THE OJIBWA: 1640-1840

TWO CENTURIES OF CHANGE FROM SAULT STE. MARIE TO COLDWATER/NARROWS

by

JAMES RALPH HANDY

A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History

Waterloo, Ontario, 1978

© James Ralph Handy, 1978
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis.

I authorize the University of Waterloo to lend this thesis to other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research.

[Signature]

I further authorize the University of Waterloo to reproduce this thesis by photocopying or by other means, in total or in part, at the request of other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research.

[Signature]
The University of Waterloo requires the signature of all persons using or photocopying this thesis. Please sign below, and give address and date.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Title Page</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Title Page</td>
<td>(i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Author's Declaration</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Borrower's Page</td>
<td>(iii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>(iv)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The Ojibwa Before the Fur Trade</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Saulteur</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- growth of cultural affiliation</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- the individual</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Hurons</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- fur trade</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Iroquois competition</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- dispersal</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>The Fur Trade Survives: Ojibwa Expansion</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- western villages</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- totems</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Midiwewin</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- dispersal to villages</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ojibwa Expansion Into the Southern Great Lakes Region</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Iroquois decline</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- fur trade</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- alcohol</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(iv)
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ojibwa Expansion (Cont'd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- dependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The British Trade in Southern Great Lakes 1760-1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- traders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ramsay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- presents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Indian Land Surrenders in Upper Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- settlers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Simcoe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- settlement in the interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- confusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Missionary Enterprise Among the Indians of the Lower Great Lakes Area - 1815-1830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Wesley - Methodists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Peter Jones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Changing Government Attitudes in the 1830's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Anderson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- pressure from Ojibwa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(v)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14)</td>
<td>Commencement of the Establishment</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Lake Simcoe and Huron Ojibwa</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- clearing the land</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15)</td>
<td>The Experiment Falters</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- the road</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- conflict between Anderson and the chiefs</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- monetary restrictions</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16)</td>
<td>Government Missionary Conflict: Control for Control's Sake</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Colborne's promises</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Methodist conflict</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Catholics</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17)</td>
<td>White Encroachment and Harassment</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- growth of settlement</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- village at Narrows</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- immigrants</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18)</td>
<td>The Great Manitoulin</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Anderson's suggestions</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Sir Francis Bond Head</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19)</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20)</td>
<td>Footnotes</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21)</td>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(vi)
INTRODUCTION

Reserves are an accepted fact in the history of native people in Canada. For most of Canada's Indians they are a stark, harsh reality which draws boundaries of poverty around them, separating them, perhaps inextricably, from the main stream of economic progress in Canada.

For decades a debate has raged among government officials, Indian leaders and white philanthropists concerning the exact role the reserve has played in shaping the existence of Canada's native population. By some they are reviled as the main feature of an apartheid system which has led to cultural rigidity and economic exclusion. Others have viewed them as necessary evils, as a cultural enclave which allowed the Indian to maintain elements at least of a culture being buffeted on all sides. The truth is probably somewhere in between. Initially designed to assist the Indian while they developed the skills needed to fit into the emerging Canadian society, they have, in the process, become stagnant pools of poverty, despair and powerlessness.

It seems ironic that despite this continuing debate, and despite various attempts to analyze the official policy change on the part of the British Government towards reserves in the middle of the eighteenth century, nobody has delved deeply into the events surrounding and the history of the first major attempt by the Imperial British Government to
create a reserve to 'civilize' and 'cultivate habits of industriousness' among the native people of Canada.

The establishment of Coldwater-Narrows Indian Reserve in 1830 was in many ways the culmination of one period of Government-Indian relations and the beginning of another. As the first government sponsored agricultural reserve in British North America the events which surround Coldwater-Narrows, its perceived success or failure, contain significance which belies its relatively brief existence. The lessons learned here went deep into the consciousness of Indian Department officials.

Coldwater-Narrows also marks, perhaps, the most obvious, although not the most successful, attempt on the part of significant elements of the Ojibwa in Upper Canada to create for themselves and the generations to follow a viable place in the society which was taking shape around them.

In the two centuries before the reserve period the Ojibwa had emerged from a small population of isolated clan villages, centred at the head of Lake Huron with little sense of cultural affiliation. As the fur trade began to envelop them not only did their material culture thrive but their sense of nationhood, of cultural affiliation and ties with those bands around them developed into the full
realization of an Ojibwa people. Their numbers increased dramatically, they annexed huge areas, and as the fur trade more obviously favored their aboriginal way of life over those of previously more prosperous tribes, the Ojibwa became in many ways the model for a Pan-Indian culture.

This flowering of the Ojibwa culture only served to enhance an already strong sense of individual autonomy in which any constraints on the individual were regarded as undue fetters. But it seemed, just as the Ojibwa gradually became inextricably dependent on European goods for their survival, the fur trade had bypassed them, their hunting grounds became depleted and their lands encroached upon by white settlers. The Ojibwa were forced to accept government payment to survive, were forced to accept government direction in their warfare and diplomacy and, slowly but surely, were forced to accept white law and dictates in their personal relations. Many Ojibwa had become aware that old beliefs and traditional ways no longer worked in the radically altered circumstances which engulfed them. The fact that Coldwater-Narrows ultimately proved of little assistance in preparing the Ojibwa to function viably in these altered circumstances held significant portent for later Ojibwa history in Upper Canada.

Coldwater-Narrows is also a good example of that process common in the history of European expansion but
perhaps best described by George Copway, an Ojibwa:

"Behold the change! Commerce urged on by the pale face strides rapidly and resistlessly into the midst and orders them back, back, back, to make way for its houses and its merchandize. Scarce is he camped ere he once again is told to go further west."(1)

Upper Canada in the 1800's was the scene of a pitched battle between those whose actions Emeric de Vattel attempted to justify in publicizing a Swiss jurist's opinion that "every nation is therefore bound by natural law to cultivate the land which has fallen to its share,"(2) and those who had been most successful in assisting the Ojibwa to do just that. The Methodist missionaries had demonstrated noted success in shepherding their Ojibwa charges to an orderly life based on industrious agricultural production. Coldwater-Narrows occurred at the zenith of Methodist influence in Upper Canada. The success of Coldwater-Narrows and, perhaps more importantly, the amount of control they were able to maintain over both the establishment and the Ojibwa involved in it were perceived to be of primary importance to the continued growth of Methodist missions in Upper Canada. Hardening governmental determination to stifle that growth became most apparent at Coldwater-Narrows, while (occasionally) both the Methodists and the Indian Department felt compelled to work together to insulate the Ojibwa against those settlers clamouring for the land the Indian controlled. The growing belief on the
part of the Methodists, the Indian Department and the Indians themselves that they would be unable to do so acted in conjunction with the unique circumstances eventually to insure that the fear would come to fruition. The forced Ojibwa abandonment of the Coldwater-Narrows enclave was both a dramatic instance of the process Copway describes and a warning to other Ojibwa in Upper Canada.

For all these reasons a thorough examination of the Coldwater-Narrows experiment would seem to do much to illuminate an important period in Canadian Indian history. A few have skirted the topic. R. Surtees, in an unpublished master's thesis entitled "The Development of the Indian Reserve Policy in Upper Canada",(3) draws a picture of the shifting and buckling which went on within the Indian Department during this period to accommodate the government's jump into the fray. Peter Schmaltz has given us a detailed account of the Saugeen Indians, concentrating much of his attention on this period in an unpublished M.A. thesis(4) and a later revision, The History of the Saugeen Indians.(5) Donald Smith's unpublished Ph.D. thesis "The Mississaugas, Peter Jones, and the White Man: The Algonkians Adjustment to the Europeans on the North Shore of Lake Ontario to 1860"(6) covers much of the background leading up to the Coldwater-Narrows experiment and gives a good over-view of related events in Upper Canada but concentrates
primarily on the Credit Mission and Peter Jones' exertions. Similarly, E. Graham's Ph.D. thesis, "Strategies and Souls"(?) and later book Medicine Man to Missionary,(8) while covering roughly the same period in Upper Canada, concentrate primarily on Government/Missionary jockeying for position and only mention the Coldwater-Narrows experiment. None of these works provide us with the detailed discussion of the government's first major step that any understanding and illustration of subsequent reserve history seems to demand.

In attempting to provide this detailed description and to explain the events which occurred during the experiment it is first necessary to come to some understanding of the position the Ojibwa found themselves in in Upper Canada during the early 1800's. Numerous secondary sources have described early Ojibwa history in the Great Lakes area, their growing tribal awareness, material and cultural fluorescence and a number of the studies previously mentioned discuss in some detail the pervading changes which overwhelmed the Ojibwa in Upper Canada during the first half of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless a synthesis of these various works seems in order. For, just as subsequent reserve history in the Dominion cannot be fully understood without first viewing the Coldwater-Narrows experiment, that establishment and its significance cannot be comprehended if they are not placed, graphically, within the context of the accelerating development of the colony itself.
and the swift, all-encompassing changes which engulfed the Ojibwa in the two centuries before Coldwater-Narrows.
A number of nineteenth century historians have given us a variety of colourful explanations concerning how the people who called themselves Anishnaube (spontaneous man) became known to the French and ultimately posterity as the 'Ojibwa'. Ojibwa meant 'to pucker' and this has been alternatively explained as an appellation given them because of the way their moccasins puckered from the stitching,\(^1\) or even more colourfully as how their enemies looked after being roasted.\(^2\) The most logical explanation though is that one given by Edward Neill suggesting that it was derived from the pucker of water caused by the narrows at Sault Ste Marie.\(^3\) If Sault Ste Marie indeed has the honor of contributing the name to the Ojibwa it is an honor well deserved, for the narrows at Sault Ste Marie and the attendant white fish fishery played a pivotal role in the development of a sense of nationhood and shared cultural traits among the Ojibwa.

In 1641, the time of the first recorded contact between the French and the diverse Algonkian bands located throughout the Upper Great Lakes area, these bands were just emerging from a long period of gradual cultural development. This cultural progression, the late Woodland Period, was
characterized by the autonomous development of small isolated groups demonstrating "extreme cultural diversity".\(^{(4)}\) The semi-nomadic utilization of the resources available had encouraged the limiting of social grouping to small summer villages of one hundred to one hundred and fifty people.\(^{(5)}\) These villages were in essence little more than "territorially-based descent groups",\(^{(6)}\) a brief gathering of a few small hunting units who felt they shared a common ancestor or totem, were able to draw their organization from the sense of kinship that evolved and felt a commonality because of a "consciousness of neighbourhood."\(^{(7)}\) During the bulk of the year even these small villages dissolved. They, by necessity, split into a myriad of isolated family hunting units. These villages were all related culturally, spoke a mutually intelligible language, engaged in similar economic pursuits and shared certain concepts of religion and individual autonomy.\(^{(8)}\)

By the beginning of the eighteenth century the concept of a cultural tie which joined all these bands into one powerful, if loose, tribal entity was already well established. In searching for the spark that helped set off this rapid development, historians have traditionally been quick to point to the fur trade as the most important single element. There is no denying the pervasive effect of the fur trade but the process had begun before the fur trade
had been felt directly by the northern Algonkians. The key to this nascent development was the white fish fishery at the narrows of Sault Ste Marie.

The impulse for the isolated village group had always lain in economic necessity. To survive in the relatively sparse flora and fauna of the Northern Great Lakes region these Algonkian speaking people had developed a complex round of activity based on six distinct seasons. Each of these six seasons (bibon, sigun, misohamik, nibon, tagwagia, nimegsikang)(9) was characterized by a distinct economic activity. From December to March, bibon, was spent in family hunt camps pursuing moose and deer. March to mid-April, sigun, was maple sugar time. Three or four related families would congregate at large maple groves where the women would collect the syrup and the men would spear fish. By mid-April a few of the men would travel south to trade meat, furs and sugar to the Huron for corn and tobacco while the others would hunt and fish.(10) This round of varied activity would continue throughout the year.

The Saulteur had not been forced into this annual seasonal activity. The abundant white fish harvest during the summer had allowed about one hundred and fifty of them to live in a permanent settlement at Sault Ste Marie(11)
relying on the harvest and local hunting to supply their needs. During periods of hardship, particularly in the early winter before enough snow had fallen to allow the families to scatter to hunt camps in search of moose and deer, various neighbouring kin groups were periodically forced by hunger to travel to the Sault to barter or beg from the Saulteur's supplies. Gradually more and more of these kin groups would return to the Sault Narrows to fish during the summer months. As the number of people attending the fishery grew it became a most convenient spot from which to organize and launch joint trading ventures to the Huron, or for the Huron to approach to accomplish their trading. As the importance of the fishery at the Narrows became increasingly apparent more and more diverse people began to meet there during the summer and, increasingly, to stay over the winter months. The paramount position of the Saulteur became even more evident.

During the mid-1600's the Jesuit, Claude Dabion, described the Saulteur as having allied themselves with three other bands of five hundred and fifty people who by then were living at Sault Ste Marie permanently. He estimated that there were approximately four hundred and fifty others who hunted in the area and fished there in summer, as well as another five hundred who were "entirely
nomadic" but returned to fish in summer. (12)

Throughout this period the Sault garnered increasing importance as a centre for religious and ceremonial activity. The growing congregation of people allowed for a flowering of that ceremonial life usually engaged in during summer months in the village. Its role as a primary trading centre also fostered the growth of shared ceremonies with other groups, such as the Hurons, which strengthened alliances.

This was obviously one of the major functions of the Feast of the Dead held at the Sault which the Jesuit, Jerome Lalement, described:

"Those of each Nation, before landing, in order to make their entry more imposing, form their canoes in line to wait until others come to meet them. When the people are assembled the chief stands up in the middle of his canoe and states the object that has brought them thither. Thereupon each one throws away a portion of his goods to be scrambled for. Some articles float on the water, while others sink to the bottom. The young men hasten to the spot. One will seize a net, wrought as tapestries are in France; another a beaver skin; others get a hatchet or dish.... There is nothing but joy, cries and public acclamations to which the rocks surrounding the great lake return an echo that drowns all their voices.

When all the Nations are assembled and divided, each in their own seats, beaver robes, skins of otter, of caribou, of wild cats and of moose; hatchets, kettles, pome-
kein beads and all things that are precious in this country are exhibited. Each chief of a Nation presents his own gift to those who hold the Feast." (13)

The mixing inherent among the various Algonkian bands gradually fostered the realization of shared traits and, often, interests. These similarities were illuminated even further by the obvious differences made apparent by the visits of other nations, particularly the Huron. The increased size of the trading units, which developed because of this congregation at the Sault, created the need for greater cooperation in trading excursions. All of these elements were combining to foster the growth of a larger sense of cultural affinity.

The Ojibwa later needed this sense of commonality as a growing reliance on the fur trade created increased demands on traditional structures. These Algonkian bands had gradually become involved in the fur trade before direct contact with the French. The Hurons had been able to expand their aboriginal trading apparatus very efficiently and their strategic position between the western tribes and the French to allow them to distribute French goods for furs.

This trade extended to the northern Algonkian bands, but before the mid-1600's it created few far ranging ramifications in either their economic activity or social,
religious life. In the first place, the route through which the fur trade was carried out was the long familiar one of barter with the Hurons. As described earlier, the Algonkians had long been engaged in trade with the Hurons. It was this already existing link which allowed the Huron to control the Great Lakes fur trade and to a certain extent erected them as a buffer between the potentially disruptive effects of European contact and the emerging Ojibwa culture in the north. The shape of the existing proto-Ojibwa culture also helped temper the effects of the fur trade upon the Algonkian bands. With the exception of Sault Ste Marie, the bands were still an extremely scattered population. It was decades before many of the clan villages were to receive any significant input of European trade goods.

Similarly the traditional round of economic activity fit well into the demands of the fur trade. For the relatively small number of skins needed in the early days of the trade, the family hunt group only needed to spend a little more time on hunting beaver during the winter months. As they became more efficient hunters due to the introduction of iron hatchets and arrow heads it did not mean a significant decrease in their harvest of moose and deer. There was no large scale cooperation
common during the winter months which could be disrupted by the demands of the fur trade. Thus it was only after the dispersal of the Huron in the mid-1600's and growing involvement in the fur trade that the changes wrought began to shake the traditional structures of northern Algonkian life, as well as providing the final impetus for the growing awareness of an Ojibwa commonality.

Before we can understand the effects of this growing involvement in the fur trade, we need to delve a little deeper into the culture of the pre-contact Ojibwa.

The often discussed Indian views on land ownership have, to a certain extent, created a common misconception of North American Indian society as one of Utopian socialism, in which each member got according to his needs. This is exactly that, a misconception, when discussing most native culture in Canada. It certainly is when viewing the Ojibwa. Ruth Landes in *Ojibwa Sociology* believes that early Ojibwa culture was more accurately described as "ruthless individualism". She goes on to explain:

"All property...is held by individuals not by groups. Society can only ascertain the legality of the acquisition. Beyond that, society has no voice. Indeed, the individual is urged to do the furthest he likes, legally he cannot be criticized when, for example... he refuses to tolerate needy families on rich hunting grounds." (14)
This obsession with the freedom of the individual pervaded all aspects of Ojibwa society. Whether scattered in the family hunting groups or congregated in their summer villages Ojibwa society was notable in its lack of social control structures. Indeed social conduct was inevitably "governed only by the conventional obligations of kin."\(^{(15)}\)

But even within kin groups members of the family were given almost complete autonomy. Young children were very quickly given the rights and responsibilities of adults and were expected to govern their conduct in a like manner.

To the French and English this lack of authoritarianism was often unintelligible. Nicholas Perrot, reporting in the 1600's, was shocked that "the father does not venture authority over his sons, nor does the chief dare to give commands to his soldiers."\(^{(16)}\) Indeed, not being able to understand this true freedom, both the French and the English helped perpetrate a further misconception, that of the Indian chief who ruled his people with a tempered firmness, which still exists today in popular depictions of Indian life. This type of chief was a rarity. An Ojibwa village would have had any number of elders responsible for various areas - war, oratory, etc. \(^{(17)}\) but all this signified was that they were individuals noted for their skill or judgment in that particular area. If they ever proved ineffective they would no longer be consulted.
Ojibwa religion reflected this individual freedom. The Ojibwa had several varieties of shaman, and although the entreaties of a successful shaman would be very powerful he (or she) was only recognized as a mortal who had been granted a particular skill. Perhaps the most important event in determining the future of a young Ojibwa, and the most intense religious experience of his life, was the quest for a guardian spirit. Through fasting and hallucination the young Ojibwa hoped to attract the ministrations of a spirit out of nature. Much of the young Ojibwa's future success would depend on the power and dedication of this guardian spirit. Those who received a very special blessing became shamans, either a waveno (leader) or djishu (conjurer) or kugaeinchagy (seer). But the success or failure at all times depended upon the efforts or power or the individual and his helpers.

The Ojibwa gods and spirits were in essence individuals also. Most Ojibwa believed in one supreme spirit who never became apparent but manifested himself through a host of subordinate spirits. These subordinate spirits were not mindless followers but individuals in their own right with their own special quirks and personalities. The subordinate spirits were responsible for imbuing all of nature with supernatural power and, as even nature was composed of unfettered individuals, the Ojibwa was constantly bombarded
by attacks from the supernatural on all sides.(20)

Ojibwa society during this initial period then was a natural progression over the approximate one thousand years of the Late Woodland Cultural Development. What had developed was a society shaped and fitted around individual exertion, not only in economic pursuits but in social organization and spiritual fulfillment. A society in which "all the essential articles they used they made themselves, and all members of the group could perform the requisite tasks...they were primarily self-sufficient and self-contained."(21)

This self-sufficiency helped create a society best termed atomistic, that is "one characterized by primary emphasis upon individual freedom and freedom from cultural restraints; reserve in inter-personal relations, lack of large scale organisms, weak and ineffectual leadership."(22) But the excesses of this individualism were tempered by a pervading "kindness" throughout the group, by the feeling that one really was responsible for the welfare of those around him. Thus, although individual aggrandizement was perfectly within the bounds of 'legal' behaviour it certainly was not the norm.

It was this type of society, moving gradually towards a shared group consciousness and involved on a
limited scale in the fur trade, which embarked on a period of accelerated cultural change, physical expansion and cultural fluorescence in the initial period of intense involvement in the fur trade. The immediate cause of this involvement was the loss of the Huron buffer through their dispersal in the early 1650's.
CHAPTER 2

HURONS

The Coldwater-Narrows Indian Reserve was really a thin band joining two villages. This band ran from the narrows of Lake Couchiching and Lake Simcoe to Matchedash Bay (later Coldwater) on Lake Huron. As mentioned above, by the early and mid-1800's, when the reserve period began in Upper Canada, the Coldwater-Narrows area and most of the rest of Upper Canada was inhabited by Ojibwa or the closely allied Mississauga. The Ojibwa were relative newcomers though, and the story of their occupation of Upper Canada from the head of Lake Superior is a long and involved one.

The strip from Coldwater-Narrows ran through the middle of what had been, two hundred years earlier, the heart of Huron country, probably the most populous tribal alliance north of Mexico. The dispersal of these Huron tribes and the allied Petuns and Neutrals in the middle of the seventeenth century is arguably the most important single incident in Canadian history. Up until their dispersal the Huron had jealously guarded their position as brokers between the French and the Indian tribes to the west. It is clear that they could not have maintained this position indefinitely, but their absence after the dispersal none-
theless changed the shape of French-Indian interaction for many years to come, and might have even significantly altered the success of the English conquest of Canada one hundred years later.

The Hurons had progressed through the same period of Late Woodland Culture earlier described, but their favourable geographic position and more fertile soil had created significantly different results than those for the more northerly Algonkian groups. Huron culture had developed around an intensive agricultural use of corn. This agricultural base had allowed for proliferate population growth and the establishment of various fair sized towns as well as numerous villages, large in comparison to the Ojibwa kin group village. The Huron, although basing their economy on corn production, were not completely sedentary. Their villages were moved every few years as the fields around them became too depleted from the intensive planting and slash and burn clearing. The men still engaged in significant hunting, being absent from the village much of the year. Nonetheless the corn base allowed for a relative material prosperity and certainly a much greater security against the famine common among the northern Algonkians. Indeed, Hunt asserts that they had developed their agricultural techniques to such an extent that they could "keep on hand at all times a supply of corn sufficient for three or four
years"(1) in case of crop failure.

The greater size of the village social unit and the ease of transportation and communication had resulted in the development of a rich community life. Tribal identity was highly developed. The sense of commonality with the other bands comprising the Huron nation was strong. Social organism was developed and complex. Ceremonial life was highly organized, ritualized and occurred on a large scale.(2)

Even before the fur trade, the surplus garnered through their agricultural pursuits and their well developed and effective social organisms had allowed for the development of fairly extensive trading between the Hurons and the tribes which surrounded them. As already indicated much of this trade was with the northern Algonkian bands, trading corn directly for furs or meat. Their advantageous position on the edge of the northern hunting areas had also allowed them to develop a nascent role as middleman, exchanging such items as tobacco or copper which they received from the Iroquian Tobacco and Petun who surrounded them in the lower Great Lakes area for the produce of the northern forests. These trading activities had allowed the Huron to develop by the early 1600's formalized trading alliances and ceremonial ties which stretched surprising distances.(3)
As the French began to penetrate into Huronia, beginning in the second decade of the sixteenth century, the Hurons found themselves again in an advantageous position. Although the Lower Great Lakes area was not a particularly good trapping area for furs it struck through the better trapping grounds in the western lakes. Both the Ottawa river route and the way around the southern Great Lakes traversed through territory that for a significant period of time was effectively controlled by the Huron. The Huron were able to use their already established trading alliances, their highly developed sense of tribal identity and powerful social control organism, their valued surplus food base, abetted by a restrictive French trading policy which, for a period anyway, discouraged any interior penetration, to develop into the paramount French trading partner and the most powerful Indian nation in the Lower Great Lakes area.

There is some debate among historians about just how deeply Huron life was affected by the fur trade. There is no doubt that, as had happened in other areas, initially the fur trade resulted in a sharp growth in the material prosperity of the Hurons. At the same time this material prosperity resulted in a flourishing of the ceremonial life. The need for larger cooperation in the increased size of
trading excursions also enhanced the authority of traditional chiefs and clan leaders.

G.T. Hunt, in *The Wars of the Iroquois*, asserts that the fur trade had even significantly affected the traditional Huron economic base:

"It may be seen that the canny Hurons enjoyed an enviable position, merely exchanging the products of the economically captive Petuns and Neutrals for the true riches of the region. In this position it is not strange that they should have allowed their agricultural production and provision for the future to wane, that they should have come to depend less and less upon their own crops for a food supply and to put by less against a day of want." (4)

Recent research by Bruce Trigger has revealed a number of problems with this assertion by Hunt. He asserts that Hunt had a heightened concept of the Huron control of Petuns and Neutrals and that they were much freer to trade elsewhere than Hunt suggests. More importantly, Trigger argues convincingly that although the trading activities of the Huron increased, the majority of the Hurons still spent the vast bulk of their time on traditional farming pursuits. Thus he believes that agricultural production did not decrease significantly. (5) This question attains some significance when the reasons for the Huron's dispersal are discussed, and Trigger's research has placed a different slant on traditionally accepted explanations.
Early in the seventeenth century it had become obvious that the Huron position was going to place it in opposition to the also powerful Iroquois confederacy to the south. The Iroquois, particularly the Mohawk, had become inextricably involved in the fur trade, with first the Dutch and then the English traders at New York and Albany. Their increasing demand for more fur and the diminution of the beaver in their areas caused them to look covetously towards the rich fur lands in the western Great Lakes, the trade from which was controlled by the Huron. Throughout the first half of the seventeenth century the Iroquois had attempted to induce the Huron, using the incentive of cheaper goods, to trade their furs with the Iroquois. Although at times partially effective these treaties never held for any significant period of time, often because of the intrigues of the French who feared any Huron-Iroquois cooperation. (6) These intervals of peace only temporarily interrupted long periods during which the Iroquois tried to blockade the trade routes to the French by conducting a series of raids designed to disrupt the Huron/French trade and to supply confiscated furs. But, as Hunt asserts, "These raids and ambushes, although they produced fur, produced a meager supply, wholly insufficient for Iroquois needs." (7)
Consequently in the winter of 1649 the Iroquois joined forces to launch a large scale raid on the Huron villages, destroying one town and harassing the area for a period of time. It is not altogether clear whether the Iroquois were "an army of a thousand men with a single purpose," to push the Hurons out of Georgian Bay-Lake Simcoe region, as Hunt suggests,\(^8\) or whether it was simply a raiding party, larger than usual to be sure, but with no clearer intentions than numerous similar raiding parties. Whatever its purpose, after causing little serious disruption, the party withdrew.

What is amazing is the Hurons' reaction to this invasion. During the following year the Hurons, seemingly seized with panic, abandoned most of the Georgian Bay-Lake Simcoe area, eventually attaching themselves to other tribes, even joining the Iroquois, or following Jesuit advice, perished from famine on overcrowded islands in Georgian Bay. These deaths and the disruption of perhaps forty thousand people\(^9\) is one of history's great tragedies and mysteries. Hunt believes that the explanation for the Hurons' hasty withdrawal was the result of the disruption of the economy based on trading.

"Such an economy would function very well so long as the complex and intricate tribal relationships upon which it depended were undisturbed, but the complexity of the mechanism
made it fragile, and if it were shattered
the result would be catastrophe...in 1649
to 1650...the finespun fabric of their com-
merce was torn apart by the storming Iroquois
and, though losing few in battle, they
starved by thousands," (10)

and were rendered "capable of neither reason nor strategy". (11)

But Trigger, not accepting Hunt's hypothesis that the
Hurons' agricultural base had earlier been abandoned,
searched for more complex answers. His detailed history
of the Huron, The Children of Aataenistic, describes
painstakingly the intricacy of the Huron reactions.

As Trigger asserts, Huron involvement in the fur
trade, partial acceptance of Jesuit priests and suffering
from the ravages of European diseases(12) had seriously
damaged the harmony of the traditional Huron society.
Traditional authority was being seriously questioned,
rivalry created between tribes and long held beliefs about
the structure of the world around them were being
questioned. The Huron no longer felt confident with the
spiritual world that enveloped them and thus did not feel
competent in dealing with the real world around them. It
was this more than the disruption of their trading routes
which caused the seeming panic in the Spring of 1650.

Whatever the reasons, the Huron flight and the
later dispersal of the Petuns and Neutrals by the Iroquois,
had by 1660 effectively depopulated the entire southern Great Lake-Georgian Bay area and cleared the way for the incredible expansion of the Ojibwa in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and their direct involvement in the fur trade.
CHAPTER 3

THE FUR TRADE SURVIVES: OJIBWA EXPANSION

At the time of the Huron dispersal in the mid-seventeenth century the Ojibwa were limited to a narrow area around northern Lake Huron and Lake Superior. In the next one hundred years they were to occupy "a vast region in the centre of the continent."(1) This region included, in the words of George Copway:

"from Gananoque below Kingston; all western Canada; the north of Lake Huron; the north of Lake Superior; the north of Lake Winnipeg; the north of Red River Lake about one hundred miles. The whole extent comprises over 1900 miles east to west and 200 to 300 miles north and south."(2)

The Ojibwa owed this unparalleled expansion to their effectiveness in adapting their traditional society and economic pursuits to the more intensive involvement in the fur trade demanded after the Huron dispersal.

With their unexpected success against the Hurons, the Iroquois had hoped that they would be able to take control of the western fur trade, thus forcing the French to deal exclusively for furs with the Six Nations. But even as the Huron were dispersing the seeds for the new fur trade and Iroquois frustration were already being sown.
The Ottawa, with the assistance of a few fugitive Huron, had been able to assemble a fur fleet at Sault Ste Marie and in the spring of 1654 this fleet descended the Ottawa River. After the few sparse years following the Huron dispersal "the French were overjoyed at the sight of the canoes loaded with the precious beaver skins...plenty and prosperity once more visited the colony. Canada re-awoke to life and hope"(3) and the Ottawa traders were assured a profitable journey. Following this fur convoys again became a common sight on the Ottawa River.

The Iroquois, realizing that their hopes of controlling the western fur trade had been premature, launched a major attack on the Ottawa and other western tribes in 1656 and 1657. Their attack was not completely successful but they did create enough tension to prompt the Ojibwa to abandon Sault Ste Marie for a brief period and the Ottawa to abandon Manitoulin Island for a much longer period of time.

They were not, however, able to stop the fur trade. Huron, Ottawa and Ojibwa were able continually to gather fur brigades in the villages around western Lake Huron and Lake Superior and to squeeze through the net of raiders the Iroquois had suspended over the Ottawa River. By the 1660's
the Iroquois power had begun to wane. Decimated by a plague in 1662 and weakened by warfare with the Susquahannas to the south, they were finally defeated by a large force of Ojibwa, Ottawa and Pottawatomis (the Council of Three Fires). The major battle occurred at Lake Simcoe.\(^4\)

This and later minor defeats eventually resulted in the Iroquois withdrawal to the south of Lake Ontario.

By this time the Ojibwa were just beginning to develop that strength and power that they were to demonstrate throughout the following decades. Until now the Ottawa had been the major traders in the revised fur trade. The Ojibwa, when not threatened by the Iroquois, were able to supply their somewhat modest need for European trade goods through trapping and hunting in their traditional winter hunt camps. But, gradually, through their contacts in the growing summer villages, their demand for trade goods increased. At approximately the same time, the more efficient hunting techniques and increase in economic prosperity brought about by the introduction of iron trade goods helped foster a significant increase in population. Both of these factors combined to put a strain on the resources of the traditional hunting areas, which in turn prompted the beginning of the Ojibwa "career of expansion".\(^5\)
The initial avenue of expansion for the Ojibwa was into the rich fur areas of present day Minnesota and Wisconsin. The bulk of this expansion occurred between 1680 and 1700. The mode of expansion was primarily that of pioneering kin village groups. Old villages, finding land pressure intense and a scarcity of fur animals in the area, would foster kin groups venturing out to form satellite villages which would, initially at least, maintain their ties with the old village.

By the beginning of the eighteenth century the Ojibwa had completed the bulk of their westward expansion, occupying most of the western Great Lake region, forcing their way into areas which brought them into conflict with numerous other peoples and creating significant changes in Ojibwa social systems. As was discussed in the earlier chapter, intense involvement in the fur trade did not completely disrupt the traditional round of economic activity for the Ojibwa. Probably the greatest change occurred in the structuring of interpersonal relations and group decisions. Although most Ojibwa were involved as primary producers for the fur trade, they were beginning to spend their summers in large trading towns scattered around the Great Lakes. These towns, Green Bay, Chaquemagon, Arbre Coche and Michilimacincac, of which Sault Ste Marie was a
prototype, played an important role in widening Ojibwa interpersonal contacts. Unlike the former summer villages, composed of one clan all members of which could trace their ancestors back to a common totem, these trading towns, like Sault Ste Marie, were multi-clan villages. This implied great changes in social political structure. In the smaller villages the scope for communal enterprise was limited and any that were undertaken were easily organized by the clan elders. In the new towns, the demands on the structures were much greater. The business of outfitting trading caravans, co-ordinating defense against the Ojibwa's now numerous enemies and dispensing justice in large town composed of not only numerous clans but also different tribal groups, demanded more effective leadership than Ojibwa society was originally able to furnish. (8)

The Ojibwa were able to adopt two different aboriginal concepts to supply this needed direction. Initially the power of various paramount chiefs was recognized and they were given more authority than was usual. But the most effective way of ensuring cooperation throughout the tribal entity was the greater significance given to totemic clans. (9) By using the totemic clan concept, Ojibwa village groups were able to develop a feeling of kin association with other village groups which traced their ancestry through
the same traditional totem. This simple process not only aided in developing a community of interests among the Ojibwa located in the large trading towns, but also supplied an effective framework around which to structure civil authority.

The other aboriginal concept that the Ojibwa adapted to the increasing scope of Ojibwa communities was the Midiwewin. In the words of Hickerson, the Midiwewin was

"an organized priesthood of men and women who had occult knowledge of killing and curing by use of herbs, missiles, medicine bunches and other objects which had medicinal properties...[Its members] were repositories of tribal traditions, origins and migrations integrated in systems of myths and legends."(10)

There is some question about how aboriginal the Midiwewin society was. It is possible that it was the result of an amalgamation of borrowings from the other tribes the Ojibwa were associating with in the western Great Lakes and a partial mimicry of the priests the Ojibwa were now accustomed to seeing. It is most probable though that the Midiwewin was an aboriginal concept which saw growth in both its size and power due to the demands now being placed on it by the larger Ojibwa communities.
In a society where controlling the spirits and living in harmony with them were deemed to be of supreme importance in maintaining order and stability, it was to be expected that the growth of Ojibwa society would place demands on the traditional means of maintaining this order. The growth of the Midiwewin society not only supplied the Ojibwa with a more powerful force in dealing with any possible threats from all those elements of nature imbued with the power of aiding or hampering the efforts of man, but also developed as a powerful organism where all subjects of importance to Ojibwa society could be discussed and affirmative action decided upon.

By the 1720's the Ojibwa were at the height of their economic prosperity and cultural fluorescence. They had been able to maintain a large degree of autonomy, had resisted Christian teaching and had developed an efficient means of exploiting not only the fur trade but their position between the traders and those more western tribes which desired trade goods and now had to approach the Ojibwa for them. Their position and power allowed them to begin to feel superior to many of the other less powerful tribes around the Upper Great Lakes, and they certainly felt themselves superior to the French who were among them. This is hardly surprising.
"The coureurs de bois often committed a thousand base acts with the savages in order to obtain their beaver skins; they followed them even on their hunting expeditions and did not even give them time to dry and prepare their pelts. They endured the stinging jeers, the contempt, and sometimes the blows of these savages who were lost in wonder at covetousness so sordid, and at seeing the French come from so great a distance with so much fatigue and foul smelling beaver skins, with which they had clothed themselves and which they no longer needed." (11)

After the 1720's their position began to change slowly. The French policy towards the fur trade had shifted to one encouraging expansion and exploration. (12) Despite efforts by the Ojibwa the French began to develop contacts with the tribes to the west of the Great Lakes and the Ojibwa (and Ottawa) began slowly to lose their favourable position as middlemen.

The Ojibwa situation was still enviable enough though. Despite losing their middleman role they continued to control valuable fur hunting grounds. Trading had never completely disrupted their trapping pursuits. As the French began to by-pass the Ojibwa this economic pursuit was simply strengthened. As a result, Ojibwa economic prosperity was reduced slightly but, more significantly, the role of the western trading towns seriously declined. With this decline there was a noted dispersal of bands and clans. The hunting band again became the basic socio-
economic unit\(^{(13)}\) and the smaller summer villages became the norm once more.

The primary difference between the old and new villages was that these small villages and even the smaller hunting bands had developed into multi-clan organisms in which the members traced their ancestry back to different totems. Indeed there is even some indication that by this point the totem had become a social grouping not directly tied to a belief in shared ancestry. Consequently individual Ojibwa occasionally transferred their allegiance from one totem clan to another if this was perceived as enhancing their status. The small villages were no longer held together by shared ancestry but by their consciousness of a proud tribal heritage while the totemic clans helped maintain a sense of commonality throughout the Ojibwa nation and provided a structured framework around which communal pursuits could be organized.

Despite losing their role as middleman the Ojibwa remained effective exploiters of the fur trade. Other Upper Great Lakes tribes, Ottawa and Pottawatomi, having lost middleman roles, began to emulate the Ojibwa culture. Thus

"by 1760 there had arisen in the Upper Great Lakes region a uniformity of tribal culture...developed in the direction of the Chippewa culture-type." (14)
Since the days of the early congregations of groups around the narrows at Sault Ste Marie, the northern Algonkian bands had travelled through three stages of social development. From the autonomous patri-lineal descent groups immediately following the Late Woodland Culture, they had, responding to the demands of the fur trade, shifted their primary organization to multi-clan political trading villages on the lakes. As the Ojibwa lost their role as middleman political and social organization again shifted back to a smaller scale, but now to composite hunting bands with Ojibwa-group consciousness.

Throughout it all the Ojibwa had withstood the potential destructiveness of the fur trade relatively well. Despite the occasional "seasons of scarcity and want" (15) the fur trade had allowed for significant economic prosperity while still allowing the Ojibwa to remain relatively self-reliant. They had, for the most part, steadfastly resisted Christian teachings and despite the increasing use of alcohol as a trade item were not yet experiencing the great disruptions "demon rum" was later to play on Ojibwa society. Because of their more scattered existence and little direct contact with white traders the Ojibwa suffered less from the ravages of European diseases than the Huron before them. In short, while the fur trade had helped foster the growth of Ojibwa tribal consciousness it had
not yet caused the lack of confidence in the traditional society that had played such an important part in the Huron disintegration.
A significant part of the Ojibwa expansion did not follow the general westward trend. East of the Saulteur around the head of Lake Huron a number of autonomous bands lived, following the general life style of limited involvement in the fur trade described earlier. During the middle years of the seventeenth century, when Iroquois power was at its zenith, these bands were forced northward, eventually coming to rest in the Keenan Peninsula north of Lake Superior. The tremendous disruption caused by this forced migration, the need for a common defence and the increasing involvement in the fur trade combined to inculcate the group solidarity and expansion of cultural ties discussed earlier. By the late 1660's and early 1670's, when they began gradually to move southward again, these bands had also developed multi-clan villages and a sense of shared cultural traits as a result of this congregation and subsequent dispersion.

Three of the bands, the Achiligouiane, the Amicoure and the Mississauga had been removed enough from the main flow of Ojibwa cultural affiliations to maintain their autonomy and, to a certain extent, have remained separate, as the Mississauga, to this day. The tribal division
between the Mississauga and Ojibwa proper has always been obscure. There is little cultural differentiation and throughout the period individual Indians were easily moving from one group to the other. For the purpose of this paper then, subsequent discussions will not differentiate between the Mississauga and the Ojibwa.

There is some debate about the exact dates of this Ojibwa migration south, but the prevailing opinion, and the one Donald Smith adheres to, after a thorough study, is that this migration began as early as 1666, shortly after the Iroquois had ceased their periodic forays into the Georgian Bay area. As the Iroquois power continued to diminish, evidenced by their defeats by the Council of Three Fires during the latter half of the seventeenth century, the Ojibwa expansion southward continued. After the dramatic defeat of the Iroquois in the 1690's they agreed to Ojibwa control of the Great Lakes area to the north shore of Lake Ontario and a free fur trade route to the English at Albany. As early as 1710 the Ojibwa were planting corn in the area west of Lake Simcoe and by 1720 were firmly established throughout the entire southern Great Lakes area.

Although reports of the Ojibwa planting corn in Southern Ontario indicate that they were able to take ad-
vantage of the increased fertility of their new homes in the Southern Great Lakes area to become involved in agriculture it never achieved the significance for the Ojibwa that it had for the Huron. Their involvement was, for the most part, restricted to a brief period of planting in the spring. The fields would then be abandoned while the Ojibwa dispersed to hunt or travel to fishing grounds. In the fall they would return to harvest what corn had survived the ravages of pests and weeds.

For the most part the Ojibwa in the Southern Great Lakes area were hunters. They engaged in the traditional round of Ojibwa seasonal activities, as well as concentrating a significant amount of their energies on trapping and hunting for the fur trade. They were not able to engage to any extent in the middleman role other Algonkian groups farther west were able to, or as the Huron had when they occupied a similar position. The Ojibwa lacked the widespread trading contacts the Huron had enjoyed, and by now the French had long since by-passed the Southern Great Lakes area, doing their trading in the rich fur lands further west.

Competition between the French and British for the furs of the area, though, allowed these Ojibwa to command significant solicitation and assistance from the French.
The Ojibwa were able to trade freely with the British at Albany, assured of an unmolested passage through the Iroquois by the agreement in the late 1690's. Despite the construction of the French fort at Niagara in 1721 in an attempt to intercept this trade the Ojibwa were able, until the 1740's, to play the two colonial powers off against one another. This position of power, enhanced by the knowledge that their furs were important enough for unlicensed traders (coureurs de bois) to seek them out in their hunt camps enduring the contempt of the Indians and "the miserable life" inherent in the trade,\(^4\) maintained in the Ojibwa a sense of superiority over the white man which forced the French for the most part to act in a solicitous and humble manner among the Indians.

It was partly this belief in their superiority, coupled with the effective way traditional life styles and beliefs were coping with the new demands of the fur trade, that prompted the Ojibwa to reject Christian teaching. The frustration of the Jesuit and other Catholic missionaries, accustomed to their success with the Huron and limited success with other more eastern Algonkian groups, was expressed by Abbé Pacquet in 1751. He claimed the Ojibwa had "never shown the least zeal for religion, on the contrary they had been much opposed to it."\(^5\)
In the early 1700's, although not quite so rich as their western cousins, Ojibwa in the Southern Great Lakes region flourished and their relatively new found pride in the history of the Ojibwa people provided a constant source of entertainment during their abundant leisure time. According to Pouchot -

"The Indians are not altogether occupied by the chase when in their villages. They neither hunt nor fish except to live. During the sojourn that they make, they assemble in their cabins...where with calumet in mouth they discuss their politics and rehearse the history of their nation." (6)

Indeed Ojibwa life in the early part of the eighteenth century was colourful and exciting. Even their dress reflected this vibrancy. At the close of this period Alexander Henry, an Englishman, aided by Ojibwa friends was trying to escape detection by passing as an Ojibwa. This is how they effected the transformation (it is worth quoting at length for the vivid picture it portrays of Ojibway dress);

"My hair was cut off and my head shaved, with the exception of a spot on the crown of about twice the diameter of a crown piece. My face was painted with three or four different colours, some parts of it red, others black. A shirt was provided for me, painted with vermillion and mixed with grease. A large collar of wampum was put around my neck and another suspended in my breast. Both my arms were decorated with large bands of silver above the elbow, besides several smaller ones on the wrists, and my
legs were covered with mitasses (leggings) a kind of hose made, as is the favorite fashion, of scarlet cloth. Over all I was to wear a scarlet blanket, or mantle, and on my head a large bunch of feathers."(7)

As in all other parts of Canada though, the Ojibwa in the Southern Great Lakes area were not to benefit from the fur trade in the long run. Even during the best days of the trade the Ojibwa were never able to accumulate much from their efforts. Alexander Henry, during his life as an Ojibwa, discovered that after a full season of successful hunting he had gained about one hundred and sixty dollars and on "inquiring into the price of goods I found that all my funds would not go far."(8)

One of the biggest problems of the fur trade, however, was the growing Ojibwa addiction to the alcohol traders used to attract the Indian and increase their profits. According to Pouchot:

"Brandy is, without doubt, the thing of all others that the Indian loves the best... It is a means for attracting whole nations and has become an object of too great a commerce. Although they would not now consent to be deprived of this pernicious liquor they are nevertheless very much ashamed of having become accustomed to it, and regard its use as the principal cause of their ruin."(9)

Indeed Frank Severance believed that it was only by the "brandy distributed without measure" that the French were able to attract the Indians to their posts.(10)
The increasing use of brandy held serious portent for the Ojibwa. With the encouragement of French traders many Indians, after a long winter's trapping, found they had laboured the whole season for a few days of drunken revelry. They would have little left to stake themselves for another season of trapping and, as they were now increasingly unable to meet their expanding needs in traditional ways, many Ojibwa were forced into perpetuating debt to various traders.

Near the end of the French period in Canada it became obvious that the biggest problem the Ojibwa faced due to their involvement in the fur trade was the growing dependence upon imputs of European goods.

The continuing antagonism between the two colonial powers in North America finally came to a head around the middle of the eighteenth century. When Louisburg fell in 1746 it became increasingly difficult for the French to equip their posts with supplies for the fur trade. This restriction had a disastrous effect on the Ojibwa and enraged them to such an extent that portions of them, particularly the Mississaugas who by now were developing closer ties with the Iroquois, attacked the French posts in the west. Although the Ojibwa stopped their hostilities in 1748, the fall of Louisburg marked the beginning of
more than a decade of extreme scarcity which only abated with the surrender of Quebec on 8 September 1760. (12)

During the war, and despite their earlier hostility, the Ojibwa fought on the side of the French although the French viewed them as very unreliable allies. (13) As the tides of war continued to go against the French, the supplies available for the allied Indians became increasingly scarce until near the end of the war the Southern Ojibwa were forced to petition Pouchot at Fort Niagara:

"Father we need your pity, we have no longer any ammunition, nor anything to cover us since we lost you. We hope you will have pity on us. Our people will all die this winter." (14)

The conquest of Canada by the British had serious consequences for the Ojibwa in the Southern Great Lakes area, as it did for all Indians in Canada, but perhaps its greatest lesson was the realization it brought that the Ojibwa was no longer independent. They could no longer supply themselves with the materials they now needed to survive and henceforth must depend on the European for that survival. Many Ojibwa no doubt recognized this as did M. Pouchot, the French Commander at Niagara during the war. His final thoughts on the Ojibwa as he departed following the surrender of the post began with "To their misfortune we came among them." (15)
CHAPTER 5

THE BRITISH TRADE IN SOUTHERN GREAT LAKES - 1760-1800

The defeat of the French by Britain in 1760, and the consequent assumption of authority by the British over the area brought important changes to the Ojibwa in Upper Canada. The British were more interested in encouraging settlement in the Great Lakes area and, with French withdrawal the Ojibwa no longer had competing colonial powers interested in maintaining their affections.

Initially it was business as usual. Following the fall of Quebec in 1760, while the British were still scrambling to occupy French posts, traders were already making their way west.\(^{(1)}\) It was these traders through whom, for almost the next four decades, Ojibwa-white contact would be maintained and upon whom the bulk of the Ojibwa would depend for a significant element in their survival. Thus it is important to come to some understanding of what type of men these were and what sort of relations the Ojibwa had with them.

By all accounts the traders were the least desirable of the English and French in the new world. McIllwain 48
calls the Indian trader "the very scum of the earth" and decries "their treatment of the Indians...as hardly suitable to description." (2) A trader in Toronto in the early 1770's leaves us this colourful account of his partner:

"...on the whole he is one of the most lazy, indolent young fellows I ever saw. The whole winter he sat at the fire side with his elbow on his knee and his chin in his hand picking his nose without speaking a word. He has wore a shirt 13 or 14 weeks without changing it the whole time, I don't think he ever washed. When he took his shirt off it swarmed with lice." (3)

Perhaps the best example of the relationships between the Ojibwa and traders who proliferated around them can be found in the story of David Ramsay. Ramsay was an unlicensed trader who had set up shop north of Lake Ontario in 1771 and was later arrested for the murder of a number of Indians. In Ramsay's account of his murders he told Sir William Johnson, superintendent of the Indian Department, that he had been continually harassed by Indians who boasted of the Englishmen they had killed and took goods from him with no hope or thought of paying them back. Ramsay was eventually kidnapped by a group of Indians, and according to him, he killed them while escaping. An indication of Ramsay's opinion of the Indians with whom he traded was his own account that he chewed the lead shot before loading his gun as he felt it a shame to kill an Indian with a smooth
Part of the reason for the hostile relations between the traders and the Indians was the main trade item, alcohol. The same merchant who provided us with the colourful description earlier also wrote Sir W. Johnson informing him that they had just received a large supply of rum without which "we would lose all our spring trade." (5)

This trade in rum and the effects it had on the Indian often resulted in hostility and violence between the traders and their suppliers. Sir W. Johnson told Lord Bathurst in a letter

"of the fatal effects of rum... I have just received a fresh instance in the murder of a trader and his servants on Lake Huron by some of the Nation whose people were killed by Ramsay. The traders sold them rum and neglecting to leave them, tho' advised by themselves to do so, on being refused more liquor they seized it, got intoxicated, a squabble ensued which resulted in the death of the trader and his servants." (6)

Of course the deteriorating relations between the traders and Indians did not escape the notice of Indian Department officials. Sir W. Johnson, who became chief superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Northern District in 1755, when the Indians, particularly the Iroquois had significant power and could do much harm to British interests, retained his belief in the need to pacify the Indians and keep them loyal to the British cause. Sir William was
followed by Colonel Guy Johnson and, in 1782, by John Johnson. Sir William's followers believed wholeheartedly in his system and were equally impressed with the need to retain the good will of the Indians. The fur trade brought in approximately two hundred thousand pounds sterling annually and, although the conquest of Canada had removed much of the immediate French threat, the French retained their trade in the far west down the Mississippi. Johnson was continually regaled with stories about French intrigues in the area designed "to render us odious to the Indians." The continued resistance around the western Great Lakes by various Indian groups under the nominal leadership of the Ottawa, Pontiac, only served to heighten this apprehension. Of course, during and after the American Revolution the British had further cause to fear alienating the Indians of the Great Lakes area.

General Haldimand probably best summed up British feeling when in 1776 he agreed with Guy Johnson that "the friendship and active alliance of the Indians must be preserved at any cost, for if they do us no good they may do us much harm." The officials of the Indian Department were fully aware of the great extent and power of the Ojibwa nation. William Johnson wrote to the Earl of Hillsbоро in 1768 affirming that the Ojibwa were "the most
powerful nation to the westward." Not only could they make or break the British fur trade but he personally knew an Ojibwa chief "a man of much influence [who] can bring some thousands of his people into the field."(10)

Realizing the importance of maintaining the loyalty of the Ojibwa, the continuing misadventures of the traders infuriated and worried Johnson and other Indian Department officials. Johnson wrote to General Gage as early as 1767 declaring that the Indians "are daily abused but there is no preventing it without proper authority."(11) Gage, sensitive to the problem, immediately replied to Johnson that

"I am quite sensible of the irregular behaviour of the traders and have intimated to His Majesty's Secretary of State...that they must be restricted by law and a judicial power invested in the officers commanding at the posts to see such law put in force."(12)

Following these communications the government instituted a system of government storekeepers responsible for trade at all the posts. Post commanders were given greater authority in dealing with traders and government ships were to be used to transport furs and supplies.

Despite these measures, unlicensed and licensed traders continued to mistreat the Indians and Johnson continued to insist that further restrictions be enforced. The
Earl of Dartsmouth replied to one of Johnson's requests in September of 1772:

"The manner in which you express yourself on the subject of the present temper and disposition of the Indian leaves but little room to doubt that if some method is not soon fallen upon to restrain the numberless frauds and abuses which are at present committed by those who carry on trade and have intercourse with them, we shall be involved in an Indian war." (13)

But he later admitted that "there is not sufficient authority in the Crown for the execution of such a plan." (14)

One of the problems in any system of regulating trade that could be devised was that the French traders were continually representing to the government officials that the restrictions imposed were intended to eliminate them from the trade to the advantage of the English traders in Albany and in Montreal. Johnson repeatedly denied that the traders were being discriminated against and hotly replied to Carleton in 1767 that "in fact the traders, both English and French, but particularly the latter, do as they please." (15) Nonetheless these petitions continued to help restrain any plans that the Indian Department could sponsor to restrict traders in the Great Lakes area.

Perhaps the best indication of how ineffective these restrictions were is again the case of David Ramsay. Before
his arrest for murder, Ramsay had been taken into custody by Captain Brown, the Commanding Officer at Niagara. He was sent away to Quebec, but despite the fact that he was obviously an unlicensed, thus illegal, trader, he very quickly was back with the Ojibwa north of Lake Ontario, where he eventually committed his murders. And yet the Indian Department's hands were tied. After Ramsay was arrested he was sent to Quebec for trial, but Johnson predicted that

"(as is usual on such occasions) the 'Interest with which his Creditrs will make with those who are his Jurors, and the Prejudices of the Commonalty against Indians will probably prove the means of his being acquitted, altho' he makes use of Threats that he will do much more mischief when enlarged." (16)

Obviously the government was going to have a difficult time controlling these traders and could not hope to use them as agents to foster the British tie. Most members of the British colonial government in Canada believed the maintenance of this tie to be of extreme importance. Bearing in mind the inability of the fur trade to strengthen Indian allegiance to the British they relied upon a system of annual presents to help ensure that loyalty, keep them trading at British forts and, in later years particularly, as payment for services done in battle for the British crown.
Immediately following the British defeat of the French the British General, Amherst, emphasizing economy, withdrew the funding for the bulk of these presents. Sir William Johnson fought bitterly against this action believing that

"the reduction of Officers and Retrenchment of Expenses in the Indian Department has already been represented by their (Spanish and French in the west) Agents as Instances of our Parsimony; Neglect and Contempt." (17)

Although the resistance of the allied western tribes under Pontiac partly caused by the reduction in presents proved Johnson's fears, the presents remained on a limited scale until the growing antagonism of the northern colonies prompted the British government to change its course. During and after the War of Independence it was the policy of the British Government to attract as many Indians from the Great Lakes region to the British forces as possible. (18)

To do this they were forced to increase significantly the presents they handed out, both to attract American Indians and to keep up the reward implicitly promised the Indians who fought on the British side. These presents eventually became a significant annual expense to the British government. Despite continued schemes and suggestions concerning ways in which this expense could be reduced (such as that by Deputy Superintendent William Claus in 1777 that the
presents be given only as the occasional reward "or the Indians will expect them as their due."(19) the Indians did indeed come to expect them and the Indian Department found it increasingly difficult to reduce them. Consequently between 1813 and 1816 approximately one hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling worth of presents were distributed annually.(20) The vast bulk of this went to Indians in the Great Lakes area.

The Ojibwa had come to depend on these presents for a significant portion of their trade goods. Their hunting grounds were no longer able to supply the huge quantity of furs necessary to appease their growing appetite for European goods. But the Indians knew the British fears and were becoming expert at playing on them to prompt Indian official largesse through veiled and sometimes outright threats.

In 1767 Wabacommegat, an Ojibwa chief from north of Lake Ontario, approached Johnson with this recrimination:

"Now Brethren, it's a shame that this should be the only post where the Indians have no presents; in the posts up the country they get everything they want in great abundance. I hope, therefore, you will not do as you did last time I was at this place, which was to give me only about as much powder as would load my firelock. I am ashamed to return home and tell my young people I have been well received by my Brothers, the English always take care of
us and use us well, and at the same time I have not so much as one load of powder and shott to give them to show our Bretherns have been kind to us." (21)

Wabacommegat was careful to precede these remarks with a story of how the Shawnee had sent them a "Bad Belt" (an invitation to war) but that the Ojibwa had refused it out of loyalty to the British and, of course, were now expecting their just rewards. Indeed, throughout the latter part of the 1700's Johnson and his successors were deluged with stories of 'Bad Belts' being passed from tribe to tribe, often from chiefs expecting an acceptable token of appreciation from the British.

Despite the presents the Indians in the Great Lakes were not prospering. The throwing together of various tribes and bands within the restricted area of the southern Great Lakes had created severe tension and unease among the tribes. Traditional means of governing inter-tribal relations were no longer working. At the same council in 1767 Wabacommegat gave Johnson a partial picture of this unrest.

"The Poutawatamis of St. Joseph were still drunk and doing mischief wherever they went to, that Saquinas had killed a young Huron, that the Saquinas had sent a Belt to the Hurons to try to make a reconiation (sic) for the murder, that the Huron had received the Belt but would not make answer to it, that the Indians around Detroit had very bad hearts." (22)
Increasing the unease and disorientation felt by the Indians in the Great Lakes area, periodic epidemics continued to sweep the Indian villages. Simcoe's Diary of his visit to Lake le Claie (Lake Simcoe) in 1793 tells us of whole families being too sick to travel to their winter hunting grounds and of bands losing their most respected and venerated elders, as well as their best hunters.(23)

The most disruptive aspects of the changing world of the Ojibwa in the Great Lakes area continued to be the effects of alcohol on their health and society. The Ojibwa seldom benefitted from the presents they received, generally transferring them to waiting traders for a gallon or so of cheap English rum. Despite attempts on the part of the Indian Department to control these traders, they were almost always present during or shortly after the distribution of presents. John Cameron reported to Simcoe in 1806 that many of the Indians "return to the woods in much worse circumstances than when they left them."(24)

The Indian Department itself was responsible for much of this growing addiction. Despite their attempts to control the use of rum by traders, department officials continually supplied barrels of rum at the presentation of presents and at Indian councils despite the pleas of "the
Chiefs of several Nations." (25) Brigadier General McLean, after watching the fort of Niagara dispense four hundred and twenty-two gallons of rum in sixteen days, observed

"it appears to me that the people at the head of the Indian Department seem to vie with each other who shall expend most rum and the great chiefs are striving who shall drink most rum." (26)

This situation could not continue much longer. It was obvious that Indian society in the Great Lakes area was no longer able to cope with the pressures thrust upon it. Even the most casual observers were able to perceive the debilitated state of the Indians. One such observer, a traveller passing through Upper Canada in 1795, remarked:

"...this race of men are gradually wasting away...the intemperate use of strong liquors continue to enervate them. The savage returning from an expedition benumbed with cold and enfeebled by fatigue would barter the world for a gallon of rum." (27).

Throughout this period Indian Department officials were obsessed with maintaining the Indian as an ally in war and as the bottom rung of an economy based on the fur trade. Although they attempted, ineffectually, to control the most blatant outrages of the traders, their primary interest in doing so was to maintain the Indian's allegiance. Nobody within the Indian Department was able, at
least until well after the turn of the century, to foresee any other role for the Ojibwa in the Great Lakes area.
CHAPTER 6

INDIAN LAND SURRENDERS IN UPPER CANADA

Of course the final degradation for the Indians of Upper Canada was the loss of their lands. Even at its worst, alcohol only got its grip on some of the Ojibwa. When they were most rampant disease epidemics always left a certain percentage alive and well. But one plague continued to pour into Upper Canada that no Ojibwa was able to resist forever - settlers.

Even before the conquest of Canada English settlers in the colonies to the south were beginning to search elsewhere for cheap agricultural land. After the British victory a logical arena for their exertions was the Southern Great Lakes area. In the years immediately following 1760 this pressure was directed mainly at the Niagara frontier.

The type of tense relations which were to typify English/Ojibwa negotiations concerning land immediately became evident here. Almost before the smoke had cleared, in 1761, General Amherst had given certain traders leave to settle and clear land near Niagara. This liberty was viewed with much distrust by the Ojibwa who claimed the area as hunting grounds. They indignantly complained to Superintendent Johnson who, in turn, penned this warning to Amherst:

61
"I see plainly that there appears to be a universal jealousy amongst every nation, on account of the hasty steps they look upon we are taking towards getting possession of this country, which I am certain will never subside whilst we encroach within the limits which you may recollect have been put under the protection of the King in the year 1726, and confirmed to them by him and his successors ever since." (1)

The protection Johnson speaks of was again confirmed by the Crown in the Proclamation of 1763, reserving significant portions of land for Indian use and indirectly confirming their ownership of all land not surrendered. The Indian Department and Crown officials in the Southern Great Lakes area were caught in the dilemma of trying to appease two conflicting interests. More and more settlers were clamouring for land, but at the same time the Indian Department officials were always cognizant of the need to maintain good relations with the Indians who resisted any encroachment. The solution seemed obvious to the English, imbued with their concept of land ownership and assured that there was a just or unjust price for anything, they would purchase the land from the Indian.

They wasted little time obtaining their first block of land around the Niagara River from the Ojibwa in 1764. (2) For the next two decades, although the Great Lakes area remained Indian country, and civil/military
authority for the area remained primarily organized around the fur trade, significant numbers of settlers continued to pour into the area around the Niagara River and eastern Lake Ontario. This flood of settlers so swamped government officials that, by 1788, Philip Frey, the Crown surveyor in the area, had resigned himself to only laying out lots "in such parts of the country where I found people were taking up the lands and settling in a promiscuous manner." (3)

The Indian Department and military authorities were always aware of their limited power and the extent to which they must rely upon the good will of the Indian nations for the protection of these incoming settlers. The problems inherent in this situation became acute after the American revolution and the settling of loyalists and disbanded soldiers in the Lower Great Lakes area. George Powell, secretary to the Province of Quebec, warned military authorities in the area that these settlers were "at the mercy of the savages whenever these people may take it into their heads to quarrel with them." (4) The tension of the situation was heightened given the new settlers' attitude towards the Indian nations around them. Most of these settlers, although they couldn't agree with the rebellious nature of the colonies to the south, had been long incul-
icated with the superior and antagonistic nature of Indian/white relations in the States. Isaac Weld, after travelling through the Great Lakes area in the latter part of the eighteenth century, gave this assessment of the situation:

"The necessity of treating the Indians with respect and attention is strongly inculcated in the minds of the English settlers, and they endeavour to act accordingly; but still they cannot banish wholly from their minds, as the French do, the idea that the Indians are an inferior race to them, to which circumstances is to attribute the pre-dilection of the Indians for the French rather than for them." (5)

By 1791, with the birth of Upper Canada as a distinct political entity, it had become obvious to colonial officials that not only must "something be done to conciliate the affections"(6) of the Indians around the lower Great Lakes, but also that the new colonial government had to embark on measures to extend their control over the Indian nations within the confines of the colony. Both of these objectives were uppermost in the mind of the first Lieutenant Governor, John Graves Simcoe.

Simcoe brought energy and imagination, often excessive, to the government of Upper Canada. He sought to exemplify the prosperity available through British guidance and, through a demonstration of this prosperity, draw the rebellious states to the south back into the folds of the
Empire. Simcoe's vision of the Upper Canada he wished to foster did not allow for large areas reserved for and controlled by wandering bands of Indians.

The first step in Simcoe's plan was the orderly settlement of the interior of the colony. In Simcoe's words:

"To settle these various descriptions of men so as to promote the cultivation of the land, to give power and energy to civilization, efficacy to just government, and to combine a force whose appearance may prevent the meditation of hostility, it is indispensibly necessary that a Capital should be established in some central situation and that...almost instantaneously a Great Body of Emigrants should be collected in its vicinity." (7)

He eventually settled on the Town of York for his new capital. The final decision in favour of York was in no small way determined by the ease with which he foresaw communication with the interior from the proposed new capital. The French fort of Toronto (at York) had for many years during the latter part of the French regime been the terminus of a secondary fur route which had joined Lakes Ontario and Huron through the carrying place from Toronto to Lake le Clae, later renamed Simcoe, and from there down the Severn River to Matchedash Bay on Lake Huron. (8) Simcoe believed by locating his new capital at the site of this old French fort he would not only establish effective
control of this route but would promote settlement between Lake Ontario and Lake Simcoe.

In this hope he was acting in part upon the assessment of Benjamin Frobisher who reported to General Henry Hamilton, shortly before the beginnings of civil authority in Upper Canada. Frobisher told Hamilton the lands from Lake Ontario to Lake le Claie "abound with good wood and are generally fit for cultivation." He warned the military authorities though "there are several villages of Mississaugas...who raise Indian corn and other grain and whose friendship it will be necessary to cultivate." (9)

Indeed, perhaps uppermost in Simcoe's mind was the security he felt would accrue to the new colony if his plan of settlement should be adopted. Simcoe believed that Matchedash Bay on Lake Huron would prove of vital importance to British interests in the event of war with the States. In 1794 he wrote with some urgency to Lord Dorchester:

"The necessity of occupying Matchedash Bay and Long Point becomes to me every hour more evident, in particular as I know of no other Ports in which our shipping would find shelter should the Army of the States occupy Detroit." (10)

Given the hostility of the Ojibwa to the British in 1791, when Simcoe assumed his duties, an important element in his planning was the control this proposed settlement
would give the British authorities over the Ojibwa and Mississauga. Simcoe, writing to the British Colonial Office in 1792, assured the officials:

"...it is requisite for the safety and security of the Province to occupy the different Posts I have intimated, York, Long Point and London, to separate and command the Indian Nations...

The extent of this settlement reaching to the waters that fall into Lake Huron (Lake Simcoe to Matchedash Bay) will form a strong barrier should the Messassaque Nation...be hostile to the British interests." (11)

Simcoe's plan of settlement required an orderly transfer of land from the Ojibwa to the Crown and a mollification of the tense relations which had developed between the Ojibwa and settlers and British interests. British officials had already purchased much of the land required for Simcoe's nascent dreams. In 1790 the Mississauga had sold much of the land north of Lake Ontario between the Bay of Quinte and Lake le Claiie and Rice Lake. Despite Indian Department official promises, many of the Mississauga were disappointed in the extent and tardiness of payments for this property, and continued to harbour rankled feelings because of the perceived unfairness. (12)

Indeed throughout most of this period Indian land purchases remained in a state of confusion which bewildered colonial officials and angered the Indian nations involved.
In 1784 Pokquanee, a Mississauga chief, replied to Indian Department demands that although

"his nation did not own all the land between the three lakes, [they] were willing to transfer their 'right of soil' and property from the head of Lake Ontario... to the River le Tranche." (13)

Of course neither colonial officials nor the Indians themselves were positive about the meaning of 'right of soil' as opposed to ownership. Colonial officials simply considered the land to be sold. This type of land transaction continued to cause misunderstanding, bitter feelings and, more cynically, resulted in the Indians of Upper Canada, particularly the Ojibwa, being cheated out of vast tracts of land.

There is no denying the colonial officials were intent on getting as much land as they could out of the hands of the Ojibwa for as little as possible. In the early years of settlement in Upper Canada the military authorities, with their accustomed heightened appreciation for the power of the Six Nations, were solicitous of their good feelings to the exclusion of Ojibwa/Mississauga interests. In 1779, Lieutenant Colonel Mason Bolton, the commander at Fort Niagara, resisted attempts by Butler's Rangers to settle on Six Nations' land with the warning, "we must be
cautious how we encroach on the lands of the Six Nations,"(14) but was agreeable a year later to having them settle on Mississauga land. This type of cavalier indifference to the feelings of the Ojibwa was again displayed in 1780. Guy Johnson and General Haldimand were discussing a further purchase of four miles of land on the Niagara River. Johnson warned Haldimand that although the land was owned by Mississauga "it is in the neighborhood of the Senecas... [thus] it is necessary to make some previous arrangement with their chiefs to facilitate the business with the Mississaugas, who I apprehend will make few difficulties."(15) After this purchase Johnson again demonstrated the British attitude toward the land purchases with his observation to Haldimand that "the Indians are well satisfied, having received about the value of 300 suits of clothing which was as little as I could give them and they would have got the most part of that quantity in a little time without any consideration from their necessitous condition."(16)

Much of the confusion concerning land surrenders in Upper Canada resulted from both Indian Department and Indian uncertainty over the extent of lands under their control. Officials were continually negotiating with Ojibwa along the lakes for land which extended well back of the lake frontage. Of course 'lake' Indians would feel no compunc-
tion over selling their 'right of property' to land which they used only occasionally. Whether British officials conducted these fraudulent negotiations knowingly or not it resulted in almost constant confusion. Government surveyors were often being confronted by Ojibwa bands who had no inkling their land had indeed been sold. (17)

Gradually the Ojibwa began to realize the true value of the property they were transferring. The Six Nations had their own bitter experiences with the loss of their land in colonial New York. As early as 1768 a Seneca chief, Warraghiyagey, had complained to Johnson:

"Wherever we turned we saw our blood, and when our young men went to go a hunting the wild beasts in our country they found it covered with fences and that they were weary crossing them; neither can they get venison to eat, or bark to make huts for the beasts are run away and the trees cut down." (18)

The Six Nations kept close to their hearts the memory of that experience and were much more careful about the possession of their new lands in Upper Canada. Under the prompting of Joseph Brant, the Mohawk Chief, the Ojibwa began to listen to his advice on most land sales. This new association, coupled with the growing threat of uprising by the 'back' Indians prompted the colonial officials to approve a purchase of land in 1797 for three shillings
four pence an acre, as compared to the previous government price of two pence per acre. (19)

The colonial government reacted to this solidarity among the Indian nations of Upper Canada in a characteristic and decisive fashion. Peter Russell almost immediately instructed his agents "to do everything in their power... to foment any existing jealousy between the Chippewas and the Six Nations and to prevent as far as possible any junction or good understanding between these two tribes." (20) The Department began to give the Mississauga their annual presents at the River Credit or Humber rather than at Six Nations and refused to recognize Brant as their agent.

By 1805, due to government intrigue and Brant's overbearing attitude, the close bond between the Mississauga and the Six Nations had been broken. Almost a decade of disease epidemics among the Ojibwa had seriously reduced both their numbers and their power and they again lost all control over the number and extent of land surrenders. Most Ojibwa land to the tip of Georgian Bay was considered by the British to have been transferred to their dominion.

Whether the Ojibwa surrenders came at a period of disorganization or in the brief period of effective bargaining, the purchases were, of course, not fair transactions.
The British believed themselves to be purchasing all rights of usage and property, in short, ownership, whereas Ojibwa attitude to their land and land surrenders was probably best described by Chief Yellowhead, a chief of Lake Simcoe Ojibwa, at an Indian Council near Holland River in 1818. He told Deputy Superintendent W. Claus that "it would be folly in me to say that the land is mine, for the land belongs to God, who bestowed it on all for our subsistence." (21)

Expectedly, the surrender of their land and the growth of settlements in Upper Canada had a disastrous effect on Ojibwa prosperity. In the early days of settlement the few nascent communities provided a ready market for the produce of the Indian hunt. Weld, in his travels, observed that "the Mississauga keep the inhabitants of Kingston and Niagara and of the different towns on the lake well supplied with fish and game," (22) which provided a welcome supplement to trapping income. Indeed game was so plentiful and the hunt so attractive that Simcoe even felt it necessary to restrict the ownership of firearms among settlers in the Niagara district to ensure that they didn't neglect their farms. (23)

But hunting could not for long remain a viable pastime for the Ojibwa in Upper Canada. As settlement continued apace they soon became more and more restricted
in their hunting grounds. Payment for what hunting they did pursue was as often measured in barrels of rum as in any practical goods. Whole bands periodically engaged in prolonged fits of drunken revelry which, coupled with restricted hunting lands, prompted a number of the southern Ojibwa continually to neglect the chase and rely more completely on presents and payments from British officials. As this became more and more the norm among the Southern Ojibwa they received this admonition from Shawaraxcapowee, an Ojibwa chief from the northern lake areas: "In a little time you will not know how to hunt and the English will despise you."(25) Although Shawaraxcapowee's prophecy proved unerrring the Ojibwa of Upper Canada had little choice.

In the negotiations for land sales, the Ojibwa were assured that the incoming settlers would be of assistance to the Indian. By 1805 it was painfully obvious that this promise could not be kept. The settler was triumphing over the hunter. The two could not mix. The Mississauga Chief, Quinipeo, complained to W. Claus:

"when we encamp on the land they drive us off and shoot our dogs and never give us any assistance as was promised...Father, the farmers call us dogs and threaten to shoot us in the same manner when we go on their land..."(26)
As the proceeds of the Ojibwa hunt continued to decline so did the amount of fur they were able to supply the traders in the Southern Great Lakes area. As the total of furs declined and the number of settlers continued to increase the fur trade lost much of its importance in the estimation of the officials in Upper Canada. By 1792, Simcoe in a series of proposals to the colonial office stated that on its present footing the fur trade was "of no use whatever" (27), instead he believed it was a serious deterrent to the continued growth of Upper Canada.

By 1820 it was obvious to many Ojibwa that they could no longer rely on the traditional methods of subsistence. Their hunting lands were steadily shrinking, cut up by farm fences and reduced in abundance by cleared land. Neither could they hope to trap enough to provide for their wants. The land could no longer support it. All the while more white settlers continued to stream into what was to the Ojibwa still their land. In 1820 a Mississauga chief summed up the situation to William Graves:

"You came as a wind blown across the great lake. The wind wafted you, we nursed you. We protected you till you became a mighty tree that spread through our hunting land, with its branches you now lash us." (28)
MISSIONARY ENTERPRISE AMONG THE INDIANS OF
THE LOWER GREAT LAKES AREA - 1815-1830

As already mentioned the primary contact between
the Ojibwa and the European during the half-century after
the British conquest was through traders, both licensed
and unlicensed, who ventured among the Ojibwa bands. Part
of the reason the field was left so completely open to
these traders was the notable lack of attempts to prosy­
etize among the Ojibwa. Previously the Ojibwa, secure in
their world and adapting well to the changes which engulfed
them in the fur trade, had almost totally rejected the
efforts of Jesuits and Recolléét priests under the French
regime. Small pockets, segments of some Ojibwa bands, had
been baptized and fewer, even smaller pockets, followed any
of the precepts of Catholic teaching.\(^{(1)}\)

After the conquest even this dwindling missionary
exertion declined. British attitude towards the Indian in
Upper Canada, as described earlier, was governed by few
considerations: maintaining their allegiance in war, pre­
venting attacks on settlers and their active participation
in the fur trade. Neither military authorities nor indivi­
dual traders were thus likely to see any advantage in the
vesting of missionary zeal upon the Ojibwa.
Even if the British official attitude had been more inclined to Ojibwa conversion it is doubtful that England could have supplied the missionary enterprise required. England throughout the eighteenth century was committed to mercantile expansion and almost alone among European nations had not yet tied this expansion to converts to the Church of England. Indeed, as late as 1793 Lord McCartney could proudly proclaim at the Imperial Court of China that "the English...have no priests or chaplains with them as have other European nations",(2) as his ultimate argument in favour of British traders.

This attitude was destined for a wholesale, if not abrupt, change. By the late eighteenth century-early nineteenth century British attitudes towards much of the world around them were experiencing pervasive changes. Still very much convinced of the benefits of British industry and secure in the right of the British mercantile interests to control the globe, they were becoming, haltingly but inextricably, concerned with its effect upon the other 'inferior' peoples of the world. Led in many of these changes, through parliament and pamphleteering, by the Clapham Sect, English society was becoming as concerned with spreading the benefits of British society, justice, letters and ultimately religion as it had been and still was with the spread of British industry.(3)
Although, as already indicated, much of this quite amazing shift was championed by the Clapham Sect of parliamentarians and men of letters, in the sphere of Indian missions in North America the more important genesis came rather indirectly in the form of John Wesley and, more directly, the Methodist faith.

Wesley had been a not too successful Church of England minister. Much of his lack of success sprang from too little commitment to the idea of salvation as expounded by the Church of England. Wesley, in true Methodist fashion, suffered under this lack of Commitment until he "felt the divine spark kindled in his soul"(4) and dedicated his life to helping others to a realization of this salvation. To Wesley those intent on searching for holiness must:

"Let thy religion be the religion of the heart. Let it lie deep in thy utmost soul...Be serious. Let the whole stream of thy thoughts, words and actions flow from the deepest conviction that thou standest on the edge of the great gulf... just ready to drop in, either into everlasting glory or everlasting burning..."(5)

Wesley and Methodism, with its powerful fire and brimstone concept of salvation and relatively exultant public prayers, enjoyed a moderate success among the middle and lower classes of British society. By 1769 it had enough of a following in Britain and among new emigrants
to the colonies to support two missionaries in America. From the initial work of Richard Boardman and Joseph Pilmoor, Methodism in America enjoyed immediate success. Wesley's concept of salvation, the inherent egalitarianism of Methodist doctrine and the increasingly exuberant exhortations of Methodist preachers tapped a previously unbroached vein in pioneer America.

Methodism in America, though, quickly became quite distinct from its British or Wesleyan Methodist root. To Wesley, Methodism was always to remain essentially part of the Church of England. This connection, perceived by most British Methodists, was always able to temper the more profuse exertions of both exhorters and saved alike, which soon typified Methodist meetings in the colony. Thus by 1784, after American independence, the British connection was no longer felt to be a desirable attribute for what in essence had become an uniquely American church. That year the Reverend Thomas Coke presided over the establishment of the Methodist Episcopal Church of America thus severing the fetters long held by the Wesleyan Methodists.

Methodism was fundamentally a missionary faith. The strong belief in the salvation of the individual, the commitment that true conversion required of the saved and the enthusiasm and vitality that these brought to the Method-
ist church constantly required new arenaSfor the doctrine to be propagated. Consequently, through that "great agency for the rescue of lost souls," the camp meeting, American Methodists extended their circuit into Upper Canada. (6)

It was one thing, though, to spread the gospel among pioneer backwoodsmen - rude, unlettered to be sure, but the vast majority from British stock - and quite another to attempt to convert the 'wild heathen' in their wilderness haunts. Most settlers in Upper Canada and many ministers of the different faiths would have thought, at the turn of the century, such a proposition slightly ludi-
crous. Until the second decade of the century the attempts were few and uninspired.

In 1801 the Moravian Brother, Denke, encouraged by the visits of some Ojibwa to the Fairfield community, attempted to start a mission at the St. Clair River. Although his endeavours were accepted by some of the Ojibwa there, and at least tolerated by the majority, his advances were not particularly encouraging. Finally, during one of his absences, white traders nearby were able to convince a number of the Ojibwa that recent sickness was his responsi-

bility, and he was forced to abandon the mission. (7) Roman Catholic priests occasionally visited bands such as the
Ojibwa on Drummond Island, reconfirmed them in their faith and appointed lay preachers, but did little to effect any external change in their situation. By the early 1800's the Mohawk at the Six Nations Reserve on the Grand River were occasionally being visited by a Church of England minister and had service read to those that assembled on Sunday by one of their chiefs, usually Henry Aron Hill. Their oratory most often lacked ardour and, in the admittedly biased opinion of Peter Jones:

"...the gospel preached among them seemed to have little or no effect upon their moral conduct...Drunkenness, quarrelling, fighting, were the prevailing vices of the Six Nations of Indians.... in this respect they were no better than their pagan brethren."(8)

The overall attitude of the Church of England was probably best described in the purported confession of Rev. A. Pridle to Peter Jones when he declared that "he and his fellow labourers laughed at the idea as...a fruitless effort."(9)

The first Methodist ministers fared little better, if demonstrating a little more concern. Individual ministers would sometimes hold camp meetings which were also open to Indians and such zealots as Nathan Bangs were preaching to groups of Indians in Upper Canada as early as 1803.(10) But, despite the presence of seventy-six Methodist
ministers (11) in Upper Canada by 1812, the Methodist Church did not officially interest itself in the conversion of the Indian until after 1815.

The spark which finally prompted Methodist interest was the work of an unsanctified coloured preacher, John Steward. Steward, without instruction from the Methodist conference, had established a mission among the Wyandots near Detroit. Their immediate response to his fiery exhortations opened the eyes of such Methodist leaders as W. Case and provided the impulse for further energy to be put into the conversion of the Indians of North America, particularly those in Upper Canada. The successful work of John Seward came as a revelation to some. In the words of Alvin Torry:

"No one it seems since the days of Barnhard to the time of the reformation among the Wyandots, thought that the gospel of Christ could march directly up to the wild, drunken, degraded Indian's heart and make a successful attack upon the evil of his moral nature." (12)

The Methodists launched their attack almost immediately. The Rev. Alvin Torry was assigned to the Six Nations Reserve on the Bay of Quinte and in the spring of 1824 the first Methodist Indian Church was established at Davisville. (13)
Despite this advance, the hard work of the Methodist preachers and the inherent attractiveness of Methodist doctrine, Methodist accomplishments remained unspectacular until, in 1825, Peter Jones attended a Methodist Camp Meeting at the Six Nations, held by Alvin Torry and William Case. Jones, the son of a Mississauga mother and a Welsh father, had been wavering towards an acceptance of Christian doctrine for some time. In his own words -

"I had been halting between two opinions. Sometimes whilst reading the word of God, or hearing it promoted, I would be almost persuaded to become a Christian, but when I looked at the conduct of the whites who were called Christians I saw them drunk, quarreling, fighting, cheating the poor Indians and acting as if there was no God, I was led to think there could be no truth in the white man's religion and felt inclined to fall back again to my old superstitions." (14)

Jones' conversion is most often presented in typical Methodist 'divine spark' fashion. Alvin Torry says,

"As he listened the word of truth sank deep in his heart and conviction seized upon his soul. The tears streamed from his eyes... he leaned forward and cried aloud for mercy." (15)

Whether his conversion was quite that dramatic, his 'salvation' and committal to the Methodist cause contained serious portent for Methodist missions in Upper Canada.
From this point, until almost the end of the 1830's, the Methodists were successful in gathering converts to their missions and in effecting at least external changes in their mode of life in a way which is unprecedented in missionary endeavour. The success was based upon two corner stones, the work of Peter Jones or native assistants like him and the advantages to be gained from education of the young and industry expended in agricultural pursuits.

Jones, shortly after his conversion, was able to convince a large segment of his mother's band of Mississaugas to journey to the Grand River and listen to the Methodist ministers. They arrived in tatters, having spent much of their travelling time around "huckster shops" between the Credit and Grand Valleys. Jones and the Methodists were able to convince a majority of the tribe to throw off their previous wandering ways, abstain from the use of spirits, and devote themselves to industrial pursuit of the orderly life.

It is from this initial success that Methodist missions grew. Both Lt. Governor Maitland and Bishop Strachan were sufficiently impressed with the orderly conduct of the Methodist converts at the 1825 distribution of presents and swayed enough by Peter Jones' petitions to
help the Methodists establish a mission on the Credit River. Accordingly houses were built, money spent on agricultural implements and a school house erected. The first, and probably the most successful, Methodist mission in Upper Canada was established.

The Methodists used their success well. Through Peter Jones they were able to recruit a number of Ojibwa convinced of the benefits of Methodist teaching who travelled with Methodist preachers to extol the virtue of salvation. Now, thanks to the Credit Mission, the advantages of salvation would be obvious to all who wanted to see: log houses, instruction in agriculture and schooling for their children. Word spread, the great experiment the Ojibwa at the Credit River were undertaking was known throughout the Great Lakes area, and portions of many bands came down to see for themselves. The Methodists used these visits to great advantage. George Ryerson, for some time the Methodist minister at the Credit, describes the general formula used:

"The uniform practice of the Christians on such occasions is to divide the visitors between one, two or three families, according to their numbers, where they are hospitably entertained for the two or three weeks that they generally stay. The other Christian inhabitants of the village then send each his portion of corn, or potatoes, or venison, etc., to the houses where the strangers were enter-
tained. During the temporary residence so indefatigable are the Christians in exhorting them that they seldom return to the solitudes of the wilderness without more or less having experienced the salvation of God through faith in Jesus Christ." (18)

With the good example of the Credit, with converts returning to diverse, scattered bands of Ojibwa, no doubt with thoughts of full stomachs and warm cabins as fixed in their heads as Methodist exhortations on salvation, and with Methodist ministers accompanied by fervent native assistants spreading the word to Ojibwa bands across Upper Canada, Methodist Indian missions began to spring up throughout the colony.

Methodist exertion and the conversion of Peter Jones do not, however, explain adequately why significant portions of the Ojibwa now appeared to be ready to accept Christian teaching after so soundly rejecting attempts in the previous century.

Much had changed for the Ojibwa between 1760 and the early 1800's. In the words of the British Commissioners investigating Indian affairs in Upper Canada:

"...They were an untaught, unwary race among a population ready to take every advantage of them. Their lands, their presents and annuities, the produce of the chase, their guns and clothing, whatever they possessed of value, were objects of temptation to needy settlers and the unprincipled trader, to whom
their ignorance of commerce and of the English language and their remarkable fondness for spirits yielded them an easy prey."(19)

They were not, though, blind. The wisest among them saw early that many of their previous assumptions no longer pertained to a world so radically altered. Throughout the early part of the nineteenth century individual Ojibwa chiefs petitioned the government for assistance in learning new ways of coping. These suggestions were invariably ignored. The 1805 Purchase of Land from the Ojibwa had, according to the Ojibwa chief David Sawyer, included the promise by the government to settle them in a village, provide agricultural implements and, most importantly, teachers. The implements were supplied but no instructions as to their use. The tools waited, rusting in the village clearings.(20)

As conditions throughout the early 1800's deteriorated - as settlers grew in number and hunting less viable - more and more Ojibwa began to realize the need for change and became increasingly frustrated in their inability to effect that change. Given these altered circumstances it is not surprising that the Methodists, with their demonstrated effectiveness in helping accomplish that transition, should gain immediate support. The Ojibwa were not
primarily drawn to the Methodist version of salvation, rather they accepted the Methodist missionaries as the only brokers available to help individual bands begin to carve a life for themselves in the new society growing up around them.
CHAPTER 8

CHANGING GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES IN THE 1830'S

In May of 1829 Sir J. Kempt proposed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies some general principles on which to base a revision of Indian affairs in Upper and Lower Canada. He suggested in part that the Indian Department:

"1st. Collect the Indians in considerable numbers and settle them in villages with a due portion of land for their cultivation and support.

2nd. To make such provision for their religious improvement, education and instruction in husbandry as circumstances may from time to time require.

3rd. To afford them such assistance in building their houses, rations and in procuring such seed and agricultural implements as may be necessary, commuting when practicable a portion of their presents for the latter." (1)

These three suggestions were accepted by the Lords of the Treasury, although funds to be spent on it were severely restricted (twenty thousand pounds annually - the total expense of presents for the previous year). (2) Consequently in 1830, the control of Indian Affairs in Upper Canada passed from the hands of the military authorities directly into those of the Lieutenant Governor Sir John Colborne. This shift was both the culmination of a two
decade period of transition, the beginning of a new aspect in government relations with the Indian and a time of dramatic portent for the Ojibwa in Upper Canada. What it meant simply was, in the words of Duncan Campbell Scott, that

"...Indian officers were no longer to be solely purveyors of presents or almoners of the crown grants; they were to be transformed into the executants of a humane and progressive plan for the civilization of the aborigines."(3)

This transformation, as important as it was, has been cited often in discussions of Indian Affairs in Upper Canada, most notably by Robert Surtees in "The Development of Indian Reserve Policy in Upper Canada." The focus of these discussions has been, though, on humanitarian impulses emanating from Whitehall, an integral part of that transmutation in British thought discussed earlier. This is a neither complete nor accurate picture of the process. As suggested earlier, Kempt's suggestions, their acceptance by the Lords of Treasury, and the subsequent shifting of authority for Indian Affairs was the culmination of a lengthy process, the result of over a decade of suggestion by local authorities, pressure from Ojibwa desiring change and, ultimately, an immediate reaction to changing circumstances and a perceived threat to continued
Indian Department influence over the Indians under its jurisdiction. All these forces continued to batter away at military authority, inertia and jealousy.

In the decade before Kempt's suggestions most perceptive observers saw that the conduct of Indian affairs was doing little good for Ojibwa in Upper Canada, and a few cared enough to note this fact. In 1818 Deputy Superintendent William Claus remarked to the Mississauga after purchasing their final tract of land:

"Your great father's wish is to make you comfortable but I much fear you will not benefit by it. I see a number of Boats about your River and white people in them. They are here for no other purpose but to make you drunk and get your clothing from you."(4)

Despite inadequate government attempts to restrict whisky traders at the presentation of annuities, their attendance "rendered the scene...one of riot and debauchery as long as anything was left wherewith spirits could be procured."(5)

As early as June of 1820 Lieutenant Governor Maitland had suggested to the Earl of Bathurst that they appoint a clergyman, a school master and teacher-farmer for the Ojibwa.(6) Despite these observations and suggestions little change appeared in the Indian Department. Ultimate
authority continued to be vested in the military. They perceived their responsibility, as far as the Indian was concerned, solely in terms of maintaining their allegiance in case of war, and protecting settlers against any potential threats from Indian bands. The military authorities believed, and rightly so, that their system of presents and payments of annuities would ensure their British connection. As late as 1829 Sir J. Kempt was able to assure Sir John Colborne that "there is little doubt that by a continuance of kindness they will be disposed again to take up the Tomohawk when required by King George."(7)

Probably more important in maintaining this conception of the relationship between Indian Department and their charges, was that until the mid-1820's the Department was controlled by loyalists imbued with the William Johnson tradition in Indian negotiations. These loyalists, the later-Johnsons, John Butler, Alexander McKee, Matthew Elliot, had long been used to viewing the Indians as allies in war, leaving them to govern their own affairs when not needed in this capacity. They did not begin to become replaced by the new breed of superintendent, G. Ironsides and T.G. Anderson, until well after the war of 1812.(8)

Finally, as an important sphere of military operation in the colony, the Indian Department had become a
significant source of patronage for the Commander of the Forces and those immediately below him, one jealously guarded. (9)

By the late 1820's a number of new circumstances had combined to ensure that a continuation of military authority over the Indian Department carried along the same lines was no longer tenable. The cost of the annual presents distributed by the Indian Department had climbed considerably since their inception in the last century. As the cost grew and the perceived importance of the Indian, particularly the Ojibwa, as allies for war decreased, the Lords of Treasury began to search for ways of reducing or eliminating this charge.

As early as 1822, Lord Bathurst had written to Lord Dalhousie requesting his advice concerning the reduction of the expense. Lord Dalhousie's reply was not encouraging:

"Old customs have established claims in the minds of the Indians, upon the bounty of their Great Father...which if curtailed or broken off, would be considered a breach of faith, unjustifiable in their eyes, and would assuredly be followed by consequences serious to be avoided." (10)

Even into the 1830's the question of the expense of annual presents plagued the Treasury Department and
Secretary of State for the colonies. In 1832, in reply to a query by Lord Goderich, Sir John Colborne informed him that he believed that "the British Government cannot, I imagine, now, under any circumstances, get rid of an inconvenient debt."(11)

Assured that the continued issuance of presents was a necessity Treasury searched for means of reducing their cost. In 1827 Lord Goderich wished to commute the presents into money payments to reduce the costs of transport and the employees required by the Indian Department. Again they were thwarted. The Earl of Dalhousie responded that "the payment of presents or other tribute to them in money would be received with the utmost alarm...money to the Indians is instantly spent on spirituous liquor."(12)

Given the state of Indian affairs in Upper Canada, the continued and growing cost of the annual presents seemed a certainty for many years to come. The ability of Kempt's proposals to relieve the Imperial purse eventually of a cost quickly being seen as intolerable was one of its most persuasive arguments. In 1829 Sir James Kempt communicated to Secretary of State Sir G. Murray, the judgment that "the settling of the Indians...will gradually relieve His Majesty's Government from the expense of these presents and eventually from that of the Indian Department."(13)
There were other important recommendations for the change. The Indian Department was being pressed by a number of local superintendents and agents, as well as concerned observers, to establish the Indian Department on a new footing.

In 1824 James Buchanan sent "A Plan for the Melioration and Civilization of the British North American Indians" to the Earl of Dalhousie, the Governor General of the Canadas. In this plan he called for the creation of a "Royal Asylum" for the Indians within the line of 44th degree north latitude and Lakes Huron and Simcoe, where they should be protected and instructed. Although the Earl of Dalhousie did not act upon these recommendations he was not able to ignore the implications.\(^{14}\)

Perhaps the most important of these promptings came from the superintendent of the Indian station at Drummond Island, T.G. Anderson. Anderson is an interesting character central to our story (because he became Superintendent at Coldwater-Narrows) and played a pivotal, if little recognized, role in Indian affairs in Upper Canada throughout much of the first half of the nineteenth century. A glimpse into Anderson's early career is justified as it is typical of many employees of the Indian Department during this period.
Anderson arrived in Canada, at Kingston, in 1795 intent on developing a career in law. After working for a merchant briefly he was seduced by the merchant's brother, Robert Dickson, to join him as an Indian trader in the Wisconsin area. Dickson, according to Horseman, "the most prominent British fur trader on the Upper Mississippi"(15) and Anderson enjoyed a profitable trade until the outbreak of the war of 1812, upon which they used their considerable influence to encourage their Indian clients to the British side. Between the two of them they mustered close to three hundred warriors. Anderson and a party of Indians eventually took Prairie du Chien in 1814. As a reward, Anderson, in 1816, was given the post of Clerk for the Indian Department at Drummond Island under John Askin Jr.(16)

In 1817 Anderson, now Superintendent at Drummond Island, thought he saw a basic flaw in the handling of the Indian Department. He believed that allowing the Indian to depend upon Government provisions not only resulted in increased costs to the Department, but led to the ultimate degeneration of the Indian. He wrote Deputy Superintendent W. Claus agrily that

"They did not raise crops for their own winter's subsistence, they whiled away their summers slothfully, drinking, and in winter when neither fish nor hare are to be caught they depend on government provisions."(17)
He went on to propose that the Potaganasee* on Drummond Island be denied presents unless they prepare gardens and raise crops, that these crops would come under Indian Department control and that farmers be hired to instruct adult Indians on agriculture and school teachers to wean the children from the hunting life.

Although Anderson did not receive official support from the Indian Department for his recommendations, he did eventually compel a number of Potaganasee to start gardens and his recommendations were probably instrumental in his being named Superintendent of the Coldwater-Narrows Reserve.

The Indian Department was receiving more significant pressure from Ojibwa chiefs. In the 1820's the American government had spent considerable money and energy in erecting establishments, consisting of missionaries, school masters, farmers and mechanics. The bulk of these establishments were grouped around Lake Michigan and Lake Superior and seemed to the British authorities to have as their purpose the alienation of the affections of the

---

* The Potaganasee were in reality Ojibwa. Potaganasee is Ojibwa for "many inlets", a term they used to describe their home on the north shore of Drummond Island. Anderson and the Indian Department simply became used to coining this band of Ojibwa as such, a coinage continued here for the sake of clarity.
'wandering' Indians from the Michigan/Wisconsin area. These were the same Indians that the British had spent considerable sums on in the form of presents to ensure their loyalty. Their allegiance was still felt to be of importance. It seemed that not only were 'wandering' Indians being seduced by these developments, but the establishments were straining relations between the British government and 'resident' Indians as well.

A speech made by a Potaganasee, Ashagashe, to T.G. Anderson at Drummond Island in 1827 is worth quoting at length as it gives voice to a fear the Indian Department officials held close:

"Father we have observed with some degree of jealousy the establishment of a place at Michilimackinac at which the children of our great father are taught the means of living in the same way the whites do, where they also learn to make their thoughts on paper and to think the news from books as you do;....

...Father we might send our children to Mackinac to get sense but we are not big knives...we have arms as well as the whites but we don't know how to use them." (19)

Perhaps the most pressing and immediate prompting for the civilization policy of the Indian Department was a variation on the same fear of American alienation of the Indians around the Great Lakes area. As previously discussed, the Methodist missions were extremely successful
and individual Methodist ministers had developed significant influence among a number of Ojibwa bands. Not only had the success of such missions as the Credit done much to convince authorities that a program to create industrious farmers out of the Ojibwa in Upper Canada could be successful, but the success had caused apprehensions about the effects of this growing Methodist influence.

The British believed they had good reason to fear Methodist influence. As already seen, the American Methodist Episcopal Church bore little resemblance to its British source and had cut off all important ties with the Wesleyan Methodists. The Methodist missions in Canada were controlled until 1828, when the first Canadian conference met, by an American based conference of Methodists. More importantly, until well after the war of 1812 the vast majority of Methodist ministers originated in the States. After the war of 1812 the Genesee Conference became much more circumspect in finding Upper Canadian or newly arrived ministers from the United Kingdom for service in Upper Canada.] At a time when American paranoia was running high and eight out of ten settlers were of American origin Methodist activity was viewed with extreme suspicious. (After all, the British had just been at war with the Americans.)
If Methodist exhortation among the settlers was disliked it is not surprising, given the perceived importance of the Ojibwa as allies in war, that their work among the Indians was viewed with increasing dismay. H.G. Darling, in 1828, reported to Sir G. Murray that although

"it is undoubted that they have done some good by influencing the Indians to embrace Christianity and have inculcated the first principles of civilization..." he wondered

"whether this disposition of the Indians should not be encouraged by the British Government, as the most certain means of riveting their affection and securing their loyalty and attachment; which will naturally incline to that power from where they are sensible their chief good is desired." (22)

The Governor General, Sir James Kempt, was even more pointed in his fears of the Methodists. He penned a warning to Lieutenant Governor Sir J. Colborne that the "Methodists inculcate Republican principles in the Indians... if the British Government does not step in between the Indians and the Methodist missionaries it may be repented too late." (23)

Thus the change in the focus of the Indian Department and its transfer to Civil Authority. Prompted by employees, knowledgeable observers and the Ojibwa themselves, hounded by the Treasury Department to reduce costs, afraid of
American Government influence through their attempts at mission stations, anxious about and prompted by Methodist successes and, yes, imbued with a real desire to ameliorate the degenerating conditions of the Ojibwa in Upper Canada, the Indian Department was, at last, ready to embark on their experiment in 'civilizing' the Ojibwa, the Coldwater-Narrows establishment.
CHAPTER 9

THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT

In 1829 the British abandoned Drummond Island to the Americans. Although the military establishment there was ordered to repair to St. Joseph's Island and then Penetanguishene the Indian Department, under Superintendent T.G. Anderson, was advised to proceed to Matchedash Bay to prepare for the establishment of an agricultural enclave there. This enclave, the Coldwater-Narrows Settlement, was to run the fourteen miles from the Narrows of Lake Simcoe to Matchedash Bay, and was to be based around the establishment of individual family farms along a strategic road between the two sites. This establishment Colborne believed to be the key to Indian Department civilization policy. Not only would three tribes of Ojibwa from Lakes Simcoe and Huron, as well as the Potaganasee from Drummond Island be situated there, but the establishment was meant to act as a magnet for the more northerly tribes of Ojibwa. They were now to repair to the vicinity (Penetanguishene) for their annuities and presents and would be impressed enough with the advantages of agricultural life to join the Ojibwa already located. Through the connection provided in their settling into the establishment Colborne
believed that the continued allegiance of the northern tribes would be ensured while eventually reducing the need for continued expenditure on their subsistence. For Coldwater-Narrows to act as this magnet it needed first to be successful in settling the Indian tribes of Lake Simcoe and Huron.

At its inception it enjoyed every prospect of success. The Lake Simcoe and Lake Huron Ojibwa had for a half a century been located in and amongst a number of islands in both lakes. Here they had pursued a diversified economy, doing some hunting and fishing, but also planting a significant amount of corn, turnips and squash. As in the rest of Upper Canada the latter years of the eighteenth century showed a marked decline in the viability of traditional economic pursuits. This coupled with a general demoralizing of the various bands removed much of the impulse for any greater exertion in maintaining their way of life.

Perhaps the most complete picture of the lives of these Ojibwa near the turn of the century was that drawn by Alex MacDonnell, Sheriff of the Home District, in his diary of a journey by Lieutenant Governor John Graves Simcoe from Humber Bay to Matchedash Bay in 1793. During their brief visit to the area MacDonnell recorded that the
Lake Simcoe Indians had given up raising crops on a number of the islands, including Grape Island. Throughout the whole duration of their visit the Ojibwa the Governor's party came across were continually drunk. Indeed, on the last day of their stay at Matchedash Bay all the Indians had continued to drink through the night and at the time of the Lieutenant Governor's departure they "had not the use of limb or reason"(4) forcing Simcoe himself to man a paddle.

The Ojibwa got most of their rum from a number of traders operating on Lakes Huron and Simcoe. The most important of these was Jean Baptiste Constance, who had been trading at Matchedash for well over fifteen years. Although by all accounts Constance was one of the most scrupulous of traders in Upper Canada, an indication of the type of relations he enjoyed with the Ojibwa can be garnered from MacDonnell's description of his trading post. It was a solid stockade, extremely well defended. Although occasionally he would allow small parties of Ojibwa inside the stockade, the bulk of the trading was done outside of the garrison and the Indians were never allowed to drink inside its walls. Both the Lake Simcoe and Lake Huron Ojibwa had developed a dependency relation on Constance and a number of other, less scrupulous, traders,
sinking so far in debt there was little hope of ever extricating themselves from it.

Simcoe's journey corresponded to one of the periodic epidemics which occasionally swept the 'back' Ojibwa. Both at Lake Simcoe and at Lake Huron Simcoe found many Indians sick and a number dying. At De Grassi Point an Ojibwa principal man predicted that "the end of the world is at hand, Indians will be no more" and petitioned Simcoe's party "you white men pray: we poor Indians do not know what it is, but we hope you will entreat the Great Spirit to remove the sickness from amongst us." (5)

In recent years these Ojibwa had demonstrated an inclination to settle into the type of orderly life envisioned by Colborne and Anderson. As early as 1827 Yellowhead, principal chief of the largest tribe in Lake Simcoe, had expressed to Lieutenant Governor Maitland and W. Claus his desire to enjoy the benefits of a settlement for his people. Yellowhead petitioned, in part:

"Our native brothers are desirous of forming a settlement...It is our desire to come together, many of us have thrown aside our former habits and wish to adopt the habits of civilized life...we shall then be enabled to pursue a regular system of agriculture and greater facilities will be afforded us in following the precepts of our religious teachers." (6)
The impulse behind the desire expressed by Yellowhead is not hard to trace. After his success with the Credit Mission, Peter Jones, in 1826, held a Camp Meeting at Holland Landing with the Lake Simcoe Ojibwa. Although Jones did not immediately gain a large number of converts, Chief Yellowhead declared that his Indians were free to make their own decisions and that he would have made his by next spring. Chief Snake was converted at the meeting and promised to visit the Credit during the winter. Chief Snake then inquired as to when his people could expect to have a school. (7)

By 1827 the Methodists had erected a temporary school house at Holland Landing, staffed by the teacher William Law. More than one hundred Lake Simcoe Indians were "obedient to the faith" and the school had sixty scholars. In 1828, after being refused land at Holland Landing to establish a mission, in the words of Bishop Strachan "so long as they remained under the instruction of their present teachers" (8) the Indians returned to a number of islands in Lake Simcoe still controlled by the Indian bands. Here a second school was established and they were encouraged in animal husbandry and agriculture.

The Lake Simcoe Ojibwa could not be entirely satisfied with their situation though. The Lake Simcoe Ojibwa
were still tied inextricably through a form of debt bondage to a number of French traders. (9) These traders resented the Methodist assumption of control and the economic loss they would entail should the Ojibwa abandon their hunting and trapping. P. Jones reports that in the early days of Methodist work traders were continually threatening beatings if Ojibwa listened to the Methodist preaching. (10)

After their retreat to Yellowhead's Island the harassment of traders continued. Chief Yellowhead, in a memo to Chief Superintendent Givens in 1829, complained that two traders had cut down his lumber and offered it to him for sale. When Yellowhead complained these traders purportedly burned down a temporary chapel the Indians were using.

The situation among the Lake Huron Ojibwa was little better. Many of John Aisance's band had come to meetings at Holland Landing. The band has also been visited regularly by Jones and other Methodist lay preachers. In 1828 James Currie was sent to establish a mission at Matchedash Bay and Peter Jones, after a visit in 1829, gives us this appraisal of their conduct:

"The people are much devoted to the service of God. There have been no instances of intoxication among them since their conversion, the leaders are very vigilant in the discharge of their duty." (11)
But, despite their orderly behaviour and the proximity of the military station at Drummond Island and Penetanguishene, the Lake Huron Indians were also harassed and hindered in their transition by traders. Many of Aisence's tribe had also gotten irrevocably into debt. (By 1829 the total debt of the three tribes was one thousand and forty-four pounds 17 shillings.) These traders felt they had an economic position that could only be maintained by thwarting Methodist and Indian attempts to establish another economic base in agriculture. The traders realized their influence and control over the Ojibwa would decline in direct proportion to that which the Methodist ministers were able to acquire.

A magistrates' court in Newmarket on the 15th of August 1828 was the site of a drama which gives an indication of the type of conditions which prevailed as well as some insight into why the Ojibwa accepted both Methodist and later government protection. Chief Aisance had pressed charges against a French trader who had purportedly beaten an Indian severely. The magistrate summarily dismissed the case because the Indian could not remember the date upon which the beating purportedly occurred. As he was being dismissed Aisance protested:
"I have been abused again and again by your people, and no notice has been taken of them for their bad conduct; I thought that the reason you did not take notice of us was because we were so wretched, ignorant and drunken, and consequently not worthy of regard, but now our eyes are opened to see our miserable condition, and in seeing, we have endeavoured to forsake our former evil ways. I cannot suffer without having justice done to offenders." (13)

It is probable that Aisance, Yellowhead and the other Ojibwa chiefs by now realized that they had to demonstrate their capacity to participate in the society growing up around them in order to expect protection from that society. They also realized that they would need more powerful assistance than the Methodist Society was able to offer. Indeed, the initial impulse for the Coldwater-Narrows Reserve was a product of John Aisance's and Anderson's agreement on this issue. Anderson wrote to Lieutenant Governor Colborne, through Chief Superintendent Givens from Penetanguishene early in 1829. He believed

"the immediate establishment of a school for the Indians in this neighbourhood with its other advantages would be a great inducement to the western Indians to settle within British territory." (14)

Anderson also informed Colborne that John Aisance had indicated he wished to settle his tribe at Matchedash Bay because it would afford "easy communication with his
brothers at Lake Simcoe".* He desired a school, some assistance and instruction in farming and a blacksmith for his people. Anderson further informed Colborne that

"with one yoke of oxen, the assistance of the Indians and the Interpreter and blacksmith of the Indian Department, a temporary school house and forge could be built at a very small expense, perhaps plus or minus 20 to 25 pounds." (15)

Anderson and the Indian Department embarked on the development of the reserve with some energy. By the spring of 1830 clearings for villages had been started at both the Narrows and Matchedash. Anderson had received permission to start the Indians on construction of a road between the two, and to pay them two shillings per day for their work. (16) Throughout the summer of 1830 Anderson had about eighty Indians from the three different tribes working on the road, (17) and work proceeded apace.

That fall Chief Yellowhead sent Anderson the encouraging message that his tribe "intend to settle at the village you are building for us and end our days there and

*Although the sheer bulk of Indian petitions for establishments indicate that there was a genuine desire, one must approach each one with caution. Throughout the whole period both missionaries and employees of the Indian Department seemed to have created or altered petitions from the Ojibwa to suit their own purposes.
our children will be kept in school." (18) The following year Ojibwa from all the tribes had begun clearing spots on the road for houses, (19) planting plots of potatoes around their houses and clearing land for a communal farm. (20) Anderson was able to report to Chief Superintendent Givens that there were sixteen acres of corn, ten of oats, three of peas and four of spring wheat planted on the North River Flats near the Narrows and five acres of potatoes at Coldwater. He told Givens he believed "there is every prospect of their having an ample supply of corn and potatoes for next winter." (21)

Throughout 1831 and the following year carpenters were at work constructing houses for the Indians and buildings for the establishment. A saw mill had been completed at Coldwater. (22) By the spring of 1833 Anderson was able to give this encouraging description of the establishment. At the Narrows there were sixteen two-family log homes built, eleven old log shanties and three wigwams. It had a Methodist meeting house and school, one frame house for Chief Yellowhead and sixty acres under cultivation. Coldwater had a meeting house and school house, Anderson's frame house, thirteen two-family log homes, six old log houses, a sawmill and one hundred and ten acres cultivated. (23) Anderson estimated that the
establishment produced approximately three to five hundred bushels of wheat.\(^{(24)}\) Both the Narrows and Coldwater had a school, the Coldwater school being a government boarding school,\(^{(25)}\) and Anderson was in the process of establishing workshops to teach some of the Indians trades.\(^{(26)}\)

The accomplishments of the establishment were impressive. It seemed the Ojibwa would soon be able to support the establishment from their own fields. They had access to religious instruction, schooling for their children, and assistance in farming. As important, the establishment afforded protection from the demands and harassment of traders and seemed to offer the Ojibwa legal recourse if they resumed.
CHAPTER 10
THE EXPERIMENT FALTERS

Prompted by the petitions of Anderson, Yellowhead and Aisance, fostered by the initiatives of the Methodists and approved by a government determined to reduce expenses while maintaining the allegiance and affection of both resident and wandering Indians, the Coldwater-Narrows Reserve had a lot of roles to play and expectations to live up to. The encouraging accomplishments cited above on closer inspection hid a deeper malaise. Despite the accomplishments, Coldwater-Narrows was rocked with conflicts from its very outset.

Much of the problems encountered at Coldwater-Narrows can be traced to unrealistic expectations by Indian Department officials, notably Anderson and Colborne, concerning the speed and extent of transition expected of the Indians. The Ojibwa could not or would not live up to these expectations.

One key to the expected success of the establishment was to be the road from the Narrows to Matchedash Bay. Anderson and Colborne believed the traffic between Lake Simcoe and Lake Huron was going to increase dramatically
in the next few years. They realized how important for the development of the colony a well-maintained road between these two points would be. This road would link shipping traffic on Lake Simcoe to that on Lake Huron and would be a strong incentive to direct settlement north from Toronto, along the route to Lake Simcoe. Thus the Coldwater-Narrows road was to be a belated fulfillment of Lieutenant Governor Simcoe's dreams.

The government believed that by settling Indians along the road they would keep it maintained while establishing a transport business for themselves which would help support the enclave. From the beginning this scheme ran into problems. The maintenance of such a road was a serious burden on the Indians in the settlement. The colony had no funds to expend on the building or maintenance of roads. In other parts of Upper Canada, throughout most of this period, settlers were required to keep the roads cleared along their farm as part of their settlement duties in order to receive clear title to land in the form of patents. Colborne hoped that the transport business and Indian Department pressure would compel the Ojibwa settled along the Coldwater road to do the same.

To emphasize this intention Colborne, through Givens, informed Anderson: "You must on no account suffer
the houses to be so near to each other as to preclude the possibility of giving each family forty or fifty acres." (2) But most of the incoming Ojibwa, accustomed to village life were not prepared to locate on isolated, detached farms. Yellowhead informed Anderson that only a few of the younger braves would settle along the road while the rest of the Lake Simcoe Ojibwa were planning to settle in the village at the Narrows. He argued convincingly that they would be too dispersed along the road to send their children to school. (3)

At the Coldwater end Anderson fared a little better. Although originally wishing to establish in a village at Matchedash, Anderson was able to convince the Potaganassee who had accompanied him from Drummond Island, as well as some of Aisance's Ojibwa, to settle along the road a few miles from Coldwater. Because of their reluctance to be as isolated as fifty acre farms would demand the size of their lots was diminished. Thus their farms only stretched a little over three miles from Coldwater. (4) Consequently, for most of the fourteen miles the Coldwater road was to be untended by resident farmers.

With a considerable amount of pressure, and the encouragement of the two shilling a day wage, Anderson was able to convince the Ojibwa to complete the initial clearing of the road. But the Indians consistently refused to
expend the capital needed to engage in the transport business to any considerable extent. (5) Consequently, by the spring of 1832, the road needed a considerable amount of repair. Although Anderson was given permission to expend twelve hundred pounds on this repair it was a cost which the Indian Department could not continue to bear and a problem which plagued the establishment throughout its existence. (6)

Clearing for other purposes on the reserve was not attended with any more encouraging success. The original assumption had been that the Indians themselves were to clear room for the villages, farms and lots for individual houses. Initially the Indians again were to receive the wage of two shillings per day as well as provisions. By the spring of 1831 Anderson had decided to pay them by the clearing "for when employed by day, if someone does not superintend them they do not work one half of their time," and was finding that it was "impossible to satisfy them in respect to provisions." (7) Those working on the clearings were apt to abandon their work without notice to attend to other duties; hunting, fishing, and, in the first couple of years, to attend crops back on the island. (8) As a result of the perceived unreliability of the Indian workers, by 1832 most of the clearing was being done by white workmen,
costing between twelve and sixteen dollars an acre. (9)

Of course the principal purpose behind the work being done at the establishment was to transform the Ojibwa into self-sufficient farmers and much of Superintendent Anderson's efforts were expended with this object in mind. The description supplied earlier indicates that the establishment had considerable acreage under cultivation. Most of this acreage was poor agricultural land on the North River Flats of the Coldwater River, which had been resorted to in 1831 only after Anderson had decided that the Ojibwa were not going to be able to clear enough good land for a spring crop. (10) Throughout the whole period of the establishment and despite Anderson's confident predictions the Coldwater-Narrows was never able to produce enough crops to maintain itself. (11) Much of this failing was due to a continuing reluctance on the part of the Ojibwa to abandon the former round of occupations; hunting, fishing and collecting maple syrup. Anderson was continually embarrassed by requests for returns from the settlement as so often too many "were dispersed throughout the country" for Anderson to attempt it. (12)

As late as 1836 Anderson had to report to the Chief Superintendent that the establishment was almost deserted of men as they had gone for their fall hunting. (13) Despite
almost constant beseeching by Anderson, who pointed to the industry of the white farmers around them, Yellowhead in 1834 still refused to receive his tribe's annuities in the form of agricultural implements, although he did promise Anderson

"...in a year or two we shall be able to raise a sufficient supply (of wheat) and perhaps some to sell, and then we shall be happy to give up our land payments for the purposes you desire."(14)

Probably as important in discouraging Indian exertion in agriculture was the quality of land throughout the settlement. The area around Matchedash proved too marshy for efficient cultivation. In the fall of 1831 the decision was made to remove the establishment inland to Coldwater. Thus it was not until 1832 that the Ojibwa and Potoganasee could begin to clear and cultivate their lots. Conditions in Coldwater remained confused and unsettled throughout most of that year.(15)

Despite the ease of clearing the North River Flats area the land surrounding the village at the Narrows was not well suited for agriculture either. In 1836 James Evans, a Methodist minister, gave us this assessment from the Narrows:

"No wonder that the Indians here make but little improvement in farming, such a
thing being impractical - stony, sandy and swampy being almost the only quality of land being seen...however good the design may have been in settling them here nothing much is more certain than that they can never make much improvement on their present location."(16)

One of the major disappointments for Colborne was the lack of support given the government school at Coldwater. Established in 1832, the school, a boarding school, was designed to be a model for Indian schools and one of the chief elements of the magnet that was to be Coldwater-Narrows. The school, though, was rife with dissension and never well attended. For many parts of the year, when families were out of the community hunting or making sugar, it was almost deserted.(17)

Even at the best of times the school was not well supplied with pupils. Many parents were concerned about the care the children received at the boarding school after formal classes were over.(18) Much of the reason for its poor success was due to quarreling between various religious factions (see next chapter) but almost as important was the reaction against the rather strict, confining rules of the school. A good indication of the type of atmosphere created can be garnered from Anderson's missive to Givens stating

"As it is highly desirable that the Boarders should be kept as much as possible within the limits of the school and under
the eyes of the Teacher, a close boarded
Fence should be made to enclose this
building...and so constructed as to ex­
clude all intercourse betwixt the Boys
and Girls." (19)

At the time there were only eight boys and twenty-one
girls attending.

Obviously Anderson was not receiving the type of
cooperation he had hoped for. He was particularly upset
about the growing opposition of the Potaganasee who had
come from Drummond Island with him and with whom he thought
he had developed a lasting trust. Anderson complained to
Givens in 1831 that the Potaganasee

"were the most faithful and obedient
Indians that I had ever met with, but I
regret to say they have much changed,
whether this is attributable to bad advice
from the Indians of this part of the coun­
try or whether the whites, whose interest
it may be to keep them in slavish ignorance,
have influenced them...I cannot say." (20)

Indeed early in the establishment Colborne had advised
Anderson that if the opposition of the Indians towards
their designs continued he was to disband the establish­
ment. (21) Anderson quickly communicated this warning to
the various Ojibwa bands.

What Anderson and Colborne were finding, of course,
was that the Coldwater-Narrows Reserve could only be success­
ful to the extent that they received the cooperation of the Ojibwa and Potaganasee involved. This cooperation would accrue depending on how closely the Ojibwa perceived their aims reflected in those of Anderson and the Indian Department.

There were a number of factors at work to limit Ojibwa trust in both Anderson and the Indian Department. One of the most important of these factors was a growing conflict between Anderson and the chiefs of the various tribes. A certain amount of tension between the two was, perhaps, inevitable. Anderson, in his role as Superintendent, with the powers of patronage at his disposal, would have by necessity usurped some of the traditional chiefs' authority as he began to perform some of their functions. The situation at Coldwater-Narrows seems to have been heightened somewhat by Anderson's personality. The picture one emerges with after a perusal of Anderson's correspondence is that of an intelligent, observant, perhaps dedicated, but also ambitious, demanding and authoritarian official. Anderson seemed determined to make Coldwater-Narrows work and the high-handed manner in which he went about ensuring that it did was sure to create problems between him and the chiefs.

In the initial stages of the settlement, Anderson believed he had to use whatever pressure was at his dis-
posal to encourage the Indians to work on the road, as we have seen, to the extent of threatening to end the establishment. Anderson also kept a tight rein on any income from the reserve. Although they never ventured into transport along the road to the extent either Anderson or Colborne wished, the Indians did periodically receive small amounts of income from transporting goods for settlers. This money Anderson kept for the establishment as a whole and despite petitions refused to divide it among the Indians.\(^{(22)}\)

Anderson was also responsible for ensuring that chiefs and principal men were no longer to receive funds from the 'common stock' when they visited York. Anderson may have been correct in suggesting that this ready supply of cash, however small, prompted idleness on the part of the chiefs whom Anderson had hoped would be prime examples of industriousness, but his pointing it out to Givens did little to gain the chiefs' affections.\(^{(23)}\)

A reflection of this rivalry is evident in Yellowhead's demand that his house equal in every detail the frame house built for Anderson at Coldwater.\(^{(24)}\) Conflict between Yellowhead and Anderson reached its most dangerous point a year later. A brave of Yellowhead's tribe had been accidentally shot and killed by a Coldwater half-breed. Anderson immediately declared the half-breed guiltless and was supported in this decision by a coroner. The half-
breed was probably innocent of any crime according to British law, but according to Ojibwa tradition he had deprived that family of the enjoyment and services of their son. Some atonement had to be made. Yellowhead demanded that the half-breed either come to live with the dead boy's family "to stem the grief" or die himself. The boy readily agreed to the former and joined Yellowhead's tribe despite Anderson's vigorous protests. (25)

While the antagonism between Yellowhead at the Narrows and Anderson seemed to die down, or at least remain buried, after this incident it steadily heightened between him, Chief Aisance and the Potaganasee Chief Tawquinine. This is partially a result of the more unsettled situation at Coldwater, but more probably occurred because Anderson spent the vast majority of his time there. His closer proximity would insure that he would meddle more in affairs Aisance and Tawquinine felt their prerogative. Thus he would have been perceived as more of a threat.

In 1831 Aisance charged Anderson with accepting bribes at the annual present giving. Anderson, Aisance believed, "had always in the distribution of presents given liberally to those who brought presents [for him] and retained a portion from those who brought nothing." (26)
Whether the charge was true or whether Anderson was simply participating in the traditional exchange of reciprocal presents, Aisance's charges created bitter feelings which never completely healed. Anderson's response to Givens concerning the charges is indicative, not only of the extent of Anderson's reactions but, possibly, his estimation of the charges under him. Anderson felt that

"After serving His Majesty for upwards of seventeen years...that my honesty and integrity should now be called into question by a worthless savage...is mortifying in the extreme."(27)

By 1833 the relationship had deteriorated to such an extent that thirty eight Indians at Coldwater, led by Tawquinine and Aisance sent a petition to the Roman Catholic Bishop at York for Anderson's removal. The petition read in part:

"The Indians don't come to this place because they know very well that everything don't go rite...our Cap't when he wants anything it's always rite, and when we want anything we can't get it...I tell you Father...we will go away from this place because we don't want him."(28)

Trust in the Indian Department as a whole deteriorated throughout the six years of the settlement because of what was perceived as a failure to live up to promises made when inducing the Indians to settle on the reserve. Most
of this perceived defaulting was due to the rapidly increasing expenditures and consequent constraints placed on the monetary resources of the Indian Department. When the Colonial Office had transferred authority from the Indian Department in Upper Canada to the Lieutenant Governor they had originally informed Colborne that they wished to restrict the total expenditures for the Department to eight thousand nine hundred pounds per annum. Colborne hastily replied that this restriction would ensure that any attempts to inculcate civilization among the Indians would be impossible. Following a furious round of proposals and counter proposals the Colonial Office finally agreed to the sum of twenty thousand pounds. Although this new sum was an impressive increase over the original proposal it was simply the amount spent on annuities, presents and salaries for the Department in the last year of military authority.\(^{(29)}\) It was clear that any expenditures on the Coldwater-Narrows establishment must come from money slated for presents or annuities.

Given this restriction on financing the problems that beset the reserve in the initial years, increasing expenses, caused great alarm at the Chief Superintendent's office. In 1832 Givens warned Anderson "the heavy and embarrassing expenses incurred at that station...have contributed in no ordinary degree to cripple the resources of the Department."\(^{(30)}\) This warning came after Anderson
had already been advised that he must submit all expenses to be authorized by Givens and the Indians under his care should be warned that "they must soon cease to expect to be supplied with any food whatsoever from your stores." (31)

These restrictions made it difficult for Anderson to complete projects proposed for the establishment and already begun. The Department had promised the Indians they were to have log houses built for them if they came to join the establishment. Anderson continually had trouble in getting these houses constructed. It was almost impossible to find reliable workers at the rate the Department was offering, considering the poor rations provided. Even after the Department had decided upon limiting construction to one house for two families with only the outside hewn, the required number of houses were still not completed by the 1836 description cited earlier. (32)

Anderson was also periodically forced to abandon clearing for farms when the Indian Department continued to restrict funds. In 1831 he was informed that Givens would only authorize an additional two hundred and fifty pounds for clearing, farming and planting. It was this communication which prompted Anderson to abandon clearing the better quality land near the village and the Narrows to plant on the relatively clear North River Flats. (33) As we have seen,
the Flats still accounted for the bulk of cultivated land in 1836.

Of course none of the expenditures of the Coldwater-Narrows Reserve really represented a further drain on the Colonial Office purse. All expenditures were charged against one of two accounts. Pay for school masters, workmen and instructors were to be charged against the saving on presents. Further expenses, such as purchases of oxen, horses, etc., were charged against annual payments for land. The expenses at Coldwater-Narrows far exceeded the savings on presents and the Indian Department return on land purchased, but as the money was being deducted from a common pool and the Department was spending considerably less in other areas of the colony it seldom represented a drain above moneys allotted for the Indian Department.

Rivalry and lack of trust between Anderson and the traditional chiefs of the Ojibwa tribes involved, coupled with a pervading skepticism concerning the interest of the Department as a whole due to their monetary restrictions, helped foster a generally disruptive and uncooperative spirit throughout the establishment. The Indians and the Department, as personified by Anderson, were no longer assured of a common purpose and cooperation could not be guaranteed. Dissension pervaded every aspect of the
settlement.
CHAPTER 11

GOVERNMENT-MISSIONARY CONFLICT:
CONTROL FOR CONTROL'S SAKE

A great deal of the tension at the Coldwater-Narrows establishment can be traced to competition between the Government and various religious sects for effective control of the Lake Simcoe and Lake Huron Ojibwa. The principal poles in this tension were the Methodists, Catholics, Church of England and Indian Department. The principal cause of this tension was that neither of these poles continued to view the Indian as simply converts or as potential settlers. They had come to represent power and influence in an increasingly bitter fight.

As indicated in preceding chapters, much of the incentive for the Government's civilization policy came from their anxiety over the influence of the Methodists over their Indian converts. Partially due to the exertions of Peter Jones and partially because of the Ojibwa's search for a broker to help them alter their mode of life, to negotiate for them with authorities and to help stand between them and the harassment of white settlers and traders, the Methodists had been successful in establishing missions among both the Lake Simcoe and Lake Huron Ojibwa.
On Yellowhead's island in Lake Simcoe, under the missionary Atwood, the Methodist missions had been moderately successful. They had removed themselves, at least partially, from the whites around them and had been able to encourage the cultivation of substantial crops.(1) They had also begun to make plans to establish an extensive fishery at the island. More importantly to the Methodists, the relative seclusion from the whites had assisted in helping them resist the enticement of whisky and had aided in keeping the Ojibwa constant in their devotional duties.(2)

The Methodists greeted Colborne's announcement of the Ojibwa's impending removal to Coldwater-Narrows with suspicion and immediate opposition. George Ryerson, after a visit to Lake Simcoe, informed readers of The Christian Guardian the suggested move was:

"much to be regretted. It has rather agitated and disarranged their minds in this incipient stage of their civilization and mental improvement. In their insular situation they are sufficiently removed from the white population for every beneficial purpose." (3)

Many Methodists believed, and rightly so, that the establishment of Coldwater-Narrows was a means to curb the expansion of Methodist missions into the northern Great Lakes, a first step in ensuring that these missions become
Church of England stations. The Methodists were much disturbed at this perceived government intent. E. Ryerson warned the Indian Department and the Church of England that

"In their barbarous and heathen state, missionaries of every denomination have an undoubted and equal right to visit, establish missions among and convert them... But should one adventurous and philanthropic agricultur­alist take peaceable possession of, actively and successfully cultivate a part of the unbroken soil for the sole benefit of his fellow creatures, would it be just, honourable, even tolerable for another professed philanthropist, under pretense of promoting the same benevolent object to force, directly or indirectly, the former to retire... let each break up and cultivate the ground for himself and let not him who folded his hands and slumbered... whilst his neighbor laboured... come at harvest gathering."(5)

Ryerson left little doubt that he was referring to Indian Department designs for the Lake Simcoe and Huron Ojibwa. The Methodist missionaries consistently and steadfastly advised their charges not to accept the government's invitation to settle at the new village. They only removed this opposition after Colborne, perceiving the Methodists had sufficient influence to thwart Department plans, assured them they would "never be interrupted in forming their schools or communicating religious instruction."(6)

With this assurance the Methodist ministers prepared for the dismemberment of their establishment and the move to
the Narrows. But it was a promise which Colborne could not possibly keep. To allow the Methodists freedom in religious instruction and teaching the young smacked too much of forfeiting to them that influence Coldwater-Narrows was designed to negate. Anderson, particularly, had developed a distrust of the Methodists and was intent on removing their influence from the Indians who were now under his charge and of severing "the chain of American influence betwixt this part of the country and Michilimackinac."(7)

Nevertheless the Department and Methodists seem to have devised a formula for effective cooperation at the Narrows. According to Colborne's assurances the Methodists were to have use of the school-meeting house built by the government at the Narrows. Although they bridled at the delay involved and at not being allowed to prepare their station before the arrival of the Lake Simcoe Ojibwa, they did work in a reasonably cooperative atmosphere.

It was not long, though, before this cooperation became lost in the struggle for influence which characterized Indian Department-Methodist encounters throughout Upper Canada. By October of 1831 the Methodist minister and teacher, Gilbert Miller, was preparing to move into the almost finished structure designed for the Methodists.(8)
This precipitated one incident in an increasingly violent conflict between the Methodists and the government farmer Gerald Alley. Anderson was away from the Narrows portion of the establishment most often and communication between the two was not always easy. Consequently, Alley, although hired as the farming instructor, was compelled to perform many of the duties Anderson would have and to manage the day to day affairs of the Narrows establishment. He was originally given charge of the school house, with clear instructions from Colborne that it was to be used exclusively by the Methodists.\(^{(9)}\)

When the Methodists prepared to occupy the school they discovered that Alley had been using it as a work shop. Their complaints to Alley had no effect until Anderson, after receiving a petition, ordered him to remove the workmen.\(^{(10)}\)

Alley's reluctance to hand over the school to the Methodists was partially the result of a very open and virulent power struggle between himself and the ministers. George Ryerson and James Richardson, in April of 1832, had charged Alley with extracting exorbitant prices from the Indians for some horses he had sold. They added that Alley was periodically drunk and that his loose morality was a bad influence on the Narrows Indians.\(^{(11)}\)
Later in the same month the underlying cause of the conflict came to a head. The Government, as already stated, was primarily interested in strengthening the affections of the Indians and reducing costs. They perceived that inculcating habits of industry and ambition, transforming the Indian into a pioneer farmer, was the most effective means of accomplishing this. The Methodists, though, believed that although one of their by-products was the development of agricultural missions, the ultimate end was the permanent adherence of the Ojibwa to the Methodist Church, to following their devotional duties, to leading a saved life, pious and serious. Consequently the Methodists, Alley believed, occupied far too much of the Indians' time in devotional exercises rather than agricultural pursuits. It was this basic difference which led to the most serious confrontation between Alley and Methodists at the Narrows. The Methodist minister, James Richardson, concerned about what he perceived as a lack of religious ardour among Yellowhead's Indians, had tried to impress them with the importance of remaining in that state of salvation. In so doing he informed them that all the Government, and particularly Alley, had done for them was of no use if they did not follow the precepts of the Church and thus remain in the Lord's graces. If they strayed from this path, they were informed, they might as well drive
their oxen and wagons into the lake for all the good they had done them. (12) Given the high state of tension between the Government and the Methodists, this advice was considered to be highly suspect by both Alley and, when informed of it, Anderson. Anderson informed Givens that

"their object in so doing was...to prejudice the Indians and prevent them if possible from receiving religious instruction or any temporal advantages from any other than Methodists."(13)

Although furor over this incident gradually diminished, the Methodists and Alley remained in open conflict and in competition for their charges until Alley's resignation in July of 1832. (14)

Again though it was Coldwater which proved to be the arena for the bulk of the religious divisions buffeting the establishment. The Methodists had established a nascent mission at Matchedash, under James Currie, before the government decision to set up the reserve. As at the Narrows they were partially appeased by Colborne's assurance to Peter Jones in 1830 that the department "would leave their religious instruction to the Methodists."(15)

But this appeasement did not last long. On 25 June 1830 Peter Jones met a Reverend Archibold, a Church of England minister sent by Colborne to be a missionary at Matchedash.
He was also informed that a Mr. Hamilton had been appointed school master there. In the words of Peter Jones:

"I was very much astonished to hear that there was going to be an interference with the labours of the Methodist Missionaries among the Indians, that they had been instruments of reforming them, and that I was more surprised to hear these things, as the Governor had repeatedly said that it was not his intention to meddle with the spiritual Instructions of the Indian." (16)

From this point cooperation between Anderson, the Indian Department and the Methodists at Coldwater completely disappeared. When the establishment moved from Matchedash to Coldwater, James Currie had to petition repeatedly for a grant of land to build a mission house, and performed his duties as minister and teacher for some time from a bark wigwam. Currie, like Mitchell at the Narrows, was also often censored for occupying too much of the Indians' time with "devotional exercises", particularly by Captain Phillpots of the Royal Engineers at Penetanguishene, while Currie continually complained to the Department concerning the unsettled manner in which the establishment was being run believing that it retarded "the progress of religious and moral improvement." (19)

A great deal of trouble at Coldwater was centred around government plans for the school. For the Methodists, of course, having control over the education of the children
was an important element in maintaining the allegiance of both young and old to the Methodist precepts of religion. The Indian Department at first claimed that the government school erected at Coldwater was meant only for the Potoganansee and any other northern tribes which wished to join the establishment. They left the doors open to Aisance's tribe if they wished but if the Methodists would not agree to that the Department would build another structure for them "trusting that the Missionary appointed to that important Station will be a person of mild and conciliatory Deportment."(20) But when Aisance had petitioned Anderson to allow Currie to use part of the school building to instruct, Anderson would only reply that a Mr. Rowe, replacing Hamilton, was the teacher, but that anybody qualified wishing to assist would be welcome. Although Anderson maintained the Indians were perfectly satisfied with this arrangement, Currie was not. He insisted Anderson was intruding "on ground that they had occupied."(21)

Partially because of Currie's continued refusal to encourage the Methodist Ojibwa to send their children to the government school attendance at that school remained dismally small. Finally, in May of 1834, Anderson penned a warning to Givens. It read in part:

"I do not consider any Indian school in the country of so much importance as this..."
But before any good of consequence can be done either at this school or the one at Narrows; a change must be made...for so long as the same family as it were, having teaching from sects at variance with each other...The Indians will remain in doubt with whom to close and thus their children be kept in ignorance and trained in uncontrollable idleness." (22)

Anderson suggested that the Church of England send a proper missionary and teacher and the Methodists be forced to withdraw. If this could not be done he reluctantly recommended that they give it up to the Methodists.

This feuding between Anderson, the Indian Department and the Methodists was not restricted to the school. By 1832 it was becoming obvious in other areas. Government opposition to the Methodists in general had hardened by this time. Although the Upper Canadian Methodists were no longer as overwhelmingly American as they had been shortly after the war, the taint of that association still remained. Just as important was a perception by the government and Church of England, predominantly erroneous, that the Methodists were staunch supporters of the Reformers in Upper Canada. This belief persisted despite the considerations of such a prominent Methodist as John Ryerson that

"we have reasons to respect Sir John Colborne and it is our duty and interest to support the Government...And as it respects the Reformers, so called, take Bidwell and Rolph from them and there is
not scarcely one man of character, Honour or even decency among them, but with very few exceptions...they are a banditti of compleat vagabonds..."(23)

This perception led Anderson to inform the Methodist Indians at Coldwater that the Methodist missionaries were working against the Lieutenant Governor. When Currie learned of this he posted a series of protests, but when confronted Anderson blandly told Currie that it was his duty to inform the Indians. He had simply been reading and translating newspapers to them.(24) This incident led Methodists to believe it was at the Narrows and Coldwater...

"that the most invidious exertions have been made by a few interested and designing individuals to turn away the attention of the Indians under our charge from the doctrine and precepts of the Gospel, as they have learned them." (25)

The situation at Coldwater was heightened by another avenue of religious tension. As indicated earlier the Ojibwa on Drummond Island, the Potaganasee, had been converted in the eighteenth century by Jesuit priests. They had been confirmed in that faith over the years by periodic visits of Roman Catholic priests. By the time of the withdrawal from Drummond Island to Matchedash, in line with regular Catholic practice, Bishop MacDonald had appointed a Potaganasee chief, Tawquinine, as a lay member of the church, charged with looking to the spiritual wel-
fare of his people. It was a charge and a prerogative that Tawquinine guarded jealously as it was a means of maintaining his traditional powers amidst the changing conditions the Ojibwa were faced with. Bishop MacDonald defended his control over the Catholic Indians as closely as the Methodists did over theirs, if a little less vigorously. He wrote a memo to Tawquinine warning that

"you have been informed by me and every other priest that taught you religion that no other religion could be good but the Catholic Religion, if any men tell you that every religion be good you must not believe him and you will tell the Indian not to believe him." (26)

Anderson reported this letter seemed to have great influence on the Catholic Indians and they gathered together frequently to reread it. (27)

In 1830 Archibald feared that the Potaganasee would ask for a Roman Catholic teacher and thus "take the education of their children out of our own hands." He blamed their opposition on Aisance who "has poisoned the minds of his own people as well as the Potaganasee" and felt the best way of counteracting this opposition would be to have Indians loyal to the Church of England brought to Matchedash and "by virtue of the advantages shown to induce others to join." (28) Unfortunately, at this time it would have been difficult for the Indian Department to
recruit any significant number of Ojibwa that adhered to the Church of England. (29)

Conflict between the Catholic Indians and the Department at Coldwater continued to grow. Aisance was drawn more and more under the influence of Tawquinine and further from the restrictions of the Methodist, Currie. It appears that as he extricated himself from these fetters he and Tawquinine began to engage in drinking bouts and, generally, showed little industry and intention to cooperate on the establishment.

Finally, considering Aisance to be an unwelcome influence on the rest of the Methodists, Currie expelled him from the society. (30) Aisance's expulsion created an interesting situation. The accepted form for Methodist success among Ojibwa had been to devote much energy to co-opting the traditional chiefs. In many instances chiefs and principal men were quick to accept conversion to the Methodist faith, viewing it as another way of extending their traditional paramount position. The conversion of both the Lake Simcoe and Huron Ojibwa had followed this form faithfully. But now, with Aisance's expulsion, the Methodists lost one of the forces lending it legitimacy in the perception of the Ojibwa. They were being asked, implicitly, by both Methodists and Aisance
to choose between traditional authority and a usurper, but one which had proven more effective in dealing with the changed circumstances. The reaction of Aisance's tribe seems to have been mixed. Although Aisance had enough influence to force Currie to resign, Anderson reports that some members of his tribe would no longer obey Aisance's orders. There is no doubt that both Aisance and the Methodists, despite the arrival of John Ryerson to perform Currie's duties, lost influence due to this action, and the Lake Huron Ojibwa had lost a degree of that cohesiveness needed to supply accepted direction.

With Aisance now nominally Roman Catholic and joining forces with Tawquinine, Anderson, the Department and the Church of England teachers were met with firmer opposition from that quarter. The Catholics began to interrupt the school, demanding that separate prayers be said for the Catholic children. They eventually removed their children, charging that the teacher was more attentive to the Methodist children. Although the Catholic children were sent back to the school periodically the attendance remained disappointingly small. Two years later, in 1834, Anderson reported to Givens the school was still doing poorly because of "an excitement which has been kept up by Tawquinine's religious bigotry."
1836 the school was no longer operating and had not been for some time. (36)

This type of conflict had a serious effect on other sectors of the establishment. Although Anderson had originally been impressed with the industry the Catholics were showing in preparing their farms, as Tawquinine, Aisance and Anderson increasingly opposed each other this cooperation ended. In 1833 Anderson reported to Givens that both Aisance and Tawquinine had, on more than one occasion sent to the Narrows for alcohol. (37) Conditions grew worse. By the next year Anderson reported that the Catholics were idling about while the others were working. He believed "that the correspondence kept up between these people and Bishop MacDonald is productive of much evil." (38)

At the same time as relations were deteriorating between Anderson and the Ojibwa another source of contention emerged within the establishment. After Aisance was forced out of the Methodist camp relations between the two bands, the Methodist Ojibwa and the Catholic Potaganasee, grew increasingly taut. Much of this tension centred around the use of the school house for worship on Sundays. The original agreement had been that the Catholics would have its use until ten-thirty at which time the Methodists would be granted its use for two hours. By 1836 the
arrangement was breaking down. The Catholic Indians were continually staying late and barring the Methodists from entry when time for their worship came. (39) This sort of behaviour indicates a growing rankling which had pervaded all other aspects of the establishment.

Although, as we have seen, the establishment at Coldwater-Narrows was meant to be a showplace to induce western tribes to settle at the reserve and on British territory, it could hardly on its present footing have accomplished this purpose. The Methodist ministers and the Indian Department were in constant opposition, both intensely jealous of any growing influence on either side and both innately conscious that, given the political structure in Upper Canada, no long term cooperation was possible. Their constant feuding created an element of uncertainty and impermanence to the establishment which diminished the trust and cohesiveness needed for its success.

This feeling of uncertainty and the religious tension which caused it were heightened by the added opposition to Government plans by elements of the Catholic Potagananasee. Fed by Tawquinine's and, later, Aisance's resentment of the perceived usurpation of some of their traditional authority by Anderson, it grew into a dis-
ruptive element which affected the whole establishment and helped cause the abandonment of one key to success as perceived by the Indian Department, the school. This growing tension helped create a rift in relations, previously amiable, between the Potaganassee and Ojibwa.

All of these divisions were inherently the result of a number of power struggles between influential sectors which had lost sight of the professed aim of the establishment, the answer to Ojibwa petitions for assistance in their attempt to change their mode of life, adapt to the burgeoning society around them and provide a future for their children within it. These divisions not only prevented much real achievement from developing along these lines on the reserve, they helped insure that it would be unable to deal effectively with the pressures which were increasingly coming to bear upon it from outside of the establishment.
CHAPTER 12

WHITE ENCROACHMENT AND HARASSMENT

Originally one of the most pressing incentives which had prompted the Lake Simcoe and Lake Huron Ojibwa to petition the government for assistance was the difficulties the Ojibwa were experiencing with white settlers and traders around them. They had foreseen they would need powerful assistance in creating a buffer between themselves and the settlers who were spreading northward. Coldwater-Narrows was not, even in 1830, so removed from this spread that the government, intent on creating the reserve, should not have foreseen they would need to expend considerable energy in erecting and maintaining that buffer. That they were not prepared to do so was one of the most pressing of the initial reservations about the establishment on the part of both Ojibwa and Methodist advisers. That they were not prepared to do so proved to be, in the end, one of the principal reasons for the break-up of the establishment.

Simcoe County, through the northern part of which the Coldwater-Narrows Reserve ran, was the site of considerable immigration in the late 1820's and 1830's. It was an area promoted for settlement by the government of
the colony itself. A road running from Lake Simcoe to the military establishment at Penetanguishene was considered by the Colonial Government to be of prime economic and military importance to the colony. (1) Consequently, after the war of 1812 the government, in an effort to keep the road open at little cost, offered lots along this road to any indigent settlers who wished to take up location there. (2) As early as 1818 a number of recent immigrants from the United Kingdom were settled along the road. At the same time the government had surveyed concession lines running parallel to this road, offering lots on these concessions to indigent settlers, awarding many of them as militia grants to veterans of the war of 1812. (3) Similarly, the government offered sizable lots along the shores of Lake Simcoe to officers of the Imperial soldiery retiring on half pay. (4)

Beginning in 1818 the government had also fostered the growth of a sizable Black community on concession lines near Penetanguishene Road. (5) Near Coldwater settlement had begun to spread south from Penetanguishene where a considerable community of commuted regular soldiery had been settled since the first decade after the war. (6) Consequently by the late 1820's the previously remote back environs of the Home District had begun to fill up with settlers.
During the early and mid-thirties, Upper Canada experienced considerable accelerated immigration from the United Kingdom. Between 1825 and 1846 over six hundred thousand immigrants had left the United Kingdom, most of them entering Upper Canada. (7) This immigration was felt in the area around Coldwater-Narrows by successive waves of first Scottish then Irish settlers. (8) These settlers quickly took up what unlocated lots were available and by the mid-1830's only the odd lot remained in the hands of the crown.

This rapid settlement in the area between Lake Simcoe and Lake Huron held grave portent for the Ojibwa in the Coldwater-Narrows establishment. Even before the reserve had been designated a number of lots in the area encompassed by its boundaries had been surveyed and located. Many had been purchased by the Canada Company. (9)

In the initial phase of the settlement the Indian Department was careful to extinguish claim on the lots for non-performance of settlement duties. Givens directed Anderson to complete a careful inspection to insure that none of the original locatees would be able to claim the lots after becoming aware that the area was being improved by the Indians and the Department. (10)
Although the careful manner in which the Department took possession of the property prevented any such subsequent claims being made they were unable to prevent the settlement of the area around the reserve and the resultant problems for the Ojibwa. One of the gravest of these involved the efforts the Indians were making to remain temperate. Alcohol was a way of life among pioneer settlers and traders in Upper Canada to an extent that is hard to imagine today.\(^{(11)}\) Rum could be purchased readily, cheaply and all too often seemed to relieve the often terrifying isolation and unending drudgery of pioneer life. Although Anderson was able to insure that nobody sold alcohol within the limits of the establishment he had no such control over the neighbouring areas. Both Anderson and Colborne were continually being pressed with petitions from both the Indian chiefs and Methodists to control the trade in alcohol around their settlement,\(^{(12)}\) but neither could devise an effective means of preventing the distribution.

The situation at the Narrows was particularly discouraging. A village had sprung up, fostered by the lake traffic and the Coldwater Road, very close to the Indian settlement. There were at least three shops in the village dispensing large amounts of alcohol.\(^{(13)}\) It was
particularly vexing to the Narrows Ojibwa, most newly converted to Methodism and just recently sworn to abstinence, to be within sight and hearing of the often rowdy and drunken white settlers. The situation was well summed up by James Evans in a letter to the Christian Guardian. He reported that the Ojibwa

"are constantly exposed to temptation of that nature which is perhaps with them the most difficult to resist. A village settled by the whites is within a few rods in the rear of the Indian village and chapel, where, during Divine service in the evening ...[they can be seen] carousing to no small annoyance to their once savage neighbours, and one mounted on a stump was heard vociferating 'come here Indians, come and take some whisky'. " (14)

In the first years of the establishment, while belief in its success and devotion to the Methodist faith were strongest, surprisingly few Ojibwa seem to have been enticed by such baiting. But as faith in the establishment and doctrine declined in later years*, more and more

*The high point of Methodist activity in Upper Canada came shortly after 1813. As more immigrants arrived from the United Kingdom and less from the United States the relative influence of the Methodist Conference declined. Because of this, and despite merging with the Wesleyan Methodists in 1834, the cost of Methodist missions became extremely pressing on the conference. By the final days of the establishment the Narrows no longer had a resident missionary and was served by a circuit rider. (15)
of Yellowhead's Indians began again to sell their possessions to the rum traders,\(^{(16)}\) for the brief escape that their wares afforded.

The problems with encroachment and harassment were heightened by the growing importance of the village near the Narrows. Anderson had originally tried to discourage traders from settling in the area by establishing a government controlled fur depot which would purchase furs from the Indians at better prices than the traders. Unfortunately he could never get full approval for this scheme from the Chief Superintendent and the Indians were forced to deal with many of the same traders who had abused them previously. In the first years both Aisance and Yellowhead were under almost constant pressure to repay debts to the traders incurred before the settlement had been established. This pressure only ended when, with Anderson's approval, they used money from land payments to liquidate them.\(^{(17)}\)

Probably of more serious consequence, the village near the Narrows had become a stopping off place for many of the new immigrants waiting for transportation to Lake Huron or further north.\(^{(18)}\) Most of these waiting immigrants, poor, having recently suffered the tortuous voyage from Britain, had little to subsist on during their
usually brief stay near the Narrows. Naturally enough, they often took whatever they could get a hold of to ease their discomfort. This often meant long bouts in the grog shops, but just as often meant encroaching on Indian property. In 1832 Alley had written to Anderson describing Indian complaints "...the milking of their cows by the emigrants, the spoiling of canoe barks and damaging their canoes, - the pulling of their wagons out of order - and the abomination of intemperance..."(19).

A frightening aspect of this tide of immigrants periodically erupted. The unsanitary conditions in which their passage had been made and the sheer masses of humanity involved exposed many of these immigrants to the great epidemic diseases. They occasionally brought these diseases with them to their encampment at the Narrows where the even more susceptible Indians were endangered. The most serious of these incidents occurred when, in August of 1832, ninety-four emigrants were encamped about the village at the Narrows. A cholera epidemic broke out among them. By the end of August, although only eleven cases had been confirmed among the Ojibwa, in the words of Anderson, "the Indians and whites are panic struck and many have left the place in fear...the children have all been taken from the school."(20) Only the fortuitous arrival of two immigrant doctors who laboured among the
stricken throughout the month prevented a much more serious situation from developing. As long as the immigrants were landing near the establishment the possibility of raging epidemic lingered.

At Coldwater, although the establishment fared much better in this respect, it was by no means immune from such problems. Traders from Penetanguishene were occasionally bringing whisky into the establishment, most often for the use of the workmen engaged in construction, but occasionally a number of Indians would be intoxicated in return for whatever possessions they could dispose of.

Perhaps more seriously, there was almost a constant battle to keep neighbouring settlers from harvesting some of the Indian's crops. This was particularly true of both planted and wild hay on the flats of the Matchedash River. The establishment at Coldwater was a few miles from the flats at Matchedash Bay, separated from it by the eight hundred acres granted to Anderson as a United Empire Loyalist. Despite warnings from both Aisance and Anderson, white settlers, usually from Penetanguishene, periodically robbed these flats of their crops.

The final and most serious fear that the proximity of their white neighbours occasioned was for continued
control of their land. The Lake Simcoe and Lake Huron Ojibwa were, of course, given assurances in the initial days of the settlement concerning the security of the establishment. But as whites continued to pour into the areas around them, and as the immediate neighbourhood became settled and improvements made on the lots, the Indians began to view their land, much of it not improved and visibly unoccupied, with growing apprehension. Although there were few instances of actual white occupation of Indian land, rumours of impending Indian Department abandonment of the establishment grew increasingly common as the land became obviously more valuable. This apprehension was only heightened by Indian Department refusal to deposit with either the Indian bands or with individual Indians title to the lands they occupied.

As early as 1832, just two short years after the inception of the establishment, elements of the Indian bands had petitioned Colborne to be removed from the establishment. Anderson, in explanation to Colborne, believed the petition originated from the belief that the crown was not in total control of the land being used for the settlement and that the Indians would eventually be forced to move.\(^{(23)}\) Anderson did agree with the petition that if a place totally distinct from the whites could be found it
would produce "general satisfaction" among both Indians and whites in the area. (24) Again in 1832, Yellowhead at the Narrows made a speech sent to Colborne "praying for a removal" and suggesting that "all the Indians below this, could be induced to collect in one spot and their present settlement sold to establish them in one body." (25)

Similar fears, and a desire for one large settlement, prompted a significant portion of Aisance's tribe to inform Anderson they intended to join other Ojibwa at Owen Sound. These families were warned they could not expect any government assistance in their new location, and further, the "province is so rapidly filling up" that they would shortly again have to encounter the intrusion of the whites. (26) They were eventually only induced to stay at the establishment by the assurance they would be able to retain documents about the extent of their land and, a promise never kept, that they would be provided with separate schools for their children.

Despite this decision to stay, the latter years of the establishment were marked by predictions from both Anderson and Methodist observers that the Indians would eventually be pushed from their location and the indigent settlers would reap the benefits intended for the Indian. (27)
The efforts of the Ojibwa and the Potaganasee became increasingly preoccupied with ensuring this eventuality did not occur, or that if they were forced to remove they would have already prepared another location of their choice. Consequently less and less time and energy were spent on the development of the establishment. Anderson continually complained to Givens as the situation of the establishment was perceived to become more precarious, the Indians would work reasonably diligently on their own individual plots but would not put any effort into communal elements of the establishment. He often had to feed the cattle at Coldwater himself as there was nobody else prepared to do it.

In 1834, many of the Ojibwa petitioned Anderson that they be allowed to settle on fifty acre lots for which they would hold the title deed as a safeguard against the abandonment of the establishment. Although the Department was not adverse to dispersing the Indians on fifty acre lots - it was the original intent - they steadfastly refused, as they did throughout all of Upper Canada, to supply the Indian with title deeds. Not given security in their possessions they again began to petition, along with the Methodists, for one large enclave for all Ojibwa in Upper Canada, either at Saugeen or at Narrows-Coldwater, the feeling being the increased size
of the establishment, the greater Indian population, would provide further protection against encroachment.

This was the state of the establishment, rocked by dissension, plagued by the harassment of white settlers, traders and whisky sellers, directly in the path of waves of indigent immigrants and paralyzed by a fear for the loss of their land, when in 1836 Sir Francis Bond Head was appointed, perhaps part of one colossal mistake, Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada and, thus, the immediate arbitrator of Indian Affairs in the Province.
CHAPTER 13

THE GREAT MANITOULIN

The Rawson Report, in its brief summary of Coldwater-Narrows, decided that

"the encroachments of the white settlers on the line of the road opened by the Indians themselves, and the ill usage and pernicious example to which they were exposed at their hands, induced these tribes to abandon their settlements and to seek elsewhere a refuge from contamination of their more civilized white neighbours," (1)

but the real reason for the abandonment of the government's first agricultural reserve was actually much more complex.

Anderson and Colborne had always been particularly interested in extending their 'civilization policy' to the Ojibwa tribes to the northwest. This, as we have seen, was one of the purposes of the Coldwater-Narrows establishment and a prime consideration in determining its location. While it became obvious that Coldwater-Narrows was not to play the role of magnet it had originally been slated for, Anderson and Colborne's interest in the northern Indians was not diminished. As early as 1830 Anderson had directed a missionary from the New England Society, who had consulted Anderson, to Manitoulin, suggesting it would soon be a proper avenue for his exertions as a group of Ottawa were preparing to settle there. (2)
In 1831 Anderson transmitted a petition from Chief Yellowhead and Aisance to Colborne. The petition urged Colborne to deprive some of the northerly Indians of their presents in an effort to force them to adopt the civilized life. (3) Although it is true that Aisance and more often Yellowhead had periodically made trips to the northern Indians to exhort them to adopt agriculture and become settled, this petition parallels Anderson's interests so closely that it is difficult not to see his hand in its formation.

Two years later the Reverend Adam Elliot, supported by the 'Society for Converting and Civilizing the Indians and Propagating the Gospel Among the Destitute Settlers in Upper Canada', embarked, on Anderson's prompting, from Coldwater to Manitoulin Island. By the following year Rev. Elliot reported to Anderson he had about two hundred Ottawa and Ojibwa prepared to settle on Manitoulin Island and wished government assistance. (4) In the Fifth Report to the Society in 1835 Elliot reported the growing prospects of a mission on the Manitoulin and further informed the Society that Anderson had for some time been urging the settlement and "volunteered himself for superintendent." (5)
Indeed, Anderson had become increasingly preoccupied with the prospect of settlement on Manitoulin Island. Just two short years after the beginning of the Coldwater-Narrows experiment Anderson suggested to Colborne that the Indians under his charge would do much better if they were "all established out of the limits of the white settlement."(6) From this point Anderson periodically penned suggestions to Colborne for the establishment of one large enclave on Manitoulin Island, suggestions received with interest.

In 1835 Anderson made his final and successful pitch for an establishment on the Manitoulin. Anderson suggested to Colborne that he was prompted in this suggestion by the "conviction that it was necessary to take some immediate steps for the Civilization of the Indians as well as to prevent the Total Extinction of their Race." Anderson's lengthy justification for faith in the prospects of success for an establishment on the Manitoulin is worth quoting at some length for the insight it gives of the expected character of that establishment. Anderson began his report to Colborne with an encouraging report of the progress at Coldwater-Narrows. He says, in part, despite disappointments about its progress expressed by some quarters "it is only by keeping in view their actual state before measures were taken to assist their civilization
that any fair estimate can be formed." He goes on to assert that from "a state bordering [constantly] on starvation" they had progressed until now "every Indian throughout the Establishment is possessed of the means with moderate industry of providing himself with an ample supply of food and clothing and he has acquired sufficient knowledge of the arts of civilized life to avail himself of these advantages."\(^{(7)}\)

Anderson used these observations to conclude, "the Indian wants instruction. He everywhere appreciates the superiority of the whites in possessing the arts of reading and writing. He earnestly begs for the benefits of education" and is able to benefit from it. He suggested the Indian in Upper Canada had been deprived of their land, not without payment, "but that payment has been that of a careful and prudent worldly man making a bargain with an improvident spendthrift."\(^{(8)}\) Just as importantly, many of the Indian allies from the north had visited Penetanguishene, had seen the benefits civilization could supply and wished similar considerations. Anderson felt the claims of all these Indians could be most easily satisfied by the creation of one large establishment on Manitoulin Island.
Most importantly, the Manitoulin was chosen not only because it was well removed from settlement and had abundant rivers and game, but because in Anderson's estimate the soil was also fertile. Thus the Indian could be brought to civilization gradually. Anderson's suggestion for the Manitoulin was not a rejection of the attempt to civilize the Ojibwa, indeed the justification for its creation was the success that the Coldwater-Narrows had demonstrated and the propensity of the Indian for change. Colborne's acceptance of Anderson's recommendations was also a demonstration of his support of the civilization process not a denial of it. But behind it lay the implicit perception that this change must come slowly. The Indian, they believed, had demonstrated at Coldwater-Narrows that they had to be gradually brought to farming while still able to support themselves, at least partially, from the hunt. Above all, the Indian must be isolated sufficiently from white settlers to allow them to retain possession of their land while they were still not cultivating it adequately enough to stop encroachment.

There is no doubt that Anderson exaggerated the success of the Coldwater-Narrows establishment. There is also little doubt that this exaggeration was not only due
to a desire to have his dreams of the settlement at Manitoulin become a reality, but to insure his position as Superintendent there. Anderson realized the Superintendent of such a large station would have significant power and handled properly would ensure his future within the Department.* Even so it is still apparent that both Anderson and Colborne viewed the Manitoulin Island as a further step in the civilization process.

Colborne agreed to Anderson's plan for Manitoulin Island. Anderson wished to give each family one hundred acres, but only to provide them with the tools and instruction necessary for them to build their own houses and establish their own farms. Anderson estimated the cost of the establishment for the first year would be approximately thirty-five hundred pounds,(9) but when ordered to make substantial cuts in this estimate he found he was able to do so with little difficulty.(10) Consequently in the spring of 1836 Anderson was ordered to repair to the island to begin preparations.

*As indeed it did. Anderson was kept on despite the drastic reduction of the Department in 1836, becoming Chief Superintendent after Jarvis' death in 1845.
Despite Colborne's and Anderson's initiation it was the new Lieutenant Governor, Sir Francis Bond Head, who eventually shaped the tenor of the settlement on Manitoulin Island and its role in the history of the Ojibwa in Upper Canada. Head took over control of the Indian Department at a time when there was almost a constant clamouring for a reduction in the expenses of the Department. The Committee of the House of Commons on Military Expenditures in the Colonies in 1836 ruled that in their consideration "the Indian Department may be greatly reduced if not altogether abolished." (11) They consequently ordered Head to work towards that goal, and "in the meantime you will not consider yourself at liberty to fill up any vacancy which may occur in the establishment." (12) With these admonitions ringing in his ears, Head brought an insurmountable will and his own unique vision of the North American Indian, some of it garnered from a cavalry dash across the Argentine Pampas, and some from the freshly emerging social Darwinism in Britain, to his position.

After a brief period in the colony Head devised his often quoted analysis of the situation the Ojibwa and others in Upper Canada found themselves in. His report to Glenelg began, "Wherever and whenever the two races come in contact it is sure to prove fatal to the Red Man." (14)
Head believed that the Indian was not capable of grasping the arts of civilized life. Thus he believed that "the greatest kindness we can perform towards this intelligent, simple-minded people, is to remove and fortify them as much as possible from any communication with the whites."(15)

Head's solution was simple, direct and involved a perversion of the Manitoulin scheme initiated by Colborne and Anderson. Head believed that it was against the nature of the Indian to cultivate the soil and that this nature was incapable of altering. Ojibwa possession of great tracts of fertile land in the midst of the growing colony was intolerable. Not only were Indians incapable of making use of the land, but their land was left open to the encroachments of white settlers who, because they could make good use of the soil, were justified in coveting Indian property. Manitoulin was the perfect answer to this dilemma. The island, isolated, rocky, was of no use to white settlers. Thus the Indian could live their obviously waning days there, secure from the abuses of the whites, while subsisting on the large stocks of game and fish. This simple expedient would not only provide the Indian with peace, but would provide for the Government of Upper Canada "an immense portion of the most valuable land."(16)

All that remained was to convince the Indians of
the benefits of such a policy. Despite only halting support from the Colonial Office and the opposition of missionary groups, Head was, through promises, bribery and threats, able to force the abandonment of a number of reserves in Upper Canada. One of these was Coldwater-Narrows. On the 6th of April 1837 Anderson closed the accounts at the Coldwater-Narrows establishment. (17)

The reaction to the news of the impending Indian Department withdrawal from the settlement was swift. Originally Aisance and other chiefs had petitioned to retain control themselves of the settlement, "wanting no person to be employed on our account but a miller and a Sawyer" and these people for only one year while Indians were being trained. (18) They also wished title deeds to fifty acre lots, establishing themselves on the same footing as the settlers around them. Head agreed to Indian control of the mills, school house, etc., and to the employment of a miller and Sawyer, (19) but the transition was not swift enough. In the spring of 1837 Aisance and a number of chiefs took forcible possession of the grist and saw mills, confiscating the wheat inside and any that white settlers later brought into the mill. (20) They also demanded a grant of a large sum of money and two years annuities in one lump sum. Following Anderson's exasperated suggestions that the Department give in to their demands
"let them float on their own bottoms which will only be for a short time as they are already getting rid of all they can sell and ere long they will ground on poverty and disappointment," (21)

this arrangement was agreed to by Head.

Anderson's assessment proved, for a number of reasons, to be correct. Although a few Ojibwa families did settle on their lots and continued farming industriously for a number of years, the majority were not prepared to continue to expend the energy required to clear their lots and establish farms. With the area now being overrun by both traders and settlers neither Methodist ministers nor the Chiefs Aisance or Tawquinine had sufficient influence or authority to stop the bulk of the Ojibwa from selling many of their possessions and expending most of the annuities they received on the rum the traders offered so enticingly. By the summer of 1837 Peter Jones reported that both at the Narrows and Coldwater "the fields are growing over with weeds and bushes". The settlements appeared "quite broken up" (22) and Anderson reported the traders were already putting their "clutches on the movables." (23)

Few of the Indians from the Coldwater-Narrows establishment followed Anderson to Manitoulin though. They had lived long in the Lake Simcoe area and were not pre-
pared to move to a strange island on the prompting of a government which could give no firmer guarantee of the continued possession of their land than it had at Coldwater-Narrows and against the advice of visiting Methodist Ministers. In 1838, after control of most of the land encompassed by the reserve was officially granted to the crown, Yellowhead's tribe moved to the Rama Reserve, purchased by Yellowhead at twelve shillings per acre, while others of the settlement returned to Beauseloil and back to Snake Island. In 1849 they ceded these islands and further retreated to Christian, Hope and Beckwith Islands. John Sunday reported in 1839 that many of them were "wandering about from one island to another" and the 1858 Report of the Special Commissioners to Investigate Indian Affairs in Canada, agreed that neither Yellowhead's nor Aisance's tribes "had made little if any progress since 1838."

The abandonment of Coldwater-Narrows had resulted from a number of different forces acting in conjunction upon the Ojibwa and Indian Department in 1837. The proximity of other settlers, the encroachment that this entailed, combined with the internal conflicts to negate any sense of permanence in the establishment, a sense that was badly needed if the Ojibwa were to develop the trust required to place their faith in their own exertions as farmers. But it was not this encroachment, nor Indian
reaction to it, which was the fundamental spark leading to Coldwater-Narrows abandonment.

Both Anderson and Colborne had simply come to believe that their efforts and the resources of the Department as a whole could more completely fulfill the desired ends (in the case of Anderson his personal ends also) if directed towards Manitoulin Island and the western Indians who were expected to settle there. Bond Head upon his arrival was able to pervert that scheme to enable him both to place the Ojibwa in a situation which more accurately reflected his perception of their character and potential and, more central to his considerations, to remove what had become too obviously a barrier to the continued development of the interior of the colony.
Robert Surtees in his study of the development of the Indian reserve policy on the part of the government in Upper Canada asserts that "The Great Manitoulin was the rock which would make or destroy the project of civilizing the Indian." (1) He is indeed justified in attributing great import to Manitoulin, not only as concerns the establishment of reserves for the Ojibwa but, eventually, for all Indians in what was to become the Dominion of Canada. But Manitoulin deserves this consideration not because it was to be the proving ground for the civilization project as he suggests, but because in the manner in which it was finally established it symbolized the abandonment of that policy. The Coldwater-Narrows agricultural enclave was the rock, or more accurately the marsh, on which the policy flourished briefly and was subsequently abandoned. The Manitoulin Reserve exists as a dramatic representation of its abandonment.

The approximately two hundred years from the tentative beginnings of the development of increased cooperation among the northern Algonkian bands around Sault Ste. Marie to the dispersal of the Ojibwa and Potaganasee which had gathered at Coldwater-Narrows had been a period of dramatic and abrupt change for the Ojibwa. In that time
the Ojibwa, emerging from the early proto-Ojibwa kin groups, developed a loose tribal entity which spread over almost a quarter of a continent. By effectively responding to the fur trade, particularly after the dispersal of the Huron, they enjoyed a prolonged period of cultural fluorescense and economic prosperity.

This economic prosperity, the vast areas which had come under their control, and their aboriginal adherence to a hunting life helped insure that their capacity to wage war would keep pace with their cultural growth. They were able to demonstrate this capacity in the Southern Great Lakes area in the latter part of the seventeenth century by being a major component of the alliance which held their own against the Iroquois and halted their northern expansion. This strength ensured that their loyalty and allegiance would be solicited by the French, English and later Americans, in their continual vying for increased control of the Great Lakes area. Their allegiance was sought, not only for military advantage, but because as, perhaps, the most efficient exploiters of the fur trade in the Great Lakes area they were of significant economic importance to both French and English interests in North America.

Although becoming increasingly drawn into the fur trade and dependent on the goods they were able to accumulate
from it, their ability to exploit both their location and competition for their furs and loyalty, not only allowed them to maintain their economic prosperity but fostered a sense of superiority in their tribal traditions and security in the organisms developed to deal with the world around them. This security helped insure that the Ojibwa as a whole would resist Christian teaching in the form of Jesuit and Recollet priests, would remain confident enough in traditional authority and society to adopt voluntarily what changes were necessary in aboriginal structures to meet the demands altered circumstances required.

The conquest of Canada and the effective removal of the French from any position of influence in North America marked the beginning of a growing deterioration in that economic prosperity. The beaver was no longer abundant. The prime area for the garnering of furs had spread farther west, beyond land controlled by the Ojibwa. With the defeat of the French there was also a marked decrease in the amount of solicitation in the form of presents available to the Ojibwa, presents the Ojibwa had come to depend upon.

More importantly, though, the disruption of the trade caused by the war and the decline in their bargaining power had demonstrated to the Ojibwa their position was
becoming precarious. They no longer controlled the tools needed for their existence, nor did they have the power or influence required to insure their supply. The dependence of their position was fast becoming obvious. Ojibwa confidence and security suffered. The process, though, was gradual. The still respectable percentage of the fur trade controlled by the Ojibwa and American Independence helped delay a time which, in retrospect at least, was inevitable.

For the Ojibwa the culmination of this process occurred first in the Southern Great Lakes area and spread northward. Their economic prosperity declined still further as the growing dependence of their position and their awareness of it eroded their confidence in Ojibwa society, increasing the attractiveness of the now paramount trade item, alcohol. European epidemic diseases which until now had left the Ojibwa remarkably unscathed finally began to vent their full wrath on Ojibwa bands. Settlers, to whom the Ojibwa could never be more than a nuisance and a hazard, began at first to trickle and then to pour into Upper Canada. In a surprisingly short time they were able to determine the temper of that society.

As Upper Canada evolved from being primarily organized around the exploitation of the fur trade to
being increasingly geared towards the development of the pioneer farmer the Ojibwa position became even more precarious. Their land was purchased from them (fairly or not, it was simply a formality). They increasingly depended upon the presents and rations handed out by the military and Indian Department, a handout prompted partly by a sense of obligation on the part of the government and partly because of an anachronistic perception of both the Indian and Indian Department's role. The Ojibwa in Upper Canada were simply running out of room.

Significant elements within various Ojibwa bands were aware of the need for a fundamental change, a change the Ojibwa were simply not prepared to make without assistance. The occasional petition for such assistance fell upon deaf ears within the Indian Department, imbued with its anachronistic perception and obscured with maintaining the allegiance of the still powerful western tribes. When agents, in the form of Methodists, capable of assisting in these changes did finally present themselves the Ojibwa showed themselves ready to accept that assistance. This welcome was only heightened by the offering of an alternative form of worship to replace one which, to some Ojibwa at least, had demonstrated noted ineffectiveness, a form of worship whose style appealed to the Ojibwa's dramatic belief in the power of the spiritual.
The welcome was assured by the work of Peter Jones and others, men who could fit into the Ojibwa world but who had demonstrated they could adjust to the society around them. The welcome was assisted in its spread by the co-option of traditional chiefs. These chiefs, prompted by the Methodists, realized their traditional authority, becoming less and less effective, could be enhanced by their new position as native exhorters for the Methodist Church. Authority within Ojibwa society had always been granted to those who demonstrated effectiveness and it was the Methodists and the Ojibwa most active in spreading their teaching who were most effective in dealing with the changing circumstances around them.

The Indian Department in the colony was also experiencing changes. Still impressed with the need for maintaining the allegiance of the Ojibwa, particularly the western Ojibwa, and apprehensive about American influence among them, they were increasingly beseeched by the demands of the Treasury to reduce the high cost of maintaining that allegiance. Prompted by Methodist examples, spurred by a fear of the American impulses of the Methodist Church, amidst increasing petitions and even veiled threats from Ojibwa chiefs and imbued with its own growing sense of duty to the Indian bands, the Indian Department haltingly developed a new perception of the Indian. Control over
the Indian Department was transferred from military to civil authority.

This transfer was significant. The Indian Department was now intent on establishing Indian farming communities based on the Methodist example. This new direction did not, however, remove the continuing desire to adhere permanently the allegiance of the western tribes while reducing the costs of the Department. Under the promptings of an efficient and ambitious superintendent, Lieutenant Governor Colborne decided to establish the government's first farming enclave on the northern limits of settlement in the colony running from Coldwater to the Narrows of Lake Simcoe.

The first spoke in the government's civilization policy was in a strategic location. Not only would its location allow the government to establish a large agricultural enclave encompassing Ojibwa from both Lake Simcoe and Lake Huron but would also allow for government control of a road from Lake Simcoe to Lake Huron which would assist with the settlement and defense of the colony. Most importantly, its location would allow western Ojibway visiting Penetanguishene for their annual presents to observe their brothers' progress and entice them to join the settlement.
From its outset the enclave met with significant opposition and was rocked with problems. Methodist success at such establishments as the Credit Mission had resulted from a sense of direction imbued by the cooperation of the Methodists and Ojibwa. This cooperation had only been attained by ensuring that traditional authority within the band was not threatened by Methodist exertion and perceived that the goals of the establishment could only enhance their own position. Native Methodist exhorters such as Peter Jones, Peter Jacobs and John Sunday either were or became Ojibwa chiefs. Using the same formula Chiefs Yellowhead and Snake of the Lake Simcoe Ojibwa were co-opted to deliver messages concerning the benefits of Methodist teaching and orderly life to more northern Ojibwa. The Indian Department was unable and unwilling to follow the same pattern in establishing the Coldwater-Narrows settlement.

The role of Superintendent as perceived within the Indian Department too obviously infringed upon the prerogatives of the traditional chiefs for these chiefs to see how they could enhance their own authority within the limits of the establishment. If the responsibilities of Superintendent had not required this conflict it is probable that Anderson's character and ambition would have
ensured that it occurred at Coldwater-Narrows.

The possibility of effective cooperation was further limited by an increasingly bitter fight between the Department and Methodist ministers. A brief period of cooperation between the Methodists and government quickly disintegrated amidst heightening government suspicion of Methodist influence and increasingly desperate attempts by the Methodists to maintain that influence. At Coldwater conflict was further aggravated by a Catholic faction. As powerful elements of traditional Ojibwa society had already aligned themselves with both the Methodist and Catholic faiths and saw this association as a means for extending their own authority, it was inevitable that they would increasingly oppose Superintendent Anderson as his actions more blatantly threatened both associations. It is not surprising that the establishment at Coldwater-Narrows increasingly failed to show the type of cohesion needed to live up to demanding Indian Department expectations and to supply the Ojibwa with the direction needed to withstand external pressure.

As the population of Upper Canada spread northward, surrounding the Coldwater-Narrows Reserve, the Ojibwa became increasingly apprehensive. Given the already unsettled state of the enclave, the harassment from white
settlers and traders, the few instances of encroachment and the advances of closely encamped immigrants simply increased the disruption within the settlement and helped insure the Ojibwa would find it increasingly difficult to have confidence in Coldwater-Narrows or their future within it.

Both Anderson and Lieutenant Governor Colborne soon realized that on its present footing the enclave would not be effective in prompting the northern bands to join the establishment or adopt the orderly industrious life. At the same time Anderson, exasperated with the problems at Coldwater-Narrows, still intent on the original concept of establishing a station among the northern Indians, believed that on Manitoulin, where a Church of England minister was already establishing a mission, he could begin a settlement which could avoid the problems of Methodist and Catholic intrigues and white encroachment. Justifying his optimistic plans for Manitoulin on an exaggerated assessment of the success of Coldwater-Narrows, he proposed an even more extensive settlement on the island. His suggestions were accepted by Colborne and plans made.

But before the Manitoulin establishment could be commenced Colborne was replaced by Sir Francis Bond Head.
Head used the Manitoulin establishment to help convince a number of Ojibwa bands to abandon land they controlled in Upper Canada, land which had become valuable for the continued settlement of the colony. For Anderson the settlement on Manitoulin Island was to be a modified agricultural settlement, one in which the Indians would be able to fish and hunt for a significant period of time while adjusting to a farming life. Head carried the progression from the concept of an agricultural enclave one step further, believing that the Ojibwa were incapable of the adaptation. Head established Manitoulin Island as a haven, a place for the Indian to waste away their few remaining years secure from the vices of the white populace around them.

Thus the Coldwater-Narrows settlement remains the primary instance of the government's attempt to establish an agricultural reserve in Upper Canada. Other smaller settlements were begun, but in none of these were the resources of the department concentrated as they were in Coldwater-Narrows. The abandonment of that settlement by the Indian Department in 1837 marked that department's belief, distorted by Sir Francis Bond Head to be sure, but implicitly affirmed before his arrival, that the Ojibwa in Upper Canada were not yet ready to make that adaptation.
In contrast, the abandonment of the Coldwater-Narrows Reserve by the Ojibwa was not primarily a result of their inability to effect that transition. It was the end result of the failure on the part of these elements, the Methodists, the Indian Department, who were interested in the development of agricultural missions or reserves to cooperate sufficiently to supply needed direction to the settlement. Traditional authority in the Ojibwa bands had been able to identify its own position with the interests of Methodists. While the Indian Department, particularly Anderson, increasingly opposed the Methodists these chiefs alternately saw the maintenance of their position as dependent upon at one point opposing the Methodists and at another opposing government measures against the Methodists. Thus no element of authority, either Indian Department, Methodist, Catholic or traditional chiefs, was able to supply consistent direction towards the ultimate end. When both the government and Methodists eventually demonstrated that they were no longer prepared to expend sufficient energy to maintain the settlement, Ojibwa society lacked the commitment, and as yet, the tools necessary to assume the directive role.
FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION


### FOOTNOTES

#### CHAPTER 1

7. IBID. p174.
13. IBID. p40.
15. IBID. p5.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 1 (Cont'd)

18) D. Jenness. Parry Island. p60.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 2


3) For a thorough discussion of these ties see B. Trigger. The Impact of Europeans on Huronia. Montreal. 1969.


5) B. Trigger. Farmers and Children.


8) IBID. p87.

9) W.V. Kineitz. Upper Great Lakes. p3.


11) IBID. p97.

12) See also W.V. Kineitz. Upper Great Lakes. p3.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 3

2) G. Copway. Traditional History. P177.
7) H. Hickerson. Chippewa of the Upper Great Lakes. p171.
8) H. Hickerson. Chippewa and Neighbours. p52.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 4


2) IBID. p22. See also W.W. Warren. Ojibway Nation.


4) M. Pouchot. Memoir Upon the Late War Between the French and English 1755-60. Massachusetts. 1866. p51.


6) M. Pouchot. Memoir. p203


8) IBID. p147.


13) M. Pouchot. Memoir. p82.

14) IBID. p258.

15) IBID. p219.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 5


11) IBID. p834.

12) IBID. p836.


14) IBID. p348.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 5 (Cont'd)

16) IBID. p995.
17) IBID. Vol. 2. p914.
22) IBID.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 6


2) Rogers and Tobondung. Parry Island Farmers. p256.


4) IBID. p52


7) Simcoe to Dundas, E.A. Cruickshank (ed). Correspondence. p27.


9) E.A. Cruickshank (ed). Correspondence. p175.

10) IBID. p180.

11) IBID. p62.


13) IBID. p16.

14) IBID. p4.


16) IBID. p29.


FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 6 (Cont'd)

20) IBID. p78.
21) IBID. p68.
22) I Weld. Travels. p86.
26) IBID. p67.
27) Simcoe to Dundas, E.A. Cruickshank (ed). Correspondence. p141.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 7


5) IBID. p8.

6) IBID. p22.


14) IBID. p9.


16) IBID. p96.


20) Petition laid before the Governor General at Port Credit, 1844, from D. Smith. "The Mississauga". p118.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 8


2) IBID.


4) Donald Smith. "The Mississauga". p120.


11) IBID.


14) The "Plan" is available in the Public Archives of Ontario.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 8 (Cont'd)


19) Aboriginal Tribes. pp16-17.


23) Kempt to Colborne Feb 23, 1829. "Lieutenant Governor Office Correspondence." Public Archives of Canada (P.A.C.)
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 9

1) "Report and Description of the Reserve." 14 March 1833. Chief Superintendent Office Correspondence (CS Off.) P.A.C.


3) E.A. Cruickshank (ed). Correspondence. pp70-77.

4) IBID. p76.

5) IBID. p77.

6) Speech by Chief Yellowhead, July 20, 1827 at York. Aboriginal Tribes. 1834. p7.

7) Peter Jones. Life and Journals. p73.

8) IBID. P106.

9) Anderson to Givens, 16 March 1832. CS Off. P.A.C.

10) Peter Jones. Life and Journals. p91.


12) Anderson to Givens, no date. CS Off. P.A.C.


14) Anderson to Givens, Feb. 1829. CS Off. P.A.C.

15) IBID.

16) Anderson to Colborne, 27 March 1830. Lieutenant Governor's Office Correspondence. (Lt. Gov. Off.) P.A.C.


19) Anderson to Givens, 11 April, 1831. CS Off. P.A.C.
CHAPTER 9 (Cont'd)

20) Anderson to Givens, 12 May, 1831. CS Off. P.A.C.

21) Anderson to Givens, 27 June 1831. CS Off. P.A.C.

22) Anderson to Givens, March 1832. CS Off. P.A.C.

23) Anderson to Givens, 14 March 1832. CS Off. P.A.C.

24) Anderson to Captain Philpotts, 6 Feb. 1833. CS Off. P.A.C.


26) Anderson to Givens, 22 Jan. 1831. CS Off. P.A.C.
CHAPTER 10


2) Givens to Anderson, 24 Aug. 1830. Chief Superintendent's Letter Book (CS Lt Bk) P.A.C.

3) Yellowhead to Colborne, Sept. 15, 1830. Lt. Gov. Off., P.A.C.

4) "Report and Description of the Reserve". 14 March 1833. CS Off. P.A.C.

5) Anderson to Givens, 24 Feb. 1831. CS Off., P.A.C.

6) Peter Robinson to Anderson, 10 April 1832. CS Off. P.A.C.

7) Anderson to Givens, 11 Apr. 1832. CS Off., P.A.C.

8) Anderson to Givens, 2 May 1831. CS Off., P.A.C.

9) IBID, 24 June 1832.

10) IBID, 2 May 1831.

11) IBID, 8 Aug. 1834.

12) IBID, 14 March 1831.

13) IBID, 31 Oct. 1836.

14) IBID, 19 July 1834.


17) Anderson to Givens, 29 April 1835. CS Off., P.A.C.

18) IBID, 27 June 1833.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 10 (Cont'd)

19) IBID, 3 Feb. 1832.

20) IBID, 3 May 1831.

21) Givens to Anderson, 23 Nov. 1830. CS Lt. Bk. P.A.C.

22) Anderson to Givens, 28 May 1831. CS Off., P.A.C.

23) IBID, 12 April 1836.

24) IBID, 25 July 1831.

25) IBID, 18 July 1832.

26) Petition from Aisance to Colborne enclosed in Givens to Anderson, 12 June 1831. CS Lt. Bk., P.A.C.

27) Anderson to Givens, 20 June 1831. CS Off., P.A.C.

28) To Bishop MacDonald, July 2, 1833, enclosed in Givens to Anderson, 7 Aug. 1833. CS Lt. Bk., P.A.C.

29) Aboriginal Tribes. p472.

30) Givens to Anderson, 17 Dec. 1832. CS Lt. Bk., P.A.C.

31) IBID, 20 April 1831. See Also Anderson to Givens, 23 Nov. 1832. CS Off., PAC, and IBID, 10 May 1831.

32) For a description of Anderson's problems with workers and the compromises in construction decided upon see Anderson to Givens, 24 Feb. 1831, CS Off., P.A.C.; IBID, 3 Dec. 1832; Anderson to Captain Philpotts, CS Off., 29 Sept. 1831; and Givens to Anderson, 14 Feb. 1831, CS Lt.Bk., P.A.C.

33) Anderson to Givens, 25 April 1831, CS Off., P.A.C.

34) IBID. 22 Nov. 1830.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 11

2) IBID. Vol.1, No. 37
3) IBID.
4) IBID. Vol. 1, No. 42.
5) IBID. Vol. 1, No. 28.
6) Givens to Anderson, 31 May 1830. CS Lt. Bk., P.A.C.
7) Anderson to Colborne, 12 July 1830. Lt. Gov. Off., P.A.C.
8) Miller to Givens, 24 Oct. 1831. CS Off., P.A.C.
9) Givens to Alley, 25 Aug. 1830. CS Lt. Bk., P.A.C.
10) Anderson to Gilbert Miller, 21 Nov. 1831. CS Off. P.A.C.
11) Alley to Givens, 5 April 1832. CS Off., P.A.C.
12) Christian Guardian.
13) Anderson to Givens, 18 April 1832. CS Off., P.A.C.
14) IBID. 30 July 1832.
15) Peter Jones. Life and Journals. p270.
16) IBID. p277.
17) Anderson to Givens, 17 Oct. 1831. CS Off., P.A.C.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 11 (cont'd)

21) Anderson to Givens, 12 Oct. 1831. CS Off., P.A.C.
22) IBID. 27 May 1834.
24) Currie to Richardson, 16 April 1832. CS Off. P.A.C.
26) Bishop MacDonald to Tawquinine, 11 Oct. 1832. CS Off., P.A.C.
27) Anderson to Givens, 5 Nov. 1832. CS Off., P.A.C.
29) Aboriginal Tribes. p381.
30) Currie to James Richardson, 16 April 1832. CS Off., P.A.C.
31) IBID.
32) Anderson to Givens, 14 Sept. 1832. CS Off., P.A.C.
33) Anderson to Givens, 9 June 1832. CS Off., P.A.C.
34) IBID. 4 Nov. 1832.
35) IBID. 21 April 1834.
36) IBID. 1 April 1836.
37) IBID. 1 Jan. 1833.
38) IBID. 27 May 1834.
39) IBID. 1 April 1836.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 12


3) Tickets of Location for Humphrey Waters, John Johnson, William Davenport, etc. Oro Township Papers. Public Archives of Ontario. (P.A.O.)

4) See "The Diary of Mary O'Brien" available in P.A.O., whose husband Lieut. Edmund O'Brien was both a half-pay officer and a settlement agent charged with helping these officers take up their locations.


9) Anderson to Givens. 17 June 1831. CS Off., P.A.C.

10) Givens to Anderson, 26 April 1830. CS Lt. Bk., P.A.C.

11) For some interesting first hand accounts of the extent of conspicuous consumption of alcohol see W.L. Smith, Pioneers of Old Ontario. Toronto. 1923.

12) Anderson to Givens, 16 June 1832. CS Off., P.A.C.

13) IBID.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 12 (Cont'd)


15) G. French, Parsons and Politics. p171.

16) Anderson to Hepburn, 8 April 1837. CS Off., P.A.C.


18) IBID. 7 July 1832.

19) IBID. 22 July 1832.

20) IBID. 20 Aug. 1832.

21) Dr. Thomas to Givens, 2 Aug. 1832. CS Off., P.A.C.

22) Aisance to Givens, 26 July 1830. CS Off., P.A.C.; and Anderson to Givens, 29 July 1833. CS Off., P.A.C.

23) Anderson to Colborne, 1 Aug. 1832. CS Off., P.A.C.

24) IBID.

25) IBID. 14 July 1832.

26) Givens to Anderson, 21 March 1833. CS Lt. Bk., P.A.C.

27) "Mr. Vaux's Tour", Christian Guardian, Vol. III, No. 34; and Anderson to Givens, 7 March 1833. CS Off., P.A.C.

28) Anderson to Givens, 26 Nov. 1834. CS Off., P.A.C.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 13

3) Anderson to Givens, 2 July 1831. CS Off., P.A.C.
4) Rev. Elliot to Anderson, 5 Aug. 1834. CS Off., P.A.C.
6) Anderson to Givens, 7 March 1833. CS Off., P.A.C.
7) IBID. 8 June 1835.
8) IBID.
9) IBID. 3 Oct. 1835.
10) IBID. 3 Jan. 1836.
11) "Copy of Instructions to the Lt. Governor"(p.267), Committee of the House of Commons on Military Expenditures in the Colonies. P.A.C.
12) IBID. p270.
15) IBID.
16) IBID.
17) Anderson to Givens, 8 April 1837. CS Off., P.A.C.
18) Aisance to Givens, 19 Aug. 1836. CS Off., P.A.C.
19) Givens to Anderson, 6 Oct. 1836. CS Lt. Bk., P.A.C.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 13 (Cont'd)

20) Anderson to Hepburn, 7 Feb. 1837. CS Off., P.A.C.
21) IBID. 28 March 1837.
22) Peter Jones. Life and Journals. p384.
23) Anderson to Hepburn, 8 April 1837. CS Off., P.A.C.
27) "Report of the Special Commissioners appointed 8th of Sept. 1856 to investigate Indian Affairs in Canada, 1858" Part II.

CHAPTER 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Babcock, L.L.</td>
<td>The War of 1812 on the Niagara Frontier</td>
<td>Buffalo Historical Society, Buffalo</td>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td>1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2nd Edition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Barbeau, C.M.</td>
<td>Huron and Wyandot Mythology</td>
<td>Canada Department of Mines, Geological Survey, Memoir 80, Ottawa</td>
<td>Ottawa</td>
<td>1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Beaven, James</td>
<td>Recreations of a Long Vacation or A Visit to Indian Missions in Upper Canada</td>
<td>H. and W. Rowell, Toronto</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bishop, Charles A.</td>
<td>The Northern Ojibwa and the Fur Trade: An Historical and Ecological Study</td>
<td>Holt, Rhinehart and Winston of Canada Ltd, Toronto</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Blair, Emma H. (ed.)</td>
<td>The Indian Tribes of the Upper Mississippi Valley and Region of the Great Lakes, Vols. I and II</td>
<td>Arthur H. Clark Company, Cleveland</td>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Caniff, W.</td>
<td>History of the Settlement of Upper Canada</td>
<td>Dudley and Burns, Toronto</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>1869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Carrington, C.D.</td>
<td>The British Overseas</td>
<td>At the University Press, Cambridge</td>
<td>Cambridge</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Carver, John</td>
<td>Travels Through the Interior Parts of North America in the Years 1766, 1767 and 1768</td>
<td>Ross and Haines Inc, Minnesota</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>1850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Books and Theses (Cont'd)


Books and Theses (Cont'd)


Books and Theses (Cont'd)


Books and Theses (Cont'd)


Books and Theses (Cont'd)


Books and Theses (Cont'd)


76) Pouchot, M. *Memoir Upon the Late War In North America Between the French and English, 1755-1760; Followed by Observations upon the Theatre of the Actual War and by New Details Concerning the Manner and Customs of the Indians*. In two volumes. Translated and edited by Franklin B. Hoegh. W. Elliot Woodward. Massachusetts. 1866.


### Books and Theses (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
<th>Place of Publication</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Robertson, John Ross</td>
<td>Old Toronto</td>
<td>MacMillan Canada Ltd</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Robinson, Percy J</td>
<td>Toronto During the French Regime</td>
<td>University of Toronto Press</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>Rogers, E.S. and Flora Tobobondung</td>
<td>Parry Island Farmers: A Period of Change in the Way of Life of Algonkians of Southern Ontario</td>
<td>National Museum of Man</td>
<td>Ottawa</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>Sanderson, J.E.</td>
<td>First Century of Methodism in Canada, W. Briggs</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>Schelling, Thomas</td>
<td>The Strategy of Conflict</td>
<td>Harvard University Press</td>
<td>Cambridge</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Schmaltz, P.S.</td>
<td>The History of the Saugeen Indians</td>
<td>Ontario Historical Society</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>Schoolcraft, H.R.</td>
<td>Information Respecting the History, Condition and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States</td>
<td>J.P. Lippincott</td>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>1851-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Scott, Duncan C.</td>
<td>The Administration of Indian Affairs in Canada</td>
<td>Canadian Institute of International Affairs</td>
<td>Ottawa</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Scott, Duncan C.</td>
<td>&quot;Indian Affairs&quot; Vols. IV and VII of Adam Short and A.G. Doherty (ed.) Canada and Its Provinces</td>
<td>Publishers Association of Canada</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>Severance, Frank</td>
<td>An Old Frontier of New France</td>
<td>Dodd, Mead and Company</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>Slight, B.</td>
<td>Indian Researches, Facts Concerning the North American Indians, Including Notes of their Present State of Improvement in their Social, Civil and Religious Condition with Hints for their Future Advancement</td>
<td>J.E.L. Miller</td>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>1844</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Books and Theses (Cont'd)


Books and Theses (Cont'd)


Published Collections of Documents


Published Collections of Documents (Cont’d)


JOURNAL ARTICLES


Journal Articles (Cont'd)


Journal Articles (Cont'd)


GOVERNMENT REPORTS: PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED


4) "Correspondence Relative to the Accounts of the Indian Department in Canada West together with the Reports of the Different Accountants." Rollo Campbell. Montreal. 1847.

5) "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada laid before the Legislative Assembly, 20 March 1845." Journal of Legislative Assembly, 1844-45, Appendix EEE.

Government Reports (Cont'd)


8) "Report of the Select Committee Appointed to Consider What Measures ought to be Adopted with respect to the Native Inhabitants of Countries where British Settlements are made." British Colonial Office. Parliamentary Papers No. 538, 1836 and No. 425, 1837.

9) "Report of the Special Commissioners Appointed on the Eighth of September 1856 to investigate Indian Affairs in Canada." Printed by Indian Department at Toronto 1858. Available at Public Archives of Canada.

10) "Sixth Report of General Board of Commissioners appointed to investigate into the Business, Conduct, and Organization of the Various Public Departments of the Province of Upper Canada 1836." Included in Journal of Legislative Assembly - 1844-1845, Appendix EEE.

ARCHIVAL SOURCES

Public Archives of Ontario

1) "Annual Report of the Society for Converting and Civilizing and Propagating the Gospel Among the Destitute Settlers in Upper Canada for the Years 1831, 1832, 1833, 1834, 1835, 1836."

2) "Communications and Despatches Relating to Recent Negotiations with the Indians and Arrangements for the Future Settlement of the Tribes in this Province by Sir F.B. Head." Printed at the office of the British Colonist. 1837.


4) "Diaries of Angus MacKintosh: Agent for the North West Fur Company."
Public Archives of Ontario (Cont'd)

5) "Diaries of Mary O'Brien."

6) "Diary of Thomas Gummerell Anderson." 5 Sept. 1849.

7) Peter Jones "Anecdote Book."


9) "Statement Respecting the Indians in Canada, their Presents, Lands and Annuities." Author unknown. No date.

10) "Town Plot of Orillia and Indian Reserve Between Orillia and Coldwater." 23 Sept. 1844.

Public Archives of Canada


2) "Chief Superintendent's Office Correspondence." R. 6.10, Vols. 47 to 65.


6) "Lieutenant Governor's Office Correspondence." R.6.10, Vol. 5.

7) "Papers of the Military Secretary." R. 6.10, Vol 488.

8) "Superintendent General's Office Correspondence." R. 6.10, Vols. 8 to 17.
MAGAZINES AND NEWSPAPERS

1) Christian Advocate and Journal.
2) Christian Guardian.