

The Education of Demea in Terence's *Adelphi*

by

Justin Stricker

A thesis  
presented to the University of Waterloo  
in fulfilment of the  
thesis requirement for the degree of  
Master of Arts  
in  
Ancient Mediterranean Cultures

Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2011

© Justin Stricker 2011

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.

## Abstract

The aim of this thesis was to gather an in-depth understanding of the changes in the role of the Roman father during the Middle Roman Republic by analyzing a play called *The Adelphi* by Terence. A literature review was conducted to highlight the divergent views on Roman and Greek education and fatherhood, and its application in Rome. When Rome came into contact with Greece in 241BC, controversy was sparked on how a Roman father should raise his sons. This conflict arose because Greek fathers tended to raise sons with kindness, fairness, and equity in contrast to the heavily traditional, stern, strict, and restrictive methods of Roman fathers. There was a recent debate among modern scholars on this topic; however, it has generally been agreed that the Roman father was no longer a cold and overcontrolling paternal figure in Middle Republic.

Because of the scarcity of primary sources dating before the first century BCE, Terence's *Adelphi* is a valuable piece of evidence for understanding the 2<sup>nd</sup> Century BCE controversy that arose between those for and against all things Greek: philosophy, art, literature, mores, cultural norms and education. In his play, Terence contemplates this issue and concludes by presenting an ideal father as possessing a balance of both Roman conventional morals and paternal authority, and Greek kindness and fairness to foster affection and respect among family members. This is evident when the protagonist, the heavily traditional Roman father, Demea, initially having alienated his sons, changes his behaviour after adopting these Greek characteristics to earn back both his sons' affection. The importance of this conclusion to the play suggests that Greek Philosophy and cultural mores began to influence Roman fatherhood and education as early as 160 BCE when the play was produced posthumously in Rome. More specifically, Terence's play was one of the first social plays to impact Roman society by portraying an ideal image of a softer, and gentler Roman father, who did not solely rely on the absolute power and control he possessed over his sons.

Although there is primary evidence in literary works to support that the *Adelphi* continued to gain popularity in first century BCE with its Greek concepts of kindness, fairness, and equity in fatherhood and education, future archeological research of Roman family tombstones in Rome may further shed light on the issue concerning the extent to which Greek philosophy and mores influenced and impacted Roman society in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Century BCE.

## **Acknowledgements**

I gratefully acknowledge the invaluable support and guidance that Dr. Christina Vester provided to me in the focus and organization of my thesis.

I thank Dr. David Porreca and Dr. Judith Fletcher for their assistance throughout my graduate program.

I extend my sincere gratitude to my family, especially my parents, Tom and Gay Stricker as well as my siblings, Lauren and Steven and my good friend Laura Roncone for their continued support in all that I do.

## Table of Contents

Introduction .....	1
Chapter One: Fathers and Education in the Roman Republic.....	14
Chapter Two: Demea and Cato: Exemplars of Early Republican fatherhood.....	28
Chapter Three: Demea as a tyrannical <i>exemplum</i> .....	37
Chapter Four: Demea Aceeds to a more Greek method of childrearing.....	49
Chapter Five: The Dramatic Twist in Terence’s Plot.....	59
Conclusion.....	67
Appendix A.....	88
Bibliography.....	93

## Introduction

Terence's play *Adelphi* was performed posthumously in 160 BCE.<sup>1</sup> The story follows the love intrigues of two young men, biological brothers, but reared in different homes. Demea, the biological father of both, gave one of his sons, Aeschinus, to his brother Micio, a proponent of generosity and permissiveness in childrearing. In contrast, Demea is rearing his other son, Ctesipho, in strict authoritarian style. How the two youths deal with the outcomes of pursuing their amorous objectives suggests one of the meanings of the play. On the surface, *Adelphi* is a play dealing with the education of youths. Yet it could be equally called the *Fathers*, or *Patres*, for it details the educational approaches of the two fathers, the successes and failures of their childrearing practices and theories, and how they themselves learn from their sons. This is especially true of Demea, who confronts and reforms his traditionally rigid and harsh parenting practices because his sons dislike, deceive, and avoid him. Demea learns much, much more than his sons about himself, fatherhood, education, and the Greek and Roman world. In teaching his sons, he learns to add humanity, kindness and generosity to his formerly more restrained, conservative, and strict method of early Roman Republican education. Because of the implementation of both Greek and Roman methods into his educational practices, Demea earns the affection of his sons. The playwright Terence broadens Roman education and culture by embedding Greek theories of philosophy and practices of humanity into Demea's approach for raising his sons.

---

<sup>1</sup> Gratwick, 1999: 17. Throughout this thesis, the Latin text and translations of Terence's *Adelphi* come from

## **Greek philosophy, Greek drama, and a Roman play**

In order to understand that the education of Demea is marked as significant, both on and off the stage, an audience/reader must take into account Demea's onstage character construction as well as the massive changes occurring in 2<sup>nd</sup> century Rome. While I shall deal with the latter first, both will be more fully described in the body of this thesis. Greek social practices, philosophy, art, religion and culture flowed into Rome after the First Punic War ended in 241 BCE. Debate regarding the ideal system of education and the role of Roman fathers became very topical. At this time, Roman conservatism was being confronted by advocates for Greek ideas and the adoption of them - and on no front more than cultural mores. A significant part of culture is of course the practice of childrearing and education. The time-revered and customary understanding of the *mores maiorum* (custom of the ancestors) and education was being challenged by waves of philhellenism sweeping through Rome. This sparked two primary factions arguing for or against the acceptance of Greek ideas to enter Rome. On the one side, Cato the Elder (234-149 BCE) proclaimed that Greek culture and education would corrupt the youth of Rome, and that Roman fathers alone should control the education of their sons in order to ensure that they have a proper moral upbringing.<sup>2</sup> Greek philosophy was suspect, deemed a negative influence on Roman culture, and Cato attempted to avoid Greek - Italian interaction. Therefore, the old senator supported the senatorial decree permitting the expulsion of Greek grammarians, philosophers and rhetoricians.<sup>3</sup> Passed in 161 BCE, this decree occurred only one year before the first performance of the *Adelphi*. According to Plutarch, Cato tried to forestall the

---

<sup>2</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 20.

<sup>3</sup> Suet. *Rhet.* 25. 1-2; Gell. 15. 11. 1.

growing popularity of the Greek language and thus keep it out of Roman education.<sup>4</sup> He attacked their language proclaiming that “the words of the Greeks were born on their lips, but those of the Romans in their hearts.”<sup>5</sup> He condemned Greek texts including one by the Roman Postumius Albinus who wrote a history in Greek.<sup>6</sup> Specifically, Cato did not acknowledge the Greek concept of *humanitas* (about which more will be said later) and rejected it in his own son’s education, despite many other citizens acknowledging its concepts as a vital part of fatherhood during the Middle Republic. He did not wish to accept any influence that challenged the traditional Early Republic’s *mores maiorum* and his primary role in his son’s education.

On the other side of this issue, Scipio Aemilianus (185-129 BCE) and the Scipionic Circle, a group of Roman elites, endorsed and promoted the teaching of Greek morals, culture, language, and philosophy in Roman education and fatherhood. Unlike Cato who taught his son solely by using himself as an *exemplum* (example or model), Scipio Aemilianus brought up his sons both by example and “on the Greek pattern... for the young men were surrounded by Greek teachers.”<sup>7</sup> Most unlike Cato, Scipio Aemilianus was specifically linked with the concept of *humanitas*, and even described as being *moribus facillimus* (possessing an affable disposition).<sup>8</sup> Terence played a part in importing a changed understanding of fatherhood and education, for he was part of the Scipionic circle, the enthusiasts of Greek literature and culture who gathered together many upper-class, educated Roman nobles equally keen on amalgamating the finest aspects of Greek and Roman civilizations into Italy.

---

<sup>4</sup> Watcher, 2002: 46.

<sup>5</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 2. 12. Trans: Perrin, 1914: 337.

<sup>6</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 2. 12. Trans: Perrin, 1914: 337.

<sup>7</sup> Plut. *Aem.* 6. 8. f.

<sup>8</sup> Cic. *Amic.* 69.



One of the concepts they focused upon and sought to import to Rome was the notion of *humanitas*.<sup>9</sup> A century later, Cicero developed this concept to include ideally the characteristics *pudicitia* (modesty), *temperans* (self-control), *lenitas* (mildness), *clementia* (compassion), *liberalitas* (generosity), *rationabilitas* (rationality), and *patientia* (tolerance), as well as *facilitas* (courteousness) towards others.<sup>10</sup> I acknowledge that Cicero's concept of *humanitas* is anachronistic in this interpretation of Terence's *Adelphi*. Cicero does, however, provide a Roman definition that very closely parallels Menander's use of the Greek term *φιλάνθρωπος*. Menander is, of course, the Greek playwright of the dramas that Terence closely followed in his adaptations, and *φιλάνθρωπος* is the Greek equivalent of the Latin term *humanitas*. Both the Latin and Greek terms mean "kind, humane, mild, common to humanity." In the *Self-Tormentor*, Terence uses the adjective *humanus* (clearly linked to the noun *humanitas*) in a way that captures the semantic field of both terms. In this play, one character tries to provide comfort and remedy to his neighbour by saying "*homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto*" (I am human. I consider nothing that is human alien to me).<sup>11</sup> Both Plautus and Terence used *humanitas* and related

---

<sup>9</sup> It is generally agreed that Aemilianus and the Scipionic Circle imported the idea of *humanitas* to Rome. There is controversy when it occurred, and whether the Greek philosopher Panaetius or Terence, the Roman playwright, was the first to render this term in their works as "kind, humane". The critic George Luck, 1975: 264, writing on Panaetius and Menander, contends that Panaetius' use of the Greek equivalent term *φιλάνθρωπος* was deeply influenced by Menander. Robert Lamberton, Matthew Leigh and Oscar Nyabakken agree that Menander was the first to use the Greek term *φιλάνθρωπος* as meaning "kind, humane, and mild." Additionally, John Barsby, A.S. Gratwick, and Martin, contend that Terence and Plautus of New Roman Comedy translated this term from Menander and used the Latin equivalent *humanitas* in their own plays.

<sup>10</sup> Oscar, 1939: 396. Cic. *Leg.* 1. 25. Gay, 1996: 107-108 discusses Cicero's development of the characteristics of *humanitas*.

<sup>11</sup> Ter. *Heaut.* 77. Astin, 1967: 305 interprets this passage in much the same way, arguing that "the reason given by one character [in Terence's play] for attempting to intervene and remedy the apparent unhappiness of his neighbour... which represents an attitude of sympathy and humane concern derived from a consciousness of common humanity. It is a harbinger of the vital element of Cicero's *humanitas*." Astin adds that he believes that this sentence was taken from Menander's Greek original of the play.

words to mean “humane, common to humanity,”<sup>12</sup> thereby demonstrating that this was a current and important idea in Rome already in the middle Republic.

It was also clearly linked to education. Cicero stated that the concept of *humanitas* included fostering an education in the liberal arts and a strong ethical awareness. In the *Adelphi*, a play that engendered quite a negative reaction, Terence focused upon fatherhood and education, *humanitas*, and *aequitas* (fairness, justice, just or equitable conduct toward others, equity).<sup>13</sup> The unfavourable reaction to the play may have been due to the controversies of accepting or rejecting Greek influences, or to a sense that Greek notions of morals and behaviour were usurping the ancestral customs of the *mores maiorum* and traditional education system based on the father’s *exemplum*. The lack of ancient sources do not allow for a definitive assessment of why the play was not received well. What is undeniable is that this play taps into the cultural anxiety and debate over the role of Greek philosophy in the sphere of Roman education.

Specifically, *Adelphi* focuses on *humanitas* and *aequitas*. These concepts ask that kindness, equity, and lawfulness be extended to all citizens, including members of the family, community, and the senate. In the case of Roman fathers, these theories ask him to consider “what is fair and just” (*aequum*) with respect to fatherhood. Again, a Greek was behind this notion. Aristotle says that reasoning must be included in a father’s decision to reward, punish, or to restrict his son. This idea of ‘what is fair or right’ (*aequum*) asks for a father to be generous and loving, yet stern and serious in discipline *depending on the situation because each one differs*. By raising sons in this way, fathers earn their sons’ admiration and respect. Another example of *humanitas* and *aequitas* exists in the traditional Roman concept of *frugalitas*

---

<sup>12</sup> For Terence, *humanitas*, and related terms see the following passages: Ter. *Ad.* 107-110, 471, 687, 734-36, 934. For Plautus, *humanitas*, and related terms, see the following passages: Plat. *Asin.* 495, *Bacch.* 1169, *Trin.* 447f.

<sup>13</sup> Lewis & Short, 1987.

(frugality). There would have been pressure for fathers and sons of the Republic to follow a strict understanding of this traditional term. Contrastingly, the Greek notions of fairness and kindness of *aequum* (justice) and *humanitas* (kindness) asked for a more moderate stance with respect to wealth called *liberalitas* (generosity). In this case of the father, *liberalitas* encouraged fathers to give their sons money, but not to the extent as to lavish them with gifts, so that they would eventually learn to become financially independent. The popularity of this idea is evident as early as the Late Republic. There are examples of Roman fathers giving their sons greater financial autonomy with *peculium* (private savings) and freedom away from the home as depicted in examples of Cicero, Seneca, and Pliny the Younger.<sup>14</sup> The first century CE author Plutarch writes that a father who follows this code loves his sons more than his own affluence.<sup>15</sup> *Humanitas* also spread into the area of childhood education when the Roman Republic developed a more formal education beyond basic reading, writing, and agrarian skills with the introduction of “language, literature, oratory and, to some extent, Greek philosophy.”<sup>16</sup> As early as the third century BCE, upper-class sons began to read Greek literature as a major part of their secondary education.<sup>17</sup> Greek slaves were often used as tutors inside the Roman home in order to further enrich the family’s knowledge of the Greek world because parents were rarely able to teach all of these subjects well by themselves.<sup>18</sup> This development suggests that both Roman morals and the education system were changing sometime during the Middle Republic due to the influence of Hellenism after the First Punic War in 241 BCE. The sharp contrast between both

---

<sup>14</sup> Saller, 1986: 17. Seneca and Pliny both mentioned that separate residences were typical among aristocrats and they lauded an example of a particular devoted adult son who stayed at home with a *paterfamilias*.

<sup>15</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 5. 480. Trans: Helmbold, 1939: 259. “For no father is so fond of oratory or of honour or of riches as he is of his children; therefore fathers do not find such pleasure in seeing their sons gaining a reputation as orators, acquiring wealth, or holding office as in seeing that they (the brothers) love one another.”

<sup>16</sup> Bonner, 1977: 19.

<sup>17</sup> Bonner, 1977: 40.

<sup>18</sup> Bonner, 1977: 40.

the stern, frugal, all-powerful father figure of the Early Republic and the kind, loving, generous father of the Late Republic and early Empire invests that which Demea learns about incorporating Greek *humanitas* and Greek Philosophy into the old Roman system with importance - offstage and on.

Literary texts including Terence's *Adelphi*, legal works, inscriptions, archaeological remains, and shifting terminology are all evidence for the changing role of the father. Despite the outwardly light and comical nature of the Roman New Comedy genre, Cicero acknowledges its historical significance noting that these particular plays encompass "the imitation of [Roman] life, the mirror of behaviour, the image of truth."<sup>19</sup> Terence's *Adelphi* provides a window of historical reality for the reader to gain insight into the second century *paterfamilias* father figure. It was not an easy task, however, for the playwright to convey Roman educational realism and relevance to his spectators in Rome because of Greek dramatic elements present in *Adelphi*.<sup>20</sup> In this case, Greek conventions of drama present in *Adelphi* elevate Demea's lessons about childrearing and education beyond the simple trope of the father/son generational split.

One particular area affected by Greek influence was Roman theatre. As a former slave, adopted and then freed,<sup>21</sup> the playwright Terence (195-159 BCE) is representative of the cultural, political, and social shifts occurring in Rome during the middle of the second century BCE. He gained a reputation for his ability to reproduce Latin New Comedy faithful to their Greek models. For example, he adhered to Greek conventions by largely maintaining original plotlines.

---

<sup>19</sup> Cic. *De Or.* 2. 41. *Ex ambiguo dicta vel argutissima putantur, sed non semper in ioco, saepe etiam in gravitate versantur.* "There is no kind of wit, in which severe and serious things may not be derived." "The Latin Library." Site Accessed: 3 Nov 09. <<http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/cicero/oratore2.shtml#250>>.

Donat. *De Comoedia*. 1. 52. The fourth century CE grammarian Donatus attributed the following lines to Cicero: *Comoedia est imitatio vitae, speculum consuetudinis, imago veritatis.* (Comedy is the imitation of life, a mirror of custom, the image of truth). Trans: Kluge, 2007: 297-333.

<sup>20</sup> This includes the theme of Aristophanes' theme on Greek education and Aristotle's philosophy on education.

<sup>21</sup> Forehand, 1985: 5.

Terence's plays kept the Greek location, staging, dress, and masks. The stock characters of Menander and Greek New Comedy, the controlling old man, spendthrift son, poor citizen girl, and beautiful courtesan, are all present in Terence's comedies. Menander's focus upon the domestic world of everyday individuals and their attempts to negotiate the challenges of love is likewise ever-present in Terence. The adherence to Greek dramatic conventions in Roman plays led Romans to label this type of Roman genre *fabula palliata* 'Comedy in Greek Dress'.<sup>22</sup> A.S. Gratwick defines this genre in general as offering "the storylines and *dramatis personae* of the latest flowering of the Athenian theatre... which focused on family life and romantic love."<sup>23</sup> It is generally accepted that as a *fabula palliata*, Terence's *Adelphi* is no exception in being a close adaptation of the Greek original by Menander, whose play survives only in fragments.<sup>24</sup> In *Adelphi*, Terence also draws attention to elements of old Greek comedy and tragedy.

Aristophanes' *Clouds* is an obvious model, focused as it was on the rifts between father and son, restriction and permissiveness, control and freedom. Finally, Terence deploys the Greek dramatic conventions of *peripeteia* (reversal of fortune and/or circumstances) and *anagnorisis* (recognition of true circumstance). These two originally tragic elements, along with the embedded new philosophical concepts of *humanitas* and *aequitas*, give force to the journey Demea makes. He does not simply change his educational theory and practice. Instead, like Oedipus and Ion, he recognizes himself and his world as fundamentally changed.

Before launching into the body of this argument, it must be stated that Terence is an adapter, and not simply a Roman translator of Greek texts. He makes changes to the usual Greek New Comedy cast of characters, plotline, and plot resolution. By doubling the father and son characters, he vividly stages the two Roman approaches to raising sons with the philosophy of

---

<sup>22</sup> Marshall, 2006: 59.

<sup>23</sup> Gratwick, 1999: 1. *Dramatis personae* is translated into English as "characters of the play."

<sup>24</sup> For more information on the fragments of Menander's original play *Adelphoi*, see Gratwick, 1999: 25-52.

education as a prominent topic of debate. Doubling allows Terence to articulate the struggle between old and new and between the adherents of Cato and those of Scipio during the Middle Republican period. He achieves this by creating constant rivalry between Demea and Micio, with each explicitly challenging the other's methods including their divergent application of fatherhood with traditional Roman strictness and *patria potestas* versus Greek *humanitas*. Each one presents his understanding of this as the reason for the other's failings with respect to their sons. Although he faced criticism of *contaminatio* from one of his contemporaries,<sup>25</sup> Lucius Lanuvinus,<sup>26</sup> Terence's addition of a second play to the original one being adapted allowed him to explicitly comment on the divisive issue of education. Terence added a second Greek scene from another play by Diphilus of Sinope to the plot of *Adelphi*, and this included an incident between Demea's son Aeschinus and a slave dealer over the freedom of the other son's lover, the lute-player.<sup>27</sup> He incorporated this scene to draw emphasis to the contrasting characterisation of the sons Aeschinus and Ctesipho as their behaviour and morals reflect both Demea's and Micio's systems of childrearing.<sup>28</sup> He made other changes to the Greek original so as to place his theme of education in the foreground. Terence deepens his character, Demea, the grumpy, *senex durus* (old father) often found in the Greek New Comedy genre, by directing the audience to some well-known qualities and actions of Cato the Elder. For example, Demea and Cato share similar ancient moral virtues and instruct their sons by *exemplum*. Terence, therefore, was not a mere translator of his Greek counterpart, as he links Demea and Cato through strikingly similar Latin words so that the audience can quickly associate their education system with tradition and the Early Republic.

---

<sup>25</sup> See Beacham, 1991: 50 for the criticisms Terence faced for changing the original Greek play. For this definition of *contaminatio*, see Marshall, 2006: 12.

<sup>26</sup> For Lucius' life and works see chs. 2-5 of C. Garton's *Personal Aspects of Roman Theatre*, 1972.

<sup>27</sup> Marshall, 2006: 121.

<sup>28</sup> The issue of *contaminatio* in *Adelphi* is dealt with extensively in Gratwick, 1999: 3, 34-35.

Terence has often been seen as a proponent of incorporating Greek cultural elements and practices into Roman life. As a former slave and then freedman of Scipio Aemilianus, Terence had close ties and debts to his patron. This led to jealous accusations from other playwrights that Scipio had written his plays or at least helped him in their composition.<sup>29</sup> Twice in his prologues, Terence mentions without denial the charge that he has been aided in the writing of his plays by friends, and he refers to these friends as nobles. In his *Adelphi*, he says “*nam quod isti dicunt malevoli, homines nobiles eum adiutare adsidueque una scribere. quod illi maledictum vehemens esse existumant*” (Now as to the charge of certain ill-disposed persons, that prominent Romans keep helping our dramatist and closely collaborate with him in writing. What they reckon a devastating insult, Terence counts the best possible praise....).<sup>30</sup> In fact, Terence is not only acknowledging that he received help from his Roman friends, but is also taking pride in their collaboration to produce a Latin version of *Adelphi*. Duckworth adds that since the *Adelphi* was produced in 160 BCE for Scipio Aemilianus’ father, Lucius Aemilianus Paulus, it may be counted as evidence of the close relationship between Terence and Scipio.<sup>31</sup> This does not mean, however, that Terence was a simple vehicle for advancing the Scipionic agenda of embracing things Greek. Terence’s use of and changes made to his Greek models invest the *Adelphi* with complexity, with a careful consideration of the value of both the understanding of traditional and contemporary Roman education. In this play, there is a place for both the new and old. This is best seen in the playwright’s depictions of characters that diverge from the stock characterization found in the genre. Praised for this by Donatus,<sup>32</sup> contemporary critics such as Beacham have also noted positively that Terence’s characters are “less confined in ‘allowable’ behaviour and

---

<sup>29</sup> Duckworth, 1952: 56.

<sup>30</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 15-8. Trans by: Gratwick, 1999: 61. Terence similarly confesses and praises the support of his Roman friends he received while writing his plays in *Heaut.* 22-24. Duckworth, 1952: 56-57.

<sup>31</sup> Duckworth, 1952: 64.

<sup>32</sup> Donat. *Ad Hec.* 1. 9.

attitude.”<sup>33</sup> This allows Terence to change Demea’s character away from Cato in the final act of the play more easily as he alters the ending to fit his transformation. In the closing lines of the play, Terence invites the audience to consider Demea’s new approach to raising Ctesipho as ideal, for it incorporates both Greek concepts of *ἵσος* (what is just) and *φιλανθρωπία* (kindness) into his Roman system.<sup>34</sup> Terence introduces a novel style of fatherhood to the Roman audience asking for a father to act in a less cold and strict manner, so as to maintain harmony and affection within the family, thereby challenging Early Republican fatherhood and *patria potestas*.

Terence’s dual plotline centering around two fathers and two sons offers a unique twist on a typical Roman New Comedy play. Rather than having one youth fall in love with an unacceptable woman in this comedy, there are two. Ctesipho has fallen for a lute-player whereas Aeschinus has for an impoverished Athenian girl. There is, furthermore, a doubling of the father figure as Demea has given his biological son Aeschinus to Micio to rear. Neither Micio nor Demea approve of their sons’ choices, and both react to their misdeeds, failed expectations, and concealment, albeit in divergent ways. Not only does Terence do more than just fashion Demea as a *durus pater* (stern father) against Micio as a *lenis pater* (kind father), each often found in Roman New Comedy, he also juxtaposes their philosophical ideologies. Focusing on Demea, the playwright uses specific Latin phrases, words and situations to characterise him as a second Cato so that the audience can quickly affix his character and beliefs to a contemporary, heavily Roman traditional figure, absent of Hellenistic ideals. Beacham notes, however, that “a Terentian character frequently finds himself in situations in which he, like individuals and groups within the volatile and changing population of Rome itself, bends his rules and softens lines that define

---

<sup>33</sup> Beacham, 1991: 54.

<sup>34</sup> Hornblower and Spawforth, 1996: 1484.



his social structure.”<sup>35</sup> Terence does just this with Demea by creating a process in the last act of the play where he must change his methods to mend the broken father-son relationship.

Following the moral advice of his brother, Demea now understands that all young men make mistakes - including his own son Ctesipho. Instead of severely reprimanding his son for his affair, Demea allows him to marry his lover despite her newly acquired freeborn status. Terence also surprises his audience in the final act of the play. Demea teaches his brother Micio, who claims to be a Greek model of *humanitas* and Peripatetic virtue, that he neglects his duty of raising his son. Demea criticises his brother’s childrearing practices, for he imposes no rules and boundaries on Aeschinus and extravagantly indulges his son with a soft living, full of luxury. Because of this sudden turn of events at the end of the play, the playwright, therefore, acknowledges the importance of *patria potestas* and virtuous lessons based on the codes of *mores maiorum* in the Roman education system. Both the sons and Micio now admire and respect Demea as a wise mentor. Demea learns from his mistakes by shifting from traditional Catonian style of childrearing to a Graeco-Roman hybrid embodying a balance of the sympathetic understanding of *aequitas* (justice) and characteristics of *humanitas* and *patria potestas* in moderation. When the play abruptly ends after this sudden conversion of Demea and professed love and understanding of his new philosophy on education, the audience is left to question its own methods of childrearing from a solely Roman understanding. The centerpiece of Terence’s theme on education, therefore, is both Demea’s own process of learning and teaching which emphasises that a proper balance of Greek and Roman customs is how a *paterfamilias* should raise a son.

This thesis argues that Terence’s *Adelphi* is important evidence for understanding the changes occurring in the middle Roman Republic. Education was an important aspect of these

---

<sup>35</sup> Beacham, 1991: 54.

changes, with Romans seemingly split on how to raise and educate their sons. Were traditional and restrictive Roman methods better? Or was there room in Roman education for the newly encountered Greek philosophy that stressed *humanitas* (kindness and generosity), and *aequitas* (fairness and equality) among all citizens? The *Adelphi* dramatically negotiates these questions and concludes by showing that both have merits and very strong ones at that. So as to demonstrate this point, certain topics must be taken up in this thesis. First, the history of fatherhood and education must be discussed. In light of this cultural context, the play can then be examined. Demea's characterization as Cato will thus be examined in order to make the case that Demea, the grumpy old man stock figure, is constructed so as to refer the audience to Cato and to the divisive beliefs on education. This character is thus invested with particular force, as is his transformation from a restrictive, harsh, and traditional father to one who acknowledges and integrates alternate Greek philosophies of childrearing. Third, the *exempla* model of conservative and traditional Roman education will be marked as flawed on the grounds that Terence constructs Demea as a negative model. Next, Demea will admit to his flawed system and decide to construct a more Greek model. Then, the permissive view of parenting will be shown as possessing flaws, for Micio will be proven to be a negative model as well. And finally, the conclusion will show that Terence sees the foremost model of Roman education as one which blends Greek and Roman elements.

## Chapter One: Fathers and Education in the Roman Republic

Much of Demea's original educating of his son Ctesipho is undertaken in accordance with the Early Republican practice of using an *exemplum* to teach morals and behaviour. In other words, an early Roman father taught his sons virtues based on his own example. This system, however, was not the only one that fathers turned to in the late Middle Republic, the time in which Terence's play was produced. The influence of Greek culture and education brought conflicting views of how a Roman father should raise and educate his sons. The ethical and educational context of Terence's *Adelphi*, therefore, is complex and competing.

Ancient sources such as the Twelve Tables suggest that the head of household, or *paterfamilias*<sup>36</sup> could be excessively and cruelly controlling in order to maintain the obedience of family members. According to ancient sources, the Decemvirate were ten men selected by Roman citizens to create these codes and sentences and thus to form the core constitution of the Early Republic around the fifth century BCE. In the area of private law, the Twelve Tables mandated that a father punish his sons severely for nonconformity to the unwritten *mores maiorum* (ancestral moral customs) "of frugality, work, discipline and piety."<sup>37</sup> During the Early Republican Period, the Roman father had the right to punish his son's moral misconduct. He could disown him, sell him into slavery,<sup>38</sup> or put him to death.<sup>39</sup>

There has been a long tradition of acknowledging the Roman father's power as is attested by the works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus who wrote approximately four hundred years after

---

<sup>36</sup> Hornblower and Spawforth, 1996: 1122 write that the *paterfamilias* was normally a father, or grandfather.

<sup>37</sup> NovaRoma.org. Because positive law regulated few aspects of Roman daily life, the Romans shaped most of their behaviour by virtue of the *auctoritas maiorum* ("prestige or respect of the ancestors"). <[http://www.novaroma.org/nr/Via\\_Romana](http://www.novaroma.org/nr/Via_Romana)>. Mellor, 1999: 19 writes on the ancient customs of the *mores maiorum* as attested by Cato the Elder. See also Cic. *Cat.* 2. 3; *Sest.* 16; *Phil.* 2. 51. 12. 28; 13. 14; Sall. *Cat.* 52. 36; *Iug.* 62. 5.

<sup>38</sup> Table IV. 2 442-443. *Si pater filium ter venunduit, filius a patre liber esto.* "If the father thrice surrender son for sale, son shall be free from father."

<sup>39</sup> Table IV. I. A father shall have the right of life and death over his son born in a lawful marriage. Trans: Scott, 1973: 64.

the Twelve Tables were ostensibly established. In his *Histories*, Dionysius seeks to mitigate the opposition of the Greeks during the first century BCE toward the new rule of their Roman conquerors by focusing upon their good Roman virtues while arguing that the Romans are descendants of their Greek ancestors.<sup>40</sup> In the area of the education, Dionysius asserts that Greek youth were more morally disobedient than Roman ones because they were subject to light punishments by their fathers for a limited amount of time.<sup>41</sup> Therefore, in the following passage, Dionysius writes approvingly of the superior Roman power of *patria potestas*:

Indeed, in virtue of this law men of distinction...have been dragged down from thence and carried away by their fathers to undergo such punishment as these thought fit; and while they were being led away through the Forum, none present, neither consul, tribune, nor the very populace, which was flattered by them and thought all power inferior to its own, could rescue them [and] that [these men] have been put to death by those very fathers, as is related of Manlius Torquatus and many others.<sup>42</sup>

Dionysius' depiction of stern Roman fathers gravely punishing their sons by killing them conveys an image of a cruel and cold familial relationship. According to both of these sources, if a son did not meet the ethical standards of his *paterfamilias*, the father had absolute legal power to inflict any punishment necessary.

Roman authors such as Cicero, Seneca, and Valerius Maximus describe the father and son relationship differently from the Twelve Tables and Dionysius. Contrary to the image of the cold, overbearing father, these sources depict a loving, understanding, respectful and less restrictive family head. For example, Cicero, a Late Roman Republican author, contrasts the cruel, serious, conservative manner of the early Roman *paterfamilias* with the "mild, gentle, and

---

<sup>40</sup> Dion. Hall. 2. 26. Trans: Cary, 1937: 387-389.

<sup>41</sup> Dion. Hall. 2. 26. Dionysius felt it was especially unfair that Greek fathers could not sell their children because the Greeks felt it was harsh and tyrannical.

<sup>42</sup> Dion. Hall. 2. 26 Trans: Cary, 1937: 389.

moderate” ones of his own days.<sup>43</sup> Writing around the same time, Livy asserts that Early Republican fathers used to possess absolute authority over their sons, but that by his time, they no longer do. He writes that “when the [Early Republican] father and son disagreed, no discussion was possible or even necessary.”<sup>44</sup> According to Virgil, a father in the Late Republic generally desires to win and retain the affection of his sons and is therefore moderate in his strictness.<sup>45</sup> In the *Aeneid*, this is clearly brought out in the portrayal of Aeneas, a dutiful father who seeks out and listens to the counsel of his aged father Anchises and who also safeguards the future of his son Ascanias, even though this means emotional and physical suffering for himself. The image of Aeneas leaving a burning Troy with his lame father on his shoulders and his son in hand is telling. A Roman carried the weight of his ancestors – with all that means – along with taking the guidance of his children in hand. Valerius Maximus presents multiple cases of both father and the son showing *pietas* (dutiful esteem) to each other.<sup>46</sup> The younger Seneca, writing during the first century CE, contends that a father must be moderate in his punishments and that he could not kill his sons without consulting the senate.<sup>47</sup> He also adds that the worst fathers are the ones who supervise their children with constant whipping for even the most trivial sins.<sup>48</sup> Also writing during the first century CE, Pliny the Younger argues that a father should be empathetic when deciding punishment for the immorality of youth because fathers were also young boys once.<sup>49</sup> Seneca advises fathers to use harsh punishment only if it is required because

---

<sup>43</sup> Cic. *Pro Caelio* 33. *Sed tamen ex ipsa quaeram prius utrum me secum severe et graviter et prisce agere malit an remisse et leniter et urbane.* The Latin Library. <<http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/cicero/cael.html#33>>.”But first I will ask herself, whether she would have me deal with her in a severe, solemn, old-fashioned manner, or in a soft, gentle, and courteous one.” Trans: Duncan, 1811: 326.

<sup>44</sup> Livy. *Epon.* 1. 50.

<sup>45</sup> Virg. *Aeneid.* 5. 724-5; *Panegyrici Latini* 12. 17. 2

<sup>46</sup> Val. Max. 4. 1. 493-495.

<sup>47</sup> Sen. Y. *Ben.* 1. 15; 1. 16.

<sup>48</sup> Sen. Y. *Clem.* 1. 16.

<sup>49</sup> Plin. Y. *Ep.* 9. 12. Trans: Shelton, 1988: 32.

a child's "unlimited freedom creates an intractable personality."<sup>50</sup> These authors suggest the image of the father had already transformed into a more loving, moderate, less severe figure who endeavoured to win their sons' affection by the Late Republican and Early Imperial Periods. Because Terence's character Demea represents a model of this evolution through his education and transformation away from Early Republican practices, a gentler, more lenient image of the Roman father was introduced to the Romans as early as the Middle Republican Period in 160 BCE.

Just as there were two competing ancient forces arguing for the correct way to raise young Romans, so too have contemporary critics taken opposing viewpoints concerning the issue of the role of the father and its proper application in a rapidly changing Rome. Relying upon the Twelve Tables and Seneca as evidence, Paul Veyne contends that father-son relationships were stern and cold during the Republic, but gradually assumed a more affectionate character as the Empire progressed.<sup>51</sup> Similarly to Veyne, Lewis Morgan depicts the typical Roman *paterfamilias* as an all-powerful figure and argues the father "killed, abandoned, beat, terrorized and sexually abused" his children.<sup>52</sup> These modern interpreters suggest that the Roman *paterfamilias* throughout the Republic was inhumane and sought to reprimand his sons severely.

Authors such as Brent Shaw, Richard Saller, Jean Gaudemet, Marcia Colish, David Danube, Bruce Frier, and Stanley Bonner have taken a more permissive, liberal view of the Roman father-son relationship, firmly placing the affectionate family and its manifestations in the Middle Republic. Richard Saller focuses on evidence that shows that the concept of *pietas* (respect) within the family once asked for complete obedience from the son; however, this

---

<sup>50</sup> Sen. Y. *Ben.* 3. 38. Trans: Shelton, 1988: 31.

<sup>51</sup> Veyne, 1990: 139.

<sup>52</sup> Morgan, 1877: 466 argues that "in the patriarchal family of the Roman type, paternal authority passed beyond the bounds of reason into excess of domination."

evolved into a mutual duty for both the father and son by the Middle Republic, thereby asking a *paterfamilias* to be more understanding and compassionate toward his son.<sup>53</sup> In contrast to the fifth century laws of the Twelve Tables, Brent Shaw argues that the Republican Roman father was less severe because there were legal limitations to his *patria potestas*. He also contends that the father did not hold the power of life and death over his sons during the Republican period.<sup>54</sup> Marcia Colish states that Greek philosophy influenced both the removal of the Roman father's absolute control over his sons and the institution of a *peculia* (private allowance) for sons who held complete control over these funds.<sup>55</sup> Jean Gaudemet writes that a father, even in the Early Republic, could not invoke extreme punishments onto his sons without consulting the senate, for he was under "the supervision of the censor, his neighbours, and the family council made up of relatives and friends."<sup>56</sup> Thus, a *paterfamilias*' social circle limited his *patria potestas*. David Danube provides a fictitious example of a 90-year-old *paterfamilias* extending his *patria potestas* over his 70-year-old sons, and 50-year-old grandsons in order to show that in reality the lifelong power of the father described by the Twelve Tables is questionable.<sup>57</sup> Using archaeological evidence from the first century CE, Bruce Frier helps to dispel this lifelong power of the *paterfamilias* further by showing that the life expectancy for Roman males was around 25 years of age during the early Imperial period in 1 CE. He states "of those who reached 10, about one in three then lived to 60, and only one in seven to age 70."<sup>58</sup> Therefore, his findings prove that David Danube's case of the 90 year old father was quite rare. Furthermore, Eva Cantarella

---

<sup>53</sup> Saller, 1994: 12. See also Saller and Shaw, 1984: 145.

<sup>54</sup> Shaw, 2001: 34 also rejects the equation of the religious obligation of the father to either accept or reject a son into the family with *potestas* existed. He argues that historians have mistranslated the Latin word *tollere liberum* as the literal meaning "to lift the child," as to accept the child into the family instead of the definition ancient sources such as Cicero, Terence, Seneca, and Ovid mean as a gesture of lifting up the child including "to raise the child," meaning "to rear" to feed and clothe the child.

<sup>55</sup> Colish, 1999: 380-381.

<sup>56</sup> Gaudemet, 1969: 331.

<sup>57</sup> Danube, 1969: 79.

<sup>58</sup> Frier, 1982: 213-51.

remarks that sons usually acquired *sui iuris* (their own legal independence) early in life due to the low life expectancy of Roman fathers.<sup>59</sup> She also writes that although the Twelve Tables allowed fathers to disinherit their sons without reason, sons could appeal this judgement and the judges could override his decision and give them back intestate succession, thereby showing that sons too gained some legal rights by the Middle Republic.<sup>60</sup> In the area of education, Stanley Bonner compliments Frier's conclusion by arguing that both high mortality rates and military requisites required the father to be absent in many cases so the education of boys was likely passed on to other family members or slaves.<sup>61</sup> These sources suggest that as early as the Middle Republic, the *patria potestas* of the *paterfamilias* was weakening as sons were given more legal rights and freedom contrary to the tight control depicted by the Twelve Tables and Dionysius.

The reason for this modern debate and conflicting view of ancient sources regarding the Roman father's methods of punishment, his extent of *potestas*, and his relationship with his sons is due to the five-hundred year span of time between the start and end of the Republican Period. To add to the problem, there is a scarcity of primary literary sources on the Roman family detailing the practices of childrearing and education before the first century BCE. The only contemporaneous Latin literary sources on Roman fathers and sons before the first century BCE are three men who lived in Rome during the second century BCE: the famous senator, Marcus Porcius Cato, and two Roman comedy playwrights, Plautus and Terence.<sup>62</sup>

---

<sup>59</sup> Cantarella, 2003: 281-298.

<sup>60</sup> Cantarella, 2003: 290.

<sup>61</sup> Bonner, 1977: 13.

<sup>62</sup> Joyal, McDougall and Yardley, 2009: 151.



## 1. ii. Demea and the Ideal of Education

For much of the play, Demea's childrearing and educational practices follow a specific track. Although not rooted in historical fact, his practices adhere to the ideals of education as practiced and handed from generation to generation, and as found in the mythological exemplars of early Roman figures, their actions, and time. From the beginning of Rome around 750 BCE until 350 BCE, the education of boys was done mostly if not entirely by the parents. Because Rome was primarily an agrarian community at this time, sons learned necessary agricultural and literacy skills.<sup>63</sup> The Early Republican education system was based heavily on moral teachings because fathers desired their sons to become lawful and respectable citizens. A father usually taught his sons proper moral virtue based on the *mores maiorum* (customs of the ancestors). These *mores* (morals) included courage and *virtus* (moral virtue), *industria* (diligence), *constantia* (determination), *parsimonia* (austerity), *gravitas* (self-control), *pietas* (piety), *fides* (trust) and *severitas* (strict discipline). The *mores maiorum* (morals of the ancestors) were a standard among the Roman citizens because they stemmed from those in power, the senate, who established them. With no widespread written record of these ancestral virtues, a Roman father usually passed them down in the family by teaching his son to follow his own ethical *exemplum* (example).<sup>64</sup> For instance, the aristocracy established the importance of frugality by advocating against Roman citizens' visual display of affluence even at their own funerals, for the Early Republican state was not wealthy.<sup>65</sup> In the household, therefore, fathers would teach their sons by their own *exempla* (examples) to curb their display of wealth so that they too understood the importance of the moral code of *parsimonia* (parsimony). At that time, fathers could easily force

---

<sup>63</sup> Shelton, 1988: 104.

<sup>64</sup> Shelton, 1988: 4. See also Ward, 1962: 57-58.

<sup>65</sup> McDonnell, 2006: 13.

their sons to limit their financial extravagance because they had complete control over the entire family's property and wealth until death.<sup>66</sup>

The Romans preserved the ancestral customs in early myth by creating the ideal of strong, autonomous, frugal, and tenacious farmers. For instance, the mythological figure Horatius Cocles personifies these ancestral virtues of the *mores maiorum*. Although a farmer marked by *industria* (industry), he also acknowledges the debt he owes to Rome for he fights bravely as a soldier to protect his farmland and fellow citizens, thereby acknowledging the weight of cultural *pietas*.<sup>67</sup> In another Early Republican myth, Cicero praises Manius Curius Dentatus for his attributes of *parsimonia* (frugality) and *fides* (honesty) amid the demands of war and governing.<sup>68</sup> These myths reflect the ideal image of the Early Republican Roman man and the lifestyle and morals that Demea endeavoured to teach his sons in *Adelphi*. The playwright Terence depicts Demea as firmly acknowledging *frugalitas* and *severitas* (strict discipline) in addition to other early morals mentioned above in order to convey that his way of living and teaching was based on the traditional understanding of *exempla*.

The question arises, however, whether the ordinary Roman father, even in the third century BCE was a follower of the austere morals illustrated in early myth and in Dionysius, or whether, as one might naturally expect, there was a development toward a different, more lenient set of morals especially when Rome came into direct contact with foreign cultures during the Middle Republic. In fact, the portrayal of the kind, generous, and less severe Roman father by first century Roman authors suggests that the Late Republican image of the ideal *paterfamilias* did change as did his role in educating his children. This transition was partly due to Greek influence when Roman power spread to Greece at the end of the First Punic War in 241 BCE.

---

<sup>66</sup> Cantarella, 2003: 287.

<sup>67</sup> Livy. *Epon.* 2.10. Shelton, 1988: 4.

<sup>68</sup> Shelton, 1988: 164-165. Val. Max. 4. 3. 5; Plin. Y, 16. 185.

Since the Romans were intrigued by Greek philosophy, culture, and religion, their ideas concerning an ideal father and education system were introduced to Rome. Demea's adoption of these ideas at the end of *Adelphi* suggests that Greek practices and mores had a significant impact in Rome as early as the second century BC when the play was produced.

## **Chapter Two: Demea and Cato as exemplars of the Early Republican system of fatherhood and morality**

It is first important to analyse how Demea is constructed with respect to Roman education. This will lead to an understanding of the limitations of education that Demea eventually acknowledges in the play's progression, as well as the changes that Demea ultimately undertakes to gain the affection and respect of his sons. Before integrating the Greek cultural concepts of *humanitas* and *aequitas*, Demea educates Ctesipho by following Early Republican tradition for four-fifths of the play. To communicate this to the audience, Terence intricately weaves Cato the Elder into Demea's speech and actions, especially in his philosophy and methodology of childrearing. Since Cato lived a life with strict, conventional morals based on the *mores maiorum* and continually practiced *astrecti continentia* (self-restraint) from Roman vices in both public and private spheres,<sup>69</sup> he is the ideal exemplar of a deeply conservative Roman father. Just as Cato taught his son Licinianus ethics using himself as an *exemplum*, Demea too instructs Ctesipho in this way. This makes Cato an ideal candidate for Terence to imitate for his character Demea in *Adelphi*.

The playwright creates the image of Demea as a Cato-like moral advocate by drawing out lifestyle and behavioural parallels emphasising their strong adherence to moral *virtus*, *diligentia*, and *parsimonia* on the farm. Both Cato and Demea teach their sons to avoid the antithetical vices of *luxuria* (extravagance), *otium* (leisure) and *libido* (sexual affairs). These vices obstruct men who are on their ideal path to *virtus* since they encourage profligacy, idleness, and indulgence of the senses. Both Cato and Demea not only label men who engage in these activities as bad *exempla* but also take an active role to seek justice by reprimand. Using his authority as a high ranking magistrate in Rome, Cato dictated his own perception of the unwritten *mores maiorum*

---

<sup>69</sup> Val. Max. 2. 8. Trans: Bailey, 2000: 227.

onto other senators.<sup>70</sup> Whenever he deemed their actions contrary to proper behaviour, such as conducting lives marked by luxury, immorality, leisure, and pleasure,<sup>71</sup> he attempted to have them expelled for “the city had need of a great purification.”<sup>72</sup> Consequently, Cato clashed with the younger generation of senators who did not live in accordance with the old-fashioned moral code. Similarly in *Adelphi*, Demea neurotically inspects the moral conduct of all the main characters throughout the play by running around and vocalising intense moral outrage arguing that they should be punished. Demea meets the same negative opposition as Cato did in Rome for this behaviour, for they both dictate their strict set of morals to their sons and others too severely. By highlighting this Catonian conduct in Demea, Terence undermines Cato’s conservative nature and education system because Demea feels compelled to change his behaviour and morals to include both Greek and Roman ones in order to gain the affection of his sons. The playwright strengthens his educational message to the audience when Demea chooses to include Greek *humanitas* and Aristotelian *aequitas* into his methods of conduct and childrearing, and consequently he earns the love and respect of the characters in the play.

Since there were no formal educational institutions, nor any written record of ancestral customs,<sup>73</sup> an Early Republican father taught his sons his own understanding of ancestral conventions using *exempla*.<sup>74</sup> In other words, both Cato and Demea use only themselves as a role model to teach their moral ideals to their sons. The early concept of *pietas* in the *mores maiorum* requires that sons obey their fathers’ commands and believe in the virtues that their fathers do.<sup>75</sup> And Demea and Cato clearly expected their sons to follow their footsteps exactly. By the Middle

---

<sup>70</sup> Miles, 1996: 112.

<sup>71</sup> Plin. E. 7. 100.

<sup>72</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 2. 16. Trans: Perrin, 1914: 349.

<sup>73</sup> Ward, 1962: 58.

<sup>74</sup> Bonner, 1977: 18.

<sup>75</sup> Saller, 1994: 105.

Republican Period, this old system based on the father as the sole *exemplum* began to change as public institutions were constructed in Rome. Plutarch attests to Romans accepting public education when the first Roman public school of Spurius Carvilius was built in 230 BCE.<sup>76</sup> Public education became one of first waves of Hellenism flowing into Rome. As schools continued to spread, teachers were replacing previous Roman fathers roles as educators for their sons. Many of these teachers were Greek, and they taught Roman boys more uniform ethics including Greek ones which were amalgamating with the Roman ancestral customs. At that time, some Romans sent their sons to be educated by Greek mentors. Despite this, Cato did not accept this Greek institution in his home. He controlled his son's education entirely by himself as Early Republican fathers had done, teaching his son to follow early conventions including the Roman laws of the Twelve Tables.<sup>77</sup> According to Plutarch, Cato asserted that he himself would only teach his son, despite having a Greek grammarian slave named Chilon.<sup>78</sup> Using his father only as his *exemplum*, Lucianus was restricted from gaining access to outside knowledge through travel and was forced to learn at home.<sup>79</sup> In addition, Cato wrote a plethora of books for his son from which to read to gain historical and moral insight. One was called the *Origines* and it survives in fragments today.<sup>80</sup> This work was filled with praise of Roman classical values, dignity, and austerity while Greek philosophy and literature were excluded.<sup>81</sup> Cato expressed his disdain for the Greeks in a letter entitled *Ad filium*, teaching him to fear Greek doctors.<sup>82</sup>

All these points are important because Demea likewise teaches his son virtues to follow and vices to avoid through *metus* (fear) of reprimand, which is discussed more later. Demea

---

<sup>76</sup> Plut. *Quaest.* 50.

<sup>77</sup> Bonner, 1977: 10. Sreedharan, 23: 2004.

<sup>78</sup> Shelton, 1988: 105. Bonner, 1977: 10. Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 2. 20. Trans: Perrin, 1914: 361.

<sup>79</sup> Bonner, 1977: 12.

<sup>80</sup> Nep. *Cato.* 3.

<sup>81</sup> Bonner, 1977: 12.

<sup>82</sup> Cato. *Ad fil.* fr. 1 J; Plin. *Nat.* 29. 14.

dictates his own set of strict morals attempting to control his son: “*hoc fugito*” (Always avoid that). “*hoc laudist*” (This is a source of praise!). “*hoc vitio datur*” (That counts as a failing).”<sup>83</sup>

Demea boasts about his lessons to Syrus, Micio’s slave, because he deems himself to be the perfect model for his son to emulate in life.<sup>84</sup> Demea is constantly telling his son to look at his father as the only role model, despite saying to take example from others in the following lines:

*fit sedulo. nihil praetermitto; consuefacio; denique inspicere tamquam in speculum in vitas omnium iubeo atque ex aliis sumere exemplum sibi.*

One does one’s honest best; I pass nothing over; I train him; in short, I tell him to look into people’s lives as if into a mirror and to take his model from others.<sup>85</sup>

In reality, he expects his son to copy himself and not others. This expectation is already evident by this act in the play because Demea already praised Ctesipho’s supposed qualities in act two discussed in detail below. Since Demea’s system is based on *exemplum*, Syrus remarks that “*domi habuit unde disceret*” (he can teach Ctesipho at their home in the country).<sup>86</sup> Both Cato and Demea’s methods of instruction are truly Roman and traditional as they are their sons’ only mentors. This is important because Demea’s transformation at the end of the play dramatically changes so much that he allows his son to learn on his own without being under constant scrutiny of his father.

Both Cato and Demea desire to teach their sons Roman *virtus* using themselves as *exempla* so that they will become lawful and respectable citizens. The Latin word *virtus* encompasses many different meanings such as courage, manliness and moral character.<sup>87</sup> Cato the Elder was one of the first Romans authors to use this word in the moral sense in his *Origines*. Because Romans believed that a “violation of *fides* was an offense against both the gods and the

---

<sup>83</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 416-417.

<sup>84</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 94; 126; 564.

<sup>85</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 415-16.

<sup>86</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 413.

<sup>87</sup> Ward, 1962: 57.

community,<sup>88</sup> they tried to teach moral *virtus* for the good of their sons, which remained important in Roman education throughout the Republic; however, the path to attain this ideal changed. Following the Early Republican tradition, Cato states in his *Origines* that *virtus* stems from the stern and simple morals of the ancestors.<sup>89</sup> In act three of *Adelphi*, Demea's adherence to ancestral *virtus* is evident for he comments on the fine and traditional ethics of his friend Hegio. Demea expresses his concern that the majority of people are no longer morally good citizens like in the old days saying "*homo antique virtute ac fide. haud cito mali quid ortum ex hoc sit publice. quam gaudeo!*" (what a great dearth there is these days of good men and true like him – a man of his word, of good old sterling quality! Him the source of harm to society? Not in a hundred years!).<sup>90</sup> The words *antique virtute ac fide* are important as indicators that men in general no longer follow traditional morals like Demea still does in the play. Ancestral *virtus* is also a part of Demea's system of childrearing. Syrus remarks that when he lists Ctesipho's *virtutes*, which are in fact Demea's. Demea follows with praise of his own method of raising his son because that is what he wants to hear. In the following lines, Syrus makes note of Demea's ignorance of his son's true nature: "*laudari te audit lubenter: facio te apud illum deum virtutes narro.*" (He likes to hear [Ctesipho] praised: I make [him] a saint in his [father's] eyes: I list [his son's] fine qualities).<sup>91</sup> *Virtus* is one of the ancestral morals that Demea maintains throughout the play even after he includes Greek concepts into his own. Strong moral virtues were encouraged and considered positive to the state, parents and fellow-citizens since they teach sons to abide by the laws of the senate. In the final act of *Adelphi*, Demea maintains the Early Republican

---

<sup>88</sup> Ward, 1962: 57.

<sup>89</sup> McDonnell, 2006: 55 says that Cato claims in his *Origines* frag. 51. 3. 2. 22 that success stems from the stern and simple morals of the ancestors. Edwards, 1993: 1 remarks on the examples of Cato, frag, 18, 58, 144 saying that "Cato's writings...referred back to the virtues of still earlier Romans, 'our ancestors' (*maiores nostri*).

<sup>90</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 443-444.

<sup>91</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 535-536.



convention of *virtus*, but he decides to adopt a new view that young men can learn morals on their own without their father's constant supervision and still be morally good even if they indulge in some vices. As Demea learns to accept this, he becomes more compassionate like Micio toward his sons and he reduces his authority over his Ctesipho's moral education.

Cato and Demea teach their sons that *virtus* is obtained by following an Early Republican agrarian lifestyle. Both fathers worked diligently on the land, producing food for themselves, and their fellow citizens, and therefore sustaining Rome. Praised in early Roman heroes like Horatius Cocles and Manius Curius Dentatus, farming was held in high esteem during the Early Republic because it was critical to Rome's survival. Another Early Republican figure is the dictator Cincinnatus who physically worked his own land showing *industria*.<sup>92</sup> The importance of this vocation on the farm is also prevalent in the roots of given family names in the Latin language. For example, Marcus means "born in March," the first farming season of the year; Pulumnus means "corn-pounder"; Piso, comes from the Latin verb *pisere* (to pound); Fabius, (from the bean); Lentulus, (the lentil); and Cicero (the chick-pea.)<sup>93</sup> Part of the *mores maiorum*, *parsimonia* was crucial at this time. Livy comments on this remarking that "*nulla unquam res publica nec maior nec sanctior nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit... ubi tantus ac tam diu paupertati ac parsimoniae honos fuerit*" (No state was ever greater, none more righteous or richer in good examples... where humble means and thrift were so highly esteemed and so long held in honour).<sup>94</sup> The reason why early Republican men held thrift in such high esteem is because Rome was still a small nation and rather poor in the Early Republic. The early fathers, therefore, sought to attain and preserve affluence for the wellbeing of their sons. The state eventually gained more wealth as it conquered and looted foreign powers including Greece, a point that

---

<sup>92</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 1. 2. Trans: Perrin, 1914: 303. Livy. *Ep.* 3. 27.

<sup>93</sup> Marrou, 1956: 230.

<sup>94</sup> Livy. *Epon.* 1. 11. Trans: Foster, 1919: 7.

helps explain Micio's financial profligacy described in detail later. Before Rome started expanding, however, most Romans worked with *industria* in order to survive, let alone build affluence. An Early Republican boy, therefore, was taught the significance of earning money by working attentively on the land following his father's *exemplum*.

Cato and Demea also held the Early Republican values of *industria* and *parsimonia* in high esteem and expected their sons to do the same by working as hard as they did on the farm. Cato taught his son that *industria* on the farm was the best way to achieve *virtus*. Plutarch attests to this as he notes that Cato practiced "diligence, determination, discipline, and self-sufficiency."<sup>95</sup> Having lived on a Sabine farm in the *rus* (country) during his youth and adulthood, Cato worked with *industria* as an *agricola* (farmer) according to Nepos.<sup>96</sup> Cato writes about his moral values in the same way saying that he spent his entire youth "*in parsimonia atque in duritia, atque in industria*" (in frugality, rigor and industry).<sup>97</sup> He followed in the footsteps of Cincinnatus, refraining from leisurely activities by continually working in his fields with his own hands despite having many servants.<sup>98</sup> In his *De agricultura*, Cato further demonstrates the strong need for *industria* proclaiming that no Roman should halt productivity even during storms.<sup>99</sup> He teaches his son *industria* and *parsimonia* by telling him how to live life: "buy not what you need, but what is essential; what you do not need is dear at a penny... it is better to wear out than rust out."<sup>100</sup> Cato and his son also lived in a frugal house in the country which "was so little that it did not afford adequate privacy."<sup>101</sup> At that time, Cato also read to his son the laws of the Twelve

---

<sup>95</sup> Shelton, 1988: 4.

<sup>96</sup> Nep. *Cato*. 3. The Latin Library. *In omnibus rebus singulari fuit industria. Nam et agricola sollers.*

<sup>97</sup> Cato. frag. 28. See Astin, 1978: 3.

<sup>98</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai*. 1. 2. Trans: Scott-Kilvert, 1967: 121.

<sup>99</sup> Kiley, 1977: 128 writes that "when Cato speaks of the tasks that can be accomplished on rainy days or religious holidays, it is in the context of a response to the inefficient bailiff who is excusing himself for the farm's disappointing yield." Cato. *De Agri*. 2. 2-3, cf. 37. 3-4.

<sup>100</sup> Sen. *Epp*. 94. 27; Plut. *Cat. Mai*. 4; Gell. XI, 2. 6. See Bonner, 1977: 18.

<sup>101</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai*. 4. 4. Trans: Scott-Kilvert, 1967: 121.

Tables.<sup>102</sup> Ancient sources remark that his son listened to these lessons and implemented their concepts when he too became a senator by following a thrifty dress code. Licinianus was said to have walked the streets of Rome as a magistrate wearing rather frugal clothing compared to other Roman senators.<sup>103</sup>

In *Adelphi*, Micio describes Demea like Cato in the following lines: “*haec omnia: ruri agere vitam, semper parce ac duriter se habere; uxorem duxit, nati filii*” (Demea’s programme: constant toil on the farm, the self-discipline of thrift and austerity; marriage; two sons).<sup>104</sup> This description of Demea as a stern and frugal man is also provided by Demea himself: “*ego ille agrestis saevos tristis parcus truculentus tenax duxi uxorem: quam ibi miseriam vidi!*” (It was I, the very model of the peasant, dour, mean, aggressive, tight-fisted, that took on marriage – and what distress I found in that!).<sup>105</sup> For four-fifths of the play, Demea whole-heartedly believes that following this *tenax* (diligent) and *parcus* (frugal) way of life and having his son do the same is absolutely necessary. Further demonstrating both Demea’s adherence to the ancestral morals and his expectations for his son to follow by his *exemplum*, Ctesipho too is described by his father with the same Latin vocabulary. Demea describes him as working hard *ruri* (on the farm), following the peasant virtue of living a frugal life (the adjective of *parsimonia* in this line is *parcum*) in the country: “*ruri esse parcum*” (living a life of thrift... on the farm).<sup>106</sup> In the following lines, Demea implements the code of frugality in his own life and his sons saying “*Heia autem, dum studeo illis ut quam plurimum facerem, contriui in quaerendo vitam atque*

---

<sup>102</sup> Mentioned in Cic. *Leg.* 2. 60 and Servius *Ad Aen.* 2. 80.

<sup>103</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 3. 2.

<sup>104</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 45.

<sup>105</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 867-868. Demea’s description of himself parallels Aristoph. *Clouds*, 43 when Stresiadēs describes him as an old-fashioned farmer and is found in a fragment of Menander.

<sup>106</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 95.

*aetatem meam*” (I put all my energy into making as much as I could for them).”<sup>107</sup> Micio also states that his brother continually adheres to the virtue of *parsimonia* while raising Ctesipho with the Latin adjective *parce*: “*Eandem illam rationem antiquam optine: conserua, quaere, parce, fac quam plurimum illis relinuas*” (Hold on to that policy! Scrimp, earn, save every penny, to see that you leave behind as much as you possibly can for them).<sup>108</sup> By portraying Demea as a follower of ancestral morals and an idealised past, Terence invites the audience to associate Demea with Cato and the Early Republican way of life before his transformation. This is important because Terence makes it easier for the Roman audience to relate Demea and his morals and methods to their own early traditions, now challenged by Scipio and his followers. Once Demea undertakes and blends Greek conventions with his own system, the audience can also assess whether or not to accept his changes as positive and improve their own Roman system of childrearing.

Just as Demea and Cato taught their sons by having them learn the virtues of *parsimonia* and *industria* through their own ‘good’ *exempla* in the country, they also criticised other citizens who were bad *exempla* indulging in the opposite vices of luxury, lust, and leisure in the city. Once Rome gained booty after its victories in Spain and Greece during the Middle Republic, Romans still generally associated the rural, agricultural occupation of farmer with righteousness, and urban occupations as the most corrupting. Both Cato and Demea were no different as they attacked ‘immoral’ citizens leading less purposeful, more extravagant lives than themselves because “the highpoint of Roman moral virtue was always situated in an idealised past.”<sup>109</sup> Cato takes a strong position against the immoral conduct of Roman citizens stating that “by doing

---

<sup>107</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 867-869.

<sup>108</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 812-814.

<sup>109</sup> Hunter, 1985: 109-110.

nothing men learn to do ill.”<sup>110</sup> He fought extravagance in Rome by advocating for a great number of laws against *luxuria*.<sup>111</sup> For instance, Cato supported the institution of the *Lex Oppia* in 215.<sup>112</sup> This law banned Roman upper-class women from displaying their affluence in public stating that “no woman should possess more than half an ounce of gold, wear a multicoloured garment (particularly trimmed in purple), or ride in a carriage within a mile of the city of Rome.”<sup>113</sup> When the Second Punic War ended, Roman matrons wished to repeal the act. According to Livy, Cato stood firmly against them, opposing the repeal.<sup>114</sup> Cato continued his assault on the wealth available to women with his support of the *Lex Voconia* in 169 BCE. This law prohibited those who owned property valued at 100 000 sesterces from making a woman their heir, and it prohibited extraordinary legacies in a will of a greater value than the inheritance of the ordinary heirs.<sup>115</sup> Cato also modified property tax to curb greatly Roman opulence,<sup>116</sup> and spoke against excessive taxes on food.<sup>117</sup> In another attack against financial misconduct on a more personal level, Cato tried to prosecute Scipio Aemilianus for excessive *sumptus* (expenditures) as his actions as a general went against the code of parsimony. Scipio was denounced by Cato for indulging his own personal expenditures as well as “squandering extravagantly high pay upon his troops.”<sup>118</sup> Cato feared that soldiers would spend their high earnings on unnecessary luxuries and pleasures of the senses.<sup>119</sup> In his *De agricultura*, he argued that Roman farmers must follow this custom by purchasing a *rus* (farm) that does not cost them a

---

<sup>110</sup> See Columella, XI, 1, 26 in Bonner, 1977: 18.

<sup>111</sup> Nep. 2. *Nam et in complures nobiles animadvertit et multas res novas in edictum addidit, qua re luxuria reprimeretur, quae iam tum incipiebat pullulare.*

<sup>112</sup> Forde, 1975: 101.

<sup>113</sup> Forde, 1975: 101.

<sup>114</sup> Livy. *Perioc.* 34. *Porcius Cato auctor fuisset ne ea lex aboleretur.*

<sup>115</sup> Livy. *Perioc.* 41. *Q. Voconius Saxa tr. pl. legem tulit, nequis mulierem heredem institueret. Suasit legem M. Cato.*

<sup>116</sup> Forde, 1975: 204.

<sup>117</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 2. 8. Trans: Perrin, 1914: 325.

<sup>118</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 2. 3. Trans: Perrin, 1914: 313.

<sup>119</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 2. 3. Trans: Perrin, 1914: 313.

great deal of *sumptus* (expenses) in order to avoid material indulgence.<sup>120</sup> He also argued that Roman farmers must not go out to dine, as it is costly and unnecessary.<sup>121</sup> Even at mealtimes with his family, Cato limited his *sumptus* on food by eating simple meals with turnips and bread.<sup>122</sup> Upon his son's death in 152 BCE, Cato continued to adhere to the moral code of parsimony by providing a frugal funeral costing only a small monetary *sumptus*.<sup>123</sup> According to Cicero, the same Latin word *sumptus* is used in the same context as a financial one in Table X of the Twelve Tables advocating Romans to curb excessive display during funerals in Rome: "Enactments in the Twelve [tables] demand the limitation of *sumptus*...at funerals."<sup>124</sup> Therefore, expenses were a general concern for the Early Republican aristocracy and Cato felt the same way even though by the Middle Republic, Rome had accumulated a great deal of wealth. Following the *mores maiorum*, Cato deemed that financial misconduct went directly against *parsimonia*.

Demea also criticises Micio and Aeschinus for indulging in luxury complaining that Micio's *domus sumptuosa* (house is full of financial expenses) and a primary reason that he has lost Aeschinus to luxury: "*adulescens luxu perditus*" (the son ruined by soft living).<sup>125</sup> Demea seeks to save his money under the code of *parsimonia*, and gripes about others who have a great deal of financial *sumptus* because he expects that everyone should be frugal with their money. Micio acknowledges his brother's concern for his Ctesipho's and Aeschinus' excessive expenditures: "*principio, si id te mordet, sumptum filii quem faciunt*" (First about the expense our sons are causing, if that's what really hurts you).<sup>126</sup> Demea also criticises Micio's financial *sumptus* on himself deeming it as selfish and proclaiming that his brother "*sibi vixit, sibi*

---

<sup>120</sup> Cato. *Agr.* 5. *Videto quam minimi instrumenti sumptuosusque ager ne siet.*

<sup>121</sup> Cato. *Agr.* 5. *Vilicus ne sit ambulator, sobrius siet semper, ad cenam nequo eat.*

<sup>122</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 25. 1-3. Trans: Scott-Kilvert, 1967: 121.

<sup>123</sup> Livy. *Per.* 48. *M. Porcius Cato filii in praetura mortui funus tenuissimo. . . sumptu fecit.*

<sup>124</sup> McDonnell, 2006: 13.

<sup>125</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 760.

<sup>126</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 807.

*sumptum fecit*” (has lived for himself, he has spent on himself).<sup>127</sup> By having Demea follow the conventional Early Republican frugality code like Cato to such an extreme, Terence adds to the shock value at the end of play when Demea decides to become less stingy with money and more generous like Micio, thereby following the Greek *humanitas* code of *liberalitas* (generosity) in order to gain the affection of his sons.

For the Romans, luxury and lust were cognate vices that went against good Roman moral virtue. Roman authors did not draw a sharp distinction between sexual immorality, on the one hand, and sumptuary excesses, on the other. *Licentia* (licentiousness) and *luxuria* are associated in the history of the Roman people and attacks on particular individuals.<sup>128</sup> For example, Sallust uses the words *luxuria* and *licentia* as synonyms for vice noting that they were prevalent among the Roman citizens during his time.<sup>129</sup> In a second example, Livy recounts at the beginning of his history of Rome that *luxus* (luxury) and *libido* (lust) tainted previously virtuous Romans.<sup>130</sup> In Rome, Cato had a strict policy against lust saying that “*libidinosa enim et intemperans adulescentia effatum corpus tradit senectuti*” (for an intemperate and indulgent youth delivers to old age a body all worn out).<sup>131</sup> Cato was also against the temptation of physical pleasure in public; he advocated a similar stance in Rome because he considered it to go against the ancestral tradition of marriage and self-discipline. Cato contrasts virtue to vices and pleasure in the following passage: “*ut summae gloriae sint a virtute proficiscentia, dedecoris vero praecipui existimentur quae voluptas suadeat non sine labe vitiorum*” (As the beginnings of the highest glory are from *virtus*, so, in truth, the beginnings of paramount disgrace are judged to be things

---

<sup>127</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 865.

<sup>128</sup> Edwards, 1993: 5.

<sup>129</sup> Sal. *Cat.* 11-13.

<sup>130</sup> Livy. 1. *Praefatio.* 12.

<sup>131</sup> Cic. *Sen.* 30.

that pleasure urges not without the stain of vices).<sup>132</sup> Appropriating the voice, stance, and authority of Cato, Cicero argues that old age is free of lust and sexual pleasure and he associates the words *libido* and *voluptatis* with immoral young men who can commit treason and overthrow the state: “*hic patriae prodiones, hinc rerum publicarum eversiones...libido voluptatis... stupra vero et adultera et omne tale flagitium nullis excitari aliis illecebris nisi voluptatis.*”<sup>133</sup>

According to Polybius, Cato was disgusted and outraged by the young men in Rome who increasingly were paying a talent for sexual pleasure and three hundred drachmas on caviar in the city. He compared these wasteful young men of his time to frugal, hardworking ones from the earlier times, convinced that such vices would lead the Roman Republic to ruin: “Marcus Cato was outraged... in a speech to the people, [he] complained that one might be quite convinced of the decline of the republic, when pretty boys cost more than fields and jars of caviar more than ploughmen.”<sup>134</sup>

Likewise in *Adelphi*, Micio recounts his brother’s constant obsession with avoiding lustful and leisurely acts including sex, partying, and drinking (the Latin verb: *potare*):

*venit ad me saepe clamans ‘quid agis, Micio? quor perdis adolescentem nobis? quor amat? quor potat? quor tu his rebus sumptum suggeris, vestitu nimio indulges? nimium ineptus es!*

He keeps coming here shouting ‘Micio! What’s the idea? Why spoil the boy and bring shame on us all? Why these girls? Why these wild parties? Why foot those bills, and pander to his grotesque ideas of style?’<sup>135</sup>

Demea behaves this way because he believes he is losing his sons to luxury and lust due to Micio’s laxity and profligacy (*perdis adolescentum nobis*). Demea too argues that the sexual

---

<sup>132</sup> McDonnell, 2006: 55. Cic. *Sest. frag.* 141. 15.

<sup>133</sup> Cic. *Sen.* 40. Trans: Falconer, 1923. “From it come treason and the overthrow of states... the lust for pleasure... indeed, rape, adultery, and every like offence are set in motion by the enticements of pleasure and by nothing else.”

<sup>134</sup> Polyb. 31. 25. 4-5.

<sup>135</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 64.



misdeeds of Aeschinus would end up in ruin and he uses the word *licentia* (lust) here: “*verum nimia illaec licentia profecto euadet in aliquod magnum malum*” (all that wanton licence is bound to end in some dreadful disaster).<sup>136</sup> This is important as Demea sharply changes at the end of the play in allowing his son Ctesipho, to marry the former lute-player Bacchis who is both the source of his sexual misdeeds as well as financial expenses. Although Demea strongly criticises Micio and Aeschinus for following a life full of extravagance and high expenses, nevertheless after he decides to follow a more generous life, he softens his view of this vice. This is evident in the final act of the play when he allows Ctesipho to marry Bacchis, a poor freedwoman, despite Ctesipho and Aeschinus having spent a great deal of money to free her from slavery.

The issue of restraint from indulging in love and leisure is further evident with the words for sexual misconduct – *flagitium voluptatis* (shameful acts for pleasure). Cato did not embrace his wife in public unless some catastrophe such as loud thunder frightened her because he felt that the public display of affection was *flagitium voluptatis* (sexual misconduct).<sup>137</sup> Cato deemed sexual conduct as an opposing vice to diligence and therefore negative, as attested by Seneca. This author remarks that Cato describes his son as a *vir bonus* (morally upright man) because of his *industria* to become a skilled orator unlike other lazy, unambitious *libidine viris* (men who are only in their lusts).<sup>138</sup> Cato expected this too from his fellow senators. Polybius writes that Cato said that “He removed a senator from his official position for showing what he deemed *flagitium voluptatis* when he publicly kissed his wife in the presence of his daughter.”<sup>139</sup> The Twelve Tables also uses the word *flagitium* as committing a disgraceful act which dishonours

---

<sup>136</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 508-510.

<sup>137</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 2. 17. Trans: Perrin, 1914: 353.

<sup>138</sup> Sen. *Contr.* 1. *Pr.* 8-9. Trans: Edwards, 1993: 82.

<sup>139</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 2. 17. Trans: Perrin, 1914: 353.

another person or the state: “If any person had sung or composed against another person a song such as was causing slander or insult to another... he should be clubbed to death.”<sup>140</sup> Demea uses the word *flagitium* three times in the play as strong moral condemnation for Aeschinus’ and Syrus’ ‘scandalous conduct’.<sup>141</sup> In one example, Demea says “*fero alia flagitia ad te ingentia boni illius adolescentis*” (I bring more terrible, shocking news of that fine young man to lay before you).<sup>142</sup> Demea believes that Aeschinus has also had an affair with Bacchis, so he refers to his *flagitia* (misdeeds) in the plural. Since Demea originally believes that both luxury and lust are cognate vices, he is a truly Early Republican Roman Cato-like educational figure for four-fifths of the play. In the final act, however, Demea accepts a more gentle tolerance for misdeeds because, like his brother, he no longer views his sons’ dabbling in these vices to mean that they are inherently evil by nature, but instead typical acts of morally good men. Contrasting his outcries of *flagitia* earlier, Demea now learns to teach Aeschinus and Ctesipho calmly and rationally. After learning to moderate his own vices at the end of the play, Demea follows both Greek and Roman values which earn his sons’ love and his brother’s respect.

In contrast to Micio, Demea never completely ignores the vices of his sons even after his transformation at the end of play because he takes a moderate stance with respect to them. Like Cato, Demea feels leisure, for example, is associated with indulgence and immorality because it goes against the ideal lifestyle of working hard on the farm. In other words, since both Cato and Demea sought to gain affluence through hard work, they both felt that *otium* compromised their efforts to avoid financial *sumptus* and went against the ancestral code of *industria*. Cato also advocated that a farm overseer must restrain his wife from immorality such as *luxuriosa*

---

<sup>140</sup> Table VIII. 1. *Si quis occentavisset sive Carmen condidisset, quod infamiam faceret flagitiumve alteri... cautum est ut fustibus feriretur.* Trans: Warmington, 1938: 475.

<sup>141</sup> Ter. Ad. 112; 379; 721.

<sup>142</sup> Ter. Ad. 723.

(luxurious) spending of money by going out to dine, or seeking *otium* because they went against the morals of austerity and self-discipline.<sup>143</sup> Cato also asserts that a *sobrius* (sober) mode of life as ideal to avoid excessive *otium*.<sup>144</sup> This connection is evident in his *de agricultura*, when he stresses that the farm overseer must not be an *ambulator* (one who seeks entertainment relentlessly), be able to account for his time allotted for *otium* and business,<sup>145</sup> while always being *sobrius*. Cato attacked the senator Lucius for immoral behaviour and had him expelled in 192 BCE for inappropriate use of magisterial *imperium* (power) at a banquet while intoxicated.<sup>146</sup> According to Valerius Maximus, Cato also kicked Lucius Flaminius out of the senate because he beheaded a man in order to entertain a woman he was in love with.<sup>147</sup> Cato protested that women must always follow a *sobrius* mode of life proclaiming that they should be charged with death if they drink alcohol.<sup>148</sup> In an attack against Scipio's moral character, Cato went to the senate to defame Scipio's leadership due to his excessive *sumptus*. Cato illustrated him as "an impresario of some festival, not a commander on active service."<sup>149</sup> This image of Scipio indulging in leisure is also a topic of contention in *Adelphi* as Demea argues with many characters for the same reason. In one example, Demea voices his disgust for Micio's lazy life as a bachelor because he does not follow the proper moral code of *industria* saying *egit vitam in*

---

<sup>143</sup> Cato. *Agr.* 143. *ne nimium luxuriosa siet... ad cenam ne quo eat neve ambulator siet.*

<sup>144</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 96.

<sup>145</sup> Cic. *Planc.* 66. *Clarorum virorum atque magnorum non minus otii quam negotii rationem exstare oportere.*

<sup>146</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 2. 17. Trans: Perrin, 1914: 351-353. The consul had a man killed at a banquet while being under the influence of alcohol.

<sup>147</sup> Val. Max. 2. 8. Trans: Bailey, 2000: 211. *Sicut Porcius Cato L. Flaminium, quem e numero senatorum sustulit, quia in provincial quondam damnatum securi percusserat, tempore supplicii ad arbitrium et spectaculum mulierculae, cuius amore tenebatur, electo.* Also found in Livy. *Epon.* 34. 184.

<sup>148</sup> Gell. 10. 23. *Sed Marcus Cato non solum existimatas, set et multatas quoque a iudice mulieres refert non minus, si vinum in se, quam si probrum et adulterium admisissent.* "But Marcus Cato declares that women were not only censured, but also punished by a judge no less severely if they had drunk wine than if they had disgraced themselves by adultery."

<sup>149</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 2. 3. Trans: Perrin, 1914: 313.

*otio* “his life has been one long merry holiday.”<sup>150</sup> Demea advocates against drinking on seven occasions. For instance, Demea yells at Micio’s slaves and Syrus for sauntering around the house *potestis* (drunk) *ubi potetis vos* “for you people to loll about drinking on.”<sup>151</sup> On a second occasion in the fourth act, Demea yells at Syrus and Micio’s other slaves for drinking: “*peccato maximo quod vix sedatum satis est, potatis, scelus*” (monstrous immorality that’s barely been brought under a modicum of control, and you people are carousing).<sup>152</sup> In a final example, Demea yells at his brother when he discovers Ctesipho drinking in Micio’s home saying “*quor nunc apud te potat?*” (why is he tipping in your house this minute?)<sup>153</sup> Comparatively, both Demea and Cato condemn those who are imbibing as they associate the act of drinking as unproductive. Therefore, just as they followed the traditional Roman virtues of the *mores maiorum*, they taught their sons to deem anyone who did not follow them as bad *exempla*. This is important because Demea does not back down against his brother even at the end of the play. Demea is correct not to condone Micio’s laxity and extravagance because they influence laziness and idleness in Aeschinus and Ctesipho. Most importantly, Demea realises at the end of the play that Micio ignores the important place of *patria potestas*, and thus his duties as a father, which I will explain in more detail later.

Since Cato is a contemporary Middle Republican figure who still practices and teaches his son Licinianus *virtus* by *exemplum* and the old values of diligence, determination, austerity and self-discipline of the *mores maiorum*, he is a perfect exemplar for Terence to model his character Demea after. Just as Cato’s moral authority took place in the private sphere of his home as the stern father restricted his son to learn only in the home, and taught him through his hand-made

---

<sup>150</sup> Ter. Ad. 863.

<sup>151</sup> Ter. Ad. 886.

<sup>152</sup> Ter. Ad. 773-775.

<sup>153</sup> Ter. Ad. 799.

texts and only by his *exemplum*, Demea too taught his son the same virtues and vices in the same way. Both fathers desire their sons to become morally, upstanding citizens; therefore, they criticise bad *exempla* in the city possessing the immorality including extravagance, laxity, and permissiveness so that their sons will not fall prey to these vices. Because they took the role as a moral educator of the *mores maiorum* very seriously, they executed punishments for indulgences in vices and gained unpopularity as a result. As Cato tried to stem the tide of the waves of Hellenism challenging Roman tradition,<sup>154</sup> he enforced the *mores maiorum* by having other Roman senators scrutinise the daily conduct of other citizens to ensure they lived and worked in accordance with his ethical beliefs. He felt that “no one should be left to his own devices and desires without inspection or review, either in marrying, or in the begetting of children, in the ordering of daily life, or in the entertainment of friends.”<sup>155</sup> His old-fashioned views, closed-mindedness, and extreme punishments including senatorial banishment, amassed him many opponents in Rome, especially those of the Scipionic Circle. Cato had to defend himself in court against his enemies at least forty-four times throughout his life.<sup>156</sup> Livy and Plutarch write that Cato’s lack of popular support threatened his placement for censorship during his election in 184 because the nobility united against him in an attempt to have him not chosen.<sup>157</sup> Cato was also criticised by ancient authors on account of his moral outrage displayed as a senator. For instance, Nepos describes Cato’s censorship with *acerbitas* (severity),<sup>158</sup> while Pliny describes him as a cold senator devoid of human emotion.<sup>159</sup> With a completely opposite view of these authors, Cato had a high opinion of himself boasting that he “owed less to Rome than Rome [owed to

---

<sup>154</sup> Forde, 1975: 194.

<sup>155</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 2. 15. Trans: Perrin, 1914: 347.

<sup>156</sup> Gale Research Inc., 1998: 375.

<sup>157</sup> Livy. *Epon.* 39. 41; Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 16. 3

<sup>158</sup> Horsfall, 1989: 52.

<sup>159</sup> Plin. E. 7. 100.

him],” according to Plutarch.<sup>160</sup> Further discussed in the next chapter, Demea is constantly seeking out misconduct, vocalising moral outrage throughout the play because he feels that his morals are correct and methods of educating his son are infallible. Demea also holds the opinion that neither are subject to debate and he constantly refutes the Aristotelian advice of his brother until the end of the play. His outrage and thirst for ethical conformity causes an unloving and undesirable relationship with his sons, while Micio and Syrus judge Demea as a bad father and *exemplum* for Ctesipho. When Demea finally realises that these characters and his sons love Micio and hate him, he takes a moderate stance concerning his role as a paternal and moral mentor and accepts one that accords more with Micio and less like Cato and his Early Republican system and moral ideals. In the closing lines of the play, Demea describes that he understands that he must raise Ctesipho and Aeschinus with a proper balance of *patria potestas*, *humanitas*, and *aequitas*. Subsequently, his change of heart earns him back the affection of his sons and respect of the other characters. Terence, therefore, invites the audience to consider the new Demea at the end of the play as an ideal *paterfamilias*. Advocating a kinder, milder father fitting the Aristotelian golden mean of fatherhood and education at the conclusion of the play, the Roman playwright softens the image of the overly zealous, cold, controlling father modeled by Cato, Dionysius and the Twelve Tables, and portrayed by Demea.

---

<sup>160</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 2. 14. Trans: Perrin, 1914: 343.

### Chapter Three: Demea as a tyrannical *exemplum*

Since Terence was a member of the Scipionic Circle, perhaps he sought to undermine Roman conservatism and anti-Hellenism by depicting Demea as a bad Cato-like *paterfamilias*?<sup>161</sup> Although this cannot be proven, it is clear that Terence does not allow Demea's traditional Roman philosophy and practice of education to win over his sons' affection and conclude the play. Instead, the playwright invites the audience to view Demea as a bad moral *exemplum* for Ctesipho by depicting the *senex durus* as stubborn, quick to anger, and arrogant. Terence does this by cleverly describing Demea with the Latin words *vis* (force), *iratus* (anger), *clamens* (moral outrage), *superbia* (arrogance), *metus* (fear), and hatred (*odium*), all of which carry a negative association with *tyranni* (tyrants).<sup>162</sup> By portraying Demea as a bad father for his sons, Terence foreshadows for the audience Demea's necessity to change, for his behaviour has alienated his brother and his sons. Once Demea realises that these character traits he possess are flawed, he decides to follow his brother and adopt a more Greek model of fatherhood and education to earn back his family's love and respect.

Livy describes the final Roman king, Tarquinius Superbus, using the words *ira* (anger), *superbia* (arrogance), and *odium* (hatred) in the following lines: "*seu ira seu odio seu superbia insita ingenio nullam eum vocem emisisse.*"<sup>163</sup> In antiquity, tyrannical *vis* (force) and *ira* (anger) found strong echoes in the Greek world and were well-marked in Roman society.<sup>164</sup> Throughout the Roman Republic, tyrants were deemed to control the citizenry by *vis* (force). For example, Livy writes that Tarquinius' rule did not have the sanction of the people and the senate, and that

---

<sup>161</sup> Cary, 1960: 252.

<sup>162</sup> Lewis, 2006: 24; Braund and Most, 2004: 171.

<sup>163</sup> Livy. *Epon.* 1.54.7. "Whether from anger, or hatred, or native pride, the king, he said, had not pronounced a single word."

<sup>164</sup> Harris, 2001: 229. See also *Oedipus Tyrannus* for these words and *Bacchae*.

he maintained his position of *imperium* (power) as tyrant by means of violent *vis*.<sup>165</sup> Tyrants were a threat to the social order of Rome. They were extremely disliked due to the fact that the previous Etruscan monarchy in Rome was despotic and tyrannical.<sup>166</sup> Because the Romans detested tyranny, the senate was created to avoid a monarchic rule from ever happening again. Romans continued to detest tyranny during the Republic due to corrupt Roman provincial governors. According to William Harris, these governors, on account of their irascibility, had succumbed to the temptation to behave like tyrants. As a result, Romans endeavoured to avoid a reputation for irascibility during the second century BCE.<sup>167</sup> In a letter to his brother Quintus, the governor of Asia, Cicero connects the vice of *iracundia* (irascibility) to both the public and private spheres of Rome, arguing that it is necessary to avoid in both realms since it is associated with tyrannical behaviour. He discusses this in the following lines: The people have a “reservation in their encomia of you, and that concerns *iracundia*. This vice is considered even in this private normal life I lead, to be a sign of irresponsibility and weakness....”<sup>168</sup> The Roman author Horace associates *ira* with insanity saying “*ira furor brevis est*” (anger is a brief insanity), and Seneca describes “*ira est cupiditas ulciscendae injuriae*” (anger as a desire of unjust punishment).<sup>169</sup> The Greek philosopher Aristotle describes *ὀργίλοι* (irascible men) as those “who get angry quickly and with the wrong people and for the wrong things and too violently....”<sup>170</sup> These authors, both Greek and Roman, suggest that the words *ira* and *iracundia* were generally accepted as negative characteristics of tyrannical individuals, whether they be political or family leaders.

---

<sup>165</sup> Livy *Epon.* 1.49.3.

<sup>166</sup> Livy. *Epon.* 27. 19. 4.

<sup>167</sup> Harris, 2001: 241.

<sup>168</sup> Cic. *QF.* 1. 37. See Harris, 2001: 204.

<sup>169</sup> Hor. *Ep.* 1. 2; Sen. *De Ira* 1. 2. 4.

<sup>170</sup> Arist. *N.E.* IV.v.8. *ὀργίλοι* is a vice of excessive anger at the wrong times. It strays from the ideal mean of Aristotle describes See appendix A for more details.



There are other terms marking out tyrannical individuals. In *Adelphi*, Micio describes Demea's method of childrearing using the words *imperium* and *vis*: “*et errat longe mea quidem sentential qui imperium credat gravius esse aut stabilius vi quod fit, quam illud quoi amicitia adiungitur*” (he's grotesquely strict... it is a serious mistake to think that power based on might is more real or better grounded than power which essentially involves friendship).<sup>171</sup> Like a tyrant, Demea controls Ctesipho by *imperium* and *vis*. As the play continues, Micio witnesses Demea's three outbursts expressing moral outrage. Micio thus judges his brother as possessing *iracundia* (hot temper)<sup>172</sup> and Syrus calls Demea *iratum* meaning “mad.”<sup>173</sup> According to Aristotle, a father who is surly is both argumentative and advocates for bodily reprimand because it causes pain.<sup>174</sup> An example of Demea's surliness is his initial reaction to the supposed affair of Aeschinus and Bacchis in act one. He demands moral retribution, and threatens to disown Aeschinus before even speaking with him to confirm the rumours.<sup>175</sup> In a another situation in act five, Demea threatens to punish Ctesipho's lute-player earlier by overworking her to death: “*istam psaltriam una illuc.... abstraham.... atque ibi favillae plena fumi ac pollins coquendo sit faxo et molendo; praeter haec meridie ipso faciam ut stipulam colligat: tam excoctam reddam atque atram quam carbost*” (I'll drag that artiste [Bacchis].... I'll see that she gets covered in ash, smoke, and flour from milling and baking, and besides that I'll have her gathering hay at high noon. I'll roast her black as charcoal).<sup>176</sup> Due to the negative association with these words related to anger and surliness in antiquity, Terence invites the audience to consider Demea's anger as both tyrannical and a vice, for he is easily angered, and frequently displays it at the

---

<sup>171</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 65-67.

<sup>172</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 146; 756; 794.

<sup>173</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 404.

<sup>174</sup> See Webster, 1950: 210; Arist. *Rhet.* 1383 b 31, cf. 35; 1384 b 17.

<sup>175</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 134. Trans: Gratwick, 1999: 71. *Profundat perdat pereat: nihil ad me attinet.* “Let him stew in his own juice; the wastrel; he's no son of mine.”

<sup>176</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 843; 846-849.

wrong time and in the wrong manner.<sup>177</sup> His anger is a primary reason why he is a bad moral *exemplum* for Ctesipho.

Furthering his negative image as a moral *exemplum* for Ctesipho, Demea has multiple fits of anger and public outcries of injustice, which contradict the ancestral custom of *gravitas*. The Romans considered *gravitas* to be an important attribute. According to Roman convention, men should behave in a calm, rational manner in any situation without a display of great emotion, including rage. Additionally, according to Cicero, the Greeks associate anger with someone who has *melancholia* (an unsound mind).<sup>178</sup> Mentioned above, Micio points out to his brother that his display of extreme emotional distress is without gravity and stability: “*et errat longe mea quidem sententia qui imperium credat gravius esse aut stabilius vi*” (and it is a serious mistake to think that power based on might is more real or better grounded than power which essentially involves friendship).<sup>179</sup> In a later scene, Micio mocks his brother’s entrance onto the stage with the word *graviter* (gravely). Realising that Demea is walking on stage, Micio interrupts his conversation with Pamphilla by saying “*quisnam a me pepulit tam graviter fores?*” (Who thunders at my portal so?)<sup>180</sup> because his brother is entering on stage boisterously proclaiming immorality “*clamat: ei mihi! quid faciam? quid agam? quid clamem aut querar?*” (Disaster! Panic! Woe! I’m lost for words!)<sup>181</sup> (how does this quote show he is proclaiming immortality? Rephrase introductory line for quote) Consequently, Micio describes Demea’s display of distress after he just discovered Ctesipho’s affair: “*rescivit omnem rem: id nunc clamat*” (that’s it; he’s learnt the

---

<sup>177</sup> This parallels Arist. *N.E.* IV.v.8 term *ὀργυλοι* which he says is a vice of excessive anger displayed at the wrong times, and the wrong manner. It strays from the ideal mean of Aristotle *πραότης*, meaning “gentleness or mildness” the Latin equivalent is *lenitas*. See appendix A for more details.

<sup>178</sup> Cic. *Tusc.* 3. 5.

<sup>179</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 66-67.

<sup>180</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 788. Trans: Gratwick, 1999: 151.

<sup>181</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 789.

truth; that's why the noise).<sup>182</sup> Disregarding the ancestral virtue of *gravitas*, Demea again enters onto the stage angrily shouting about moral outrage. Terence invites the audience to consider him as a bad moral *exemplum* for his son because his public display of outrage goes against the Roman virtue of *gravitas*.

*Superbia* (arrogance) is also another characteristic associated with tyrants due to their often strong feeling of superiority and excessive arrogance.<sup>183</sup> For four-fifths of the play, Demea is under the illusion that his system of childrearing is flawless and his son is a perfect example of himself. Even when all of the characters in the play know the truth about Ctesipho's affair, Demea remains ignorant (in a state of *agnoia*), blinded by his high estimation of himself as a man, father, and moral educator. Although Demea boasts that his paternal success is due to his demands that his son conform absolutely with his strict moral authority, he lacks any true influence over Ctesipho's ethical choices - let alone anyone else in Micio's household. Demea becomes a tool for comic irony when he is easily deceived and controlled by Syrus and Micio. It is Syrus who most easily outwits the blind Demea, and mocks him directly with *error fabulae* (false stories),<sup>184</sup> praising his son for excessive anger and moral outrage. Syrus tells Demea exactly what he wants to hear about his son, namely that he is an exact replica of himself. Syrus mocks Demea's excessively strict system by telling him a fictitious situation where Ctesipho had been *iratum* (enraged) by Aeschinus' immorality and *clamare* (publicly cried out): "*Atque iratum admodum...coepit clamare 'o Aeschine, haecin flagitia facere te! Haec te admittere indigna genere nostro!'*" (And a fine temper he was in! He started shouting, 'For shame, Aeschinus! How

---

<sup>182</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 792.

<sup>183</sup> Livy. *Epon.* 1.53.6,9; 1.54.1,7; 1.59.9; 3.39.4 describes Tarquinius Superbus as *superbia* four times. Arrogance is also a characteristic of

<sup>184</sup> Duckworth, 1952: 171. *Error fabulae* is common comedic device used by Greek and Roman New Comedy playwrights.

can you do such terrible things! How can you commit acts which disgrace our family!)<sup>185</sup> Again words expressing anger and public outcry are used. Demea compliments Ctesipho's *insaniens* (raving)<sup>186</sup> at Aeschinus for *argentum perdis* (squandering money) to free the slave Bacchis for his own sexual *flagitium*.<sup>187</sup> Demea's positive reaction to Syrus' use of vocabulary evoking tyrannical behaviour emphasises his despotic position as a father and mentor. This is evident when Demea praises his son's supposed moral outrage, pointedly comparing it to his own by using the same word *clamens*.<sup>188</sup> Demea admits that Ctesipho learned this type of tyrannical behaviour as he employed harsh discipline while raising him: "*illud sis vide, exemplum disciplinae!*" (Just look at that model of sound training!)<sup>189</sup> Ironically, while commending himself for teaching his son public anger and outrage, Demea is portraying himself as a bad *exemplum* for Ctesipho because anger and outrage are not considered positive attributes of a Roman father.

The use of the *exemplum* was not the only model of fatherhood, parenting, or ancient education. Greek theories were beginning to be imported and integrated, challenging the Roman status quo. Among the different Greek approaches and theorists lie the works of Plato and Aristotle. Plato contends that fathers who teach their sons by example also control them by fear.<sup>190</sup> He says that these fathers teach their sons using "every word spoken and every deed done for teaching, pointing out that this is just, that unjust, and this honourable, and that

---

<sup>185</sup> Ter. Ad. 404-409.

<sup>186</sup> Ter. Ad. 562.

<sup>187</sup> Ter. Ad. 410.

<sup>188</sup> Ter. Ad. 413-414. "*Syre, praeceptorum plenust istorum ille*" (Syrus, that lad's full of remarks like that one).

<sup>189</sup> Ter. Ad. 767.

<sup>190</sup> Ter. Ad. 415-16. Trans: Gratwick, 1999: 107. Demea is speaking to the slave Syrus that he teaches his son Ctesipho morals by *exemplum* in the following lines: *fit sedulo. nihil praetermitto; consuefacio; denique inspicere tamquam in speculum in vitas omnium iubeo atque ex aliis sumere exemplum sibi*. "One does one's honest best; I pass nothing over; I train him; in short, I tell him to look into people's lives as if into a mirror and to take his model from others." Although Demea says to look at other people's examples, nevertheless, in reality, Demea expects his son to model himself and not others.

dishonourable, and this holy, and that profane and this do, but avoid that.” Plato adds that if a son is unwilling to obey his father’s moral example, these fathers will “straighten [their sons] like bent and twisted wood with threats and blows.”<sup>191</sup> Demea does in fact control his son by fear of punishment matching Plato’s description. To draw attention to the tyrannical attitude behind Demea’s threats and blows, Terence draws attention to the traditionally understood dichotomy of *liberalitas* and *metus*. Terence intentionally plays on the Latin words *liberalitas* and *metus*. Greek and Roman authors often used these words in opposition when discussing an evil and controlling tyrant.<sup>192</sup> In his *Politics*, Aristotle remarks that tyranny is often executed by a reign of open terror and contempt in order to oppress the freedom of the people, so that the tyrant can rule only for his own benefit.<sup>193</sup> In a second example, Cicero uses tyrannical fear in opposition to liberty in the following lines: “Fear is a poor guardian over any length of time... Through silent judgments and secret elections, liberty and laws will rise up again and freedom will bite back more fiercely when suspended, than when she remains undisturbed”<sup>194</sup> He uses *libertas* in opposition to the controlling tyrant. Terence creates a similar tyrant in Demea who oppresses the freedom of Ctesipho. This is evident when Micio compares Demea’s methodology of strict control to a tyrant using the word *dominus*, contending that this method instils fears and deceit in Ctesipho:

*Hoc patriumst, potius consuefacere filium sua sponte recte facere quam alieno metu. hoc pater ac dominus interest. Hoc qui nequit, fateatur nescire imperare liberis.*

Training a son to do what is right because he wants to, not for dread of someone else – that is being a real father; that is the difference between a father and a tyrant; and if there is anyone who can’t cope with that, he should face the fact that he does not master the art of ruling the unruly.<sup>195</sup>

<sup>191</sup> Plato. *Rep.* 506c, 619c. Trans by: Webster, 1960: 209.

<sup>192</sup> Balot, 2009: 175.

<sup>193</sup> Arist. *Pol.* 5. 8. 7.

<sup>194</sup> Cic. *Off.* 2. 23-24.

<sup>195</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 74-75. Trans: Gratwick, 1999: 65.

This passage uses vocabulary such as *patrium, filium, consuefacere, sua sponte, alieno metu, dominus, imperare, and liberis* to establish a link between a father's and ruler's roles: failure to teach a son to learn of his own accord will be replicated by public failure, by an inability to master and govern fellow freeborn men.

In Aristotle, Plato, and Cicero's argument, a tyrant's use of *metus* has public repercussions. In the *Adelphi*, it also has personal ramifications. Micio contends that even though Demea is trying to compel his son to abide by his personal set of morals through *metus*, Ctesipho will fall into moral misdeeds behind his father's back.

*malo coactus qui suum officium facit dum id rescitum iri credit, tantisper cavet; si sperat fore calm – rursus ad ingenium redit.*

If someone is forced to behave properly by punishment, then he watches his step just so long as he thinks any nonsense would be found out. But if he is pretty sure it could be kept quiet, then he reverts to his true nature.<sup>196</sup>

This passage conveys the image of Ctesipho walking on eggshells, constantly worrying about being discovered and punished by Demea. This is important because Micio's Aristotelian suggestions that fathers who control by fear engender deception holds true for Ctesipho. Individuals will show their true nature as soon as the threat of punishment ebbs. In one specific example, Ctesipho describes his father's excessive watchfulness: "*ubi me illi non videbit, iam huc recurret, sat scio: rogabit me ubi fuerim: ego hodie toto non vidi die*" (When he sees I'm not there, I know he'll be running back here again any minute. He'll stick to the question where I've been: 'I haven't seen you all day long!').<sup>197</sup> Fearing punishment from his father, he plots to deceive him about his whereabouts: "*quid dicam?*" (What am I going to say?),<sup>198</sup> "*causae quid*

---

<sup>196</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 69-72. Trans: Gratwick, 1999: 64.

<sup>197</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 526-527. Trans: Gratwick, 1999: 117.

<sup>198</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 528. Trans: Gratwick, 1999: 117.

*dicam?*” (What earthly excuse can I offer him?)”<sup>199</sup> Echoing the words of Micio, Ctesipho hides his true nature from his father but reveals it to other characters in the play. Eschewing the ethics and moral behaviour of his father, Ctesipho does not live a frugal mode of life as he allows Aeschinus to spend a great deal of money to pay off the slave dealer Sannio for his lute player.<sup>200</sup> In a second example, Ctesipho disregards his father’s moral teachings on the importance of sobriety.<sup>201</sup> In the fourth act, Ctesipho and Syrus enter on stage with garlands while holding drinks, verbalising their hope that Demea fall sick and die. Of his father, Ctesipho says, “*utinam quidem; quod cum salute eius fiat, ita se defetigarit velim, ut triduum hoc perpetuo prorsum e lecto nequeat surgere*” (Barring him to his health, I hope he gets so tired that he’ll be absolutely stuck in bed today, tomorrow, and the day after that!).<sup>202</sup> Ctesipho desires that his father become sick and bedridden because he will then have freedom, which every Roman citizen deserves. Ctesipho, moreover, will no longer be controlled by fear of his father. Crushing his son’s dream, Demea enters on stage following his speech, and Ctesipho quickly hides out of fear of punishment for drinking alcohol.<sup>203</sup> Ctesipho’s inclination toward anger and deceit of his father invites the audience to judge Demea’s methods as excessively controlling and tyrannical.

Both Cicero and Aristotle compare tyranny to a lower form of rule, being that of master over slave with the tyrant desiring that his subjects be incapable of action.<sup>204</sup> In *Adelphi*, Syrus mocks both Demea’s dominant role in his childrearing system and Ctesipho’s servile position by playing the role of Demea at Micio’s house. In the following lines, he orders around his fellow slaves in a tyrannical manner, thus inviting the audience to see Ctesipho’s role as servile.

---

<sup>199</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 532. . Trans: Gratwick, 1999: 119.

<sup>200</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 799.

<sup>201</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 95. Demea tries to convince Micio that Aeschinus should lead a similar life of sobriety like Ctesipho. This statement is ironic because Ctesipho drinks alcohol on a few occasions behind Demea’s back.

<sup>202</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 520.

<sup>203</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 535-536.

<sup>204</sup> Arist. *Pol.* 5. 9. 8-9.

*Hoc salsumst, hoc adusutumst, hoc lautumst parum... sedulo moneo quae possum pro mea sapientia: postremo, tamquam in speculum, in patinas, Demea, inspicere iubeo et moneo, quid fact usu.*

This needs more salt, this should be crisper, this lacks flavour... remember to do it like that the next time... I do my honest best to pass on all I can kitchen-wise. I tell them to look into the pans, sir, as if into a mirror, and tell them what needs doing.<sup>205</sup>

Terence intentionally has Syrus use *hoc* plus a verb in the imperative mood to mock the authoritarian nature of Demea's teachings.<sup>206</sup> There is also a play on the words *iubeo inspicere tamquam in speculum, in patinas* "I tell them to look into the pans just as if into a mirror." Syrus is directing the audience to recall Demea's claim about educating his son using himself just as if his son was learning using a mirror. Syrus is directing the audience to see the ridiculousness of Demea's explanation of his childrearing of Ctesipho using himself as the *exemplum*.

Terence uses Syrus' mockery of Demea to point to the limitations of using the tools of a tyrant to teach. Using anger and controlling through fear leads to the deception of true character, something clearly done by Ctesipho in the *Adelphi*. Furthermore, Terence points out the limitations of exerting control through anger and reliance upon imposing fear. These characteristics allow the tyrannical individual to be deceived, and to a large degree, controlled. Employing a gentle comic irony, both Syrus the slave and Micio the lenient father are granted the power to control Demea. One example of this is found when Syrus depicts Ctesipho as the spitting image of the stern father in order to quell the latter's excessive anger in the following lines:

*Ego illius sensum pulchre calleo. Quom feruit maxume, tam placidum quam ouem reddo... laudatier te audit lubenter: facio te apud illum deum.*

I'm the perfect expert in [Demea's] tuning. When he's blowing hottest, I can make him placid as a sheep... [because] he likes hearing you [Ctesipho] praised: I make you a saint in his eyes.<sup>207</sup>

---

<sup>205</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 425-429.

<sup>206</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 416-417. Demea tells Syrus that Ctesipho learns morals by listening to his father's commands saying *hoc facito... hoc fugito... hoc laudist*.

<sup>207</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 534-535. Trans: Gratwick, 1999: 119.



Terence uses the same word *placidum* to describe Micio's ability to control Demea's rage: "quom placo, aduorsor sedulo ac deterro" (to quiet him at all, I have resolutely to face him out and frighten him off).<sup>208</sup> Further illustrating Demea's powerlessness, Syrus leads Demea on two wild goose chases, leading him in different directions that deter him from discovering the truth behind Ctesipho's love affair.<sup>209</sup> Further depicting Demea as a bad *exemplum*, Terence creates irony with the slave Syrus controlling the master Demea relatively easily due to his irrational anger and arrogance.

Aristotle argues that tyranny can be executed using a reign of terror and oppression so as to control the people, using the threat of death as a consequence for opposition.<sup>210</sup> Ctesipho acknowledges his fear of being destroyed or disowned by his father as a consequence for his refusal to fall in line with his father's moral code. This is evident in Terence's use of the Latin verb *perimo*, a term meaning both 'to kill' or 'to destroy'. Ctesipho dreads his father's outrage so much that he yells at Syrus to force Aeschinus to pay the 2000 asses owed to Sannio fearing that the slave-dealer will tell Demea the truth of the affair. As he then says, failure to do so means "ego tum perpetuo perierim" (it would be total disaster for myself).<sup>211</sup> Ctesipho fears so greatly that his affair and excessive spenditure on a slave would cause his father to scold him and possibly even murder him. Expressing this fear of his father again in the fourth act Ctesipho panics and quickly hides from his father just before Demea enters into Micio's house. He

---

<sup>208</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 144.

<sup>209</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 402. Syrus lies to Demea saying "I think [Ctesipho's] been busy at something a good while at the farm." 574-585. As Demea is looking for Micio, Syrus claims he knows where Ctesipho is, and gives Demea random directions to different places throughout the city of Athens, which led Demea astray from his son.

<sup>210</sup> Arist. *Pol.* 5. 6.

<sup>211</sup> The verb *perierim* means both 'to be destroyed' and 'to perish'. Ter. *Ad.* 282-283. According to Gratwick, 1999: 190, Cato never paid more than 1500 drachma for a slave. Bacchis in *Adelphi* cost 2000 asses; therefore, Cato would have thought that buying Bacchis is too costly, and a waste of money as she is connected to sex, luxury, and leisure.

collapses, quietly exclaiming to himself *perii!* “I’m dying!”<sup>212</sup> It is also important to note that Ctesipho fled Athens when rumours started to spread about his affair, for he feared his father would hear of it.<sup>213</sup> Ctesipho’s extreme fear of punishment by his father is no surprise because Demea earlier threatened to disown Aeschinus after he heard the rumour about his sexual affair with Bacchis. Demea declared at that point: “*profundat perdat pereat: nihil ad me attinet*” (Let him stew in his own juice; the wastrel; he’s no son of mine).<sup>214</sup> Ctesipho’s fear for harsh punishment of death or disownment recalls the severe *pater* of the Early Republican period, a man who punished his son as described in the work of Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the laws of the Twelve Tables. While the Twelve Tables assert that fathers have the power of life and death over their sons with a similar Latin word *neicare* meaning ‘to kill’ or ‘to destroy’, nevertheless the Roman audience during the second century would have probably frowned upon Demea’s threat to disown Aechinus since these penalties could be seen as immoderate. Romans could be punished for killing their sons by the time of the Late Republic. For example, Quintus Fabius Maximus killed his son for a sexual offense, but received legal punishment for his actions.<sup>215</sup> Terence, therefore, invites the audience to judge Demea as a bad *exemplum* for Ctesipho as his son dreads his own father.

According to Aristotle, it is not unusual for those oppressed to feel anger and resentment toward the individual enforcing tight control.<sup>216</sup> In *Adelphi*, Ctesipho is so fearful of his father that he resents him. He is so bitter because he is under such constant moral scrutiny that he wishes that his father become bedridden for an indefinite period, so that he will finally be free to

---

<sup>212</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 543. *Perii*.

<sup>213</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 275.

<sup>214</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 134.

<sup>215</sup> Saller, 1994: 116 notes that the exact punishment received was not written down; however, it is still significant, as the prosecution itself suggests that fathers could receive legal reprimand by the senate as early as the Middle Republic for punishing their sons.

<sup>216</sup> Arist. *Pol.* 5. 8. 9.

make his own choices based on his own beliefs, which every Roman Republican citizen deserves.<sup>217</sup> Feeling no sense of liberty, Ctesipho abhors his father forcing him to learn by his example at the farm: “*et illud rus nulla alia causa tam male odi...*” (and I shudder at the word farm).<sup>218</sup> Demea acknowledges at the end of the play that both sons hate him: “*nunc exacta aetate hoc fructi pro labore ab eis fero: odium*” (now, my time quite spent, this is the return I get from them for my struggles – their loathing).<sup>219</sup> This is crucial for it is the hatred of Ctesipho that leads Demea to reconsider his own behaviour and system of education.

The hatred and fear of Ctesipho and Aeschinus suggest that Demea is a bad paternal *exemplum* because “*adulescentes senum praeceptis gaudent, quibus ad virtutum studia ducuntur*” (young men find pleasure in their elders, by whose precepts they are led into virtue’s path).<sup>220</sup> Demea’s control by fear, anger, moral outrage, and arrogance are characteristic of a tyrannical father; and therefore are bad models of behaviour for Ctesipho to learn by *exemplum*. By behaving this way, Demea also unknowingly continues to drive Ctesipho toward feeling hatred for his father. This is important because when Demea decides to follow Micio’s advice, he moderates his control by allowing his sons freedom of choice at the end of the play, finally ending his tyranny. As a result, Ctesipho and Aeschinus no longer resent Demea, but admire him.

---

<sup>217</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 518-519. Trans: Gratwick, 1999: 117.

<sup>218</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 523.

<sup>219</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 870-71.

<sup>220</sup> Cic. *Sen.* 26.

## Chapter Four: Demea and Greek Philosophy in Rome

In matters of the heart, finance, and restraint, Demea is a Cato-like character who must change and adapt his childrearing practices because his lessons have engendered terror, deceit and hatred in his sons. Both the behaviour and educational methodology of Demea verge on the tyrannical, and the play makes it clear that this has resulted in his sons loving Micio and despising him. When Demea realises that he does not have absolute knowledge as a moralist and educator, *anagnorisis*, or recognition, occurs. Originally a Greek concept and dramatic device, *anagnorisis* is a moment of critical discovery when a character profoundly comprehends both him/herself and his/her own situation. It most often precedes *peripeteia*, a Greek term meaning reversal of circumstances. It is important to note that both *anagnorisis* and *peripeteia* occur in *Adelphi* because they invest this comedy and Demea's changed direction with depth, with the weight that usually accompanies recognition and reversal in Greek tragedy. *Adelphi* does not simply direct the audience towards Demea's changed character and approaches by using Greek dramatic devices. Instead, by using the Latin equivalents of Greek philosophical terms, it grounds Demea's new educational approach in Greek Peripatetic philosophy. This is significant because Terence's inclusion of Greek elements supports the notion that he played a role in introducing the Romans to Greek ideas of education. Because Demea ends up following some of the ideals of *humanitas* and *aequitas* and wins his sons back suggests that Terence favoured these Greek ideals and desired his audience to view them in this same way.

As Demea transitions from ignorance to knowledge (*anagnorisis*),<sup>221</sup> the play shifts to a serious and enlightening moral tone.<sup>222</sup> Disposing of his old style of education, Demea accepts the guidance of his brother to improve his system of childrearing. He thus loosens his tight grasp

---

<sup>221</sup> Demea's discovery of the truth of Ctesipho's affair led to his "recognition" of the truth *ἀναγνώρισις* (*cognitio* in Latin).

<sup>222</sup> Duckworth, 1952: 140.

of *potestas* over his sons and moderates his anger and adherence to the *mores maiorum*. Consequently, Demea's situation is reversed by Terence in the final act.<sup>223</sup> This dramatic convention of reversal, or *peripeteia*, is relevant to this drama's theme of education because Demea crosses from misery to happiness<sup>224</sup> and reconciles not only with his sons, but also his brother; however, it goes well beyond that for it is predicated on his yielding to other means of educating children. Demea now accepts that his brother's criticism of his overconfidence in knowledge as a father and educator is accurate: "*homine inperito numquam quicquam iniustiust qui nisi quod ipse fecit, nihil rectum putat*" (there's no worse judge than a man of limited experience; he thinks nothing can be right unless he's done it himself).<sup>225</sup> By accepting this criticism of his own system of education, Demea no longer follows a narrow and controlling path in which he claims absolute authority in everything, as he had previously boasted of when he stated: "*Em huic mandes siquid recte curatum velis!*" (If you want a job done right, here's your man, leave it to [me]!)<sup>226</sup> For Demea, true knowledge now means accepting the necessity of modifying his system of childrearing:

*Numquam ita quisquam bene subducta ratione ad vitam fuit, quin res aetas usus semper aliquid adportet novi, aliquid moneat, ut illa quae te scisse credas nescias, et quae tibi putaris prima, in experiundo ut repudies quod nunc mihi evenit.*

No-one has ever had his way of life so precisely worked out that circumstance, time, experience is not always producing something fresh, always teaching a lesson, so that we unlearn what we believed we knew, and what we had reckoned fundamental, we reject in its trail.<sup>227</sup>

Demea acknowledges that his harsh actions, obsession with strict morals, and overuse of *imperium* (power) of *patria potestas* are wrong. He knows that his obsession with controlling his

---

<sup>223</sup> Duckworth, 1952: 140.

<sup>224</sup> According to Duckworth, 1952: 140, Donatus defines Terence's inclusion of the transition from misery to happiness in his comedies as *catastrophe*, the Latin equivalent of *περιπέτεια*.

<sup>225</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 98-99.

<sup>226</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 372.

<sup>227</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 855-860. Trans: Gratwick, 1999: 157.

sons have led them to have such ill feelings toward him that they elude him and wish for his premature death. This is evident when Demea considers his sons' feelings for himself and for his brother: "*illum amant, me fugitant; illi credunt consilia Omnia, illum diligent, apud illum sunt ambo, ego desertu sum; illum ut vivat optant, meam autem mortem exspectant scilicet*" (They think he's special, they avoid me; they confide everything in him, they are at his side, both of them; I am left alone; they pray for his preservation, and it's clear they look forward to my death.<sup>228</sup> Because Demea recognises that his sons adore Micio and hope he lives a long life, he decides to listen and models his approach after his brother's Greek philosophy and methodology of fatherhood.<sup>229</sup> He thus moderates both his character, softening, for example, his anger and his controlling behaviour, as well as his methods of childrearing - a move that directs the audiences' attention to the educational point of the play.

Demea's Roman conservative views on frugality and sexual restraint dramatically change, for he acknowledges that his stiff and unyielding conservatism has not been successful. His transformation is important because up until now he has been a stalwart exemplar of the early education system centred on the holder of *patria potestas*, the sole authority who directs the life of the household based on his perceptions of *auctoritas maiorum* (the authority of the ancestors). Demea's subsequent actions reflect an amalgamation of his own Roman methods of childrearing, and the Greek lessons found in Aristotle's views on emotion, virtue and education - all of which are echoed by Micio throughout the play. As we have seen in chapter two and three of this thesis, the battles between the Demea and Micio have been not only a clash between two opposing methods of education, but also two different characters. Micio leans toward more Greek beliefs that follow closely with the Greek Peripetatic school of thought, a school to which

---

<sup>228</sup> Ter. Ad. 870-875.

<sup>229</sup> Ter. Ad. 870-875.

Menander is believed to have belonged. This is important to emphasise because Demea learns that an ideal father-son relationship should include Greek virtues; he learns it should be amicable, full of kindness, and based on trust and not fear. Demea uses this knowledge in the final act to prove to his sons that he has learned to be a good father. Subsequently, Demea mends his broken relationship with his sons and brother. With his rehabilitation complete, the play concludes. With Demea's rehabilitation complete, Terence concludes the play portraying an ideal Roman father as a man who both respects Roman morals and *patria potesta*, and *humanitas* and *aequitas*. By doing so, the playwright broadens Roman education by establishing Greek Peripetetic philosophy as an integral part of conventional Roman practice.

In order to convey that Demea changes his system to model a more Greek one, Terence maintains a close adaptation of Menander's original play *Adelphoi* and alludes to the philosophical teaching by Greek thinkers such as Aristotle. He translates the philosophical vocabulary from Greek to Latin and gives them to Micio to voice throughout the play.<sup>230</sup> As part of this philosophy, it is important to keep in mind that a person must possess *ἡθoς* (a good natural and moral disposition)<sup>231</sup> in order to obtain the mean of any of the virtues of character described by Aristotle.<sup>232</sup> In *Adelphi*, Terence sends the message that both Ctesipho and Aeschinus have *ingenium*<sup>233</sup> (inherited decency), which naturally helps guide them to a virtuous path. Because both sons possess moral decency, they should be told of their immoral misdeed, and forgiven for them, for they, too, are born with an understanding of what is what and wrong. This concept runs parallel to the Greek equivalent *ἡθoς τ' ἐγγενές*, "an inborn nobility of

---

<sup>230</sup> See the introduction of Martin, *Terence Adelphoe*, 1976; Webster, *Studies in Menander*, 1960: 195-219 ('Menander and Philosophy'); and Lord, "Aristotle, Menander and the Adelphoe of Terence," 1977: 183-202.

<sup>231</sup> Liddell & Scott included Aristotle's use of ἡθoς meaning "moral disposition." Arist. *NE*. X.viii.3.

<sup>232</sup> Sachs, 2002: 68.

<sup>233</sup> Gratwick, 1999: 198 defines *ingenium* used by Terence in *Adelphi* as "inherited decency."

character” found in Aristotle.<sup>234</sup> For example, Micio tells Demea to take account of Ctesipho’s innate goodness, advising his brother “*liberum ingenium atque animum*” (it’s possible to tell inherited decency of spirit).<sup>235</sup> Micio explains this natural decency saying: “*quae ergo in illis esse video, ut confidam fore ita ut volumus? video sapere, intellegere, in loco vereri, inter se amare*” (Well, what signs do I see in them to make me so certain that they will turn out just as we wish them to? I see that they have sense, discrimination, respect when it matters, and mutual affection).<sup>236</sup> In describing Ctesipho and Aeschinus in this manner, Micio echoes Aristotle’s philosophy on good moral disposition. On many other occasions, the playwright subtly transmits this moral message to the audience by employing the word *vir bonus*,<sup>237</sup> meaning “a morally upright and honest man.”<sup>238</sup> Despite Aeschinus indulging in his own pleasure and leisure with wine and women, Hegio refers to the boy as a *bonus vir* (good man). In a second example, Syrus contends that Ctesipho acts with *animo bono* (a good spirit); therefore, he should not fear punishment of Demea for his sexual affair.<sup>239</sup> In a final example, after disclosing that his knowledge about his son’s affair, Micio assures Aeschinus that since he is characterized as possessing *bono animo*, he will permit his son to marry Pamphila: “*bono animo es. duces uxorem*” (Don’t worry. You’re marrying her).<sup>240</sup> He does not invoke the Roman father’s right and power to reject his son’s choice, directing the audience to consider the *mos maiorum* and the power of the *paterfamilias* as contingent upon their children’s disposition and nature.<sup>241</sup>

---

<sup>234</sup> Arist. X.viii.3. “If exhortation were all that were needed to persuade the young to aim at virtue, there would be no problem. But in fact, exhortation will only inspire such young men as they are naturally liberal and make the well-born and truly beauty-loving character tenacious of virtue.” Trans by: Gratwick, 1999: 198.

<sup>235</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 829.

<sup>236</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 826-828.

<sup>237</sup> Berger, 2002: 377.

<sup>238</sup> Lewis, 1997: 243.

<sup>239</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 543. “*Quin tu animo bono es*”. In this line, Syrus is telling Demea that Ctesipho has a good soul.

<sup>240</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 696.

<sup>241</sup> Goldsworthy, 2008: 37.



As part of moderating his tyrannical control over his sons, Demea models his forgiveness, and heeds his brother's following lesson on fatherhood: "*non necesse habeo omnia pro meo iure agere*" (I do think that it is essential to transact everything by the letter of a father's legal rights).<sup>242</sup> This runs parallel with Aristotle's claim that "the equitable man does not demand everything that is legally due to him, but is prepared to accept less, even when he has the law on his side."<sup>243</sup> At the very end of the play, Demea, too, does not demand everything by the letter of a father's legal rights. Although as a Roman *paterfamilias* with the power to reject the marriage between Ctesipho and Bacchis, he works with the situation by allowing him to marry her, for he understands that his son has a good moral disposition and that harsh punishment is unnecessary. Demea displays forgiveness and compassion, which are both Greek concepts of *humanitas*, and are two human emotions that are a part of Demea's new system of childrearing.

Along with a good moral disposition, Aristotle explains that *αἰδώς* (shame), albeit not an Aristotelian virtue, is an important feeling that arises after committing an immoral act;<sup>244</sup> he adds that it is suitable only for young men because they are prone to make moral mistakes. Aristotle says that since *αἰδώς* "may keep them in check," fathers should teach sons to feel this way.<sup>245</sup> The Latin equivalent of *αἰδώς* is *pudor*, meaning "the shyness that causes one to draw back from another, the fear or respect that causes one to make way for another even when it is within one's *iura* (legal rights), because a father should allow his son some *libertas* (freedom)."<sup>246</sup> Micio mentions that he trains his son by allowing him to have his own moral ideals because he believes

---

<sup>242</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 53-55.

<sup>243</sup> Arist. *N.E.* V.x.8. Trans by Webster, 1950: 206.

<sup>244</sup> Arist. *NE.* IV.viii.2. Trans: Rackham, 1926: 249.

<sup>245</sup> Arist. *NE.* IV.viii.3. Trans: Rackham, 1926: 251.

<sup>246</sup> Barton, 2001: 202. Showing the importance of *pudor*, which is possibly a Greek invention, by the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE in Rome, Plin. *Y. Ep.* 5. 13. By the first century CE, Pliny the Younger praises *pudor* as an ideal attribute writing about its importance in the following lines: "*oportet quidem, quae sunt inhonesta, non quasi illicit, sed quasi pudenda, vitare*" (One ought, no doubt, to avoid whatever is dishonourable, not so much because it is illegal, as because it is shameful).

that the result will be that Aeschinus will have *pudor*, which will help his son make moral decisions even when he is not present. In these lines, Terence places *pudor* in opposition to *metus* to emphasise that fathers should allow their sons freedom to make their own choices, and not coerce them into making decisions by fear of reprimand. Micio states “*pudore et liberalitate liberos retinere satius esse credo quam metu*” (I believe it is better to control the rising generation by being generous and by creating respect, not dread).<sup>247</sup> Micio believes that since both sons were born with inherited decency, they can feel *pudor*, if raised without *metus* (fear) of punishment. Micio acknowledges that young men will inevitably make mistakes, and those raised by fear are compelled to hide these misdeeds from extremely severe fathers: “*postremo alii clanculum patres quae fert adulescentia ea ne me celet consuefecerunt filium*” (the things other lads get up to, pathetically deceiving their father [are] the things which young manhood brings).<sup>248</sup> He believes that when sons commit immoral acts, they will understand that it is wrong and feel shame; consequently, they will learn to avoid doing these deeds on their own in order to relieve their guilty consciences. Demea’s good friend Hegio also accepts the philosophy that son make mistakes as natural part of youth. He reacts to Aeschinus’ affair with Pamphila as understandable: “*perquisite nox amor vinum adulescentia humanumst*” (night, love, wine, youth overcame him; it’s understandable).<sup>249</sup> Micio and Hegio acknowledge that it is normal for young men to dabble in immoral behaviour, and they will eventually return to a virtuous path if they have a good soul and a sense of shame. They understand that fathers must forgive their sons for

---

<sup>247</sup> Ter. Ad. 58-59.

<sup>248</sup> Ter. Ad. 53-55. Trans: Gratwick, 1999: 65. *Postremo alii clanculum patres qua faciunt quae fert adulescentia, ea ne me celet consuefecerunt ceteros.*

<sup>249</sup> Ter. Ad. 470.

misdeeds. Aristotle too says that this type of man “is prepared to forgive the errors young men make as it is human nature, which he shares with the good-tempered or mild man.”<sup>250</sup>

In the last act of the play, Demea understands that sound judgement is necessary, and that he must forgive his son for his affair. He also learns that although Ctesipho will make mistakes, he should not always interfere and punish his son, and as we will see soon, Demea allows his sons the choice to be morally trained by him:

*si id voltis potius, quae vos propter adulescentiam minus videtis, magis inpense cupitis, consultis parum haec reprehendere et corrigere met et obsecundare in loco, ecce me qui id faciam vobis.*

If... you want me to catch and correct things which you are unwary of because you are too young, want too intensely, and think over too little, and if you want me to back you up on occasion, I am here to do that for you.<sup>251</sup>

Demea now accedes to the fact that his supervision and control must be done in moderation. He tells his sons that they may like a word of advice or reproof from him *on occasion*. In addition, by following the advice of Micio, Hegio and implicitly, Aristotle, that it is understandable for young men make mistakes, Demea learns compassion, kindness, and forgiveness. All of these attributes allow for his sons to learn to love him again.

Subduing his excessive *ὀργιλότης*<sup>252</sup> (irascibility) and *δύσκολος*<sup>253</sup> (unfriendliness) in act five, Demea changes his father-son relationship to one that involves two of Aristotle’s ideal means of virtue: *πραότης* (mildness), and *φιλία* (friendliness), in other words, a general pleasantness in life.<sup>254</sup> For example, Demea says “*repressi, redii, mitto male dicta omnia*” (I am

---

<sup>250</sup> See Webster, 1950: 206; Arist. *N.E.* 1125 b 34.

<sup>251</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 992-994.

<sup>252</sup> Arist.IV.v.8. Mentioned earlier, Aristotle described men who are “irascible... get angry quickly and with the wrong people and for the wrong things.” Demea realises that he was behaving irrationally and excessively with his anger, but now he exhibits a softer, milder behaviour closer to the mean of gentleness.

<sup>253</sup> Arist.IV.vi.2-3 said that “those [deficient in friendliness] who object to everything, and do not care in the least what pain they cause, are called surly.” Demea here no longer wants to argue and inflict pain and punishment onto others. He displays friendliness toward all of the characters.

<sup>254</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 64. *Nimum ipsest durus, praeter aequomque et bonum.* Trans: Gratwick, 1999: 64-65.

in control, I am myself. No more harsh words from me....).<sup>255</sup> He is no longer prone to the passions of anger and arguments causing pain.<sup>256</sup> As a mild and friendly man, he greets all the characters, even the slaves in the vocative, which he never did earlier in the play. For example, Demea kindly addresses “*o Syre noster, salve: quid fit? quid agitur?*” (Ah, our own dear Syrus; Hello. All right? How are things?)<sup>257</sup> In a second example, when Geta steps on stage, Demea says “*Geta, hominem maxumi preti te esse hodie iudicavi animo meo*” (Geta, my verdict on you today is that you are an extremely valuable fellow).<sup>258</sup> In addition, Demea no longer reacts with anger towards Ctesipho and handles his son’s affair with Bacchis kindly, with *humanitas*, a term to be discussed in the final chapter. Aeschinus, Syrus and Ctesipho all call Demea *lepidus* (nice/agreeable), which conveys that Demea moved away from his previous role as *senex durus*.<sup>259</sup> Aeschinus also now addresses Demea as *pater*.<sup>260</sup> As a more kind father, Demea steps down from his authoritarian position, and places his sons on an even level of respect, moving closer to the mean of Aristotle’s virtue of *φιλία* (friendliness), which follows closely with Menander’s idea of Greek *humanitas*.<sup>261</sup> He acknowledges that trying to force his sons to obtain virtue by anger, moral outrage, and *imperium* as a *paterfamilias* is futile as these methods caused Ctesipho and Aeschinus to hate him. Demea knows that they need to have a desire of their own to learn virtue, which is evident when he gives his sons the choice to have him help raise them and ask for his advice on occasion.

---

<sup>255</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 795.

<sup>256</sup> Arist. II.vii.2. Because Demea quells his passion caused by his excessive anger, and no longer pains his sons caused by unfriendliness, he moves closer to the ideal of Temperance; however, he still feels passionate enough to enact pain on his brother Micio in the final act of the play.

<sup>257</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 883.

<sup>258</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 892-3.

<sup>259</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 911; 914; 966. They are calling Demea the nicest, and kindest.

<sup>260</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 927; 987; 996.

<sup>261</sup> Arist. IV.vi.4-5. Demea hits closer to the mean of *φιλία*, for he now displays “an element of affection” for his sons. Although he has cared for Aeschinus and Ctesipho, this is his first time demonstrating love for them, which he receives in return. Lamberton argues that perhaps the mean is better understood when used by Menander as *philanthrophos* meaning kind, and friendly.

Aristotle also advocates for a man to be *ἐλευθεριότης* (liberal/generous),<sup>262</sup> which is the mean between the *ἄσωτία* (wastefulness) and *ἀνελευθερία* (stinginess).<sup>263</sup> As part of his transformation, Demea begins to model himself as a follower of these Greek concepts. Since Demea is deficient in his financial generosity for four-fifths of the play, he fits into Aristotle's category of *ἀνελευθερία* (stinginess). Micio advises Demea not to be overly concerned with money noting that he is too stingy: "*solum unum hoc vitium adfert senectus hominibus: adtentiores sumus ad rem omnis quam sat est*" (there is only one real failing that old age brings to us all – we older people are more preoccupied with money than it's proper that we should be).<sup>264</sup> Realising, however, that he is too stuck on money by the last scene in the play, Demea professes that he will no longer follow the strict moral code of frugality: "*nam ego prope iam excurso spatio omitto*" (I now drop the austere life that I had always lived up to now).<sup>265</sup> He shifts towards being a more generous father with paternal *humanitas* by allowing his sons some financial freedom, which is reflective of fathers such as Cicero, Seneca and Pliny who gave their sons *pecunia* (independent allowances) in the Late Republic and early Imperial periods. Because Demea no longer follows the strict code of *frugalitas*, he allows Ctesipho to marry the slave girl Bacchis who has no dowry, an important and customary requirement for a good marriage. Demea, however, holds true to the tradition of Roman marriage permitting Ctesipho the marriage, but on the condition that "he may keep her; but he's to draw the line."<sup>266</sup> Demea is able to display fairness here with his son, and at the same time teaches him to avoid excessive sexual

---

<sup>262</sup> Arist. IV.i.24 says that liberality is "the observance of the mean in the giving and getting of wealth; he will spend the right amounts...and take the right amount from the right sources." Trans: Rackham, 1933: 193.

<sup>263</sup> Arist. *N.E.* 4.i.29 says that Prodigality and Stinginess "are modes of excess and of deficiency." Trans: Rackham, 1933: 197.

<sup>264</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 833-834.

<sup>265</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 859-860. *Nam ego prope iam excurso spatio omitto.* Trans: Gratwick, 1999: 157.

<sup>266</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 998-999. *Sino: habeat: in istac finem faciat.*

pleasures.<sup>267</sup> In other words, Ctesipho cannot be wasteful like his brother Aeschinus who was indulging in love affairs with his Micio's money. By allowing Ctesipho to marry Bacchis, Demea no longer exhibits the tight control that the *paterfamilias* had over the decision concerning his children's spouses as attested in the Twelve Tables. This is significant because by the Late Republic, Romans valued forgiveness,<sup>268</sup> and Demea forgives Ctesipho for concealing the affair. Accepting that his strong adherence to traditional Roman morals concerning strict frugality and sexual restraint have damaged his relationship with Ctesipho, Demea learns to model his personality closely with Greek Peripatetic concepts. By including Greek Peripatetic philosophy into his system of education, Demea becomes a kind, less stern, and judicious father gaining back the love and respect of his Ctesipho.

---

<sup>267</sup> Arist.II.vii.3 says that *ἀκολασία* (profligacy) is an excess of pleasures including sexual pleasure, which Demea asks his son to avoid indirectly here.

<sup>268</sup> Val. Max. 5. 9. 1; 5. 9. 4. Valerius Maximus gives two examples where a father spares his son from moral condemnation by forgiving him for suspected adultery with his own wife, the son's stepmother.

## Chapter Five : Dramatic Twist in Terence's Plot

Although Terence does advocate that Greek philosophy should be an integral part of fatherhood and education, he realises that the value of traditional Roman morals and education. For four-fifths of the play, Micio is portrayed as an ideal model of fatherhood, his system of education appears effective, and his philosophical advice is convincing. In act five, however, Terence uses the dramatic device of surprise and incongruity<sup>269</sup> which breaks the expected outcome of Micio's triumph over Demea in order to direct attention to a new critical attitude toward fatherhood and education. Terence not only overturns Demea's fate from bad to good, but also Micio's from good to bad (*peripeteia*). Demea is able to realise and show his sons that Micio is a bad father. This Terence foreshadowed when Demea tells his brother, "*scilicet ita tempu fert: faciundumst. ceterum ego rus cras cum filio cum primo luci ibo hinc.*" (I hope these all too noble principles, this so-called philosophical outlook of yours, doesn't end in our ruin).<sup>270</sup> Demea's warning turns out to be remarkably astute. Since Micio does not follow his own Peripatetic advice, Demea is able to make his brother a fool in the final act.<sup>271</sup> I shall here argue that Micio's belief that Aeschinus' sense of *pudor* replaces the need of paternal authority and reprimand is incorrect. Furthermore, Micio's inclination to treat his son too much like an equal encourages Aeschinus to take advantage of him, and his continuation to live life according to his passions, all lead to his own downfall and humiliation in Terence's version of the play.

Aristotle explains that a person who practices the following attributes by habituation and proper reasoning can have a disposition placed at the ideal *ἕξις* (*hexis*) "mean of the scale" and

---

<sup>269</sup> Duckworth, 1952: 140 explains that *Surprise and Incongruity* is a comic device meant to set up the audience to expect one outcome of the play, and then surprise them with the unexpected.

<sup>270</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 839-841. Trans: Gratwick, 1999: 155.

<sup>271</sup> See Appendix A for a better idea of Aristotle's virtue of the mean, and passages that reflect Micio's inability to attain the mean in any of Aristotle's virtues.

exhibit an equilibrium of ideal virtues: *πραότης* “gentleness,” (Lat. *lenitas*), *φιλία* “friendliness” (Lat. *amicitia*), and *ἐλευθεριότης* “generosity” (Lat. *liberalitas*). Throughout the play, Terence implies that Micio follows and practices the Latin equivalents of these three Aristotelian virtues. First, the playwright portrays Micio as the stock gentle and yielding elder, the *senex lenis*. Micio himself explains that he raised his son based on friendship (*amicitia*) and even attempts to use the word *amicitia* as a lame rationale for betraying his promise to Demea to not interfere in each of their son’s affairs. After hiding Ctesipho in his house, allowing him to indulge in alcohol, and buying him a mistress, Micio replies to Demea saying “*nam vetus verbum hoc quidemst, communia esse amicorum inter se omnia*” (Well there’s that old saying, Friends say not mine and thine but ours).<sup>272</sup> Micio admits that he raised his son “*pudore et liberalitate*” (by a sense of shame and by being generous).<sup>273</sup> As we will see in this chapter, Micio does not behave in the way that he claims, as one who promotes in his childrearing the ideals of modesty and generosity. His friendship and kindness all fail to hit the mean of Aristotle’s virtues.

### 5.ii Micio’s misunderstanding of Aristotle’s theories

Although Micio claims “*quouis illos tu die redducas*” (one could call these lads [Aeschinus and Ctesipho] to heel any day of the week),<sup>274</sup> in reality he is unable to achieve this. The problem is that Micio has misinterpreted Aristotle’s philosophy of *pudor*. He has believed that his son’s sense of shame will keep him from excessive self-indulgence in pleasures, and subsequently lead him back to a virtuous path. Although Aristotle acknowledges and praises a sense of shame in young men, he contends that shame is not a virtue<sup>275</sup> and that young men must be raised by discipline and by laws with employing the fear of punishment to “secure that the character [of

---

<sup>272</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 803-804.

<sup>273</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 57.

<sup>274</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 830-831.

<sup>275</sup> Arist. *N.E.* II.vii.14 says that “For though *αἰδώς* is not a virtue, it is praised....” Trans: Rackham, 1933: 105.



youth] shall have at the outset a natural affinity for virtue.”<sup>276</sup> After hearing rumours that Aeschinus was involved in a sexual affair, Demea suggests that young men ought to be educated by these same three elements: law, shame, and fear. He states “*quem neque pudet quicquam, nec metuit quemquam, neque legem putat tenere se ullam*” (That vandal has no conscience, no respect, no idea that any law might apply to him!).<sup>277</sup> Unsurprisingly, Demea demonstrates respect for *leges* (laws), *pudor*, and *metus* throughout the play and shows understanding that they can help keep men on a virtuous path. However, Demea only learns how to apply his knowledge of law and justice late in the play, a point that will be discussed in a moment. Like Demea, Aristotle marks the necessity of discipline and laws in education and childrearing by explaining that it is hard for [men] to live in with σωφροσύνη (moderation, prudence, discretion) and in a self-controlled way, [for it] is not pleasant to most, and especially the young.<sup>278</sup>

Contrastingly, Micio is so lenient and friendly with his son that he will not use any form of discipline. Micio never confronts his son even when Aeschinus ignores his father’s wishes.<sup>279</sup> He even rewards him with money for wine and women just to earn and maintain his son’s love.<sup>280</sup> Micio raises Aeschinus not like a son, but like a friend, a fellow “citizen or free man.”<sup>281</sup> As a result, Aeschinus does whatever he wants, and does not respect his father as an authoritative figure.

---

<sup>276</sup> Arist. *N.E.* X.ix.9-11.

<sup>277</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 84-85.

<sup>278</sup> Arist. *N.E.* X.ix.8 “it is difficult to obtain a right education in virtue, loving what is noble and hating what is base.... without being brought up under right laws; for to live temperately and hardily is not pleasant to most men, especially when young”. Trans: Rackham, 1932: 631. See Lord, 1977: 189.

<sup>279</sup> After Aeschinus stayed out drinking all night while his father worried (in the first Act of *Adelphi*) Micio did not even speak to his son about the issue. Micio mentions in Act One, Scene Two that Demea complains that he allows Aeschinus to drink and buy prostitutes with his Micio’s own money.

<sup>280</sup> Because Micio exhibits excess friendliness, he is an *adsentando* (flatterer) on the Aristotelian scale of friendliness.

<sup>281</sup> Lord, 1977: 187.

Although Aristotle writes that the mean of friendliness on his scale of virtue resembles the word *φιλία* (friendship), the philosopher also says he cannot define it as one form of friendship. He thus calls it a nameless virtue.<sup>282</sup> Aristotle says that there are three types of friendships.<sup>283</sup> It is the third type, the one “based on pleasure” that describes Aeschinus and Micio’s relationship: Aeschinus loves his father “for [his] own good or [his] own pleasure, and not as being the person loved, but as useful or agreeable”. In other words, Aeschinus loves his father’s excessive agreeableness, generosity and leniency. For the reasons mentioned above, Micio does not manifest friendship in the ideal way Aristotle described, and as we shall see at the end of this chapter, this has devastating consequences for Micio.<sup>284</sup> This is evident at the beginning of play when Aeschinus does not return from a night of partying. Aeschinus does not feel any sense of *pudor* for his behaviour, even though Micio believes it is immoral. Furthermore, due to his father’s excessive leniency, Aeschinus behaves in this way because he does not know what is right or wrong or even that his father is concerned. Syrus foregrounds Micio’s error by negatively characterizing Micio’s childrearing approach in the following line: “*inepta lenitas patris et facilitas prava*” (The father’s [Micio’s] mistaken leniency and perverse laxness.)<sup>285</sup> Demea also argues that his brother’s idea of compassion and financial generosity is somewhat self-centered because he does not play the proper role of a Roman father saying “*sibi vixit, sibi*

---

<sup>282</sup> In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle defined *φιλία* originally as a nameless virtue because he felt the Greek term *φιλία* (friendship) does not capture exactly what Aristotle has in mind. To be a friendly person, according to Aristotle, is not to be indiscriminately friendly (like Micio is on multiple occasions). It is to accept and to object to the right things in the right way.

<sup>283</sup> Arist. VIII.III.1. explains that the ideal friendliness is “a reciprocal affection... when men love each other, they wish each other to become more virtuous.” The other two friendships are not ideal: one is friendship based on utility (i.e. how useful one is to another without love in the relationship); the second form of friendship is based on pleasure meaning these “men love their friend for their own good or their own pleasure.” Trans: Rackham, 1932: 459.

<sup>284</sup> Liddell and Scott, 1996 cite Aristotle using the term *φιλία* as a sense of “friendliness” or “amiability.”

<sup>285</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 390-391.

*sumptum fecit.*” ([Micio] has lived for himself, he has spent on himself).<sup>286</sup> He tries to be too understanding and lenient towards Aeschinus and thus neglects his duties as a *paterfamilias*. By granting his son almost unlimited financial and moral freedom without any discipline, his son according does not learn the responsibilities of a respectful son and fails to tell him of his love affair with Pamphila.

Interestingly, Terence names Micio’s son ‘Aeschinus’, a word which is transliterated from the Greek *αἰσχύνη* term meaning both “shame, disgrace, or violation” and “sense of shame, honour, reverence”. The Latin equivalent is *pudor*. In learning of his obligations to his father and his culture, Aeschinus undergoes a switch from the first Greek meaning to the second. In the fourth act, Aeschinus confesses that his affair was shameful, crying “*id mihi vehementer dolet, et me tui pudet*” (as truly as having let myself do this wicked thing hurts me to the quick, it fills me with shame for your sake!)<sup>287</sup> Terence’s use of *pudet* in the play is relevant because Micio believes that his son’s affair with Pamphila was immoral, but he need not reprimand him for Aeschinus feels guilty for his immoral affair. Aeschinus expresses his guilt to Micio in the following lines: “*ita velim me promerentem ames dum vivas, mi pater, ut me hoc delictum admisisse in me, id mihi vehementer dolet, et me tui pudet*” (Father, all I want is truly to earn your lifelong love, as truly as having let myself do this wicked thing hurts me to the quick, fills me with shame for your sake!) I think Terence intentionally names the character Aeschinus as he transitions from being shameless to being respectful and considerate.

It is true that Micio suggests that it is the duty of the father to *consuefacere* (habituate) his son to behave decently of his own free will.<sup>288</sup> However, for Micio moral habituation appears to involve employing the incentive of gifts rather than the disincentive or remedy of reprimand. For

---

<sup>286</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 865.

<sup>287</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 683-685.

<sup>288</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 74.

example, in act four, Micio tells Aeschinus that he had already knows about his son's affair with Pamphila; however, he does not display anger, discipline, or discuss the immorality of the affair with his son; instead, to Aeschinus' surprise, Micio tells his son that he has already prepared their wedding.<sup>289</sup> After quickly reconciling, Micio leaves the stage, and Aeschinus is left to question his father's reaction to his own immorality. Aeschinus says "*quid hoc est negoti? hoc est patrem esse, aut hoc est filium esse? si frater aut sodalis esset qui magis morem gereret?*" (What's going on? Is that what a father is supposed to be, or is it what a son is supposed to be? If he were my brother or best friend, how could he have humoured me better?)<sup>290</sup> After realising that Micio's reaction was not paternal, Aeschinus appears as if he truly feels shame (*pudor*) for his affair saying to himself "*itaque adeo magnam mihi inicit sua commoditate curam, ne forte imprudens faciam quod nolit: sciens cavebo*" (By fitting in with me like this he's filling me with dread in case I do anything inadvertently to hurt his feelings through not thinking. I'll conscientiously watch my step).<sup>291</sup> At this point in the play, the audience would probably favour Micio's method of childrearing. The irony of Aeschinus' confession, however, is revealed in the last act of the play when he does not keep his word to protect Micio's well-being; instead, Aeschinus pleads to his father to accept all of Demea's absurd demands costing Micio greatly, which I will discuss momentarily.

During his monologue in the fourth act, Demea exposes Micio's weaknesses to the audience when he reveals that Micio acts completely agreeably - without any limits -and this allows his sons to become morally corrupt; they both indulge in immoral deeds without consequences imposed by Micio. Demea asserts that Micio is "*clemens placidus, nulli laedere os, adridere omnibus... ille alter sine labore patria potitur commode*. (always mild, always calm,

---

<sup>289</sup> Ter. Ad. 706-707

<sup>290</sup> Ter. Ad. 708-709

<sup>291</sup> Ter. Ad. 710-711.

never lashing out at anyone, smiling at everyone. . . . It's that opposite of mine [Micio] who wins the comforts of a father without any effort).<sup>292</sup> This has allowed Aeschinus to become a spoiled and negligent young man. Demea lists his brother's excessive and deficient behaviours to pointed effect. For example, although Micio describes himself as having *clementem vitam* "an untroubled life," Demea describes his brother's "untroubled life" as lazy "*ill' suam semper egit vitam in otio, in conviviiis*" (His life has been one long merry holiday).<sup>293</sup> He states that his brother is self-centred and financially selfish: "*sibi vixit sibi sumptus fecit*" (he has lived for himself, he has spent on himself).<sup>294</sup> Modelling himself on his father, Aeschinus selfishly spends money on wine and women, a point that marks both father and son out as financially imprudent. Furthermore, Demea fully understands at this point in the play that his brother has gained the affection of his sons through his excessive mildness and forgiveness: Micio is "*clemens placidus, nulli laedere os, adridere omnibus... vitam in otio... clemens... sibi vixit sumptum fecit*" (always mild, always calm, never lashing out at anyone, smiling at everyone).<sup>295</sup> Demea recognizes that the sons love Micio for this. He also, however, understands that because Micio never imposes rules upon Aeschinus and Ctesipho, and is failing his paternal obligation to teach them moral boundaries. For all of these reasons, Demea concludes that his brother is not a good father.

Furthermore, Demea points out that Aeschinus has taken advantage of Micio's excessive *clemens* (forgiving) and *placidus* (gentle) attitude. Demea, moreover, contends that his brother's laxity and other deficiencies are effortless.<sup>296</sup> Demea fears that without any paternal discipline, sons will not have any moral boundaries because they will not be able to distinguish between

---

<sup>292</sup> Ter. Ad. 864; 871.

<sup>293</sup> Ter. Ad. 863.

<sup>294</sup> Ter. Ad. 865.

<sup>295</sup> Ter. Ad. 863-864.

<sup>296</sup> Ter. Ad. 872. *Ille alter sine labore patria potitur commoda*, "it's that opposite of mine who wins the comforts of a father without any effort."

what is right from wrong. Demea's fear that Micio will continue to spoil Aeschinus runs parallel to authors from the Late Republic and early Imperial Periods who warn against excessive permissiveness and generosity.<sup>297</sup> Once Demea realises that his brother is excessively deficient as a father, he undermines Micio through a comedic device called *reductio ad absurdum*.<sup>298</sup> This device is used by Demea as a device to unravel the methods behind Micio's system by playing the same excessively generous and lenient role. Although Micio voices Aristotelian philosophy and displays *humanitas*, he cannot see that his own system also strays from the mean of virtue. For example, Aristotle speaks about *φιλία* as "the natural friendship between parents and offspring"<sup>299</sup> saying that fathers "are to aid the young, to guard them from error; [sons] to the elderly, to tend them, and to supplement their failing powers of action... to assist them in noble deeds"<sup>300</sup> Micio advocates through a similar use of words that a father-son relationship should be based on friendship. He uses the Roman word *amicitia* (friendship) as ideal: "*et errat longe mea quidem sentential qui imperium credat gravius esse aut stabilius vi quod fit, quam illud quod amicitia adiungitur*" (And in my view, it is a serious mistake to think that power based on might is more real or better grounded than power which essentially involves friendship).<sup>301</sup> Here Micio is stating that friendship is a more powerful paternal tool of persuasion than the might and force of a surly father.<sup>302</sup> Sons will adhere much more to a voice that they respect, than one whom they despise. However, for Micio, his over-agreeability causes him to be *obsequious*, which, according to Aristotle, is excessively kind and strays from the Aristotle's mean of *φιλία*. Already

<sup>297</sup> See the introduction for specific examples of Roman authors who advise against fathers who are excessively lenient toward their sons.

<sup>298</sup> Duckworth, 1952: 287.

<sup>299</sup> Arist. *N.E.* VIII.i.3. See also Webster, 1950: 207.

<sup>300</sup> Arist. *N.E.* VIII.i.2. Trans by Rackham, 1932: 452-3.

<sup>301</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 65-67.

<sup>302</sup> Arist. *N.E.* IV.vi.9. Aristotle notes that a man who is deficient in friendliness is surly (*δύσκολος*) meaning that "he disapproves of everything." Trans: Rackham, 1932: 239. The closest Latin equivalent in the play is the adjective *durus* (inflexible, rigid, stern). Demea plays the typical role of the *durus pater*, which Micio describes him as in line 64, and Demea himself admits in line 859, and subsequently throws away.

mentioned above, Aeschinus does not respect Micio, or view him as a father with authority. This is because Micio allows his son unlimited freedom, much wining, dining, and spending. Demea, therefore, teaches Micio and his sons by mimicking Micio's acts of excessive friendship in act five that he is not performing his duties as a father.

In the final act of the play, Demea plays the role of the overly generous and kind father, and admits it in the following lines:

*age age, nunciam experiamur contra ecquid ego possiem blande dicere aut benigne facere, quando hoc provocat. ego quoque a meis me amari et magni pendi postulo; si id fit dando atque obsequendo, non posteriores feram.*

Well, all right then: let's now try in response to see if I can say anything nice, act kindly, now that [Micio] challenges me to it. I too have a claim to the love and admiration of my own children; if that is what you get by giving things and falling in line, I shan't take second prize.<sup>303</sup>

Demea does this at Micio's expense to teach him and his sons that Micio is excessively extravagant, compliant, and lazy. Demea begins by greeting Micio's slaves - Syrus and Geta - with kind words first saying: "*o Syre noster, salve: quid fit? quid agitur?*" (Ah, our own dear Syrus; hello. All right? How are things?).<sup>304</sup> Then, Demea says to Geta "*Geta, hominem maximi preti te esse hodie iudicavi animo meo. Nam is mihi profectost servos spectatus satis quoi dominus curaest, ita uti tibi sensi, Geta...*" (Geta... you are an extremely valuable fellow. For the servant who really has made the grade in my opinion is the one who cares about his master exactly as I have seen you care...).<sup>305</sup> Next, Demea gains back Aeschinus' love and respect by professing his love to his son, embracing him warmly, and giving advise about his marriage to Pamphila: "*tuos hercle vero et animo et natura pater, qui tea mat plus quam hosce oculos.*" (Yes indeed, your own true father, in

---

<sup>303</sup> Ter. Ad. 878-881.

<sup>304</sup> Ter. Ad. 883.

<sup>305</sup> Ter. Ad. 891-894.

heart and soul, who loves you more than his own sight).<sup>306</sup> At this point, Aeschinus' wedding is being delayed because the musician and choir are late; therefore, Demea suggests to Aeschinus the following advice:

*missa haec face, hymenaeum turbas lampadas tibicinas, atque hanc in horto maceriam iube dirui, quantum potest: hac transfer, unam fac domum: transduce et matrem et familiam omnem ad nos.*

Forget all that stuff, wedding-hymns, crowds, torches, music. Have the garden-wall broken down as quickly as possible. Carry her over that way, make it one house, and bring her mother and the whole lot over to us.<sup>307</sup>

Aeschinus accedes to Demea's advice, and happily responds: "*placet, pater lepidissime.*" (I like it! Father, you're wonderful!)<sup>308</sup> By mimicking the generous and affable behaviours of his brother towards Aeschinus, however, Demea cunningly proceeds to tamper with his brother's assets: "*fratri aedes fient perviae, turbam domum adducet, sumptu amittet multa.*" (My brother's house will be an open street, he'll have the throng at his house, he'll lose lots in the cost).<sup>309</sup> As Demea dictates these events mentioned above, Aeschinus sides with him, and Micio henceforth is a spineless servant to Demea's demands. For example, Demea and Aeschinus easily coerce Micio into giving up his life as a bachelor by marrying Pamphila's elderly, unattractive, impoverished mother, Sostrata. First, Demea tells Micio "*hanc te aequomst ducere, et te operam ut fiat dare.*" (It's only right that you, Micio, should marry her, and that you, Aeschinus, should encourage the union).<sup>310</sup> Once Micio initially refuses, Aeschinus kneels and grasps his father's knees proclaiming "*sine te exorem, mi pater.*" (Please let me have what I ask, father).<sup>311</sup> Micio responds angrily telling

---

<sup>306</sup> Ter. Ad. 903-904.

<sup>307</sup> Ter. Ad. 907-910.

<sup>308</sup> Ter. Ad. 911.

<sup>309</sup> Ter. Ad. 912-913.

<sup>310</sup> Ter. Ad. 933.

<sup>311</sup> Ter. Ad. 936; 938.



his son “*insanis, aufer!... satin sanus es? Ego novos maritus anno demum quinto et sexagesimo fiam atque anum decrepitam ducam?*” (You’re mad! Let go!... Are you quite sane? Me become a bridegroom at last at sixty-four, marrying a broken down old woman?). Although Micio is quite apprehensive to marrying Sostrata, he eventually gives in: “*etsi hoc mihi pravom ineptum absurdum atque alienum a vita mea videtur, si vos tanto opere istuc voltis... fiat*” (Though it seems to me immoral, tasteless, stupid, and at odds with my whole outlook... if you both want it so badly... very well).<sup>312</sup> By agreeing to a marriage with Sostrata, Micio abandons his carefree life, avoiding the full domestic responsibilities, and envisions the walls that maintained his privacy and liberty break down and crumble. Demea also convinces Micio to set free his own servants, Syrus and his wife, Phrygia saying: “*iudico Syrum fieri esse aequom liberum... siquidem prima dedit haud dubiumst quin emitti aequom siet*” (the verdict on Syrus today is that it’s really only right [Syrus] should be a free man... [and since Phrygia] was the first to feed [Aeschinus], there’s no question – it’s only right that she should be free).<sup>313</sup> Demea also convinces Micio to give up an acre of his land to Demea’s best friend, Hegio: “*agellist hic sub urbe paullum quod locitas foras. huic demus quo fruatur*” (There’s a little bit of land just outside town that you rent out. Let’s give [Hegio] the benefit of that).<sup>314</sup> When Micio refuses to accept his brother’s absurd demands, Demea rebuttles with the same argument against frugality that Micio used against him at the end of act 4 after which Micio gives in and accedes to Demea’s demands: “*vitium commune omniumst quod nimium ad rem in senecta adtenti sumus. hanc maculam nos decet effugere*” (The real failing common to all of us in old age is that we become too preoccupied with money. It’s up to us to steer clear

---

<sup>312</sup> Ter. Ad. 944-945.

<sup>313</sup> Ter. Ad. 960; 976.

<sup>314</sup> Ter. Ad. 949-950.

of that black mark).<sup>315</sup> As a result of Micio's losses, Demea parodies the excessive generosity *largitas* and the *adsentando* of Micio with the goal to expose his weaknesses. What Micio felt was compassion and kindness was also idleness and laziness as a father because he did not desire to deal with family conflict.

By humiliating his brother, Demea plays this deliberate charade designed to teach his brother that he too had failed to hit the true ideal of a father; he shows Micio how easy it is to win apparent affection by generosity and compliance with other people's wishes. Although Micio's generous actions are devoted to creating and maintaining amity, Terence invites to audience to ask to what extent does this trait arise from Micio's need for the approval of Aeschinus' love, or whether it was simply plain laziness? Following this charade, Demea reveals his lesson.

*ut id ostenderem, quod te isti facile et festiuom putant, id non fieri ex vera vita neque adeo ex aequo et bono, sed ex adsentando indulgendo et largiendo, Micio*

I want.. to show you, Micio, that what our boys thought was your good nature and charm didn't come from a way of living which was sincere or from anything right or good, but from your weakness, indulgence, and extravagance.<sup>316</sup>

Demea exposes Micio's immoral actions, all of which Latin terms have Greek philosophical equivalents, calling him excessively *adsentando* (compliant), *indulgendo* (indulgent in pleasures), and *largiendo* (permissive). In other words, Demea teaches Micio that he has failed as a father, for he is excessively indulgent in pleasures *indulgendo* (profligacy/excessively licentious),<sup>317</sup> is marked by *largiendo* (prodigality),<sup>318</sup> and he is *adsentando* (a flatterer).<sup>319</sup>

---

<sup>315</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 953-955. See also Ter. *Ad.* 831-835 for Micio's statement that old age leads to men becoming too stingy.

<sup>316</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 986-988.

<sup>317</sup> The Greek equivalent of the Latin word *indulgendo* is *ἀκολασία*. Arist. *N.E.* II. vii. 3. explains that "in respect to pleasures and pains... the excess [is] Profligacy (*ἀκολασία*). Trans by: Rackham, 1932: 99.

Demea renders his poor, humiliated brother “*qui non irasciter*” (spiritless)<sup>320</sup> as his spineless servant unable to defend his rights and property as a citizen, and a man against Demea’s absurd demands. In the passage above, Demea also uses Micio’s own Peripetatic advice “*aequomque et bonum*”<sup>321</sup> against his brother by explaining rightfully saying that he strayed *ex aequo et bono* (from what is just and good) due to his immorality.

In the last scene of the play, Demea confesses to Micio, Ctesipho, and Aeschinus that he purposely mimicked his brother’s deficient characteristics to expose the weaknesses in his brother’s system of fatherhood and childrearing. Afterwards, Demea offers his sons a choice to love and respect him as a moderate moral educator and authoritative figure, which will help them become morally, good citizens, or continue to learn by Micio’s example, which will lead them to become irresponsible, spoiled immoral men.

*Nunc adeo si ob eam rem vobis mea vita invisā, Aeschine, est, quia non iusta iniusta prorsus omnia, omnino obsequor, missos facio.*

If this is the reason my outlook on life is repellent to you boys, that I do not simply go along with anything you do, right or wrong, I wash my hands of you – you can spend and squander and do whatever you like.<sup>322</sup>

Demea’s use of the words *iusta* (justice) and *iniusta* (injustice) supports that he has a new understanding of what is morally just and unjust. Aristotle describes as this “*καὶ ἡ ἥξις αὐτῆ ἐπιείκεια, δικαιοσύνη τις οὐσα καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρα τις ἕξις*” (the disposition described is Equity; it

---

<sup>318</sup> The Greek equivalent of the Latin word *largiendo* is ἀσφτία. Arist. *N.E.* II. vii. 4 explains that “in regard to giving and getting money, the excess [is] Prodigality (ἀσφτία)... the prodigal [man] exceeds in giving and is deficient in getting [money].” Trans by: Rackham, 1932: 99.

<sup>319</sup> The Greek equivalent of the Latin word *adsentando* is κόλαξι. Arist. *N.E.* IV.vi.9 says that if a man “sets out to be pleasant... for the sake of getting something,” he is a κόλαξι. I argue that Micio follows along like a puppet with Demea’s demands to maintain Aeschinus’ affection, who is begging his father to do what Demea asks.

<sup>320</sup> The Greek equivalent of the Latin word *qui non irasciter* is ἀόργητος. Arist. *N.E.* II.vii.10 The deficient vice, ἀόργητος means that men with this virtue lack spirit. In *Adelphi*, Micio’s lack of spirit makes him look foolish and servile when he agrees to all of Demea’s demands in act 5.

<sup>321</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 64.

<sup>322</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 988-992.

is a special kind of Justice, not a different quality altogether).<sup>323</sup> *Obsequor* is also important here because it parallels Aristotle's Greek word for someone who is deficient in *φιλία* (friendliness), which he calls *ἀοργήσια* (spinelessness) implying that Micio behaves in this way. Demea earlier labeled Micio as spineless, which Aeschinus and Ctesipho now understand is not a good character trait: “*si id fit dando atque obsequendo, non posteriors feram*” (if that is what you get by giving things and falling in line, I shan't take second prize).<sup>324</sup> In contrast to his brother, Demea now follows the Roman ideal of the *bonus pater familias* (good Roman father) as this type of father according to Roman law is “the average type of an honest, prudent, and industrious man.”<sup>325</sup> He understands that forcing morals on other people not only made him an irrational and *durus* (surly) man, but also a less respectable father and educator, which Syrus emphasised by mocking his system earlier demonstrating that Demea had no control or authority over his sons. Instead of forcing his sons to follow his financial advice, as he would have previously done, he allows them to make their own decisions so that they too can understand that being a father involves more than just generosity, excessive indulgence and agreeability. In the final lines of the play, the sons and Micio respond favourably saying “*tibi, pater, permittimus: plus scis quid opus factost*” “we submit to you [Demea], sir: you know better than we what is appropriate).<sup>326</sup> Following this line, Demea's rehabilitation is complete. He earns the affection and respect of his sons as an authoritative figure. They now deem him as a good paternal *exemplum*. Demea, moreover, earns the respect of Micio and Syrus. As the curtains close, all four characters exclaim “*istuc recte. plaudite!*” (The right decision, that. Applause).<sup>327</sup> Terence uses this reversal of fate (*peripeteia*) at the end of the play not only because he does not want to discredit completely the

<sup>323</sup> Arist.V.x.8. Trans by: Rackham, 1932: 317.

<sup>324</sup> Ter. Ad. 880.

<sup>325</sup> Berger, 2002: 377.

<sup>326</sup> Ter. Ad. 996-997.

<sup>327</sup> Ter. Ad. 999.

old-fashioned Roman, Catonian method of childrearing, but because there are positive aspects of Demea's childrearing. Demea reveals to the audience that he has chosen to follow a more virtuous mean. He undertakes his role as a more lenient, less authoritarian father. The audience can sympathise with Demea, who as a father, despite his tyrannical methods, genuinely strives to teach his sons to become good citizens and thus he shares the same goal as Micio and Roman fathers. This is significant because Terence takes the *durus pater* (harsh father) and the *lenis pater* (lenient father) of earlier tradition and with unusual psychological insight transformed Demea into a new type of father, who is neither too harsh, nor too lenient. Demea, by almost implausible coincidence, has recognised not only the faults of his own method of childrearing, but also his brother. He provided a solution to the play by allowing Ctesipho to marry Bacchis, and taught his sons to respect him as a moderate authoritarian figure and wise father. Demea has shown that he has gained an understanding and appreciation of Greek philosophy relating to education: equity, law, justice, and the custom of *humanitas*, all made him a better candidate as a moral educator than Micio.

## Conclusion

Terence extends Roman education and culture beyond the Roman family and Italy by integrating Greek philosophy and humanity into Demea's system for raising Ctesipho. Greek pedagogical influences were broadening Roman public education almost a century before Terence's *Adelphi* was performed. When Scipio Aemilianus chose to educate his son using multiple Greek mentors, he served as one more example of the challenge to traditional Roman educational practice arising from the integration of Greek culture and norms. The Romans recognised this, and decided to lean on their Greek counterparts for wisdom and thereby expanded their own culture and education practices.

Although Romans, including the popular Scipio Aemilianus and the Scipionic Circle, were already open to having their sons learn by means of Greek scholars and public education, Terence sought to challenge those Romans who still favoured the traditional Cato father-figure approach: raising and educating sons at home through using exemplars. In order to ensure his success, the playwright undermines his opponents – both dramatic and historical - who opposed this cultural shift of the second century BCE. By weaving many qualities of Cato the Elder into Demea, the playwright ensures that Romans favour neither Cato's conservative system of education nor his cold, stern, and frugal qualities. Making the message more clear to the Roman audience that the conservative method of fatherhood produced bad paternal examples for Roman sons to follow, Terence adds tyrannical attributes to Demea including excessive anger, control by fear, and hubris. Terence, therefore, further reinforces in *Adelphi* that a harsh and stern father can create undesirable results as these do appear in Demea's son. Ctesipho is timid and fearful of his father's wrath. To remedy this issue of authoritarian fathers being the sole *exemplum* for sons,

Terence stresses that Demea learns the most in *Adelphi*. He is taught and comes to recognise that fathers too can learn from others and acquire new perspectives even in old age.

Before his death, Terence raised the possibility that Romans would adopt elements of the Greek education, with sons learning from multiple models, both Greek and Roman. The fact that the play was well received in 160 BCE suggests that the Roman audience was pleased with the results of Demea's education - that fathers and sons alike can attain knowledge by learning from others outside of the family and that knowledge and morals do not simply pass downward from father to son in a pedagogical hierarchy.

### **Possible Future work for scholars**

One interesting avenue of future work is delving into the ancient sources so as to ascertain the reliability and truth of Cato's disdain and dismissal of all things Greek. Despite Cato's strong opposition to the influence of Greek Hellenism and the Scipionic Circle while raising his first son Licinianus, some ancient and modern sources suggest that he may have changed his disapproval of all things Greek before his death in 149 BCE. Perhaps he, in a similar way to Demea, also learned that the knowledge of his Greek counterparts concerning the ideal image of the father was in fact more wise, rational and fair than he initially decided. A surprising number of ancient writers indicate that Cato's last known statement was appreciative of the Hellenophile Aemilianus as a Roman leader.<sup>328</sup> All these sources write on Cato's praise for Scipio's intellect and conduct as a Roman general at the start of the Third Punic War in 149 BCE with Livy's account below.

*Quam virtue eius et Cato, vir promptioris ad vituperandum linguae, in senatu sic prosecutus est ut diceret reliquos, qui in Africa militarent, umbras volitare,*

---

<sup>328</sup> See Forde, 1975: 261. Polyb. 36; Livy. *Epit.* 49; Dio. Sic. 37. 17; Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 27. 4-5 and *Mor.* 200 and 805.

*Scipionem vigere, et populus R. eo favore complexus ut comitiis plurimae eum tribus consulem scriberent, cum hoc per aetatem non liceret.*<sup>329</sup>

In the Senate, his valour was praised by even Cato, a man whose tongue was better suited for criticism, but now said that the others fighting in Africa were mere spirits, whereas Scipio was alive; and the Roman people received him with so much enthusiasm that most districts elected him as consul, although his age did not allow this.

Contrasting his earlier attack against Scipio's character due to immoral financial misconduct, Cato here expresses a positive attitude towards him, which may suggest that they mended their relationship and ended the ongoing feud of Cato versus the Scipionic Circle after Terence's death and the production of *Adelphi* in 160 BCE. Although it is feasible that Polybius and the other authors of the Late Republican and early Imperial periods placed in Cato's mouth these words of praise for Scipio in order to strengthen their arguments for a Hellenised Rome seeking to bring closure to the bitter feud between the factions in Rome, I believe that Cato changed his view on Scipio and anti-Hellenism. There is evidence to suggest Cato changed his mind years before his death, particularly when he condoned the marriage of his second son Cato Salonianus to Aemilianus' daughter around 158 BCE.<sup>330</sup>

In his bibliography of Cato, Forde ponders whether his protagonist realised that he was excessively conventional and too overconfident in his own old-fashioned set of morals and conduct in the following lines: "perhaps [his last known statement] is a sepulchral admission that he, too, could err... [as a] farmer-statesman who lived by principle, discovered emotion, [and] found all of his own maxims impossible to live by..."<sup>331</sup> If Cato did recognize his own close-mindedness and realise that the knowledge of Greek philosophy and *humantias* were valuable, perhaps he changed his conservative opinions concerning childrearing, learning that it was too

---

<sup>329</sup> Livy. *Per.* 49.

<sup>330</sup> Plutarch. *Cat. Mai.* 24. Forde argues that this happened in 158 B. C. E. . For more details, see Forde, 1975: 274.

<sup>331</sup> Forde, 1975: 261.



difficult for Romans to adhere to such strict morals and principles of livelihood. Cato may have changed and become “less rigorous in age” since Cato himself was prosecuted in 164 BCE on a charge of extravagance, a quality and practice he vehemently attacked senators for earlier.<sup>332</sup> Cato may also have changed his conceptions on the importance of marriage, sexuality, and luxury, as it is recorded that he took a young slave as his mistress, and also “encouraged the prostitution of his male slaves with his women slaves in lieu of family ties.”<sup>333</sup> Perhaps Cato realised in his old age, like Demea, that Greek philosophies contained positive morals and practices. In forcing such a high standard of ancient morals onto other Romans, Cato gained so great an opposition that he had to defend himself numerous times in court and nearly did not receive the consorship in 184 BCE.<sup>334</sup> In contrast to Cato’s unpopularity and coldness, Scipio Aemilianus was a popular, yet moderate man who appreciated Greek philosophy. Polybius, a client of Aemilianus, praises Scipio’s temperance and self-discipline, while Diodorus records his moderation and reasonableness.<sup>335</sup> Thus, it is possible that Cato realised that his disapproval of Aemilianus was due to his relentless, stubborn attitude, and subsequently decided to adopt the Aristotelian golden mean, *aequitas* and *humanitas* like Scipio Aemilianus. Cicero writes that Cato favoured the *humanitas* of Micio over the coldness of Demea in Terence’s *Adelphi*, but felt the ideal father is one that is neither extreme.<sup>336</sup> According to Cicero, Cato speaks about the faults of character, not old age, as he tries to defend the attack on his own stern character and

---

<sup>332</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 25. 3.

<sup>333</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 24. 1.

<sup>334</sup> Forde, 1975: 194. Gale Research Inc., 1998: 375. Livy. *Epon.* 39. 41; Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 16. 3.

<sup>335</sup> Polyb. 31. 25. 2f; Dio. *Fg.* 70. 9.

<sup>336</sup> Cic. *Cato.* 65. *Avaritia vero senilis quid sibi velit, non intellego.* Leigh, 2004: 9 comments on Cato’s remark written by Cicero saying that “Cato the Elder prefers the kindness of Micio to the harshness of Demea”; however, the author argues that the “sly joke is that Cato is appalled by the very character [Demea] whom readers have regularly associated with his own ways.”

other good men including the comparison to him and Demea in *Adelphi*. He refers to Demea's education at the end of the play as a positive one and prefers overall Micio's kindness.<sup>337</sup>

The critics say, old men are morose, troubled, fretful, and hard to please... yet moroseness and the other faults have some excuse... [as] old men imagine themselves ignored, despised, and mocked at... But nevertheless all these faults are much ameliorated by good habits and by education, as may be seen [in *Adelphi*].... I approve of some austerity in the old, but I want it, as I do everything else, in moderation. Sourness of temper I like not at all. As for avariciousness in the old what purpose it can serve I do not understand....<sup>338</sup>

I believe that the 'good habits and education' mentioned by Cicero in this passage are referring to Demea and his new understanding of learning, in particular when Demea acknowledges the flaws in the old system of education and fatherhood in the following lines:

No-one has ever had his way of life so precisely worked out that circumstance, time, experience is not always producing something fresh, always teaching a lesson, so that we unlearn what we believed we knew, and what we had reckoned fundamental, we reject in its trail.<sup>339</sup>

Thus, these sources suggest that Cato may have followed the same path as Terence's Demea.

Shortly after the play was performed in 160 BCE, Cato starting shifting from his stubborn view that old Roman values were infallible to one that acknowledged the importance of Greek philosophy and culture as part of fatherhood and moral education. It is possible that Cato's transformation was a result of Terence's negative portrayal of Cato in the play through Demea. Further research into the life of Cato and his relationship with Scipio Africanus after 160 BCE could shed light on these theories, and further explain the influence of Greek philhellenism in the second century BCE.

Just as Terence endeavoured to defeat the conservative, cold, stern image of the Cato-like and tyrannical Roman father, I too set out to remove this same image found in modern sources

---

<sup>337</sup> Cic. *De sen.* 65.

<sup>338</sup> Cic. *De sen.* 65. Trans: Folconer, 1923.

<sup>339</sup> Ter. 855-860. Trans: Gratwick, 1999: 157.

such as Paul Veyne and Lewis Morgan, who represent in their works the image of the *paterfamilias* as a paradigm for successful and absolute domestic authority over sons. Since scholars tend to recognize and understand patterns of family life today with reference to the past, there is some motive to get the history of the Roman family as accurately as possible. This is no easy task, as there is a dearth of primary sources dating back to Roman Republic. Veyne and Morgan's arguments based on the Twelve Tables and Dionysius of Halicarnassus can exercise greater power over the imagination than the realities of family life. Terence's *Adelphi*, however, helps to remove these misconceptions of Roman fatherhood, as it compliments those ideal qualities represented by Late Republican and early Imperial sources including Livy, Virgil, Seneca, and Pliny, thereby helping to resolve the conflicting representations of the *paterfamilias* among primary sources.

I acknowledge that the debate concerning the *paterfamilias* has been challenged well by Saller in particular, and recent scholarship favours his argument that the ideal Roman Republican father was kind and compassionate. Because Terence's *Adelphi* helps to shed light on the evolving image of the kinder and more understanding *paterfamilias* during the second century BCE, this play is a piece of valuable evidence for these scholars who believe educational and childrearing debates began during the Middle Republic. For example, Saller asserts that *pietas* became a mutual respect for both father and son; in much the same way, when Demea learns that he must respect his son's boundaries and feelings, Ctesipho learns to love and dutifully respect his father. In a second example, Marcia Colish contends that Greek philosophy was a reason for the removal of the Roman *paterfamilias*' absolute control. Demea learns by means of Greek Aristotelian philosophy from his brother, the importance of being a kind, loving father, which led to his own relinquishing of power over his sons. Close examination of the evidence for a

compassionate, softer image of the *paterfamilias* suggests, once again, that there is no strong evidence for holding up Roman fathers as a paradigm of excessive punishment, and brutal severity.

## Appendix A

Aristotelian Virtue #1 is concerned with friendliness and a general pleasantness in life.

LANGUAGE	DEFICIENCY	IDEAL MEAN	EXCESS
LATIN	Demea calls his own life <i>durum vitam</i> = rigid/inflexible life. (Ter. Ad. 859)  Micio describes Demea as <i>durus</i> (Ter. Ad.45; 64). <sup>340</sup>	<i>Amicitia</i> (Ad. lines 65-67)	<i>Adsentando</i> (Ter. Ad. 986-988)
GREEK	<i>δύσκολος (dyskolos)</i> <sup>i</sup> (Arist. N.E. 4.6.9) * <i>dyskolos</i> : title of Menander's play	<i>Φιλία (philia)</i> <sup>ii</sup> (Arist. N.E. 4.6.4; 8) <sup>341 iii</sup>	1. <i>ἄρεσκος (areskos)</i> <sup>342</sup> (if for no purpose) (Arist. N.E. 4.6.9)  2. <i>κόλαξ (kolax)</i> (if for own advantage) (Arist. 4.6.9) *kolax: title of menander play
ENGLISH	Surly/Unfriendly	Friendliness	1. Obsequious/Spineless 2. Flatterer

<sup>340</sup> *Durus* (inflexible, rigid, stern) is a synonym of *difficilis, difficile* <sup>340</sup>= surly, inflexible.

<sup>341</sup> Perhaps the mean for friendliness is better understood when used by Menander as *philanthrophos*<sup>341</sup> (kind, friendly)<sup>341</sup>

<sup>342</sup> If someone does something for no purpose he is

Aristotelian Virtue #2 is primarily concerned with money and expenses

LANGUAGE	DEFICIENCY	IDEAL MEAN	EXCESS
LATIN	<i>Inliberale</i> (Ter. Ad. line 449, cf. 664 (adverb) 886; 464 and 57n)	<i>Liberalitas</i> (Ter. Ad. 449) (57-58) (463-4) (684)	<i>Largior</i> (Ter. Ad 940. 988) <i>Largitas</i> (Ter Ad. 985)
GREEK	<i>ἀνελευθερία</i> ( <i>aneleutheria</i> ) (Arist. II.vii. 4)	<i>ἐλευθεριότης</i> ( <i>eleutheriotēs</i> ) (Arist. 4.1.1)	<i>ἀσωτία</i> ( <i>asōtia</i> ) (Arist. II. VII. 4)
ENGLISH	Illiberality or stinginess is the concept of “conduct unbecoming to a gentleman figure prominently in <i>Adelphi</i>	Liberality/Generosity (observing the due mean in money matters)	Prodigality, extravagant

Aristotelian Virtue #3 is concerned with the emotion anger

LANGUAGE	DEFICIENCY	IDEAL MEAN	EXCESS
LATIN	<i>qui non irasciter.</i> <sup>iv</sup> (Ter. Ad. 136 <sup>343</sup> ; 864 <sup>344</sup> )	<i>lenitas</i> (Ter Ad. 390-1)	<i>Ira/iracundia</i> (Ter. Ad. 146; 755; 794)
GREEK	<i>ἀόργητός (aorgēsia)</i> <sup>v</sup> (Arist. N.E. II.vii.10)	<i>πραότης (praotēs)</i> (Arist. N.E. II.vii.10)	<i>ὀργιλότης (orgilotēs)</i> (Arist. N.E. II.vii.10)
ENGLISH	Lack of spirit	Mildness/gentleness	Irascibility

<sup>343</sup> Ter. Ad. 136. Demea mocks Micio's inability to get angry.

<sup>344</sup> Ter. Ad. 864. Demea speaks about Micio saying *Nulli laedere os*. "never lashing out at anyone."

**Aristotelian Virtue #4 is primarily concerned with physical pleasures and pains**

LANGUAGE	DEFICIENCY	IDEAL MEAN	EXCESS
LATIN	_____	<i>temperantia</i>	<i>Intemperantia/indulgo</i> (Ter. Ad 940; 985; 988)
GREEK	<i>ἀναίσθητοι</i> ( <i>anaisthētos</i> ) (Arist. II.vii. 3)	<i>sōphrosunē</i> (σωφροσύνη) (Arist. II.vii.3)	<i>akolasia</i> (ἀκολασία) (Arist. II. vii. 3)
ENGLISH	Rarely occurs: Insensible (deficient in enjoyment of pleasures)	Temperance (can experience pleasures, but understands how to not overindulge)	Profligacy, licentiousness, sensuality (excessive in enjoyment of pleasures)



**Aristotelian Virtue #5 is primarily concerned with the law, justice, and equity in the state**

LANGUAGE	IDEAL MEAN	EXCESS
LATIN	<i>Aequitas/iustum</i> (Ter. Ad. 449) <i>aequum adj.</i> (Ter. Ad 57-58; 463-4; 684)	<i>Iniustum</i> (Ter. Ad. 940; 985; 988)
GREEK	<i>δικαιοσύνης</i> 1) Lawful (ἴσος) 2) just and fair	<i>ἀδικίας</i> (Arist.V.i.8) 1) breaks the law 2) takes more than is due : unfair
ENGLISH	Particular Justice/Equity	Injustice (caused by greed)

**Notes related to Appendix A**

<sup>1</sup> Arist. 4.6.9. Loeb Page 239 says that “He that disapproves of everything is therefore surly.”

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle does not have an exact Greek word for this ideal mean, which translates better in English as friendliness; however, he says it closely resembles *phila*. The definition of emotions given in *Rhetoric* for “friendly feelings” and *Nicomachean Ethics* Book 8

<sup>3</sup> Arist. N.E. 1155b18-21 = friendship resembles each other – reciprocal affection, wishing well, and awareness (1155a5) Each of the three types has a goal: What is good, pleasant, and useful. (1155b18-21)

<sup>4</sup> HellenoLatinikonLexikon page 55.

<[http://ia600402.us.archive.org/30/items/HellenoLatinikonLexikon/dictionnaire\\_grec\\_latin.pdf](http://ia600402.us.archive.org/30/items/HellenoLatinikonLexikon/dictionnaire_grec_latin.pdf)>

<sup>5</sup> The deficient vice *aorgēsia* would be found in people won't defend them selves. They would lack spirit, and be considered foolish and servile.

Aristotle *N.E.* IV.v.5-7. Trans by: H. Rackham. *Loeb Classical Library*. page 231. “The defect, on the other hand, call it a sort of Lack of Spirit or what not, is blamed ; since those who do not get angry in the right manner, at the right time, and with the right people. It is thought that they do not feel or resent an injury, and that if a man is never angry, he will never stand up for himself; and it is considered servile to put up with an insult to oneself or suffer one’s friends to be insulted.”

## Bibliography

- Arendt, Hannah. *Between past and future*. New York, Penguin Classics, 1993.
- Astin, Alan E. *Cato the Censor*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
- Balot, Ryan K. *A companion to Greek and Roman political thought*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2009.
- Barclay, William. *Train up a child: Education ideals in the ancient world*. Santa Ana: Westminister Press Inc., 1959.
- Barton, Caroline. *Roman honour: the fire in the bones*. Berkeley: university of California Press, 2001.
- Bailey, D.R. Shackleton. *Valerius Maximus: Memorable Doings and Sayings*. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Beacham, Richard. C. *The Roman Theatre and Its Audience*. London: Routledge, 1991.
- Berger, Adolf. *Encyclopaedia dictionary of Roman law*. Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, [1953]. (Transactions of the American Philosophical Society; New Series, Volume 43, Part 2, 1953). [ii], 333-808 pp. Reprinted 2002 by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.
- Bradley, Keith. *Discovering the Roman Family: Studies in Roman Social History*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Braund, Susanna and Glenn W Most. *Most. Ancient anger: perspectives from Homer to Galen*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Bonner, Stanley Frederick. *Education in ancient Rome from the elder Cato to the younger Pliny*. California: University of California Press, 1977.
- Cantarella, Eva. "The Classical World." *Classical Association of the Atlantic States*. Vol. 96, No. 3 (Spring, 2003), pp. 281-298.
- Colish, Marcia. *Medieval Foundations of Western Intellectual Tradition*. London: Yale University Press, 1999.
- Cary, Earnest. *The Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus*. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937
- Cary, Max. *A History of Rome Down to the Reign of Constantine*. London: Macmillan, 1960.
- Danube, David. *Roman law: Linguistic, social and philosophical aspects*. Edinburgh, 1969.

- Dillon, Matthew and Lynda Garland. *Ancient Rome from the early Republic to the assassination of Julius Caesar*. New York: Routledge, 2005.
- Duckworth, George. *The Nature of Roman Comedy: A Study in Popular Entertainment*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952.
- Duff, J. Wight. *A Literary History of Rome in the Silver Age*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927.
- Duncan, William. *Cicero's Select Orations*. New York: Pearl-Street, 1811.
- Edwards, Catharine. *The Politics of Immorality in ancient Rome*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Folconer, W. A. *On Old Age. On Friendship. On Divination*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1923.
- Forde, Nels W. *Cato the Censor*. Boston: Twayne Publishers: A Division of G.K. Hall & Co. Boston, 1975.
- Forehand, Walter. *Terence*. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1985.
- Foster, Benjamin Oliver. *Livy: History of Rome*. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1919.
- Francese, Christopher. *Ancient Rome In So Many Words*. New York: Hippocrene Books Inc., 2007.
- Frier, Bruce W. "Roman life expectancy: Ulpian's evidence." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* Vol. 86 (1982), 213-51.
- Gale Research Inc. *Encyclopaedia of World Biography: Brice-Ch'i Pai-Shih*. Vol. 3. Gale Research, 1998.
- Gaudemet, Jean. 'Familie' in *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* 7, cols. 1969. 286-358. (found in Rawson Marriage, Divorce and Children: 1991)
- Gay, Peter. *The Enlightenment: The Rise of Modern Paganism*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996.
- Gardner, Jane and Thomas Wiedemann. *The Roman Household: A Sourcebook*. London and New York: Routledge, 1991.
- Gratwick, A.S. *Terence: The Brothers*. Warminster: Aris & Philips Ltd, 1999.

- Grubbs, Judith Evans. *Women and the law in the Roman Empire: a sourcebook on marriage, divorce, and widowhood*. London and New York: Routledge, 2002.
- Harris, W.V. *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.
- Hallett, Judith. P. *Fathers and Daughters in Roman Society: Women and the Elite Family*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Helmbold, William Clark. *Plutarch: Moralia*. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1939.
- Hooper, Finley. *Roman Realities*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1979.
- Hope, Valerie in "A Roof Over the Dead: Communal Tombs and Family Structure" in R. Laurence and A. Wallace-Hadrill (eds.), *Domestic Space in the Roman World.*" *Journal of Roman Archaeology Supplement* 22 (Portsmouth, RI, 1997), 69-88.
- Hornblower, Simon, and Antony Spawforth. *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press , 1996.
- Horsfall, Nicholas. *Cornelius Nepos. A selection including the lives of Cato and Atticus*. Translated with introductions and Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Hunter, Richard L. *The New Comedy of Ancient Greece and Rome*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Kiley, Mark Christopher. *Prayer from Alexander to Constantine: A Critical Anthology*. London: Routledge, 1977.
- Kluge, Sofie. "A Hermaphrodite? Lope de Vega and the Controversy of Tragicomedy." *Comparative Drama*. Volume 41, Number 3, (2007) 297-333.
- Leigh, Matthew. *Comedy and the Rise of Rome*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Lewis, Charlton T. *A Latin Dictionary*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879.
- Lewis, Sian. *Ancient Tyranny*. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2006.
- Lord, Carnes. "Aristotle, Menander, and the Adelphoe of Terence." *Transactions of the American Philological Association*. Volume 107 (1977) 183-202.
- Marrou, H.I. *A History of Education in Antiquity*. Translated by George Lamb. London: Sheed and Ward Ltd., 1956.

- Marshall, C.W. *The Stagecraft and Performance of Roman Comedy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Martin, R.H. *Terence Adelphoe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- McDonnell, Myles Anthony. *Roman manliness: Virtus and the Roman Republic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Morgan, Lewis H. *Ancient Society*. London: Macmillan & Company, 1877.
- Miles, Gary. B. *Livy: reconstructing early Rome*. New York: Cornell University, 1995.
- Mellor, Ronald. *The Roman historians*. London: Routledge, 1999.
- Nybakken, Oscar E. "Humanitas Romana" *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, Vol. 70 (1939). 396-413.
- Perrin, Bernadotte. *Plutarch: Lives*. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1914.
- Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: The Rise of Modern Paganism* New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995.
- Rawson, Beryl. *Children and Childhood in Roman Italy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Rawson, Beryl. *Marriage, Divorce, and Children in Ancient Rome*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.
- Rawson, Beryl. *The Family in Ancient Rome: New Perspectives*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1986.
- Sachs, Joe. *Nichomachean Ethics*. Plymouth: Focus Publishing, 2002.
- Saller, Richard. *Patriarchy, property and death in the Roman family*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Saller, Richard. "Patria Potestas and the stereotype of the Roman family." *Continuity and Change* (1986), 5-20.
- Saller, Richard and Brent Shaw. "Tombstones and Roman family relations." soldiers, civilians and slaves," *Journal of Roman Studies* 74 (1984) 124-56.
- Scott, S.P. *The Civil Law including Twelve Tables, The Institutes of Gaius, The Rules of Ulpian, The Opinions of Paulus, The Enactments of Justinian, and The Constitutions of Leo*. New York: AMS Press Inc., 1973.
- Scott-Kilvert, Ian. *Makers of Rome: Nine Lives by Plutarch*. England: Penguin Books, 1967.

- Sreedharan, E. *A Textbook of Historiography 500 BC to AD 2000*. New Delhi : Orient Longman Private Limited, 2004.
- Shelton, Jo-Ann. *As the Romans Did: A Source Book in Roman Social History*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Shaw, Brent. "Raising and Killing Children: Two Roman Myths." *Mnemosyne*, Volume 54, Number 1, 2001.
- Treggiari, Susan. *Roman Marriage: Iusti Coniuges From the Time of Cicero to the Time of Ulpian*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Veyne, Paul. *A History of Private Life: From Pagan Rome to Byzantium*. Ariès Phillippe (ed) Cambridge: Harvard/Belknap, 1990.
- Wagenvoort, Hendrik. *Pietas: selected studies in Roman religion*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1980.
- Ward, Allen, Fritz M. Heichelheim and Cedric A. Yeo. *A History of the Roman People*. New Jersey: Pearson Education Ltd., 1962.
- Warmington, E.H. *Remains of Old Latin Vol. 3 Lucilius and The Twelve Tables*. London: Harvard University Press, 1938.
- Webster, T.L. *Studies in Menander*. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1960.

---

<sup>i</sup> Arist. 4.6.9. Loeb Page 239 says that "He that disapproves of everything is therefore surly."

<sup>ii</sup> Aristotle does not have an exact Greek word for this ideal mean, which translates better in English as friendliness; however, he says it closely resembles *phila*. The definition of emotions given in *Rhetoric* for "friendly feelings" and *Nicomachean Ethics* Book 8

<sup>iii</sup> Arist. N.E. 1155b18-21 = friendship resembles each other – reciprocal affection, wishing well, and awareness (1155a5) Each of the three types has a goal: What is good, pleasant, and useful. (1155b18-21)

<sup>ii</sup> Aristotle does not have an exact Greek word for this ideal mean, which translates better in English as friendliness; however, he says it closely resembles *phila*. The definition of emotions given in *Rhetoric* for "friendly feelings" and *Nicomachean Ethics* Book 8

<sup>iii</sup> Arist. N.E. 1155b18-21 = friendship resembles each other – reciprocal affection, wishing well, and awareness (1155a5) Each of the three types has a goal: What is good, pleasant, and useful. (1155b18-21)

---

<sup>iv</sup> HellenoLatinikonLexikon page 55.

<[http://ia600402.us.archive.org/30/items/HellenoLatinikonLexikon/dictionnaire\\_grec\\_latin.pdf](http://ia600402.us.archive.org/30/items/HellenoLatinikonLexikon/dictionnaire_grec_latin.pdf)>

<sup>v</sup> The deficient vice *aorgēsia* would be found in people won't defend them selves. They would lack spirit, and be considered foolish and servile.

Aristotle *N.E.* IV.v.5-7. Trans by: H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library. page 231. "The defect, on the other hand, call it a sort of Lack of Spirit or what not, is blamed ; since those who do not get angry in the right manner, at the right time, and with the right people. It is thought that they do not feel or resent an injury, and that if a man is never angry, he will never stand up for himself; and it is considered servile to put up with an insult to oneself or suffer one's friends to be insulted."