Domestic Terrorism in the Canadian News Media: a Framing Analysis of Canadian-Connected Terrorism in 2013 Newspaper Articles

by

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AUTHOR’S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
Abstract

Terrorism is one of the most politically and rhetorically significant issues shaping the world today, and a popular topic in the news media. Canada is no exception. Recently, the problem of domestic (or homegrown) terror has emerged as a complex and emotionally potent phenomenon, one seemingly on the rise. However, there is an absence of media scholarship investigating this issue from a Canadian perspective. This study examines the Canadian news media’s treatment of Canadian-connected terrorism. Central to the journalistic discourse are frames, which serve to define, assess, characterize, moralize, and contextualize terrorism for readers. Frames provide narratives for key aspects such as alleged suspects, arrests, plots, police activities, and legal/political responses. A qualitative framing analysis approach is employed to identify and discuss news framing of Canadian-connected terrorism via extensive inductive coding of 173 Canadian news articles from print and online media sources, spanning January 1st – December 31st, 2013. Recurrent frames are established using evidence from the articles and discussed in terms of the messages they send about the nature of domestic terrorism/terrorists, their usefulness for understanding terrorism as a multifaceted global problem, and, where feasible, theoretically informed explanations for the use of specific frames. Findings indicate that the Canadian news media favours terrorism as a topic, but does not provide particularly informative articles. The reasons for this discrepancy proved varied, complex, and intimately linked with the way the mainstream news media – and other powerful organizations – operate and interact.

Keywords: terrorism in the news, domestic terrorism, Canadian terrorism, framing analysis, media analysis, Canadian media analysis
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Research Questions

1.1 Introduction

Terrorism is one of the most politically and rhetorically significant issues of our time. It is a particularly insidious kind of violence, because it attacks not only our physical selves and property, but “our sense of security, both as individuals and as societies” (Thorup, 2010, p. ix). If the aim of terrorists is to unsettle, to gain notoriety, and to instill fearful images of themselves as dangerous, unpredictable enemies of the state in the public consciousness, then an increasing number of modern-day terrorist groups can count themselves successful. Finding and eliminating terrorist individuals or organizations is a critical objective for governments, militaries, and intelligence agencies in Canada and the world over. As law professors Ramraj, Hor, and Roach (2005, preface) point out, “anti-terrorism law and policy have become matters of global concern”.

Modern counter-terrorism efforts, they continue,

[cross] boundaries between states and between domestic, regional and international law. It also crosses traditional disciplinary boundaries between administrative, constitutional, criminal, immigration, and military law, and the law of war (Ramraj, Hor, & Roach, 2005, preface).

The event most foundational to creating the demand for and nature of modern counter-terrorism is the terrorist attack known ubiquitously as ‘9/11’. On September 11th, 2001, the United States suffered four organized terrorist attacks which destroyed the World Trade Center towers and struck the Pentagon, destroying a significant part of this symbolic building as well. Shortly thereafter, the United Nations Security Council enacted Resolution 1373, calling on all states “to ensure that terrorism was treated as a serious crime” (Roach, 2007, p. 5). September 11th and Resolution 1373 are what thrust
terrorism into the spotlight as a persistent ‘global concern’ over the past thirteen years. Since 2001, many global powers have come to see terrorism as a very serious threat. As a result, these nations have enacted serious defensive measures and redefined their laws in unprecedented and controversial ways. There has been much debate in Canada over how to understand terrorism, how we ought to combat terrorism, and whether we are doing enough, among other concerns (Roach, 2007; RCMP, 2009; Parent & Ellis, 2011). NGOs, government, intelligence, and military bodies, and academics from a wide variety of disciplines have weighed in, contributing to the public discourse on terrorism.

A sociological perspective may attend to the creation of meaning in the public discussion of terrorist phenomena. Labeling acts of violence or subversion as ‘acts of terror’, and their perpetrators as ‘terrorists’, lends these actions and people a special aura of dread and danger rarely afforded to the common criminal. As noted, the reactions to terrorism have been quite significant, and have radically changed foreign and domestic policies of many countries – including Canada's. Wars have been waged under the banner of keeping citizens safe from terrorists, and fears of terrorism are used to justify controversial bills which drastically alter citizens’ democratic, constitutionally-entrenched rights and freedoms (Hardin, 2004).

A growing number of terrorist attacks are perpetrated not by foreign radicals, but by those living, often legally and legitimately, in the same country in which the attack takes place. Frequently, these radicals are citizens themselves. Take, for instance, the 2006 case of the Toronto 18: a group of eighteen radicalized young men, most of whom were minors at the time, plotted horrific acts of violence against Canadians and Canadian institutions, reportedly including plans to “attack the Parliament Buildings, storm CBC
offices in Toronto, take hostages, and even behead the prime minister” (Wilner, 2008, p. 1). These young men had such an impact, and their acts were so shocking, that some eight years later they are still brought up in the news media. Wilner (2008, p. 2) asks us to consider that none of the young men rounded up in Ontario was a foreign national… most were born, raised, and educated in Canada, while those who had been born abroad had moved to Canada as youngsters.

Furthermore, Wilner (2008, p. 3) posits that “the general trend since the 2001 attacks [of September 11th] has been the diminution of centrally orchestrated international terrorism matched by a concurrent rise in localized and unaffiliated terrorism”. Pregulman and Burke’s (2012, p. 1) study corroborates the claim that “incidents of ‘homegrown terrorism’… have increased in aggregate since 9/11”. The increasing problem of domestic terrorism on Canadian soil has garnered significant media attention – as have reports of radicalized Canadians involved in terrorism overseas.

While most people are widely aware of the existence of terrorism, and that it poses a threat to national security, until recently, very few Canadians have firsthand experience with terrorism. “With few exceptions,” a military historian and terrorism specialist maintains, “Canada's [pre - 9/11] experience of terrorism was less frequent, less lethal, and less disruptive than those of many other countries” (Charters, 2008, p. 3). These few exceptions took place almost exclusively between 1960 and 1985, meaning that there is an almost-twenty-year gap between Canada's last major experiences with terrorism, and the attacks of September 11th, 2001, after which terror incidents of all kinds skyrocketed. Even with the increase in domestic terrorism, nearly all of the recent terrorist plots in Canada were (fortunately) thwarted before any loss of life occurred.

However, last year may have signaled the beginning of the end for this period of
relative peace. In a span of just two days in 2014, Canadians saw two deadly domestic terror attacks take place in Quebec and Ottawa. On October 20\textsuperscript{th}, Martin Couture-Rouleau hit two Canadian Forces members with his car; Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent died as a result of injuries sustained in the attack. Two days later on October 22\textsuperscript{nd}, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shot Corporal Nathan Cirillo to death while the Corporal stood guard at Ottawa’s War Memorial. Both Couture-Rouleau and Zehaf-Bibeau were known to be Muslim converts, a fact that was widely reported in the media (Bell, 2014a). A quick review of late 2014/2015’s press trends show that these tragic events received widespread news coverage, driving up the already-high amount of publicity afforded terrorism and the ‘terror threat’. Furthermore, media discussion of these incidents helped foment, if not introduce, controversies and complexities surrounding the public’s perception of terrorism, including the relationship between domestic terror and foreign radical groups like ISIS/ISIL, and the role of the mental health system in identifying, treating, and preventing radicalization and violence. Until recently, most Canadians had never witnessed a terrorist attack on their own soil, and the impact of news reports on how Canadians think about and respond to terrorism should not be dismissed.

As psychologists Friedland and Merari (1985, p. 591) caution, “terrorism is highly effective in inducing fear and worry, even when the actual damage it causes is moderate”. Implicit in this statement is the recognition that seeing and/or learning about damage caused in a terrorist attack affects people emotionally, even if no one was hurt or killed. Similarly, news stories about the radicals-next-door, including sensational details about plots, weapons, and violent ideologies, might be emotionally unsettling, and engender feelings of risk and fear.
Research has long suggested that media framing has important and real effects. We know that exposure to media hype about crime elevates fear and perceptions of risk; likewise, Nellis and Savage (2012, p. 748) demonstrated that for their sample of Americans, “exposure to terrorism-related news is positively associated with perceived risk of terrorism to self and others”. Shoshani and Slone (2008, p. 53) showed Israeli young adults TV news clips, and found “higher posttest levels of anxiety, anger, stereotypes, and negative enemy perception in the terrorism versus nonterrorism media exposure”. But, curiously, upon extending the implications of Shoshani and Slone’s findings, Friedland and Merari (1985, p. 591) concluded that terrorism appears to have failed to produce the attitudinal change desired by its perpetrators, the high levels of fear notwithstanding. On the contrary, terrorism caused a hardening of attitudes, strong opposition to any form of political reconciliation with terrorists, and widespread support for extreme counterterrorist measures. Terrorism, in other words, proved to be counterproductive. Even if the effect of terrorism usually is not victim acquiescence and a win for the terrorists, the experience of terrorism cannot be ignored as an emotionally potent life event. If just reports of terrorism can cause feelings of fear and insecurity, that is reason enough to study the nature of such reporting. In particular, the emerging significance of domestic terrorism as a sociopolitical, emotional, and ethical issue, combined with the potency of the news media as a vehicle for relaying information, makes it all the more relevant to examine what messages are presented in news coverage of domestic terrorists and terrorist events.

This study uses qualitative frame analysis, a popular social science/communications research tool, to locate semantic messages about the nature and characteristics of domestic terrorism in the news. Media, especially news media, provide
legitimized ‘lenses’ or ‘frames’ for understanding what domestic terrorism is, how and why it happens, and how we should think about and respond to it. Uncovering these frames and their component elements, as I have attempted to do here, necessitates a careful, substantively- and theoretically-informed reading of Canadian news media, with close analytical attention to what they say about the phenomena.

1.2 Research Question and Research Objectives

Having established the importance of modern news media (and frames) as vehicles for passing on the stories that help people make sense of their world, the main research question guiding this project is: how were domestic and Canadian-connected terrorists and terrorist events portrayed (i.e. framed) by the Canadian news media in the year 2013?

There are a few sub-questions I must confront in the process of answering the research question above. What are the media telling Canadians about domestic (or ‘homegrown’) terrorism? Some specific areas of interest are: what qualities might media ascribe to the terrorist, the plots/weapons, their motivations, and the implications of the terrorist act or event? Who are the authorities the media turns to when discussing domestic terrorism? Moreover, what kind of information is upheld as meaningful? Which (real or proposed) responses to domestic terrorism are portrayed as favoured/accepted, and which are criticized or diminished in importance? In a broader, more generalized sense, what recurrent themes and messages emerge in the Canadian media’s conceptualization of domestic terrorism?

To address this question, and all questions that may branch from it, I have examined the framing present in 173 articles from nearly 40 Canadian newspapers from
across the country, ranging from large-scale national publications like the *Globe and Mail* or *Maclean’s*, to regional/local papers like the *Kitchener-Waterloo Record* or the *Hamilton Spectator*. Each of these articles has been coded line-by-line, using reputable qualitative data analysis software, to distinguish frames or elements of frames. My analytical objective is not only to accurately and consistently identify and describe relevant, useful codes representative of frame elements, but also to use these codes to structure frames that typify and (to the highest degree possible) encapsulate the Canadian news media’s recent presentation of domestic terror and related issues.

1.3 Research Definitions

Strong, clear, conceptually valid definitions are essential for a successful research project (Berg & Lune, 2012). The following definitions introduce and clarify the central concepts this research is built on.

For the purposes of this study, *domestic terrorism* is any act of terrorism committed:

1. by Canadian citizens, within Canada's borders
2. by non-Canadian citizens, living in Canada
3. by Canadian citizens, in a country other than Canada

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1 I am aware that this is a broad definition and includes situations which others may not consider truly ‘domestic terrorism’. However, the situations are similar enough – and distinct enough from the general idea of terrorism as something perpetrated by some culturally remote Other – that I believe they can be grouped together unproblematically. Additionally, this definition both a) allows access to a greater pool of articles, and b) gets at the part of the framing most interesting to me: how does the news media handle instances of terrorism that could hurt Canadians ‘in our own backyard’, and/or instances of terrorism committed by our own?

2 The terror suspects I am describing here are technically non-citizens, meaning they are not legally ‘Canadian’, but are people who have legally lived and worked within Canada's borders.
‘Terrorism’ furthermore, does not refer to any particular academic or official definition of the phenomena, but is an emergent definition coming from the news article database. As my main research question asks how the Canadian news media defined, presented, and framed terrorism, it would be counterintuitive to impose an external definition. The articles making up the database were collected via targeted keyword searches; therefore, each one is an example of what Canadian newspapers presented as domestic terrorism in the year 2013.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

In this literature review, I have endeavoured to construct a narrative that takes the reader from the earliest identifiable instances and sites of terrorism-like violence to its development into the dreaded and destructive phenomena which transfixes our world today. This includes definitions, redefinitions, justifications, and responses, as well as methods, beliefs, tactics, and contextual details from choice case studies illustrating relevant or definitional aspects of terrorism. The instances discussed were selected because they appeared in more than one reputable academic source as representative of a ‘progression’ in the practice of terror, or because they offered a particularly good example of something recurring and pervasive in terrorism. Some brief historical analysis contrasts differences and similarities in instances and types of terrorism. The focus of this thesis is not a comparative analysis of terrorism through the ages, but a modern-day framing analysis of news media; nonetheless, I believe it is important to rest any theories, discussions, or conclusions that may arise on a solid foundation of factual, historical information about the overall phenomenon of terrorism.

One question emerged as pivotal, but disturbingly obscure: what exactly is (and is not) terrorism? In an effort to address this question, I reference and critically assess working definitions of terrorism employed by governments, NGOs, and academics, as well as some ‘common-sense’ understandings of terrorism. As this thesis focuses centrally on domestic terrorism in a Canadian context, both Canada’s history with terror and domestic terrorism are discussed in special detail. Finally, particular attention is given to literature exploring terrorism using media analysis techniques, and especially to the studies which helped inspire and inform my methodological approach in this thesis.
2.1 Definitions of Terrorism

The historical analysis is based on two assumptions. The first is that despite specific similarities (death, destruction, political/national/ideological rivalries, etc.), terrorism was and is somehow different from other types of brutal political violence. The second is that there are enough commonalities amongst a variety of seemingly disconnected, disparate events in world history to trace a meaningful ‘history of terrorism’ – however different these events may be from what we now consider terrorism. For example, in the modern context, the idea or label of terrorism is typically invoked to indicate physical and/or psychological violence by non-state actors (like al-Qaida), as opposed to brutality or oppression by the official ruling body (like the French Revolution or Russian governments throughout history). As Miller (2013, p. 1) says,

We have become accustomed to conceptualizing “terrorism” as an illegitimate effort by subnational, clandestine factions [emphasis added] to sabotage existing government systems and do great harm to innocent civilians in the process. However, this has not stopped scholars from applying modern understandings of terrorism to retroactively characterize certain historical events as terrorism, events involving various actors – frequently including governments and/or militaries – because symbolic brutality and fear-as-control were dominant facets (Miller, 2013, p. 2). The Kishinev Pogrom, for instance, was perpetrated against Russian Jews by the ruling Tsarist monarchy, but has been qualified as terrorism from a modern point of view because of the emotional and psychological effects they were intended to have, and partially succeeded in inflicting, upon the target Russian Jewish community. Says Goldstein (2013, p. 587),

To my mind, the Bund revolutionary Vladimir Medem’s words that ‘The events in Kishinev… [were] a terrible blow. People with weak nerves sank into depression. Some lost their sense of sheer despair. Others began to reconsider their
worldviews,’ sum up the situation after the Pogrom in light of its harsh and tragic consequences.³

Though state terrorism has taken a backseat to revolutionary, religious, and ideological terrorism in the past half century, this has not limited academics from contextualizing a great deal of historical brutality as precursors to modern-day terrorism. Nor have any particular norms delimiting terrorism stopped modern governments, NGOs, and the media from creating addendums to existing definitions of terrorism, and applying the term to describe an ever-widening array of acts and situations – including ones that recall the past.

For example, The United States Senate Armed Services Committee (USSASC) recently released a statement referencing the difficulty of distinguishing state and non-state actors, saying,

These [cyber terrorist] threats come from a range of actors, including: (1) nation states with highly sophisticated cyber programs (such as Russia or China), (2) nations with lesser technical capabilities but possibly more disruptive intent (such as Iran or North Korea), (3) profit-motivated criminals, and (4) ideologically motivated hackers or extremists. Distinguishing between state and non-state actors within the same country is often difficult [emphasis added] – especially when those varied actors actively collaborate, tacitly cooperate, condone criminal activity that only harms foreign victims, or utilize similar cyber tools (Clapper, 2015, p. 2).

While this acknowledgement of the blurred lines between state and non-state terrorism seems appropriate to me, the news media has been observed to extend the ‘terrorism/terrorist’ designation to such hitherto unrelated crimes such as gang shootings

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³ Interestingly, these Pogroms had a similar effect on the Jewish community as more recent Palestinian terrorist attacks have had on modern Israeli citizens: the Kishinev Pogroms helped galvanize the Zionist movement, which expanded and diversified “after – and as a consequence of – the Pogrom” (Goldstein, 2013, p. 588). Gavirily-Nuri and Balas (2010) report that, rather than being cowed by the violence, Israelis who have been victimized by terrorist attacks tend to become more anti-terrorist in their perspectives, and more determined to wipe out the terrorist threat.
(“Alberta teens receive maximum for shooting boy, 5, while he slept”, 2013) and domestic abuse (Berrington, 2012). Though it has, ostensibly, been going on for centuries, and certainly, some historical patterns may be observed, there seems to be no hard limits on what terrorism actually is and is not.

Of course, there exist ‘common-sense’ understandings of terrorism, the mediated possible roots of which are explored in this thesis. However, if an average Canadian were to try to rigorously and critically answer the question, ‘what makes something a terrorist act, or someone a terrorist?’, using just the information from the government and the news media, it would be understandable for him or her to arrive at the (somewhat disappointingly tautological) conclusion that the only exclusive, non-contradictory, and consistent trait common to everything that we now know as terrorism is the fact that someone called it that. While acknowledging this ambiguity, it seemed nonetheless helpful to touch on the assortment of definitions present in the ‘expert’ literature – publications from government/security agencies and academic researchers.

2.1.1 Government/Security Sources

According to CSIS, Canada’s security and intelligence organization, “terrorism is still the leading threat to Canada’s national security” (CSIS, 2014, p. 42). A previous CSIS (2011, p. 7) publication identified terrorism as a kind of political violence, including,

an act or omission undertaken, inside or outside Canada, for a political, religious or ideological purpose that is intended to intimidate the public with respect to its security… or to compel a person, government or organization… from doing or refraining from doing any act, and that intentionally causes one of a number of specified forms of serious harm.
This definition is abridged from the one found in the Canadian Criminal Code, and is the same one the RCMP use (Government of Canada, 2015). The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (CIA, 2007).

The best governmental definition I found was from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, also American, who recognizes that “there is no single, universally accepted, definition of terrorism” (FBI, 2005, p. iv). Perhaps unsurprisingly, given their awareness of terrorism’s ambiguity, the FBI’s own definitions of terrorism are close to academic in their complexity and thoroughness. Some main elements the FBI ascribe to terrorism are: a) the unlawful use of force and violence against a government or civilians for the sake of intimidation or coercion, b) being either domestic (located within U.S. territory) or international acts of political/ideological violence and coercion that are considered criminal inside U.S. jurisdiction, and c) further divided into terrorist incidents, acts that did occur, and terrorism preventions, planned acts which were “interdicted through investigative activity” (FBI, 2005, pp. iv-v).

It is possible that Western political/military/intelligence agencies’ definitions of terrorism are purposely vague, so that they may be used to their maximum utility in mutable situations where national security is at risk. In spite of this, all the above definitions share what might be contextually regarded as foundational aspects of terrorism: violence, coercion/force/control, political/ideological motives, and threat towards civilians or ‘noncombatants’.
2.1.2 Academic Sources

Studies have found over 200 definitions of terrorism (Matusitz, 2013, p. 2). I have only referenced a few here. Conte performed a case study of definitions of terrorism in four countries. He found that, despite the existence of a comprehensive and humanitarian approach offered by the UN, “there is no overwhelming consensus within the international community on a definition of terrorism, so that individual States have been required to formulate their own definitions of the term” (Conte, 2010a, p. 425).

Reinforcing the idea of vague but consequential common-sense understandings of terrorism is the claim that “in its popular understanding the term ‘terrorism’ tends to refer to an act that is wrong, evil, illegitimate, illegal, and a crime” (Conte, 2010a, p. 7). In terms of popular usage,

The term has come to be used to describe a wide range of violent, and sometimes not-so violent, conduct (especially in the hands of the media since 11 September 2001). Acts characterised as terrorist in nature can occur both in conflict and peace-time. They may constitute crimes in domestic and international law, and they are motivated by a complex matrix of reasons and ideals. Their characterisation can also depend upon the person or institution using the label and may even change over time. To give two striking examples, the list of most wanted terrorists kept by the United States featured, at one time, Yassir Arafat and Nelson Mandela, both of whom were subsequently awarded the Nobel Peace Prize: evidence that this is a highly political and controversial issue. In the months prior to his death, Yassir Arafat was in again described as a terrorist by the United States Administration (Conte, 2010a, pp. 7-8).

This excerpt nicely encapsulates the subjectivity in defining terrorism, furthermore pointing out the shifting and highly politicized application of ‘terrorist’ as a label. One man in the example, Nelson Mandela, is popularly viewed in the West as a civil rights leader for ending South African Apartheid. After Mandela’s death, Britain’s Prince Charles, U.S. President Barak Obama, and other Western heads of state came out to officially pay their respects (Clark, 2013). Contrast that with Yassir Arafat, the Palestinian
leader who is yet again “described as a terrorist” (Conte, 2010a, p. 8). It is reasonable to explain this remarkable difference as an ideological extension of the U.S. administration’s support for the state of Israel, which denies the Palestinians’ right to independence; perhaps ‘the enemy of my friend is my enemy, too’ when it comes to identifying terrorism. Even those who challenge law and order and the status quo may be absolved and even embraced, so as long as the political consequences are favourable.4

Schmid and Jongman’s definition has become quite popular in the social sciences, and is widely accepted as the best definition of terrorism that we have today due to their intensive methodology. To develop their definition, they “gathered over a hundred academic and official definitions of terrorism and examined them to identify the main components” (Matusitz, 2013, p. 2). Essentially, Schmid and Jongman (1988/2005) performed a content analysis, correlating violence, political goals, causing fear and terror, indiscriminate, arbitrary targeting, and the victimization of civilians/noncombatants. The authors generalized terrorism as

… an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent actions employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought (Schmid & Jongman, 1988/2005, p. 28).

4 The inverse can be observed in the U.S. administration’s attitude towards Afghani mujahedeen during the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, when they were seen as rightfully defending their home against the Americans’ political rival, the Soviet Union. Militia – including a young Osama bin Laden – were even trained and supplied in CIA-founded camps by American operatives. Official opinion of the same groups drastically changed when the trained mujahideen began joining groups like al-Qaida and otherwise continuing the fight against what they saw as encroaching outside forces, including Western interests. From the American perspective, this was “a classic Frankenstein’s monster situation” (Burke, 1999).
Cowen echoes aspects of this definition, arguing that “terrorism is a spectacle produced for viewers, many of whom live apart from the violence staged events” (2006, p. 233). One pithy remark has it that “terrorism is theater” (Jenkins, 1974, p. 4). This appears to be an apt description of how audiences in the West process terrorism. For the majority of Canadians and Americans, terrorism is something encountered through the nightly news, rather than something they expect to encounter in their everyday lives.5

One logical reason that terrorism has escaped clarity and consensus of definition is the fact that groups and individuals rarely identify themselves as terrorists voluntarily. As Matusitz (2013, p. 2) explains, “terrorism is a pejorative term”. When self-labelling, people favour terms akin to “freedom fighter” (Gupta, 2008, p. 6). “In the Arab/Islamic world,” Gupta elaborates, those whom the West considers terrorists are known to sympathizers as “‘Shahid’ or ‘martyrs’” (2008, p. 6). Openly claiming to be a terrorist has lost whatever appeal it may once have had. The last group to self-identify as ‘terrorists’ were the Jewish extremist group Lehi, active in the British mandate of Palestine during the 1940s; even then, other Jewish nationalist groups rejected the label, reinforcing its status as a pejorative term by instead declaring that the British were the terrorists (Gupta, 2008). Gupta’s (2008) study reveals some of the confusion and complexity inherent in pinpointing and addressing terrorism, illustrating the practical defining characteristics of terrorism as relativistic and changing depending on whose side one is viewing the conflict from.

5 Despite recent attacks on our home soil, this statement is still true in a relativistic sense: when compared to the citizens of Israel/Palestine, much of the Middle East, and some parts of Africa and Eastern Europe, we in the West (especially Canada) have enjoyed a significant degree of freedom from terror attacks.
Actions and methods condemned as terrorism, when they are perpetrated by one’s opponents, may be considered perfectly acceptable when adopted by one’s allies. The French revolutionary Robespierre thought of terror “as either a weapon of oppression when utilized by despots of monarchical rule, or as a means of liberation when dispensed in the name of the people” (Miller, 2013, p. 37). Robespierre, of course, thought himself to represent the people, making his applications of terror “justice… an emanation of virtue [resulting] from the application of democracy to the most pressing needs of the country” (Miller, 2013, p. 37). This perspective became codified in the Robespierre government’s increasingly draconian policies, including “severe police laws, permitting the authorities to make sweeping arrests on the basis of little more than suspicion and rumor” (Miller, 2013, p. 38). Unlike a situation of traditional warfare, revolutions, guerrilla warfare, and the like are almost inherently sites of shifting meanings and uncertain realities. Whether the revolutionaries/guerrillas are fighting to grab power by any means necessary, or struggling to maintain control, the unstable power dynamic puts a limit on any one group’s ability to propagate their privileged definitions, except within their own established sphere of influence.

This is an important point to consider when trying to understand terrorism. It is something of an ethical, political, and historical minefield trying to “[distinguish] a terrorist from a ‘revolutionary’, an ‘insurgent’, a ‘freedom fighter’, a ‘martyr’ or an ordinary criminal” (Shughart, 2006, p. 9). Both the ‘terrorists’ and their targets see themselves as the victims, their actions justifiable and rooted in righteous defense. A look into the history of terrorism will help further illuminate how this happens.
2.2 The History of Terrorism

“International terrorism is not a new phenomenon,” (2010, p. 7) Conte tells us. It is “one of a number of genres of political violence, which also include war, genocide and ethnic cleansing among its main categories” (Miller, 2013, p.1). Though terrorism and terrorist groups might materialize during any of the above forms of conflict, and frequently have been associated with such events, terrorism (domestic and international alike) is thought of and treated as a distinct entity.

The practice of terrorism has gone through many transitions and fluctuations in popularity from its bloody origins to the present day. A foray into the history of terrorism reveals ancient militant groups with similar structure, practices, methods, and goals to the terrorists of today: notably, the Jewish Zealots and the Muslim Assassins. From the beginning, religion was integrated into terrorism. Referring to the Zealots and other seminal groups, Rapoport (2002) notes, “religion determined every purpose and tactic of this ancient form [of terrorism]”.

The Jewish Zealots, or sicari, who attempted to violently subvert the Roman occupation of Palestine, are widely reported as the earliest example of a socially and politically motivated group using terrorist tactics (Shughart, 2006, p. 13). The word sicari is “a generic Latin term derived from sicarius, ‘dagger-man’ [used to] denote the Zealots” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, p. 55), a reference to their penchant for quick, stealthy stabbings of Roman soldiers and officials. The Jews found Roman rule humiliating and oppressive after enjoying more than a century of independence, and revolted in “spontaneous hotbeds of insurrection” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, p. 56). The sicari were able to channel the latent violence born of the widespread humiliation felt by the Jewish people. They were able to organize and then direct that violence
against the Roman “invader,” as well as against those members of the Jewish community whom they considered to be traitors to the national cause (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, p. 57).

Much like typical modern-day non-state terrorist groups, the *sicari* realized they came from a position of weakness, and adopted “an indirect strategy aimed at keeping the adversary off balance by waging an essentially psychological campaign… [evolving] over time and in response to circumstances” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, p. 58). The Romans reacted in kind, hoping to strike a psychological blow by crucifying 2000 Jews.

Chaliand and Blin (2007a, p. 56) further explain, “it was the first use of terror in a war that was to last several decades”. Here we see terror used as a tool by both the insurgent *sicari* and by the ruling Romans. This ‘first’ is significant for yet another reason – it is one of the oldest examples of how the idea of purity is often central to radical and extremist movements. The *sicari* sought Jewish political purity, by attempting to subvert and excise Roman rule and establish a Jewish government, and Jewish religious purity, by brutalizing other Jews “whom they felt to be insufficiently scrupulous in their piety” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, p. 57). In this regard, the *sicari* can be compared to modern-day Islamic fundamentalist groups, whose strict adherence to an absolute version of Islamic belief frequently leads them into vicious and bloody conflict with neighbouring groups, societies, or nations with somewhat different interpretations of correct Islamic doctrine and practice.⁶

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⁶ Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups might be the most topical example, but they are by no means the only other group to cling to an absolutist purity that scathes inwardly as well as outwardly. Ideological entities including the Canadian Communist party (Laxer, 2004), the Irish Republican Army (Derkins, 2003), Maoists, and the German Nazi party (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a) exhibited the same tendencies, manifesting as group shaming and purges.
The second documented example of an ostensibly terrorist organization is that of the Islamic group known as the Assassins, originating from Iran and Syria. The Assassins earned their place amongst the forerunners of terrorism by [co-opting] the use of terror to psychological ends and [targeting], among others, a foreign, Christian power: the Crusaders. The terrorists themselves were animated by an unshakeable faith that allowed them to sacrifice themselves willingly in the course of a mission in the certainty that they would ascend directly to paradise (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, p. 61).

The group developed out of a “less moderate [i.e. more radical]” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, p. 62) Shi’ite Muslim movement, a result of the schism between Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims that persists to this day. The Assassins’ main goals were the establishment of theocratic Shi’ite rule wherever they were active, and the annihilation of anyone who they saw as opposed to their cause (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, pp. 65-70). They were known for their ritualistic use of bladed weapons, their methods of disguise and infiltration, intimidation through murder, and for their adherents’ willing acceptance of suicide missions – in fact, most Assassins died in the course of carrying out their crimes (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a). This is a familiar story, and as Chaliand & Blin (2007a, p. 70) tell us, “over the centuries, volunteers for death would become an integral element of the history of terrorism, as can still be seen today in the status enjoyed in certain quarters by… suicide bombers”. Also familiar is the fact that – much like the sicari before them, and countless others after them – the Assassins turned their blades upon fellow Muslims that they believed to be heretics or traitors just as easily as they did against Christians or political rivals (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, pp. 71-73).

Though these groups were active centuries ago (around 6 B.C.E. for the sicari Zealots, and during the early 1000s A.D. for the Assassins) echoes can be seen in the
ideologies, actions, beliefs, and statements emanating from modern-day fundamentalist religious terrorist organizations. However, the choice to use terroristic measures stems from more than the motivations of extremist fervor and hatred alone, a complexity often overlooked in some discussions of terrorism. According to Chaliand and Blin (2007a), both of these early cases involved situational contingencies which led to the decision to adopt such strategies. As the authors explain,

taking up the arms of terrorism was a logical choice for the Assassins, as it had been for the sicarii. Its effectiveness made it the primary weapon in their strategic arsenal and eventually defined the sect’s very essence for posterity (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, p. 60).

These two organizations are at the very root of what we now identify as terrorism, in many ways establishing precedents for other terrorist groups (especially those from the Middle East).

In the following centuries, terror became largely a weapon of armies, rather than civilian upstarts. One of the foremost proponents of terror was the nomadic Mongol horde, active across both Asia and Europe from 1206 – 1370 A.D. The Mongols “relied on the terror they inspired in civilian populations and armies to prevent uprisings in their wake” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007b, p. 86). In his Discourses, Macchiavelli characterized the Mongol invasions as notably horrific, a “kind of war most frightful and cruel” (1950, pp. 302-304); he theorized that they engaged in this cruelty because they were driven out of their homeland by famine or calamity, and were now attempting to usurp new lands and utterly destroy the inhabitants and their culture, so as then to possess these lands and their resources for themselves. Macchiavelli cleverly pinpointed a theme recurring in various contexts throughout the history of terrorism: that it often arises out of a sense of desperation and need. While scarcity was hardly the only reason behind the Mongol
invasions, it is a problem inherent in the nomadic lifestyle. The need to search for new resources when old ones were exhausted is a quintessential part of a transient existence, and this certainly applied to the Mongols, as did cultural values extolling strength, conquest, and the avenging of perceived wrongs.

The Mongols acquired resources through trade as well as conquest, but their reputation as traders, is overshadowed by their vicious battle tactics meant to fully humiliate the enemy and set an example for others. Among the Mongols’ reported deeds were massacring entire cities, using captured civilians as human shields (while sacking their human shields’ native cities or towns), leaving piles of skulls, torturing enemy rulers to death, mass rape, and cannibalism (Hays, 2012). The Mongols were known and feared across Europe and Asia for their brutality. Cities were known to surrender tribute or let the Mongols loot at will rather than face the wrath of the horde (Hays, 2012). Their tactics alone were not unique, but the fact that their empire was based on intimidation, subjugation and control via psychological warfare at least as much as it was on physical violence is notable as an instance of widespread, effective terrorism.

Famed English social and legal philosopher Hobbes envisioned a *rule by terror*, wherein fear of authority granted the dominant authority power and strength (Hobbes, [1651] 1996). Hobbes was not thinking of the itinerant Mongol horde, but of nations ruled by cruel despots. He wrote this shortly after the Thirty Years’ War, a horrific conflict involving nearly every powerful European nation of that time. The Thirty Years’ War was atypical for its time, since it was a war “in which terror was used systematically” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007b, p. 85). Part of what made the war so vicious was the fact that it was a war of religion as well as politics, pitting Catholic and
Protestant states and groups against each other (Miller, 2013, pp. 21-23). Terror was used as a weapon of war by the various European militaries, private mercenaries, and civilian guerillas. The French marquis de Sourdis, for example, killed a number of random locals from a town his forces captured, and then strung up their corpses in a nearby forest in the hopes that anyone passing through would spread the word of his victory (Chaliand & Blin, 2007b, p. 91). This instance, not unlike the atrocities perpetrated by ISIS/ISIL on civilian communities in Iraq and Syria, exemplifies the terrorist ethos of casually exploiting civilians, using violence and death as symbolic messages, and – interestingly – putting a conscious priority on spreading the news of the attack. Part of how the nomadic Mongols managed to exploit powerful European and Asian cities was through their reputation; galling tales of torture, death, and destruction were reason enough for some rulers to sacrifice their treasures and their pride. Perhaps the marquis de Sourdis expected similar results. “Terrorism [as] theater” (Jenkins, 1974; Cowen, 2006) was beginning to take shape.

The Thirty Years’ War was ended with the peace of Westphalia in 1648. The diplomats who gathered at Westphalia found the abject violence of the war and its cost to human life abominable. The resulting accords instated mechanisms to ensure no one nation could dominate all others. They established principles of tolerance and international non-interference, stipulating that no state could rightfully meddle in the affairs of another (Chaliand & Blin, 2007b, p. 91). The peace of Westphalia was quite effective, for a time, putting an end to wars of religion and the terrorism associated with them.

However, in 1789, “terror assumed an altogether different aspect. No longer a
minor instrument of the military apparatus, it had become a basic tool of the apparatus of the modern state” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007b, pp. 91-92). Over a century after Hobbes theorized about the ‘rule of terror’, the actual word *terrorism* was coined by Burke to describe the events of the French Revolution, where roughly 40,000 executions by guillotine were conducted “in order to instill fear in the minds of the ‘enemies’ of the revolution… [or] to terrify an aristocrat or a supporter of the French monarchy into submission” (Gupta, 2008, p. 7). Violence flourished during and after the French Revolution, as “the monarchy ceased to maintain its authority and competing factions vied to fill the vacuum of power” (Miller, 2013, p. 35). As traditional French institutions and loci of power crumbled, Miller (2013, p. 35) explains, an unstable series of new institutions arose, with “new frameworks of political legitimacy being invented almost daily”. Each new institution strove to secure its legitimacy by publicly executing its ‘enemies’ – a distinct and ruthless show of symbolic violence, sending the message that they would not tolerate any threat to their newfound power.⁷

As the Revolution progressed, the dominant Robespierre government took up increasingly brutal and extremist measures, including campaigns to eliminate not only counterrevolutionaries, but those who were “indifferent… [or] passive towards the Republic” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007c, pp. 108-109). Robespierre himself was an ideological purist, determined to “cleanse society of the filth that pollute it so as to begin afresh on new foundations” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007c, p. 110). Of course, he did not work alone. Executions were ordered and enabled by committees and laws. Acts like the Law

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⁷ The gruesome executions and bloodshed did not actually function as an effective coercive measure or a deterrent; during the revolution, these groups winked in and out of existence, often replaced by others of their ilk (Miller, 2013, pp. 35-6).
of 22 Prairial “allowed anyone to be accused of being an enemy of the revolution… [and] abolished all the legal guarantees that had survive to that point” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007c, p. 109). Furthermore, the Committee of Public Safety dismantled the previous separation of executive, legislative, and judiciary branches, and promptly took command of all three. Rulers used xenophobia, character assassination, and wars to legitimize their actions and justify the savagery against their own people (Chaliand & Blin, 2007c, pp. 109-111). The French Revolution illustrates a government which simultaneously believed it was ‘fighting the enemies of the people’, and yet was itself the primary enemy of the people, committing terrorism against its own citizens by robbing them of their rights and trying to control them through fear and murder. The rhetoric employed has some disturbing parallels to modern-day governments’ responses to the threat of terrorism: the whittling down or removal of civil rights, blurring of the lines between branches of government and their jurisdictions, and introducing vast increases in the power of government bodies to decide (in secrecy and/or with decreasing accountability and supervision) the fate of citizens they deem somehow suspicious.

2.3 Contemporary Terrorism

Rapoport (2002) delineates “four waves of rebel terror” in the modern world (1800s – present day). These waves are anarchist (1880s – 1920s), anti-colonial (1920s – 1960s), new left wave (1960s – 1990s), and religious (1979 – present day) (Rapoport, 2002). Subsequent historians of terrorism have borrowed from and built upon Rapoport’s

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8 This may seem to be a very broad range to label ‘contemporary’, but I chose it because – as I will demonstrate – it is during this timeframe that we may observe the beginnings of the styles of terrorism most relevant in today’s world.
four waves. Many of the books and articles I consulted for this literature review emphasize the same movements as Rapoport, mostly supporting his chronological flow (i.e. proposed timelines/eras) as well (Shughart, 2006; Chaliand & Blin, 2007a-2007e; Miller, 2013).

Shughart (2006, p. 7) condenses and slightly changes Rapoport’s ideas, describing “three stylized waves [of terrorism]… terrorism in the service of national liberation and ethnic separatism, left-wing terrorism, and Islamist terrorism”. Shughart’s take on Rapoport’s work is reductionist, yet highly compatible nonetheless. National liberation and ethnic separatism can be correlated to anti-colonial terrorism; left-wing terrorism can be linked to both anarchist and new left wave terrorism; and Islamist terrorism is part of the religious wave. I discuss contemporary terrorism using the four terms and labels I found most inclusive and useful as distinctions characterizing variations of terrorism. These are a) anarchist, b) national liberation and ethnic separatist, and c) religious, with the addition of d) state terrorism, as identified in Chaliand and Blin (2010a, p. 229).

A ‘wave’ may be thought of as a period of time dominated by a particular type, or variation, of terrorism (Rapoport, 2002). All four variations have old roots, but have persisted into modern times. We may observe the Palestinian people’s timeworn conflict with Israel, the Freemen-on-the-Land movement in Canada and the United States, and the infamous international terrorist organization al-Qaida, or the more recent ISIS/ISIL. Furthermore, modern-day states like Iran and North Korea have been declared terrorist regimes by the United States, citing human rights abuses against their own citizens as well as international aggression. Each wave/variation may share common characteristics with others; they are not discrete, but they do provide a useful idea of the developmental
‘path’ of contemporary terrorism.

Before discussing the first three waves, I want to address state terrorism. State terrorism emerges repeatedly as part of other waves and variations of terrorism. It is not a wave of contemporary terrorism; its heyday, if it had one, would likely have been during the time of the French Revolution and the Pogroms. I have recognized state terrorism in this discussion because it recurs again and again as an important factor shaping terrorism phenomena today. As I will demonstrate, anarchist terrorism was largely inspired and fueled by the cruel and unstable Russian state, and national/ethnic liberation terrorism is fundamentally a conflict between a population that feels subjugated and the ruling majority. Religious terrorism and state terrorism have a complex relationship: sometimes state terrorism occurs in response to religious terrorism, and in other cases, a religious dictatorship may be branded a ‘terrorist state’. Acts of terror have been committed by states during war, as well as against their own people, historically and into the present day. Some of the most potent modern examples come out of Latin America: death squads in Brazil, suppression of Indians in Guatemala, abuses by the Argentine military, the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, and the notably brutal counterterrorism and counterinsurgency measures employed by Peru by Fujimori’s government. Africa has also seen its share of state terrorism in the last forty years: the dictatorships of Taylor in Liberia, Nguema in Guinea, and Idi Amin in Uganda, civil war in Sierra Leone, and the Rwandan genocide (during which rape was routinely used as suppression, punishment, or to break the will of women and their families). In the Middle East, massacres have occurred against the Kurds by the Turkish state, and against the Sunni population by Syria. Saddam Hussein’s regime was known for “the systematic deployment of terror at
every level” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007e, p. 230), especially against Kurds and Shiites. In Asia, Cambodian dictator Pol Pot committed genocidal massacres, and in one year, the Suharto regime in Indonesia murdered between 300,000 and 500,000 known or suspected Communists (Chaliand & Blin, 2007e, pp. 229-230). These are just a few examples of a worldwide phenomenon.

2.3.1 Anarchist/Left-Wing Terrorism

Rapoport (2002) lists anarchist/left-wing terrorism as the first wave of contemporary terrorism. A type of anti-government terrorism, left-wing terrorism is specifically related to left-wing extremist political ideology. Left-wing terrorist organizations typically endorse violent action against capitalist institutions, the bourgeoisie, and what they see as an exploitative, classist status quo. The peak of left-wing terrorism occurred in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with anarchist terrorism and Russian terrorism. Indeed,

It was ‘anarchism’ and ‘anarchists’ – as well as nihilists, dynamiters, Blanquists, assassins, revolutionists, fanatics – rather than ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ which were used in most of the nineteenth century to describe what we would today term terrorist acts (Thorup, 2010, p. 103).

Anarchist terrorism has been summarized as “bomb attacks as a means of propaganda” (Hubac-Occhipinti, 2007, p. 113). Rapoport (2002) delves deeper, explaining that

The Anarchist doctrine has four major points: 1) Modern society contains huge reservoirs of latent ambivalence and hostility. 2) Society muffles and diffuses them by devising moral conventions to generate guilt and provide channels for settling some grievances and securing personal amenities. 3) However, conventions can be explained historically, and therefore acts we deem to be immoral, our children will hail as noble efforts to liberate humanity. 4) Terror is the quickest and most effective means to destroy conventions. The perpetrator frees himself from the paralyzing grip of convention to become a different sort of person, and society's defenders will respond in ways that undermine the rules they
During the mid-1800s, the United States and Europe were experiencing hitherto unknown levels of technological progress and socioeconomic transformation due to the continuing Industrial Revolution, increased life expectancy, and an unprecedented amount of immigration. These factors and others combined to facilitate the development of two main socioeconomic classes: proletariat and bourgeoisie, worker and capitalist (Hubac-Occhipinti, 2007, p. 115). As more people migrated from rural areas to live and work in the city, the average person’s job changed from that of a farmer to a factory employee. Conditions in early Industrial Revolution-era factories were harsh and dangerous, with long workdays, little freedom for workers to refuse orders and few workers’ rights. Cities quickly became overcrowded, with the working class vying for even the worst of paying jobs so as to avoid life on the street or in one of the era’s dismal poorhouses (the injustice and cruelty of which became famously immortalized in literary works such as Dickens’ *Oliver Twist*). However, life was significantly less grim for those who owned the means of production. The capitalist upper classes had the privilege of political and social influence inaccessible to the working classes, though their wealth was built on the labour of those toiling in their mills, mines, and factories. While many social philosophers, such as Adam Smith, argued in favour of the capitalist system, certain other thinkers took a less optimistic view, decrying its inherent inequalities, as well as the many abuses and vulnerabilities suffered by the working classes. Socialism, communism, and other movements and ideologies with an emphasis on workers’ rights and greater socioeconomic equality arose in response to Industrial-era working conditions. Marx and Engels, the fathers of classic and contemporary sociological perspectives such as Marxism, conflict theory, and many others, based their analyses on the Industrial
European economy and social conditions. Anarchism is of the same family as communism, socialism, and other pro-worker/anti-establishment politics, but is typically the most extreme version; both communism and socialism are notably more pro-establishment in the sense that these ideologies allow for the existence of a government or ruling body (though the right government is one supposedly by the people, for the people, limiting if not precluding private ownership of social goods and restricting the ability for individuals to capitalize on the means of production). Anarchism, on the other hand, was against not only the perceived inequality and oppression of the capitalist economic system, but the idea of big government (i.e. beyond community-centered rule) itself.

While some anarchists subscribed to more moderate views, limiting their activities to nonviolent meetings, rallies, and publications, anarchists such as Pytor Kropotkin advocated “propaganda by deed… [to awaken] popular consciousness” (Hubac-Occhipinti, 2007, p. 116). Across Italy, Spain, America, and France, anarchists paired impassioned public statements condemning capitalism and inequality with violent attacks on people and places they saw as symbolic of the reviled social order. Prominent anarchist terrorists include Emile Henry, who turned to terrorism in an effort to avenge miners who had gone on strike, but had been ignored by the mining company. Henry placed a bomb in the company’s offices; however, the bomb was discovered and taken to a police station, where it exploded and killed five people. Henry rationalized his actions in typical extremist fashion, saying, “the building was inhabited only by bourgeoisie; hence there would be no innocent victims… the bourgeoisie as a whole should expiate its crimes” (Hubac-Occhipinti, 2007, p. 129). He later bombed a café in Paris, killing one
person and injuring others, after which he stated, “the bourgeoisie did not distinguish among the anarchists… [since you, the bourgeoisie] strike indiscriminately, we, too, strike indiscriminately” (Hubac-Occhipinti, 2007, p. 129). Anarchist terrorism faded when leading figures in the anarchist movement called for an end to propaganda by deed (Hubac-Occhipinti, 2007, p. 130). Nonetheless, certain aspects of the anarchist extremists’ ideologies and political rhetoric are still alive in some more extreme left- and right-wing groups.

Just as the suffering and oppression of the working classes endemic to Industrial Revolution-era Europe incited movements of radical anarchism, state terrorism (which also victimized the lower/working classes of society) played a part in fostering discontent and desperation as well. Russia, for example, has a long history of state terrorism via secret police and totalitarian rulers, from the Tsarist monarchy to the Communist era. It is important to note that Russian anarchist and left-wing terrorism, which was a seminal force driving the anarchist movement in Europe and abroad, was developed largely as a reaction to the state’s repression and abuse of the lower classes. Particularly notable was the Tsarist regime’s state terrorism against the Jews. For centuries, campaigns of death, torture, and destruction known as Pogroms were regularly launched against Jewish communities in order to limit their numbers and wealth, and to ensure subservience to the Tsar (Ternon, 2007). Goldstein (2013, p. 587), for example, refers to the galvanizing 1903 “terror attacks perpetrated against the Jews of Kishinev [or] the Kishinev Pogrom”.

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9 During the Soviet period, leaders like Joseph Stalin wielded totalitarian levels of control over his people and party, killing millions in his attempts to create an ideologically pure Communist state. Like Robespierre, Stalin ruled through propaganda and fear, manipulating the media and using his secret police to execute or exile anyone he saw as a threat – including fellow party members, such as his former comrade Leon Trotsky (Harris, 2013, pp. 97-119).
Social systems of serfdom and classist tyranny oppressed the numerous poor of all religious backgrounds.

In response, socialist revolutionaries began printing documents calling for the assassination of the ruling Romanov family, and the murder of landowners (Miller, 2013, p. 66). This intensified in the mid-1800s – early 1900s, individuals and minor revolutionary groups had been bombing, assassinating, and otherwise assaulting the Tsarist government and its representatives with some regularity from the 1840s onwards, culminating with the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 (Miller, 2013, pp. 66-75). The propagandists were a significant, though not always successful, force in the Russian socialist revolution, used to recruit, set standards, and communicate (Rapoport, 2002; Ternon, 2007, pp. 140-141). Through propaganda we learn of Russian radicals’ utter dedication to the cause, as shown in circulated materials idealizing the revolutionary as ‘a doomed man’…his identity and consciousness are dominated by one single notion – the total passion for the revolution. To accomplish this goal, he must liberate himself first from all connections to the civil order and the state, which he seeks to destroy (Miller, 2013, p. 68).

Here, another dimension of the nature of radicalism and terrorism is made explicit. Before taking extreme, violent actions against a society, the perpetrators begin to see themselves as no longer connected to that society, and that society as representative of them. Additionally, some appear to manifest a detachment from the self; one’s life is consumed by the cause, and any personal goals become sublimated into the revolution, the purity of the movement. As former Weatherman Brian Flanagan says, “when you feel you have right on your side, you can do some pretty horrible things” (PBS, 2015).

Rapoport (2002) cites two reasons for the anarchist wave beginning in the late
19th century: doctrine and technology. First, he confirms the power of the propagandists, saying,

Russian writers, particularly Nechaev, Bakunin, and Kropotkin, created a doctrine or strategy for terror, an inheritance for successors to use, improve, and transmit. Participants, even those with different ultimate objectives, were now able to learn from each other (Rapoport, 2002).

Furthermore, Rapoport (2002) comments on terrorist groups as situated in a broader social context. He states that,

... if one compares Nechaev's Revolutionary Catechism with the Training Manual Bin Laden wrote for Al-Qaeda, the paramount desire to learn from the experiences of both friends and enemies is clear (Rapoport, 2002).

Technology, as mentioned at the beginning of this section on left-wing terrorism, was in a state of flux during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. New technologies were changing not just the state of labour and the possibilities for invention, but the very nature of human interaction. Railroads, the telegraph, and newspapers allowed people to travel, share information, and learn in ways previously unthinkable. People were able to immerse themselves in a vast world of facts, ideas, and perspectives never before accessible to the common citizen. As Rapoport (2002) surmises,

The transformation in communication and transportation patterns is the second reason that explains the timing and spread of the first wave. The telegraph, daily mass newspapers, and railroads flourished in this period; and subsequently throughout the 20th century, technology continued to shrink time and space.

Naturally, these new technological conditions provided a fertile breeding ground for the spread of ideologies from around the world. It was now easier than ever for groups like the anarchists to recruit members and disseminate materials. Rapoport's (2002) analysis suggests that since its dawning, mass media has been connected with radicalism.
The legacy of the late 19th century anarchists laid the groundwork for a slew of leftist revolutionary groups to take up terrorist methods. In the United States, the Weathermen (or the Weather Underground Organization) committed several bombings, attempted bombings, and other terrorist acts from 1969 to 1987 (Kushner, 1998, pp. 145-151). Taking their name from a Bob Dylan song, the Weathermen started as a student organization with anti-war, anti-capitalist, and anti-government values (The Port Huron Statement, 2006). Having decided peaceful protests were ineffective, the group started riots and declared war on the American government. These tactics gained them the media attention they desired (PBS, 2015). The Symbionese Liberation Army, “a group of Berkeley radicals led by… an escaped convict”, also in the United States, “adopted its rhetoric from Communists and South American revolutionaries” (Sullentrop, 2002). They embraced the concept of “‘urban propaganda’”, which called for selective violence “aimed at capturing media attention” (Sullentrop, 2002). The SLA claimed responsibility for murder, but are perhaps best known for the kidnapping of Patty Hearst, whose grandfather and father were Hearst Corp. press barons. The high-profile drama of Hearst’s kidnapping put the SLA in the media spotlight (Sullentrop, 2002). These two left-wing radical groups help characterize terrorism as theater in the 20th century.

In Germany, another leftist, anti-capitalist student group known as the Red Army Fraction (RAF), also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, executed hijackings and shootings, killing more than 30 people from the late 1960s and to the mid-1980s (‘Who were the Baader-Meinhof Gang?’, 2007). The ideological plan behind the killings is unclear, but the BBC (2007) tells us that

Some analysts believe the RAF had hoped to push the state to a breaking point,
goading it into introducing a series of illiberal measures that would whip up anger within the left and spark some form of civil war.

A radical left-wing movement known as the Red Brigades were active in Italy from 1970 to 1984. “At its peak the organization had thousands of active members” diffused throughout Italy (Stanford University, 2012). They gained notoriety for attacking property rather than people, such as arson and raids on right-wing organizations’ offices; however, they were responsible for the kidnapping and murder of Christian Democrat leader Aldo Moro (Stanford University, 2012).

The Weathermen, SLA, Baader-Meinhof Gang, and the Red Brigades are all part of what Rapoport (2002) defines as the “new left wave”. The Vietnam war, he says, “produced the psychological requisites” (Rapoport, 2002) for this new wave of groups emerging from the West, but hostile to the West’s values and agenda. They saw themselves as “vanguards for the masses of the Third World… [standing up] against the American Goliath” (Rapoport, 2002). The new left wave provides an interesting parallel to modern-day domestic terrorism – like many of the ‘average Canadian boys’ who become radicalized, these groups were made up of people who adopted terrorist ideologies because they began to identify with a culture other than the one they were raised in, and subsequently became obsessed with righting what they perceive as injustices or oppression against that culture.

2.3.2 National Liberation and Ethnic Separatist/Anti-Colonialist Terrorism

The next wave, national liberation and ethnic separatist, or anti-colonialist terrorism, is set up in opposition to an occupying force. The ancient sicari were of this type. A more modern historical example were the Carbonari, an Italian secret society
(circa 1809) dedicated to overthrowing Napoleonic occupation of Italy. Groups like this espouse “alternative conceptions of political legitimacy” (Miller, 2013, p. 43). For instance, the Carbonari initiation ceremony was a political, anti-despotic, and satirical adaptation of traditional Catholic ritual, including “symbols of Catholicism that were to be used violently against the French occupiers” (Miller, 2013, p. 43). Italy is a strongly Catholic country, but the Pope at the time had allied himself with Napoleon, forcing the Carbonari to subvert Catholic tradition in their goal to expel the French and gain independent rule. The fact that the secret society lifted their initiation ritual from a Catholic template indicates the religion’s cultural saturation; the fact that they “deliberately mocked” (Miller, 2013, p. 43) the ritual shows that they no longer accepted the authority of the mainstream church, and additionally, that national independence took primacy over religious loyalty. Like the sicari, the Carbonari were a clandestine group with no formal military, “favoring the dagger and poison in the combat against Bonaparte and his Italian ally, the Pope” (Miller, 2013, p. 44). National liberation/ethnic separatist groups are most often at a power differential with their opponents, and thus adopt subversive methods.

Prior to the rise of Islamic terrorism, national/ethnic terrorism was the foremost type of modern terror. Says Shughart (2006, p. 14),

… much of the terrorism of the post-Second World War period originated in the grievances of ethnic and religious groups marginalized politically in artificial nation-states created by the colonial powers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Arbitrary borders and inflexible rulers plagued the people of Central Asia, the Balkans, Palestine, and the Middle East generally. Shughart (2006, p. 14) claims that events in
these regions, including left-wing terrorist groups declaration of solidarity with the oppressed peoples, “can be said to be the root causes of all three waves of modern terrorism”. While all three waves are certainly connected to some degree, it is important to recognize the propensity for more-or-less independent formation of terrorist groups. Shughart (2006, p. 14) admits that the terrorism which arose in Europe and the Middle East does not explain today’s Latin American terrorists, the Tamil Tigers, or ‘cult’ terrorist groups like Japan’s Aum Shinriyko.¹⁰ Notable “separatist or autonomist ethnic movements in the West” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007e, p. 227) include the Irish Republican Army, the military wing of the Spanish Basque Homeland and Freedom group, and Canada’s FLQ.

The first domestic terrorist organization in Canada, the Front de liberation du Quebec (FLQ), was a French Canadian separatist group active in the 1960s. FLQ tactics included using stolen dynamite to bomb mailboxes in Anglophone areas, the Montreal Stock Exchange, RCMP offices, and Montreal City Hall, among other targets they felt were representative of the Anglophone domination of French Canada (Whitaker, 2010). They had a manifesto and a publication, through which they communicated threats intended to foster fear and intimidation, as well as to recruit sympathetic individuals. In addition to bombings, and theft, the FLQ orchestrated two successful kidnappings. The FLQ became bolder with time, ‘coming out’ on national radio, escalating violence, and threatening to kill members of Parliament (Whitaker, 2010). In response to increased

¹⁰ Cases like Aum Shinriyko, a Buddhism-based new religious movement which carried out deadly sarin attacks in 1994 and 1995, are closer to religious terrorism than any of the other waves/varieties. Similar to the infamous American group the Manson Family, who killed innocent people to precipitate a race war they believed to be imminent, a doomsday philosophy and a charismatic leader are at the heart of this instance of ‘cult’ terrorism.
FLQ aggression, and requests from Quebec politicians, Prime Minister Trudeau enacted the War Measures Act. This act suspended habeus corpus and gave police liberal powers of arrest. Most politicians supported Trudeau, but others criticized the implementation of the War Measures Act as an excessive reaction. Still others expressed support for the FLQ (Whitaker, 2010). The FLQ Crisis was a controversial period in Canadian history, and perhaps bespeaks something about ethnic separatist terrorism. In this case, the FLQ appealed to the discontent of a significant ethnic/cultural minority, and were seemingly tolerated before they began to take hostages and threaten lives. Furthermore, Trudeau was criticized for compromising the rights and freedoms of Canadians, even in an effort to protect Canadians, perhaps because he was attempting to protect them from other Canadians. However, domestic terrorism in general is a thorny issue, and the aforementioned controversies could be more related to this difficulty than to ethnic separatism in particular.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one of the most familiar national/ethnic liberation efforts, as well as one of the most longstanding. The Palestinian National Liberation movement, or PLO, has been struggling to achieve an independent Palestinian state since its inception in 1964 (Chaliand & Blin, 2007e, p. 225). This case is a good example of the power differential common to this variation of terrorism. “The PLO… sought… to undermine Israeli society through guerrilla warfare,” explain Chaliand and Blin (2007e, p. 226.). However, the “impossibility” of waging successful guerrilla warfare against the Israelis “caused the Palestinian organizations to fall back on terrorist activities” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007e, p. 226). The 1968 diversion of an El Al flight between Athens and Cairo began the PLO’s campaign of “‘publicity terrorism’”
(Chaliand & Blin, 2007e, p. 226) designed to bring their dispossession to the attention of the West. They succeeded in getting the West’s attention; however, what sympathy they may have garnered did not help them gain a homeland. The PLO were branded a terrorist group by Israel shortly thereafter. Since then, Israel has continued to move further into the West Bank, and Palestinian groups and individuals have resorted to tactics such as hostage takings, suicide bombings, and homemade rockets. While Israel recognizes the PLO as the voice of the Palestinian people, they do not acknowledge Palestinian claims to sovereignty.

Another, similar conflict is that between Russia and Chechnya. This situation shares many features with the Israel-Palestine conflict: for instance, the fight is between a small, poor, strongly religious, highly nationalistic population and a stronger, better-established, ‘legitimate’ state. Like Israel, Russia refuses to acknowledge the Chechen claim to land and independence, instead maintaining that they are part of Russia and subject to Russian rule. After the USSR split, a Chechen National Congress was formed, and campaigned for recognition as a nation. Russian President Boris Yeltsin dismissed the Chechen request, arguing that, unlike the Baltic and Central Asian states, Chechnya had never been an independent entity. Like the Palestinians, Chechen militants have attacked targets such as schools, shopping centers, and theaters, mostly using bombs (Bhattacharji, 2010).

2.3.3 Religious (Islamist) Terrorism

The contemporary roots of the newest and currently strongest wave, Religious (Islamist) terrorism, may be traced back to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, wherein
religious fundamentalists overthrew the American-backed Shah.\textsuperscript{11} The Islamic fundamentalist ethos subsequently caught on throughout Central Asia and the Middle East, likely nurtured by the sociopolitical instability, poverty, and increasing Western hegemony which followed in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1989 (Shughart, 2006, p. 8). Nationalist/ethnic and revolutionary groups in the Middle East looked to religion for a framework to inform and justify their messages, beliefs, and methods. Following the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, the American-trained and equipped mujahedeen who had forced them out dissolved into a variety of different groups, some staying local, and others branching out to places like Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kashmir – places known today as terrorist hotspots (Migaux, 2007, p. 297). Wherever they went, these groups strived to establish Islamic law, expel non-Muslims or ‘heretical’ Muslims from the region, and fight what they saw as Western encroachment. Tactics like bombing, suicide bombing, hostage taking, hijacking, and others were considered acceptable, even at the cost of civilian lives. Their reputations preceded them, helping the ex-mujahedeen convert and recruit “a second generation of marginalized youths in search of an identity” (Migaux, 2007, pp. 296-297).

The most notorious jihadi organization to rise from the Afghani war was al-Qa'ida, led by Osama bin Laden, the son of a Yemeni billionaire with ties to the House of Saud. Bin Laden distinguished himself as a charismatic figure during his long history working

\textsuperscript{11} I put (Islamist) in brackets rather than writing Religious/Islamist, as I did in the previous subsection headings, because not all religious terrorism prominent in the 20\textsuperscript{th} and 21\textsuperscript{st} centuries has been Islamist; one cannot generalize about religious terrorism in the same way one may generalize about national liberation, ethnic separatist, and anti-colonialist terrorism (which all seem to describe the same thing, give or take certain minutiae). Many terrorist groups have been founded in the name of one religion or another throughout history. However, it is not unfair to characterize Islamist terrorism as the face of modern religious terrorism, especially in the past fifteen years.
for religious and nationalist anti-Western and anti-secularist causes (Lentini, 2013, p. 84). He was responsible for the shift in the Islamic fundamentalist movement from seeking just “to establish sharia in their own countries… to a global struggle” (Lentini, 2013, p. 91). The global struggle, which led to deadly attacks on Western soil, was contextualized by bin Laden and al-Qaida as a mission of revenge, “necessary and as a form of recompense for killing Muslim civilians, and a means to attempt to dissuade them [the West] from killing more of his co-religionists” (Lentini, 2013, p. 93). In reality, Bin Laden’s efforts at global struggle have resulted in more death and destruction in Muslim lands than anything else in recent history, via the ongoing ‘War on Terror’. He did, however, do a great deal to publicize the Islamic fundamentalist cause.

In addition to established tactics (e.g. sending audio/video/written statements to news media), al-Qaida’s methods of recruitment included such novel tactics as using the internet. Al-Qaida affiliated websites, accessible around the world, sent messages about the terrorist group’s goals and desires: for example, to kill ‘heretical’ Muslim leaders (Lappin, 2011, p. 5). Currently, ISIS/ISIL are using the same strategies, with a distinct emphasis on recruitment. Videos posted online by foreign converts, such as Canadian John Maguire, may serve two or more functions: they call on Western Muslims to give up their lives of ill-gotten safety and security to join radicals fighting to avenge oppressed fellow Muslims, and also, they include threats against an “unsuspecting” Western population (Bell, 2014). Blogs from the wives of ISIS/ISIL fighters extol the virtues of marrying jihadis and raising the next generation of Islamic warriors (Amarasingam, 2014). This is in addition to videos posted with no other goal than to spread horror, fear, and intimidation – for instance, videos of beheadings or of towns being razed.
History illustrates how spreading word of one’s exploits, even purely symbolic ones, is essential to successfully cultivating a sense of legitimate and impending threat. However, unlike the Mongols, the anarchists, or even the FLQ, modern-day terrorists have a new advantage in the internet. Through the internet, these groups can reach an unprecedented audience, promote their views, give orders, and send powerful explicit and implicit messages designed to cause fear. Websites like liveleak.com, youtube.com, and other video hosting sites provide terrorists with a direct voice; they no longer have to rely even on news networks to broadcast their messages of psychological warfare and/or recruitment. It was in 1974 that Jenkins (p. 4) famously concluded that “terrorism is theater”. He further explains this characterization by saying,

Terrorist attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the electronic media and the international press. Holding hostages increases the drama. If certain demands are not satisfied, the hostages may be killed. The hostages themselves often mean nothing to the terrorists. Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not at the actual victims. Terrorism is theater [emphasis mine] (Jenkins, 1974, p. 4).

As more and more ‘stages’ become available to the terrorist, the theatrical element emerges as increasingly more significant to examine. This fact bolsters the relevance of the research conducted here. This thesis is not on terrorism itself, but rather, on the media’s coverage of terrorism – probing the Canadian news media’s role in the ‘theater’ that is modern terrorism.

2.4 Domestic Terrorism

Domestic terrorism is very similar to terrorism as described by Schmid and Jongman (2005), and appears frequently in the history of contemporary terrorist organizations and attacks. The goal is to cause fear and panic amongst the target
audience; to this end, domestic terrorists use violence to draw attention to a political or ideological cause. They firmly believe that society has gone wrong, whereas they are in the right, and the only (or most effective) way to correct things is through violence. Nearly every terrorist/extremist group is willing to kill or injure its own people, for various reasons, so this in and of itself ought not to be so shocking. Nonetheless, domestic terrorism carries a special horror as it confronts us with the enemy within (Wilner, 2008). “For all intents and purposes,” Wilner (2008, p. v) says of the Toronto 18, “the group was autonomous, self-generated, and independently trained. Worse, its members were Canadian, through and through [emphasis mine]”. The fact that these young men, who were raised in ostensibly good Canadian communities, were willing to engage in jihadist-inspired violence against their own government and civilians, is mentioned as particularly disturbing.

Another complexity of domestic terrorism is that while religious narratives (the lens through which we commonly understand international or foreign terrorism) may feature dominantly in some domestic terror attacks or ideologies, they are found in addition to secular extremist heuristics centered on issues like protecting the environment, protesting economic corruption, or protesting government repression of personal freedom. These concerns may be more relatable to a secular Canadian audience, and thus more controversial to lump in with other sorts of terrorism. For example, in regards to eco-terrorism, Neville and Smythe (2009, p. i) ask, “does [the Canadian military’s] mandate therefore extend to eco-terrorism, or are such acts better addressed as cases of civil disobedience, under the purview of the police and judiciary?” Of course, there is a meaningful difference for most people between plotting to detonate a
homemade bomb in a crowd of unsuspecting civilians, and blowing up a piece of industrial equipment, but both are terrorist tactics. How types of terrorism presented in the media are identified and differentiated, and how any differences (including value judgements and favoured responses) are constructed, are among the questions and considerations explored in my research.

Not only is domestic terrorism arguably considered more appalling and more complicated than international terrorism, it is rapidly becoming more feared. In the CSIS 2013 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada (p. 4), special reference is made to the threat posed by “homegrown violent extremists”. In a poll from the same year, Canadians prioritized domestic terrorism and cyberattacks as the most threatening concerns, significant to note when most participants also expressed the belief that Canada is at a medium or high risk for terrorist attacks (‘This week: New poll reveals that Canadians are most worried about cyberattacks and home grown terrorism’, 2013). “We’re not worried about al-Qaeda,” says the survey’s architect, “we’re worried about Canadians. We’re worried about people in our communities” (‘This week: New poll reveals that Canadians are most worried about cyberattacks and home grown terrorism’, 2013). In this study, news stories written for people in Canadian communities, and, unfortunately, written about people from Canadian communities are scrutinized for how they portray domestic terrorism and its relationship to our society. Could the news media framing be reinforcing and/or encouraging suspicion against fellow Canadians? This is an important issue to address due to its potential impact on Canadian society and culture, the psychosocial wellbeing of Canadian citizens, and other consequential aspects shaping and guiding life in this country.
Moreover, the severity of the recent domestic terror attacks in Quebec and on Parliament Hill can only have increased Canadians’ level of worry about domestic terrorism. The recent attacks, and the looming threat of terrorism in general, were the primary justifications for Bill C-51, which passed in June 2015. Bill C-51 extends the powers of judges and CSIS agents in unprecedented ways, and reduces the burden of proof investigators and police forces are subject to – trends which have been ongoing since the Anti-terrorism act of 2001 (Department of Justice, 2015). This thesis cannot claim to make any conclusive statements about the impact news framing has had on Canadians’ willingness to trade traditional legal procedures, rights, and freedoms for the promise of security. In addition to addressing a void in the sociological research on terrorism in the media (framing studies specifically focusing on Canadian content), revealing the implicit and explicit messages found in Canadian news articles on domestic terrorism may help shed light on an issue which is indisputably at the crux of our nation’s politics. While acknowledging the limitations of this thesis, it is worthwhile to consider the benefit that future, more expansive qualitative document analysis research has to offer social scientists. Such research could prove indispensable for gaining a better understanding of how perspectives and ideals related to terrorism are developed and permeated within culture and subculture(s); in turn, the findings of this research (e.g., the views/interpretations championed and the solutions/responses recommended) could be compared with actual government practices. Do government actions align with mediated suggestions? How about the levels of dissent, support, or controversy Canadians express about particular legal/political decisions versus others? The information above, as well as findings of previous studies discussed in the following chapters, indicates that this would
be a fertile topic for scientific investigation.

2.5 *Domestic Terrorism in the Canadian Context*

Cohen and Corrado (2012, pp. 67-68) claim that “throughout its history… Canada has not been a frequent target of either domestic or international terrorism”. In the period between the start of the Cold War, but prior to 9/11, Cohen and Corrado (2012, p. 68) tell us that acts of terror in Canada

… have been rooted in environmental or animal-rights issues, designed to compel the government, an industry or corporation, or an individual to change their position or behavior on a specific issue, such as clear-cutting forests, performing abortions, or testing pharmaceuticals on animals, rather than to achieve the mass killing of civilians.

The authors appear to differentiate between this and political terrorism based on the idea that terrorists motivated by environmental or animal-rights issues are performing their acts of terror with more of a utilitarian bent (i.e. to stop a specific thing from happening), than the goal of mindlessly killing civilians. Ultimately, this argument betrays some misunderstanding of the motivations of political terrorists, for whom the mass killing of civilians is not an end unto itself, but a ways of achieving notoriety and calling attention to a particular cause. The attacks, kidnappings, and assaults on civilians perpetrated by these terrorists serve to demonstrate that the terrorist group is willing to kill and die for the advancement of their ideology, which often calls for powerful groups or individuals to, as Cohen and Corrado (2012, p. 68) say, “change their position or behavior on a specific issue”, such as foreign policy or the treatment of ethnic minorities within Canada. However, there is a grain of truth to their statement on the nature and rarity of terrorism in Canada.
Counting the FLQ Crisis of 1960s Quebec, there had only been four notable terrorist attacks directly affecting Canada pre-2001.\textsuperscript{12} The second was the October 1982 bombing of a missile manufacturing plant in Toronto, which injured ten people (‘Timeline: Canada’s brushes with terror’, 2014; Antliff, 2004). The bombing was committed by an anarchist collective with radical environmentalist and feminist beliefs; known as the Squamish Five, or Direct Action, the small group was active in Canada during the early 1980s. Its recruits included a suburban anti-porn activist and a member of the socio-politically inclined Vancouver punk rock band the Subhumans (Antliff, 2004, p. 74). While the Toronto bombing was the most high-profile, other acts of ‘propaganda by deed’ attributed to the Squamish Five were the May 1982 bombing of an environmentally controversial British Columbia hydro substation, which caused $5 million in damages, and in November of the same year, the firebombing of three pornography stores accused of selling violent material (Donovan, 1989). The RCMP arrested the Squamish Five in 1983 (Antliff, 2004).

Third was the tragic 1985 bombing of Air India Flight 182 – still considered the worst terrorist attack in Canadian history – where 329 people, mostly Canadians, were killed when a bomb was detonated aboard a passenger plane that departed from Toronto (Public Safety Canada, 2014). This attack was attributed to Sikh nationalists (Cohen & Corrado, 2012), one of whom resided in Vancouver. Canadian security organizations were later blamed for failing to share crucial information that may have prevented the

\textsuperscript{12} For reasons of limited time and space, I have left out of this thesis the history of genocide and terroristic violence perpetrated during the colonization of Canada between and amongst English and French settlers, as well as various Native groups, and racist attacks on Chinese labourers/settlers in the early 1900s. The state oppression of Indigenous Canadian culture via residential schools may also be discussed meaningfully within this context.
deadly attack (Encyclopaedia Britannica Editors, 2015).

The fourth infamous attack came in December 1989, when Marc Lépine, a young Quebec man with a personal and political grudge against feminists, opened fire on students at the Montreal tech school École Polytechnique (Bindel, 2012). According to notes and statements left by Lépine, he believed feminism was ruining both society and his own life. He specifically targeted women, killing fourteen young female students and injuring ten others, as well as injuring four men before turning his gun on himself. Media at the time were reluctant to link Lépine’s act to political or ideological reasoning, characterizing him as a “madman… [for whom] the women just happened to be in the way” (Bindel, 2012). Police would not disclose the contents of his suicide note on the grounds that it might inspire copycat killings; the founder of a feminist-positive, anti-sexist group Men Against Sexism holds that “‘the public felt too uncomfortable with the political explanation’” (Bindel, 2012).

Though Lépine’s misogynistic political motivations were eventually revealed, official averseness to proclaiming his acts as such illustrates how Canadians at the time did not think in terms of terrorism. Lépine’s attack was cast in the same light as those by people with strictly personal, apolitical antipathies: for instance, the P.E.I. bomber, active from 1988 to 1997, who simply wished for “‘revenge against society’” (“No day parole for P.E.I. bomber’, 2002), or the Concordia professor whose professional resentments led him to shoot and kill four of his own colleagues in August 1992 (Concordia University Archives, 2008). Today, it is reasonable to assume that the École Polytechnique shootings would have immediately attracted media attention as a domestic terrorist attack.
After the attacks of September 11th, 2001, and following Canada’s participation in the War on Terror, Canada saw a sharp increase in terror incidents, including plots, attempts, and suspects. One of the first major events of this nature was the 2006 case of the ‘Toronto 18’, which saw eighteen Toronto men accused of plotting to blow up targets like the Toronto Stock Exchange, CSIS headquarters, and a military base, as well as behead the Prime Minister. Each of the men charged was Muslim, and,

They hoped, apparently, that their actions would avenge the deaths and injuries suffered by Muslims abroad at the hands of the United States and its allies and end Canada’s involvement in the war in Afghanistan” (Dawson, 2014, p. 64).

It was the Toronto 18 which truly introduced to Canada the idea that Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, previously an international phenomenon, could be a problem here at home, “with real consequences for Canadians” (Dawson, 2014, p. 64), and furthermore, that these terrorists might be of the homegrown variety. Many Canadians initially remained skeptical about how serious the terrorist threat actually was due to the young age of most of the suspects (ranging from under eighteen to thirty years old), questions surrounding the role of suspected RCMP agent provocateurs, and the fact that charges were eventually stayed against four of the adults and three of the youths (Dawson, 2014). However, as the case progressed and more details were revealed, “it became clear that a catastrophe was narrowly averted, the police had not entrapped the offenders, and the terrorists… had acted with serious and sustained intent” (Dawson, 2014, p. 65).

Though they did not succeed in their plans, Canadian scholar of terrorism Lorne Dawson (2014, p. 65) cites the case of the Toronto 18 as the event that showed that “the threat to Canada from some of its own citizens [is] as real as that faced by Britain, the
United States, and other countries”. The question of why Canada’s own citizens would turn against it was repeatedly addressed in the media buzz following the arrests (Blatchford, 2013). It is a complex question, made more so by the diverse backgrounds of the men involved; of the ten adults convicted, most were middle class, university or college educated, and radicalized within Canada. Only one had a prior criminal record (Dawson, 2014, p. 77). Many were quick to point to religion as a factor, and – while it is an important part of personal and group identity and certainly of consequence to examine – Dawson (2014, p. 85) cautions that the significance of religion “must be [assessed] on a case-by-case basis and not a priori”, as “most of the young men appear to have come from secular, nominal, or at best moderately religious backgrounds”. The Toronto 18 shared “an intense, coherent religious rhetoric and sense of purpose”, but blended traditional religious ideals with secular youth culture, “mixing the catchphrases of Islamic fundamentalism with the lingo of the gangster rap culture of white youth” (Dawson, 2014, p. 85).

While identifiably part of the wave of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, it may be enlightening to compare cases like the Toronto 18 with many of the radical leftist groups, specifically Rapoport’s new left wave, that formed across Europe and North America in the 1970s. Commonalities include the modernization of old ideologies and the melding of these with aspects of modern youth culture and political concerns, largely educated and middle-class origin of members, and the justification of terrorism in supposed defense of oppressed foreign peoples. Such a study might highlight possible trends in domestic terrorism and radicalization phenomena, something which would likely help academics, lawmakers, and security officials better understand present-day domestic terrorism.
In the years following the Toronto 18’s 2006 arrest, Dawson (2014, p. 65) tells us, “a number of other young Canadian Muslim men have been arrested on similar terrorism charges”. The amount of detail varies from case to case, with often just the barest facts available. In 2008, Momin Khawaja became the first person charged and convicted under Canada’s anti-terror law for financing terrorism overseas and creating a remote-control detonator. Khawaja is currently serving life behind bars (‘Timeline: Canada’s brushes with terror’, 2014). The RCMP made somewhat mysterious arrests of three Canadian men in 2010, claiming that in an operation dubbed ‘Project Samosa’ they had uncovered ties to an international terrorist plot. Two of these men were convicted in 2014, while the third was found not guilty. The next year, Tahawwur Rana, a Canadian citizen, was arrested and found guilty of supporting a plot against a Danish newspaper that ran cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed (‘Timeline: Canada’s brushes with terror’, 2014).

The rate of terror busts continued to rise, and 2013 saw the deaths of two allegedly radicalized Canadians in Algeria, the arrest of two men living and working in Canada charged with conspiring to attack a VIA Rail passenger train, and the arrest of two Canadian-born citizens over a plot to bomb the B.C. legislature during Canada Day festivities. Each plot, but most explicitly the latter, was said to be “fueled by al-Qaida-related ideology” (‘Timeline: Canada’s brushes with terror’, 2014). In October of 2014, an automobile attack by Martin Rouleau-Couture killed a Canadian soldier in Quebec. A couple of days after this attack, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shot and killed another soldier outside the Ottawa Parliament building, then stormed the Parliament building itself, dying in the attempt. The attacks appear unrelated, other than that both men are believed to be recent converts to Islam (Bajekal, 2014). A variety of other internal terror threats
have been identified by the RCMP and CSIS since 2006, including over 200 potentially radicalized religious extremists, environmentalists, and political protestors (Dawson, 2014; Tello, 2014).

Two important facts can be deduced from the preceding information. First, incidents of Canadian-connected terror have unquestionably been occurring more and more frequently over a short period of time. Second, these incidents can almost all (if not absolutely all) be characterized as domestic terrorism. Domestic terrorism appears to be the predominant type of terrorist threat to Canada. As the events described in this short overview of Canadian-connected terrorism illustrate, the most dangerous Canadian-connected terror attacks and plots have involved Canadian citizens or residents themselves. This seems especially true of the plots and attacks over the last fifteen years.

Intimately linked with the danger of domestic terrorism is the problem of ‘foreign fighters’, young Canadians who travel overseas to fight with ISIS/ISIL or other radical groups in conflict zones such as Syria and Iraq. As of April 2015, security officials estimate that at least 300 Canadians “are believed involved in jihadi terrorism here and overseas” (McLeod). This situation is disturbing for many of the same reasons as domestic terrorism committed within Canada’s borders – while the idea of personal threat to Canadians within their own homes and communities is lessened, there remain the disquieting implications arising from the idea of people born and raised in Canada, integrated into Canadian society, and with first-hand experience of an (ostensibly) ordinary Canadian life. Furthermore, there is a growing concern about the threat these ‘foreign fighters’ pose should they survive and return to Canada. As intelligence officials explained to the Ottawa Citizen,
Those who survive and return to Canada as trained terrorist fighters present a greater danger. Authorities especially fear the longer-term cumulative effect the foreign-fighter phenomenon could have on domestic safety and security (McLeod, 2015).

CSIS director Michel Coulombe and RCMP deputy commissioner Mike Cabana, quoted in the above article, use the foreign fighter problem to justify expanded Canadian counter-terrorism laws and increased freedom and jurisdiction for security forces. These measures, such as those outlined in Bill C-51, will not be used to “make CSIS a secret police force” (McLeod, 2015), nor to target environmentalists or other activist groups. These assurances are made in response to the criticism Bill C-51 has encountered, from both government and civilian sources. The foreign fighter issue is an aspect of domestic terrorism which has become increasingly significant in public discourse, notable even within the over-arching framework of domestic terrorism’s rising notoriety.

Domestic terrorism has emerged as an active and troubling phenomenon relevant to Canadian society on multiple levels, from the daily newspapers available to the average citizen to the highest levels of government and security organizations. This thesis rests upon the idea, (hopefully well) justified above, that the issue of domestic terrorism, including its ongoing evolution and consequences, is one which deserves careful and continuing academic attention.
Chapter 3: Framing Analysis: a Methodological Review

Frames are literally all around us. We encounter framing whenever we read a book or a newspaper, turn on the television, or go to the supermarket. Furthermore, we engage in framing ourselves whenever we try to teach, preach, or explain things to others. It is impossible to avoid framing when creating or translating ideas, explanations, or narratives from thoughts or ideas into meaningful communication (Entman, 2004).

Framing analysis has proven to be a popular method across disciplines, including political science (Herman & Chomsky, 1988), economics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), sociology (Benford & Snow, 1988; 2000), and, particularly, in communications studies. It has been the most frequently utilized theory in top mass communication journals since the beginning of the 21st century (Entman, 1993; D'Angelo & Kuypers, 2010, p. 1), and has been noted for its efficacy in the analysis of news media (Pan & Kosicki, 1993).

Since Goffman (1974) integrated the theory of framing analysis into sociology with his seminal work *Frame Analysis: An essay on the Organization of Experience*, it has grown in popularity as a way to study multiple aspects of social life and culture. Goffman helped enable this by parsing what had formerly been the language of journalists and communications scholars into an interactionist-sociological way of thinking. Goffman’s (1974, p. 13) classic *Frame Analysis* was (somewhat characteristically) concerned with frames strictly as “the organization of experience – something that an individual actor can take into his mind – and not the organization of society”. However, other sociological thinkers have expanded upon this focus on the organization of experience, using framing studies to make reference to the larger organization of society and the interplay between the macro (society) and the micro

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Naturally, any method which has enjoyed such widespread popularity has also become very diversified, with perhaps little tying it together in practice. Entman (1993, p. 51) declares that,

Despite its omnipresence across the social sciences and humanities, nowhere is there a general statement of framing theory that shows exactly how frames become embedded within and make themselves manifest in a test, or how framing influences thinking.

This presented a challenge when researching framing analysis for the purposes of my study, as I strove to find the right kind of theoretical and methodological support for my research question and research conditions. Fortunately, different scholars’ definitions of what frames consist of and what they do seem often to agree, and I was able to find a satisfactory level of detail on these topics to inform my own work.

3.1 What are Frames?

In the very same article wherein he bemoans the fractured state of the framing paradigm, Entman (1993) compiled some basic, conceptual traits of frames and framing. He explicates,

Whatever its specific use, the concept of framing consistently offers a way to describe the power of a communicating text. Analysis of frames illuminates the precise way in which influence over a human consciousness is exerted by the transfer (or communication) of information from one location – such as a speech, utterance, news report, or novel – to that consciousness… to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (Entman, 1993, pp. 51-52).

Schulenberg and Chenier (2012, p. 7) echo Entman's (1993) definition of frames,
describing framing “as a way of promoting a particular version of reality”. Nelson & Wiley (2001) posit that frames are how people establish and re-establish hierarchies among values.

D’Angelo and Kuypers’ (2010) compilation Doing News Framing Analysis offers a broad look at the different ways framing is defined by a variety of skilled, experienced researchers. It is largely from this book that my understanding of frames and framing analysis was cultivated and clarified. Entman, a widely-published and seemingly quite influential figure in frame analysis, is cited throughout the book (Lawrence, 2010; van Gorp, 2010; Reese, 2010) and contributed his own highly informative chapter. Building on his previous characterizations, he summarizes framing as “the process of culling a few elements of a perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a particular interpretation” (Entman, 2010, p. 336). Reese (2010, pp. 21-22) tells us that

Frames, as a semantic equivalency, refer to structures in various locations (cultural, symbolic, and psychological), raising the often confusing question of where does the frame reside? Based on my own definition of frames as organizing principles, the frame is always an abstraction and finds its manifestation in various locations.

Frames are commonly seen as a way to promote a particular version of reality. How framing is accomplished (i.e., how frames work) is a much more complicated question; understanding this is crucial to understanding the approach and findings in this thesis.

3.2 How do Frames Work?

Fully developed frames “perform four functions: problem definition, casual analysis, moral judgment, and remedy promotion” (Entman, 2010, p. 336). What this
means is that frames act comprehensively (i.e., calling upon multiple aspects of a topic or linking several different judgements) to define what is real, possible responses to situations, what is right to do, and what is best to do. When used successfully, frames “introduce or raise the salience or apparent importance of certain ideas, activating schemas that encourage target audiences to think, feel, and decide in a particular way” (Entman, 2010, p. 336). Frames may be introduced and/or propagated by any group, in support of any agenda, from the government and the military to corporations to activist groups (Benford & Snow, 2000).

Framing devices, specific rhetorical components through which a message may emerge and travel, are essential to how frames operate. Frequently, frames are made manifest by utilizing techniques of placement within the text, repetition, and/or association with culturally familiar symbols (Entman, 1993; Reese, 2010). If the headline of an article promotes a particular understanding, that understanding may be more potent than frames buried in the article text. Consider the message a hypothetical news story titled ‘Crime Increases as Homeless Population Grows’ sends through these few but impactful words. Even if the article text explains that the increased crime rate comes from rising instances of crime against the vulnerable homeless population, the simplistic, glance-over reading of the headline still stands to engender the idea that the homeless are the cause of crime. Placing frames within the summary, introductory paragraphs, or alongside the ‘facts’ of an article (especially if certain frames are more interpretive/opinion based than factual) also constitutes ideal placement. Repetition of a quote, concept, fact, or ideal also serves to convey and reinforce a frame – such as when an article features recurring mentions of a group’s numbers, sending the message that the
group is some combination of powerful, growing, and/or worth paying attention to. When a frame is associated with culturally familiar symbols, the meaning of the established symbol can be used to indicate how the framers desire audiences to view the newer comparison. An example is Greenpeace’s widespread definition of genetically modified crops as “frankenfood” (Nisbet, 2010, p. 50). Conceptually linking genetically modified crops, which remain a subject of debate and uncertainty for many people, with Frankenstein’s monster imagines these crops not as the product of progressive science and a public boon, but as the result of conceited scientific excess and as a potential danger to humanity. Catchy terms and buzzwords are but one way language acts as a powerful framing device. Redefinition is another; Nisbet (2010, p. 50) notes how American religious conservatives have “relabeled the medical procedure known as ‘dilation and extraction’ as ‘partial birth abortion’”, changing the popular terminology in an attempt to emphasize the gorier aspects of the procedure, and thus produce an emotional, anti-abortion response from the public.

Furthermore, as frames are created by “selecting and highlighting some features of reality while omitting others” (Entman, 1993, p. 53), understanding the selection process underpinning media framing is key to understanding how frames work. News media framing … is known to be influenced by multiple factors, including the journalist personal belief system, his working conditions, the editorial position and journalistic practices in his organization, as well as more distant factors such as the economic environment, the political climate, and by broader ideological and cultural conditions prevalent in his society (Provalis Research, 2014). This excerpt helps illustrate the relationship between groups, frames, individuals, and society. Various ‘climates’, or conditions, foster the acceptance and development of
certain frames, while minimizing the importance of others. However, the individual (in this case, a journalist) may act as a frame-creator as well as a frame-transmitter, presumably more successful as one or the other based on variables such as his or her editors and professional norms.

It is important to note that the simple existence of a frame does not guarantee its adoption, nor does the popularity of a frame mean it is accepted universally and unconditionally, even within a particular audience. Converging with Goffman’s (1974) focus on individual interpretations and Hall’s (2006) attention to the process of encoding and decoding frames, Entman (1993, p. 53) cautions that “the presence of frames in the text, as detected by researchers, does not guarantee their influence on audience thinking”. Hall (2006, p. 165) argues against the understanding of framing as a one-way, cause-and-effect phenomenon, saying, “the audience is both the ‘source’ and the ‘receiver’ of the television message”. As reality exists outside language, the audience must decode incoming messages in order to meaningfully incorporate these messages into their lives. Hall proposes three hypothetical positions from which a message may be deconstructed. There is the dominant-hegemonic position, which accepts the message at face value; the negotiated code or position, which accepts some aspects of the message while questioning or adapting others; and finally, the oppositional code, which interprets the message from a standpoint of strong individual values, seeing it as merely the expression of a particular (privileged) viewpoint (Hall, 2006, pp. 171-173).\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{13} An example of the oppositional code in action might be certain groups’ rejection of the ‘terrorist’ label and the re-application of this pejorative term to the group’s accusers or enemies – e.g., the Jewish nationalist groups who did this to the British occupiers during the 1940s.
While it is true that audiences have their own minds and are capable of making any number of diverse judgements about incoming frames, many studies have illustrated the power of framing.\textsuperscript{14} Kahneman and Tversky (1984) used hypothetical scenarios involving probability to demonstrate that framing can determine how well people notice, understand, and remember a problem, in addition to how they evaluate and respond to it. Reese (2010) argues that the American news media’s framing of certain conflicts as a War on Terror helped legitimize the conflicts, as well as perpetuate the legitimacy of the ‘War on Terror’ narrative itself. Similarly, Brewer and Gross (2010, pp. 180-181) reviewed “largely… quantitative research, particularly experiments”, and found that … considerable evidence supports the conclusion that issue-specific partisan frames introduced by elites and broader storytelling frames used by journalists can influence public opinion on policy matters. Furthermore, Entman (2010) showed how media power is framed as liberal (i.e., having a liberal bias), while de Vrees (2010, p. 205) discovered that “the valence of news frames affected participants’ economic expectations and support for the enlargement of the EU”. The influence of news framing is such that some scholars have called for the development of a standard by which to judge how well the media perform the inevitable task of framing. For example, 

The media should provide enough information independent of the executive branch that citizens can construct their own counter-frames of issues and events. It is not enough for the media to present information in ill-digested and scattered morsels. Rather, what citizens need is a counter-frame constructed of culturally resonant words and images, one that attains sufficient magnitude to gain wide understanding as a sensible alternative to the White House’s interpretation (Entman, 2004, p. 17).

\textsuperscript{14} Seemingly, the dominant-hegemonic and/or negotiated positions are significantly more common than the oppositional code.
Theoretical papers outlining the concepts and ideas behind frame analysis, along with practical studies applying the methodology, show the great promise frame analysis has as an approach to critically analyzing the news. Studies like these confirm the prevalence of detectable frames in the news media, offer clues to what that framing might look like and focus on, and hint at the sort of broader effects journalistic framing may have on a population.

### 3.3 Why Frame Analysis?

I was attracted to the methodology of frame analysis because it is a method for the study of documents, which is a central component of this thesis. My research question deals directly with how Canadian newspapers portrayed domestic terrorism in 2013, and framing/frame analysis is the best way to characterize and investigate this topic. On a deeper level, it is a useful tool in a study of messages disseminated on a national scale, messages whose content may serve to provide heuristics through which Canadians understand and make decisions about themselves, their government, their culture and their values (Gavriely-Nuri & Balas, 2010, pp. 417-419). One of the reasons framing analysis is relevant to sociology is because it helps sociologists understand documents comprehensively for their place in the lives and schemas of individual people, and subsequently, society. That said, I wish to emphasize that at this stage I am only concerned with isolating and discussing the frames found in my news article database, and I am not equipped to carry the research any further except in a purely speculative fashion. Nonetheless, I am pleased to know that my findings have the potential to be a part of more extensive research in the future, perhaps as a basis for comparison alongside surveys of Canadian public opinion regarding the issues at the heart of the frames
Another reason I settled on frame analysis methodology was the number of other studies which applied it to similar questions as mine, in a similar context. While I was unable to find any studies of terrorism in the Canadian media to serve as an example for my own research, I came upon several international studies which I have used as reference points. Tischauser (2010), for one, explored anti-Arab and anti-Muslim bias by comparing the New York Times’ coverage of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War and the Israeli-Gaza conflict of the same year. The author examined the journalistic language and contextualization of the two conflicts, discussing the ideological slant of the coverage in relation to U.S. interests. Tischauser’s (2010) theoretical approach was conflict-based; he relied heavily on the Propaganda Model of Herman and Chomsky (1988). I found his study enlightening, but concluded that I wanted to take a (relatively) more ‘neutral’ approach to my analysis. Andén-Papadopoulos (2008) addressed the way the Abu Ghraib torture photographs transformed the American news media coverage of the prison, the military, and the War on Terror, contributing to counter-framing which challenged the dominant American narratives of good and evil. Gaviely-Nuri and Balas (2010, p. 410) pointed to the “annihilating framing” common to Israeli television coverage of wounded soldiers during the Second Lebanon War, providing a good example of identifying and discussing frames designed to “blur basic components of an object, phenomenon or event in order to exclude it from the public discourse”. Being familiar with their study certainly helped me identify similarly selective framing in my own database. Norris, Kern, and Just’s (2003) book on the framing of terrorism tracked the evolution of U.S. news coverage of terrorism after 9/11, specifically noting how impressions of threat and risk
were cultivated. Overall, the single substantive study most influential on my thesis’ development was Reese’s (2010) chapter “Finding Frames in a Web of Culture: the Case of the War on Terror”. Reese’s study offered some very helpful insights on the role of frames in the media, how to conduct news framing research, and the different approaches one could take to framing analysis. Furthermore, he dealt with “media jingoism and marginalization of dissent” (Reese, 2010, p. 19) in the creation of the War on Terror, issues which emerged as all too relevant within the Canadian context. It was from Reese, along with Entman (1993; 2004; 2010), that I learned most of what I needed to know about the practical aspects of conducting a news framing analysis.

The final reason for my choice is that frame analysis is a flexible methodology. It is friendly to qualitative, quantitative, and mixed-methods research, and it can be adapted to a variety of contexts. Knowing this, I felt comfortable that I would be able to address my research questions within my research context, successfully fitting the methods to my study.

3.4 What Sort of Frame Analysis?

I elected to do a qualitative, code-based frame analysis. The predominant reason for this choice was that a qualitative frame analysis was simply the method which best suited the research question; a question centering on what constitutes the portrayal of domestic terror in the Canadian news media.\textsuperscript{15} The necessary inquiry is one probing the

\textsuperscript{15} A secondary reason is my prior experience and comfort with qualitative research. However, if the research question would have been significantly better served by using a quantitative or mixed methods research design, I would have chosen to investigate, develop, and execute a design of this nature. Ensuring the method is complimentary to the research question and the spirit of one’s inquiry is more important than choosing a method one has firsthand experience with.
qualities of the frames and the processes by which they are created.

I used Reese’s (2010) study on the news media’s framing of the War on Terror as a basis for comparison and, to a significant degree, an inspiration. Not only was his subject matter similar to mine, I identified with many of Reese’s (2010) theoretical standpoints and approaches to research. His methods were similar to mine, having selected a sample of 226 news texts from *USA Today* which featured the War on/against Terror(ism) as part of the headline or main text (Reese, 2010, p. 29). I was somewhat more stringent with article criteria, as Reese (2010, p. 29) “didn’t make any distinctions between editorials or news articles”, whereas I purposefully weeded out strictly-opinion articles. Naturally, Reese had more articles, which may have led to different advantages.

Reese (2010, pp. 18-21) views frames as existing in a “web of culture”, and employs a grounded, qualitative methodology of frame analysis. He rejects what he surmises as a traditional “how” orientation (i.e., framing effects analysis) in favour of an emphasis on the “what” of frames and framing (i.e., identifying frames in their cultural environment). Reese ‘s (2010, p. 19) method emphasizes the importance of identifying framing devices, which he exemplifies as “specific linguistic structures such as metaphors, visual icons, and catchphrases that communicate frames”. I, too, have placed an emphasis on uncovering framing devices, which the next two chapters will explore in more detail. Additionally, Reese (2010, pp. 19-20) continues,

… the what of framing (analysis) leads the researcher to examine latent aspects of the text, such as reasoning devices (e.g., problem definition and moral evaluation…) as well as specific keywords that constitute the concepts underlying frames (e.g., the words *game* and *competition* are integral discourse elements of a strategy frame in political campaign news…).

I agree with Reese (2010) on this point, as latent aspects of the text/frames can make up
some of the most foundational, if subtle, supports for any given frame. Furthermore, the latent aspects are harder to isolate, and thus stand to be more likely to go unquestioned (unnoticed even) by the audience. “If the what of frames are explored,” Reese (2010, p. 20) tells us,

it encourages an analysis that delves into the contextualization of topics – social, historically, culturally – and urges the framing researcher to look closely at the particular features of the frame… the specificity that is engendered by the what of a framing study helps in the end to uncover the culturally relevant and resonant theme that illuminates unique social and political understandings. And these are the sorts of frames that have the greatest implications for understanding the how of framing.

In the case of my research (and Reese’s), the social, historical, and cultural contextualization of frames is a highly potent topic, considering the far-reaching and broadly impactful nature of modern terrorism.

Finally, Reese (2010, p. 21) offers a helpful metric for assessing the significance of frames, saying that, “the significance of frames increase as they become more overarching and broadly reaching”. Of course, “the bigger the frame… the more difficult it can be to isolate and measure the social influence process [i.e., the how]” (Reese, 2010, p. 21). The difficulty of measuring the social influence of frames is certainly something I struggled with in the early stages of this thesis. While I wanted to investigate social effects and discuss them in comparison with the frames I discovered, I lacked the time and resources to conduct the additional studies that would be necessary to gather any real data on public opinion/social effects.

However, I diverge from Reese (2010) in that I choose to also acknowledge what he considers to be the how of framing. Reese (2010, p. 20) describes the how as a process-centric approach, conceiving of frames as “strategic resources, constructed and
wielded by an individual or group”. While I am, of course, limited in my conclusions to the data in my news article database, which mostly offers information on the what of frames, in analyzing and discussing the frames I uncovered, it became worthwhile to talk about the potential intersections between the interests of powerful groups (such as privileged speakers) and the narratives espoused or disregarded by the news media. Such discussion is informed partially by the latent aspects of frames, including inexplicit but prominent framing devices, partially by my research into the history of terrorism, and partially by the theoretically-versed sociological imagination.

My frame analysis is based on a thematic content-analysis-style coding. Thematic coding means that codes were developed to reflect themes found in the articles. Codes became more defined as the analysis progressed; Chapter 4 (analytical techniques) goes into more detail regarding the processes of coding and frame development. My unit of observation was words/sentences/references. However, holding to the qualitative nature of the thesis, the emergent themes made up my unit of analysis. Like Reese (2010, p.29), I approached frames as being “embedded across a body of discourse and speakers” – as a result, the frames I accepted as most salient were those which popped up across a wide variety of articles, events, and contexts. Definitions and examples are available for review in Chapter 5 (data analysis) and in Appendix A.
Chapter 4: Analytical Practices and Analytical Tools

4.1 Analytical Practices: Rationale for Codes

Codes were, for the most part, built inductively.\textsuperscript{16} This means I created them from the content in the articles. Whenever something appeared to be an important part of the media narrative or the construction of the topic, I created a code for it. This includes both overt messages such as politicians vowing to combat terrorism, and more subtle factors such as the sort of people quoted or presented as authorities in the article.

Another way I created codes was by using my theoretical and substantive knowledge of issues surrounding terrorism in the media. This is how I formed my first few codes; about 10-15 in total were developed this way. Both ways of code-building were informed by the literature I consulted: existing publications showed me things I might expect to find in articles about terrorism, and other scholars’ definitions and distinctions helped support my confidence in my own. Nunn (2007, p. 90), for instance, makes the (somewhat intuitive) distinction between “[human] victims or property-based targets”, similar to my separate codes for Deadly Attack and Potential Damage/Violence to People versus Damage to Property.

I completed nineteen rounds of coding, divisible into two phases: the first, to identify and define the codes, and the second, to make sure I did not miss any instances in the articles. This was a concern of mine because of the inductive process. Some codes took shape later than others, necessitating retroactive coding in certain articles. I kept notes detailing when I developed a new code, including the name of the article I first used

\textsuperscript{16} Exceptions were my few starter codes, such as the Speaker variable, or Deadly Attack – elements I knew would be part of all or most articles, or things that I was certain would come up in at least one.
it in – thereby, I knew which articles were ‘behind’ in the coding. Using these procedures, I developed roughly 91 codes by the time data analysis was finished. Additionally, I kept track of how much time I spent during each coding session. Overall, more than sixty hours went into reading, developing, coding, and refining the data.

Not all of the codes proved fruitful beyond the article or two that inspired them; nevertheless they were useful to have as ‘benchmarks’ to refer to when assessing the codes as a whole. A few of these less frequent codes were included in the final discussion and analysis because I felt they were significant or interesting to talk about.

For a full list of codes as they appeared in MAXQDA during the data analysis, including definitions, examples, and frequencies, see Appendix (A).

4.2 Analytical Practices: Building Frames

After both rounds of coding were complete, I began the actual frame analysis. Frames were developed from thematically convergent combinations of codes, or from particularly potent codes. Certain frames were built upon comparing a set of two or more codes which answer the same question or cover the same theme, for example, Pro-Academic/Pro-Knowledge Sentiment and Anti-Academic/Anti-Knowledge Sentiment, or any of the over seven codes ascribing motive to the terrorist (such as Terrorists Socially Motivated, Economic Causes of Terrorism, and Anti-Western Goals or Motives). Sometimes frames contributed to other frames: for example, Relevance of the Terror Suspect’s Personal History and Character is a frame unto itself, but also helps support Terrorism (Especially Domestic) is a Serious, Escalating, and Deadly Threat. Further and much more specific information on how each frame was built can be found in the data analysis section.
4.3 Analytical Tools: MAXQDA

Coding and analysis in this thesis was accomplished with the aid of a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). The use of CAQDAS enjoys great support in the social sciences, including endorsement from Hafner (2015, p. 104), who used MAXQDA to identify patterns in transcribed interviews and field notes, and Koenig (2004, p. 1), who proposes that CAQDAS can serve to “extend… recent advances in the empirical measurement of frames”.

I chose to use CAQDAS to ensure that I was, as much as possible, basing my frames on tangible, concrete evidence that would be available for continuous review of my own or by other researchers. I found this to have been a good decision, one which I would recommend or repeat in the future. I have a better idea of which codes/themes in my data are the strongest or weakest than I would if I had not used CAQDAS to perform coding. I am better able to discuss and defend my conclusions, and furthermore, my research is more open to examination by others. As an additional benefit, my finished coding is accessible for future research. I can continue the research by adding and analyzing more articles, and/or articles from different years.

I used the VERBI GmbH software MAXQDA (1989). MAXQDA is a CAQDAS that has been used for over twenty years to accomplish “qualitative and mixed methods data analysis” (VERBI GmbH, 2015). The software performs a variety of helpful functions, such as basic word counts, coding and categorizing, and visualizations such as maps, word clouds, and code relations.

I found MAXQDA suitable for several reasons. First, I found the interface more intuitive than that of competing software like nVivo. Creating and tagging codes were
simple click-and-select or drag-and-drop processes. Additionally, MAXQDA allows the researcher to assign different colours to different codes and subcodes: this was a great boon when trying to visually assess an article or paragraph with a lot of codes, and when editing, deleting, or recoding specific instances. Another point in MAXQDA’s favour was its purported versatility in handling different types of documents (some articles in my database were in .doc or .docx file format, others were .pdf). While it is true that one can create MAXQDA databases with all of these filetypes and more, I still ended up having to go through the tedious process of editing and re-saving certain articles in a new format due to serious bugs in the original files. After dealing with several bugged files, I decided to convert each article to Microsoft Word. I experienced no more article-related impediments after that. Finally, one moderately influential reason I chose MAXQDA is that I was gifted a copy that I could install on my personal computer. As a graduate student on a very tight budget, this alone made the software an efficient choice compared to the alternative programs, which would either have required me to buy them, or to code/analyze exclusively in university computer labs.
Chapter 5: Data Analysis: Findings and Discussion

5.1 Framing Devices

I found the following framing devices to be present in the Canadian news media’s treatment of domestic terrorism. Framing devices serve to communicate messages definitional to each specific frame (Van Gorp, 2010, p. 52). The use of a particular framing device may not always mean the same thing, or may mean multiple things, supporting more than one distinct frame. Interpreting framing devices and assessing their relevance is a context-dependent process, and the bigger picture must be kept in mind. Below I have assembled an overview of the most foundational framing devices, noted as such for quantitative frequency and/or in qualitative strength.17

5.1.1 Repetition of Data

The Toronto Star article titled “Anti-government sovereign citizen movement claims 30,000 members and growing in Canada” repeatedly mentions how the Freemen movement is growing, that there are already 30,000+ members (according to the group), and that this growth is a dangerous thing. I have tracked each instance of the topic and bolded the relevant words or phrases. Brian Alexander is a self-proclaimed Freeman-on-the-Land and one of a growing number of Canadian followers of the so-called "sovereign citizen" or "Natural Persons" movement [emphasis mine] (Moore, 2013).

A few lines down the article repeats the number given in the headline.

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17 Qualitative strength means communicative potency, or how well the framing device expresses the frame/how essential it is to the frame’s existence.
The Law Society of B.C. and B.C. Notaries have both issued warnings about Freemen, which the law society said in a bulletin last year may number as many as 30,000 in Canada [emphasis mine] (Moore, 2013).

Furthermore,

In June, about 80 people paid to hear [Freeman guru] Clifford spread the sovereign gospel at a seminar in Victoria [emphasis mine] (Moore, 2013).

Still later, readers are reminded,

… [the FBI] warns the movement will likely grow [emphasis mine] (Moore, 2013).

The above quotes exemplify the use of repetition as a framing device. Elsewhere in the article, Freemen-on-the-Land are characterized as hotheaded political dissidents with the propensity for violence, considered domestic terrorists in the United States, and given to tying up the courts with ridiculous demands and criminal behavior. And, of course, they’re growing in number. Note that this point is reinforced in various ways, by citing numbers (80 seminar attendees, 30,000 group members), as well as statements indicating that the movement is growing and will likely continue to grow in the future.

5.1.2 Repetition of Quotes

Different journalists writing for a variety of Canadian newspapers displayed the same practices in terms of using or prioritizing sources or quotes. A quote from one high-profile individual could often be found across many articles. Take the following quote from RCMP Assistant Commissioner James Malizia:

"At no time during the investigation was public security at risk” (‘Home-cooked terror; RCMP arrest two in Canada Day plot to blow up B.C. legislature’, 2013).
This same quote appeared, verbatim, in articles from newspapers including the National Post, the Kitchener-Waterloo Record, and the Red Deer Advocate, as well as the Halifax-based Chronicle-Herald. Repetitions such as this happen in part because newspapers, especially smaller publications, borrow from one another; but also, seemingly, because the quote or statement at hand is viewed as essential or central to properly telling the story. The repeated information then becomes part of the default understanding of the issue or event. As a result, messages that are repeated within a certain context often become focal frames themselves.\(^{18}\)

5.1.3 Privileging or Prioritizing of Certain Voices

The promotion of certain voices over others is possibly the most impactful framing device, one which helps create and support nearly all frames found in the articles (Entman, 2010 & 2012; Reese, 2010). The news articles I analyzed exhibited a consistent reliance upon quotes, statements, and information from a definable set of speakers. The news media established these speakers as legitimate sources of information about domestic terrorism, be it a specific event or as a general phenomenon. In a years’ worth of news articles discussing a variety of unique domestic terrorism-related events or topics, eight main speaker categories emerged.\(^{19}\) They are, in order of frequency:

\(^{18}\) It is important to acknowledge that many Canadian papers are owned by the conglomerate PostMedia, which distributes stories amongst its papers. Therefore, the repetition is more a consequence of corporate consolidation of the Canadian media than an emergent property of journalistic practices. Nonetheless, it is still worth discussing as – despite the reasons why it has occurred – repetition is part of the Canadian media and helps shape the framing found therein.

\(^{19}\) Other sources, such as corporate speakers, were occasionally found in the articles, but their contributions were marginal and brief.
1. Police (26% - 278 instances)
2. Community (22% - 230 instances)
3. Political (18% - 187 instances)
4. Legal (11% - 119 instances)
5. Terrorist (8% - 88 instances)
6. Academic (7% - 73 instances)
7. Media (5% - 49 instances)
8. Victim (3% - 37 instances)

Figure 1: Visual Representation of Speaker Division
The chart above displays whose testimony journalists cite most often, and whose stories articles are built around. Certain information is promoted as most valuable and certain perspectives as most important. As a result, these speakers have a great deal of opportunity to frame and reframe the issue on their terms, fostering their own understandings, opinions, values, beliefs, and agendas, which then become popular frames promoted within the Canadian news media.
Even amongst the privileged voices, all are not equal. I was unsurprised to observe the emergence of police, political, and legal speakers as some of the loudest of these voices. As a matter of course, these speakers make statements intended to be quoted and published by the media. Moreover, they are, in practice, the people who investigate and arrest terrorists (police), and the people who are responsible for establishing justice and protecting Canadians from terror threats (all three). Modern terrorism is often approached as a criminal issue, and police and politicians are the intuitive, established authorities for matters related to crime (and also policy, immigration, international relations and other issues intimately connected to terrorism). Legal speakers may be viewed as experts or insiders concerning the progress of terrorism-related trials, or when discussing counter-terrorism laws. At this point, it appears to be convention for journalists to turn to these sources when writing about domestic terrorism.

I did not expect community speakers to feature so prominently in the analysis. Despite the fact that these sources almost never have anything especially insightful to say about terrorism writ large, or even the specific terror plot in question, they are by a large margin the second most common type of speaker found in the news article database, eclipsing even political speakers. One explanation for this may be that the articles focus on Canadian-connected and domestic terrorism, making average Canadians’ viewpoints more relevant to report. More likely is the fact that they are easier to access than most of the other speakers. A great deal of theorizing on journalistic rationale vis a vis community speakers is provided later, in the unpacking and discussion of various frames. Whatever the reason, the popularity of community speakers has made crucial impacts on the dominant frames in this study.
The remaining speakers, terrorist, academic, media, and victim (in order of prevalence) each make up less than 10% of the speaker total, and did not appear to feature prominently as frame creators. I was somewhat amused to see terrorist speakers (8.3%) as more commonplace than academic speakers (6.9%); I theorize that this is likely the case because of the domestic terror emphasis of my research. It is possible that the same might apply to international terrorism, if journalists consistently dedicate article space to the videos, social media comments, and other propaganda and threats emanating from groups such as ISIS/ISIL or Boko Haram. Within the confines of my database, I assume the unexpectedly high number of terrorist speakers can be attributed to a) terror suspects’ statements at trials, b) pre-existing manifestos or communications, and c) interviews with people not yet arrested or accused of terrorism, but who are definitively presented in the articles as having radical ideologies or belonging to extremist groups.

Academic speakers seem unfortunately underrepresented (though this is, perhaps, a biased perspective). The media did show a respectful affinity for ‘terrorism experts’: however, the majority of these were police/security speakers rather than academic. Journalistic focus is tuned more towards the action than the theory, which may explain the general lack of enthusiasm for interviewing academic researchers about domestic terrorism.

The media speakers code refers to instances of news sources quoting other news sources, e.g., the National Post using information from CBC to fill out a story. As discussed earlier, news is often repetitive, which is the main significance media speakers have in the process of frame creation. Media quoting media may also serve to legitimate
the news sources quoted, as a type of peer recognition, and furthermore, a contribution to the quoted news source’s visibility.

Finally, victim speakers did not play an important role in frame creation, except by proxy as a source for personal stories and emotional reactions. The framing of domestic terrorism as an emotional issue certainly emerged as a significant heuristic. Victim speakers contributed far less towards this emotional framing than community speakers, probably because of their fewer numbers. In 2013, most terrorist offences did not result in death, injury, or damage to persons or property. Nonetheless, victim speakers were typically able to give some of the more impactful statements, and surely influenced the potency of the frame.

5.2 Frames

In the following section, I delineate and analyze the actual frames built upon my 91 inductive codes, including the previously explained framing devices. The frames summarize important and/or popular viewpoints, associations, heuristics, and other ways of communicating about and understanding domestic terrorism employed by the Canadian news media. This list may not be exhaustive, but I am confident that I have covered the dominant frames within my database, and discussed them from as many relevant angles as possible.

Where the comparison of more than two somewhat contrary component codes makes up an element of the frame, I have provided simple visual diagrams (such as Figure 1 above). In other cases, only one code (or two that were not contrasting with each other) stood as supporting the frame. In these latter cases, and in cases where two fairly
straightforward codes evidenced the frame (such as law enforcement successes vs. law enforcement failures), I did not judge it necessary to add visual diagrams.

5.2.1 Secrecy Regarding Terrorism is Appropriate/Acceptable

Obscurity of truth, details, or motivations in the statements provided by police, intelligence, or military spokespeople, judges and lawyers, and other authorities came up quite frequently in the articles. Generally, there is little satisfactory or definitive information available to journalists writing about terrorist events. These obscurities made one of the first emergent themes, and it ended up as one of the thickest, with 217 incidents coded. Articles described the terrorist situation as being shrouded in mystery, with reporters receiving only (or close to) the vaguest answers from official sources, and finding themselves blocked from further investigation. I only coded instances where specific mention was made of the lack of detail available – as in the following examples.

When asked whether the plot had a religious motive or was instead driven by something else, Assistant Commissioner James Malizia sidestepped the question... the force declined to comment on the specifics of its investigation, such as whether officers had infiltrated the plot ('B.C. Mounties say duo planned to blow up legislature’, 2013).


I did not find any articles where everything was considered to be known about a terrorist event or issue. Certain articles took a ‘what we know now’ or ‘the facts to date’ approach, but even these posed unanswered questions or recognized gaps in media understanding.

Sometimes this secrecy or confusion came from family members or former friends of the radicalized individual, who are trying to come to terms with what
happened. Journalists frequently seek these people out, likely because they are more accessible than those working for CSIS or the RCMP. In some cases, family members express their own confusion or disbelief, which the journalist then reports, further adding to the presentation of terrorism as a mysterious threat.

Why did the 29-year-old, who grew up in a nonreligious family in a sleepy seaside town on England’s south coast, turn to such an extreme form of Islam? Leech, who made a film about Dart called *My Brother the Islamist*, has spent years thinking about it and still isn’t sure (Quinn, 2013).

“And that’s quite — I don’t know what the word is — it’s massive. It’s really hard to explain” (Quinn, 2013).

Other instances had former friends, co-workers, or family members giving limited statements or flatly refusing to talk to the media, obstructing journalists’ quests for more information.

Ubada Enderi said he didn’t want to talk about his brother because he was worried about his words being taken “out of context” (Brewster, Levitz, & Jones, 2013).

Fellow students, neighbours and others who know the family in London were tracked down over the last few days, and shed some light on Enderi — but few wanted to speak publicly (Brewster, Levitz, & Jones, 2013).

Martineau said she was surprised at his arrest. Asked for further details about him, she said, "You probably know more than I do" (Quan & Kennedy, 2013).

But Shanti Thaman said she was stunned to learn they had been charged in a terror plot.

“It is shocking. We never suspected this,” Ms. Thaman told the Sun, as police searched the house Tuesday afternoon (Hutchinson, 2013).

The crux of this frame’s sociological significance is that it normalizes official secrecy and public obliviousness when it comes to terrorism cases. While there are plenty of good reasons why leaking too much information could compromise the case, ongoing
investigations, or even national security itself, the degree of obscurity shrouding almost every aspect of terrorism arrests and trials poses another type of danger – Canadians do not know what our own security forces, government, or judicial authorities are doing. The number of times that an absence of concrete knowledge was mentioned across different articles, regarding different cases, makes it appear normal and acceptable when the facts of these cases are hidden from the public. Considering the special and unusual measures now legal for dealing with terrorism, accepting silence and secrecy about terrorism cases potentiates the risk of abuse and unjust treatment many fear is possible (or already happening).

I considered that changing journalistic norms and practices may play a key role here. Some established journalistic agencies claim that investigative reporting, of the sort where journalists were expected to do their own research and hunt down leads, has crumbled in the past couple of decades, replaced by an occupational culture where journalists are taught to gather information from authorities/experts (such as police) and report it verbatim (Walton, 2010; Coronel, 2013). The prevalence of police and political speakers provides some support for this viewpoint. However, I often observed journalists pursuing other avenues or sources, a major example being the widespread reliance on community speakers.

The blame cannot be laid entirely at the feet of journalists. Painting a vivid picture of ‘who, what, when, where, and why’ is not possible when police and intelligence officers withhold their findings, as demonstrated in the following excerpts.

How they journeyed from a Southwestern Ontario city to the front lines of an attack that shook the world has not been revealed (Freeze, Ha, & Hui, 2013).
… security officials won't officially comment on the identities (Freeze, Ha, & Hui, 2013).

… a former assistant director of intelligence [said] he could not comment on specific cases (Freeze, Ha, & Hui, 2013).

Investigative reporting ranges from impractical to illegal when dealing with matters of national security. Journalists covering terrorism are limited to getting information from authorities, who are often reluctant to share that information. More often than not, it appears that authorities give out only as much information as is necessary to convey their successful and legal/ethical handling of the potential threat. Only the barest details may be included, such as, that they are “[retracting] past investigations” (Freeze, Ha, & Hui, 2013).

Though they will not reveal facts, police and security workers are frequently freer with sharing their emotional experiences and judgments. For instance,

… he could not comment on specific cases, but his work involved hard choices. ‘I sucked my breath back many times, to go ‘Okay. Drop them. Move to these people,’’ he said (Freeze, Ha, & Hui, 2013).

“Canadian Security Intelligence Service – an agency constantly pressed to make hard decisions about whom to keep tabs on, and when to cease surveillance” (Freeze, Ha, & Hui, 2013).

Publication bans, according to terrorism researcher Lorne Dawson (2014), are commonplace in Canadian terror investigations and trials. Though well-intentioned and arguably necessary, these bans serve to further limit how much journalists can publicize these events (meeting, November 11th, 2014). It is usual to have a flurry of media activity around the outset of a terrorism case, reporting on arrests and charges, and seeking statements from experts and authorities. However, once the trial begins in earnest,
publication bans may be enacted with the goal that the trial not be compromised. The result is that a lot of the reporting on any given case takes place before the trial, where the bulk of what will be revealed in the criminal case, at least until its conclusion, is disclosed. The rest of the information and/or proceedings might not be made public for years, if ever; therefore, the initial frames journalists must develop and work with to conceptualize a terrorism case are put together in a deeply fact-uncertain context.

5.2.2 Relevance of the Terror Suspect’s Personal History and Character

Many articles try to explain who the terrorists are and/or why they became violent radicals. One way to frame this is to focus on suspects’ personal lives, using past and present instances of deviance to construct the unbroken narrative of a consistently criminal, ignorant, or mentally ill state or lifestyle. Of course, negative evaluations ruled the data, as illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 2: Negative vs. Positive or Neutral Evaluations of the Terror Suspect’s Character

\[\text{Instances of deviance directly connected to the alleged terrorist act or plot are exempt.}\]
Suspects were portrayed as criminal, immoral, or disreputable in 31% of character assessments (482 instances total); immature, ignorant, or ridiculous in 24%; and, as displaying disgusting, irrational, or abnormal behaviour or psychology in 16%. See the criminal behavior emphasized in the following quote:

But before he could be evicted, police arrested him on outstanding warrants from Quebec. He was charged with pushing a landlady down a flight of stairs in Montreal in 2007. An arrest warrant was issued in 2010 when he failed to show up for his trial (‘Owner upset by mess in reclaimed rental ‘embassy’’, 2013).

Adopters of Freemen-on-the-Land ideology are arguably portrayed as immature, ignorant, and ridiculous in statements from legal professionals and societies.

“What we've seen over the last year is an increasing level of frustration, an increasing level of desperation. People just don't like the idea that someone isn't
going to help them with their fantasy,” Usher said, noting the society [of Notaries Public of B.C.] discourages its members from signing the “nonsensical” legal documents (Moore, 2013).

“It appeals to the angry male whose life isn't working out very well,” Usher said. “You get this spiral of legal mess that the only person that's benefited is the person who's taken their money for the seminar teaching them how to do all this” (Moore, 2013).

Likewise, the VIA rail plotters’ disregard for the authority of the Canadian Criminal Code (which made headlines), may be seen as ridiculous, as well as possibly irrational.

“This Criminal Code is not holy book,” Chiheb Esseghaier, 30, told the court as he stood in the prisoners’ box at Old City Hall, wearing the same blue and black jacket he was arrested in. He also had glasses and a dark beard (Young, 2013).

The Code could not be relied on, Jaser continued, saying: “Only the creator is perfect” (Young, 2013).

Other terror suspects are noted for their bizarre, abnormal, or sordid statements, behavior, or psychology. Social isolation, drug use, and living conditions emerged frequently as support for this framing. Counter-terrorism expert Ray Boisvert says of the warning signs of radicalism,

“… somebody [during radicalization] starts to withdraw, shifting their friendships, shifting away from typical activities, becoming intolerant, dogmatic in their political religious views…” (MacCharles, 2013).

Similarly, the following account of a reclaimed Freemen-on-the-Land ‘embassy’ points out that,

Windows were covered with towels, clothing was heaped on floors and dirty dishes were piled in the kitchen that smelled like rotten food (‘Owner upset by mess in reclaimed rental ‘embassy’”, 2013).

John Nuttall and Amanda Korody were perhaps the 2013 terror suspects most commonly characterized as insane, psychotic, and/or addicted.

But they clearly had few resources at their own disposal, and lived in what some
reporters have observed to be a filthy apartment in Surrey, filled with litter and empty bottles of methadone, a prescription heroin replacement (Hutchinson, 2013).

By comparison, neutral, sometimes normalizing statements presenting the terror suspect as integrated into society made up about 20% of character-evaluative statements.\(^{21}\) Statements describing the terror suspect as a typical or normal person happened just 9% of the time. Openly positive evaluations of suspects’ (former) character took place to a far lesser degree, and were only invoked to reinforce the idea that they had fallen from grace – i.e., underlining their deviance. Says an ex-classmate of one of the young men from London who became foreign fighters,

“In my memory, he's got a smile and was kind of a happy-go-lucky person,” said former classmate Michael Melito, 25, who was shocked to hear the news. “I don't know how he's changed or who he met since high school...” (Freeze, Ha, & Hui, 2013).

It is by making news out of a terror suspect’s personality, in addition to focusing on the associated emotional reactions, that heavy reliance on community speakers changes what might be more suitably understood as a political, socioeconomic, or crime story into a human interest piece. For example, the news coverage of the former London, Ontario high schoolers involved in a deadly attack on an Algerian gas plant tells us more about the young men themselves than about the actions which led them into a

\(^{21}\) Being integrated into society is not inherently positive; all it suggests is that the terror suspect managed to slip under society’s radar. I counted it to assess this frame because being integrated into society requires having enough stability to lead some degree of a ‘normal’ life, or at least to have some skill in mimicking one.
newsworthy situation in the first place. These excerpts from the *Globe and Mail* illustrate the human interest framing in action.

> During high school, Ali Medlej was considered a "happy-go-lucky" football player. Xristos Katsiroubas, his classmate, was a quiet student from a Greek Orthodox family (Freeze, Ha, & Hui, 2013).

> Mr. Medlej and Mr. Katsiroubas had been friends at the London South Collegiate Institute in London, Ont., a mid-sized city two hours west of Toronto (Freeze, Ha, & Hui, 2013).

The statements above clearly center on the personal life and characteristics of the suspect. Personality traits like ‘happy-go-lucky’ or ‘quiet’ have little to do with anyone’s terrorist career, yet these are traits repeatedly highlighted in the article.

There are multiple explanations that may account for this framing. In this case, it is likely that journalists simply lack access to the information that would help them construct the story wholly as a crime narrative. More pervasively, the relative ease of getting personal information about a terror suspect, compared to the difficulty of accessing legal, political, or criminal information about them, may help foster the trend of framing terrorism as an emotionally charged human interest story. It is, plainly, much easier to access and coax quotes out of people like former neighbours, colleagues, classmates, and family members, who were not involved in the terrorist act and can contribute little or no information about it, than it is to access the accused, co-conspirators, or military/police/intelligence officials.

Another explanation for this frame’s popularity may be that it successfully sells papers. Van Gorp notes that frames “contribute to the emotional appeal of the news” (2010, pp. 87). Canadian journalists seem to be aware of the potential value of playing to
their audience’s emotions when discussing domestic terror. Entman points to “the production norms encouraged by market competition” (2010, p. 339) as influential in the creation and adoption of certain frames over others. Journalists and CEOs alike want their articles to be popular and profitable. If media producers believe that personal histories, character studies, emotional reactions, and/or tales about the terror suspect from former community members are what the public wants, there will be pressure on journalists to give them just that. “Qualities [such as] simplification and fragmentation” (Entman, 2010, p. 340) are known to result from production norms which enculturate journalists to prize readership and mass appeal over uncompromising dedication to the facts. Entman suggests that how well a frame informs the readers, or how accurately it conveys the events discussed, may be secondary compared to how well a frame can sell papers. Theoretically, this could create a feedback loop, wherein readers come to expect a certain approach from the news media, and the news media delivers what they know is expected of them. As Entman explains, “perceived public opinion can and does feed back to influence the future framing behavior of elites and journalists” (2010, p. 333). It is therefore possible that this frame, and indeed any weak but popular frame, can be shifted by public preferences or demands for more rigorous reporting.

Finally, the media emphasis on the social and personal lives of terror suspects might have turned out to be as strong as it was because my database of articles were selected for their specific emphasis on domestic terrorism. Stories of the jihadist next door are more compelling when it is easier to imagine the jihadist living next door to you in your Canadian suburb – a concern that is not nearly as applicable when discussing threats from foreign radicals.
One message implicit (and sometimes explicit) in the proliferation of anecdotes and statements from former neighbours, classmates, and co-workers, as well as warnings from police and security officials, is that it’s possible that average Canadians know, live with, or work with violent extremists. The repeated reports of those interviewed as shocked and surprised to hear about the terrorism charges was powerful rhetorically and significant as a framing element. A common theme was that the terror suspect might have been weird, or even hostile at times, but no one thought s/he could carry out such an act – therefore, they were hiding in plain sight, under the community’s nose the whole time.

5.2.2.1 Sub-Frame: The Radical Next Door

When the terror suspect’s past and the emotional reactions of the community are evaluated, two significant frames emerge. The first is the radical next door, elements of which we have already touched on. This frame is executed when the article presents terror suspects as being, at least at one time, more or less normal people. Examples can be found in the media coverage of the London, Ontario boys accused of attacking an Algerian gas plant, the underage radicals of the Toronto 18, the suburban-punkette-turned-jihadi Amanda Korody, and even in the case of the two men charged with plotting to derail a VIA train as an act of terror.22 A CBC article on the last-listed incident illustrates the narrative of a promising, beloved child changing into a potential terrorist, which can be a component of this frame.

… [Chiheb Esseghaier’s] father did admit that in the last few years his son had changed and that the changes did not please him (‘Via terror plot suspect a ‘very good boy,’ mom says’, 2013).

22 These men were not Canadian citizens, but they did live in metropolitan Canadian cities and worked respectable jobs while here.
The framing is even more explicit in the following excerpt from a Maclean’s article titled ‘Why terrorism can grow in any soil – including our own’.

Both young men, aged 24 and 22, respectively, were friends at London South Collegiate Institute. And like their hometown, their upbringing seems, from the outside, utterly average. A third friend... was similarly recognizable as a typical teen. Today, Medlej and Katsiroubas are dead and Yoon is in a Mauritanian jail serving a two-year sentence for ties to a radical terror group (‘Why terrorism can grow in any soil – including our own’, 2013).

Still more explicitly illustrating this frame is a National Post article about the danger posed by domestic radicalization and terrorism.

One [of the Toronto 18] worked at a Canadian Tire gas bar. They went for coffee at Tim Hortons (Blatchford, 2013).

The central message implicit in this frame is that terrorists may be hidden among everyday Canadians: in our workplaces, our high schools, even our gas stations. The idea that these ubiquitous Canadian social institutions could be populated by budding radicals is an unsettling one, further exacerbated by the articles’ insistence that these people were once or are in some ways ‘normal’ – meaning, essentially, that it is impossible to tell who might be a terrorist until it’s too late.

While the radical next door frame sends messages of fear and paranoia, like all emotional framing, it may simultaneously help sell papers. The uncertainty fostered by this frame could be a hook for people wishing to understand more about how domestic terrorism happens – though it seems likely they will end up as uncertain as when they started reading.\(^{23}\)

\(^{23}\) Nonetheless, this uncertainty may be the most realistic attitude to have. Domestic terrorists share little to no common traits, other than radical ideology of some sort; there is no formula for determining who is
5.2.2.2 Sub-Frame: The Time Bomb

The second common personal characterization is the time bomb. While the radical next door is presented as an average person who lost their way, the time bomb was lost long before they turned to radicalism. This frame relies most heavily on the negative personal characterizations defined and explained at the beginning of the discussion of the overarching frame.

“He was a combustible human being with little sense of morals or repercussions,” Victoria artist Jesse Ladret, who once lived in the same apartment complex as Mr. Nuttall and knew him through friends, told the Post by email on Wednesday (Hopper, 2013).

John Nuttall, referred to in the above quote, is an easy example of the time bomb terrorist trope. Beset by mental illness, poverty, and substance abuse, the article paints a clear picture of Nuttall as a thoroughly unwholesome person.

… homeless… racked up a record of violent offences… dabbled in neo-Nazism… a particularly heavy alcohol and drug user even by punk rock standards (Hopper, 2013).

A National Post article frames one of the young men from London, Ontario who committed terrorism in Algeria as a time bomb. The article focuses almost entirely around his high school days, which his classmates say were rife with misbehavior, disregard for Canadian values, and violence.

He did not have a reputation as a good student. Classmates recalled him setting off cherry bombs in the schoolyard and stealing. “He always sat at the back of the classroom, showing up to 20 minutes to 30 minutes late every day — never cared about school” (Keidan & Bell, 2013).

Mujahid Enderi refused to sing O Canada at school in London, Ont. He said his

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going to becomes a terrorist (Dawson, Nov 11th 2014, meeting).
Muslim faith forbid it. When the time came for the class to stand beside their desks for the national anthem, he left or made sure to arrive late. The Libyan-Canadian’s zeal eventually turned violent (Keidan & Bell, 2013).

As illustrated above, this frame fosters the idea of terrorists as disgruntled, aggressive people who were always, in some sense, degenerates – or at least outsiders. That they were drawn to radical ideologies and terrorism is not a surprise, but rather, a natural extension of their pre-existing violent personalities.24

5.2.3 Charismatic Figures and Recruitment: Stronger Inroads than Self-Radicalization

The articles in my database showed that the prevailing idea about how (note: not why) people get involved in terrorist activities or extremist groups is via recruitment and/or exploitation by powerful, established radicals (124 instances total). The following figure breaks down the component codes.

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24 Some journalists may argue that in this case, they are just stating the facts about the suspect’s history—equal in nature to explaining that the suspects planned to plant bombs or use poison gas. While there is no reason to disbelieve or challenge the fact that many terror suspects had previous criminal records or mental health problems, it is the repeated emphasis on the suspect as degenerate that makes this a distinct and salient frame.
Self-radicalization, a situation in which the would-be terrorists seek out and pursue extremist groups or ideologies on their own, is referenced only 21% of the time. The remaining 79% of instances explain terrorist radicalization using more external factors. These consist of radicalization through recruitment (51%), where new members are acquired through specific, targeted recruitment techniques, but not necessarily a
special individual contact; the other 28% present a charismatic figure (a highly charming and captivating person who uses their social skills and/or mystique to win over converts) as an important, sometimes essential, enabler of the radicalization process.

Canada Day plotters John Nuttall and Amanda Korody are amongst the few domestic terror suspects consistently labelled as self-radicalized. The following excerpts tell the story of Nuttall as a man disconnected from community, “a virtual unknown” and a self-made fanatic.

But while he seems to have remained a virtual unknown to Muslims within his Surrey neighbourhood, Mr. Nuttall's friends and family recounted seeing the 39-year-old's quick descent into religious fanaticism; the apparent product of what the RCMP called his “self-radicalization” (“I will die a martyr”: B.C. terror suspect's brother was 'weirded out' by his sudden conversion to radical Islam’, 2013).

“He was a complete Muslim all of the sudden, in no time. I didn't know my brother anymore, he was a completely different person,” said Mr. Nuttall's brother in a Wednesday interview with CTV (“I will die a martyr’: B.C. terror suspect's brother was 'weirded out' by his sudden conversion to radical Islam’, 2013).

Another article explains that,

According to police, they are Canadian-born, “self-radicalized” individuals who were “inspired by al-Qaeda ideology” but acting of their own accord. They had “educated themselves” on making improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, the kind that are used by radicals to randomly kill and cause harm (Hutchinson, 2013).

In these statements, we are left with the impression of Nuttall and Korody as self-made terrorists, who, while inspired by “al-Qaeda ideology”, had little to no connection to a real group of radical Islamic terrorists. They converted without the help of a Muslim community, and subsequently taught themselves how to commit acts of widespread, deadly violence, ostensibly for ideological purposes.
Conversely, the former landlady of Nuttall and Korody offers a very different, very straightforward statement, promoting her belief that the two were being radicalized by external forces.

“I don't know why they would be plotting something. Someone was brainwashing them” (Hopper, 2013).

The charismatic figure comes up as a particular “radicalizing influence” (Quinn, 2013). For example,

… individuals who become radicalized tend to follow a very similar pattern after being exposed to someone who is an “influencer” who condones or encourages their extremist interpretation or path of action (MacCharles, 2013).

The above theme is repeated in other articles and other statements, such as these assessments of the likely vector of two Londoners’ journey towards terrorism.

The path Xristos Katsiroubas and Ali Medlej took likely began with a typical teenage need to make a difference and a sense of invincibility, then passed through the Internet before intense indoctrination in a group setting run by a “radicalizer” (Richmond, 2013).

“It's somebody close to them. I guarantee it, it's somebody very close,” said Ray Boisvert, former assistant director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) (Richmond, 2013).

Ideas of radicalization as influence, e.g., the possibility that one person can radicalize another, is accepted by the legal system as well.

Prosecutors allege Abassi had “radicalized” Esseghaier, a Montreal resident who is one of two men charged with plotting to attack a Via Rail train (‘Canada quick to downplay ties to U.S. terror suspect’, 2013).

When the same idea is propagated by multiple sources, particularly by such authoritative or expert individuals as members of the RCMP, Crown prosecutors, and the former assistant director of CSIS, it stands to gain a more significant kind of legitimacy.
The charismatic figure and recruitment frame enjoys widespread acceptance, and thus may be one of the more meaningful frames isolated in this analysis.

5.2.4 (Conditional) Sympathy for the Moderate Muslim Community

Generally speaking, the articles I reviewed presented local, non-radical Canadian Muslim communities in a positive light. Many community speakers were from such communities, incorporating the perspectives of Muslims who are peacefully integrated into Canadian society. When the Canadian Muslim community was mentioned, articles featured at least one speaker from a Canadian Muslim community, often an imam or another community leader. Their statements commonly took the form of distancing themselves and their fellows from whatever terrorist incident the article discusses. To examine one statement offered in the wake of the attempted B.C. legislature bombing,

Several leading members of B.C.’s Muslim community were shocked at the alleged homegrown plot. “These names don’t ring a bell at all. They’re not even Muslim names,” said Adam Buksh, president of Surrey Jamiyah Mosque. Buksh said members of his mosque and the B.C. Muslim Association do not condone radicalism (Moore & Keller, 2013).

A similar public disavowal came in response to news that four young, Canadian Muslim men had attacked an Algerian gas plant (two of four died in the attack). As one Muslim community leader explained,

“There is a trend in some radical groups that are non-violent to disavow the idea of loyalty [to Canada],” he said. “These people generally find themselves isolated because it is not something that resonates with the rest of the congregation” (O’Brien & Maloney, 2013).

Other printed statements emphasize the mainstream Muslim community’s unawareness of any terrorist activity in their midst.

"That's what we keep thinking about," said one London Muslim Mosque member. "If they (terrorist teachers) are here, it's a very curious thing. Where are they
from? Does anybody know them? Who talked to them?” asked the man, who didn't want to be named (Richmond, 2013).

Moreover, several articles credit local Muslim communities with promptly tipping off police whenever they do became aware of suspicious activity.

The RCMP did confirm an imam gave them information that led to the arrests, although “not too many details were shared. They did say a prominent community leader has come forward” (Young, 2013).

Within a religious community, imams have kept an eye out for radicalization, Badat said (Young, 2013).

“We would not hesitate at all in informing the agencies to do their part. As Canadians, we share the concerns. We are equally affected by any terrorism threats” (Young, 2013).

In addition to giving members and representatives of the Muslim community a platform to share their side, journalists included quotes that both acknowledged and condemned the backlash against moderate Muslims which has historically occurred in the wake of terror attacks. For instance,

“And the mood there was what will be the backlash, how are we going to handle the media and the press reports from looking like they are stereotypically demonizing Muslims, when it was a tip from our leadership that prompted the arrest” (Levitz, 2013).

Articles stressed friendship and cooperation between Muslim communities, their leaders, the larger communities to which they belong, and Canada’s law enforcement agencies. One such Muslim community leader affirms these bonds of friendship and solidarity, saying,

“It says enough for guys like me to go back to people and say no, no that's not how it is. You might think it's this way, you might try to come up with a conspiracy but I know some real stand-up guys inside the RCMP who took the time to take our community aside and say ‘hey look, you guys are part of the greater community, there might be things said about you guys but know that's not what we believe’” (Levitz, 2013).
Muslim speakers were consistently sure to either condemn religious radicals and violence and/or assert their commitment to Canadian laws and values, including their role in drawing police attention to possible terrorist plots. This is evidence of the Muslim community attempting to frame itself as peaceful, law-abiding, and anti-terrorist. Benford and Snow (2000) explain how it can be crucial for social movements to use the media to get their own preferred frames across; Muslim communities across Canada seem to realize this, frequently speaking up to disavow and distance themselves from Islamic terrorists. Journalists support this framing by including Muslim community speakers, reporting positive evaluations of Muslim communities from the RCMP, and condemning the very real, unjustified attacks moderate Muslims have suffered in the past. While the news media certainly do draw connections (some which appear all but explicitly causal), between Islamic beliefs and terrorism, I found the dominant framing of Canadian Muslim communities to be sympathetic, accepting, overtly non-accusatory, and generally positive.25

5.2.5 Terrorism as a Religious (Islamic) Issue

Existing simultaneously with the sympathetic framing of moderate Canadian Muslim communities is the framing of terrorism as an Islamic phenomenon. Most articles offered some level of explanation or speculation about the motives driving terrorists, or the reasons for their actions. I located ten identifiable categories of heuristics and/or

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25 These are not mutually exclusive frames: an article may feature defense of the moderate Muslim communities, while only a few lines later characterizing terror suspects most significantly as radical Islamists, or suggesting conversion to Islam as a precursor to terrorism.
perspectives causally explaining or defining terrorism. None of these causes were coded as mutually exclusive: an article could promote multiple ways of understanding terrorism (e.g. discussing it primarily as a religiously-motivated act, but also acknowledging the role played by personal dissatisfaction). Sometimes the information came from quotes, and at other times, from journalistic inference. The dominant framing regarding causes or underlying factors appeared via journalists attending or disattending to certain facts – i.e., prioritizing or disregarding specific traits or aspects of the person(s) or event(s), selected from any number of possible angles. Codes cataloguing attribution of terrorists’ motives or reasons, from most to least prevalent and including raw frequencies, are:

1. Islamic Conversion or Beliefs as a Factor (32%, 132 instances)
2. Race or National/Ethnic Origin as Relevant (16%, 65 instances)
3. Political Dissidence (12%, 49 instances)
4. Terrorists (Personally) Dissatisfied (10%, 42 instances)
5. Terrorists Socially Motivated (10%, 41 instances)
6. Complex View of Terrorism (7%, 31 instances)
7. Terrorism Act of Revenge, War, or Defense (6%, 24 instances)
8. Anti-Western Goals or Motives (4%, 18 instances)
9. Eco-Terrorism, (3%, 12 instances)
10. Economic Causes of Terrorism (0.7%, 3 instances)

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26 I am referring to causality in a very rough, basic way; I did not hold the news articles up to scientific principles establishing causal relationships. For the purposes of coding, a statement or quote attributing terrorism (at least partially) to a specific quality or phenomenon counted.
I have also created a chart to visually display the frame components.
Figure 4: Visual Representation of Motives/Conditions Driving/Underlying Terrorism in the Canadian Media

As illustrated above, religious (specifically Islamic) extremism was overwhelmingly reported as the key factor inspiring terrorism. When articles stated or hinted at motives, explanations, or causes for terrorism, Islamic beliefs or conversion to Islam made up 32% of 417 coded instances. If a terrorist/suspect was Muslim, their faith
was unfailingly brought up in conjunction with their alleged plots or actions, if not directly linked to their radicalization and subsequent involvement in terrorism.

Scholars understand involvement in terrorism as a complex phenomenon with a variety of possible pushes, pulls, and other underlying factors which may affect a person on their path to radicalism. Certain sources and articles expressed a complex view of terrorism, speaking to the multiplicity of justifications, goals, conditions, circumstances, and other influential factors which have shaped the diverse array of terrorist incidents seen in the past decade and a half. Roughly 7% of instances reflected this complex view of terrorism.

Despite the legitimacy of a complex view, this way of understanding the problem is not reflected in the Canadian media, which frames terrorism predominantly as a religious issue, and terrorists as Muslim fanatics. Religion is certainly important to consider, especially when the terrorists in question so blatantly invoke it as a justification for their acts. However, the popular framing of religion as the biggest, most powerful root cause of terrorism often served to overshadow and diminish other, less simplistic aspects of radicalization and terrorism. For example, journalists mentioned economic causes of terrorism as significant less than 1% of the time. Ecological, conservationist, or animal rights centered beliefs were second least, at almost 3%, closely followed by purely anti-Western goals or motives (i.e., the destruction of the West as primary or sole aim), which comprised a shallow 4%. Revenge, war, or defense were only acknowledged as motives in roughly 6% of coded instances, even though these are, in some form or another, foundational elements of nearly every terrorist credo throughout history.
Sociological theory holds that the beliefs, expectations, and morals of one’s primary social group, or those of a desired community, provide one with values governing thought and behavior, informing notions of what is acceptable or unacceptable, ideal or discouraged, and necessary or non-compulsory (Mead, 1932; Cooley, 1962). In most cases I examined, a community, be it an informal group of friends (such as the London boys, high school friends) or an established extremist cell (like the U.S. Freemen-on-the-Land or the Animal Liberation Front), was instrumental in enabling the terrorist act. An extension of this may be active in the apparent effectiveness of recruitment strategies and charismatic figures. Despite the variety of theory, anecdotal evidence, and even concurrent framing pointing to the centrality of social motivations, just 10% of the instances referenced social motivations or group bonds as an important element contributing to radicalization.

Personal dissatisfaction made up another 10%, rather minimal considering that many experts and scholars routinely cite this as a reason for rejecting one’s own culture and adopting contrary, radical ideologies. In cases where the terrorist/suspect was not in direct contact with an extremist group, dissatisfaction with themselves and a sense of alienation from mainstream cultural values can lead them to contact such groups, or to plan acts of terror on their own. Many Canadians who become radicalized are teens or young adults; the search for identity, belonging, and meaning – a natural part of this phase of life – can leave young people particularly susceptible to radicalist rhetoric promising brotherhood and the chance to punish evildoers, right injustices, and protect the weak. Historically, bored young men have long been drawn to the adventure, excitement, and purpose of war (Miller, 2013).
Political dissidence fueled 12% of causal messages, largely bolstered by the attention radical libertarian groups such as the Sovereign Citizen Movement and Freemen-on-the-Land garnered in 2013. Arguably, all terrorism has a political agenda, conflicting with the mainstream or hegemonic political agenda; therefore, this element, too, deserves more recognition than I observed.27 Finally, race or ethnicity was mentioned as a causal or underlying factor about 16% of the time; I will expand upon this below.

Today’s high-profile terrorist threat comes from Islamic groups, committed to religious rhetoric preaching the destruction of unbelievers and/or driving them out of Islamic lands. Certainly, religion is a core element of their propaganda – this includes their self-attributed rationale for acts of violence and destruction. However, to understand modern terrorism simply through the lens of religion, as the most prominent frame in Canadian news media does, presents an incomplete picture of a complex phenomenon.

5.2.6 Salience of Race/Ethnicity/National Origin

As indicated above, about 16% of the causal or explanatory instances made note of the ethnic backgrounds of terror suspects in a prominent way. This includes national heritage, the immigration status of suspects and their parents, and other aspects of their racial/ethnic background(s). In cases where the accused were not Canadian citizens, their national origin (e.g., Raed Jaser coming from Palestine) was brought up as a matter of

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27 In the interest of transparency, I have considered the possibility that political messages and political causalities are so intrinsically linked to discussion of terrorist incidents that I have passed over some of the more subtle examples, and if so, my count may be low on this code. However, my most liberal error estimates do not put political dissidence at higher than 17% of the instances, an interesting difference but still not one which would invalidate or even challenge the religious framing I have proposed as dominant.
course – I did not observe exceptions to this rule. Canadian-born suspects of Middle Eastern descent were treated similarly. News articles making note of the racial/ethnic/national background of suspects is not unique or interesting on its own. However, comparing the ways in which the ethnicity of Middle Eastern individuals was discussed with the treatment of and slant on non-Middle Eastern terror suspects yields interesting results.

The fact that any suspect had Middle Eastern heritage was never contextualized as anything other than normal and uneventful. For example, this bit of information from a Toronto Star article:

Enderi, whose family came to Canada from Libya, went to high school with the other three boys and lived close to Medlej and Katsiroubas (Livingstone, MacCharles, & Shepard, 2013).

This statement prominently characterizes the subject as a Libyan immigrant, a fact which does not come up again in the rest of the article. Its casual nature is typical of statements about Middle Eastern ethnicity. Seemingly, Middle Eastern (and, of course, Muslim) is how we expect our terrorists to be.

I base this claim on the fact that when terror suspects were White, Asian, Mediterranean (or otherwise not Middle Eastern), their heritage was regularly mentioned as exceptional in some way. No article explicitly said that Middle Eastern people or Canadians of Middle Eastern descent were more likely to be terrorists, but articles expressed more shock and confusion when the terror suspects were of a different ethnic origin. Examine the phrasing of the two sentences in the following excerpt.

A Cree who wears a traditional coonskin cap he made himself, Dawood is a member of the James Smith First Nation in Saskatchewan. He is also a strident advocate of armed jihad (Bell, 2013).
First, we learn Dawood is a Cree and a member of a Saskatchewan First Nation. This information is juxtaposed with the next bit of information – that he is an advocate of armed jihad. Moreover,

Even the Muslim leader who converted Dawood said he disagreed with his views on violence (Bell, 2013).

The framing here is subtle, but significant. It is bizarre that a Cree man is involved in jihadi ideology, and similarly surprising that the Muslim leader who converted him is the more moderate of the two.

One excerpt, drawn from a *Maclean’s* article, discussing the conversion and eventual radicalism of non-Muslim, non-Middle Eastern young men, notes their ethnicity and religion – as do many articles about them.

Katsiroubas, raised in a Greek Orthodox family, was quieter but enjoyed road hockey and video games. A third friend, Aaron Yoo of Korean-Catholic descent (‘Why terrorism can grow in any soil – including our own’, 2013).

The article title, ‘Why terrorism can grow in any soil’ further implies that something new and strange is taking place: terrorism is springing up in previously unexpected places and people.

Using race/ethnicity as a framing device is nothing new; established racial stereotypes can be one of the “culturally shared notions with symbolic significance” (Van Gorp, 2010, p. 85) that are known to work very well in creating and maintaining a hegemonic frame. It is worth noting that several articles, overtly at least, did not invoke ethnicity to pigeonhole or condemn, but to emphasize how different from certain established cultural notions the reality really was – that so many of the young, Canadian
domestic terrorists/suspects that made the news in 2013 were not from the stereotypical ethnic background, i.e., Middle Eastern. As one article stated,

The notion that three middle-class kids from diverse religious backgrounds attending high school in an average Canadian city could become radicalized to this extent raises big, uncomfortable questions for all Canadians (‘Why terrorism can grow in any soil – including our own’, 2013).

Similar to the radical next door frame, the salience of ethnicity frame was used in 2013 to change the boundaries delimiting notions about who could be a terrorist. As the older idea of the terrorist as foreign, Islamic/Middle Eastern, and wholly alien in motivation and mindset is still alive and well (the reigning default image, even), I view the new challenges to this image as more of an expansion than a re-interpretation. Granted, it is possible that this more expansive reframing could be interpreted as promoting the idea that race/ethnicity is not a determining or causal factor in radicalization, if one only takes a sample of overt messages into account. Examining the bigger picture, however, shows us that the media’s apparent surprise when terror suspects turn out to be non-Muslim or non-Middle Eastern (and the lack of surprise when they are), speaks to a frame still anchored in and validating a particular, ethnically-connected image of the terrorist.

5.2.7 Betrayal of Canada

Some of the more sensationalist or emotive articles framed domestic terrorism as a betrayal of Canada, a perverse and heinous act. For instance,

Yet, perversely, when Raed Jaser turned increasingly intolerant, as he is accused of doing in his alleged involvement with a plot to derail a VIA Rail train, he turned his focus not on the culture and countries that drove his family away, but on the one that offered them safe harbour (McParland, 2013).
Another article tells us that he is,

… accused of plotting to terrorize the Canadians who gave his family a second chance (Humphreys & Bell, 2013).

In the above texts, Jaser’s status as a former refugee is invoked as an aggravating factor.

Canadian-born terror suspects are also discussed within the frame of betrayal, but differently. The following statement illustrates the more subtle denunciation:

We don't know why. Maybe they had planned to spend the rest of their day - Canada Day, for the rest of us - celebrating the carnage, mocking the people whose lives they might have taken, and those who would have been maimed. That was their intention all along, police allege. To kill and destroy (Hutchinson, 2013).

In this article, Nuttall and Korody’s purported anti-Canadian sentiment is clear, but their (forfeited) Canadian-ness is only addressed obliquely. Contrary to my expectations, Canadian-born terror suspects received a (relatively) greater degree of acceptance. In fact, in a different National Post article devoted to Korody, who had an affluent Ontario upbringing, the author minimizes the angle of her turning against the culture and society which had, presumably, provided her with a comfortable early life – instead, the focus is on her post-adolescent mental health issues and troubled personal life.

Josh Korody, her cousin, told the National Post that growing up, Ms. Korody was the “cool” older cousin, intelligent and creative but lacking in focus. “She was very unstructured,” said Mr. Korody, who runs a music recording studio in Toronto. “I know she definitely didn't have a normal life” (‘Canada Day terror suspect had a privileged yet troubled upbringing and disappeared a decade ago, family says’, 2013).

Her cousin’s free-spirit characterization is followed directly by details of the charges Korody faces.
Ms. Korody was arrested Monday for her involvement in an alleged plot to detonate explosive devices on the steps of the B.C. legislature on Canada Day (‘Canada Day terror suspect had a privileged yet troubled upbringing and disappeared a decade ago, family says’, 2013).

The accusations against Korody are serious and terrible, comparable to those against Jaser. However, the aforementioned article is mostly comprised of community speakers’ accounts of Korody’s distance from her family, indiscriminate attention-seeking behavior, and other aspects of her pre-jihadi life which are decidedly more tragic than condemning.28

One impression I was left with was that when people immigrate to Canada, and later take up radical ideologies, their betrayal is discussed with anger; when Canadian-born citizens do the same, it is viewed with confusion, disappointment, and sadness. I found just 14 instances of the supporting code, so I am hesitant to present any of my findings or impressions as conclusive, or even strong. This code did, however, offer some thought-provoking instances illustrating potential differences in the framing of domestic terror suspects.

5.2.8 Redefining Canadian Values

Some journalists frame domestic terrorism as something which either is forcing us, or should force us, to reevaluate and redefine traditional Canadian values. Most often, these values are somehow those relating to national security. A National Post article asks,

And what does the democracy that values individual liberties, not to mention the vision of itself as a welcoming cultural mosaic, do about that [returning foreign

28 Unlike her partner, John Nuttall, Amanda Korody clearly falls under the Radical Next Door sub-frame. Though she was historically a troubled person, she is often portrayed as adrift in the world and susceptible to bad influences, not a violent or bad person herself.

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This frame is associated with the controversies surrounding many of the new and expanded counter-terrorism measures the Canadian government continues to implement. In contrast to watchdog-oriented frames decrying potential or real abuses of power, we are asked to consider that our established civil rights and liberties might be making Canada vulnerable to attacks from unscrupulous extremists.

5.2.9 Reinforcing Canadian Values

Politicians invoke this frame when they say that our democracy/free society will not crumble in the face of terrorist threats or attacks, and also when they express commitment to Canadian values. Political figures from Safety Minister Vic Toews to Prime Minister Stephen Harper have reached out to the media, making statements that helped frame domestic terror plots or attacks as something that will make Canadians stronger and ever more devoted to our established beliefs, values, and institutions. This defiant framing is illustrated clearly in Christy Clark’s response to the attempted Canada Day bombing in British Columbia.

B.C. Premier Christy Clark said she was profoundly shocked by news of the arrests. “But let me say this to those who resort to terror: You will not succeed,” Clark told reporters at the legislature in Victoria. “You will not succeed in damaging our democratic institutions. Just as importantly, you will not succeed in tearing down the values that make this country strong” (Home-cooked terror; RCMP arrest two in Canada Day plot to blow up B.C. legislature, 2013).
5.2.10 Terrorism is Under Control

While there were only 7 total instances of citizens commenting on their level of faith in Canada’s police and security services, 5 out of these (roughly 71%) were positive. When citizens’ thoughts on this matter were published, the good outweighed the bad (only 2 messages, about 29%, were negative or critical). Similarly, only 4 coded instances showed citizen evaluation of the government. The low numbers show that it is rare for journalists to include citizens’ views on the effectiveness of our police, our security services, or our government against terrorism.

Perhaps tellingly, most of the information on the success of anti-terrorism procedures comes from police and security personnel themselves. Of the identified speakers quoted in the news articles, a whopping 278 instances (26%) were coded under Police Speaker. For ease of analysis, I included national defense, intelligence, and security operatives in this category. Examples of typical police speaker statements include the following.

The RCMP said it has been following the suspects' activities for months and said investigators ensured the alleged bombs were harmless (Moore & Keller, 2013).

And,

What Mounties did say was that the tip was subsequently passed on to the RCMP's Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSERT) in B.C., who used a “variety of complex investigative and covert techniques” throughout the month's long probe (Oliver, 2013).

“We detected the threat early and disrupted it,” said RCMP Assistant Commissioner James Malizia. “I want to reassure our citizens that at all times during the investigation, our primary focus was the safety and protection of the public” (Oliver, 2013).

Or,
“The spectre of these young people returning to Canada with combat experience and thoroughly radicalized views is a serious national security concern,” Michel Coulombe, the deputy director of operations for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service agency told MPs studying the bill last year (Levitz, 2013a).

Understandably, police speakers were typically not interested in sharing information about failed attempts to capture terrorists or prevent terrorism. Their comments were usually vague, yet positive, and frequently given to the press following a high-profile arrest or thwarted plot. Naturally, these speakers wish to paint themselves and the organizations they represent in the best possible light, lest they invite further criticism, cutbacks, or scandal. The dominance of police speakers effects the framing of domestic terrorism by presenting the issue in a manner positive towards themselves, which I sum up as: ‘yes, terrorism is a threat and terrorists pose a danger, but we have neutralized them and will continue to do so’. The implicit (and sometimes explicit) message is that terrorism is under control – the authorities, who citizens are safe trusting, have it covered.

For the most part, they are right. There were minimal successful terrorist attacks on Canadian soil in 2013, compared to several successful arrests and charges against suspected terrorists. However, there were still some successful attacks (e.g. the Glebe fireboming), as well as a number of fairly high-profile instances of radicalized young Canadians leaving the country and committing violent acts of terror overseas (e.g. the group from London). These events were occasionally discussed critically by journalists in terms of CSIS’ neglecting to perform adequate surveillance, or the RCMP’s failure to apprehend the culprit, but these messages are rare. Just 7 instances of overt criticism, less than 5%, were found in the articles, compared to 135 instances of reporting law
enforcement success (a remarkable 95% of the statements regarding law enforcement success/failure).

My data only applies to 2013, but interesting changes to this frame may have occurred because of the deadly 2014 attacks in Quebec and Ottawa. This question could make for a rewarding future research project.

5.2.11 Problems with the Government

As mentioned above, the articles offered few examples of the Canadian government being evaluated. Citizen (non-journalist, non-politician, or non-federal employee) quotes regarding confidence in the government numbered 4 in total; all other evaluations of politicians only occurred 11 times. In both cases, the majority of the evaluations were negative. A significant majority of citizens (75%) expressed a lack of confidence in the government’s ability to successfully stop terrorism, while just 25% believed the government was doing enough to protect Canadians from terror attacks. Amongst the others, 73% of the evaluations were critical. The effectiveness of the government’s anti-terrorism measures was questioned, as well as the sincerity of their commitment to understanding and neutralizing terrorism (versus merely trying to appear as though they are doing something). Conversely, 27% of the evaluations were positive, praising political leaders for appropriate and successful action against the terrorist threat.

5.2.12 Problems with the Legal System

I found more examples of critical attitudes towards the government when examining perspectives about law and legal responses. This topic yielded 147 instances,
making it fuller and stronger than the aforementioned evaluations of the government itself.29 Five main categories emerged, with 65% of the perspectives offering negative opinions about recent laws or governmental actions.

Figure 5: Positive and Negative Attitudes Towards the Law and/or Legal Responses to Terrorism

29 Discussions of law/legal responses delve into a specific aspect of governance, and the laws themselves, whereas the previous codes dealt with opinions on the government more generally.
The most frequent objection was that modern Canadian anti-terrorism laws and legal responses are overly harsh, problematic, or controversial (39%). Following that was the complaint that terrorism was being used for political profit or advancement by individuals or parties (16%). Finally, claims that the Conservative party was suppressing dissent or opposition to their counter-terrorism measures (notably, by accusing critics of being soft on terrorism, which many considered a low blow) made up roughly 10% of perspectives. It is worth noting the positive perspectives: about 22% of articles presented new laws or legal responses against terrorism as supported or recommended. Also, some speakers and journalists (13%) expressed trust in our legal system’s ‘safety nets’, claiming that even though the government’s new counter-terrorism measures had incredible powers and scope, said measures would not be abused and the average Canadian need not fear them.
Despite the positive minority, the fact that most instances express discontent or paint our politicians in an unflattering light makes for an interesting frame. While news media rarely engage in criticism of police and intelligence/security forces, criticism of the government is readily accepted. There may be many intangible reasons contributing to this fact: perhaps the former are more venerated than the latter, seen as defenders and heroes rather than cronies and crooks. One plausible (and tangible) reason is that politicians are willing to criticize other politicians far more than police, intelligence, or military personnel – political speakers were the third most common type of speaker (18%), and they often had negative things to say about one another. Anyone who has watched an attack ad during election season knows that inter-party infighting can be brutal, and on the high-profile topic of terrorism, the media provided an ample platform for competitive rhetoric between parties.

One prominent example is Stephen Harper’s dismissal of Liberal leader Justin Trudeau’s suggestion that we ought to examine the root causes of involvement in terrorism.

“I think, though, this is not a time to commit sociology, if I can use an expression,” Harper said. “These things are serious threats, global terrorist attacks, people who have agendas of violence that are deep and abiding threats to all the values our society stands for” (Fitzpatrick, 2013).

Harper’s clear adherence to a punitive rather than investigative framework for dealing with terrorism not only countered Trudeau’s approach on a fundamental level, but cast the implication that Trudeau was ignorant of the true threat of terrorism. Accusations of being ‘soft on terrorism’ are a political weapon frequently wielded by the Conservative party against other politicians.
Political mud-slinging is hardly a one-sided practice, however. Members of the NDP have vocally criticized Conservative responses to terrorism, declaring, for instance:

“A responsible Canadian government would not have kept hitting the snooze button until tragedy struck somewhere else in the world,” said New Democrat MP Dany Morin during the debate (‘Government says new terror laws necessary’, 2013).

Police and security forces are not pitted against each other in such a way (notwithstanding the potential for battles over jurisdiction or responsibility for failures). At least, this is not their public presentation. More often than not, if one such speaker mentioned another individual or agency, it was with a supportive, co-operative tone. Local police, the RCMP, and CSIS reinforce the idea of combined efforts to keep Canadians safe, whereas politicians wish to emphasize their own party’s superiority in combating terrorism and protecting Canadians, which may include demonizing or belittling other parties’ capabilities.

Finally, it is politicians who make the laws which police and security forces are subject to. Thereby, the government is positioned as the ultimate authority, and potentially held to a higher standard of responsibility in the minds of journalists and other speakers. Regardless of cause, the government and its laws seems to be framed as a noticeably acceptable target for criticism and negative evaluation.

5.2.13 Terrorism (Especially Domestic) is a Serious, Escalating, and Deadly Threat

Many elements of the news articles created and reinforced the idea that domestic terrorism is serious, escalating, and deadly – a bloody, insensible practice, and, by explicit statement or implication, something Canadians ought to be concerned about. To
assess messages of a serious/escalating threat, I coded each instance where alleged terrorist individuals or groups were noted for their growing impact on or danger to society (200 instances). I also coded instances of escalating legal, police, and/or intelligence attention to individuals, groups, or phenomena labeled as terrorist. These instances came up early on in the coding process, and formed one of my first codes. Later on, I came across articles that downplayed domestic terrorism as not a very serious threat, generally portraying it as a low risk relative to other dangers (28 instances), but their influence on this frame is negligible. Below is a visual comparison of the two codes.

Figure 6.1: Domestic Terror as Serious vs. Not Serious or Less Serious
A weighty 88% of instances clearly represented domestic terrorism as a dangerous and rising threat to Canadians. This was accomplished mostly through quotes from experts, authorities, and officials, predominantly police and political speakers. One National Post article explains,

Security officials have been raising concerns for several years about radicalized youths joining the Islamist extremist cause, arguing they pose a danger both abroad and once they return to Canada with training (Keidan & Bell, 2013).

Another method of reinforcing the seriousness of domestic terrorism was journalistic implication via comparison. Many articles about the Canadian Freemen-on-the-Land movement ended up in my database because in each one (of multiple, unique articles, not just reprints or copies), the author mentioned that in the United States, the FBI considers the American Freemen-on-the-Land a domestic terrorist group. The oft-repeated line:

The FBI considers the movement a domestic terror threat in the U.S. but a Freemen-on-the-Land spokesman told The Canadian Press earlier this month that violence is not advocated and has no place in the movement (Graveland, 2013).

Without explicitly stating so, making these connections sends the message that the Canadian Freemen are equally dangerous and radical; thus, they are framed as potential terrorists. Journalists seem insistent on reiterating this idea, despite the fact that the American Freemen have shot at least one police officer, whereas the Canadian Freemen are better known as a nuisance than a threat to society at large, committing crimes such as squatting and driving without a license.
I found five more elements that contribute to the frame of domestic terrorism as a serious, escalating, and deadly threat. For example, articles may prominently feature a gamut of emotional responses to a terrorist event, from an assortment of sources. Journalists pad these articles with quotes emphasizing the shock, horror, and fear experienced in reaction to the event. Another tactic appealing to readers’ pathos is positing disturbing, emotionally-charged hypothetical scenarios. The following excerpt is a near-perfect example.

As I walked around there at the height of rush hour Monday night – GO commuter trains also run out of Union and the subway does a turn there, so it's busy – I looked upon the crowd. Who would have been "the face of Canada's terror bombing," as eight-year-old Martin Richard has been called Boston's, had it proceeded along lickety-split?

Could it have been the teenager with the small clutch of flowers? The young man who made animals-in-the-jungle noises to amuse his girl as they said goodbye? The older couple, he sweating and breathless, she organized and clearly in charge but quietly frantic, who went off to find out where they should go next?

While she was gone, the old fellow's phone beeped that he had received a text: The sight of him fumbling, with arthritic hands, to retrieve the tiny phone, first out of a pocket and then out of its fancy leather pouch, and then punching the keyboard, inexplicably broke my heart.

Toronto's train station: Canada's trusting passengers: May they stay strong, as Mr. Ortiz said (Blatchford, 2013a).

Even if the people quoted were never in danger from the plot or attack, or the scenario never actually happened, the emotional content can still reinforce the dangers of domestic terrorism. As previously explained in the discussion of speaker types and the frame relevance of the terror suspect's personal history and character, articles framing an issue this way have the benefit of being more widely relatable, making the content more of a human interest story than a crime or politically-oriented narrative. Furthermore,
a fear angle may serve to raise interest in the topic (and help sell future news stories). I coded 134 instances of emotional responses to terrorism.

The third component of this frame is the level of detail and description given to terrorists’ weapons. I coded 218 instances where the exact type of weapon used (or planned to be used) in a terrorist attack was identified and described in some degree of detail. This detail ranged from the bare minimum (e.g. ‘a bomb’) to fairly extensive, for example,

Nuttall and Korody are alleged to have made three explosive devices out of pressure cookers, similar in make to the type of bombs used in the recent Boston Marathon bombings that killed three people and injured more than 260, and placed them or arranged to have them placed around the legislative buildings in Victoria (Oliver, 2013).

Most descriptions were moderately to highly graphic in their level of detail. The more explained about the weapon, the gorier and more unsettling the description becomes. The excerpt above tells us that the terror suspects created three bombs, akin to the bombs that killed three and injured a great many more in a previous terror attack, and were allegedly prepared to plant them around an important government building, on a day when a high concentration of people would be gathered there to celebrate. Describing the bombs invites people to imagine what might have happened, had they not been apprehended by the RCMP. For example,

“Had this plot been carried out, it would have resulted in innocent people being killed or seriously injured,” said RCMP assistant commissioner James Malizia (DiManno, 2013).
Some examples, like a fertilizer bomb, are frightening because the ingredients are reasonably commonplace. The potential for death and destruction, combined with the fact that domestic terrorists are fully able to build these contraptions at home, from scratch, makes detailed description of weapons a supporting element in the news media’s framing of domestic terrorism as a serious and deadly threat.\(^\text{30}\)

In fact, several articles made a point to mention the potential damage or violence to people resulting from a terrorist attack, independently of the discussion of weapons. I analyzed instances of media focus on terrorist plots or intentions that had as a goal causing death, injury, or trauma to humans, but which failed; these made up the forth component of this frame. Having differentiated these instances from attacks that succeeded in killing at least one person (the fifth component), I then compared the two.

\(^{30}\) In cases where the death toll would not come from weapons per se, but from seizing control of something dangerous and intentionally using it to hurt people, I looked for detailed description of what the terror suspects planned to do, how they planned to do it, and the degree of projected carnage, had the attack been successful.
There were slightly more failed attacks (61%) than successful ones (about 40%), but not by very much. I counted references to Canadian plots or deaths, at home and abroad, and plots or attacks committed in other countries by Canadian-connected terrorists.
Occasionally, if a foreign incident was a) domestic terrorism, b) deadly, and c) mentioned in close connection with a Canadian plot or attack, or brought up to demonstrate Canada’s vulnerability, I included it. I discovered that the Boston Marathon bombings were a journalistic favourite in this regard. Often in the Canadian news media, the shock, horror, destruction, and brutality of this event became a wake-up call of sorts; many Canadian-content domestic terrorism articles use it as a point of comparison and as a cautionary example. There were 130 instances of articles linking Canadian to non-Canadian domestic terror, or vice versa.

Finally, another aspect of media’s framing of terrorism as a serious and deadly threat to Canada is the image of the competent and fearsome terrorist. While the overwhelming majority of terrorist characterizations peg them as criminal and immoral, ignorant and ridiculous, disgusting, irrational, and abnormal (92%), or some other form of psychosocial failure, roughly 9% of the time, this rhetoric is supplanted by one presenting the domestic terrorist as clever, successful in his plans, and an adept manipulator of the Western system.
Messages of competency are found in a National Post article referring to the Toronto 18:

“They picked Christmas for the date of their training camp because they were Canadian kids who knew the country shuts down at that time of year” (Blatchford, 2013).
Somewhat incongruently, even when the terrorists are described in the negative/incompetent terms mentioned above, they are still presented as a threat to people and/or their property. Yet, as discussed earlier, opposing frames may exist simultaneously, and frame elements may become composites of more than one frame, gaining different meaning when switching context. When considering the apparent dichotomy at hand, recall the socially isolated, drug-addicted pair who attempted to blow up the B.C. legislature; or, the Freemen-on-the-Land who took over an elderly woman’s rental home, declared it an embassy, and caused major damage to the property (and psychological stress to the owner). She says of her experience,

“I'm at wits' end and somebody says to me: 'Oh they're just a bunch of kooks,'” said Caverhill. “I say: 'No, they're not. They're not kooks - they're crazy, yes, they're dangerous, yes'” (‘Calgary home declared ‘embassy’ by Freeman Property located in Calgary’s upscale Parkdale neighbourhood, 2013).

Though the Freemen-on-the-Land are known for being ignorant, irrational, and ridiculous (their interactions with the justice system have showcased these propensities time and again), victim speaker Rebekah Caverhill warns that their odd behavior does not make them benign or inconsequential.

*Terrorism as a serious, escalating, and deadly threat* turned out to be one of the most well-developed and best-supported frames in my analysis. The ideas in this frame are clear. Terrorists exist; some of them exist and operate inside Canada (possibly even inside the readers’ own communities); they are dangerous; and they have the potential to be competent. These are people who have turned their backs on Canadian society, people who are intentionally, actively constructing plots and building weapons with the power to
kill or maim, and furthermore, they have no moral compunction against using these weapons to kill ordinary people. In fact, they have done so (or tried to) many times before. A powerful question implicit in this frame is, could a successful terror attack happen in Canada? The also-implicit answer tells us that yes, it could.

I have only touched upon the basic components of the frame here; there is so much potential for further analysis and deeper discussion that I am convinced it would be possible to write another paper simply on how the media creates, conveys, and reinforces this particular idea of terrorism – possibly, without even having to expand the database. It is certainly among the most significant media frames for understanding terrorism in the Canadian context.
Chapter 6: Conclusions

This research revealed some interesting findings on the framing of domestic terrorism in the Canadian news media. Starting with the broad research question, ‘how were domestic and Canadian-connected terrorists and terrorist events portrayed (i.e. framed) by the Canadian news media in the year 2013?’

One finding showed that the media presentation of domestic terrorism and the academic discussion of the phenomenon were disparate. While academic sources tend to favour a more complex interpretation of events, individuals, and organizations, the media tend to gravitate towards simple focal themes which are implicitly or explicitly put forth as explanations or important facets of the topic. Race, religion, psychological states, and other essentialist factors were reported as connected with terrorism by default. Academic findings, on the other hand, explain that the influence of any of the above should be determined on a case-by-case basis, not a priori.

Among the most popular frames were salience of race/ethnicity and Islamic conversion/beliefs as a factor. Secrecy regarding terrorism is appropriate/acceptable, relevance of the terror suspect’s personal history and character, and terrorism (especially domestic) is a serious, escalating, and deadly threat also emerged as notable frames. While a focus on race and religion was typical in the articles, journalists nearly always made efforts not to be overtly racist, as demonstrated in the frame (conditional) sympathy for the moderate Muslim community.

Some findings were less frequent, but still interesting and worth discussing. For instance, a combination of frames and framing devices hinted at differences and divisions characteristic of certain organizations and made visible by the news media. The analysis
of speaker variables, when assessed with the rest of the content, illustrates some examples. Political speakers were commonplace, yet criticism of political bodies and individual politicians was relatively rampant. Contrasting this with the nearly always uniform statements and stories offered to the press by the even more popular police/security speakers, one may draw certain conclusions about the nature of the political game versus the operations of agencies such as the RCMP, CSIS, and local police forces. The latter tended to show more solidarity in terms of the information, statements, and objectives both offered to and withheld from the press, showing a unified – if inscrutable – front, whereas the former helped present an image of discontent and controversy with respect to the political scene.

Another interesting detail was the expansion of what is presented in the media as terrorism. Found amongst the expected reports about bombings, hijackings, and plots were articles extending the label of domestic terrorism to crimes such as a gang-related shooting and a case of squatting. This development is especially potent because of the special counter-measures widely accepted as justifiable (even necessary) in terrorism cases. Treating more and more types of crime as terrorism may lead to changes in how crimes and criminals are dealt with in the Canadian legal system.

The framing devices used most often and to strongest effect were repetition of data, repetition of quotes, and privileging or prioritizing of certain voices over others (such as in the speaker variable discussed above).

This thesis provides some much-needed answers on terrorism framing specific to the Canadian context. However, it is only the beginning for framing research in this milieu. Future research building on or incorporating the data from this thesis could
include exploring certain frames more thoroughly. Frames like the popular ones discussed in the preceding paragraphs, along with others such as *privileging or prioritizing of certain voices, charismatic figures and recruitment: stronger inroads than self-radicalization*, frames related to Canadian values, and those evaluating the government, legal system, and security forces merit more attention based on what they could explain about Canadian law and society (as well as media framing in general).

Another option for building upon this research is to repeat the same study, using the same methodology and practices, but using articles from different years. Trends present in the 2013 news articles may be tracked across time. In this way, scholars may observe and analyze which frames persist in popularity and which fall out of favour in the Canadian news media. Not only would this be a good judge of the study’s replicability, but if successful, would offer conclusions valuable to academics ranging from sociologists to communications scholars to political scientists.

Taking a more holistic approach, a research design incorporating data from focus groups or survey results could serve to see how well the general public absorbs media framing. Studies focusing simply on the mediated aspects of framing – what is said in the texts in question – can only go so far. When combined with data from public opinion research, however, framing studies can go a long way towards explaining the impact of frames on society. This thesis discusses many possible, theoretical effects of the media frames I discovered on public belief, opinion, and action. However, none of these can be correlated with the popularity of specific frames without complimentary research actually investigating public opinion firsthand. I suggest focus groups because they are known to be effective at probing the qualitative elements of human belief and opinion, and because
they may be used to gather data from a wider, larger sample than is practical for one-on-one interviews. Survey data would be my second choice, as it could address relevant questions (such as what news sources participants accessed and their agreement with selected frames), but with less depth (albeit with a larger sample size) than qualitative methods.

Furthermore, this thesis may be valuable for its contributions to the study of war framing in general, as discussed in Reese (2010) and Gavriely-Nuri and Balas (2010). Reese (2010), D’Angelo and Kuypers (2010), and Entman (1993) wish to develop a more unified theory and practice of framing research. If compared to other news framing studies, especially those covering issues like terrorism, security, or war, this thesis may help establish methodological and contextual commonalities that could guide future research. Not only might this development help scholars better understand the framing in legitimized sources of news media, but also the ways terrorist groups use the media to spread their messages of fear and/or propaganda.

There are important gaps in the academic knowledge base on this topic, especially from a Canadian perspective. As explained in the literature review, at the outset of this research project I could not find any Canadian studies about the framing of domestic terrorism, or even any less-specific frame analyses of (generalized) terrorism in the Canadian news media. This is a rather important knowledge gap, given that terrorism is a highly popular topic in the news. My thesis is among the first academic research to explore this particular aspect of Canada’s response to terrorism. The articles in my database cover a variety of domestic terrorism incidents, from Islamic fundamentalist terrorism to eco-terrorism to cases that illustrate new applications of the term (such as
calling a gang shooting “domestic terrorism”). Hence, my analysis, and the resulting frames, draws from a diverse assortment of what the Canadian news media called terrorism in 2013. Awareness of the frames revealed in this thesis provides a jump-off point for comparisons with the data from other framing research (on terrorism specifically or news media more generally), with public opinion research, or as support for non-framing-centric studies about Canadian media, culture, government, and/or response to terrorism.

The overarching conclusion garnered from the findings – evident when addressing the body of frames as a whole – is that the Canadian media is obsessed with terrorism, but, for the most part, falls short of informing and educating their audience to any significant degree. Journalists showed a tendency to sensationalize, e.g. relying on emotional appeals and discussing terror suspects’ personal lives, instead of filling their articles with empirical facts and expert theories about the terrorist incidents they discuss. Focus on religion and race undermined discourse on the more universal, more underlying causes/explanations of terrorist radicalization, and additionally may support certain racist or extremist perspectives. While most journalists shied away from explicit fearmongering, several authors (such as the National Post’s Christie Blatchford) asked the audience to imagine dangerous, deadly acts of terrorism as they could happen on Canadian soil, leading news readers into emotionally charged hypothetical scenarios. The cultural, emotional, psychological, and physical damage domestic terrorism stands to cause was stressed even in articles reinforcing the competence of Canadian security services in preventing attacks. Speculation on ‘what may have happened’, including
graphic details about the alleged terrorists’ weapons and how they planned to use them, helped bolster this presentation of domestic terrorism as a serious and severe threat.

When relevant ‘hard facts’ about the terror incident were included, they were bare-bones, and almost exclusively came from two main sources: police speakers and political speakers. But the former are purposefully guarded as a part of their institutional culture, and the latter are more interested in using rhetoric to make themselves seem appealing to the public (or insulting their political rivals). Statements from both types of speaker are most often collected the same way: via public press conferences staged by the government or security services, the representatives of which thereby have total control over what information is disseminated, and what is kept secret. Two remedies to the problems of poor quality and quantity of information and undue, irrelevant emotionalizing and/or sensationalizing are: a) a return to investigative reporting, wherein journalists sought out leads and facts on their own, rather than relying solely on the information selectively fed to them by authorities, and b) a greater reliance on academic speakers (ideally, to the minimization of community speakers).

Overall, I am pleased with how this thesis turned out. Despite certain setbacks and limitations, the end result yielded some valuable and interesting findings. This study offers great opportunity for other scholars to integrate its data into their own papers, and furthermore, to build upon it, testing the reliability and validity of my methods and conclusions. As a contribution to Canadian media studies, terrorism studies, and framing studies, I believe this thesis stands on its own as an important (and perhaps groundbreaking) work. The highest honour I could hope for, as an academic, is the chance to contribute something of meaning to the body of Canadian sociological
scholarship. If this thesis can do this in even one small way, my efforts have been worthwhile.
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Appendix A: List of Codes, Definitions, and Frequencies

The following is a report created by MAXQDA, detailing all codes and subcodes, definitions, notes and examples (from code memos), and frequencies.

Sentiment re: Academic Research or Knowledge [0] Organizing code.

Pro-Academic/Pro-Knowledge Sentiment [36]

Article includes statements supporting the deeper investigation of domestic terrorism and the need for ongoing research.

Simply the mention of an academic/think tank study or it's data does not count.

E.G. "“If people do not stand up to discuss this, we will not be able to shine the spotlight,” said Salim Mansur, an associate professor of political science at the university in London, Ont., “We have to ask difficult questions.”"- Ottawa Sun - Need more dialogue to shine light on homegrown terror

Anti-Academic/Anti-Knowledge Sentiment [10]

Article relates anti-academic or anti-knowledge sentiment towards terrorism. Attempts at scientific investigation and holistic understanding of terrorism are portrayed by the speaker as the wrong response: often accompanying this kind of statement is the assertion that the only right view of terrorism is strictly as a criminal act, and the right response is punitive. Moreover, it is implied that the two approaches are mutually exclusive, and that anyone who wants to understand terrorism is either deluded, soft on terrorists, a sympathizer, and/or making excuses for their criminal behavior.
E.G., Harper's famous anti-sociology quote:

"Stephen Harper says now is not the time to "commit sociology" in response to the arrests of two men accused of conspiring to attack a Via Rail train." - Winnipeg Free Press

Terror incidents should spark anti-crime

Now is not the time to understand terrorism using sociology - why might that be?

**Citizens' Faith in the Government** [0] Organizing code.

**Confidence in the Govt** [1]

Canadians confident that the govt can and will do what is needed to successfully stop terrorism. Expressed explicitly as citizen's opinion, different from just praise for govt or messages of govt success. Citizen commentator/opinion, not official.

**Lack of Confidence in the Govt** [3]

Canadians not convinced the govt can protect the country from domestic terrorism. Expressed explicitly as citizen's opinion, different from just criticism for govt or messages of govt failures/shortcomings. Citizen commentator/opinion, not official.

**Citizens' Faith in Police/Intelligence Agencies** [0] Organizing code.

**Confidence in Police/Intelligence** [5]
Article mentions Canadian confidence and/or trust that police and intelligence agencies are doing their best and will be successful at preventing domestic terrorism. Expressed explicitly as citizen's opinion, different from just messages of police success.

**Lack of Confidence in Police/Intelligence** [2]

Article mentions Canadians' doubt, concern, insecurity, fear etc. regarding police or intelligence agencies' ability to stop domestic terrorism. Expressed explicitly as citizen's opinion, different from just messages of police failures.

**Metaphor/Simile** [0] Metaphor used to describe terrorism. Organizing code.

**Terrorism as Natural Force** [3]

i.e. natural disaster, weather phenomenon (wind, tide), animal (Al Qaida tentacles, biting).

**Terrorism as Sickness in Society** [2]

i.e. terrorism is like cancer, insanity, or other illnesses on a social level.

**Terrorism as Toxic/Poisonous** [1]

i.e. terrorism as a toxic or poisonous element leaking into and/or corrupting society.

**Speaker** [0] Who are the speakers in the article? Organizing code.
Speaker: literal speaker, i.e. one who is quoted directly ("speaking" to the audience via the reporter), OR source, when the type of source is mentioned ("govt officials say", "accused's brother stated", police revealed" etc.).

**Political Speaker** [187]

Article quotes a politician or political representative.

**Victim Speaker** [37]

Victim of terrorist is quoted in the article.

**Academic Speaker** [73]

Article quotes academic perspectives on domestic terrorism.

e.g. "University of Toronto law professor Kent Roach also raised concerns about the investigative hearings and preventative arrest provisions. While the Supreme Court of Canada upheld investigative hearings as constitutional, he believes there is a “danger” that using them against an uncooperative witness might “alienate” them. He believes that’s exactly what happened during the Air India bombing investigation which ended in an acquittal in large part, he said, due to the fact “witnesses felt forced to testify.”"

terror bill becomes law

**Terrorist Speaker** [88]

Quotes from the terrorist(s) or suspect(s) are used. Terrorist(s) get to explain/defend their actions and/or perspectives. Might not be at all sympathetic to them, however; I expect
quotes will often be snippets of radical statements used to punctuate the article with proof of their deviancy.

Defending self: "'Yes, there has been the odd person here and there that has actually fought back and done some stupid things, but those are individuals. And to paint all Freemen as terrorists, it would be the same as painting all Frenchmen FLQ or all Germans Nazis. It's kind of ridiculous," he said." - freemen (brian alexander)

INTERESTING b/c is white, non-religiously oriented Canadian citizen- Freemen are given more positive quotes/opportunities to defend themselves and promote an opposing point of view than are other (i.e. Islamic) terrorists?

**Community Speaker [230]**

Article quotes members of the community (laypeople) reacting to or commenting on the terrorist event. May be people who knew the terrorist(s), non-radicalized family members of terrorist, victims' family members, or members of the community the terrorist(s) were from.

E.g. "Like many teens, both youths engaged in drinking, smoking and dating, said a former friend who attended South Collegiate Institute with the two young men. But they also talked about Islam all the time, as though they were faithful Muslims, said the acquaintance, who described them as "bipolar" in their faith.

To some young people, it's an "attractive bravado," said London Mosque board member Dr. Wael Haddara. "'There's an old saying, 'it's much easier to die for your faith than to live up to it.' Those groups probably provide a sense of belonging, esprit d'corps. . . a quick way to God. A shortcut." - Londoners in Algeria
Police Speaker [278]

Quotes from police, CSIS, RCMP, or their official spokespeople featured in the article.

E.g. ""The RCMP is aware of the Freeman-on-the-Land ideology and the interaction that some police jurisdictions have had with individuals who follow this movement. Additionally, in recent years, the RCMP has received correspondence directly from followers of this movement," RCMP spokeswoman Julie Gagnon said in an email." - Freemen (brian alexander)

Legal Speaker [119]

Quotes from a lawyer discussing, defending, or prosecuting the case/issue in the article.

E.g. ""We've seen that escalation already," said Ron Usher, general counsel for the Society of Notaries Public of BC." - freemen (Brian Alexander)

Media Speaker [49]

Article references another media outlet or quotes another publication.

E.g. ""On Monday, CBC said the duo travelled overseas with two other Londoners but the report has not been confirmed." - Questions surround Londoners' role in Algeria

Terrorists Competent/Fearsome [29]
Terrorists on the Internet [38] Mention of terrorists using the internet to spread their messages, recruit others, and/or communicate with co-conspirators, OR using the internet to combat terrorists.

**Complex View of Terrorism** [31]

Article offers an analysis/explanation of terrorism that takes into account the complex and diverse array of situations, perpetrators, methods, and/or motives that are part of the terrorism phenomena.

E.g. "Supt. Richer told reporters that violent radicalization was not new, nor was it "exclusive to any single ethnic or interest group, any one religion, any specific socio-economic class, ideology or political world view."

- Nat Post, 'Overwhelming interest' leads RCMP to confirm

**Terrorism Act of Revenge, War, or Defense** [24]

Mentions terrorism as revenge or vengeance against actual or perceived slights or attacks against the terrorist or their people.

E.g. "After running over and trying to behead Pte. Rigby with a meat cleaver, the killers said they were avenging the deaths of Muslims by British soldiers." - Nat Post, Military feared Canadian soldiers could also be

Includes driving non-Muslims out of Muslim lands, e.g.

But he is all for waging what he calls "defensive jihad," which he defined as "defending against people who are in Muslim lands who shouldn't be." While he once wanted to
travel to Yemen, because Awlaki was there, he said he decided against it. "I was going to go but I thought of my kids," he said. Instead, he encourages other Canadians to make their way to places like Somalia to take up arms.

- Nat Post, Cree jihadist

also, terrorism as rightfully defending Muslims and protecting the community, e.g.

"For us as Muslims, our religion teaches that we're brothers and sisters," said Dawood, 33, who said he feared repercussions if his last name was published. "You have to stand up for your brothers and sisters, you have to defend them."- Nat Post, Cree jihadist; How a boy from a reserve became

**Economic Causes of Terrorism** [3]

article mentions economic factors such as poverty, inequality, etc. as fuel for terrorism or an underlying cause.

E.G. "[FBI] And it warns the movement will likely grow, fuelled by the recent economic downturn..."- Tor Star, Antigovernment sovereign citizen movement

**Anti-Western Goals or Motives** [18]

Article provides terrorists' anti-Western goals, motives, ideologies, manifesto, etc.

Applies to both individuals and groups.

E.g., "... Al-Shabab, described by Public Safety Canada as "an organized but shifting Islamist group dedicated to establishing a Somali caliphate, waging war against the
enemies of Islam, and removing all foreign forces and Western influence from Somalia." - Nat Post, Somali MP wants Canadian parents to keep close

**Terrorists had Good Home Life** [20]

Statements telling the reader of the terrorist(s) happy, average, or otherwise good home life.

All the more confusing why they turned to terrorism.

**Terrorists as Alienated or Had Poor Home Life** [37]

Terrorist(s) as victims of an abusive environment or some other harsh living circumstances which helped produce the violent/radicalized person they became.

"The teens all came from homes filled with violence, drinking and drugs and were in and out of foster care." - Hobbema, Alta teens receive maximum sentence

**Terrorists Dissatisfied** [42]

Terrorists described as being dissatisfied or unhappy with themselves, their lives, the West, political situations, and/or the world as a whole - and turning to radicalization as a way to change that. Boredom, alienation, and the desire for excitement may also turn up as forms of dissatisfaction that may underline a person’s radicalization.

E.g. "“A big motivation for Richard and a lot of the guys who end up becoming radicalized is this idea of identity, and transformation, and becoming something,” Leech said. “Not liking who they are, wanting to become something else.”"
“‘If you take somebody who is slightly disenchanted and inclined to think the West is not very good, and you put them in with these people, the next thing you know you want people to do violence.’ When asked if Canadians need to ‘readjust’ their thinking about what makes a terrorist, Fadden said most young recruits are those ‘who feel that the Muslim world is under attack and that somehow Canada is contributing to that.’”

It’s a major concern for security services, said Pantucci, who called Syria a “magnet” for those who are disaffected or simply looking for some excitement.

“That is 100 per cent a substantial consideration, no doubt about it,” he said. “If you’re a bored young man from some place and are going nowhere, and don’t do anything exciting and then someone comes along and says, ‘You, my son, can be a warrior, you can fight on the battlefield,’ it sounds very exciting.- the road to radicalization

**Terrorists Socially Motivated [41]**

Article explains terrorists as being socially motivated: wanting to 'fit in', to prove themselves to the primary group (a community of radicals). Related to charismatic figure, but more personalized to the terrorist - charismatic figure 'seduces', whereas community motivates. Includes mentions of terrorists as people insecure with their status in an adoptive group, such as new converts, who feel like they have a lot to prove.

e.g. Prof. Christian Leuprecht, a terrorism expert at Queen's University and Royal Military College, said it was difficult to say whether converts were more prone to radicalization. He said their involvement in terrorism could stem from a need to prove themselves. "This is partially, conceivably, what may be driving some of this, that you've
got to show that you're willing to do things for the cause that other people aren't, to show that you're a true believer, as a sort of litmus test," he said.

and

he compared their situation to that of a "striker," a prospective member of an outlaw biker gang. "The guy is not patched yet and feels he has to work twice as hard to demonstrate his worthiness. So I think the convert might be inclined to go fast, go hard because they feel they have to prove to others ... 'I'm a true believer.'" - Nat Post, Desire to fit in with the Muslim community can push

or "Aaron Yoon, who went to the same high school as the others"- Macleans, Terror raises questions about us

**Terrorists Penitent/Reject 'Terrorist' label [4]**

Terrorists are penitent or apologetic about their past actions, explaining that they are sorry for what they have done/what they planned to do and/or that they no longer believe in terrorism.

e.g. "... Dirie had claimed at his sentencing that he no longer believed in terrorism or violence."- Nat Post, Alberta high school dropout explains why he, an [STARTED USING THIS CODE AT THE ABOVE ARTICLE]

OR

Terrorists or terror suspects are reported as claiming to be against terrorism/violence, despite charges against them.
e.g. "The brother said he even asked Aaron at the time about Islamic-linked terrorism; he responded that such violence is contrary to Muslim beliefs and that he was "100%" opposed to it."

- Nat Post, Aaron Yoon, friend of Canadian suspects in Alge

**Terrorists Un-Canadian/Betrayed Canada [14]**

Statements casting terrorists as inherently non-Canadian; Canadian-ness something they sacrifice when they resort to terrorism.

e.g. ""Canadian citizenship is predicated on loyalty to this country and I cannot think of a more obvious act of renouncing one’s sense of loyalty than going and committing acts of terror,” Kenney told reporters." - Immigration minister eyes move to strip terrorists

Also: article explains/implies/asks how terrorist has somehow 'betrayed' Canada - the land which has given them so much.

e.g. "Why would someone whose family has been offered a safe haven from the strife that has marked their life, turn against that very country? Why kill the people who have embraced you? As the Jaser's history shows, if they were excluded from anywhere, it was the region of their birth; Canada is the country that gave them acceptance."- Nat Post,

Why would VIA 'plotter' turn against Canada

**Terrorists Ideologically Motivated [82]**

*** NOT USED. Intended to describe the multiple instances of IDEOLOGY of various or indiscriminate sorts described as a motivator or root cause of terrorism, but had too
much overlap with Al-Qaida Ideology as Motive. Al-Qaida Ideology and self-radicalized
codes better considered on their own.

Original definition: Mentions Al-Qaida or Al-Qaida affiliates by name as an influence on
the domestic terrorist(s). Terrorist(s) may be in communication with Al-Qaida/affiliated
groups, OR may have researched and adopted the ideologies on their own (self-
radicalized).

**Al-Qaida Ideology as a Motive** [95]

Al-Qaida Ideology specifically mentioned as a motive by the terrorists themselves or
authorities (i.e. police or academics).

E.g. "two Canadian citizens, driven by an "al-Qaida ideology" - B.C. Canada Day
bombers

**Self-Radicalized** [26]

Domestic terrorists introduced themselves to Al-Qaida ideology and pursued it
independently. Were not (at least initially) recruited by or in contact with established
radicals.

**Radicalized Through Recruitment** [63]

Domestic terrorists had personal contact with, were taught, and/or were given instructions
("radicalized") by an existing radical. Could be over the internet, through a Mosque, or
while on vacation.
Had CONTACT/PARTICIPATION/INTERACTION with terrorist mentors, as opposed to wholly self-radicalized.

**NOT Al-Qaida Ideology** [26]

Domestic terrorists discussed are not affiliated with or inspired by Al-Qaida. Examples include Freemen-on-the-Land, environmental or animal rights activists, or other non-religiously-motivated violence/threats labelled as domestic terrorism (e.g. Pickering terror hoax, Alberta reserve shooting).

E.g. Wiebo Ludwig “claimed that sour gas on his Alberta property was to blame for animal deaths and miscarriages among family members and took aim at the oil and gas industry.” - Canadians with terror ties

**Law Enforcement Successes - Public Protected** [135]

Article tells of law enforcement successes in combatting terrorism and foiling specific plots. Emphasizes the efficacy of Canadian police and intelligence services.

"RCMP say they have foiled a domestic terror attack hatched by two Canadian citizens, driven by an "al-Qaida ideology" to blow up the British Columbia legislature during Canada Day celebrations.

Police were informed of the alleged plot in February by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and a five-month investigation culminated with the arrests of two people in Abbotsford, B.C., on Monday, RCMP announced on Tuesday."

The police successes are keeping the public safe.
"At no time during the investigation was public security at risk, Malizia said.

The devices shown in the photographs were inert, and posed no public threat, police said."

- B.C. canada day terror plot

**Law Enforcement Failures** [7]

Examples of law enforcement/intelligence agencies failing to identify, monitor, foil, or arrest terrorists. Not necessarily a blatant criticism, but pointing out to the reader a potential lapse that could have cost lives.

e.g. “CSIS did not, however, have the pair under surveillance when they left Canada last year.” - London residents shocked by news that Canadians

And "Responses have ranged from incredulity to accusations of incompetence aimed at law-enforcement agencies. A Vancouver Sun editorial last week claimed the incident reflects poorly on all Canadians: “We failed to prevent an international terrorist movement from recruiting our young men, and we failed to prevent them from taking human life.”- Macleans, "Why terrorism can grow in any soil"

**Police Following Procedure** [34]

Article presents police and intelligence agencies as following procedure. Contrary to extreme measures. Often in the form of police officers describing/justifying their investigations to media.
E.g. "There are investigative processes that police must follow in gathering evidence to determine any potential involvement by Canadians," Supt. Richer said." - Nat Post, 'Overwhelming interest' leads RCMP to confirm

**Terrorists ARE Canadian Citizens** [170]

Terrorists discussed are Canadian citizens or legal residents.

Perhaps irrelevant. If relevant: code means the Canadian status pointed out, or the Canadianness of the terrorists/suspects discussed explicitly in the article. Expect they will all have this to some degree.

e.g. "Brian Alexander is a self-proclaimed Freeman-on-the-Land and one of a growing number of Canadian followers of the so-called "sovereign citizen" or "Natural Persons" movement." - freemen (brian alexander)

Omar Khadr “returned to Canada following his repatriation in September of 2012.”

“Two Canadian men from London, Ont., have been linked to a terror attack at an Algerian gas plant in January 2013” - Canadians with terror ties

**Terrorists NOT Canadian Citizens** [22]

Article specifically mentions that the terrorist(s) are not Canadian citizens, despite living/working in Canada at the time of the plot/attack. Articles that only mention the terrorists as being "of [Canadian city]" do not count, even if the terrorists are known (by me) not to be citizens, because as far as the reader can tell, they are from that city.

**Preventative Methods** [46]
Article carries the idea that cautionary behavior or preventative methods can/should be used to protect oneself or one’s community from domestic terror. Includes quotes or pointers explaining how this can be done. May cover techniques on spotting or stopping terrorists, or what to do in case of suspected terrorism, or just reminders that the public should take "an active role in intervention".- Tor Star, Algeria terrorist attack: third canadian believe

E.g. [Police] “said the case is a prime example of why both renters and landlords need to fill out the appropriate forms. "If you are a renter or, on the other side, a person who is doing the renting, you need to make sure that you are doing the right thing," he said. "When there is no paperwork, it causes significant issues for the authorities to deal with." - Freemen, Calgary police arrest sovereign renter

and,

“It’s something I think we need to get serious about. We need to co-ordinate our efforts in our communities and make sure we’re able to prevent these things.”

- Nat Post, Forth former student from London, Ont high sch

or

"He said converts needed more guidance and support to make sure they did not fall into what he called the "jihad trap."”- Nat Post, Desire to fit in with Muslim community can push

Domestic Terror Less Serious or Not Serious [28]
Article conveys viewpoints that domestic terror is not a big problem or serious threat in Canada, overall or at least relatively (compared to other threats like international terrorism or other violent crime). Might be a general statement or in reference to specific alleged/potential terrorist groups.

E.g. “"We're not seeing that really being a huge issue for us right now."" - Freemen, police consider charges

**Terrorists at Large/Released** [20]

Terrorists going uncaptured, still free and potentially dangerous. Also, terrorist suspects being released from prison or without charges (in cases where article does not portray them as innocent, just not proven guilty).

"Two others indicted in the case remain at large." - rebecca rubin case

“Of the group, seven have been released without charges” - Toronto 18, Canadians with terror ties

**Terrorists Arrested** [116]

Describes the arrest of terrorist(s); not necessarily charges or sentence.

**Terrorists Charged/In Court** [116]

Describes terrorist(s) being charged in court.

**Terrorists Convicted/Sentenced** [65]

Article discusses domestic terrorist(s) being convicted and/or sentenced in a court of law.
E.g. "Three teens involved in the shooting death of a five-year-old boy on an Alberta reserve have received the maximum youth sentence - three years of supervised custody - for manslaughter in a crime the judge called "domestic terrorism."

**Terrorists Typical/Normal People [41]**

Article describes at least some parts of the terrorist(s) lives, histories, aims, and/or motivations as normal or understandable. Author may seemingly show pity or sympathy towards the terrorist(s); story might be of how they fell onto the wrong path. This might make the turn to radicalism more tragic - esp. if terrorist(s) are young.

E.g. "The path Xristos Katsiroubas and Ali Medlej took likely began with a typical teenage need to make a difference and a sense of invincibility, then passed through the Internet before intense indoctrination in a group setting run by a "radicalizer."" - Londoners' role in Algeria terror attack

**Terrorists Integrated into Society [99]**

Article describes terrorists as having normal jobs, families, and/or roles in society.

“She said the Katsiroubas family, who are Greek Orthodox, had been coming to her shop for about 30 years and she had watched young Xristos and his brother grow up.” - London residents shocked by news that Canadians

Many possible implications: 1. they can blend in, insidious and dangerous 2. they may not have been that different from normal Canadians before becoming radicalized 3. they are to be found in all our communities; they could be among us now
E.g. “In 2010, Esseghaier began working toward his doctorate at one of the province’s jewels of advanced research, the National Institute for Scientific Research (INRS), located just south of Montreal.”

“There was a large RCMP presence Monday at an industrial plaza in North York. According to an automatic email signature, an “R. Jaser” is a customer service representative at a moving company located in the plaza.”

- Toronto terror plot suspects were religious men

**Islamic Conversion or Beliefs as a Factor [132]**

The Islamic faith, background, and/or conversion of the terrorist(s) is noted by the article as relevant to their terrorist activities and ideology. The intensity or extremism of the beliefs may be emphasized. Popular conception...

EVEN THOUGH! Lorne Dawson says of homegrown terrorist radicalization, "It has little to do with geography, religion or heritage"

- Macleans, Why terrorism can grow in any soil

E.g. "But they also talked about Islam all the time, as though they were faithful Muslims, said the acquaintance, who described them as "bipolar" in their faith." - Londoners in Algeria

“Esseghaier’s devout adherence to Islam reportedly set apart him from colleagues at a high-tech research facility.” - Toronto terror plot suspects were religious men

**Race or National/Ethnic Origin as Relevant [65]**
Article mentions the terror suspect's race, ethnicity or national origin (separate from Canadian/non-Canadian citizenship) as a notable or relevant part of the person's backstory, or as an (implicit or explicit) factor in their radicalization.

e.g. Middle Eastern here:

"The three, despite the diverse backgrounds, were part of a clique dominated by Muslim students of Middle Eastern descent, part of a subtle racial division at the school, a classmate said.

“They had their own little group. I was more at the side of the school with all the skaters and jocks. All the ‘inter-racial people’ were at the front of the school — that’s where they hung out.”

- Nat Post, How three Canadians graduated from a rebellious Korean here:

"The young man's conversion to Islam - though highly unusual in Korean culture - seems to have been welcomed by his surprised relatives, defusing trouble with Aaron that his brother declined to detail."- Nat Post, 'He's 100% against terrorism'; Man wants to cle White here:

"I've never seen one white Canadian come to the musallah," he said

- Nat Post, '_I_will_die_a_martyr' B

PROBABLY NOT UNIQUE TO TERRORISM. Media have long been known to emphasize the race or ethnicity of criminals as a matter of course - compare, "Vietnamese
gangs in Toronto" vs white gangs, or "Biker gangs" i.e. Hell's Angels, whose membership is overwhelmingly white.

**Obscurity of Truth/Details/Motivation [217]**

Article describes the terrorist situation as being shrouded in mystery, confusion, vagueness from official commentators, and/or otherwise missing a lot of information.

"Little else was released. And months on, more questions than answers remain." - BC canada day plot

"When asked whether the alleged plot had a religious motive or was instead driven by something else, Malizia was vague." - BC duo planned canada day attack

“There are also unconfirmed reports under investigation that a second Canadian was part of the squad, along with Somali fighters from Sweden.” - Probe focuses on Canadian as suspect

Terrorists’ own motives or reasons for radicalization can be cast as obscure. Often, quotes from family/community members struggling to come to terms with the terrorist incident are used to portray the bafflement and lack of understanding of the general public.

“Why did the 29-year-old, who grew up in a nonreligious family in a sleepy seaside town on England’s south coast, turn to such an extreme form of Islam? Leech, who made a film about Dart called *My Brother the Islamist*, has spent years thinking about it and still isn’t sure.” - The road to radicalization
IT IS POSSIBLE that articles use quotes/stories/reactions from fmr friends, colleagues, or neighbours of terrorist(s), Muslim or local community members, etc. to fill out an article when official sources are not forthcoming with information.

"Thinking of" Committing Terrorism [10]

Article references opinions/statements supporting the investigation and prosecution of people who are merely THINKING of committing terrorism, joining terrorist groups, etc. Deterrence not just for action but seemingly for thought. Suspicion becomes closer to being accepted as truth/reasonable grounds. Often to do with the "foreign fighter problem".

e.g. "Queen’s University and Royal Military College terrorism expert Christian Leuprecht said the bill does two key things. It “prevents the foreign fighter problem,” like the recent incident involving two Canadian youngsters who took part in a deadly attack in Algeria, and “lowers the threshold” of proof so those thinking of training abroad to commit an act of terror can be prosecuted, not just those who actually do it." - terror bill becomes law

"As part of S-7, the government has also introduced four new terrorism offences to the Criminal Code, all of which have to do with leaving or attempting to leave Canada to commit several of the existing terrorism offences in the Code."

- CBC, Bill to restore sunetted anti-terrorism laws debated

Eco-Terrorism [12]

Terrorists mentioned in article are motivated by environmentalist/animal rights causes.
For example, "A Canadian woman who surrendered after a decade hiding in Western Canada is expected to enter guilty pleas in the largest eco-terrorism case in U.S. history, court records show.

Rebecca Rubin, 39, originally from North Vancouver, was accused in a federal indictment of being a member of cells of the Earth Liberation Front and Animal Liberation Front known as The Family." - Rebecca Rubin case

**Political Dissidence** [49]

Framing domestic terror as connected to or resulting from political dissidence. Dissidence means notable, vocal disagreement with the laws and/or practices of the Canadian government. May entail active rebellion against these laws/practices in the form of doing illegal acts.

E.g. Freemen on the land who "drives without licenses and does not pay income tax"

OUTLIER: Toronto 18 "claiming they opposed Canada's military mission in Afghanistan" - Nat Post, Unemployed techie created fake evidence of terror ... most suitably fits under political dissidence, though most accounts attribute a more Jihadist motive to their plot.

**Charismatic Figure(s)** [35]

Article makes reference to a charismatic figure in charge of/responsible for a terrorist organization, movement, cell, etc. May be either by name, or their existence mentioned as a generalized explanation/theory.

ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT: draws new members into radical/terrorist ideologies:
"If there is a guru of the Freeman movement in Canada these days it's a man named Dean Clifford from Manitoba. In June, about 80 people paid to hear Clifford spread the sovereign gospel at a seminar in Victoria and tickets are now available on his website to another scheduled for Toronto this November." - Tor Star, Antigovernment sovereign citizen movement

Can sound romanticized and larger-than-life. E.G.,

""The influencer is a respected person. It could be a person with some pedigree, relative to where they've been and what they've done. They could have a gunslinger moxy to them," Boisvert said."

- The Observer, Homegrown Terrorism

**Muslim Community Distances/Condemns Terrorism** [78]

Article includes quotes from people in the Muslim community or mentions reaction distancing the Muslim community from terrorists and their acts. Mentions of the Muslim community helping the RCMP and CSIS, and keeping watch for radicals and extremists among them, portray the Muslim community as distinct from terrorists. Some overlap with Vigilance/Suspicion is expected.

"Several leading members of B.C.'s Muslim community were shocked at the alleged homegrown plot.

"These names don't ring a bell at all. They're not even Muslim names," said Adam Buksh, president of Surrey Jamiyah Mosque."

OR statements condemning terrorism and disavowing themselves from radicalism

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"Buksh said members of his mosque and the B.C. Muslim Association do not condone radicalism."

OR affirming the Muslim community's commitment to Canadian law, order, and values.

"In my mosque, if I see any kind of things like that happening ... I will stop them in their tracks and report them to the authorities," he said.

"We are law-abiding." - B.C. Canada day plot

“Many times we have been at the RCMP facilities and the government agencies for input, for sensitivity training,” said Badat. In turn, Mounties are invited visit mosques and community centres so Muslims in Canada “get a sense of how we can communicate and how we can contribute in the best interests of the country.” The role of imams, he said, is to “motivate our congregations that we are not to be blamed but we have to do our part.

“Terrorists generally isolate themselves and are learning and being inspired by jihadi videos on the Internet. Terrorism and these crimes don’t really have a religion.” - Terror plot; Toronto Muslim leader tipped off RCMP

**Vigilance/Suspicion [100]**

Article mentions the past or ongoing vigilance of Canadians or promotes the need for vigilance in identifying and/or stopping domestic terrorism. Including suspicion of people/places/things previously thought of as innocuous or new on the radar.

E.g. "It may have been a phone call from a suspicious Surrey neighbour, a tip from a police informant or the product of electronic intelligence." - BC Canada day terror plot
"That's what we keep thinking about," said one London Muslim Mosque member. "If they (terrorist teachers) are here, it's a very curious thing. Where are they from? Does anybody know them? Who talked to them?" asked the man, who didn't want to be named." - Algerians in London

May refer to vigilance on the part of police/intelligence organizations as well as civilians.

"We're monitoring to make sure it doesn't become as big a problem as it has been in the United States and obviously we work with our partner agencies south of the border as well to help us gauge the trends," he said." - Police consider charges in rental embassy

“Once it gets to the attention of authorities, it’s usually too late, somebody’s already gone way too far down a path. Once somebody starts to withdraw, shifting their friendships, shifting away from typical activities, becoming intolerant, dogmatic in their political religious views . . . when that happens, you’ve got good cause to intervene... You need to be your brother’s keeper.”- Canada will 'recommit' to combating homegrown terrorism

Criminal/Immoral/Disreputable Past Behavior or Character [148]

Instances of terrorists displaying poor morals or character outside of terrorist activities or beliefs; stories showing how the terrorist(s) did wrong things in the past. Includes being in trouble with the law (previous arrest warrants, a criminal record pre-terrorism), drug addiction, theft, and/or violence.

E.g."A friend recommended the man and he promised to do some work on the place in exchange for a few months' free rent. A few months later, Caverhill went to inspect the property and said she found the kitchen and bathroom had been gutted, all the inside
doors removed and the floor of one bedroom painted black." - freemen on the land, calgary

"He was charged with pushing a landlady down a flight of stairs in Montreal in 2007." - freemen, calgary

Instances of terrorists doing wrong/illegal things in the present or as an ongoing phenomena also count.

E.g. "one official who has followed the rise of the sovereign citizen movement in Canada says there have been a number of confrontations in B.C. and elsewhere during routine traffic stops or legal proceedings." - freemen

**Immature, Ignorant, or Ridiculous [115]**

Examples of terrorists being uneducated or stupid; making commonplace mistakes or worse.

E.g. "Alphabet magnets on the refrigerator spelled out the word "respect" and a sign on the door of one room called it a meeting place for people of the "First Nations Sovran Embassy of Earth."" -freemen on the land, calgary

article mocks terrorists; its language makes light of them using jokes, puns, etc.

Reminiscent of Herman & Chomsky’s propaganda framing, newspapers saying things like “Clobba Slobba” to make fun of Slobodan Milosevic during the Bosnian conflict.

E.g. “A Calgary home that the owner says was claimed as an "embassy" by a follower of the Freemen-on-the-Land movement is now freemen free.” - Freeman frat house now freeman free (title of article)
Broken English or fragmented sentences can also be used to this effect.

e.g. “Toronto terrorism plot: ‘Criminal Code is not holy book,’ Chiheb Esseghaier tells court” - headline

The holy book comment alone is somewhat ridiculous in context...

"[Esseghaier] told a judge that criminal law was "imperfect" because it was not derived from a holy book."

- Nat Post, Man charged in VIA derailment plot fled Germany

**Disgusting/Irrational/Abnormal Behavior or Psychology [79]**

Domestic terrorist behavior or appearance weird, disgusting, abnormal, and otherwise appalling. Above and beyond differing political or religious ideologies, bridging into common sense knowledge and practices. Domestic terrorists' lives and habits presented as remarkably unhygenic, derelict, irrational, etc. References to their past or current history of mental illness also reinforce the idea that there is something deeply and severely wrong with domestic terrorists.

E.g. "Windows were covered with towels, clothing was heaped on floors and dirty dishes were piled in the kitchen that smelled like rotten food." - freemen on the land, calgary

abnormal behavior: "claimed the home as an embassy" - freemen, calgary

ridiculous: "Notaries have found themselves embroiled as many Freemen attach inexplicable importance to having notaries authorize documents the Freemen have invented to declare their status." - freemen, bc (brian alexander)
Mental illness: "Nuttall may be found not criminally responsible for his alleged actions due to a mental disorder. In late July, he was transferred to a psychiatric hospital in Coquitlam for assessment." - BC canada day plot

**Description/Detail of Weapons** [218]

Article describes what sort of weapons the terrorist(s) used/were planning to use. Detail may vary, i.e.: "a bomb", "a homemade bomb", "a homemade pressure cooker bomb".

"Nuttall and Korody are alleged to have made three explosive devices out of pressure cookers, similar in make to the type of bombs used in the recent Boston Marathon bombings that killed three people and injured more than 260, and placed them or arranged to have them placed around the legislative buildings in Victoria." - bc canada day plot

“...for his role in a fertilizer bomb plot in the U.K. in 2004” - Momin Khawaja, Canadians with terror ties

**Potential Damage/Violence to People** [168]

The plot or attack described included damage to human beings (death or injury) as part of its goal or as an anticipated side effect, but did not actually kill anyone (that the article mentions). To code mention of attacks that were successful in killing people, use Deadly Attack.

E.g. “Esseghaier is co-accused with a 35-year-old Toronto man, Raed Jaser, of conspiring to attack and murder persons unknown for the benefit of a terrorist group, and of
conspiring to interfere with transportation facilities — a plot that police allege was supported by Al Qaeda in Iran.” - Toronto Terrorism plot; criminal code is not holy book

Also includes the mention of violence as an acceptable/encouraged part of an organization, group, or individual's worldview/credo.

E.g. ""Individuals associated to this movement are a concern because some followers advocate violence to promote their views and this may involve violence toward police officers." - freemen (brian alexander)

**Deadly Attack** [107]

ONLY use this for when actual deaths occurred as a result of terrorism; otherwise, use Damage/Violence to People. Deaths may be Canadians, or foreigners if killed by a Canadian-connected terrorist. How old/recent the deaths are is irrelevant (i.e., the FLQ and Air India deaths are still relevant) as long as the article itself was published in 2013.

**Damage to Property** [37]

Domestic terrorism is linked to property issues or property damages in the article. theft, vandalism, sabotage, illegal occupation, and the like are discussed as the goals and/or activities of domestic terrorists. attack or threats to home, business, equipment, or institution(s).

E.g. "A woman has seen her Calgary rental home for the first time since a self-proclaimed sovereign citizen was removed from the property last week."

Animals released from fur farm
Sabotage of pipelines or equipment

Potential or planned damage to property will be included under this code.

e.g. "... if they would fund his plan to bomb an oil pipeline in Canada, he set in motion a cautionary tale about prosecuting terrorism before it has been committed."

- Nat Post, the difficulty in prosecuting terrorism before questioning the "average Canadian" image [31] Article makes a point of how "average", "normal", or "unassuming" the terrorists were. Describes them as typical, possibly including accounts of "normal" activities, habits, or character traits terrorists were known to have.

e.g. "Last week, former London residents Ali Medlej and Xristos Katsiroubas were publicly identified as participants in the al-Qaeda attack this past January on a natural-gas plant in Algeria that left 29 insurgents and 39 hostages dead. Both young men, aged 24 and 22, respectively, were friends at London South Collegiate Institute. And like their hometown, their upbringing seems, from the outside, utterly average. Medlej played football and was known for being boisterous and having a quick temper. Katsiroubas, raised in a Greek Orthodox family, was quieter but enjoyed road hockey and video games. A third friend, Aaron Yoon of Korean-Catholic descent, was similarly recognizable as a typical teen."

"If the upbringings of Medlej and Katsiroubas seem remarkably unremarkable, this comes as no surprise to Lorne Dawson, co-director of the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society and chairman of the department of
sociology and legal studies at the University of Waterloo. He says most homegrown terrorists share similarly unassuming backgrounds."—Macleans, Why terrorism can grow in any soil

anti-Muslim racial profiling [17]

anti-Muslim racial profiling (or official sentiment) mentioned as a possibility and/or a concern.

terrorism experts [29]

article presents certain speakers and/or sources as experts on terrorism, either by stating this verbatim, or by explaining that they have a background in terrorism research.

Past instances of Canadian terror [57]

i.e. Air India, the FLQ… mentioned in the article alongside current terrorist events.

linking Canadian to non-Canadian domestic terror [130]

Article mentions attacks outside of Canada and by non-Canadians alongside Canadian instances, drawing explicit or implicit parallels to the Canadian situation. Most frequently this appears to be references to the Boston Marathon bombings.

This quote draws clear parallels between the Bush govt in the U.S. and the Harper govt in Canada; not only does it compare U.S. policy on terror to our own, but it posits that a U.S. terror event, the Boston bombings, in fact affect Canadian policy:

e.g. "The former George W. Bush government in the U.S. used to change the colour of its “terror threat” if it was marching into headwinds on other matters. In this case, by
abruptly changing gears last Friday and deciding to move on its long-neglected anti-terrorist legislation, Conservatives immediately faced charges of using the Boston Marathon bombings for political expediency.” - Toronto terrorism plot takedown helps Conservatives

**Canadian domestic terror as symptom of a global problem [51]**

Article mentions Canadian-connected terror incidents as part of a larger global phenomenon: enabled/influenced by, happening because of, or appearing as a manifestation of violent radicalism internationally. Canadian terror incidents can be understood as parts of a bigger movement.

Contrast with: "Assistant Commissioner Wayne Rideout said the charges involved a "domestic threat" to target Canada Day festivities on the grounds of the provincial legislature in Victoria. There were no links to international organizations, said Rideout."

- The Guardian, BC Mounties say duo planned to blow up legislature

Even though later in the same article, the RCMP "repeatedly" claim that "the plot was linked to an "al-Qaida ideology" - in some ways contradictory to the characterizing of plot as an entirely domestic threat

**law/legal responses [37]** Primarily organizing code. Initially used as a catch-all code for discussion of law and legal responses to terrorism, but abandoned as nearly all instances of this could fit under the more specific subcodes listed below.

**terrorism used to justify emergency/special powers or measures [72]**
mentions terrorism as (rightly or wrongly) being used to justify or defend the implementation or continued use of special powers above and beyond traditional canadian criminal law.

**terrorism used for political profit/advancement** [23]

political parties framed as using the threat of terrorism to advance their own interests, including using the law to footholds of power and/or disregard civil rights.

e.g. "The high-profile terror arrests play to the Conservatives’ strength, allowing them to preach their tough law-and-order agenda and their no-mercy-for-terrorists talking points. And maybe add a few bucks to their coffers." - Toronto terrorism plot takedown helps Conservatives

**opposition or dissent silenced/crushed** [14]

political opposition or dissent to counter-terrorism measures silenced or crushed.

may include opponents withdrawing their objections for fear of seeming sympathetic to terrorists.

e.g. "But when it came time to question Stephen Harper, during a time when Canadians might be watching — and in the clip that would likely make newscasts — NDP Leader Tom Mulcair pulled back, offering only congratulations to the police and the “brave” Toronto imam who tipped police." - Toronto terrorism plot takedown helps Conservatives

possibility of dissent already precluded.
Security expert Wesley Wark believes there was a degree of opportunism in the Conservative move to bring the anti-terror debate to the Commons floor Monday, “but not a desperate opportunism; they added a degree of triumph to a victory already at hand.’” - Toronto terrorism plot takedown helps Conservatives

**legal safety nets/honourable prosecution** [19]

mention of a legal measure as being a "safety net" designed to prevent abuses of anti-terrorism legislation. Justifying the "safety" of such legislation by explaining that even though it has incredible powers and reach, it is reasonable, and the average Canadian need not fear it.

E.g. "For example, he said, peace officers can’t just jail an individual for three days, but must make a case before the courts for ongoing detention after 24 hours. He believes the plan to sunset the measures after five years pending another review is also a good safety net." - terror bill becomes law

**legal responses supported/reccomended** [33]

legal responses harsh/problematic/controversial [58] New laws or legal responses to terrorism cited as controversial or overly harsh. Examples include laws that infringe on Canadian civil rights or extreme measures taken to detain/punish suspected terrorists.

“[Omar Khadr] The convicted terrorist, who some argued was a child soldier at the time and shouldn’t face charges” - Canadians with terror ties

**emotional response** [134]
Speakers or author talk about feelings in reaction to a terrorist case. E.g., expressing "shock", horror, or other emotions, like

"Premier Christy Clark said it was "profoundly shocking" to think that anyone would want to harm "thousands of people who were gathered on Canada Day with their families and their children."

-Journalist attempt to foster a sentimental, emotional reaction, for instance, by expounding upon the lives of the victims, or providing an emotionally charged hypothetical sceanario, e.g.

"I looked upon the crowd. Who would have been "the face of Canada's terror bombing," as eight-year-old Martin Richard has been called Boston's, had it proceeded along lickety-split? Could it have been the teenager with the small clutch of flowers? The young man who made animals-in-the-jungle noises to amuse his girl as they said goodbye? The older couple, he sweating and breathless, she organized and clearly in charge but quietly frantic, who went off to find out where they should go next?"

- Nat Post, Who would have become 'the face of Canada's terror'

(I have been using it as a catch-all for public reaction, including interest, and some other things that may be best conceptualized as "opinion" or "beliefs about" rather than feeling.)

e.g. interest: "The RCMP acknowledges that there is an overwhelming interest in the matter concerning an attack on an Algerian gas plant in January, and that this issue is captivating the Canadian public," Supt. Marc Richer said."
- Nat Post, 'Overwhelming interest' leads RCMP to confirm

NOT referring to the emotions of the terrorist or speculation thereof.

**punitive response** [39]

Describing or advocating a punitive response to terror threats.

“The kidnappings sparked an increase in military presence and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau implementing the War Measures Act, which allowed police to arrest citizens and to hold them without bail.” - FLQ Crises, Canadians with terror ties

**citizen condemnation** [6]

Non-govt/police affiliated citizens making statements of condemnation or defiance against terrorism.

E.g. "To quote the magnificent words uttered just a few days ago by the Boston Red Sox designated hitter David Ortiz, "This is our f--ing city, and nobody gonna dictate our freedom."" - Nat Post, Who would have become 'the face of Canada's terror'

**official condemnation** [23]

Political, law enforcement, military, or other officials go on record condemning the terrorists. OFTEN SIMULTANEOUSLY REINFORCING CANADIAN VALUES/THE STRENGTH OF CANADIAN INSTITUTIONS. Declaring that terrorist efforts are/will be futile.

"B.C. Premier Christy Clark said she was profoundly shocked by news of the arrests."
"But let me say this to those who resort to terror: You will not succeed," Clark told reporters at the legislature in Victoria. "You will not succeed in damaging our democratic institutions. Just as importantly, you will not succeed in tearing down the values that make this country strong." - B.C. Canada day plot

**serious/escalating threat** [200]

Can be either a direct statement of an individual's/group's/phenomenon's growing impact on or danger to society...

OR a statement about escalating legal/official responses to deal with a particular individual/group/phenomenon.

E.g. "RCMP and the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police officers are developing awareness materials for frontline officers, and the movement is the subject of upcoming policing seminars in Vancouver and Toronto." - freed or falling; some wonder the fact that the RCMP and Canadian police are paying more attention to the freemen and spending time and effort to make their members aware = they deserve attention and control.

**politics** [33]

article focuses primarily around politics or political concerns.

**politicians vow to combat terrorism** [28]

Quotes from politicians reaffirming, vowing, or demanding action against terrorism. May be used as a rhetorical tool to slam another party for being soft on terrorism.
politicians evaluated negatively [8]

Article criticizes politicians.

E.g. "It is a discredit to the Canadian political body as a whole that while our neighbours to the south were dealing with death, casualties and a manhunt which locked down a major U.S. city, our political leaders were consumed with parsing terrorism comments made on the CBC by Trudeau."

- Toronto Star, Conservatives playing politics with anti-terror bill: Tim Harper

politicians evaluated positively [3]

Article praises politicians.