Seleukos IV Philopator
by
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Author’s Declaration

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to prove that Seleukos IV Philopator was a competent ruler after the death of his father and throughout his peaceful 12 year reign. Seleukos was a king who led a successful reign and led the Seleukid Empire through a challenging time of recovery and rebuilding, undeserving of any neglect or negative reputation he receives in both the primary and secondary source material. Although there are few pieces of information which directly address Seleukos, what does remain in the literary, numismatic, and epigraphic evidence supports that he was an active and prudent ruler. Contrary to the inactivity and weakness he is accused of, Seleukos did not follow the treaty of Apameia, he was able to manage the internal affairs of his kingdom, and he developed a robust foreign policy to take part in international politics. Although he is often seen only in the shadow of his father and brother, Seleukos’ reign was an important and vital part of Seleukid history.
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Chapter I: Introduction

“The reference is to the Seleukos surnamed Philopator, the son of Antiochos the Great, who performed no deeds worthy of Syria or of his father in his reign, but perished ingloriously without fighting a single battle.”

“[Seleukos] fait un peu pâle figure entre son père Antiochos III et son frère cadet Antiochos IV”

Above, St. Jerome and Édouard Will respectively serve to demonstrate the essence of general opinions on the Seleukid monarch Seleukos IV Philopator. Indeed the reputation of Seleukos is less notable in comparison to his namesake founder of the Seleukid kingdom, his own famous father, and even his infamous younger brother; however, unlike these other three Seleukid kings, much less about Seleukos has been transmitted to modern scholars concerning his life and reign. This in turn leaves modern scholarship largely at the mercy of ancient historians who, feeling that his reign was less than ideal for a Hellenistic ruler or writing from the perspective of Roman influence, wrote with little to no interest in Seleukos. These factors were further exacerbated by those grandiose reigns which bookended his own. The primary source depictions (or lack thereof) will be discussed below. The questions which remain are as follows: what was happening under the reign of Seleukos IV and is the opinion that he was a lazy and unsuccessful ruler justified? Can a ruler who reigned alone for twelve straight years, from 187-175 BCE, with no major conflict or highlighted problems be considered a failure?  

Although his reign was perhaps not the most obviously active, negative opinions have unfairly been applied to Seleukos. Certainly it is true that he was not responsible for any great

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1 Jerome In Danielem 11.20, in reference to the quote “And there shall stand up in his place one most vile and unworthy of kingly honor, and in a few days he shall be destroyed, not in rage nor in a battle.”, and Will 1982, 254. Unless stated otherwise, “Seleukos” will refer to Seleukos IV.

2 All subsequent dates will be in BCE.
expansion of the Seleukid Empire, nor was he particularly known for any great battles, but his positive qualities are often overlooked by ancient and modern historians alike. Seleukos IV Philopator was not the inactive and lazy king which he is often portrayed to be; although challenged by the circumstances in which he was ruling after the battle of Magnesia and the subsequent treaty of Apameia, he successfully governed the Seleukid Empire through the resulting hardships and maintained his political positioning by rebuilding foreign relationships and rehabilitating a defeated kingdom. Limited as he was in some aspects of his ability to act as a king, he was able to hold together his inheritance through deft governing of a reduced kingdom and maintaining peace so that an important period of recovery was able to take place. One wonders whether Seleukos understood the challenges under which he would be forced to command his kingdom, and whether or not he thought that he was a successful paradigm of a Seleukid, or even a Hellenistic, king.

This thesis will examine the life and reign of Seleukos in several areas key to understanding his time as king. It will begin with an overview of the Seleukid war against Rome and her allies, Antiochos III Megas’ campaign to reclaim Seleukos I’s vast empire, and the entrance of Seleukos IV into some prominence during that conflict. This conflict leads directly to the treaty of Apameia, where the conditions and the effects of the treaty will be discussed, followed by whether or not the treaty itself was legally valid for Seleukos’ reign. It will then move to discussion of internal affairs of the Seleukid Empire at the time, the aspects of Seleukos’ rule which happened within his domain, such as the kingdom’s economy and his religious considerations. Next, the external affairs of the kingdom will be presented, especially focused on foreign policy and relations, with a discussion of Seleukos’ lack of military action. The final thing to be examined will be the death of Seleukos and the state of the Seleukid throne in the years following his passing.
As already mentioned, Seleukos himself is largely a neglected figure in most ancient and modern scholarship; very little information is written on him in the remaining primary sources (both literary, epigraphic, and numismatic) which in turn creates difficulties in the modern study of him. Perhaps the paucity of primary sources led to modern scholars judging Seleukos similarly to the ancient ones as being unimportant, perhaps because after the reign of Antiochos III the next major events in the Seleukid kingdom happen under Antiochos IV. This perhaps made Seleukos that much easier to overlook and less interesting for directed attention. The primary sources on Seleukos are generally negative due to the fact that he did not fit an aggressive kingly persona. Furthermore, because many of the sources were directed to studies of things other than Seleukos, he appears primarily only in minor ways. This point is also relevant for modern scholarship.

Among the primary historical sources, Seleukos held a firm reputation for excessive caution, weakness, and inactivity. This is certainly displayed in the quote of Jerome above, who directly calls him an unworthy heir. Jerome’s own view of the Seleukids was very much influenced by the Bible which he is analyzing, and therefore by its Jewish viewpoint which was not always positive towards their Hellenistic rulers and certainly was affected negatively during the late reign of Seleukos and under his successor. It is also worth mentioning that Jerome is a fairly late source for this period, writing in the late 4th century CE. Similarly to Jerome, the books of Maccabees (I and II, both composed in the late second century BCE) provide some information about Seleukos and the Seleukids, though this information is of course biased especially considering the Jewish Revolt and the leader for which the books are named. Polybios is one of the closest contemporary

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3 Gruen 1984, 644.
4 Some discussion of the Jewish people and the rule of Antiochus III, Seleukos IV, and Antiochus IV can be found below.
5 I Macc was probably written between 135-104, in Hebrew or Aramaic. II Macc has a more complex origin, originally written in 5 books by Jason of Cyrene, which was subsequently epitomized, and then again edited with the addition of two letters (the first of which is dated to 142); see Austin 2006, 216 and Ehling 2008, 54-8.
literary sources to address Seleukos, writing in the same century in which Seleukos lived. However, if any direct comment on the character or ability of Seleukos was made in Polybios, it does not survive in what has been transmitted of his work until today. The same is true of Livy, who used Polybios as a source for his own historical writings, though both he and Polybios mention Seleukos largely as an agent in the events of others rather than treating him as a lead player or commenting as other ancient authors do. Justin, who writes moralizing history through epitomizing Trogus, moves right past Seleukos IV’s entire reign, jumping from the death of Antiochos III to Antiochos IV’s invasion of Egypt two books later. Given the lack of exciting events in Seleukid Asia during this time it is not entirely surprising that Justin does this. Finally, Appian claims that Seleukos was feeble in his reign and had no success because of his father’s misfortune. Interestingly, he does not entirely blame Seleukos himself as a cause for the creation of the negative opinions, but rather the circumstances of his rule, more similarly to the opinions of modern scholars discussed below. Appian also writes a more compressed version of events compared to Polybios and Livy.

Why might the ancient authors have viewed Seleukos in this way? Many were writing from a Roman or pro-Roman viewpoint, for one. Errington also attributes this view to being formed as a result of the kingdom having to pay an indemnity to Rome, and indemnity which “hindered virtually every political initiative that might have interested contemporary historians”; this in turn led to the characterization of Seleukos as weak and lacking in initiative. It may be partially true that the indemnity caused some trouble, however it is not entirely clear that the indemnity was

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6 Just. 32.2 and 34.2 respectively. Justin also fails to mention even Perseus’ wedding to Seleukos’ daughter Laodike. The Prologi of Trogus (XXXII) mentions the death of Seleukos and his replacement by Antiochos (IV), which Justin also does not include in his narrative: “Mortuo Seleuco filio Magni Antiochi successit regno frater Antiochus.”

7 App. Syr. 66; See Appendix B1 for Appian and Josephus text.

crippling to any plans which Seleukos may have had. Certainly kings were expected to be wealthy, a poor king was a contradiction in terms. The power of the Ptolemies is often related to money and income, and the same applied to Seleukos’ successor Antiochos IV when he paraded his wealth and power at Daphne in 166. Wealth enabled kings to employ troops and acquire booty; it also allowed them acquire and control territory, which in turn financed military power.⁹

Furthermore, perhaps more importantly, kings were associated very much with strength; as was the case with wealth, a weak king was a contradiction. In their addresses to their armies at Raphia in 217, both Antiochos III and Ptolemy VI, since neither had yet won a major victory due to their recent ascension to kingship, were forced to refer to their ancestors’ victories to motivate their troops.¹⁰ Hellenistic kings were expected to take personal command of major military campaigns and lead the royal forces. As a result, royal status often derived from first instances of military success instead of solely through descent or wealth, especially in the Seleukid dynasty where “the chief business is assumed to be war.”¹¹ Polybios directly points to the fact that courage and ability in war are two hallmarks of a successful king and later gives examples of the courage of Antiochos III.¹² There is also an inscription extant which praises Antiochos I for being “avid for battle”, again consistent with this assumed role of Hellenistic kings.¹³ All of the major growth or contractions of the Seleukid Empire were related to military events, and since Seleukos had no

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⁹ Austin 1986, 459-60.
¹⁰ Ibid; Polyb. 5.83.
¹¹ Austin 2005, 125; Eckstein 2006, 82-3, 88; Antiochos III’s anabasis campaign was what made him worthy of royalty, not only to those in Asia but those in Europe as well.
¹² Polyb. 4.77.3; Antiochos’ courage in Polyb. 11.34.14-16; Ptolemy IV wanted peace so Polybios shows him some contempt in 5.87.3, although he had shown his willingness to fight already at Polyb. 5.85, and even Antiochos became an object of criticism for Polybios when he seemed to back down from larger ambitions at Polyb. 15.37, cf. App. Syr. 28; see Eckstein 2006, 88.
¹³ Austin 2006 159 = OGIS 219, an inscription dedicated by Ilium in honour of his ascension, which may rather have been for Antiochos III.
major military actions during his reign he was then relegated to a lesser status.\textsuperscript{14} Bad kings were seen as immobile, lazy, prisoners of the palace, and because Seleukos appeared to fit this mold it formed his poor reputation, a reputation which was not unlike that which was given to Demetrios I, Alexander I Balas, or Antiochos IX Cyzicenus.\textsuperscript{15} Seleukos’ reputation is further hurt by the fact that only he and Antiochos II were Seleukid kings who died in their palaces, adding to the image of an inactive king not leaving his home.\textsuperscript{16}

Modern scholars, on the other hand, are largely divided on the opinion of Appian, acknowledging that he may not have been a brilliant king but he would have been unable to act any way other than he did.\textsuperscript{17} It seems that the majority of modern scholars hold a somewhat middling view of the contribution of Seleukos to the Seleukid Empire. Few outright proclaim him as a poor king but few give him very much attention or speak highly of him, which is not unexpected considering the scarcity of primary sources. Modern views may be divided into four categories: those who neglect Seleukos, those who are entirely negative about him, the majority who are ambivalent, and the minority who take a rather positive view. From authors who neglected Seleukos whenever he is mentioned it is primarily to discuss another historical character in relation, as is the case in Grainger (2017) and Walbank (1993), in whose works Seleukos is very seldom mentioned, or Bar-Kochva (1976), where Seleukos is not mentioned at all. The second category contains those authors who are entirely negative towards Seleukos; a good example of

\textsuperscript{14} Examples: Ipsos in 301, and then Koroupedion in 282 for gain of Asia Minor by Seleukos I. Antiochos III’s victory at Panion for gain of Koile Syria and Phoenicia, or his defeat at Magnesia for losing Asia Minor. The defeat of Antiochos VII in 130-29 for loss of the east. See Austin 2005, 125; Walbank 1993, 124.
\textsuperscript{15} Kosmin 2014, 176.
\textsuperscript{16} Kosmin 2014, 144.
\textsuperscript{17} Le Rider 1993, 49; See below for specific discussion.
this is Hölbl in writing his history of the Ptolemaic dynasty when he says that Antiochos III was “succeeded by a weak king”.18

The largest category of modern scholars addressed here are those who believe that Seleukos was an average king dealing with difficult circumstances. These authors often adduce competency as a military commander in the field; generally they look to the period of conflict with the Romans before his time as king, given the lack of evidence for conflict during his own reign.19 Gruen points to the fact that Seleukos was ruling in difficult circumstances although he still wished to rule as did his forebears.20 Another opinion very common among scholars is that it was appropriate for Seleukos to have been content with curbing any personal ambitions and presiding over the necessary recovery of the kingdom after the devastation of defeat by the Romans. Thus his reign represented a strange period of peace for the Seleukids.21 His focus on rebuilding and paying the indemnity and the resulting restraint led to Seleukos’ ill-gotten reputation as a weak ruler, gaining for himself little prominence, and leaving little mark on history.22 Still, many of these authors put a proportionately greater weight on what evidence remains since there is so little of it. These authors present a more robust image, pieced together from consolidating a variety of sources, which is often less a feeble and idle one than the commonly depicted Seleukos.23 The final category, those with an entirely positive opinion of Seleukos’ reign, is almost solely represented by Rostovtzeff, who claims that the spectacular revival of the Seleukids under Antiochos III

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18 Hölbl 2001, 141.
19 Mørkholm 1966, 32; Grainger 1997, 64; Bevan 1966, 120.
20 Gruen 1984, 644; Mørkholm 1966, 32.
22 Kosmin 2014, 21; Bevan 1966, 120; Gruen 1984, 644; Seleukos eventually abandoned paying the indemnity, see further discussion below.
“continued, despite Roman victory against Antiochos, under his successors Seleukos IV and Antiochos IV.”

One can see from the opinions in both the primary and secondary literature that there is hardly a unanimous opinion of what value Seleukos brought to the dynasty. It will be argued that Seleukos was a competent and prudent king, and he carried forward the work of Antiochos III. In order to understand the reign of Seleukos, and the circumstances under which his reign was constrained, one must begin with the final years of Antiochos III Megas.

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24 Rostovtzeff 1964, 841.
Chapter II: Antiochos III and the Future Seleukos IV: Before 187

It is challenging to place Seleukos’ birthdate precisely. Grainger believes that Antiochos III’s earliest child was not born before 220/119, a son who would be Antiochos (sometimes given the epithet “Neos” and also known as Antiochos the Son). Mørkholm places Seleukos’ birth sometime after that between 219 and 215. He was the son of Laodike, who was a daughter of Mithridates II of Pontus and was married to his father Antiochos III in 221, shortly after his succession to the Seleukid throne in 223. Seleukos had at least five siblings: two brothers, the aforementioned Antiochos the Son and his younger brother Antiochos (later IV), and three sisters, Kleopatra, Antiochis, and Laodike, who was also his wife. His primarily used epithet is Philopator, presumably for acknowledgement of his father’s illustrious reign, however Josephus gives an alternate epithet for Seleukos as “Soter”.

Antiochos III Megas is known today for his aggressive expansion of the Seleukid kingdom, which, through attempting to reestablish the size it had reached at the end of Seleukos I’s rule, eventually brought him into direct conflict with the Romans. Antiochos unleashed the Fifth Syrian War in 202 in Koile Syria and Phoenicia when he swept through that area in 202/1 and crushed the Ptolemaic forces in 200/199 at the battle of Panion, near the headwaters of the Jordan River. Rome advised him not to invade Egypt and instead he spent 198 subjugating Koile Syria and Phoenicia at his leisure. Rome’s relations with the east had intensified significantly after the Second Punic War when they were able to direct a larger amount of their efforts there. This resulted

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25 Grainger 2017, 112; Mørkholm 1966, 32.
26 Kosmin 2014, 136; for more information of the lineage of Seleukos, see appendix A.
27 Grainger 1997, 63; this list may not be exhaustive. More on Laodike as Seleukos’ wife below.
28 Josephus AJ 12.223; this is perhaps a conflation with Seleukos III Soter (Keraunos) or even Demetrios I Soter, as Seleukos IV is not called this anywhere else. This must also be the correct Seleukos, since he is both referenced as being the son of Antiochos Megas at 12.223 and the brother of Antiochos Epiphanes at 12.234.
in stronger connections with both the Seleukid and the Ptolemaic kingdoms through increased Roman involvement in Greece and Macedonia after 200.\(^\text{31}\)

In order to understand the context for Seulekos’ rule, it is first important to know of Antiochos III’s war against Rome during the 190s. During the spring of 197 Antiochos embarked on an expedition to restore Seleukid rule to Asia Minor. He was successful in regaining influence in many regions, including taking land from Philip V and Ptolemy V while also applying pressure to the independent Greek cities along the Ionian coast.\(^\text{32}\) At the same time a land army commanded by two of his sons and two generals, Ardys and Mithridates, set out towards Asia Minor to assist in this campaign.\(^\text{33}\) In 196, both Eumenes II of Pergamon and Antiochos sent envoys to T. Quinctius Flamininus at Corinth, seeking to gain sympathy from a then uncommitted Rome.\(^\text{34}\) He crossed the Hellespont in 196 and seized several cities along the way, including an abandoned Lysimacheia.\(^\text{35}\) Rome came to mediate between Antiochos and Ptolemy, and ordered him to evacuate all that he had taken from Philip and Ptolemy.\(^\text{36}\) Rome initially avoided making and direct interference into the affair since Antiochos was an acknowledged *amicus* of the Roman republic, but eventually the idea of a Seleukid king in Europe worried the senate and pushed the Romans to action.\(^\text{37}\)

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\(^{31}\) Gera 1998, 50.

\(^{32}\) Livy 33.19.8-11; Gera 1998, 73; Ma 2000, 87; Grainger 2002, 83-4; Hansen 1971, 74; he was notably unable to capture either Smyrna or Lampsakos, who appealed to Rome while he wintered in Ephesos, see Hansen 1971.

\(^{33}\) Livy 33.19; Antiochos had no son named Ardy, so these two names could constitute both of the generals or it could be one general and Antiochos IV, sometimes named Mithridates; it seems more likely that it is the two generals since in Polybios since he calls Antiochos IV “Antiochos the youngest son” at 16.18.6 and again at 16.19.10 where he is in charge of some cavalry. It may have been Seleukos (IV) and Antiochos (IV) with that army, their youth explaining the need for generals, see Ma 2000, 87.

\(^{34}\) Hansen 1971, 75.

\(^{35}\) Livy 33.38.8-14; Polyb. 18.49.2; App. Syr. 1; Hansen 1971, 75; Gera 1998, 76-66; Green 1990, 304.

\(^{36}\) Ibid.; Gera 1998, 74; Grainger 2010, 274.

\(^{37}\) Livy 32.8.13 and 16, 32.27.1; Gruen 2014, 285; Gera 1998, 75; Burton 2011, 105-6; the origin of Roman *amicitia* with the Seleukids is unclear.
At the aforementioned meeting with Rome, which was either in 196 or 195, in addition to demanding he return land the Romans also issued a demand that he not to cross the Hellespont with an army; Antiochos refused to comply, claimed that he had no intention of attacking Rome and did not interfere in Italy, and was questioning why the Romans thought they had a right to interfere in his ancestral claim to Thrace as spear won land taken by Seleukos I at the battle of Koroupedion. Antiochos also announced to the Romans that he was just about to conclude a treaty of friendship with his adversary Ptolemy, though how far along this process was at the time is unclear.

Seleukos was a prominent figure in this campaign, both as a commander and as a representative of his father’s rule while governing Thrace. Furthermore, with Seleukos’ army Antiochos was able to assert substantial control over Asia Minor before Magnesia. He first appears as the motivation for Antiochos’ decision to rebuild Lysimacheia: Antiochos was setting it up as a European capital for Seleukos to rule over, after he hunted down the barbarians who had pillaged it and retrieved its citizens. Grainger identifies the restoration of Lysimacheia as perhaps the opening action leading into the restoration of Lysimachos’ kingdom, which certainly aligns with Antiochos’ claims to be interested in ancestral spear-won lands. Antiochos spent some time rebuilding and recuperating Lysimacheia, and after 195 he left Seleukos in charge of the city as he quietly went southward after hearing false rumors about the death of Ptolemy V. The

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38 Polyb. 18.49-52; Livy 33.29.1-43.3; App. Syr. 3; Will 1982, 159; Green 1990, 304; Gera 1998, 77, 82; Grainger 2002, 84; Bevan 1966, 51; Austin 2006 196.
39 Hölbl 2001, 140.
40 Ma 2000, 93, who specifies ‘cis-Tauric’ Asia Minor.
41 Polyb. 18.51.7; Livy 33.40; Capdetrey 2007, 214, 370; Grainger 2002, 95, 100; he was probably to be left at Lysimacheia with professional administrators to help him, as he was around 20 years old at this time.
42 Grainger 2002, 71.
reestablishment of Lysimacheia constitutes the beginning what Will refers to as “guerre froide” between the Seleukids and the Romans at Lysimacheia.\textsuperscript{43}

An important event which happened during this time was the death of Seleukos’ older brother Antiochos the Son during the summer of 193 by poisoning, who was until then the co-ruler, in Syria before his journey eastwards to govern the upper satrapies.\textsuperscript{44} This left Seleukos to the elevation of co-rule of the kingdom with his father. Seleukos’ brother Antiochos the Son was born around 220, first appears in the records during Antiochos’ eastern campaign, and fought at Panion; he became co-regent with his father in 210 and married his sister Laodike IV.\textsuperscript{45} Antiochos learned of the death of his first born son during a meeting with P. Villius Tappulus.\textsuperscript{46} With Antiochos the Son gone, it is not unreasonable to think that Seleukos’ role under his father during the war against the Romans was the result of extra responsibilities and duties to fill the position his brother had previously occupied.

Antiochos crossed the Aegean to be commander-in-chief of the Aetolian League on their offer of the position.\textsuperscript{47} However, this expedition to Greece would end in massive failure for Antiochos. He was defeated at Thermopylae in 191 by Roman forces and was forced to retreat back to Asia Minor, before the final battle at Magnesia.\textsuperscript{48} It is from Seleukos’ actions below during the war with Rome that one is able to see that Seleukos had the ability to be a successful military commander and was also deemed capable by his father to govern.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{43} App. Syr. 4; Will 1982, 160; Eckstein 2006, 292.
\textsuperscript{44} Livy 35.15, which also reports that Antiochos himself had his son murdered, though this seems unlikely. A Babylonian king list gives his death in 119 SE = 193, Sachs and Wiseman 1954 (Babylonian King List), 208; Will 1982, 167; Taylor 2013, 109; Grainger 1997, 63-4; Grainger 2002, 157; Ma 2000, 93.
\textsuperscript{45} App. Syr. 4; Polybios 18.8; Bar-Kochva 1976, 151; Mørkholm 1966, 38; Houghton and Lorber 2008, 1; Sachs and Wiseman 1954, 207; Ma 2000, 93.
\textsuperscript{46} Livy 35.15.2.
\textsuperscript{47} App. Syr. 12; Hansen 1971, 77.
\textsuperscript{48} Livy 36.15-32; App. Syr. 17-20; Diod. 22.3; Briscoe 1981, 241-251; Hansen 1971, 78.
\textsuperscript{49} It is possible that Seleukos only had a nominal leadership role in this campaign, and that the effective command was given to a more experienced general, see Coşkun 2016 for full discussion of this subject.
In 191/0, presumably after the defeat at Thermopylae, Antiochos recalled Seleukos from Lysimacheia and stationed him in Aeolis at the head of an armed force, threatening Phokaia, the naval base of Elaia, and the Roman base at Kanai. Although Eumenes and the Romans raided around him, he did not move his army.\(^\text{50}\) From this position Seleukos was able to successfully reverse the political situation in Phokaia where the population was divided into two factions: the oligarchs who wanted to support Rome, and the democrats who wanted to support the Seleukids.\(^\text{51}\) By reversing the situation at Phokaia he showed that he possessed some measure of political acumen. The direct presence of Seleukos undoubtedly helped his cause. When a delegation of pro-Romans and pro-Seleukids came to meet with him, Seleukos simply moved his army closer and eventually swayed the city to his side; this in turn brought other cities to the Seleukids, such as Syme.\(^\text{52}\) Seleukos kept the army with him through the winter in Aeolis, attempted to take the harbor at Elaia, and began to ravage the countryside around Pergamon. Eventually Antiochos joined him from Apameia with Galatian mercenaries; they were able to successfully hurt Eumenes’ food supplies. An attempted peace negotiation at Elaia failed.\(^\text{53}\)

They then further attacked Elaia and Pergamon itself, blockading the former, though they were careful not to trap themselves in a costly and time-consuming siege.\(^\text{54}\) In 190 the Romans again met with Antiochos, but he again rejected their terms and Seleukos continued the blockade while Antiochos marched north to secure control of the Hellespont.\(^\text{55}\) Seleukos continued plundering, but was forced to retreat from his attacks on Pergamon and withdrew entirely from

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\(^\text{50}\) Livy 37.8.5-7; Hansen 1971, 80; Bevan 1966, 94-5; Briscoe 1981, 303-4; Grainger 2002, 268: this force was probably fairly small, but sufficient to maintain Seleukid presence along the coastlands around Phokaia and maintain pressure on the cities there, though likely not more than that.

\(^\text{51}\) Livy 37.8-9.

\(^\text{52}\) Livy 37.9.1-4; Polyb. 21.6; Briscoe 1981, 304; Grainger 2002, 268; Bevan 1966, 96; Walbank 1979, 170: Phokaia would eventually be sacked by Rome for its defection to Antiochos, despite promises against this.

\(^\text{53}\) Hansen 1971, 83.


\(^\text{55}\) Grainger 2002, 295.
Attalid territory; he was blocked from the city by a corps of Achaians, under a certain stratēgos Diophanes, which had arrived to help the Attalids, though the exact extent of their success is likely to have been somewhat exaggerated by the patriotic Polybios.\(^ {56} \) Despite the Seleukid efforts, the Romans had been able to come to Asia Minor to confront them. Antiochos tried to stop the Romans by offering to give up his claim to European cities, any friends of Rome, and also to pay for half of the Roman war expenditure, but the Scipios rejected his offer and pushed on to Magnesia.\(^ {57} \)

The war between the Romans and the Seleukids came to an end at Magnesia-on-Sipylos in late 190 or early 189.\(^ {58} \) Antiochos in kingly fashion commanded the right wing of the Seleukid battle line himself, while Seleukos, acting as a second-in-command for his father, and his cousin Antipatros commanded the left wing comprised of mixed troops directly opposite Eumenes and his Achaian allies.\(^ {59} \) Antiochos ordered Seleukos to begin the battle, since the Seleukid left wing greatly outflanked the right of the Roman alliance, but Eumenes was familiar with Asian fighting techniques and was able to take advantage of confusion in the attack. Opposing missile fire scattered Seleukos’ camels, which in turn threw the cavalry arrangements into disarray. The chariots were unable to create a charge, they became vulnerable to flanking maneuvers, and Eumenes was able to break the line. While Antiochos had success on the right he did not wheel

\(^ {56} \) Polyb. 21.9; Livy 37.20.1-21.4; App. Syr. 26; Hansen 1971, 84; Evans 2012, 32; Briscoe 1981, 321-2; Will 1982, 178.

\(^ {57} \) Gera 1998, 90; the famous Scipios, L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus, consul of 191 and so named for this victory, and his brother P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, a legate in this expedition for the former, referred to collectively as the “Scipios” henceforth.

\(^ {58} \) Scullard 2003, 269; Will 1982, 180; Mørkholm 1966, 22; Mørkholm places the date in late 190, while Will places it more specifically in January of 189.

\(^ {59} \) Livy 37.40-41 = Austin 2006 203; App. Syr. 45; Grainger 2002, 320, 324; Pietykowski 2009, 214; Errington 2009, 220; Briscoe 1981, 348-351; Seleukos’ wing consisted of, among other things, 2000 Cappadocians armed in the Galatian style, 2700 light infantry, 3000 cataphracts, 1000 companion cavalry, and 2500 Galatian cavalry with a small force of Tarentine horsemen. This also included charioteers, which were new to the Seleukid lines, and camel archers.
back and support the left, recreating the same mistake which had cost him the battle at Raphia in 217.\(^{60}\)

It is difficult to disagree with Will’s analysis that it was a definitive disaster for Antiochos, who was “put to flight like Darius III” to Sardeis as he collected others; upon arriving at Sardeis he learned that Seleukos had survived and was on the way to Apameia likely together with high ranking courtiers.\(^{61}\) The Romans did capture Antipatros and Zeuxis, one of the commanders of the center of the Seleukid line, and re-issued their initial conditions for truce which included: the renunciation of Antiochos’ claim on Thrace, the evacuation of Asia Minor from the line of the Taurus Mountains, a 15000 talent indemnity, 20 hostages, and the surrender of several important people including Hannibal, who had been advising Antiochos throughout the war.\(^{62}\) Antiochos retreated back behind friendly borders into Syria, while he left Seleukos behind in charge of Asia with an army of unknown size, although it was likely not negligible. The fact that Seleukos was left behind there may suggest that Antiochos planned to gather more troops over the course of 189 if the Romans continued to insist on their stringent terms.\(^{63}\) In spite of Antiochos’ possible hopes, the Seleukids were forced in the end to accept the Roman terms; this victory ended the ‘Antiochene’ war for the Romans and made them the supreme arbiters of Asia Minor.\(^{64}\)

One of the conditions of the truce was that Antiochos would supply Gn. Manlius Vulso with grain and supplies for a campaign that he was about to undertake against the Galatian tribes in Asia Minor, the delivery of which Antiochos assigned to Seleukos. He brought the grain to Antiocheia-on-Menander where the Romans were camped and delivered them to Vulso but refused

\(^{60}\) Grainger 2002, 325; Pietrykowski 2009, 215-17; Scullard 2003, 270; Bevan 1966, 110. For a complete analysis of the battle, line composition, and Antiochos’ strategy see also Bar-Kochva 1979, 163-173.

\(^{61}\) Livy 37.44.5-7; App. Syr. 36; Will 1982, 181; Grainger 2002, 329; Scullard 2003, 270.


\(^{63}\) Grainger 2002, 342.

\(^{64}\) Mørkholm 1966, 22; Gruen 2014, 282, 286.
to give any to the Pergamene troops there, citing that his father had agreed “to help only the Romans.” Vulso insisted that Seleukos supply the Pergamenes as well, and forbade any Roman from taking from the grain until the Pergamenes had gotten a share.\(^65\) Even this early on one can see the hostility which Seleukos continued to hold against Pergamon, and Rome as well, which will become a large part of his foreign policy later in life. The grain transfer very likely depleted the stores which Seleukos had at Apameia, preventing him from keeping a large army nearby.\(^66\) Seleukos also provided guides to the Romans for their expedition to the interior of Asia Minor.\(^67\)

Livy suggests that Seleukos, the middle son, was given control of Lysimacheia in 196 in order to elevate him above his elder brother Antiochos the Son, but Taylor asserts that this is to be better understood as a grant to the son who was not intended to become king.\(^68\) After the defeat at Magnesia, one of Antiochos’ very first priorities was to consolidate the dynasty, and his eldest surviving son, Seleukos, became co-regent with him at least by 189.\(^69\) Assessing a date for the beginning of Antiochos and Seleukos’ co-rule is challenging because of the lack of evidence from Babylonian primary sources, and as such scholars are split on whether he was elevated soon after Antiochos the Son’s death (in 193) or later, in 189.\(^70\) Grainger argues that Seleukos became co-regent in 192 after the death of his brother, however he provides no conclusive evidence that

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\(^66\) Grainger 2002, 343-4.

\(^67\) Livy 38.15; Mørkholm 1966, 24.

\(^68\) Livy 35.15; Taylor 2013, 109.

\(^69\) Will 1982, 200; Mørkholm 1966, 32; Errington 2009, 223; Sachs and Hunger 1989 (Babylonian Astronomical Diaries), 188: 123 SE = 189, from Babylonian Astronomical Diaries, where it is first listed as “Kings Antiochos and Seleukos”; the earliest date for the co-rule is VII/14/123 SE = Oct. II, 189, see Parker and Dubberstein 1956, 22.

\(^70\) The argument for 189 largely rests on the fact that co-rule is not attested until that year; The Babylonian King List (Sachs and Wiseman 1954, 207-8) does not mention co-rule between Antiochos III and Seleukos and simply states the initial regnal year for Seleukos’ sole reign, though it does mention co-rule between Antiochos (III) and Antiochos (the Son) and Antiochos (IV) and Antiochos the son of Seleukos. Furthermore, The Babylonian Astronomical Diaries (Sachs and Hunger 1989, 295-325) mention no ruler(s) between SE 119 and 123 (193-189 BCE), being “[kings] Antiochos and A[ntiochos]” and “Kings Antiochos and Seleukos” respectively.
Seleukos was elevated to kingship at that time.\textsuperscript{71} Other scholars, such as Habicht, believe that Seleukos was not made co-regent until 189.\textsuperscript{72} If the latter is true, then there was a noticeable gap between the death of Antiochos the Son and Seleukos’ ascension in which Antiochos rules alone; perhaps Antiochos was too occupied with the war or too far from Seleukos to formally name him co-regent.\textsuperscript{73} It could be suggested that it was not until after defeat at Magnesia that Antiochos made the decision to promote his second son, and that he deliberately waited until after the terms of the treaty of Apameia were set in order that Seleukos would not be named in, and therefore bound by, the treaty.

\textsuperscript{71} Grainger 1997, 64, cites Sachs and Wiseman (1954) for the Babylonian King list, see above note.  
\textsuperscript{72} Habicht 1989, 338.  
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.; Habicht does not specify a reason for Antiochos’ delay in making Seleukos his co-ruler only in 189, and does not explain the gap after Antiochos the Son’s death.
Chapter III: The Treaty of Apameia, Death of Antiochos III, and Succession of Seleukos

The treaty of Apameia changed the Hellenistic east, where Rome became the predominant power. The naval disarmament clause made the Romans a dominant naval power in the east through their Pergamene and Rhodian allies, and the time which followed was one of frequent Roman interference.\(^{74}\) By contrast Seleukid power was somewhat reduced, and restricted to the eastern Mediterranean and Iran.\(^{75}\) Initially the problems created by Apameia were Antiochos’, however following his death they fell to his successor Seleukos. Will writes that Seleukos was paralyzed by the consequences of his father’s defeat but still did not resign.\(^{76}\) Seleukos certainly had a number of problems stemming from the Seleukid defeat by Rome, but he was not entirely as paralyzed as Will suggests.

The treaty of Apameia, which is reported in Polybios, Livy, and Appian,\(^{77}\) enshrined the demands originally made by P. Scipio on behalf of his brother immediately after Antiochos’ defeat at Magnesia, ratified first by the Roman senate then a second time at Apameia in 189/8.\(^{78}\) It is known that the Romans engraved the treaty on bronze tablets and placed them in their capital.\(^{79}\) The treaty was carefully designed to weaken the Seleukid Empire so that Roman interests would not be jeopardized in the future, and equally importantly to punish Antiochos for not complying with the initial Roman demands during the previous years.\(^{80}\) However, while Antiochos was left sovereign and not a vassal to Rome, the conflict left the Seleukid devoid of any western ambitions

\(^{74}\) Gruen 1984, 643: Implies that the treaty of Apameia rather stabilized the area and diminished the need for Roman interference.

\(^{75}\) Harris 1979, 223; Errington 2009, 222-3; Tarn and Griffith 1952, 28-29.

\(^{76}\) Will 1982, 255.

\(^{77}\) See Appendix B2 for Polyb. 21.42., Livy 38.38, and App. Syr. 38-9, where the full known terms are listed in these three authors; any primary source references to the terms of the treaty of Apameia henceforth will be generally to these three sources unless stated otherwise.

\(^{78}\) Livy 37.35, 37.45.11-18; Polyb. 21.17.3-8; Diod. 29.10; App. Syr. 38; Errington 2009, 223; Will 1982, 185; Le Rider 1993, 50; Gera 1998, 90; Mørkholm 1966, 22, 25; Briscoe 1981, 360-1.

\(^{79}\) App. Syr. 39; Le Rider 1993, 50.

\(^{80}\) Gera 1998, 92.
for the time being. Cut from the Aegean world, the empire became more strictly Asian than ever before. The rearrangement of Asia Minor favoured Pergamon and Rhodes; even if they did not become ‘clients’ of the Roman state in the sense that Badian once argued, the relationship with Rome was definitely one of benefaction and obligation at least as far as the Romans would have been concerned. This also meant that Roman patrocinium passed the Aegean and extended all the way to the Taurus Mountains.

The effects of the treaty were felt immediately in Syria, and while the terms were hard they were not crushing, though the great decrease of manpower, territory, and money led to a loss of prestige on the international political scene. Furthermore, the terms of the treaty were very one sided in nature: while the Seleukids had plenty of obligations, the Romans did not seem to reciprocate beyond pledging not to help each other’s enemies. Will divides the treaty into five categories of clauses including territorial, military, political, economic, and legal; Paltiel divides it into only three types: territorial, financial, and alliances. The latter model will be followed here. In short, the main conditions of the treaty were as follows: Antiochos was to withdraw from Asia Minor west of the Taurus, was forbidden a large navy, mercenary recruitment from Roman influenced areas, elephants, and certain political actions, and he was to pay an indemnity of 15000 talents, which, according to Harris, was “hardly to be called an indemnity.”

The treaty had many effects on Antiochos III’s kingdom, even before it was ratified by either side. Immediately after the first terms were set after Magnesia, Antiochos was required to

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81 Will 1982, 188.
82 The idea of foreign clientelae was first formalized by Badian (1958), see Ager 2009 and Burton 2003 for further discussion.
83 Will 1982, 297; Gruen 1984, 87.
84 Mørkholm 1966, 28.
85 Gera 1998, 95.
86 Will 1982, 186; Paltiel 1979a, 30-31.
87 Ibid.; Harris 1979, 223; McDonald 1967, 1; Gruen 2014 286; Bringmann 2007, 91, Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 214-15; Diodorus 29.10 reports only 5000 talents, contrary to the other sources.
surrender twenty political hostages which were to be exchanged every three years; among those hostages was the future Antiochos IV. These circumstances, along with the required payments, kept the Seleukids in an inferior position. In addition to demoting Seleukid power, the treaty sought to maintain a constant relationship between the two states. The treaty was concerned with the idea of state relations between the Romans and the Seleukids, with Polybios noting that it proclaimed friendship for all time between them; later in 173 Antiochos IV had his ambassador Apollonios renew this alliance and friendship.

Perhaps the most significant result of the treaty of Apameia was the loss of Seleukid territory in Asia Minor, where the war was ultimately decided and was essentially the entirety of the territory which changed hands as a result. This loss, firstly, separated the Seleukids from the cities in Asia Minor, removing any power which they could derive from them. Secondly, did to leave Asia Minor mean to withdraw physically from the geographical area, or does it mean to relinquish their intangible territorial claim? Polybios uses the verb ‘ἐκχωρεῖν’ to describe the withdrawal, which here has a double meaning to both physically leave and to relinquish claim, and Antiochos agreed to evacuate behind the Taurus. The purpose of the Roman terms was to prevent a resurgence of Seleukid power; they needed to deny Antiochos any point of strategic advantage in the western end of the Taurus range. A problem was that the ‘cistauric’ region was undefined with reference to the western end of the range.

The formerly Seleukid portions of Asia Minor were divided between Eumenes II and Rhodes, who both benefitted greatly from Rome’s generosity; the redistribution was meant to

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89 Livy 42.6.8; Le Rider 1993, 63; Gruen 1984, 86.
90 Habicht 1989, 324.
91 Capdetrey 2007, 224.
92 McDonald 1967, 2, 6-7; Mørkholm 1966, 22.
93 McDonald 1967, 2, 4.
create a balance of power and the territory was allegedly given as “gifts” to them from Rome, which took no territory for itself and did not yet establish a province east of the Adriatic. The Roman army and fleet were recalled completely to Italy.\textsuperscript{94} Eumenes was even awarded a part of Mysia which Prusias of Bithynia had previously taken from him and then still occupied, although the Scipios had guaranteed the inviolability of his kingdom in 190 for Prusias’ agreement to not side with Antiochos, a fact which would soon cause friction between these two kingdoms.\textsuperscript{95} Rome’s generous gift to Eumenes meant that he was left as a bulwark against future disturbances in the east, wedged between the Seleukids, Antigonids, Bithynia, Cappadocia, Galatia, and with Pontus nearby.\textsuperscript{96} Although their empire was reduced, despite the loss of Asia Minor the Seleukids still commanded a huge kingdom.\textsuperscript{97}

The indemnity clause is also one of the heavier terms which the Seleukids had to endure at this time, since it was inordinately large. Antiochos was ordered to pay the Roman war costs, which the Scipios estimated generously to be at 15000 Euboan talents of silver, broken down into 500 talents paid on the spot, another 2500 upon the ratification of the treaty, and an additional 12000 at equal installments yearly for twelve years, and furthermore they were to pay Eumenes 350 talents and an additional 127 talents in lieu of grain.\textsuperscript{98} The initial demand was not arbitrary as it was meant to reflect the Roman war costs. Although it was an exaggerated estimation and a very high amount, it was not enough to cause any provocation.\textsuperscript{99} This was another way in which the Romans were able to budget and limit the dangers which the Seleukids could pose; it is possible

\textsuperscript{94} Polyb. 21.45.10, 22.5.4, 25.4.5; Bringmann 2007, 96; Gera 1998, 95; Gruen 1984, 87; Burton 2011, 81, 197; more below on the division of Asia Minor to Eumenes.
\textsuperscript{95} Habicht 2006, 1-2.
\textsuperscript{96} Habicht 1989, 324-5; Scullard 2003, 272.
\textsuperscript{97} Grainger 2002, 352; Tarn and Griffith 1952, 29; more below on the size of the kingdom during Seleukos’ reign.
\textsuperscript{98} Polyb. 21.42.20-21; Livy 38.38; Le Rider 1993, 50; Gera 1998, 90; Errington 2009, 223.
\textsuperscript{99} Le Rider 1993, 63; Mørkholm 1966, 22.
that they estimated the potential of the kingdom with input from Pergamon and Rhodes before specifying the amount. Compared to other recent indemnities which Rome imposed Antiochos’ was huge. It was both larger and due more quickly than any of its contemporaries and placed the Seleukids at a huge disadvantage, likely purposely, to Roman allies in the area.\footnote{100} This indemnity was also a way in which the Romans could test Seleukid allegiance over an extended period of time, giving them the ability to assess political developments within the empire and to gain some external control.\footnote{101} Derow remarks that the war against Antiochos was the most profitable up to that point for the Romans, and the massive influx of money forever altered their economy.\footnote{102}

The final clause type related to alliances and military restriction. The treaty called for the Seleukid navy to be reduced to only 10 decked ships, with smaller craft, and no sailing west of Cape Sarpedonion in Cilicia unless delivering payment, hostages, or ambassadors.\footnote{103} This essentially barred Antiochos from legally entering the Aegean; the surrender of the main fleet broke the naval power of the Seleukids.\footnote{104} After Apameia Vulso sent orders for the ships at Patara to be destroyed, and 50 were either broken up or burned.\footnote{105} Furthermore, Antiochos was not allowed to initiate any invasion, but he could repel one provided that he in no way profited from doing so.\footnote{106} He was not allowed to recruit mercenaries or volunteers for his military from any of the areas which was vaguely termed as “sub dicione populi Romani sunt”.\footnote{107} Finally, Antiochos

\footnote{100}{Le Rider 1993, 61-62: faster and larger compared to those applied to Carthage in 201 (10000t over 50 years), Philip V in 195 (200t + 1000t, 500 immediate and the remainder over 10 years), and the Aetolians in 189 (200t).}
\footnote{101}{Gera 1998, 99.}
\footnote{102}{Derow 2005, 65.}
\footnote{103}{Mørkholm 1966, 26; Gera 1998, 29, 94.}
\footnote{104}{McDonald 1967, 3.}
\footnote{105}{Livy 38.39.3; Capdetrey 2007, 370.}
\footnote{106}{Gera 1998, 94.}
\footnote{107}{Livy 38.38.9; The comparable phrase from Polybios 21.42.15 is “μὴ ἐξέστω δὲ Ἀντιόχῳ μηδὲ χεινογείν ἐκ τῆς ὑπὸ Ρωμαίους ταττομένης μηδ’ ὑποδέχεσθαι τοὺς φεύγοντας”, equally as vague with ταττομένης and ὑπό (“order/appoint/impose” and “under”, together “put under/subjected to”) instead of dicione (“domain/sway/authority”). See Appendix B2.
was no longer permitted to keep or raise elephants, and was supposed to hand over all he had; Livy also reports that Vulso gave all of the elephants which he had received to Eumenes as a gift.\textsuperscript{108}

Another, more indirect result of Antiochos’ defeat at Magnesia was the loss of territory and allies in the east, who took advantage of Seleukid misfortunes to assert their independence. Antiochos III’s complicated system of alliances and agreements at least partially survived under Seleukos, but the defeat at Magnesia showed weakness in the empire where only twenty years prior Antiochos had asserted some level of control.\textsuperscript{109} Modern scholars disagree on what exactly the state of the eastern satrapies was when Seleukos inherited their rule. Particularly uncertain are areas such as Media and Persia, though it can be said with some certainty that Seleukos controlled Cilicia, part of Pamphylia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Susiana, and Babylonia, in addition to the more recent territorial acquisition of Koile Syria and Phoenicia.\textsuperscript{110} Swain claims that there was significant discontent and separatist movements in the latter two portions of the Empire.\textsuperscript{111} However, this seems not to have been the case, given that Josephus relates that the Jewish population at least was treated well and content under Antiochos III and Seleukos, and gives no indication of discontent there.\textsuperscript{112}

Grainger offers the following analysis on some of the difficulties which Antiochos, and Seleukos eventually, encountered. They faced dangers from both the east and south as a result of territorial loss, from Parthia and Armenia in the east and the Nabataean kingdom in the south, all former Seleukid dependencies who were becoming more formidable. The Parthians rebelled and

\textsuperscript{108} Livy 38.39; Mørkholm 1966, 26; Gera 1998, 92.
\textsuperscript{109} Grainger 2010, 314; Errington 2009, 223.
\textsuperscript{110} Le Rider 1993, 52; Will 1982, 255; Houghton and Lorber 2008, 1, says that Seleukos opened new mints in Media and Persis, so it is more likely that he had them under his control.
\textsuperscript{111} Swain 1944, 75; Swain, however, presents no supporting evidence for discontent.
\textsuperscript{112} Josephus AJ 12.129-153; Seleukos IV was however accused of acting against the Jewish people in II Macc 3 late in his reign.
the new king Arsaces IV declared his independence.\textsuperscript{113} In Armenia, two native dynasts who were \textit{strategoi} of Antiochos threw off their allegiance and assumed the title of king, Zariandros in Sophene and Artaxias in Armenia proper.\textsuperscript{114} There is no information of what happened further east; Elam was the object of Antiochos’ final campaign, and according to Mørkholm he likely lost control of Baktria and Media as well, since the Greco-Baktrian kingdom began raiding.\textsuperscript{115} What exactly the Seleukids fully controlled of the eastern Asian portion of the empire is not entirely clear. After suppressing the rebellion of Achaios in Asia Minor during his early reign, Antiochos III had sought to gain control over the territory which preceding generations had lost; as a result he turned first his attention to both reassertion in the east and then later to the recovery of Koile Syria from the Ptolemies (by 200). He had reestablished himself in Armenia by 212, Hyrkania, the Satrapies of Parthia, Baktria, and Sogdiana, Areia, Arachrosia, “India”, and even possibly Karmania. It seems however that the major work of this expedition had been diplomatic rather than militaristic. There was only an assurance that the east was Seleukid so long as both he and his negotiating partners lived, and there was no indication that he could even call on the kings for times of war.\textsuperscript{116} This makes a concrete understanding of the eastern portion of the empire more

\textsuperscript{113} Bevan 1966, 119; Tac. \textit{Hist}. 5.8.2-3.
\textsuperscript{114} Strabo 11.14.5-6 and 15; Diod. 31.17a; Mørkholm 1966, 28-9; Gera 1998, 99; Bevan 1966, 119.
\textsuperscript{115} Mørkholm 1966, 29; Grainger 2010, 283.
\textsuperscript{116} See Grainger 2017, 109-113: he posits that the expedition by some standards could be considered a failure, since he was entangled in a two year siege of Baktria, which he seems not to have captured, and gained only a small amount of territory; furthermore all of the kings he encountered survived and so did their kingdoms. Certainly Antiochos must have thought of it as a success however, since he claimed the title “Megas”. It is often assumed that the goal of the expedition was conquest and restoration, but rather it could be that he distinguished between ‘rebels’ like Molon who were executed and ‘ruling kings’ such as Xerxes in Armenia who were subordinated. If this is so, then: Baktria and Parthia fought, were defeated, and negotiated; King Sophagasenos of “India”, whose territory was probably Parapamisadai, was already an ally so he submitted; Arachrosia, Areia, and Drangiana were brought back, and he returned through Karmania, Gedrosia, and Persis. The Death of Euthydemos of Baktria and the ascension of his son, Demetrios, who began to raid “India”, possibly sparked the need for a second expedition in 187 on which Antiochos died, seeing the framework of his earlier expedition falling apart.
difficult to assess. Although there were yet no direct threats made against the Seleukid realm, these were still factors in which Seleukos needed to remain vigilant.

The east was not the only place in which the Seleukids lost allies; those in Asia Minor also faced issues if they continued a strong association with the Seleukids. A notable example of this is Ariarathes IV of Cappadocia, who had both helped Antiochos fight in Asia Minor and had married his daughter Antiochis. In 189 Ariarathes surrendered to Vulso, and not long after in 188 gave Eumenes his own daughter in marriage and secured for himself better peace terms; he fought against the Galatians and remained a faithful ally of Pergamon until his own death.117

Antiochos left his co-ruling son Seleukos in charge when he departed for the upper satrapies again in 187 on his final campaign, which eventually would make for a smooth succession.118 He died on the 3rd or 4th of July in 187, at a temple of Bel in Elam (Elymais) near Susa at the age of 53.119 The nature of Antiochos’ campaign is still contested, the most common view is that he was plundering the temple due to financial problems caused by the indemnity, as reported by Polybios, Justin, and Diodorus. The theme of temple plundering was to become a familiar one in Seleukid historiography from this point on.120 The story of Antiochos’ death is usually built upon a foundation consisting of his desire to renew his exploits against Ekbatana, which he had accomplished in 211/0. While pillaging the temple there he experienced resistance from the local population and was killed by the mob “comme un vulgaire bandit.”121 While plunder is the common explanation, there surely would have been political implications; the east needed to know that they were still firmly under a strong Seleukid rule after the heavy defeat Antiochos

117 Mørkholm 1966, 28; Gruen 1984, 86.
118 Grainger 1997, 64.
120 Polyb. 18.51.8; Just. 32.2; Diod. 29.15; Tarn and Griffith 1952, 29; Gruen 1984, 644.
121 Will 1982, 200; Green 1990, 244; Errington 2009, 223.
had suffered in the west, and it is most likely that he was trying to reassert his hold on places like Parthia, Baktria, or Media. Furthermore, in the same passage in which he points to the need for plunder, Diodorus records that Antiochos accused the people of Elam of starting a war against him. This is a plausible explanation for why he was in direct conflict with the citizens there.

With his father dead, Seleukos was the sole ruler of the Seleukid Empire. The earliest date for his sole rule is July 19, 187, and he is attested continuously until 175 in the Astronomical Diaries. Seleukos was about thirty years old around this time, since he is first attested in public in 197/6; this first attestation may have been his entry into political life, when he must have been around 18 years old. A lot of what Seleukos would do during his reign was a direct result of the defeat at Magnesia in 189. He obtained the throne through an easy and smooth succession, as he was already serving as co-ruler and general and was in Syria at the time. Gera deems his ascension to the throne to have been positive for the status of the Seleukid Empire since he sees Antiochos as being ill equipped for the patient healing and rebuilding task ahead, for which Seleukos, in turn, seems to have been adequately suited: under his rule rebuilding was possible.

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122 Mørkholm 1966, 29.
123 Diod. 29.15; Gera 1998, 99.
124 July 19, 187 = IV/11/125 SE, Parker and Dubberstein 1956, 23; Sachs and Wiseman 1954, 208; Sachs and Hunger 1989, 186-175; Walbank 1979, 188.
125 Polyb. 18.57.8; Livy 33.40.6; App. Syr. 3; Mørkholm 1966, 32; Habicht 1989, 338.
126 Taylor 2013, 152.
127 Gera 1998, 100.
Chapter IV: The Significance of the Treaty of Apameia

As has been mentioned often thus far, many modern scholars cite the treaty of Apameia as a foil to Seleukos’ productivity during his reign.\textsuperscript{128} This position accepts that the treaty of Apameia was legally binding for Seleukos even after the death of his father in 187, such as Green says, who posits that he followed the terms with “scrupulous correctness”.\textsuperscript{129} There are also those, especially Paltiel, who believe that the conditions of the treaty were rendered legally invalid once the original Seleukid party was gone. Whether or not Seleukos was bound to Apameia, it is apparent that in either of these two viewpoints the result of his reign was the same: the treaty of Apameia’s role in Seleukos’ reign produced the same outcome whether or not it was valid for him. That is not to say that there were no consequences as a result of the Seleukid defeat and that the spirit of the treaty did not carry at least some weight in the years after 188, but rather that the terms of the treaty in itself do not appear to have hindered Seleukos in any of his activities. Whether he was legally bound by them or not, he appears to have largely ignored those which would not bring him into direct physical conflict with Rome.

Wherever the accounts of Seleukos seem to show him conscientiously adhering to the treaty, it is possible to argue that in fact he was simply trying to avoid the provocation of a second war with Rome. It will be shown below that terms of the treaty that were immediately put into effect, such as the loss of territory, were the only ones which were truly detrimental to Seleukos’ reign, and that whether the treaty remained valid or not his actions reflecting some of the major clauses would not have changed. It is true that there is no positive evidence that Seleukos ever directly transgressed the stipulations of the treaty; it is possible that Seleukos renegotiated a friendship with the Romans, since Polybios’ account of the treaty emphasizes the importance of

\textsuperscript{128} The texts of the treaty from Polybios, Livy, and Appian may be found in Appendix B2.
\textsuperscript{129} Green 1990, 424.
“φιλία” for its purpose in the opening lines. Nevertheless, some scholars support the argument that the treaty was invalid after the death of Antiochos and, while the renunciation of territory was valid, that all the other clauses concerning military and political situation were reopened with the king’s death.

The territorial clause was the one which would have the most direct and lasting effect on the Seleukids and Seleukos himself, since it was meant to be a one-time effect which would remain valid whether the treaty did or not. The Seleukid armies evacuated Asia Minor and surrendered the land to the Romans. The Taurus boundary was meant to be permanent and the land which was previously Seleukid controlled was immediately distributed amongst Roman friends; by renouncing his claim to any European territory and Asia Minor, Antiochos III automatically deprived his heirs of any right there. When he died, since he had agreed wholly to this, the claims and titles to those lands could not simply be resurrected and therefore the result of this clause was the same regardless of Seleukos’ obligation to the treaty.

The next clause is that concerning Seleukid naval power, in which the treaty states that they were restricted to those ten ships and were not allowed to sail past Cape Sarpedonion. Polybios specifies that the treaty forbade more than ten decked ships for war with more than thirty oars. The importance of the Seleukid navy is highlighted here by the fact that this was a major consideration in the original treaty. There are arguments for this part of the treaty remaining valid for Seleukos, most often cited in conjunction with the naval clause is Seleukos’ offer to give...

130 Polyb. 21.42.1; Paltiel 1979a, 31, 35; Grainger 2010, 279; renewing friendship then may have legally passed the obligation to him, although an offer of ships later to the Achaians weakens that conjecture.
131 Paltiel 1979a, 35; Grainger 2002, 353; Grainger 2017, 208.
133 Paltiel 1979a, 35.
134 Polyb. 21.42.13; Livy’s record corroborates Polybios’ account with type (specifying “actuarias”) and number. Appian alternatively records that the treaty allowed for twelve ships.
ten ships to the Achaians as a gesture of friendship.\textsuperscript{136} Mørkholm explains this offer as Seleukos attempting to reduce his navy to comply with the treaty, while Gera claims that he was interested in giving away his allotted ten ships and replacing them with a modernized navy thereby keeping his skilled boat craftsmen practiced.\textsuperscript{137} The latter is less convincing, since it seems unlikely he would be interested in giving up all of his ships, and Gruen asserts contrarily that the gift in fact implied that the Seleukids were still a naval power able to spare the ships for the Achaians.\textsuperscript{138} Another viewpoint, if Seleukos was legally bound by Apameia, is that he simply ignored that clause altogether, and the appearance of a ship’s prow on Seleukid coinage during this period was perhaps to advertise continued maintenance of the fleet in defiance of the Roman conditions placed on Antiochos at least.\textsuperscript{139} It is more likely, however, that Seleukos began to recuperate the navy as soon as the royal treasury allowed for it.\textsuperscript{140} The conveyance of his daughter to Perseus for marriage by the Rhodian fleet in 179 is often used as proof that he adhered to the terms of the treaty in naval respects. The use of the Rhodian fleet, however, need not mean that Seleukos had no fleet of his own: while the treaty did not forbid any modest bridal processions at sea if Seleukos had sent an appropriately magnificent fleet past Cape Sarpedonium into the Aegean it surely would have been enough provocation to bring the wrath of Rome.\textsuperscript{141} The destruction of the Seleukid fleet was another immediate effect which happened only once and was still part of the conditions carried out while Antiochos was still alive. Part of the fleet was abandoned at Patara in Lycia and a Roman force

\textsuperscript{136} Polyb. 22.7.
\textsuperscript{137} Mørkholm 1966, 33; Gera 1998, 101.
\textsuperscript{138} Gruen 1984, 645.
\textsuperscript{139} Houghton and Lorber 2008, 1, 4: Prior to this, maritime themes were not present on Seleukid coins except at Tyre by 198, and were assumed to be of local significance rather than royal.
\textsuperscript{140} Paltiel 1979a, 31.
\textsuperscript{141} Polyb. 25.4.8-10; Livy 42.12.3-4; Gera 1998, 103; Paltiel 1979a, 31; See below.
eventually destroyed it there soon after the ratification of the treaty. Even with this, the entire Seleukid navy was not at Patara, and even if all of those ships were destroyed primary sources make no mention of any pursuit of the fleet which had been under Hannibal’s command. Furthermore, in 170 Antiochos IV had a large naval force which Grainger believes likely included ships that had been built for deployment in 192/1. He used this same fleet with which he had invaded Cyprus in 168, and later that same year Popilius Laenas did not rebuke him for possession of a fleet during his intervention at Eleusis later that same year. It follows that, since this was not very far into Antiochos IV’s reign, Seleukos either possessed a fleet through his reign or was building new ships of which Antiochos was able to make use.

The treaty also forbade the breeding and maintenance of an elephant corps, which the Seleukids had used since the time of Seleukos I, and it does seem that elephants remained a part of the Seleukid realm for quite some time after Apameia. If Seleukos was bound by the treaty, then it seems that the elephant clause was only provisionally enforced by Rome and later fell to the wayside, perhaps due to the challenge of collecting all the elephants from Apameia and ensuring there were no more in the kingdom. As already mentioned, Livy notes that some elephants were taken and given to Eumenes by Vulso; perhaps this was the elephant corps which had fought in Asia and survived Magnesia. Polybios says that all the elephants at Apameia were confiscated, and that elephants elsewhere were forbidden by the treaty. The display of elephant imagery in bronze coinage, issued at Antioch during the reign of Seleukos, perhaps alluded to the surviving

142 Polyb. 21.44.3; Livy 38.39.2; Mørkholm 1966, 27; Grainger 2002, 352.
143 Grainger 2002, 352; the fleet under Hannibal’s command can be seen at App. Syr. 22 and Livy 37.8.
144 Grainger 2002, 352.
145 Livy 45.11-12; Paltiel 1979a, 33; Mørkholm 1966, 27.
146 Mørkholm 1966, 27.
147 Livy 38.39.5.
148 Polyb. 21.42.12.
elephant corps in Syria contrary to Rome’s orders; similarly, although the Seleukid navy was supposed to have been gutted, ships’ prows continue to appear on Seleukid coinage.\textsuperscript{149} On various later occasions elephants are clearly still part of the army: they are at Daphne in 166, Antiochos IV left them with his vice regent Lysias during his eastern campaign in 165, who in turn used them in Judaea in 163.\textsuperscript{150} Shortly after the death of Antiochos IV in the reign of Antiochos V, the senate sent Cn. Octavius to Syria partly to hamstring the elephants and burn the ships in 163/2.\textsuperscript{151} Sherwin-White and Kuhrt believe that this was simply a delayed implementation of the treaty and Appian says that Rome sent Octavius after learning that “there were more elephants in Syria and more ships than had been allowed to Antiochos in the treaty.”\textsuperscript{152} Although this “treaty” is likely Apameia, there is no mention of the treaty elsewhere as a justification and Polybios himself states there that this was likely done to cripple Seleukid power and to better control the kingdom.

The Seleukid armies made fairly significant use of mercenary soldiers to augment their battle lines, so the clause which forbade recruitment from areas of Roman influence and slowed army building would at first glance seem to be somewhat problematic for the royal army. Even if the treaty remained valid for Seleukos after the death of Antiochos III, it did not stop the Seleukids afterwards from recruiting anyway. The same elephant type coins of Seleukos IV which showed maintenance of the elephant corps suggest too that they were intended for distribution to the military perhaps as sitarchia or “ration pay”, a theory which is supported by finds at the military colony at Dura.\textsuperscript{153} Rome became suspicious of Antiochos IV and Polybios reports that the Romans

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\textsuperscript{149} Houghton and Lorber 2008, 2, 4, 13, 17-18. It should also be considered that elephants were a preferred motif of Seleukid victory ideology and Seleukos may have been minting the coins in either case, see Coşkun 2012.
\textsuperscript{150} Polyb. 30.25.11 for Daphne; I Macc 3:34 for left with Lysias; I Macc 6:30, II Macc 11.4 and 13.2 for in Judaea; Walbank 1979, 452.
\textsuperscript{151} Polyb. 31.2: Octavius and two others were sent to Syria to manage the affairs “as the senate determined”, with the orders to burn the ships and hamstring the elephants in addition before leaving.
\textsuperscript{152} Polyb. 31.2; App. Syr. 46; Mørkholm 1966, 27; Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 215.
\textsuperscript{153} Rostovtzeff 1964, 625; Houghton and Lorber 2008, 13.
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sent spies (ambassadors “κατοσκόπων ἔχοντες τάξιν”) to the parade at Daphne in 166, who saw nothing wrong to report despite the fact that the army there reportedly consisted of Mysians, Thracians, and even Galatians, all of whom most likely fell under the *dicio* of the Romans.\(^{154}\) This group of Romans was led by an experienced ex-censor who would have surely noticed any flagrant violation of a valid treaty, further showing that it was most likely ended in 187.\(^{155}\) Since the treaty was either legally invalidated by Antiochus III’s death or was never fully implemented, Grainger believes the armies of Antiochus IV to have been as large as Antiochus III’s despite the loss of Asia Minor, which makes it all the more likely that recruiting and the military were maintained under Seleukos IV, even if they were not employed on campaign.\(^{156}\)

In addition to restricting maritime movement, the treaty of Apameia also attempted to restrict the Seleukid expansion by land and alliances with other kingdoms. One of the major arguments in favour of Seleukos being bound by the treaty is centered on his action, or rather near action, of marching an army to the Taurus in 181/0 to aid his cousin Pharnakes I of Pontus against a coalition led by Eumenes. In Diodorus’ account, when he arrives at the Taurus Seleukos suddenly remembers a treaty which his father had with the Romans.\(^{157}\) It is not clear what exactly he remembered since the fragment of Diodorus ends abruptly there, and the event is not mentioned in what remains of the accounts of Polybios or Livy, but it is more likely that in this case Seleukos would not consider this a violation of the treaty in any case since he was not planning to annex the territory.\(^{158}\) Seleukos hesitated to cross the Taurus, not because of the treaty but rather because he could not risk fighting with Pergamon and Cappadocia and risk angering Rome by damaging her

\(^{154}\) Polyb. 30.25-27; Grainger 2002, 350; Walbank 1979, 448-453; the ethnic units may have been a denomination by name only rather than a description of the unit’s ethnic composition, see Houle 2014 for full discussion.

\(^{155}\) Paltiel 1979a, 34.

\(^{156}\) Grainger 2002, 350; the parade at Daphne is estimated to have been around 50000 troops.

\(^{157}\) Diod. 29.24; Gera 1998, 101; Mørkholm 1966, 34; Paltiel 1979a, 34.

\(^{158}\) Paltiel 1979a, 34.
allies. It was also rumored that Ptolemy V was preparing for a war to regain Koile Syria, and so removing soldiers with which he may have needed to use to defend Syria was a concern, though that threat was gone in 180.\textsuperscript{159} It is also possible that T. Flamininus was able to successfully dissuade Seleukos from taking Pharmakes’ side, since he was at that time in Asia Minor on an embassy to Prusias of Bithynia and may also have visited Seleukos as well.\textsuperscript{160} Seleukos simply could not have been unaware of a treaty valid for him before that moment, so why would he have suddenly remembered at the last second? Gera explains this in terms of pro-Roman propaganda which would attack Seleukos from two angles: first, that he was too cowardly to actually commit to war, and second, in contradiction to the first, that he was despicable enough to be willing to make aggressive movement against Rome and possibly break the treaty. This reflects the animosity towards the king and could have been a Pergamene-fabricated rumor made to damage Seleukid reputation in Rome, something which Eumenes also engaged in against Perseus to suit his own ends.\textsuperscript{161}

Finally, Seleukos did not pay the indemnity as Rome had stipulated. Why Seleukos continued to pay the indemnity is difficult to discern if the treaty was invalidated with Antiochos’ death, since he continued to pay it for quite some time, though presumably this is due to the hostages being held in Rome. They were the only guarantee for the payment and they faced a tacit threat if they treaty was breached. There is also the possibility that, while there may not have been a legal obligation, there may have been a moral obligation for Seleukos to pay his father’s debt. Although the hostages may have kept him paying initially, Seleukos simply stopped paying the

\textsuperscript{159} Gera 1998, 102; Mørkholm 1966, 34.

\textsuperscript{160} Polyb. 23.5.1; Gruen 1984, 646; Walbank 1979, 221; this embassy is famous for its connection with Hannibal’s death, as he had fled to Prusias from the Seleukid court after Magnesia; Flamininus left Rome in the summer of 183 after assisting in resolving a problem with the Spartans.

\textsuperscript{161} Livy 42.11-13; Gera 1998, 102; see also Derow 1989, 306-7.
In 177/6, Antiochos IV made the full payment of the indemnity as a lump sum in 174/3 shortly after his reign began. II Maccabees also mentions even later that a certain Nikanor wanted to complete payments in 165; Le Rider believes these may have been an end to the Apameia debts. Since Antiochos IV so quickly had the according resources available, did this mean that Seleukos was able to pay the indemnity but was unwilling to do so? In the end, the Seleukids still payed the indemnity in full with Antiochos IV’s apologies, and he must have felt that it was an obligation to pay since Demetrios, Seleukos’ oldest son who was then a Roman hostage, was hardly an effective incentive for Antiochos. Again, however, it is presumably the lack of legal grounds which accounts for the late payments, making Antiochos’ apologies ironic; it seems that Antiochos would be more willing to pay Rome due to his time spent there and his political connections with the Romans. Certainly, at the very least, Seleukos was delaying in making the payments, and Rome did not seem to care much about the fact that the indemnity was not coming as scheduled.

The question remains from this: why was there no Roman intervention as a result of Seleukos not adhering to the settlement at Apameia? In the more likely case that the treaty was made invalid for Seleukos by Antiochos III’s death, the answer here is straightforward. The treaty of Apameia established philia between the Roman people and Antiochos for all time. Livy records that “amicitia regi Antiocho cum populo Romano...esto,” and there is no mention of either Seleukos or Antiochos’ regnum; the Romans never seemed to care about any supposed

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162 Livy 42.6.6; Le Rider 1993, 60: this was in the sum of 2000t, or 1000t in some other MS.
163 II Macc 8.10; Le Rider 1993, 60; the debt mentioned in II Macc is not specified as relating to Apameia, rather as “150000 pounds of silver” which Antiochos (IV) owed to the Romans.
164 Paltiel 1979a, 34; Houghton and Lorber 2008, XXXIX; Perhaps Antiochos wished to pay the indemnity due to his close relations in Rome having spent so much time as a captive there.
165 Grainger 2002, 353.
166 Grainger 2010, 279, 283.
167 Polyb 21.43; Livy 38.33; Paltiel 1979a, 30.
transgression of the Seleukids after that, and the sources dwell on this friendship aspect.\textsuperscript{168} It is likely that the treaty was not meant by either side to be hereditary for Antiochos; treaties of the period refer to Hellenistic rulers by name and did not attribute a corporate existence to their kingdom, and it was necessary and significant to have a succession clause written into them; it is most likely that the Romans understood that Antiochos was not an immortal when they included “for all time” in the treaty’s wording.\textsuperscript{169}

Furthermore, the renewal of friendship with later Seleukids such as Antiochos IV is not sufficient evidence of the expiry of the original treaty. That any renewal took place between Seleukos and Rome is plausible but entirely unproven, and a renewal of friendship was not necessary for the renewal of a treaty. The sources on Apameia do however offer sufficient grounds for the view that the provisions of the treaty had no legal grounds after Antiochos’ death, and that both the relationship between Seleukos and Rome was dependent on the Taurus boundary and periodic renewal of friendship. There is moreover no further mention in the primary sources of the treaty even when it would suit Roman advantage.\textsuperscript{170} Nevertheless, Roman power meant that it was probably sensible for Seleukos to observe some of the main elements of the treaty.\textsuperscript{171} Although the power of the republic was always lurking in the background as a potential aid to her allies and embassies regularly appeared at Rome requesting help, their pronouncements were little more than gestures and Hellenistic states operated along traditional lines and hardly reflected Roman hegemony.\textsuperscript{172}

\textsuperscript{168} Paltiel 1979a, 33, 35 n.45.
\textsuperscript{169} Paltiel 1979a, 35, and n. 44.
\textsuperscript{170} Paltiel 1979a, 37-38, 41; there is the possibility that the treaty referred to when Seleukos marches to the Taurus Mountains is Apameia, though the latter part of the section in Diodorus (29.24) is lost. It may also be that Octavius’ delegation to Syria circa 163 was an extension of the treaty, though Polybios (31.2.11-14) does not explicitly use this as the cause for their actions.
\textsuperscript{171} Grainger 2002, 353.
\textsuperscript{172} Gruen 2014; 287.
Even if the treaty were still valid for Seleukos, there were still many reasons why Rome would not intervene in the east. It is entirely possible that, while the boundary of the Taurus originally placed by the Scipios survived, the written treaty was simply not relevant to both sides.\(^{173}\) At this time especially the Romans were very focused on Macedon and Greece, rather than yet that far eastward.\(^{174}\) In either case, a working system of international law in which such a treaty as Apameia would need to remain serviceable is only good when there is an effective mechanism for enforcement, and an absence of international law and the inability to enforce it is a recurring event in Polybios.\(^{175}\) The following are a number of reasons why Rome may have been hesitant to commit their forces to Asia. Taken one by one, these reasons may not have been enough on their own, though compounded they would have kept Rome out of Seleukos’ sphere.

First was Rome’s concerns of war and internal rebellion on home soil in Italy. That Romans had major fears of invasion is clear: in 200 P. Sulpicius Galba convinced the senate that war with Philip V was inevitable and they should fight in Macedon away from Italy.\(^{176}\) This fear is no surprise, bearing in mind that Hannibal’s terror-inspiring invasion had not been ended for a full 20 years when Seleukos took power and that Antiochus had taken Hannibal into his court as an advisor.\(^{177}\) Another major result of the Second Punic War was that Rome had lost supremacy over Italy after Cannae and throughout the course of that conflict.\(^{178}\) Hannibal’s invasion had split the Italian allies of Rome, since Hannibal had victories to back the tempting offers he made to those who seceded. Furthermore there was a real danger of renewed defection among those Italian allies

\(^{173}\) Paltiel 1979a, 41.
\(^{175}\) Eckstein 2006, 101: examples of inability to enforce include a sworn treaty not stopping Philip V from considering attacking Messene in 215 (Polyb. 7.12) and eventually following through in 214 (Polyb. 3.19.11), Nabis of Sparta attacked Messene in 202/1 (16.13.3), Antiochus III was not stopped by any obligation of peace and attacked Egypt in 202 (Polyb. 15.23.13), and Antiochus IV did the same as his father in 169/8 (Polyb. 29.26).
\(^{176}\) Gabba 1989, 207.
\(^{177}\) App. Syr. 4; Livy 34.60.
\(^{178}\) See Polyb. 2.23-42 on Rome’s difficulty in garnering obedience; Gabba 1989, 208.
who were suffering from Rome’s punishment for those who had defected to Carthage.\textsuperscript{179} In 193, some of the more astute members of the senate did not discount the possibility of an invasion of Italy, such as Hannibal suggested to Antiochos, based on the assumption that there would be Italian support against Rome.\textsuperscript{180} This distrust of the allies led to the establishment of military colonies in Italy which were at least partially situated, or specifically intended, to deal with internal dissatisfaction. Colonies such as Saturnia, founded 183 and was well placed to deal with dissatisfaction in Etruria, were larger in population and were given Roman citizenship rather than Latin, the first inland colonies to gain such, perhaps to keep loyalty.\textsuperscript{181} Eight military colonies were established in southern Italy in 197 and 194, probably to guard the coast of Campania, Lucania, and Apulia, but also to watch the interior which was particularly hostile and rebellions, and those which followed in the 180s in northern Italy were attempts to pacify and urbanize the area, like Mutina.\textsuperscript{182}

Rome’s political climate at this time also may have restrained them from venturing into the rich east; as said above, the influx of wealth from the war with Antiochos forever changed Rome. In 189, M. Acilius Glabrio abandoned his bid for censorship because of accusations that he had mishandled booty taken from Antiochos, with M. Porcius Cato as the witness.\textsuperscript{183} Another major event during the 180s in Rome was the so called “Trial of the Scipios”, which took place in either 187 or 184.\textsuperscript{184} Of this trial very little is known and equally as much is agreed upon. Exactly who

\textsuperscript{179} Badian 1958, 141; Gabba 1989, 207.  
\textsuperscript{180} Livy 34.6.  
\textsuperscript{181} Harris 1971, 155: Saturnia’s purpose is clearly military, highly defensible but no serious danger from the Ligurian pirates, a task for which Gaviscae (founded 181), which suggests perhaps an internal purpose. There was a need of troops in the area of Saturnia since 190, P. Iunius Brutus commanded a legion in Etruria which continued into 189, remaining active there until he left for Spain (Livy 2.1, 2.9, 50.15, 57.3).  
\textsuperscript{182} Livy 32.29.2ff; 34.45.1-5; Gabba 1989, 207; Lomas 2014, 242; some of these military colonies included Liternum, Volturum, Puteoli, Buxentum, Croton, Tempsa, Sipontum, Thurii, and Vibo; in 186, any of the failing colonies were bolstered with an injection of new colonists.  
\textsuperscript{183} Livy 37.57; Astin 1989, 179.  
\textsuperscript{184} Livy 38.50; Feig Vishna 1996, 129; Astin 1989, 179.
was on trial is unclear, it may have been Lucius Scipio, Publius Scipio, or even both, and the date is contested, although Astin believes that it may have been Lucius on trial in 187 and his brother Publius in 184.\footnote{Astin 1989, 179-80; Feig Vishna 1996, 130.} The nature of the charges is disputed, either a bribe from Antiochus, a misappropriation of funds used in the war, or even something within Publius’ private dealings with Antiochus. There were demands that Lucius submit accounts of the 500 talents which Antiochus had originally given over after Magnesia, and it is even possible that only Lucius was on trial and Publius was only implicated in his intervention.\footnote{Feig Vishna 1996, 130: most sources agree that L. Scipio was tried and convicted, and that the tribune of the plebs Ti. Sempronius Gracchus prevented him from imprisonment before paying the fine.} One can see the common threat between these two scandals: the Seleukids and the eastern wealth, which the senate may have been hesitant to gain more of too quickly. Rome was also having problems with the spread of a supposed Bacchanalian cult conspiracy in 186, which the consuls suppressed after it had been left to flourish for a number of years; contrary to Roman morals the Bacchanalian cultists allegedly practiced nocturnal rights which were reported to have degenerated into sexual depravity and ritual murder, and the cult was only fully eliminated by 181.\footnote{Astin 1989, 186.} Again, because this cult was similar to some which were found in the eastern world it may have led to enhanced concern about eastern Asiatic cultures, where the Romans would have to go in order to deal with Seleukos themselves.

Asia Minor was not the only theater of war for the Romans in the early second century. For some time, Rome had been working towards conquering the Iberian Peninsula and subjugating Spain.\footnote{Evans 2012, 34.} In 197 serious war broke out and the senate sent Cato there with a consular army to deal with the problem.\footnote{Livy 29.1, 31.49.7, 33.27, 34.8.4.} Attacks on the Celtiberians had only turned them to enemies and the fighting lasted many years on a large scale; it was not until 179/8 that Ti. Gracchus came and closed that
stage of the war with a system that brought relief until 171.\textsuperscript{190} Little changed in Spain during the 180s: three governors died and four were awarded triumphs for victories against the Lusitanians and the Celtiberians.\textsuperscript{191} In 180 the governor of Citerior Spain, Q. Fulvius Flaccus, won a decisive victory against the Celtiberians which led to a period of relative calm until the 150s, and the army of the Romans was even reduced to one legion instead of two.\textsuperscript{192} This shows that Rome during Seleukos reign was at least partially focused westward, dealing with the control of Spain instead of concerning themselves solely with Asia.

The final, most clear reason for which Rome would not have intervened if the treaty were still legally valid for Seleukos is Eumenes II of Pergamon, on whom there was a heavy expectation to control the east for Rome after they had withdrawn back to Italy. Apameia confirmed Pergamon’s position of freedom from Seleukid influence, and afterward Eumenes was able to deal with them from a position of strength.\textsuperscript{193} His loyalty to Rome was awarded with a large territorial gain which expanded the Attalid kingdom to its largest size, but in giving this gift to Eumenes (and another one Rhodes) Rome certainly would have expected their generosity to be appreciated and gratefully acknowledged as in \textit{do ut des}.\textsuperscript{194} Eumenes would have been expected to provide guarantees of order and the prevention of anything rising to disturb Rome, especially since his newly expanded territory bordered directly on three of the major four powers in the area.\textsuperscript{195} Asia Minor would have been too much of a political burden for Rome to keep for itself, especially since they were already dealing with expansion into the Iberian Peninsula which greatly increased their ruling area. The prospect of ruling an even bigger empire than this turned the conservative senate

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\textsuperscript{190} Livy 35.1, 36.39, 37.46 and 57, 39.7 and 20, 30, 40.1; see Badian 1958, 119-123.
\textsuperscript{191} Curchin 1991, 32: Roman victories at Calahorra in 186 (Livy 40.50) and near Toledo in 185 (Livy 41.7).
\textsuperscript{192} Curchin 1991, 32-3.
\textsuperscript{193} Allen 1983, 78.
\textsuperscript{194} App. Syr. 44; Allen 1983, 76; Evans 2012, 34; Gera 1998, 97.
\textsuperscript{195} Habicht 1989, 324.
\end{flushleft}
to indirect rule through their ally Eumenes, and they still were not interested in anything beyond the Taurus Mountains.\textsuperscript{196} The senate also passed to Eumenes those cities which had allowed Antiochos to establish a base of operations or the royal fleet.\textsuperscript{197} Rome certainly at this time had a desire for their friends Eumenes and Rhodes to maintain a peaceful Greek Aegean world in order to gain security at home; they were less interested in the far-away Seleukids or Ptolemies, seeing them as harmless enough to leave them to their own quarrels, although later they would become more interested in disruption and fermenting internal quarrels.\textsuperscript{198} However, in the post-Apameia world, in general the further from Italy events such as major interstate conflicts happened, the less the Romans were interested in them; Roman interaction with Asia Minor and the Levant, because they were further than continental Greece, was less frequent at this time and in turn had less impact on Rome than those in Greece.\textsuperscript{199} Because of their physical and political distance from the Seleukids, they simply entrusted to Eumenes any activity they may have needed completed.

Eumenes, however, had his own wars to wage against the neighbors Rome left him to fend against. After Magnesia, Asia Minor’s major powers consisted of Pergamon under Eumenes, Bithynia under the talented Prusias I, Pontus under Pharnakes I, and the Galatians – all of whom he was expected to keep in check.\textsuperscript{200} Any semblance of peace there did not last long however: already in 187 he was at war with Prusias, which did not end until Roman intervention in 183/2 after they largely ignored the situation.\textsuperscript{201} Rome’s presence was almost unfelt since Pergamon had gotten the prize, but Prusias had gained plenty of help from other allies against Eumenes including

\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{196} Evans 2012, 34; Paltiel 1979b, 43.
\item\textsuperscript{197} Capdetrey 2007, 370.
\item\textsuperscript{198} Rostovtzeff 1964, 62-3.
\item\textsuperscript{199} Eckstein 2008, 353.
\item\textsuperscript{200} Rostovtzeff 1964, 58.
\item\textsuperscript{201} Evans 2012, 35; Habicht 1989, 328: Eumenes received Phrygian Epictetus in the treaty of Apameia, which had been taken by Prusias in 190 and which Prusias was supposed to keep. This left Bithynia hostile to Pergamon even under his successor Prusias II.
\end{enumerate}
Pharnakes and also Philip V, who had been in dispute with Eumenes already over the Thracian cites of Aenus and Maronea. In 183 Pharnakes took the city of Sinope, invaded Galatia, and began his war with Eumenes; Pergamon was able to claim victory in 181 and instituted the Nikephoria festival to commemorate this victory. Eumenes was able to hold back the various challengers, though this surely left him very busy. Rostovtzeff blames Seleukos’ fear of Rome for the lack of a Seleukid presence in any of these relatively nearby conflicts, however it is more likely that it was simply a better idea for Seleukos to keep his armies at home while the kingdom was recovering. While Eumenes could deal with Prusias and Pharnakes in conflicts which eventually ended, he had a constant challenge trying to keep control of the Galatian tribes with frequent clashes. On the other hand, Eumenes was able to make an ally of Cappadocia, marrying Ariarathes IV’s daughter Stratonike. Still, Rome was the enemy of Eumenes’ enemies so long as Rome and Pergamon were allies, but they were very reluctant to involve themselves in the affairs of Asia Minor, let alone Syria, until Flamininus’ trip in 183.

Although Eumenes did come under suspicion of the senate later in his kingship, during Seleukos’ reign he enjoyed good personal relations with Rome. The suspicions which arose against him resulted from his conduct in the war against Perseus in 168/7, the Third Macedonian War, in which he was accused of making secret meetings and thinking that he would be able to make a fortune as a broker of peace between Rome and Perseus – conduct which the Romans saw as dishonest and traitorous. Shortly after his disgrace he had to ask Rome for help in fighting

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202 Habicht 1989, 325.
204 Rostovtzeff 1964, 58.
205 Allen 1983, 78.
207 Habicht 2006, 8.
208 See Polyb. 30.1-3; Livy 44.25.6, 44.27.7-9, 45.19; Allen 1983, 80; Evans 2012, 38.
Galatians, and because he could not risk angering Rome it was a tacit way for Eumenes to ask permission to fight.\textsuperscript{209} Eumenes was led to believe that as the ally of Rome he had the freedom to act as he wanted for nearly 20 years, which Rome tolerated because of their distance; that distance too, however, meant that many saw Rome as a far off and disengaged presence.\textsuperscript{210} This feeling of distance may also have extended to Seleukos, who quietly worked on his own realm.

Regardless of how modern scholars view the validity of the treaty for Seleukos, the ancient sources demonstrate that he certainly was not entirely idle and did not adhere to the terms of that treaty in itself. He still controlled a navy, elephants, armies, and as will be seen below made an international presence for himself. The treaty was not strictly enforced by the Romans, who seem to have cared very little for what was happening in the east at this time, leaving those affairs to Eumenes whilst they dealt with many pieces of their own business in the west.

\textsuperscript{209} Evans 2012, 40.
\textsuperscript{210} Gruen 1984, 541, 550-554, 578; Evans 2012, 35.
Chapter V: Internal Affairs

Seleukos may have had a quiet reign, but that is no indication of either incompetence or that he lacked any authority in his own kingdom. He may not have been concerned with martial glory but he did care about his dignity and his subjects’ welfare in keeping twelve years of uninterrupted peace.²¹¹ Although there is comparatively less information on Seleukos’ internal policies than on his external policies, there is still sufficient evidence of activity within the empire to gain an understanding of his actions. Some of the areas for which information from this period is available includes typically kingly duties such as ensuring civic honours are given, his religious considerations, the practice of city founding, and, perhaps most importantly and most expansively, the health of the Seleukid economy. It is best to then start in the area which would have been closest to Seleukos, his family.

Seleukos married his sister, Laodike IV, and she was associated with him as his queen consort. Laodike was married first to her eldest brother Antiochos the Son until his death in 193, and was subsequently married to his successor Seleukos, before she possibly married again her third brother Antiochos IV after Seleukos died.²¹² Laodike is the first Seleukid queen to have an identifiable portrait on Seleukid coinage, there is no evidence before her of rulers depicting their consorts in this “widespread medium”.²¹³ As the producer of royal heirs, Laodike IV also likely had an elevated role in the dynasty because of the imprisonment of potential heirs Antiochos (IV) and Demetrios, though she certainly already had some importance as both the daughter and wife

²¹² Grainger 2017, 47; Ager and Hardiman 2016, 145; Sachs and Hunger 1989, 189, 385: it is possible that she was married to all three brothers successively, though it is equally as possible that she died in 182/1 as per an astronomical diary entry and another Laodike (of which there were many) was involved afterwards, making for conflation with IV.
of Seleukid kings.\textsuperscript{214} The elephant type coins which were discussed above could again be seen as a reference to Seleukid might.\textsuperscript{215} They were struck under Seleukos and Antiochos IV and used the image of their sister-wife to symbolize dynastic stability. She was further the guardian of Antiochos the son of Seleukos after his death; certainly there was a level of appreciation from Antiochos IV for the ability to marry the sitting queen with the appropriate position and connections to smooth that transition.\textsuperscript{216} Seleukos was able, at least for the time, to secure the dynasty by maintaining his marriage with his sister and creating heirs as a good king should.

Seleukos continued the kingly tradition of having civic honours and citizenship conferred on certain people who had rendered outstanding service for his father. In a letter written in 186, Seleukos asked the citizens of Seleukeia to grant a statue and citizenship to a certain Aristolochos.\textsuperscript{217} This letter constitutes the only piece of evidence from Seleukos himself which remains from his entire twelve year reign.\textsuperscript{218} Antiochos III had a lot of rewards to offer, such as land and citizenship, from his many military expeditions, and since he perished before being able to give them out himself Seleukos continued doing this on his behalf.\textsuperscript{219} These types of rewards not only honored the individual who received them, but also inspired others to demonstrate the sort of zeal and goodwill demonstrated by the recipient.\textsuperscript{220} Although the letter was not phrased as an instruction, the residents of Seleukeia were still expected to accept; any city would have accepted the request regardless as it was an easy way to gain the king’s favour, since a ‘friend’ given a civic identity in one’s city would be like a representative in the king’s court. His

\textsuperscript{214} Ager and Hardiman 2016, 166.
\textsuperscript{215} See page 30-31.
\textsuperscript{216} Mørkholm 1966, 36; Ager and Hardiman 2016, 166-7; Seleukos IV’s son Antiochos henceforth will be called “Antiochos Seleukou” to avoid confusion with Antiochos the Son.
\textsuperscript{217} Welles 1974, 45 (letter); Austin 2006, 206, Chaniotis 2005, 45; Kosmin 2014, 206.
\textsuperscript{218} Habicht 1989, 338.
\textsuperscript{219} Welles 1974, 45; Chaniotis 2005, 65; Austin 2006, 206.
\textsuperscript{220} Chaniotis 2005, 65.
instructions were to enroll him in the deme Olympios and the tribe of Laodikeia.\textsuperscript{221} The letter was printed on tablets and placed within the city, most likely intended from the start to be an open letter which the public could see; this was one way in which the Seleukids could control their cities.\textsuperscript{222} This letter is indicative of a practice of ensuring the proper rewarding of important people and civic interaction with his subjects, which may have been more widespread under Seleukos’ rule.

The religious affairs of the empire were also an area in which Seleukos ensured that proper care was taken. While Seleukos may not have been directly involved in the cults themselves, it is clear from their very existence that they were administered to his liking. He was, like his father, a supporter of the Jewish Temple at Jerusalem, where he financed the Temple sacrifices by covering all the expenses necessary for them from his own personal revenues.\textsuperscript{223} There is also evidence for the cult of the living king under Seleukos in the form of an annual priesthood list from his reign, which shows the various priestly roles for ancestor worship with one for Seleukos among the list.\textsuperscript{224} Additionally, citizens of the Empire were interested in making sacrifices on behalf of King Seleukos, his wife, and his sons, as the administrator of Esangil and the Babylonians did so to the gods Bel and Beltija for their lives.\textsuperscript{225} Seleukos tightened the royal grip on sanctuaries for better administration and oversight of finances, and one known action which Seleukos seems to have taken was to consolidate administration in Koile Syria and Phoenicia.\textsuperscript{226}

Seleukos appointed one Olympiodoros to a position of religious significance in Koile Syria and Phoenicia, which appointment remains known from a stele dated to around 178.\textsuperscript{227} This

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[221]{Austin 2006, 206; Kosmin 2014, 206; Chaniotis 2005, 65: has the bronze statue eventually placed at Skepsis, where Aristolochos spends the rest of his life.}
\footnotetext[222]{Grainger 1997, 64; Walbank 1993, 216.}
\footnotetext[223]{I Macc 3.2-3, 9.16; Capdretrey 2007, 400; Errington 2009, 269; Aperghis 2011, 39.}
\footnotetext[224]{Austin 2006, 207 = OGIS 245 = IGLS III.2.1184.}
\footnotetext[225]{Sachs and Hunger 1989, 178.}
\footnotetext[226]{Capdretrey 2007, 98.}
\footnotetext[227]{Jones 2009, 100; Andrade 2013, 57; Capdretrey 2007, 273: the exact date of the document is lost, though it was dated to 178 through two other contemporary inscriptions. The exact title of the position is not specified.}
\end{footnotes}
inscription shows evidence of royal interest in sanctuaries and their administration.\textsuperscript{228} The stele bears an official dossier containing three letters from the mid-summer of 178, and the material of the stele suggests that it was once erected in a sanctuary in a polis or village of Seleukid Palestine. Seleukos’ letter is the oldest chronologically; it is addressed from Seleukos to Heliodoros, and is an order phrased as a letter would be.\textsuperscript{229} In the letter Seleukos expresses his interest in the safety of his subjects and declares that a kingdom works best when they can pursue interests without fear. He made it clear that he intended to introduce ‘proper’ care to Koile Syria and Phoenicia like to other places and ‘traditional honours’, which refers to the variety of local cults rather than the royal one.\textsuperscript{230} This position seems to have been similar in significance to the one to which Antiochos III appointed a man named Nikanor in Asia Minor as “high priest of all sanctuaries beyond the Taurus”. The position later had the secondary responsibility of watching over “revenues and other matters” around 209.\textsuperscript{231} It is certainly possible that Olympiodoros was appointed to the high priesthood for Koile Syria and Phoenicia since there is so much symmetry between his appointment and Nikanor’s. Thus his role would be to take care of the sanctuaries and give them the honours which were given elsewhere in the Empire.\textsuperscript{232}

If Seleukos was aware and disapproving of the lack of control over the cults in the area could it have been, as the surviving evidence shows, that it was ten years after the start of his reign that he began to take action over it? The answer to this seems to be that he needed the time to work in the new system of administration over the old Ptolemaic one. When Antiochos III took Koile Syria and Phoenicia in 200, the governor of the area named Ptolemaios son of Thaseas switched

\textsuperscript{228} Capdetrey 2007, 98; Cotton and Wörrle 2007, 193.
\textsuperscript{229} Cotton and Wörrle 2007, 191-2, 194-5; the material of the stele is of stone taken from the Judaean hills.
\textsuperscript{230} Cotton and Wörrle 2007, 196-7; it is also possible that Seleukos expressing fear for the safety of his subjects is indicative of some Jewish unrest in that area, as it was certainly a problem of the later Seleukids.
\textsuperscript{231} Jones 2009, 104.
\textsuperscript{232} Capdetrey 2007, 259; Cotton and Wörrle 2007, 193.
to Antiochos’ side but retained the titles he had born under the Ptolemies, \textit{strategos kai archiereus}; no one else in the Seleukid Empire had the same combination of titles, and there was elsewhere a separation of the secular and sacred power.\textsuperscript{233} His successors were known simply as \textit{strategoi}, so Seleukos must have reformed the title when the office was separated after Ptolemaios.\textsuperscript{234}

Very little is known about Seleukos’ share of city founding within the kingdom. Kosmin believes that he was founding cities and colonies although which and where are largely unknown with the one exception of the refoundation of Laodikeia-in-Phoenicia, which was originally named Berytos.\textsuperscript{235} That he would found a city in Phoenicia makes sense, since it was only in the fold of the Seleukid Empire since 200. So little information remains that the founder cannot be positively identified as Seleukos; it could have been Antiochos IV. It is known that it was founded during the twenty year period of their respective reigns and that both Seleukos and Antiochos had Laodikai in their lives after whom the city may have been named (mother, sisters, and wives). The name of the city as Laodikeia-in-Phoenicia is not attested in epigraphic or numismatic sources after the second century.\textsuperscript{236} From this possible foundation it can be inferred that Seleukos perhaps took part in some city foundation practices, though the evidence for this is slim.

The Seleukid economy has been the subject of much discussion in the post-Apameia period. The state of the economy is difficult to assess with certainty for this time, though there is plenty of supporting information of the many complicating factors which arose from the defeat at Magnesia. The loss of Asia Minor and the payment of the indemnity often seem to lead some

\textsuperscript{233} Cotton and Wörle 2007, 198; Capdetrey 2007, 153-4.
\textsuperscript{234} Ibid.; his two known successors were Apollonius son of Thraseas and a Milesian named Appollonius son of Menestheus. Exceptionally, the Maccabees used the combination of \textit{strategos kai archiereus}, see Josephus \textit{AJ} 13: \textit{“واجبن نجفي ب أدولفي أتوج تهن سراطيغاغن إنصغيُسرن ب الإِةنوس كايد أپُديًستن آتُن أنْحيرِئِا.”}
\textsuperscript{235} Kosmin 2014, 183, 348 n.99.
\textsuperscript{236} Cohen 2006, 205-210, esp. 206; Berytos was guaranteed its independence in 81 BCE by Tigranes I, and eventually left from Seleukid control to Roman influence in 64 BCE, then was refounded as a military colony by Augustus circa 14 BCE, see Jones Hall 2012.
scholars to believe that Seleukos’ treasury was in a poor state. This however does not seem to be entirely the case, as will be shown below.

Rostovtzeff wrote extensively on the Hellenistic economy; Austin, however, has critiqued Rostovtzeff’s views of kings and economy. Austin argues that Rostovtzeff presents kingship and royal government too personally, and that he credits kings in general for organizing and integrating the territories under their control and developing their resources, while leaving little room for the temperament and personality of the kings. Austin sees monarchies as personal regimes, and analysis of them requires room to account for irrational motives. Furthermore, Rostovtzeff has no concrete definition of economy: his consists of productive economic processes such as agriculture and trade but does not include those nonproductive processes like war. He explains the economy in 19th century terms and treats war as an irrational and intrusive force, hardly mentioning the revenues of war and their consequences. War was a potentially prosperous business (as it can still be today), and the Seleukids made plenty of war. Seleukos himself did not, a fact which is worth keeping in mind.

In total, Seleukos’ output of money in tetradrachms was not very different than either his father or brother. Houghton and Lorber say that there was an increase in production at the Antioch mint on Seleukos’ succession to account for the indemnity. To the contrary, Le Rider states that the indemnity imposed by the Romans did not arouse any greater production among the kingdom’s mints, because the king was able to collect enough currencies of any kind to levy the 1000 talents per year without needing to strike large amounts of cash; the extant documentation indicates the more likely case that activity in the mints was “quite normal” under Seleukos IV.

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237 Rostovtzeff volume is in this bibliography, for Austin’s criticism which follows see Austin 1986, 451.
239 Houghton and Lorber 2008, XXXIX.
240 Le Rider 1993, 58.
Overall it appears from workshops and emission volume that Seleukos did not suffer very extensively after 188, and the only real challenge was in silver quantities for the payment to Rome. The silver shortage for Seleukos at this time, in conjunction with the loss of Asia Minor’s silver mines, can probably be attributed to the indemnity payments. Seleukos also reorganized the Antioch mint, which is especially apparent in its production of bronze tetradrachms. Aperghis believes that the mints of the time were only producing what was necessary for the satrapies of the kingdom, though again with the production of the elephant type Houghton and Lorber argue that production must have been at least partially driven by military needs.

The ‘financial crisis’ of the empire is a common thread in most modern accounts of Seleukos, but did the loss of Asia Minor seriously affect the kingdom? Both Will and Errington show Seleukos living an existence of daily financial struggle, as Antiochos III had lived after Raphia, and according to them having to pay his army as well as the indemnity to Rome and Pergamon made money scarce. It is true that generally an increase in territory was an increase in revenue, and the opposite was true as well when the territory was decreased such as happened to the Seleukids; the loss of Asia Minor meant a massive decrease in territory and its associated revenue. Scholars such as Le Rider and Houghton and Lorber believe that Seleukos was a comparatively non-aggressive because of the financial strain from these factors. The loss of Asia Minor did deprive the Seleukids of some important revenues, which in turn may have led to some internal issues such as unhappy citizens from higher taxation or plundering of temples, though it

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241 Le Rider 1993, 60.
242 Green 1990, 422.
243 Houghton and Lorber 2008, 13: under Antiochos III, Antioch emitted several series of two or three denominations of bronze coins, and under Seleukos it issued four or five denominations with distinctive types.
244 Aperghis 2004, 239; Houghton and Lorber 2008, 2.
246 Austin 1986, 461; he also assigns Antiochos IV’s invasion of Egypt as a response to the loss.
247 E.g. Le Rider 1993, 49; Houghton and Lorber 2008, XXXIX.
should be remembered that the Seleukid Empire was still rather large.\textsuperscript{248} The cost of the indemnity may have exceeded the means of the state, and Syria was in a difficult position at the time concerning precious metals, especially silver, which previously had come from Asia Minor and traded westward.\textsuperscript{249} A case as proof of Seleukos’ financial poverty is an episode in which his first minister was to confiscate the treasure in the Temple of Jerusalem, which was a fairly wealthy center that minted its own coins for a time. This incident, along with the allegation that Antiochus was plundering temples already in 187 where he died, Mørkholm describes as “eloquent testimonies of the financial difficulties of the kings.”\textsuperscript{250}

However, it does not seem that money was necessarily a problem for Seleukos. The annual revenue of Antiochus III circa 212 were somewhere between 11-15000 talents.\textsuperscript{251} These would have increased with the acquisition of Asia Minor to 15-20000 talents per year and only back down to 10-15000 talents again under Seleukos IV, which would have been partially balanced by the addition of Koile Syria to the economy. There was no indication that the royal court under Seleukos cut down on expenditures. The reigns of Antiochus III and Seleukos mark the peak prosperity of Susa under Seleukid rule; Susa was a convergent place for commercial routes enhanced by the Babylonian Plain, the Gulf of Persia, and south-west Iran, but allowed commerce at a long distance between Syria and India; Koile-Syria was also an important area for the economy, along with the hinterland of Mesopotamia and Iran.\textsuperscript{252} There is evidence to support heightened economic activity

\textsuperscript{248} Le Rider 1993, 60; Rostovtzeff 1964, 695; Gera 1998, 100: Seleukos was given a reputation as the “tax collector” or “debt collector” king, which may support theories for higher taxation or the taking of money and could indicate treasury problems during his reign.
\textsuperscript{249} Will 1982, 255; Mørkholm 1966, 31.
\textsuperscript{250} Rostovtzeff 1964, 1282; Mørkholm 1966, 31.
\textsuperscript{251} Aperghis 2004, 259; see Polyb. 26.1; a ‘peacetime’ army costs around 7-8000t annually, and the estimated administration costs in 281 and 190 at the heights of the Empire were circa 2-3000t, likely lower in 212 since there was no Asia Minor or Koile Syria. Antiochus III also would have had a surplus from his anabasis as well. The estimation for revenues after the acquisition of Asia Minor is tempered by the addition of higher military and administrative costs, which may have been significant enough to offset the value of the additional territory.
\textsuperscript{252} Capdetrey 2007, 365; Will 1982, 188; see Le Rider 1993.
in the east: from Seleukos I to Antiochos III relatively few Seleukid coins from Seleukeia-on-Eulaios (Susa) were found, but by contrast 314 bronze coins were found there from the time of Antiochos III, as were an additional 106 from under Seleukos IV. Cohen suggests this reflects the presence of merchants in Susa, and also the importance of Susa in trade with the Persian Gulf region, which increased significantly as a result of Antiochos III’s eastern campaign between 210 and 205. Continued Seleukid presence in Susa is attested by a fragmentary decree from 177/6 which cites Laodike III, wife of Antiochos III and mother of Seleukos.

The loss of Asia Minor created only a passing problem for the Seleukids, and the kings who followed Antiochos III were wealthy, with immense territories and a variety of resources. They were helped by the fact that Koile Syria and Phoenicia equaled or surpassed Asia Minor in prosperity despite the situation initially created problems for Antiochos III. From 281 to the peace of Apameia, Capdetrey shows that the Seleukids never fully controlled Asia Minor, and much of what it claimed to control was a virtual, ideological space; considering this the loss of Asia Minor is less damaging. Although the kingdom was substantially reduced, Seleukos still had lots in his possession: in addition to Susiana, he had Syria, Mesopotamia, Babylonia, Media, and Persis under his control, and he was able to draw on the Phoenician port cities for merchant vessels. There were also commercial routes through central Asia, by route of Ekbatana, and through the Persian Gulf to centers in Arabia and India, which brought enormous revenues, and the maritime villages in Syria and Cilicia via the grand Phoenician ports which acted as his

253 Cohen 2013, 195.
254 SEG VII 2; Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 179.
255 Le Rider 1993, 49, 52; Rostovtzeff 1964, 695; Will 1982 (200) in direct opposition says that the recent acquisition of Koile Syria and its revenues without a doubt did not make up for the loss of Asia Minor, see below for why it still may have compensated.
256 Capdetrey 2007, 272.
Mediterranean connection. Some of the richest areas of the world at the time were within his realm, namely a large portion of the “fertile crescent”, Susiana, the pastureland of Media, timber from Cilicia and Syria, textiles from Babylonia for export, purple dye from Tyre, and the Phoenician glass factories. The acquisition of the Phoenician coast meant that the Seleukids were able to control the profit from the most valuable caravan trade in eastern luxury goods like perfume, frankincense, pearls, precious stones, and silk.

The indemnity was surely the harshest condition imposed by Rome after Magnesia, the heaviest burden placed on Antiochos’ successors, although Rome did not seem to be in any hurry to enforce it. Though the indemnity was very harsh, it was not enough to derail the Seleukid financial situation, however. Seleukos very quickly took over the payments for his father and kept good record of his financial actions, and while the annual 1000 talents was an annoyance for the treasury it was by no means unsupportable. Again, the yearly indemnity of 1000 talents to Rome and an additional 70 talents to Eumenes should have been paid in full by 177/6 and 184/3 respectively; it is often assumed that Seleukos fell behind because of financial woes although there is no evidence contrary to Seleukos simply deciding that he no longer wanted to pay. Seleukos was certainly introducing revenue to the kingdom. It is also true that the general prosperity of the kingdom was a strong indication of good conditions in the treasury; the conditions for recovery were in place but were hard tested by Roman demands, and loose organization and the administration system made it difficult to mobilize resources in the interest of the state.

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258 Le Rider 1993, 60.
259 Mørkholm 1966, 30; Green 1990, 422.
259 Mørkholm 1966, 30; Tarn and Griffith 1952, 143.
260 Le Rider 1993, 52, 62; cf. Will’s opinion of the cost exceeding the state.
261 Will 1982, 255; Errington 2009, 269; Mørkholm 1966, 32; Gruen 1984, 88; paid in full at Livy, 42.6.6-7.
262 Andrade 2013, 48; Andrade, however, asserts that Seleukos did not solve enduring problems like resource loss.
Another matter which may have arisen from financial problems was Seleukos’ interaction with the Jewish population of his kingdom, especially shown in the episode at the Temple in Jerusalem mentioned above. The region that became Judaea had become a part of the Empire after Panion in 200, accounting for roughly two percent of the kingdom’s population and contributing about the same amount to the treasury.\textsuperscript{266} Initially the relationship between the Seleukid royals and the Jewish high priests was smooth, Antiochos III with Simon the Just and Seleukos IV with Onias III. Under Seleukos, the tribute and taxes from Judaea amounted to near 300 talents annually, either as a lump sum or a sum promised by a tax collector.\textsuperscript{267} The first conflict with the Temple came near the end of Seleukos’ reign, when Simon (the \textit{prostates tou hierou}) came into conflict with the high priest Onias III; Simon and his brother Menelaus were Hellenists and primary supporters of Seleukid power in Judaea.\textsuperscript{268} Seleukid kings would not have plundered a temple for no reason; however, financial difficulties would make an attempt to do so more likely, if the story is true. II Maccabees states that a Seleukos learned of the value of the Temple’s treasury by Simon’s message and sent Heliodoros to collect from it, but that Heliodoros failed and returned empty handed. The money which was stored there was reported to have been the savings of widows and orphans and the deposits of the Tobiad named Hyrcanus, valued at 200 talents of gold and 400 of silver; the ‘women and children’ were probably added by the author of II Maccabees to make the deed all the more dastardly.\textsuperscript{269} It could have been that Seleukos felt entitled to a share of the treasury, which

\textsuperscript{266} Aperghis 2011, 19, 21; Mørkholm 1966, 135.
\textsuperscript{267} Sculpicius Severus \textit{Chron.} 2.17.5; Aperghis 2011, 26; it is possible that Seleukos had tax contracting in this case. Under Antiochos IV tax farming contracts were conceded to priests for the right to collect taxes in Judaea for presumably the 300t revenue, but they were outbid by a certain Jason offering 480t instead of the 300t (II Macc 4.9); a certain Menelaus offered and additional 300t, doubling the original sum, but could not collect, which possibly indicated that he depleted Judaea (II Macc 4.27). See also Aperghis 2004, 168.
\textsuperscript{268} Capdetrey 2007, 327-8, 400.
\textsuperscript{269} II Macc 3.4-35; Aperghis 2011, 32; Aperghis 2004, 173; Swain 1944, 77; Gera 1998, 105-6; Rostovtzeff 1964, 1282; Walbank 1993, 224.
may be comparable to Antiochos III’s deeds in Elam in 187 and consistent with Antiochos IV’s treatment of Judaea afterwards and during the sack of 169.\textsuperscript{270}

Crass entitlement and greed were not to be the only reasons for which Seleukos might be interested in taking part of the Temple’s revenues. For some time Seleukos had provided support for the sacrifices of the Temple, in alignment with his predecessors’ policy.\textsuperscript{271} Simon told Seleukos that the riches of the Temple did not match the accounts which were set for the sacrifices.\textsuperscript{272} However, if this is true, it meant that Seleukos was demanding only what he thought was justifiably still his from the Temple as a result of misappropriated funds which he had given in generosity.\textsuperscript{273} Furthermore, Seleukid kings expected part of the temples’ revenues and it may have been that this was being withheld and Heliodoros was sent to collect.\textsuperscript{274} The mandated flow of goods in the economy went one way: from the ruled to the ruler, who in turn provided the intangible benefits of peace and security. Flow in the opposite direction was at the discretion of the king. Rulers had to make concessions to the sensibilities of their subjects, especially those with economic and political power, and temples specifically were often beneficiaries of royal gifts.\textsuperscript{275} The Temple of Jerusalem was no exception, Antiochos III had provided for its repair and tax exemptions for priests and temple singers among other benefits, and as the central pillar in Judaea’s economy the Temple was expected to return his investment.\textsuperscript{276} The entire story narrated in II Maccabees is

\textsuperscript{270} Rostovtzeff 1964, 695.
\textsuperscript{271} II Macc 3.1-3; Gruen 2005, 266; Errington 2009, 269: Antiochos III gave tax reliefs, Temple repair benefits, made Torah laws binding, and gave protecting legislation for the temple, see also Aperghis 2011, 24-6; Habicht 2006, 96; Mørkholm 1966, 135.
\textsuperscript{272} Because Simon was the enemy of Onias, the truth of what he said is still unconfirmable.
\textsuperscript{273} II Macc 3.3; Capdetrey 2007, 173; Mørkholm 1966, 136; Aperghis 2011, 32; Aperghis 2004, 151.
\textsuperscript{274} II Macc 3.6; Aperghis 2004, 151: the Seleukid administration charged a fee for those on royal lands, often for part of its produce. See the case of Mnesimachos, from whom the administration took fifty percent of his yield as tribute, in “the Mnesimachos Inscription” (Aperghis 2004, 320-323).
\textsuperscript{275} Aperghis, 2011, 38.
\textsuperscript{276} Aperghis, 2004, 168; Aperghis 2011, 38-39; other benefits included sacrificial animals, wine, oil, and frankincense to the value of 20000 shekels (near 7 talents) and large amounts of flour, wheat, and salt, see Josephus AJ 12.138-144.
primarily an edifying tale to teach the benefits of loyalty to the Lord: Heliodoros is forced to return empty-handed and admit the power of God at the end. It could have been a real event without the supernatural elements, since it does feature prominent historical figures, and modern scholars do not reject the story that Heliodoros tried to take from the temple, but it is more likely that it was an agreement between the royal court and the Jews which ended the episode.277

Heliodoros going to the Temple shows at least the royal court in conflict with the Jews, and this surely hurt relations with them in some way.278 The tensions and instability in Jerusalem were not isolated under Antiochos IV, the extraction of fund from the temple communities and similar trends started under Seleukos IV.279 It could also be the case that the Jewish uprising was rather a response to Seleukos’ appointment of Olympiodoros as the overseer of the Temple, which placed its autonomy under threat. It may have been interpreted as movement away from Antiochos III’s policy of recognizing Jewish autonomy, or even a deliberate action by Seleukos to rebut the events of the story which the Jewish writers recorded in II Maccabees.280 A final theory is that after defeat at Magnesia weakened the Seleukids there was a rise in national spirit among their indigenous subjects such as the Jews or the Arabs.281 It does seem that Seleukos may have been the origin of money Seleukid taking from the Temple, though for what reason exactly is hard to determine, since initially he seems to have been very benign towards his Jewish subjects.

Finally, Seleukos’ first minister Heliodoros himself needs to be addressed. It was common for a Seleukid king to have a vizier in his empire such as Hermias was for Antiochos III.282 He underlines the importance of those who were close to the king, both personally and institutionally:

278 Capdetrey 2007, 273; Tarn and Griffith 1952, 214.
279 Andrade 2013, 62.
281 Rostovtzeff 1964, 64.
282 Capdetrey 2007, 280.
he was an *adelphos* of Seleukos as a childhood companion and was quite preeminent in the kingdom. Heliodoros was the first destination for all royal orders and was responsible for executing those orders, which also included financial responsibilities.\(^{283}\) He was a citizen of Antioch, the son of a man named Aischylos.\(^{284}\) That he was close to Seleukos can be shown through two monuments, one at Delos, in which he is honored and to which Seleukos himself contributed, and also in the stele concerning Olympiodoros, in which Heliodoros is addressed as Seleukos’ intimate and trusted advisor.\(^{285}\) Seleukos also trusted Heliodoros enough to have him accompany his daughter in the marriage procession to Macedon in 178.\(^{286}\)

The Seleukids after Antiochos III, although wrongly branded as “unsuccessful in their political ventures”, were still very wealthy, enough so to pay the enormous indemnity to Rome and in the case of Antiochos IV to bestow large gifts on Greek cities, maintain a well-equipped army, and display huge wealth at Daphne.\(^{287}\) Based on Antiochos IV’s immediate undertakings in foreign policy, it can be assumed that Seleukos’ attempt to consolidate the Empire’s finances was not in vain. The indemnity was not as excessive as the tribute Seleukos levied in the kingdom itself and Seleukos’ caution in character and political decisions was not from financial exhaustion.\(^{288}\)

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\(^{283}\) Capdetrey 2007, 281, 394; Cotton and Wörrle 2007, 199.

\(^{284}\) Swain 1944, 76.

\(^{285}\) IG XI4 1112-1113; Cotton and Wörrle 2007, 196, 199.

\(^{286}\) Cotton and Wörrle 2007, 199.

\(^{287}\) Polyb. 30.25; Rostovtzeff 1964, 703: Antiochos VII Sidetes made similar displays of wealth against the Parthians in 131/0, and Antiochos VIII Grypus impressed his contemporaries with lavish feasts. Campaigning in Egypt and plundering the Temple in Jerusalem may have further enriched Antiochos IV prior to Daphne.

Chapter VI: External Affairs

After Magnesia the Seleukid Empire was too weak to start a policy of revenge and Antiochos III, Seleukos, and Antiochos IV rather focused their efforts towards the east.\(^{289}\) It would have been natural for Seleukos to feel bitter as a result of the defeat and humiliation of both himself and, to a larger degree, his father at the hands of Rome. As a result of this, the sum of Seleukos’ external policies, evidence of which remains in only small amounts, translate to a mostly passive hostility towards Rome and her friends and allies: there is no question that the Seleukid sympathies at this time lay with those who were not friendly towards Rome, and as an anti-Roman movement began to define itself Seleukos may have eventually compromised his neutrality.\(^{290}\) The Romans kept a watch on Seleukos; in 183 Flamininus intended to visit Syria, but both the purpose of the visit and if he ever made it there are unknown. It is reasonable to assume that the Romans were interested in keeping the Seleukids under observation and control.\(^{291}\) With the possible exception of this visit the Seleukid court was not sent an embassy from the senate for sixteen years, between 188 and 172.\(^{292}\) Significantly, Seleukos avoided Rome in turn and no envoys were sent there during his reign, which was highly unusual for a kingdom at that time and perhaps wise for him to avoid as much as he was able.\(^{293}\) The tranquility and peace of his reign helped the recovery of the kingdom, though Mørkholm believes that his dealings with Pharnakes and Perseus show that he did not fully grasp the hard lesson learned at Magnesia, and in adhering to political concepts during his reign which promoted animosity with Rome and Pergamon he lacked the necessary adjustments

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\(^{289}\) Rostovtzeff 1964, 63.
\(^{291}\) Polyb. 23.5.1; Mørkholm 1966, 35.
\(^{292}\) Eckstein 2008, 355: this is not entirely unique to Seleukids, and perhaps was by reason of their lack of interest in control of the east. The Ptolemies in Egypt were not sent an embassy from the senate from 200-173, a full 27 years.
\(^{293}\) Habicht 1989, 340; the emissaries taking the annual payments would have constituted representatives of the Seleukid kingdom, but they were unlikely there to negotiate any diplomatic issues.
to changed conditions for success. Seleukos’ policy of befriending other states such as Macedon, Rhodes, or Pontus was not popular with Rome and her allies, especially with Eumenes as he felt Seleukos was trying to isolate him.

Seleukos spent much of his reign renewing alliances with various other states, connecting and building relations with some of the most important players of the time. He continuously tried to break the political isolation of the kingdom: during his reign he established merchants and shipbuilders from Laodikeia-in-Phoenicia on Delos to better connect himself to the Greek states, and he maintained diplomatic relations with certain Greek states, notably Athens and the Achaians, although he would have been unable to provide any support had any ever been needed. It is likely that the alliances he formed for which there is evidence extant are a fraction of those which he was able to accomplish. His dislike of the Attalids can be shown as early as the incident of delivering supplies after Magnesia, and is again shown in these relations by him almost risking war with Rome to attack Eumenes.

Seleukos wasted little time in establishing his first interstate connection and as early as 187/6 a friend of the court was honored in Athens with an inscription for his goodwill to the demos and his assistance to some ambassadors in Syria, though it could be that the Athenians were working with routine matters of state rather than attempts at friendship. Relations between the Athenians and the Seleukids were limited in the third century due to the conflicts which the Seleukids had with the Ptolemies; after his anabasis Antiochos III had tried to gain goodwill with

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294 Mørkholm 1966, 37.
296 These merchants and shipbuilders erected a monument honoring Heliodoros on Delos, see note below.
297 For inscription on Delos see IG XI4 1112-1113; Gruen 1984, 647; Bevan 1966, 123; Mørkholm 1966, 33. For specific discussion, see below.
298 Paltiel 1979b, 42.
Greek states including Athens.\textsuperscript{300} The inscription shows peaceful contact with Seleukos and also Athenians at the king’s court, and additionally gifts from Queen Laodike are mentioned as presented to the Athenians.\textsuperscript{301} Another inscription of a joint decree also mentions two distinguished families with the Seleukids, the Kerykes and the Eumolpids, who served the cult of Demeter and Kore at Eleusis.\textsuperscript{302} They voted to honour an Epicurean philosopher, Philonides of Laodikeia in Syria, and his sons, for his help in assisting Athenian ambassadors who had been sent to the king.\textsuperscript{303} Although the Romans continued to meddle in Greek affairs, it did not stop Athens from “enjoying excellent relations with Seleukos IV”.\textsuperscript{304}

The Achaian League was another group which Seleukos befriended. It had fought on the side of Eumenes during the war with Antiochus, but when Eumenes tried to renew his friendship with them they rejected his offer.\textsuperscript{305} Seleukos was able to gain the favour of the Achaians over Eumenes. He sent envoys to them in 187, as the most powerful state on mainland Greece, offering ten ships and seeking to renew \textit{philia}; they responded positively and accepted the renewal, but according to Polybios politely declined the offer for the ships.\textsuperscript{306} Diodorus, in turn, records that the Achaians accepted the ships, but Polybios’ account that they rejected the ships (only for the moment) is more plausible and it was likely that they were trying to distance themselves from

\textsuperscript{300} IG II².786; Habicht 2006, 158-165; Habicht 1997, 222; Polyb. 26.1.10 claims that Antiochus IV also was a lavish benefactor to Athens, more so than any of his predecessors. Pausanias 1.21.3 may refer to gifts from Antiochos III though it is possible that it is rather Antiochos IV, see Habicht 2006, 159.

\textsuperscript{301} Habicht 2006, 165.

\textsuperscript{302} IG II².1236; Habicht 1997, 222; Habicht 2006, 165-6.

\textsuperscript{303} Ibid. The decree dates to the first quarter of the second century, and may actually date to Antiochos III.

\textsuperscript{304} McGing 2005, 74.

\textsuperscript{305} Polyb. 22.8.1-8; Hansen 1971, 98; Apollonidas of Sikyon points to a law rejecting gifts from kings, and says that Seleukos and Prusias were likely to offer similar gifts, see also Walbank 1979, 189.

military association with Seleukos. It was not at all unusual for a king to seek friendship near the beginning of his reign.

As already mentioned, Seleukos briefly considered entering Asia Minor to intervene against Eumenes and Ariarathes on the side of Pharnakes of Pontus, who made him an offer of 500 talents for help in the late 180s; Seleukos mobilized but turned back at the Taurus. Pharnakes’ grandmother was the sister of Seleukos II, Seleukos’ grandfather, and he also married a close relative of Seleukos, which made him a relative of Seleukos and was perhaps a consideration when Seleukos began to march northwards.

His perhaps most famous connection to another Hellenistic monarch was that with Perseus of Macedon. Perseus himself was vigorously renewing his external relations which had fallen by the wayside, and he eventually looked to the Seleukids. Seleukos was certainly interested in repairing the relationship with Perseus, which had been severed during the war with Rome, and it was his most obvious endeavor to enter the Mediterranean political scene. In 186, Seleukos deviated from the standard practice and named his first-born son Demetrios, making an obvious connection to the Antigonids and serving as a reminder of dynastic relations of the past. With the alleged plan of Seleukos to attack Pergamon, when he marched an army to the Taurus, he may have sought to contain Eumenes with an alliance with Perseus; Eumenes had a foothold in Europe at Lysimacheia, and the Antigonids were probably upset that they too had sided with the Romans but had gotten nothing in return for their help unlike Eumenes or Rhodes.

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308 Gruen 1984, 93.
309 Diod. 29.24; Will 1982, 255.
310 Errington 2009, 226; the person whom Pharnakes married was Nysa, either Seleukos’ sister or niece via Antiochos the Son and Laodike IV. See Appendix A for relation in genealogy chart.
311 Pietrykowski 2009, 224.
312 Gruen 1984, 645; Mørkholm 1966, 34.
313 Gera 1998, 103; Mørkholm 1966, 34.
314 Diod. 29.24; Gera 1998, 102; See Livy 38.39 for the lands given to Rome’s allies.
Furthermore, to seal the Antigonid alliance, Seleukos gave his daughter Laodike to Perseus in marriage. Seleukos commissioned the Rhodian navy to sail her to Macedon since it was better for him not to send a fleet into the Aegean, a procession which Gruen says “dramatized the recovery of Seleukid international esteem”; the Rhodian sailors were given a gold crown each as a gift from Perseus.\footnote{Polyb. 25.4.8-9; Livy 42.12.3-4; Gruen 1984, 555, 645; Hansen 1971, 107; Tarn and Griffith 1952, 31; Grainger 1997, 64; Kosmin 2014, 170; Scullard 2003, 278; Bevan 1966, 124; see Walbank 1979, 280: date must have been sometime in early 178.} The marriage itself took place in 178 or spring 177.\footnote{Will 1982, 255; Mørkholm 1966, 35; Gera 1998, 103; Errington 2009, 244.} Could it be that the joining of houses was intended to check Rome’s power? The effect was certainly felt by Rome and alarmed Eumenes, who was an irreconcilable enemy of both kings, but Rome did nothing Seleukos or the Rhodians other than its later manifestation of its disapproval towards Rhodes for transporting Laodike with such a great display of splendor; their relationship declined until after the Third Macedonian War when Rome punished Rhodes through economic sanctions and a revocation of friendship.\footnote{Bringmann 2007, 97; Mørkholm 1966, 35; Tarn and Griffith 1952, 31; Habicht 1989, 337: Rhodes had the territories Rome had given them after the settlement at Apameia (Caria and Lycia) revoked, Rome declared freedom of Kaunos and Stratonikeia (at a loss of 120t per annum to Rhodes), and declared Delos a free port, which shifted trade from Rhodes to Delos. This collectively devastated the Rhodian economy.} The marriage itself did not go against anything which Rome had demanded, but Seleukos still tried to pacify them preemptively by offering his son Demetrios as a replacement hostage for his brother Antiocchos; the marriage made Rome suspicious of the three major powers in the wedding as perhaps an anti-Roman coalition, though this at the very core seems to just be a dynastic marriage of the traditional kind familiar to Hellenistic diplomacy.\footnote{Gera 1998, 104; Habicht 1989, 339.} This not only showed Seleukos’ initiative to collect international allies, but a marriage with the Antigonids and the cooperation of Rhodes elevated his status and helped undermine Pergamene power.\footnote{Gruen 1984, 645.}
The most notable absence from the entirety of Seleukos’ reign is any war, a factor which is continually levied against him and his reputation. This too is easily explained not as a result of Apameia but because Seleukos simply had no reason to make any. He was certainly a capable commander, as is shown in his campaigning for his father in the 190s, so it must have been a combination of both not needing to and wanting to keep the kingdom at peace for its recovery and consolidation. That it was necessary for Seleukos to go to war is a modern thought: the idea of an equilibrium established after the initial establishment of the three main successor kingdoms was an invasive idea from early modern scholarship, analogous to 19th century Europe; this assumes too that the kingdoms were like modern states with presumed policies and impersonal rulers, while Hellenistic kingdoms were more personal states in a world which was chaotic and unstable.

Successors took territory from struggle and had then both to retain control and defend it: the idea of conquest was still potent depending on the ruler and circumstances, though Seleukos himself was content to refrain from undertaking conquest expeditions. Kings did more than war, and war was not nothing more than an economic activity for kings nor were kings solely dependent on military success. Military-political affairs were linked to socio-economic affairs.

Provision of regular pay was a drain on even the wealthiest king, and the main motive for any troop was money. This perhaps meant that Seleukos either employed a smaller army to keep costs low or had difficulty paying considering any more pressing financial obligations; Seleukos had no need for a larger standing army, never recaptured the eastern satrapies which his father ruled, and there are no known plans of his for any large-scale military action in the east. Thus

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320 Austin 1986, 455-7.
322 Austin 1986, 450.
there is no evidence remaining to show that Seleukos had any interest in fighting with his eastern neighbors. To the north Asia Minor was largely the same case: Antiochos III had renounced the claim of territory at Apameia and he could not risk angering Rome by transgressing the boundary and making war on her allies. This may show that he had no intention of coming to terms with Eumenes, who now possessed territory which formerly would have been his.\footnote{Mørkholm 1966, 43; Habicht 1989, 339.} The closest Seleukos came to war was when he marched to the Taurus with an army to Pharnakes’ aid, and the prospect of the Seleukids joining the conflict may in fact have been Rome’s impetus for brokering a peace.\footnote{Hansen 1971, 102; Errington 2009, 226.}

Seleukid conflict southward was in a somewhat different position than those to either the east or north, as the Ptolemies had their own problems to deal with at this time. Antiochos III had already gained control of Koile Syria and Phoenicia and made it a satrapy after Panion in 200 as a result of the Fifth Syrian War (202-198).\footnote{Capdetrey 2007, 248 and n.129; Cotton and Wörrle 2007, 279; satrapy is sometimes called simply “Syria and Phoenicia”.} Seleukos evidently had no need or desire to open a new war with Egypt; because he already possessed the contested territory and had no claim on Egypt itself it would have been up to the Ptolemies to renew the conflicts if they wished to regain what they had lost.\footnote{Grainger 2010, 279; as Antiochos IV would claim that the Ptolemies were preparing to do before he decided to invade them, Polyb. 27.19 and Livy 42.29.} The Ptolemies, however, were quite absorbed in controlling their own internal issues. Egypt’s situation was worse in the years after 200 than it had been in the past, and young Ptolemy V was crowned after the death of his father Ptolemy IV in 204/3. Native revolts had plagued Egypt, even in the third century. Revolt in Upper Egypt caused the Ptolemies great pains from 207/6 until 186, when Ptolemy V was able to defeat the rebels,\footnote{Two successive pharaohs from Nubia governed Upper Egypt for 20 years (206-186) beginning with Haronnophris (or Herwennefer), by 201 Ptolemy V only controlled Alexandria and the Lower Nile valley. Ptolemy probably retook Ptolemais by 200/199, besieged Abydos, and retook Thebes from the second pharaoh} and a revolt in Lower

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325 Hansen 1971, 102; Errington 2009, 226.
326 Capdetrey 2007, 248 and n.129; Cotton and Wörrle 2007, 279; satrapy is sometimes called simply “Syria and Phoenicia”.
327 Grainger 2010, 279; as Antiochos IV would claim that the Ptolemies were preparing to do before he decided to invade them, Polyb. 27.19 and Livy 42.29.
328 Two successive pharaohs from Nubia governed Upper Egypt for 20 years (206-186) beginning with Haronnophris (or Herwennefer), by 201 Ptolemy V only controlled Alexandria and the Lower Nile valley. Ptolemy probably retook Ptolemais by 200/199, besieged Abydos, and retook Thebes from the second pharaoh
Egypt was only completely crushed by 184. The treaty in 195 which he undertook with Antiochus III likely forced him to concede his territories in Asia Minor, and the loss of those territories along with Koile Syria and Phoenicia had economic consequences for the Ptolemies.

The second aspect which prevented Ptolemaic invasions of Syria was that Ptolemy V died shortly after he finished quelling the rebellions in 180, as reportedly his own generals poisoned him fearing that he would take their property to fund a campaign to retake what lands Antiochus III had captured. As a result Kleopatra, who was the sister of Seleukos, came to the throne of Egypt as guardian for her too young son Ptolemy VI and ruled until her death in 176. Antiochus III had given his daughter Kleopatra to Ptolemy V in marriage in 195 as part of the treaty ending the Fifth Syrian War and effectively tied Seleukid interests to Ptolemaic ones, she wed the then 15-year-old king at Raphia in 194/3 and took the epithet ‘Syra’ to reflect her origins. Kleopatra, who was immediately friendly towards the Seleukids, put a stop to any war plans and preparations against her brother, and likewise there was no reason for Seleukos to resume or undertake any hostilities. Relations between the kingdoms turned sour sometime after her death, and Antiochus IV later used this same relationship with Kleopatra, as the uncle of Ptolemy VI, to invade Egypt.

Like Seleukos’ internal affairs, little remains of the sources speaking to his external affairs but still much can be inferred from what does remain. It is clear that Seleukos was not an idle king,
content to remain isolated and fortified in Syria, but rather that he was focused on international politics and the protection of his kingdom alike. His policy was not one of weakness, but one of measure and forethought to bring himself the best advantage and best serve the needs of the Seleukid Empire.
Chapter VII: The Death of Seleukos and the Results of his Reign

Seleukos was murdered on the 2nd or 3rd of September of 175 in circumstances which are still not clear, and at the time in his 40s, an average age for a Seleukid king to die; typically, Heliodoros is depicted as his assassin.\(^{336}\) Appian reports that Seleukos was poisoned as part of a court conspiracy.\(^{337}\) There is not much evidence that Heliodoros was actually responsible for the murder, with Appian alone naming him as the head of a conspiracy, however he still appears to be the most likely culprit.\(^{338}\) What his motivations may have been are all but speculation, perhaps he worried that he would lose prominence with the return of Antiochos (IV) to the Seleukid court from Rome, or thought that he could take power by governing in the name of Seleukos’ young son Antiochos and claim that he was preserving the dynasty, poised to maintain a semblance of legitimacy and continuity through the boy king.\(^{339}\) Appian does not speculate on this either, simply claiming that he took up the reins of power.\(^{340}\) It is plausible that he may have been bribed by the Ptolemies to destabilize the Seleukids so that Koile Syria could be reconquered.\(^{341}\) Heliodoros’ closeness to the king gave him the ability to assassinate him in obscure circumstances.\(^{342}\) If there was any part played by Rome or Eumenes in his assassination it is unknown, but not necessarily improbable; it may have been that Rome orchestrated the plan or it was a plot with Eumenes to ruin the political relations between the Seleukids and the Antigonids, which cleared the way for a

\(^{336}\) OGIS 248 = Austin 2006, 208; App. Syr. 45, 66; Mørkholm 1966, 36; Gera 1998, 108; Tarn and Griffith 1952, 29; Grainger 2010, 284; Grainger 1997, 64; Parker and Dubberstein 1956 (32) place the last known date of Seleukos as VI/10/137 SE = Sept 3, 175, while Sachs and Wiseman 1954 (208) place it on either the 2nd or 3rd that same month; there is no entry in Sachs and Hunger 1989 for the year 137 SE. The Babylonian king lists original wording implies that Seleukos died from natural causes, see Finkel and Van der Spek (2004).

\(^{337}\) App. Syr. 45.

\(^{338}\) Grainger 1997, 64.


\(^{340}\) App. Syr. 45.

\(^{341}\) Ibid.; Porphyry FGrH 260 F49a is the only text which would support this theory.

Rome-friendly Antiochos IV and misled Heliodoros, if he was the agent of their plan.\textsuperscript{343} Seleukos’ untimely death led directly to external meddling and competition for the Seleukid crown: the quiet of the kingdom died when he did.\textsuperscript{344}

The question of succession after Seleukos was complicated because he died without a selected heir. The Seleukids had a practice of co-regency before sole power was assumed by the king up to this point, such as Seleukos had with his father before his death. The hostage requirement in Rome effectively interrupted the tradition which identified the designated heir and eased succession; Seleukos had as yet been unable to do this.\textsuperscript{345} After Seleukos’ death there were three potential heirs left: his brother Antiochos (IV), his eldest son Demetrios (I), and his youngest son Antiochos (Seleukou). The multiplicity of possible heirs set the stage for what Grainger calls “Seleukid civil war”.\textsuperscript{346} Roman willingness to intervene is shown in the next few stages of the royal succession, and the “seeds of dynastic weakness” were sown in the aftermath of Antiochos’ III’s defeat even further.\textsuperscript{347}

In 176 Demetrios had replaced Antiochos IV as a hostage in Rome as a gesture of goodwill by Seleukos. Antiochos had been in that position since the loss at Magnesia for a total of 13 years at that point. Appian gives the impression that Seleukos chose to send Demetrios, though there was no indication of brotherly affection from Seleukos and it was more likely a Roman demand.\textsuperscript{348} The fact that Seleukos gave his eldest son as a hostage may be interpreted as a sign he

\textsuperscript{343} Will 1982, 255; Green 1990, 429; Gera 1998, 111; perhaps Antiochos was in Athens at the time to be closer so as to take over, but there are no hints of cooperation involved here and Antiochos had been in Athens for some time at this point.
\textsuperscript{344} Taylor 2013, 158; Bevan 1966, 125.
\textsuperscript{345} Capdetrey 2007, 381; Kosmin 2014, 131; examples of predecessors’ co-regencies: future Antiochos I (294-281) and Antiochos II (266-261), Antiochos the Son (210-193) and Seleukos IV (189-187), and then Antiochos Seleukou under Antiochos IV (175-170).
\textsuperscript{346} Grainger 2010, 352; Gera 1998, 109.
\textsuperscript{347} Derow 2005, 75.
\textsuperscript{348} Polyb. 31.2.5; App. Syr. 45; Justin 34.3.6-8; Will 1982, 255; Mørkholm 1966, 35; Gera 1998, 104; Grainger 1997, 41; Gruen 1984, 646.
felt relations with Rome were strained, perhaps as a result of his alliance with Rhodes.\(^{349}\) After Seleukos’ death Antiochos left Athens, where he had been staying since leaving Rome, and went to Eumenes in Asia Minor, where he was given a diadem and was conducted to Syria by Attalos.\(^{350}\) The chance that Antiochos would ever come to the throne had been very slim before Seleukos died, but Demetrios was now a hostage and Antiochos Seleukou was too young. Antiochos perhaps felt that he had the responsibility of claiming the throne from Heliodoros’ strings for the good of the dynasty.\(^{351}\) His was a complex coup, he became king through the benefaction of the Attalids and easily gained recognition as such from the senate who kept Demetrios in their grasp; he took the throne between October 23\(^{rd}\) and November 20\(^{th}\) of 175.\(^{352}\)

Supported by Athenian diplomacy and funded and armed by the Attalids, he was thus able to rule contrary to the line of succession and ally himself with the Attalids thereafter.\(^{353}\) An inscription on the ascension of Antiochos IV, which was erected in Pergamon as a gift from Athens, honours Eumenes and Attalos for aiding him with goodwill and affection to his ‘ancestral kingdom’.\(^{354}\) The gain to Pergamon of having a friendly king on the Syrian throne would have been immense, and completely removed the danger of the still formidable Seleukids.\(^{355}\) Rome’s role in this affair was to hold back the ‘legitimate’ heir Demetrios. Appian suggests the alliance of Eumenes and Antiochos was Roman conceived, as in 175 both were firmly in the Roman camp.

\(^{349}\) Gera 1998, 104.
\(^{350}\) OGIS 248; App. Syr. 45; Hansen 1971, 107; Will 1982, 255; Gera 1998, 112; Habicht 1997, 223; Andrade 2013, 48; he must have been released from Rome before the hostage exchange, since he was already in Athens at the time.
\(^{351}\) Mørkholm 1966, 41.
\(^{352}\) Polyb. 31.12; Josephus AJ 12.234; Will 1982, 256; Mørkholm 1966, 43; Gera 1998, 113: Antiochos was supposedly crowned in the same month as Seleukos’ death according to the Babylonian King List (see Sachs and Wiseman 1954, 208), but this is unlikely due to the fact that at the time he was not present at the court but was still in Athens, and it would have taken some time to arrive in Syria, later is favoured.
\(^{354}\) OGIS 248; Austin 2006, 208; Burstein 1985, 38.
\(^{355}\) Kosmin 2014, 131; Green 1990, 428; Mørkholm 1966, 41.
and it is also unlikely that Eumenes would have been able to help without Roman approval.\footnote{Paltiel 1979b, 42-3; Derow 2005, 75.} Rome was also somewhat wary of Perseus, and with Antiochos IV on the throne as an ally the support he may have got from the Seleukids was gone. At that time Perseus also married his daughter to Prusias II of Bithynia, possibly looking to create another collective alliance against Pergamon.\footnote{Harris 1979, 230; Green 1990, 426.}

It is possible that Antiochos Seleukou was designated the heir after Demetrios was sent to Rome.\footnote{Paltiel 1979b, 44.} The coinage issued with his mother depicted as his regent show him to be perhaps four or five years old around the time of his father’s death.\footnote{Paltiel 1979b, 44; Sachs and Wiseman 1954, 208; Mørkholm 1966, 46; Gera 1998, 114-5: Antiochos IV is listed as the son of Seleukos in the Babylonian king list, which could be an error or the result of the beginning of his reign being fixed to cover the unusual circumstances to preserve continuity; he is also listed as killing his ‘son’ Antiochos, perhaps a mistake for nephew but this is weak, most likely that Antiochos Seleukou was adopted by him and this is the reason. Gera explains this as a Babylonian custom in which all successors are named as a “son of”.} When Antiochos IV came to power he adopted the young king and made him the co-ruler. There is no evidence that anyone in Syria thought of Demetrios as the legitimate successor and although he was the elder son, Antiochos Seleukou was recognized in Syria as the heir even before Antiochos IV arrived; Antiochos IV had an uneasy claim himself, however, and he used co-rule with the boy to solidify his claim.\footnote{App. Syr. 45; Polyb. 31.2; Gera 1998, 116-7.} Demetrios opposed this arrangement but was stuck in Rome, his partisans may have shown opposition but they failed if so.\footnote{Diod. 30.7.2; Paltiel 1979b, 44-5; Sachs and Wiseman 1954, 208; Capdetrey 2007, 387, a certain Menesthus retired to Miletus in 170 in disapproval of Antiochos IV’s behavior in this matter.} Antiochos IV murdered Antiochos Seleukou in 170/69 after the birth of his own son the future Antiochos V, which shows the extent to which he felt secure against Demetrios’ claim.\footnote{App. Syr. 45; Polyb. 31.2; Gera 1998, 116-7.}
During his reign Antiochos IV essentially continued the attitude and aims of Seleukos, and a drive for consolidation and restoration of Seleukid realms.\textsuperscript{363} The revival of the Seleukids began to decay after Seleukos and Antiochos IV as a result of continuous dynastic strife which was ruinous and aimless and gradually undermined the financial and military strength of the late Seleukids, making the Seleukid kingdom helpless to defend against foreign enemies or internal disintegration such as the creation of the Jewish kingdom.\textsuperscript{364} This most damaging split left two branches of the family fighting for the throne for many years to come. The risks inherent in monarchical empires could not be eliminated, as was shown before in the War of the Brothers between Seleukos II and Antiochos Hierax and now again in the rivalry of the descendants of Seleukos IV and Antiochos IV.\textsuperscript{365}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{363} Gruen 1984, 647.
\item \textsuperscript{364} Rostovtzeff 1964, 841.
\item \textsuperscript{365} Derow 2005, 75; Mørkholm 1966, 185; Tarn and Griffith 1952, 33; Austin 2005, 132: Alexander I Balas, who claimed to be a bastard son of Antiochos IV, tried to take the throne from Demetrios in 150 and took the epithet ‘Theopator’ on coins. He was then confronted by Demetrios’ son Demetrios II in 146; in 144 Antiochos VI, Balas’ son, came to the throne.
\end{itemize}
Chapter VIII: Conclusion

Seleukos IV inherited a defeated kingdom, and successfully led the Seleukids through less than ideal circumstances by his prudent rulership. Seleukos’ reputation suffered from the perception that he did not fit into the paradigm of what then made a ‘good’ Hellenistic king, primarily because of his peaceful and militarily non-aggressive reign. In Greek thought, monarchical power was associated with great personalities and great achievements: Hellenistic kings were usually a part of constant struggle to maintain and gain territories, seldom lacked those rivals who would seek to join the ‘royal club,’ and were at least in part military leaders.³⁶⁶ Although Seleukos was a capable commander he had no good reason to enter into any conflict, and as a result he was unable to fit this particular and limited model of Hellenistic success.

For Seleukos the treaty of Apameia was not an effective means of control, and it became a piece of international law which itself was irrelevant for his reign since it either became legally invalid for Seleukos at the death of Antiochos III or Seleukos chose to ignore it. Immediate effects, such as the loss of Asia Minor and the burning of part of the royal fleet at Patara still affected him, but he still maintained military forces, elephants, ships, and was not afraid to engage in international politics. Where it seems that Seleukos was following the terms of the treaty, for instance, is explicable through his own needs or goals, although he cared not for the terms it was still prudent not to draw the ire of the Romans by either sailing into the Aegean with a fleet or crossing the Taurus to fight against Roman allies.

³⁶⁶ Austin 1986, 457-8: examples of a long history of great achievements and personalities immediately from the beginning of the Hellenistic age: Demetrius Poliorketes beat Ptolemy in 306 and he and Antigonus Monophthalmos declare themselves kings, or Attalos I bests Antiochos Hierax and the Galatians circa 238/7 and takes the title in Pergamon. As war leaders, most fought at the head of an army in the field, which is true except of some of the Ptolemies after Ptolemy IV, they wore military regalia, and described themselves as ‘victorious’ (especially true of the Seleukids and the Baktrian Greek leaders).
Signs point to Seleukos successfully managing his kingdom internally as well, participating in many activities one would expect a good ruler to engage in. During his reign he continued to mete out civic honours, concern himself with religious matters by building and modifying infrastructure surrounding the administration of temples, participate in city foundation, and also to help keep the Seleukid economy working under the heavy financial burden of the Roman indemnity with consistent sources of income. Although he lost Asia Minor, he still controlled an empire in which there was plenty of wealth and trade.

Seleukos also was successful in his external policy. Throughout his reign he maintained a certain negativity towards Rome and her allies, especially Pergamon, but he also made many powerful international friends and allies for himself. It is known that he forged alliances with Athens, the Achaeans, and most notably Macedon, but it is also likely that during his peaceful twelve year reign that he made many more for which there is no extant evidence today. Seleukos had no reason to start any wars, since moving north or westward would draw Roman attention, the east was difficult to control, and because he already controlled Koile Syria and Phoenicia it was the Ptolemies’ discretion to open a Syrian War against him instead of his against them.

The death of Seleukos, who murdered in 175, left the Seleukid Empire with many problems which would persist for many years afterwards. His infamous brother Antiochus IV Epiphanes took the throne with the help of the Attalids and possibly Rome, a fact which Seleukos’ eldest son Demetrios I did not forget. The Seleukid line was split into two rival groups, the descendants of Seleukos IV and Antiochus IV, who would trade the kingdom’s control back and forth in bloody contest and effectively reduce the power of their house with constant infighting. The troubles with the Jewish population of the Empire may have arisen in the latter years of Seleukos’ reign; under his successor these troubles would break out into full rebellion.
Seleukos, in the end, managed to accomplish a lot for being such a ‘lazy’ king. Although he by no means had a flashy reign, he did what he had to do in order to keep the Seleukid kingdom moving forward and to return it to being an international power. His quiet reign suited the difficult years after the defeat by Rome, and he spent his time putting his kingdom back at the center of Hellenistic politics. Having presided over such a substantial recovery of the kingdom, he made it possible for his successor to capitalize on a resurgence of Seleukid power by successfully leading the Seleukid kingdom through a challenging period after harsh defeat.  

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Bibliography


Appendix A: Seleukos IV Genealogy Chart

A select genealogical chart of the immediate family of Seleukos IV, including more distant relations relevant during his reign.\(^{368}\)

\(^{368}\) Prepared with some aid from Dr. Alex McAuley’s work at: http://www.seleucid-genealogy.com.
Appendix B: Select Primary Sources

B1: Portrayals of Seleukos

Appian Syr. 66

...και αὐτοῦ περὶ τοῦ παιδίου προείπον ἁμφοῖν βεβασιλευκότοιν, Σελεύκου τε καὶ Ἀντίόχου, Σελεύκου μὲν ἔτεσι δώδεκα, ἀπράκτως ἄμα καὶ ἁσθενῶς διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς συμφοράν... 367

I have already spoken of his two sons both of whom ascended the throne, Seleukos and Antiochos, Seleukos for twelve years, but feebly and without success because of his father's misfortune.

Jerome In Danielem 11:20

"Et stabit in loco ejus vilissimus, et indignus decore regio: et in paucis diebus contereatur, non in furore, nec in praelio." Seleucum dicit cognomento Philopatorem filium Magni Antiochi, qui nihil dignum Syriae et patris gessit imperio, et absque ullis praeliiis inglorius perit. 369

"And there shall stand up in his place one most vile and unworthy of kingly honor, and in a few days he shall be destroyed, not in rage, nor in battle." The reference is to the Seleukos surnamed Philopator, the son of Antiochos the Great, who performed no deeds worthy of Syria or of his father in his reign, but perished ingloriously without fighting a single battle.

B2: The Treaty of Apamea

Polybios 21.42


367 Taken from:
http://www.documentacatholicacoomnia.eu/03d/0347-0420,_Hieronymus,_In_Danielem_Prophetam,_LT.pdf

[1] The terms in detail were as follows: “There shall be friendship between Antiochos and the Romans for all time if he fulfills the conditions of the treaty: King Antiochos and his subjects shall not permit the passage through their territory of any enemy marching against the Romans and their allies or furnish such enemy with any supplies: the Romans and their allies engage to act likewise towards Antiochos and his subjects: Antiochos shall not make war on the inhabitants of the islands or of Europe: [5] he shall evacuate all cities, lands, villages, and forts on this side of Taurus as far as the river Halys and all between the valley of Taurus and the mountain ridges that descend to Lycaonia: from all such places he is to carry away nothing except the arms borne by his soldiers, and if anything has been carried away, it is to be restored to the same city: he shall not receive

either soldiers or others from the kingdom of Eumenes: if there be any men in the army of Antiochus coming from the cities which the Romans take over, he shall deliver them up at Apameia: if there be any from the kingdom of Antiochus dwelling with the Romans and their allies, they may remain or depart at their good pleasure: [10] Antiochus and his subjects shall give up the slaves of the Romans and of their allies, and any prisoners of war they have taken, if there be such: Antiochus shall give up, if it be in his power, Hannibal son of Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, Mnasilechus the Acrarian, Thoas the Aetolian, Eubulidas and Philo the Chalcidian, and all Aetolians who have held public office: he shall surrender all the elephants now in Apameia and not keep any in future: he shall surrender his long ships with their gear and tackle and in future he shall not possess more than ten decked ships of war, nor shall he have any galley rowed by more than thirty oars, nor a monere to serve in any war in which he is the aggressor: his ships shall not sail beyond the Calycadnus and the Sarpedonian promontory unless conveying tribute, envoys or hostages: [15] Antiochus shall not have permission to hire mercenaries from the lands under the rule of the Romans, or to receive fugitives: all houses that belonged to the Rhodians and their allies in the dominions of Antiochus shall remain their property as they were before he made war on them; likewise if any money is owing to them they may exact payment, and if anything has been abstracted from them it shall be sought for and returned: merchandise meant for Rhodes shall be free from duties as before the war: if any of the cities which Antiochus has to give up have been given by him to others, he shall withdraw from these also the garrisons and the men in possession of them: and if any cities afterwards wish to desert to him, he shall not receive them: Antiochus shall pay to the Romans a thousand talents a year for twelve years, the talent not to weigh less than eighty Roman pounds, and five hundred and forty thousand modii of corn: [20] he shall pay to King Eumenes three hundred and fifty talents in the next five years, paying seventy talents a year at the same time that is fixed for his payments to the Romans and in lieu of the corn, as Antiochus estimated it one hundred and twenty-seven talents and twelve hundred and eight drachmas, the sum Eumenes agreed to accept as a satisfactory payment to his treasury: Antiochus shall give twenty hostages, replacing them every three years, not below eighteen years of age and not above forty: if any of the money he pays does not correspond to the above stipulations, he shall make it good in the following year: [25] if any of the cities or peoples against which Antiochus is forbidden by this treaty to make war begin first to make war on him, he may make war on such, provided he does not exercise sovereignty over any of them or receive them into his alliance: all grievances of both parties are submitted to a lawful tribunal: if both parties desire to add any clauses to this treaty or to remove any by common decree, they are at liberty to do so. 371

Livy 38.38

Ibi ex decem legatorum sententia foedus in haec uerba fere cum Antiocho conscriptum est: 'amicitia regi Antiocho cum populo Romano his legibus et condicionibus esto: ne quem exercitum, qui cum populo Romano sociisue bellum gesturus erit, rex per fines regni sui eorumue, qui sub dicione eius erunt, transire sinito, neu commeatu neu qua alia ope iuuato; idem Romani sociisque Antiocho et iis, qui sub imperio eius erunt, praestent.

Belli gerendi ius Antiocho ne esto cum iis, qui insulas colunt, neue in Europam transeundi. Excedito urbibus agris uicis castellis cis Taurum montem usque ad Halyn amnem, et a ualle Tauri usque ad iuga, qua in Lycaoniam uergit. Ne qua praeter arma efferto ex iis oppidis agris castellisque, quibus excedat; si qua extulit, quo quaeque oportebit, recte restituito. Ne militem neu quem aliquam ex regno Eumenis recipito. Si qui earum urbiue ciues, quae regno abscedunt, cum rege Antiocho intraque fines regni eius sunt, Apameam omnes ante diem certam redeunto; qui ex regno Antiochi apud Romanos sociosque sunt, iis ius abeundi manendique esto; seruos seu fugitiuos suo bello captos, seu quis liber captus aut transfuga erit, reddito Romanis sociisque. Elephantostr tradito omnis neque alios parato. Tradito et naues longas armamentaque earum, neu plures quam decem naues tectas neue plures quam naues actuarías, quorum nulla plus quam triginta remis agetur, habeto, neue monerem [ex] belli causa, quod ipse illaturus erit. Ne navigato citra Calycadnum neu Sarpedonium promunturia, extra quam si qua nauris pecuniam stipendium aut legatos aut obsides portabit. Milites mercede conducendi ex iis gentibus, quae sub dicione populi Romani sunt, Antiocho regi ius ne esto, ne voluntarios quidem recipiendi. Rhodiorum sociorumue quae aedes aedificiue intra fines regni Antiochi sunt, quo iure ante bellum fuerunt, eo Rhodiorum sociorumu sunto; si quae pecuniae debentur, earum exactio esto; si quid ablatum est, id conquiriendi cognoscendi repetendi item ius esto. Si quas urbes, quas tradi oportet, ii tenent, quibus Antiochus dedit, et ex iis praesidia deducito, utique recte tradantur, curato. Argenti probi talenta Attica duodecim milia dato intra duodecim annos pensionibus aequis—talentum ne minus pondo octoginta Romanis ponderibus pendant—et tritici quingenta quadraginta milia modium. Eumeni regi talenta trecenta quinquaginta intra quinquennium dato, et pro frumento, quod aestimatione fit, talenta centum uiginti septem. Obsides Romanis uiginti dato et triennio mutato, ne minores octonum denum annorum neu maiiores quinum quadrageum. Si qui sociorum populi Romani ultro bellum inferent Antiucho, uim ui arcendi ius esto, dum ne quam urbem aut belli iure teneat aut in amicitiam accipiat. Controuersias inter1 se iure ac iudicio discceptando, aut, si utrisque placebit, bello.' De Hannibale Poeno et Aetolo Thoante et Mnasiolocho Acarnane et Chalcidensibus Eubulida et Philone dedendis in hoc quoque foedere adscriptum est, et ut, si quid postea addi demi mutariue placuisset, ut id saluo foedere fieret.372

Here the treaty as settled by the ten commissioners was drawn up. The substance of it was as follows: "There shall be peace and amity between King Antiochos and the Roman people on these terms and conditions: The king shall not suffer any army purposing to levy war on the Roman people or their allies to pass through the borders of his kingdom or of any subject to him, nor shall he assist it with provisions or in any other way whatever. The Romans and their allies shall act in like manner towards Antiochos and those under his sway. Antiochos shall have no right to levy war upon those who dwell in the islands, or to sail across to Europe. He shall withdraw from all the cities, lands, villages and forts west of the Taurus as far as the Halys and extending from the lowlands of the Taurus up to the range which stretches towards Lycaonia. He shall not carry any arms from the aforesaid towns and lands and forts from which he withdraws; if he has carried any away he shall duly restore them to whatever place they belong. He shall not reclaim any soldier or any other person whatever from the kingdom of Eumenes. If any citizens belonging to the cities

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372 Taken from: http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/livy/liv.38.shtml.
which are passing from under his rule are with Antiochus or within the boundaries of his realm, they shall all return to Apameia by a certain day; if any of Antiochus' subjects are with the Romans and their allies they shall be at liberty to depart or to remain. He shall restore to the Romans and their allies the slaves, whether fugitives or prisoners of war, or any free man who has been taken captive or is a deserter. He shall give up his elephants and not procure any more. He shall likewise make over his ships of war and all their tackle, nor shall he possess more than ten light decked ships, none of which may be propelled by more than thirty oars, and no smaller ones for use in any war which he may undertake. He shall not take his ships west of the headlands of the Calycadnus or the Sorpedon, save only such ships as shall carry money or tribute or envoys or hostages. Antiochus shall not have the right to hire mercenary troops from those nations which shall be under the suzerainty of Rome nor to accept them even as volunteers. Such houses and buildings as belonged to the Rhodians and their allies within the dominions of Antiochus shall be held by them on the same right as before the war. If any moneys are due to them they shall have the same right to exact them, if aught has been taken from them, they shall have the right of search and recovery. Whatever cities amongst those that are to be surrendered they hold as a gift from Antiochus; he shall withdraw the garrisons from them and provide for their due surrender. He shall pay 12,000 Attic talents of sterling silver in equal instalments over twelve years - the talent shall weigh not less than 80 Roman pounds - and 540,000 modii of wheat. To King Eumenes he shall pay 350 talents within five years, and in place of corn its value in money, 127 talents. He shall give twenty hostages to the Romans and exchange them for others in three years, that none may be less than eighteen or more than forty-five years of age. If any of the allies of Rome shall wantonly and without provocation make war on Antiochus, he shall have the right to repel them by force of arms, always providing that he shall not hold any city by right of war or receive it into friendship and amity. Disputes shall be determined before a judicial tribunal, or if both parties shall so will it, by war." There was an additional clause dealing with the surrender of Hannibal, Thoas and Mnasilochus, as well as Eubulidas and Philo of Chalcidae, and also a proviso that if it should afterwards be decided to add to, or repeal, or alter any of the articles, that should be done without impairing the validity of the treaty. 373

Appian Syr. 38-9

[38]...ὅσα καὶ ἡμῖν ἔσται χρήσιμα καὶ αὐτῶν λυσιτελῆ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἐξ ἀσφάλειαν, ἀπέχεσθαι μὲν αὐτὸν τῆς Εὐρώπης ὅλης καὶ Ασίας τῶν ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ταύρου ἑντοῦς ὀρῶν τεθήσονται, παραδοῦναι δ᾽ ἑλέφαντας δόσως ἔχει καὶ ναῦς ὅσας ἂν ἐπιτάξωμεν, ὡς τε λοιπὸν ἑλέφαντας μὲν οὐκ ἔχειν, ναῦς δὲ ὅσας ἂν ὄρισωμεν, δοῦναι δὲ καὶ εἰκοσὶ ὁμήρᾳ, ἃ ἂν ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπηγάδη, καὶ χρήματα ἐς τὴν τοῦτο τοῦ πολέμου δαπάνην, δι᾽ αὐτὸν γενομένου, τάλαντα Ἐὐβοϊκὰ αὐτίκα μὲν ἢδη πεντακόσια, καὶ ὅταν τάδε τὰς σπονδὰς ἢ σύγκλητος ἐπιστησίσῃ, δισχίλια καὶ πεντακόσια, δώδεκα δ᾽ ἔτεσιν ἄλλοις ἔτερα μύρια καὶ δισχίλια, τὸ μέρος ἐκάστου ἔτους ἀναφέροντα ἐς 'Ρώμην: ἀποδοῦναι δ᾽ ἡμῖν αἰχμάλωτα καὶ αὐτόμολα πάντα, καὶ Εὐμένια δοσὶ λοιπὰ τῆς πρὸς Ἀτταλον τῶν Εὐμένους πατέρα συνθήκης ἔχει. ταῦτα Αντιόχῳ πρᾶττοντι ἀδόλους διδόμεν εἰρήνην τε καὶ φιλίαν, ὅταν ἢ σύγκλητος ἐπιστησίσῃ.

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He must abandon Europe altogether and all of Asia this side of the Taurus, the boundaries to be fixed hereafter; he shall surrender all the elephants he has, and such number of ships as we may prescribe, and for the future keep no elephants and only so many ships as we allow; must give twenty hostages, whom the consul will select, and pay for the cost of the present war, incurred on his account, 500 Euboic talents down and 2500 more when the Senate ratifies the treaty; and 12,000 more during twelve years, each yearly installment to be delivered in Rome. He shall also surrender to us all prisoners and deserters, and to Eumenes whatever remains of the possessions he acquired by his agreement with Attalus, the father of Eumenes. If Antiochos accepts these conditions without guile we will grant him peace and friendship subject to the Senate's ratification."

All the terms offered by Scipio were accepted by the ambassadors. That part of the money which was to be paid down, and the twenty hostages, were furnished. Among the latter was Antiochos, the younger son of Antiochos. The Scipios and Antiochos both sent messengers to Rome. The Senate ratified their acts, and a treaty was written carrying out Scipio's views, a few things being added or made plain that had been left indefinite. The boundaries of the dominions of Antiochos were to be the two promontories of Calycadnus and Sarpedonium, beyond which he should not sail for purposes of war. He should have only twelve war-ships for the purpose of keeping his subjects under control, but he might have more if he were attacked. He should not recruit mercenaries from Roman territory nor entertain fugitives from the same, and the hostages should be changed every third year, except the son of Antiochos. This treaty was engraved on brazen tablets and deposited in the Capitol (where it was customary to deposit such treaties), and a copy of it was sent to Manlius Vulso, Scipio's successor in the command.

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375 Trans. Horace White, taken from: http://www.livius.org/sources/content/appian/appian-the-syrian-wars/.