assumptions limit the potential effectiveness of the movement’s strategy of contentious politics.

First, some of the movement’s assumptions of the democratic processes in the WTO are not entirely correct. For example, it is noted above that there is a perception that parliaments are excluded from WTO processes. Yet, membership to the WTO and agreements negotiated at the

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9 It should be stated here that the movement has however perhaps had some unique opportunity afforded to its voice finding space through the events of the global food crisis and the space that this created.
WTO require ratification by countries before they are finalized (WTO, n.d.-b). In fact, it was a concern that the “Bali Agreement”, a deal negotiated in December 2013 to increase trade liberalization, would fall through when some wondered whether governments – particularly India – would hold out on ratification (ICTSD, 2014). These parliamentary processes, as we saw with the Bali deal, may ironically prove to be the institution’s downfall. Counter claims are made that the process taken up by governments to ratify are not democratic, but the WTO, somewhat justifiably, notes this is not an issue of the institution, but of the ratifying country instead (WTO, n.d.-c). At the same time, not all members of the WTO are democracies themselves, and there has been a great deal of secrecy between governments and citizens on the contents of trade agreements, even on the part of democratic countries.

There are, nevertheless, democratic deficiencies that are legitimately quandaries. This includes the lack of civil society consultation within the WTO. One interviewee who has been involved in LVC identified this as a major concern for the movement in its position that the organization cannot be reformed (Ferrante, 2012). As Sophia Murphy and I point out in Chapter 5, the organization has made some effort to become more open to civil society, but this is an area that is lacking systematic, transparent and accountable inclusion.

Power relations and the democratic challenges posed by the use of breakout “green room” negotiations are the most serious critique to the WTO’s democratic credibility. WTO agreements are made through all countries coming to consensus, and single-undertaking, whereby no agreement comes into effect until all agreements are negotiated (Wolfe, 2004, p. 7). However, through closed door “green room” negotiations, a few countries gather to hash out an agreement. The WTO “Quad” countries – the US, EU, Canada and Japan – set the WTO agenda during early negotiations. This agenda setting process has excluded developing country concerns and demands, which has long been considered an ultimate affront to democracy by critics of the WTO and its processes (TWN, n.d.). While the Economist claims the WTO has a “hyper-democracy” (The Economist, 2001) because it adopts a one-member, one-vote process10 that requires full consensus, Marc Williams clarifies that this consensus is not necessarily based on a conscious vote, but rather is based on the absence of dissent:

In the context of the WTO, ‘consensus’ is defined by the absence of a formal objection to a decision by a member present when that decision is reached. This is not to say that all states have an equal voice at the WTO. In the search for consensus members meet in informal groups, and influence in the organization is a function of a country’s importance in world trade and the skills of its government’s negotiators. (Williams, 2011, p109)

Decisions are not born thus of “one member, one vote” consensus, or by “veto power”, but rather by “passive consensus, whereby any country that is not actively opposing a position is taken to be in favour of it – even if that country’s representatives are not actually present at the meeting” (ActionAid, 2003, p.3). Many report that there were accounts of “arm twisting” in the establishment of the agreements from the Uruguay Round, with some countries’ foreign aid and trade preferences threatened if they did not sign on to the agreements, as well as reports of other threats made for not conceding (Desmarais, 2007 p. 129; ActionAid, 2003, p3). Former Director

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10 A feature underscoring one of the reasons the FSM argues is why it prefers the UN.
Generals of the WTO Mike Moore and Pascal Lamy both acknowledged such occurrences (ActionAid, 2003). Agreements were also born of packaged deals, where developing countries gave up years of resistance to property rights rules (dating back to GATT and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) efforts) when they signed on to the TRIPS Agreement because it was packaged with other agreements that promised (or were at least perceived to promise) greater market access for key items such as agricultural and textile exports (Bronckers, 1999, p. 548). When countries are perceived to be gaining in some important areas, they might sacrifice their broader goals. Within the context of the WTO’s single undertaking – that is, no agreement is made until all agreements are made – results in trade-offs that can have important consequences to domestic economies and vulnerable populations.

But while the issue of power relations and the related unequal voices among Member States does convincingly point to democratic deficits, as pointed out in Chapter 5, power relations and democratic representation at the WTO are not static. The original QUAD is no longer the power bloc in negotiations, and BRICS countries have ascended to higher power (Hopewell, 2013). The G33, too, has shown that developing countries can have remarkable power when they coalesce, and in agriculture, this has been demonstrated by the group’s resistance to a deal that does not give developing countries policy space, and food security greater priority in trade considerations, as discussed in Chapter 5. Wolfe demonstrates that power blocs have never been static in the WTO. He argues that the institutional design of single-undertaking and consensus facilitates increased power for “relatively weak states to use institutional power effectively”, because it gives them the power to shut down negotiations and agreements in other areas if their voices aren’t being considered (2004, p.7). Civil society voices, too, have been given some improved access to WTO negotiations.

The point here is not to evaluate the changes in democratic representation in the WTO, but only to identify that change does take place, demonstrating that the WTO is not static. The democratic deficiencies and power imbalances in the WTO have changed, and while neoliberalism persists, there have been discontinuities with it as well, reflecting what Grabel (2015) and Andrée depict in their theories of hegemonic change. The WTO’s agenda, who sets it and who influences it have changed with changing power configurations. The organization has had to respond to criticisms about civil society’s exclusion, and has done so to a limited extent, however insufficiently. Indeed, as we see above, the food sovereignty movement has been invited to have a voice in that response. The changing power balances have brought forward opportunities to change the hard rules of trade, with the G33 and the G20 pushing for changes to increase developing country agricultural policy space. These changes have also brought forward opportunities to push for normative shifts within the trade agenda, for example, towards an advancement of the norm that food security objectives should be prioritized above trade objectives. This has been part of the G33 and OWINFS discourse.

The necessity of contentious politics through mobilized social movements to facilitate political and transformational change, particularly in the presence of severe injustice, is certain (Green, 2008; 2012; Gaventa and McGee, 2010; Tarrow, 2011). The movement’s principled concerns about the WTO’s democratic processes and neoliberal priorities are convincing. However, I argue the movement’s refusal to consider opportunities to change the organization goes against what we know about forging change, and is at risk of resulting in futile utopianism and static...
realism rather than a maturely thought strategy capable of harnessing the power of social movement. The role of contentious politics is treated in the literature as a means for generating opportunities where none exist; not as a mechanism for totalizing, transformational strategy akin to some sort of revolutionary process. Contentious politics is but part of the dynamic processes through which change, usually slowly, takes place. As Duncan Green notes, outside strategies rarely impact what happens inside; contentious politics feeds into and off of an inside strategy (2008; 2012).

The movement’s treatment of the WTO and neoliberal globalization as immutable hegemony is discussed above as part of what explains the movement’s totalizing approach to changing the international trade regime. The FSM has rejected opportunities because they see neoliberal hegemony as embedded in the current WTO agreements. However, these were opportunities to challenge the primacy of trade objectives over food security objectives, and to change the primacy given to trade liberalization as optimal in all instances. This ignores not only the opportunities to support some of the changes the FSM wishes to achieve, but also what we know about change. As Grabel (2015) and Andrée (2007) demonstrate, hegemony is not immutable, but rather dynamic, ever changing, and compromising. When hegemony is treated as immutable, such as how the FSM does with the WTO, then opportunities are missed, and the potential for transformational change are limited. The examples of opportunities within the WTO to have food security prioritized above trade, and to have increased agricultural policy space for developing countries, are examples of what Grabel (2015) categorized as “discontinuities with neoliberalism”, cracks in hegemony, changes that are integral to the processes of transformation, even though they are not themselves transformational. It is not solely that the FSM does not acknowledge these as opportunities, although these opportunities would align with food sovereignty goals. It is that the movement has predetermined there are no opportunities within the WTO, which I argue breeds the sort of realism that E.H. Carr cautioned against – the kind that breeds sterility. And which is demonstrably at odds with the role of contentious politics in facilitating change.

Meanwhile, the FSM’s proposals for “fairer” trade are vague and unqualified, which lays a very weak foundation for identifying opportunities and drafting concrete changes in policies and practices. Similarly, the push for policy space, while it is agreed here is very important, also remains vague. Many of the policies the movement seeks, such as rights to protections and supports, have a long history of being used well, but also of being used poorly (Chang, 2002). Protectionism taken to extremes can harm agricultural sectors and compromise food security, much the way liberalization to extremes can also harm agricultural sectors and compromise food security. We saw this for example with the export bans rolled out during the 2007-2008 global food crisis. While it can be said that countries have the right to implement export bans in the interest of protecting consumers by keeping food affordable domestically, the implementation of those policies had dire impacts for many who were dependent on global markets, as the removal of staples from global markets accelerated the rise in food prices (HLPE, 2011).

In sum, through its activities at the WTO, the FSM has an outside strategy of contentious politics that rejects having an inside strategy to go with it when dealing with trade issues, whether that strategy is adopted by those in the movement, or others (such as OWINFS). It engages contentious politics with a view to the impossibility of opportunity. It sees hegemony as static,
holding out for transformative change to the exclusion of dynamic processes. I am not proposing that the opportunities present in the WTO would be sufficient to bring about economic justice or a full food sovereignty model; undoubtedly they would not. However, they demonstrate possibility for discontinuity from the neoliberal order that has prevailed, a type of post-neoliberal era suggested by Grabel (2015), one that insists on more policy space and the primacy of other priorities above trade.

Democratic Quandary

In this section, I argue that the food sovereignty movement’s strategy that is inflexibly focused on issues important to some small-scale producers, to the exclusion of others’, demonstrates that the movement’s strategy is informed more by principled objectives than by practical processes of change. This not only has implications for the validity of aspects of the movement’s strategy to change the international agricultural trade regime, but also highlights a quandary with the movement’s own commitment to democratic principles, and its conceptualization of “sovereignty”.

The FSM presents itself as the voice of peasants; often conflating “peasants” with small farmers, sometimes small and medium farmers, workers, and indigenous communities (Bernstein, 2014, 11). It has, as identified above, become seen as a legitimate voice of mobilized producers in this way. What is more, it “insists on defining the spaces, the terms and processes of participation, and in so doing fundamentally change the structures that affect agriculture, both locally and globally” (Desmarais, 2007, p. 199). Yet, as discussed, it is not so clearly a voice for export producers, even though they are impacted by the movement’s efforts to promote a vision for agricultural trade and its governance.

And while it is argued that the movement’s success is premised on its balance of “diverse interests…such as gender, race, class, culture, and North/South relations – matters that could potentially cause divisions” (Desmarais, 2007, p. 33) – contradiction and contestations exist within food sovereignty, among them a diversity of interests not reflected in the movement’s agenda. The literature identifies several of these contradictions, including social justice issues (McMichael, 2014; Bernstein, 2014), class issues (Borras, 2008; Borras, Edelman, and Kay, 2008), gender issues (Benstein, 2014), consumer vs. producer rights (Edelman, 2014), and ambiguous distinctions on farmer representations (for example, inadequately differentiating between small, large, export, and domestic-market producers) (Agarwal, 2014; Burnett and Murphy, 2014; Boyer, 2010; Patel, 2009).

The omission of small-scale commodity exporters, and their production and market interests, creates a democratic quandary: a contradiction between the movement’s claims for strong democratic accountability, producer sovereignty, and positions born of consensus, and its exclusion of export producers. While the movement advocates for diversity and the rights of producers to produce what they want for whom they want, the movement appears, at best, to neglect what this means for smallholders who wish to produce for markets at odds with the movement’s core principles, and, at worst, to marginalize those producers. This raises questions

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11 This is also evident in the broad claims to representation on LVC’s website.
about whether the ‘voice’ captured by the food sovereignty movement can be represented by a single movement and whether it essentializes the peasantry/smallholder that is a romantic representation, rather than a realistic portrayal of the diversity of smallholder interests and needs and how they might be met.

For some, an ambiguous and contradictory conceptualization of food sovereignty is desirable. By eschewing an overly concrete definition of food sovereignty, there is a fluidity that allows for diversity, in an appeal to democratic allowance:

> Such conditions…constitute the historicity of the countermovement as it embodies a diversity of local challenges. Nevertheless, its formative unity is conditioned by the violence of market hegemony as instituted in a combination of structural adjustment policies, WTO trade rules and an overriding episteme applying an economic calculus to a more complex set of cultural and ecological peasant ‘practices’ (McMichael, 2014, p. 4).

In this expression, the ultimate enemy is neoliberalism (sometimes conflated with capitalism and globalization (Zerbe, 2014)). The contradictions within the FSM are thus not the point; the food sovereignty movement’s objective to undermine market hegemony is the foundational goal. McMichael goes on to conclude: “Many of these [food sovereignty/resistance] initiatives reach toward resilient practices – not without contradiction, especially when neglecting social justice concerns. But these are the seeds of survival as the shit hits the fan” (McMichael, 2014, p. 20).

Others, however, retort that these contradictions reflect analytical weaknesses that will create broader problems for food sovereignty as a realistic model for the future of agriculture (Agarwal, 2014; Edelman, 2014; Patel, 2009; Patel, 2010). Agarwal tackles the dismissal of these contradictions in detail. She targets inconsistencies within the FSM claims that they allow diversity while they also espouse central tenets and engaging in political advocacy that may be at odds with allowing for diversity. As she quite eloquently states:

> It is equally important to recognize that the valuable rights of voice and choice, exercised by the disadvantaged in local contexts, cannot always fall in line with preconceived trajectories defined by global movements on behalf of the disadvantaged. Therein lies the paradox (Agarwal, 2014; p.19).

This is directly relevant to those small-scale exporters whose interests vary and who are not necessarily take up by the FSM. In fact, the actions of the FSM may even conflict with the interests of small-scale exporters. For many, having fairer relations with transnational markets and manufacturers might be in their interests. We see this explicitly in the example of Kuapa Kokoo, discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

Dismissing the contradictions and conflicts between food sovereignty and the interests of many, including small-scale exporters, aligns with a tendency in social movements to suppress

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12 At the Food Sovereignty: Critical Dialogues conference in New Haven in 2013, where I participated as a panelist as well as delegate, some openly expressed that these contradictions are a part of the movement, and are not a problem *per se.*
identities that conflict with their goals, to create increased homogeneity (Tarrow, 2011, p. 151). This effort to suppress conflicting identities is further demonstrated by the dismissal that small-scale commodity exporters and labourers are anything but entrapped in the hegemonic system; that no producer chooses to produce for export, or if they do, they are only there because of colonial legacy, or perhaps false consciousness, but never by sovereignty. Rather than acknowledging and accounting for differences, there is instead an effort to unify everyone by categorizing them all under the oppression of neoliberal hegemony, which is employed to totalize the condition of all producers and consumers, and override differences.

Establishing collective identities is, again, an important part of contentious politics. But in this instance, the absence of a clear and inclusive position for small-scale commodity exporters demonstrates the movement’s tendencies toward their principled ambitions more than practicalities of change on trade issues. Patomaki warns that ideas of radical transformations that have ‘closed ends’ might both preclude reality and not take into account specific contexts, present and historical. The movement’s position on trade tends to create such closed ends, by venerating local markets and prioritizing trade only after their own vision of how farmers should produce. The FSM in fact does not leave space for diversity in the movement the way it intends, and claims, without implicitly (but not explicitly) asking from many smallholders, exporters and almost certainly non-exporters alike to convert to their principles. I argue this could have unintended outcomes that are at odds with their goals for small-scale producers, which Kolb notes is a frequently the case in social movement activities, though rarely researched (2007, p. 5). The results for small-scale exporters, and others, as discussed above and in Chapter 5, could be quite negative.

In sum, it is simple for proponents to espouse the values of the movement, as many have done in the literature, in protests, and in other proclamations. But movements in practice are much more complicated than they are in theory. For the FSM, these contradictions are perhaps not as reconcilable by claims of “diversity” and “market hegemony” as the movement would like. They are in fact a reflection of the marginalization of voices, however unintentional. While the movement has an ambitious and admirable horizontal democratic structure, the horizontal, deliberative process is only a partial representation of those impacted by the food sovereignty model pursued by the movement. A conversation on contradictions and ambiguities must consider not just ideas and anecdotal expressions of some participants but systematic and rigorous research of engagement in food sovereignty on the ground, as well as the voices of those who are not participating. Further rigorous research in the field is also certainly warranted to uncover the varying interests and motivations underscoring food sovereignty as a movement in addition to those who fall under its principles – such as exporters and many consumers – but whose voices are not clearly represented at this time.

**Assuming the local is better**

The movement’s position on trade, and the assumption that strong local markets are better, raises one final concern that the movement’s strategy is misaligned with the practicalities of change. The movement’s prioritization of local markets requires some accountability around whether local markets are necessarily more just than their export-oriented counterparts. Many empirical studies question whether local markets are necessarily more just (Hinrich, 2003; Hinrichs and
Allen, 2008; Dupuis and Goodman, 2005). On one hand, the movement has a very qualified objective of equitable social relations. On the other, it does not offer a sophisticated and objective account of the issues that exist within local market systems that are at odds with food sovereignty. In fact, as we see above on contradictions within food sovereignty, the movement can sometimes be arguably too dismissive of these concerns by contrasting them against the neoliberal hegemony that they are most fixed on. The movement still, largely, in their conceptualization of trade and global markets, implicitly treats the local as though it would be the antithesis of the global, assuring a sort of equity and food security that the global is at odds with. This patently ignores many of the challenges that exist in the local.

The local, even amidst smallholder communities, first and foremost, does not preclude unequal and exploitative power relations. This is obvious as patriarchy persists in global food and agriculture, and gender remains a persistent key issue. This is an issue the movement acknowledges and it prioritizes addressing patriarchy and empowering women. But the movement speaks less to other power, class and social relations that complicate the “local” (Hinrichs, 2003). As Hinrichs succinctly states, “specific social or environmental relations do not always map predictably and consistently onto the spatial relation. Indeed, fractures between the spatial, the environmental and the social feed into the sometimes contradictory politics of the food system localizations” (2003, p. 36). And why would we assume otherwise? Dupuis and Goodman categorizes the assumption that local markets are the solution to the global as “unreflexive politics” (Dupuis and Goodman, 2005, p. 361). They challenge the assumption that localism is an ideal, and argue that “unreflexive localism” can have major negative consequences by ignoring the power relations that persist at the local level, as though the local level somehow evades inequality and oppressive relations (ibid). Localism, the same authors argue, is not immune to forms of individual protectionism nor to local elites reinforcing their power over other local members of society. Rural-rural power relations, or urban power relations can certainly persist in the local. Bernstein has raised this concern with food sovereignty specifically (Bernstein, 2014).

A fixation on local markets ignores the many systemic problems with local markets at present. Different regions have varying productive capacities and trade can be an important alleviation to this (Burnett and Murphy, 2014; Barrett, 2008; Dupuis and Goodman, 2005). Underinvestment after decades of urban bias and political corruption followed by decades of liberalization policies have generated crisis in basic infrastructure such as storage and roads as well as deficits in access to credit and agricultural resources (Barrett, 2008; Bezmer and Heady, 2008; Watkins, 2008; World Bank, 2007; Murphy, 2006; Shephard, 2005; Daviron and Gibbon, 2002). One repeated problem in some regions is the “sell low, buy high” phenomena, where farmers sell their product on local markets immediately after harvest, when a glut generates low prices. The same producers later buy the same products for personal consumption in ensuing months, set at a higher price by a few sellers who have taken in the harvest surpluses (Barrett, 2008). The FSM’s focus on prioritizing production for local markets could easily exacerbate this glut and decrease prices paid to some producers. A focus on local markets can also ignore the socio-political issues of local geographies, of which there are many, that have very complex, contested and sometimes violently conflicted social relations. Because of this, Dupuis and Goodman challenge the idea that localization, despite its many potentials, is an ideal in of itself (Dupuis and Goodman, 2005). The issue of vulnerability to price volatility and power relations on global markets is a crucial
one. But the solution of the “local” as an ideal relocation of markets to address the harms of global markets is one that is overly simplistic at best and blindly ideological at worst.

In sum, the contentious politics and a forceful and engaged “outside” strategy of the FSM is an important and valid one in contributing to the transformation of the international agricultural trade regime. By mobilizing producers around the world, the movement has made tremendous advances in giving a voice for peasants in national and international politics. The movement has already, through contentious activities targeting the WTO, demonstrated that they can forge opportunities through which some of their goals can be met. The strategy generally recognizes the limited opportunities for changing the current international agricultural trade regime, and contentious politics is an important response in the face of such limited opportunities.

However, the movement demonstrates a fierce unwillingness to act on such opportunities. The movement’s goals for the institution are instead very closed-ended: to disrupt and dismantle the WTO, and as we discuss in Chapter 5, without a clear account for how such an outcome would improve conditions for small-scale producers. The movement is also closed to any other organizations seizing such opportunities, as demonstrated by its withdrawal from the OWINFS network. It is reasonable that the movement would not itself take-up these opportunities, wishing to remain an “outside” player. But that the FSM rejects the possibility of opportunities all together, and confronts efforts by others to seize opportunities emergent from contentious politics, demonstrates the movement’s binary approach to changing the international agricultural trade regime, expecting radical transformation rather than processes of change. I argue this is at odds with how change happens, and with the role of contentious politics in facilitating change.

I also demonstrate contradictions within the FSM’s strategy and its overall goals to generate sustainable and equitable agricultural markets, highlighting the democratic quandaries within the movement and their unreflexive political view of the local. In building a collective identity around the oppression of small-scale producers by neoliberal hegemony within the international agricultural trade regime, the movement has, not necessarily intentionally, suppressed the identities of small-scale commodity exporters and others who conflict with this identity. Simultaneously, they have constructed a vision of the local that does not account for the politics and power relations that persist in these markets, whereby the benefits of the local are embellished and unreflexive. This, I argue, is a limit to the movement’s overall strategy and objectives; it fails to adequately envision the outcomes of its proposals, which supports the overall argument here that the movement is guided more by grand theories and principled objectives than by the practicalities of the processes of change.

**Fair Trade Analysis**

Where the food sovereignty movement engages in a contentious, “outside” political strategy against the international agricultural trade regime, to the exclusion of a collaborative, “inside” strategy, the contemporary fair trade network relies predominantly on a more collaborative, “inside” strategy for trade governance, engaging in negotiations, invoking flexibilities and compromise to shape policy and society. While those in the movement acknowledge limited political opportunities to shape trade policy, they engage in advocacy where they see opportunity, and use non-governmental advocacy through awareness-building and markets in an effort to increase opportunities over the long term. This strategy however is restricted on a
narrow selection of governance I, notably excluding the WTO, and does little to forge opportunities where change is perceived to be necessary but unattainable. The contemporary fair trade movement adopts the broader engagement discussed in Gaventa and McGee (2010), focused not only on engaging political spaces but also with opportunities with the media, the public, and national, sub-national and international organizations. For the fair trade movement, these engagements are part of an iterative, dynamic process of change, even though change moves at an undesirably slow pace. While it could be argued the movement engages in contentious politics through some of its coalition activities, it is not a direct pursuit, despite the general acknowledgement that the current strategy is shaped by limited opportunities.

Explaining Fair Trade Strategy

In this section I move to explaining the fair trade movement’s strategy for challenging the international agricultural trade regime. I put forward two main explanations for the contemporary fair trade movement’s strategies. First is the movement’s inside strategy of collaborative politics rather than confrontational politics, and the underlying assumption that opportunities to change international trade rules and practices are limited, but small changes still matter to achieving larger changes. It is the view of those in the movement that the smaller outcomes of their political, market and social activities can contribute to the process of larger transformations over time. There is an effort by those within the movement, both those in market activities and in political activities, to have their work contribute to broader change through increased awareness by the public, increased commitments to fair trade by governments and companies, and a change in norms of how supply chains should operate. Second, the movement is a network of organizations that have limited resources available to engage in political activities. For those in the network especially, their mandate is first to producers, and markets are a top priority among many of those producers. This mandate shapes how much the movement can strategize confronting the international agricultural trade regime through political activities and other activities that are less directly related to immediate market considerations. In alignment with this, and the discussion on solidarity for whom in Chapter 6, the fair trade strategy represents some of the producer motivations and interests that make up the range of interests held by small-scale commodity exporters.

Collaborative Politics

As outlined in Chapters 4 and 6, the fair trade network engages in a number of collaborative activities at the political level for numerous reasons. While many of the movement’s activities are oriented towards securing commitments from governments for public procurement of Fairtrade products, several other activities are focused on shaping supply chain and trade policy. Overall, those in the fair trade network strategize to shape policy and regulation through available channels where opportunities exist, sometimes directly, but other times indirectly through awareness building and normative change. The network maintains a primary focus on the EU because the EU is where Fairtrade markets have the most traction (Corbalán, 2013). Those in the network participate in politics where they see opportunities to shape politics. They do continue to push for fairer trade rules despite the bleak realm of possibility, but they are
primarily committed to a more diplomatic process that involves keeping a seat at the table in government I, rather than contentiously confronting it.

One explanation for this collaborative, inside strategy is the view held by members of the movement that transformational change is dynamic and iterative, rather than abrupt. Much like is put forward by Grabel (2015), many in the fair trade movement see small outcomes as making important contributions towards achieving larger, transformative change. On one hand, there is a perception within the movement that political opportunities are limited and that markets are insufficient. On the other, there is a view that engaging in these limited opportunities helps to build something bigger:

my assumption is that [changing policy] is not going to happen overnight, that it’s not going to happen fully…it is a gradual process. And that it is therefore logical that the fair trade movement strategy is assuming that this change will not happen [overnight] and will not be yes or no – that it is something incremental – the thought that combining those two strands is necessary because they are self-reinforcing. By making available Fairtrade products to the markets, you are also contributing to raising awareness of citizens. (Corbalán, 2013).

Not only are small successes seen to contribute to broader outcomes, but these successes have also been credited with having enabled fair trade organizations to expand their capacities in challenging the international trade regime. A second explanation for the strategy, particularly with the network, is the combination of limited resources to allocate to policy and a mandate to producers to focus on markets. This is detailed in Chapter 6. Nevertheless, these limits placed on the network are not in isolation from efforts to change the international trade regime. The success of fair trade markets, for example, is credited with having enabled those under the Fairtrade International umbrella to increase their financial and human resources to expand into policy advocacy today:

Basically, we had grown to a certain size and there was a certain level of income coming in that could be dedicated to addressing the policy aspect of trading. It really comes down to – if they could have done it ten years ago they would – they just didn’t have the resources. They were just focused on one thing and doing it well, and that was getting more fair trade, more farmers in the system, more benefits back to the farmers, more people buying Fairtrade, growing the market, engaging with retailers and campaigners. It’s a critical part of trade but they just didn’t have the resources to work on it before (Walker, 2012).

Markets are also seen to open new spaces and opportunities to reach the broader public and government, which is also part of a broader strategic approach to forging opportunity that depends on mobilizing awareness and changing norms. The network has increased its focus on government procurement, where local governments commit to purchase fair trade products. Some individual fair trade organizations like Fairtrade UK focus on this as part of their own work. Government procurement not only expands markets; it is used to increase commitments to the principles of fair trade, which can be leveraged later for political change (Walker, 2013). This emphasis on increasing procurement of fair trade products and more ethical markets is tied to the
importance of European markets to fair trade producers, and producer interests in expanding fair trade markets. FTAO’s push for fair trade procurement by local governments is also about increasing ethical standards in procurement:

Whereas, if we present ourselves as a movement, and we say “we are not only defending a label, we are defending a concept of fair trade”, the concept of fair trade is explained by a number of criteria, and we are not lobbying that contracting authorities need to buy FLO products, we are lobbying for the possibility of public authorities to choose fair trade criteria (Corbalán, 2013).

For FTAO, procurement work also involves providing clarification to governments on any perceived legal barriers to ethical procurement, and the chilling effect manifest from unclear rules around preferential treatment of ethical procurement against treating all products equally. Some governments have experienced legal challenges from companies claiming that governments are discriminating against “unethical” products by committing to fair trade procurement (Corbalán, 2013). FTAO has worked to clarify the law, and to have fair trade procurement explicitly into free trade agreements (Ibid). This however counts towards the organization’s mandate to markets, and does not take up resources from its 50 percent mandate to policy (Ibid).

With the view that existing opportunities are limited, procurement and the concomitant expansion of markets can be used not only as development opportunities, but also for generating political opportunities to build and expand awareness, and harness that awareness for more far reaching change:

By getting across the message that not all trade is fair, you’re kind of also laying the ground for the necessary awareness raising, hopefully, that will create a momentum or more support to the idea that the rules and practices are not fair, and therefore, in a gradual way, there will be more public pressure to change the rules (Corbalán, 2013).

At the time of my interviews, Fairtrade UK did not compartmentalize its market objectives and broader fair trade objectives. It focuses a substantive portion of its campaigning work on engaging supporters beyond consumption, to connect them with their government representatives, to participate in debates, and in integrating education about trade and poverty into school curriculum (Walker, 2012). These activities are not about engaging citizens as consumers; they are about engaging consumers as citizens.

In a similar way, the FTAO does not work as much on European or global trade policy in part because it does not see opportunity to change policy at this time. Instead, they focus on changing the norms that open the doors to changing policy:

The reality is that it’s not yet on the public agenda because the very fundamentals of EU trade policy are so far away from all this, that trade is a prisoner of the prioritization of growth and of export for European companies to open markets.
abroad. So before the alliance is going to make specific technical proposals to do this or that, we took a step back and put trade in its place (Corbalán, 2013).

Corbalán went on to explain this as changing the norms away from being about increased growth and exports to one about fair and more ethical trade.

There is no attitude that fair trade markets will be viable across time and space, sufficient, and set to tackle every problem in the system. No person interviewed in the movement stated that these markets were the “fix” to the problems in the trade system, and many acknowledged they are simply not sufficient, nor intending, to be so. Acknowledging the criticism that fair trade does not reach the “poorest of the poor”, Walker stated:

Certification is a business decision that cooperatives make and they have to decide if it fits in to their business plans. So, even for that type of analysis you need some level of organization that implies some level of income that farmers have…We don’t reach the poorest farmers because we (Fairtrade) can’t. Certification can’t do that. Fair trade (as a principle) can do that, because they operate on a different model…[and] there are fair trade, two words, principles that we can lobby on in Europe about fairness in the supply chain (Walker, 2012).

Murray et al. go further to point out that the movement broadly cannot itself tackle every element of the neoliberal structures that undermine economic justice:

Fair Trade is a movement with considerable potential, though it makes no claim to be able to resolve single-handed the seemingly downward spiral of problems associated with the current neo-liberal globalization regime, which has led to increasing impoverishment, disenfranchisement, and alienation on a worldwide scale. It is one of the more dynamic examples of the initiatives, campaigns, and movements that are constituent elements of what Peter Evans has described as ‘counter hegemonic networks’ (Evans 2000), globalization a process of ‘globalization from below’ (Portes 1999). These efforts represent a multifaceted response to globalization that seeks to re-regulate global production, trade, and consumption in ways more protective of and beneficial to people and the environment. In this context Fair Trade becomes a case worthy of investigation in its own right, and also a vehicle for understanding the broader incipient pursuit of a fundamentally different form of globalization” (Murray et al. 2005, p. 180).

Nor are the achievements of the fair trade network viewed by members as successful end solutions. They are instead interpreted as creating new opportunities, through increased awareness and tangible ways to both support producers in the South through the purchase of their products at a fairer price, as well as to access policy makers through various campaigns. These are the hallmarks of Grabel’s “productive incoherence”, a decentralized approach to governance that does not embody coherent and totalizing change. The contemporary fair trade network is but one set of actors pursuing but one of a set of governance possibilities to implement change.
This is not, however, just a strategy born of a theory of change. It is a strategy that represents a range of producer motivations and interests. Chapter 6 discusses in greater detail that these organizations have a mandate to producers, and many producers wish to participate in the certified Fairtrade market system for a range of reasons. Products from three producer networks are certified and labelled through FLO for sale all over the world. These are Fairtrade Africa, Coordinator of Fairtrade Latin America and the Caribbean (CLAC) and Network of Asia and Pacific Producers (NAPP). FLO estimates that this to represent 1.5 million producers and workers in 74 countries through the certification of thousands of Fairtrade products.

This is not to suggest there are no qualms with Fairtrade. As Clark and Hussey note, the increased fragmentation in certification – with the recent split of Fairtrade USA and the rise in small producers symbols – suggests divergent objectives and motivations among producers and workers (Clark and Hussey, 2015, p. 2). Several studies have also shown that many producers have a limited knowledge of Fairtrade, with increased knowledge concentrated with those individuals higher up within the cooperative (Johannessen and Willhite, 2011; Lyon, 2006; Getz and Shreck, 2006; Murray et al., 2005; Shreck, 2005). The need for efficiencies in operating the cooperative and for making decisions around production and marketing can contribute to this, but many producers are also passive participants within the cooperative (Murray et al., 2009, p. 188). CLAC, as noted in Chapter 6, has maintained participation in Fairtrade markets and in FLO governance, with the chair of CLAC now also Chair of the Board at FLO. At the same time, CLAC also initiated a small producer symbol initiative in 2006 (Clark and Hussey, 2015, p. 2). We should not dismiss concerns that Fairtrade producers are inadequately empowered within Fairtrade governance (Clark and Hussey, 2015). But there is also an argument to be made for the “productive incoherence” laid out in Grabel, where decentralized governance allows for diversity and democratic representation. Fair trade does not meet all producers’ expectations of what Fairtrade markets should look like, but then we might ask whether we should assume all producer expectations for Fairtrade markets are the same? I turn to this in the next section, where I consider, drawing on the theoretical framework in Chapter 3, how we might understand the fair trade strategy as a strategy to change the international agricultural trade regime.

Understanding the Fair Trade’s Strategy

Building on this assessment of the fair trade strategy and a more nuanced framework of change, I now apply these explanations of fair trade’s strategy to the analytical framework set out in Chapter 3 to interpret how we might understand fair trade’s strategy to change the international agricultural trade regime. In this section, I argue that we can understand the fair trade strategy as one that focuses on changing the international agricultural trade regime, reflecting the theories of Peter Andrée and Ilene Grabel. I contend that the activities of those in the movement, including those involved in the fair trade network, have forced concessions from markets that are at odds with neoliberalism, much as Andrée’s theoretical framework suggests (2009). I also argue that the activities of the fair trade movement, including the network, can be considered part of a “productive incoherence” that is contributing to larger confrontation of neoliberal hegemony by

14 http://www.Fairtrade.net/who-we-are.html http://www.Fairtrade.net/who-we-are.html
15 Clark and Hussey argue this fragmentation “demonstrates” the “contested nature” of Fairtrade. I’m hesitant to agree given the data; it demonstrates that Fairtrade is contested so much as it demonstrated diversity. As Murphy and I outline in Chapter 5, not all producers are motivated towards the same goals by participating in the movement.
changing norms and building awareness, which are foundations for achieving more transformational and even policy change, as understood through the literature on global governance and development in practice.

These arguments build on my argument in Chapter 6 that we need to reconsider the notion that Fairtrade is neoliberal and co-opted, where I counter claims that fair trade is “neoliberal” through my empirical research that presents the extensive political activities and priorities of the FTN. I demonstrate that those involved with Fairtrade do not hold the view that markets are sufficient for addressing injustices in the international agricultural trade regime. I also provide evidence that explains why those in the market network have limited engagement in politics. Finally, I question whether the ascription of “solidarity economy” to the early movement should be applied to Fairtrade when the concept of solidarity economy invoked does not convincingly represent the interests of all producers engaged in Fairtrade markets.

In this section, I expand on why I object to the claims that the fair trade network is “neoliberal” by making a case that private governance need not necessarily be considered “neoliberal”, and I identify the ways that Fairtrade is more aligned to a progressive form of private governance than a neoliberal one. Fairtrade may not be as progressive as other forms of private governance, such as small producer symbols (Clark and Hussey, 2015), but nor does it embody the principles of neoliberalism, especially when we contextualize the private certification system alongside the network’s broader activities.

Finally, I evaluate the findings in Chapters 4 and 6, along with some additional findings, through the theoretical framework set out in Chapter 3. I discuss in more detail how hegemony has been transformed by fair trade, along the views of Andrée on hegemony’s mutability. I also discuss the way the fair trade network strongly contributes to change through Grabel’s Hirschmanian lens. However, I also argue that the fair trade network may be too compliant with existing opportunities, overlooking the role of contentious politics, given its broader point of view that the political space available is too closed for it to achieve its goals.

**Understanding Private Governance**

While the expansion of private governance is perhaps the result of neoliberal ideology’s rise to prominence over the last 30 years (Scholte, 2005; Rai, 2004), and can be used as a mechanism to support the neoliberal ideal of shifting away from state regulation (Clapp, 2005), it is not necessarily neoliberal itself. Peter Newell defines private governance as “international institutional mechanisms, aimed at bringing order to an area of business activity, in which state authority is either not present at all, or not the predominant form of political authority” (Newell, 2005, p. 29).

Foremost, private governance is not necessarily a shift away from the state; it can rather be a novel or new way of governing where governance was absent before (Ruggie, 2004). While the state, which has more wide-reaching impacts through implementation of regulation, and greater democratic accountability, might be a preferable location of governance, (Rai, 2004; O’Brien, 2005) the state may not be open to governing some issues. In this regard, private governance can fill a void, rather than be a shift away from the state (Ruggie, 2004). Raynolds (2012) presents this argument though a Polanyian perspective:
Although Polanyi focuses on the rise of national state regulatory institutions, policies, and laws, contemporary authors extend this argument to explain the emergence of transnational initiatives for social protection and non-governmental approaches to market regulation (Raynolds, 2012, p. 278).

While state regulation might be the farthest-reaching form of governance, when the state refuses to govern an issue, these alternative governance mechanisms can play an important role in filling this gap. Indeed, private governance, under specific conditions, may even set in motion more binding governance over time (Clapp, 2005).

Certification initiatives are also argued to be a potential “source of power over those who govern them”, and a mechanism for social resistance to the capitalist marketplace (Jaffee, 2012, p. 98, quoting Marie Christine Renard). As I will suggest below, in some instances, like fair trade, private governance may even forge the normative and epistemological space to facilitate a shift towards government regulation on the issues it seeks to govern.

This is not to suggest that there is no legitimacy to the concerns about the privatization of governance, particularly of food and agricultural governance. While private governance may be argued to have, in some instances, the authority and legitimacy to govern, the power and authority conferred through private governance can also lack representation and the participation of those governed, as well as accountability and transparency (Fuchs and Kalfagianni, 2010). Private certifications schemes are voluntary governance mechanisms, and can shroud corporations from the obligatory compliance of regulatory oversight. Private certification schemes can generate a positive image achieved through ethical procurement that might not correspond with a companies broader set of economic and social practices (Clapp, 2005, p. 224). The costs to companies associated with private certification can also benefit larger corporations while excluding smaller, competing companies (Grolleau et al., 2007). Private certification schemes can also shift responsibility for ethical behavior from powerful actors in the international supply chain to consumers, generating an “individualization” of responsibility, rather than citizen engagement to address collective problems that are more appropriately addressed through government regulation (Maniates, 2001, p. 33).

Ultimately, we should not treat all private governance equally, noting especially a difference between private industry standards and third-party standards (Clapp, 2005; Jaffée, 2012). Private industry standards are appealing to companies because they can bypass regulatory oversight and provide more flexibility on commitments (Clapp, 2005, p. 27). Third-party certification, however, can be framed as more democratic and as a counter to industry power and interests. Alistair Smith points out that third-party certification systems like fair trade markets operate within, but also beyond, the market. This has the potential to create a new balance of power, where various stakeholders contribute to shaping governance:

far from being organized solely by market forces, economies are governed by a variety of power networks...a further nuance sees governance as operating both externally and internally to value chains. This is because while quality, price and timing are often controlled from within these networks, the rise of ‘private authority’ means that many other non-state and non-market systems now
influence quality standards – as well as the labour and environmental conditions under which production takes place (Smith, 2009).

Ruggie puts forward a similar proposal, applied specifically to transnational issues that might not be governed as easily by ‘the state’, particularly when we see coordination failures and power asymmetries that lock in all states to agreements even though the majority are excluded in decision-making, such as with the WTO. Here, private governance may arguably create:

a historically progressive platform by creating a more inclusive institutional arena in which, and sites from which, other social actors, including CSOs, international organizations and even states, can graft their pursuit of broader social agendas onto the global reach and capacity of TNCs (Ruggie, 2004, p. 503).

Voluntary mechanisms are perhaps not an ideal substitute for regulation, and the shift from public regulation is indeed a hallmark of free market ideals. But I’ve presented the case here that it need not necessarily be the embodiment of deregulation through neoliberalism and market authority. I next turn to the discussion on how fair trade, especially, is doing more to advance government regulation over trade than it is creating a substitute for government regulation.

Understanding Fairtrade as Private Governance

Considering this more nuanced framework of analysis around private certification as a global governance mechanism, it becomes more difficult to label fair trade markets as neoliberal simply because they are a form of private governance. In Chapter 6 I refuted that those behind Fairtrade markets see markets as the solution to unfair international trade and supply chain governance. Many see Fairtrade markets as part of a strategy to facilitate broader regulatory changes to generate more equitable international trade and global supply chains. This evidence makes it clear that Fairtrade is not intending for private governance to supplant state and international regulation. Nor does it even mean for it to merely supplement it. Rather, it is positioned to help generate opportunities through normative and discursive change and mobilizing social awareness—all legitimate instruments of global governance and change.

Fairtrade is a third party certification system that has pushed back against the norms of free trade and unequal relations in supply chains that place a number of pressures on producers, and which has educated consumers on commodity trade and its negative impacts for producers in developing countries (Doherty et al. 2013, p. 176). Indeed, fair trade has generated considerable awareness of the inequitable nature of commodity trade, removing traction from the once frequently touted claims that “free trade is fair trade”. *The Economist,* generally favourable to free trade norms, hosted a 10-day debate in 2010 over whether trade in the EU should be freer or fairer. Political economist Ngaire Woods argued in favour of fairer trade, while mainstream economist Jagdish Baghwati argued in favour of freer trade. Readers voted over the ten days, and at the end, fifty five percent voted in favour of fairer trade (*The Economist*, 2010).

Fair trade has also helped push forward expectations for a commitment (however imperfect) to smallholder producers in developing countries that goes above and beyond the so-called benefits of participating in supply chains. It is difficult to find a company that does not claim to support the rural poor and farmers through additional programming beyond their market procurement.
This arguably demonstrates that the free market alone is no longer credibly perceived to be beneficial to small-scale commodity producers. A 2004 World Bank report on new paradigms in the global supply and demand of coffee noted that “experts predict that social and environmental concerns, especially ethical ones will continue to emerge as not only competitive differentiators but as basic rules of the game and prerequisites for participation” (Lewin, Giovannucci and Varanagis, 2004, p. 14.).

Those at Divine Chocolate see Fairtrade as setting new expectations for smallholder benefits within supply chains as well:

…you have effectively changed ‘the market’ for cocoa and created a norm of some sort that it’s simply not enough to do business as usual, that you need to do better and you need to pay farmers fair prices and ensure that they have sustainable communities. In fact, that is the speech that the head of Cadbury’s gave when they converted Cadbury Dairy Milk to Fairtrade. They were saying basically ‘no longer is it enough to be doing what we’ve been doing’ (Gorman, 2013).

By signing on to Fairtrade, these companies are acknowledging injustice, even if that is not their intention:

There is no way you can sign up to the Fairtrade certification system without implicitly [admitting you’re involved] as a company in perpetuating economic injustice, because there is no way to say [we are going to] pay more money for the thing that we have always bought without acknowledging that there was a reason that we should do it in the first place (Gorman, 2013).

Indeed, major companies frame their operations as supporting smallholder farmers and sustainability, whether through Fairtrade, other third party certifications, industry corporate responsibility initiatives, internal commitments or a mix of these. Major companies like Nestlé and Cadbury have Fairtrade certified a small portion of their chocolate supply through FLO (KitKat and DairyMilk, respectively, and only in some countries). Starbucks has certified a small portion of its coffee Fairtrade, but primarily relies on the “Coffee and Farmer Equity” (C.A.F.E.) program, private standards established by the company. Chocolate manufacturers participate in a range of activities through the World Cocoa Foundation, which has a CocoaAction program that “is a strategy that brings the world’s leading cocoa and chocolate companies together to sustain the cocoa industry and improve the livelihoods of cocoa farmers”. Nestlé’s Nescafé coffee brand posits that it “helps farmers and respects nature” through its Beyond the Cup plan, which “brings together responsible coffee farming and production practices throughout the value chain, from farmer to consumer”. Hershey’s changed its commitment after being the target of a campaign that began in 2006 to confront the chocolate manufacturer for being the last major chocolate manufacturer to not commit to take action to ensure that its cocoa was sourced from areas or producers protected from harmful labour practices and for not pursuing a reputable third

16 https://www.scsglobalservices.com/starbucks-cafe-practices
17 http://worldcocoafoundation.org/about-wcf/cocoaaction/
party certifier – specifically fair trade.\(^\text{19}\) Hershey’s responded with a commitment to source 100% sustainable cocoa by 2020 (Gunther, 2015). The company intends to achieve this through procurement of Utz, Rainforest Alliance and Fair Trade USA certified products (Gunther, 2015). As noted above, Starbucks relies predominantly on its C.A.F.E. program. Dole promotes its benefits to poor, rural communities on its corporate social responsibility website.\(^\text{20}\)

This is not to suggest that such programs are necessarily *effective* forms of private governance. Quite the opposite, as I discuss next. But it does point to a shift in normative expectations that are shaping markets and that demand companies provide additional steps to protect and remunerate farmers and labourers participating in global markets. This expectation and normative shift carries the mark of discontinuity with neoliberalism: it requires commitments from companies to behave in a way that is additional to the functioning of the market, because the free market is insufficient at best, but just plain harmful at worst.

**Fair Trade: Limits of Private Governance**

There are limits to fair trade as a form of private governance. Fair trade is a niche market that has a very limited scope – it is more a privilege to participate in fair trade markets, whether as a consumer with the means to purchase more expensive products or a producer with the capacity and good fortune to gain entry in a market with clear expectations and limited demand. Private standards like fair trade can set entry barriers, whereby only those with more resources can participate and those with fewer resources can be excluded (Giovannucci and Ponte, 2005). Fairtrade quality standards can exclude the most marginalized producers, which seems contradictory to the movement’s desire to integrate such producers into their market (Gendron et al., 2008). Those in the movement recognize that they are unable to reach the poorest of the poor, to the point that they exclude it from their mandate (Walker, 2012). And as reviewed above, many involved in the Fairtrade market efforts see the markets as limited in addressing the harmful structures of trade.

Perhaps the greatest challenge is the emergence and proliferation of weaker and co-opted certification schemes taken up by companies – initiatives that are often corporate and/or industry-led. Examples of such schemes include UTZ Certified, Rainforest Alliance, and Starbucks’ in-house program. These schemes appeal to companies largely because they have lower standards, and in doing so they offer fewer benefits to producers (Jaffee, 2012; Bacon, 2010; Giovannucci and Ponte, 2005). UTZ Certified is a private certification label that promotes itself as benefiting producers, but does not deliver commitments that are as strong as FLO certified products. According to the UTZ website, the program was founded by a Belgian-Guatemalan coffee grower and a Dutch coffee roaster.\(^\text{21}\) However, the private company Cargill – one of the largest global agricultural grain traders and agrifood companies in the United States – also claims to be the founder. They wrote on their website that they founded UTZ, “along with a

\(^{19}\) Global Exchange, which has a Fair Trade program, helped spearhead the campaign. *Raise the Bar! “Why Hershey?”* [http://www.globalexchange.org/Fairtrade/cocoa/raisethebar](http://www.globalexchange.org/Fairtrade/cocoa/raisethebar)


Dutch development organization and others in the cocoa sector, in 2007”. UTZ certification does not require a price floor for producers; prices are negotiated between the producer and trader. The UTZ philosophy is that the professionalization of the farmer helps create a better product, which in turn produces a better price; in their words “productivity and quality…is rewarded by the market”. UTZ does provide a social premium to certified producers, but it is not clear how the amount is determined. Figures released through Cargill in 2010 and 2011 showed a rise in absolute amount in premiums paid, from $400,000 (USD) to $2.2 million (USD), but the value per farmer declined from an average of $250/farmer to $84/farmer, with half of this premium going to the cooperative for social investment.

Rainforest Alliance also provides competition through lower standards. Rainforest Alliance is an independent third party certification scheme and focuses more on conservation techniques. It does not provide a minimum price, nor a social premium. Rainforest Alliance also requires that only 30% of a labeled product’s main ingredients be sustainably sourced (Newman and McConnell, 2011). Unlike both UTZ and Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade International pays producers a minimum price that is greater or equal to world market prices. Where UTZ provides a random social premium that is not clearly linked to production and/or farmers, Fairtrade’s premium is tied to production, so as to deliver predictable and accountable support to producers. Fairtrade also requires that 100% of main ingredients contained in certified products meet Fairtrade standards.

While Starbucks might certify up to 10 percent of its coffee (Jaffee, 2012), its in-house commitments have also been found to be less beneficial to farmers than Fairtrade (Smith, 2010). A deconstruction of Starbucks’ program by Julia Smith puts its standards far below that of Fairtrade as well, despite the company’s claims that they pay a higher price per pound for coffee than Fairtrade (Smith, 2010). This is because the price paid by Starbucks includes the price paid to middlemen and for delivery, and does not reflect the reality that most producers are likely paid well below the Fairtrade price (Ibid).

Indeed, in a comparison of sustainable coffee standards including UTZ, Organic, Fairtrade, and Shade Grown (which includes Rainforest Alliance), Fairtrade produces more positive outcomes across a range of indicators including price, premium, yields and quality, labour inputs, other income inputs, market access and networking, credit and extension, organizational capacity, environment and risk and planning (Giovannucci and Ponte, 2005, p. 294-295). Companies shopping for lower standards so as to appear sustainable and ethical is an ongoing challenge for Fairtrade, not just in their efforts to make trade fair, but to protect their own reputation. Dine and Sheilds note:

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As the demand for [the fair trade] market has grown, so too has the range of products claiming to belong to it (often to the delight of the most conscientious consumers). However, the extent to which corporations indulge in unfounded labelling dilutes the credibility of these products and patronises and insults the global demand for such products. The ethical trading movements must guard against the loss of consumer trust that will accompany any scandal involving the misuse of labels. Such a scandal would undermine not only the ethical trading movements but the move towards democracy that they represent” (2008, p. 185-186).

To be sure, Fairtrade markets give companies an option that avoids government oversight of supply chains. And the proliferation of private and company-led standards has provided options for companies to engage in “fairwashing” and to adopt private governance standards with lower levels of legitimacy, characterized by lower standards as well as lower levels of accountability and transparency. At the same time, Fairtrade has pursued private governance through a third-party certification scheme because there is no political will and opportunity to regulate markets and draft international trade rules to make trade fairer for small-scale commodity exporters in developing countries. Indeed, it is perhaps because of Fairtrade markets and the fair trade movement, in its activities to change norms, increase awareness and shape discourses on economic injustices that we are progressing towards regulation, even if it is at a very slow pace.

Understanding Fair Trade’s Collaborative Political Strategy

In this final section, I interpret the fair trade movement’s strategy and activities through the analytical framework set out in Chapter 3. I argue that the fair trade movement strategy includes a dynamic, iterative, and fluid political strategy that reflects a more collaborative, “inside” approach to changing the international agricultural trade regime. The movement is made up of civil society and social movement actors that draw on a strategy to disseminate information and norms, framing ways in which poverty in developing countries results from unfair trading conditions. My research did not turn up data on how fair trade has shaped awareness of how trade impacts smallholder producers. However, we can surmise from the consistent market growth rates that the network has likely expanded awareness through markets and campaigns, generating a response through an increased commitment to procuring more fairly-traded products. As noted, it has also catalyzed a shift in how companies frame their relationships with smallholder producers, and perceptions on whether trade should be freer or fairer.

From Andrée’s integrated theoretical approach to change, I argue that the FTN has been instrumental in challenging hegemony and achieving compromises from political actors and social norms that are at odds with neoliberalism. This has taken place through the interactions of those in the movement with the private sector, the public, and policy makers. The movement has made a significant contribution to challenging the position that “free trade is fair trade”. The empirical work presented above and in previous chapters demonstrate that fair trade has shifted perceptions of free trade from being positive to being detrimental for producers. Furthermore, the companies that have certified products as fair trade, and engaged in other private initiatives promoting producer interests (not necessarily genuinely) have had to respond to the negative implications of unregulated trade and supply chains. The Economist debate on free versus Fair trade in 2010 was responding to the UK government consideration of pursuing fairer trade policies. The UK appointed a supermarket ombudsman in 2013 to “protect suppliers and farmers
from abuses of power by large retailers”. These are all concessions from the “hegemonic bloc” of the international agricultural trade regime and neoliberal values, which has accommodated fair trade and conformed to some of its norms. Fair trade’s evolution, meanwhile, has required its own compromises – shifting towards prioritizing markets, certifying TNCs and plantations, keeping Fairtrade prices low in response to market pressures and market power. This is very much in line with what Andrée has put forward in his theory of change; mutual concessions are a part of change, but they need not be taken as an end. Meanwhile, the fair trade movement, including those involved in the fair trade network, has never taken markets to be a sufficient, or even the most important, means to challenging the international agricultural trade regime. We see above that the movement admits markets are limited, that policies need to change, and indeed a growing prioritization of policy advocacy through coalition activities and the work of the FTAO. These are not only examples of compromise from hegemony, but represent as well discontinuities with neoliberalism discussed in Grabel (2015).

For producers, in spite of the limitations of fair trade, there are a number of immediate benefits. Participation in fair trade markets can enhance the capacities of producers and facilitate diversification, which is important to providing opportunities for producers to get out of just producing commodities for export (despite critiques that fair trade perpetuates monoculture exports) (Smith, 2009). Murray et al., based on a two year study in Latin America, find that:

Fair Trade has…contributed to strengthening farmers’ organisations, which in turn has fostered access to other opportunities for cooperatives and their members. These opportunities include direct marketing of their coffee and other commodities, and access to training in organic farming techniques and other methods to improve the quality of their coffee, both of which are discussed below (2005, 183).

Several studies suggest that women especially have benefited socially and economically and have experienced empowerment from fair trade, and that girls have had increased access to education (Mare, 2012; Gitter et al., 2012; Kasente, 2012; Jones et al., 2012; Hanson et al., 2012). Fair trade is not expected to bring about full gender empowerment (Hanson et al., 2012), nor to bridge North-South inequalities (Smith, 2009), but it helps contribute to both of these.

In alignment with Grabel’s Hirschmanian “productive incoherence”, fair trade is one of the many small scale, messy, disparate innovations that are filled with possibility but are simultaneously limited. Fair trade does not aspire to be a singular solution, nor to be an end; rather, it aspires to be part of the process of change, to contribute to new opportunities that feed into wider change. Fair trade is, ultimately, an initiative that is reflexive, responding to changing contexts and opportunities. With the advent of neoliberalism and the concomitant loss of political opportunity, fair trade shifted away from primarily political activities towards a market system. Part of this was motivated by creating different opportunities for poorer producers where efforts to achieve fairer international trade rules and commodity agreements were proving to be unsuccessful and less attainable. Fair trade has used these markets to spread awareness and build a stronger network, which it has then used to help mobilize political advocacy, albeit on a limited scale. As the limits of markets become clearer, and new opportunities for fairer trade have emerged, the

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fair trade network has increased its political advocacy, notably with the FTAO giving a 50 percent commitment to political activities. Fair trade treats its activities and accomplishments not as an end, but as a start. And to its credit, that is consistent with the literature on how change happens.

However, the movement’s acquiescence to the limited political opportunities it acknowledges to exist is a significant limit of its strategy to change the international agricultural trade regime. The literature on change suggests that this would be a time that contentious politics might be used to forge new opportunities. While the network engages in coalitions that take up more contentious politics discussed in Chapter 6 (such as the Alternative Trade Alliance), overall it seems to respond with more collaborative activities based on existing opportunities. This collaborative approach and reliance on available opportunities limits the fair trade network’s activities largely to European political I.

It is a significant limit of the fair trade movement that it accepts the political opportunities before it, and does not actively seek to engage new movements. Fair trade engages very little with most of the global governance I overseeing global food and agriculture, including the United Nations based initiatives. As I demonstrated in Chapter 4, this has included governance mechanisms prioritizing political goals that the fair trade movement has identified as important in its literature responding to the 2007-2008 food crisis.

Corbalán communicated to me that he did not see the post food-crisis governance as being about fair trade priorities as much as (the still important) issues of food supplies and other sustainability issues:

While it’s true there has been attention to food and there is the IF campaign that came out of that, but I would not say that this has actually…maybe we have not been able to capitalize on that, I don’t know, but I don’t have the impression that it has contributed that greatly to actually making the case for fair trade, unfortunately. I think it has raised awareness on the importance of food and on scarcity, and other sustainability issues, but not on what is on our traditional agenda (Corbalán, 2013).

Corbalán emphasized instead the rules governing trade between developing and developed countries, and supply chain governance, which includes working on competition policy to control power in the supply chain (ibid). He also explained to me in the interview that participating in the global is made difficult because there is not the same interest and commitment to changing the global among all members in the fair trade network, and because it has been a challenge to find partners who would work with the FTAO on such a mission, even with the UN, such as with the Sustainable Development Goals (ibid).

The movement has also declined to engage with the World Trade Organization, a deviation from its historic roots in attempting to shape international trade policy. Fair trade has established itself as a major social movement at the political and the market level in shaping norms and expectations for what is “fair” treatment of small-scale producers in developing countries. The movement has however neglected its ability to exercise the power it has over governance of trade by not pursuing new opportunities, and engaging in some more contentious politics in global
governance to demand a more equitable international agricultural trade regime. This is already explained as being linked to the movement’s limited resources, but there is also a perception that the WTO is not as significant as it once was, with bilateral and multilateral agreements taking precedent. In this way, it was explained to me that focusing on European trade policy, where possible, is perceived to be more fruitful. This is, again, in part because of limited resources, but also because of less interest across continents among those in the network to work towards trade policy objectives (Corbalán, 2013).

Ultimately, this limited focus on existing opportunities may limit the movement’s potential in bringing about the changes to an ethical and fair international agricultural trade regime it seeks. If we consider this through the framework set out in Chapter 3, we can understand that the movement works within its limits, and occupies an important place in shaping change through its inside strategy in political advocacy, and broader efforts to influence various global governance mechanisms, such as epistemologies through awareness building and normative change. But the movement’s acknowledgement that there is limited opportunity does suggest that more contentious politics is necessary, and yet it does not seek to take this route.

**Fair Trade and Food Sovereignty Movements: Complementary Strategies for Change**

The fair trade and food sovereignty movements adopt very different strategies for challenging the existing international agricultural trade regime. One contests and resists the existing system, engaging contentious politics and an “outside strategy”, while the other largely works within the system’s boundaries, taking up “inside strategy” efforts to move those boundaries little by little towards an equitable and just trade system. The food sovereignty movement’s more radical stance draws some pretty clear lines in the sand that the fair trade network has crossed. Most obviously, the fair trade network certifies the transnational corporations condemned by the food sovereignty movement while the food sovereignty movement gives only limited space for small-scale producers to produce for export markets.

Despite these differences, we can see from the literature on change that these two movements are in fact more complementary to achieving economic justice than they are at odds. Change requires both the inside and outside strategies, that is, collaborative policy advocacy with governments and contentious politics contesting existing governance. Both these strategies are necessary for change, and neither alone is sufficient. The food sovereignty and fair trade strategies are both limited in of themselves, but are complementary in confronting the international agricultural trade regime by virtue of each adopting complementary strategies for achieving change.

The fair trade movement’s adoption of an inside strategy that is collaborative and flexible occupies available spaces to shape policy, to raise awareness and to set normative discourses on trade. This has contributed to contesting free trade by establishing awareness that free trade generates social and economic injustices for smallholder export commodity producers and workers, and the normative discourse that trade should be fair. With the expansion of fair trade has come increased legitimacy of the movement, which has provided it with increased opportunities to engage in policy advocacy with policymakers. Some of the European governments the movement has been working with have made an increased commitment to fair
trade, albeit with limited reach and too often still more of a commitment to markets. But these are important evolutions, and show signs of continuing. The movement’s inside strategy is certainly for more than just market expansion; it seeks to achieve fairer rules of trade and more equitable power in supply chains. But the movement has not prioritized forging opportunities where none are to be found, and are more content with taking up available opportunities. This makes for a slow and limited process of change.

Food sovereignty, meanwhile, has done an enormous amount to open space for peasant voices and democratic legitimacy in global governance through its contentious politics, and has been part of the movement that has raised significant awareness and distrust around free trade agreements. But the movement’s approach to change is very principled, and it does not demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of the processes for achieving its vision, nor the implications, particularly for export commodity farmers. While it seeks to dismantle, rather than reform, the WTO, it does not have a concrete vision for an alternative without the WTO. As Murphy and I have argued in Chapter 5, without a clear alternative, and without the WTO, there could be a profound governance void that will in fact leave many more vulnerable than with the WTO. The FSM’s no compromise approach also refuses any place for opportunities to shape trade governance along food sovereignty lines. This is especially true with the WTO. As a result, its strategy is limited in that its engagement in contentious politics is not interested in seizing the opportunities that are forged, nor in allowing others to seize them. This is an “all or nothing” form of contentious politics that does not align with what we know about this type of strategy’s contributions to change.

Lastly, I note, from the analytical framework that I have set out in Chapter 3, that we should not expect both these movements to be solely responsible for changing the existing international agricultural trade regime. As pointed out in Grabel, viability and sufficiency – the notion that activities of movements or organizations need meet all the needs of all people across time and space to the effect of bringing transformative change – are “lamentable evaluation criteria” (Grabel, 2015, p. 397). When we analyze these movements – or any movement – we should consider instead what contributions they bring, and be careful to consider these contributions as part of change. I would submit that it is highly unlikely the strategies and activities of a single movement can generate complete and transformational change.
Chapter 8 Conclusion

In 2009 I moved to Washington D.C. to work with Oxfam America (OA) under the optional, 8-month internship associated with my PhD. I had the privilege and great fortune to be paired with Stephanie Burgos, Economic Justice Policy Manager with OA, whom I supported in her work on trade preference reform (unrelated to agriculture). She took me to coalition meetings, meetings with the offices of elected members of Congress and the Senate, meetings with US government agencies, and committee hearings on Capitol Hill. It was a first-hand, eye-opening experience of the efforts involved in making change happen in practice – all the messiness, the strategies, having to navigate all the different interests (including conflicting interests within the left), and the losses. I took up the internship after considering a withdrawal from the PhD, because my experiences in academia were beginning to feel too isolated from the realities of the world, and that was not a personally satisfying career in international development.

I returned to academia after my time at OA with a desire to integrate more practice into theorizing, applied to my interest in the fair trade and food sovereignty movements. In the previous chapters I have expanded our knowledge of the fair trade and food sovereignty movements’ strategies for changing the international agricultural trade regime, drawing on empirical data to explain each movement and providing an analytical framework through which to understand both strategies. Both movements respond to the negative impacts of the international agricultural trade regime on small-scale producers in developing countries, but they are each treated very differently in a great deal of the literature. I have demonstrated how food sovereignty has been frequently celebrated for its radical and confrontational approach to change, while fair trade has often been characterized for embodying the neoliberal principles underpinning the international trade regime it claims to resist.

I have been concerned with the body of literature that seems to analyze the movements for whether they meet a threshold tied to principled ideas of what the world should look like, contrasted against how it currently is. There is certainly important scope for theorizing how our world is ordered, and for critical analysis of how global governance responds to that world order. But understanding how the world is ordered does not provide a great deal of insight on how change takes place, and the two should not be conflated. Thus, in my view, to analyze an activity or governance mechanism in binaries, as part of the current world order or external to it, is limited to a conversation nestled in ideals. From my point of view, based on my research and professional experiences, it becomes a privilege of academia to think in ideals without a concrete effort to consider change in practice.

Key Contributions and Take-Aways

I have developed a unique framework of analysis that helps to analyze change in a way that accounts for how the world is ordered while also considering the processes of transforming world order. This framework juxtaposes theories of world order, hegemony’s mutability, and development and change in practice, providing a framework of analysis that considers the processes through which change happens. This analytical framework is better equipped to
understand how the strategies of each movement contributes to global governance and change, one that accounts specifically for the dynamic processes of governance and change.

I provide an analysis of both movements that generates unique insights on their contributions to contesting the international agricultural trade regime, starkly different from much of the literature. By providing a comparative analysis of the two movements, and analyzing them through the same analytical framework, I put analysis of the two movements on a level playing field, and hold them accountable to the same standard. This allowed me to draw more nuanced conclusions on both movements, highlighting the strengths of each movement’s strategies, as well as the limits of each movement’s strategies. By integrating the role of different strategies for change, particularly the contrasting “inside” and “outside” strategies, I demonstrate that both movements make significant, but limited, impacts on changing the international agricultural trade regime.

By taking up an “outside”, contentious politics approach, the food sovereignty movement has created unprecedented space for the direct voice of peasants in global governance of agriculture and trade. The FSM has shown flexibility in United Nations arenas, where the movement has taken more of an inside strategy and has demonstrated short-term compromises on their ideal outcomes in order to achieve certain outcomes. However, the movement refuses, explicitly, to be flexible in response to governance of trade in food and agricultural products. This, I argue, is a limited strategy for change. The literature on contentious politics demonstrates that such politics serves to forge opportunities where none exists. I demonstrate empirically that the food sovereignty movement has forged opportunities to have a voice at the WTO at a time when the WTO negotiations are stalling under pressure from members for increased agricultural policy space – a key demand of the FSM. But the food sovereignty movement refuses any opportunity to negotiate with the WTO, based on a rejection that the institution can change, and this informs their actions. This raises concerns about how much the movement can impact governance of agricultural trade, and achieve the goals they seek. While the movement may not consider these opportunities acceptable, I demonstrate that neither does it provide a practical account of what sort of realistic opportunities it does seek, problematizing that the movement’s goals are more principled than practical.

By taking up an “inside”, collaborative strategy, the fair trade network has helped shift norms away from the pursuit of “free” trade towards “fairer” trade, have expanded awareness of the impacts of the international agricultural trade regime, have increasingly engaged in political advocacy at the local, national and European level, in addition to having worked to increase markets for producers seeking more stable and remunerative livelihoods. Members in the network admit they have shaped their strategy based on the perceived available opportunities, and have not made significant efforts to challenge closed opportunities. The acknowledgement by the movement that there are few opportunities to shape trade at the international level indicates a need for a strategy of contentious politics, to forge opportunities where none exist. Meanwhile, opportunities at the global level, such as in the reformed Committee on World Food Security at the FAO, the Comprehensive Framework for Action and the GAFSP, are relevant to the livelihoods producers, as well as at the WTO, at the very least in support of the G33 countries pursuing more agricultural policy space. Yet the movement has not prioritized engaging these spaces. Overall, it appears the network lacks an awareness of its potential to impact governance of agricultural trade at the global level, and the potential for these opportunities to achieve fair trade goals.
My research also demonstrates that both movements expressed resource constraints as impacting what activities they are capable of taking up. I argue that these strategies are also motivated in part by the interests of different producer groups – the peasantry for food sovereignty, and small-scale commodity exporters for fair trade. Food sovereignty emerged prioritizing local markets and resisting neoliberal globalization for its impacts on peasants and indigenous producers. The movement’s decision to pursue resistance at the WTO was a democratic compromise between those who sought radical destruction of the organization and those who sought to negotiate (and take up some flexibility) where opportunity presented. Fair trade’s pursuit of markets meanwhile has less to do with an ideology favouring market-led governance as much as it is born of the immediate needs of many of its producers, and the limits of political opportunity that came with the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s. Each movement’s strategy is shaped in part by the market and production interests of these different producer groups.

It is not clear that the limits to each movements’ strategy are always their weakness. It is odd that academics tend to analyze movements and organizations in isolation from a larger network of organizations and movements pursuing similar goals. On one hand, both movements have limited human and financial resources from which they can operationalize a strategy. Expecting a movement to embody a perfected strategy can be just as ideological as seeking binary change. Furthermore, both movements attempt to represent and reconcile a complex range of producer interests and motivations. This adds complexity to how each movement develops and operationalizes their strategy. On the other, I question whether it is ideal, strategically, for a moment to embody all facets of change, and whether it is not more strategic for movements to work in tandem through different strategies. A movement such as the food sovereignty movement could maintain its radical resistance from the outside, while a movement like fair trade could use its political legitimacy to operationalize the opportunities on the inside emergent from an outside strategy. I have argued here that these two movements are more complementary than competing. While the food sovereignty movement maintains its position of resistance at the WTO, the fair trade movement could be poised to step in to negotiate similar principles to food sovereignty, as an accredited and respected “inside” voice in policy.

I would posit here, though this is explicitly not (yet) an academic observation, that more thought on the practicalities and strategizing on the effective processes to bring about progressive change is necessary. If academic analysis is too tied to ideals and not enough to practice, it lends to divisions within the left. This is not to silence criticism. But there is a danger, in critiques that target the activities and strategies of movements that are rooted in ideal outcomes rather than theories of change. Politics is messy, humanity beautiful but also beastly, and change an ever-present condition and challenge.

**Future Research**

This dissertation points to several areas for future research. The framework of analysis that I have developed here is applied only to the strategies of each movement, but would benefit from a systematic examination of the impacts of each movement on changing the international agricultural trade regime. As stated in the introduction, this study sought only to use the theoretical framework for analysis; but like any framework, it would benefit from future analysis that would serve to test and hone the framework.
Further research can also provide a better understanding of whether and with what impacts movements or organizations can transition from an “inside” to an “outside” strategy. That is, if fair trade shifted from an inside strategy to an outside strategy in response to limited political opportunities for change, would that result in a limited capability to continue, or in a return to its inside strategy?

The most urgent outstanding research is an improved understanding of the market and production decisions of small-scale producers in developing countries. This is particularly important for social movement analysis, as the literature already strongly disputes claims of representation. Leaders from farmer organizations are often taking leadership in movement engagement; producers themselves can be even further removed from representation. We know already there is disjuncture between movement and producer objectives within both movements. Before the international agricultural trade regime can be properly changed, it is necessary to have a stronger and more systematic understanding of the desires of those it is being changed for, so any transformational change best represents the range of interests of small-scale producers in developing countries.
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